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Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’S Democratic Dimension

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Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’S Democratic Dimension Road to Sibiu #EURoad2Sibiu Building on the Spitzenkandidaten Model Bolstering Europe’s Democratic Dimension February 2017 What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the potential to be reproduced and What is now widely referred innovation. Critics have questioned its impact on the strengthened, with clear to as the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ institutional balance of the EU, expressing concerns democratic benefits for process was over a politicisation of the European Commission, the Union. born in unique circumstances. After six years and challenging the extent to which the process of financial and economic crisis that transformed the truly addresses contemporary challenges in the EU’s European landscape and left many Europeans deeply democratic dimension. concerned about their future and that of their children, faith in the European project and in its ability to foster In the run-up to the May 2019 elections, the debate a long-term return to growth and upwards convergence over the Spitzenkandidaten innovation has been among all Member States was severely dented. The reignited, garnering support across the European percentage of citizens with a positive view of the institutions and the Member States. Most recently the EU was on a downward slope, falling from 48% in Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar and Croatian Prime September 2006 to 35% in September 2014. Minister Andrej Plenković endorsed the innovation in separate speeches delivered to the European Parliament The need for reinvention was clear. Faced with on 17 January and 6 February 2018 respectively. unprecedented criticism, European leaders recognised that extracting the EU from the crisis would not be What started out as an experiment in 2014, has the enough to win back the hearts and minds of European potential to be reproduced and strengthened, with clear citizens, and that a renewed effort was needed to democratic benefits for the Union, confirming it asthe strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European right choice for a Europe which is not afraid of House. And among the different options to achieve this, discussing its fundamentals. the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ idea stood out both as having reached sufficient institutional and political maturity, ‘If you want to strengthen European and as holding the promise of instilling a stronger democratic ferment at the heart of the EU system. democracy, then you cannot reverse the small democratic progress seen Introducing a visibility contest for the top with the creation of lead candidates – executive job in the European Union, with lead “Spitzenkandidaten.” I would like the candidates competing for the post through campaigns experience to be repeated.’ – European across the EU, rather than through the meanders of the political process, was not an uncontroversial Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union address, 13 September 2017. Disclaimer The #EURoad2Sibiu Series is part of an ongoing project by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) to intellectually accompany the work of the European institutions in setting out a path for the future of the EU at 27 in the run-up to the Leaders’ Summit in Sibiu in May 2019. The Series will shed light on a number of initiatives that were identified as priorities in European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union address and/or have been included on the Leader’s Agenda. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. 1 The Spitzenkandidaten model: Box 1. The EU has travelled far: part and parcel of the EU’s Treaty evolutions leading up to the institutional development Spitzenkandidaten model The European Parliament first gained a say in the The European Union has been through more than two procedure to appoint the Commission with the Treaty decades of dynamic institutional development. It has of Maastricht in 1992, which stipulated that the embarked on new projects, such as the Economic and nomination by the governments was to take place Monetary Union; enlarged to twenty-eight members; by common accord after consulting the Parliament. created new structures and streamlined its decision- But this was not extended to the selection of the making. The need and desire to deepen the EU’s President.2 Only with the Treaty of Amsterdam, in legitimacy has closely accompanied these endeavours, 1997, did the Parliament gain the right to approve fuelled by a perceived ‘democratic deficit’ that the candidate for the post of Commission President, dominated debates about the future of Europe in the prior to the approval of the entire College.3 The Treaty 2000s. Attempts to bridge the gap between decision- of Nice then modified the appointment procedure makers and citizens were therefore prominent on the in the European Council, moving from unanimity to EU’s political agenda. qualified majority. In accordance with the EU’s system of ‘dual Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon decisively legitimation’, set out in Article 10 of the Treaty on the , European Union (TEU), citizens are represented both strengthened the role of the Parliament empowering it to elect the candidate, rather than directly through the European Parliament, and indirectly merely approving him or her. Specifically, through their own governments, working together in the Article Council and in the European Council. 17 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union states that a candidate for President of the Far from being a one- European Commission is proposed by the European Yet, while the EU has acquired new off event, it reflected Council to the European Parliament, ‘taking into functions, its democratic mandate a long-term trend in account the elections to the European Parliament had not grown accordingly. In the EU’s institutional and after having held the appropriate consultations’. fact, it was the desire to breathe new development. The candidate is elected by the European Parliament political life and energy into the EU’s by a majority of its component members. legitimisation process that led to the launching of the Spitzenkandidaten experiment in 2014. Although conceived in a relatively short time, the Spitzenkandidaten approach was in effect both a result, as well as an integral part Figure 1: Citizens say stronger role for of the process of EU reform. Far from being a one- European Parliament in designating off event,it reflected a long-term trend in the EU’s institutional development. It was also a logical Commission President is democratic progress consequence of the entry into force of the Treaty of ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the Lisbon, which specified that the outcome of the elections following statement: the election of the President and the European Commission as a whole by the to the European Parliament needs to be taken account European Parliament based on the result of the when proposing candidates for President of the European European elections represents significant progress for Commission (Box 1). The Treaty of Lisbon also established democracy within the EU?’ a closer link between citizens and the democratic life of the EU, stating that Members of the European Parliament are Total ‘Agree’ Total ‘Disagree’ explicitly ‘representatives of the Union’s citizens ’. 19% Don’t know The development was met with a strong endorsement from citizens. In a 2014 survey, 63 percent of respondents agreed with a statement that 18% ‘the election of the President of the Commission taking 63% into account the results of the European elections represented significant progress for democracy within the EU’, whereas only 18 percent disagreed.1 The development was Source: European Parliament, 2014 met with a strong endorsement from citizens. 2 For the first time in the history of the European Union,10 History as it unfolded: the five parties decided to elect their ‘lead candidate’, whilst two declined to do so – the Alliance of European 2014 Spitzenkandidaten Conservatives and Reformists,11 and the European experience Alliance for Freedom.12 The Treaty of Lisbon did not explicitly require European Martin Schulz, then President of the European political parties to identify ‘lead candidates’ in advance Parliament was selected in November 2013 to represent of the European Parliament elections. However, this idea the Party of European Socialists. Guy Verhofstadt had been brewing for a number of years (Box 2), and was selected to represent the Alliance of Liberals the combined effect of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and Democrats, while Ska Keller and José Bové and political readiness helped the Spitzenkandidaten represented the European Green Party, and Alexis idea to reach maturity in the run-up to the 2014 Tsipras the Party of the European Left. Finally, in European Parliament elections. March 2014 and less than three months before the elections, Jean-Claude Juncker emerged as the lead candidate for the European People’s Party during the Box 2. The gestation of an idea: its Convention in Dublin, where he received 382 of how the Spitzenkandidaten 627 votes cast. Michel Barnier, the other contender for concept emerged the role and the then French European Commissioner in charge of financial services, received 245 votes. A The story of the Spitzenkandidaten process goes third candidate – former Latvian Prime Minister Valdis back to at least 1997, when a general convention Dombrovskis – had withdrawn his candidacy before the of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) poll took place, on 5 March 2015, choosing to endorse party endorsed the idea of putting forward a ‘top candidate Juncker instead.13 candidate’ in the European elections who would go on to become President of the European The hope was that the process would help European Commission, should the party win the elections. The political parties to convey their propositions more clearly idea of a lead candidate was also picked up by think to the electorate, and raise interest among citizens as tanks at the time – most notably in a petition from their votes played into the process of selecting a new 4 the Jacques Delors Notre Europe Institute in 1998.
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