DOCSLIB.ORG

CHRIST Is R IS£H

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

SECOND CLASS POSTAGE PAID AT LINDEN, NJ AND OTHER MAILING ADDRESSES NO.7 CARPATHO-RUS, ALLENTOWN.N.J. MARCH3l,2000 VOL. LXXIII Translated from one of our old 1930s calendars. CHRIST Is RIS£H In Our Native Land This happened last year, in one of our Galician villages. With bright sunshine and bright happiness, spring appeared in Peter Zarechny's home. I don't want to write about this happiness, because as a rule it is not possible to describe happiness exactly, and also I would have to get inside Peter's soul to understand this happiness as he understood it. Orphaned from childhood, he had wandered around in foreign lands. He had spent some time in Prussia and in America, searching for his fortune. But nowhere could he find this fortune. He was never destitute, never hungry, and yet something was always lacking. He was hard working, so he never knew any great want. Nevertheless, he always had this overwhelming dream of familiar: happiness, not out there somewhere among foreigners but right here in his native land, among his own people, on the banks of a mountain brook, in a cherry orchard, under a thatched roof. That is what he thought of as his fortune. f) L.urdIlluffKing, p.s II fll()rto!illl1n,!)'iJu w!I ill Ule /Olllb willi That is how he saw himself in the days of his Your icdj;, lIS yod'; !foil m>~ on tile ulirt!tIiI!f rsli.fiIlg.l"IMm childhood, living with his good parents. How well from &OlTIJption (InatUs1To!llil# tkutJi. 701I11T~ tIle !Pu.Jsov.:r 0/ they lived or if they were happy, he did not know I'KQ1TlII'tilJn Imd Ule -;fair/a/ion 0/ Ule 'J-J.1Jr/J. nor did he dwell on it much. He knew only that he himself lived very well then. He went to school and The Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church In of eternal life by your Resurrection." And studied, and after school he herded geese outside America through the darkness of this world we each came the village. He gazed on this simple peasant life forward with our candles to take light from the with his child's eyes, and he liked it very much. PASCHA paschal light of the risen Christ. Making our Then, suddenly, Heaven willed that he lose both his procession together into Church again and again, To the Vendrable Hierarchs, Clergy and Faithful of father and his mother in the same year. we joyously discover that: "As giving life, as the Orthodox Church in America more splendid than paradise, and more radiant His older brother took over the homestead, than any royal chamber, your tomb 0 Christ, is Dearly Beloved in Christ: and he himself went to work as a shepherd for the the fountain of our Resurrection!" local pastor. He continued going to the village We are struck by the exuberant words of school, and his life with the priest was not bad at Then tasting of the fountain of immortality, the paschal homily of St. John Chrysostom - by all. He moved up from shepherd to wagon master, we sing our festal shout to the God who has given the all-embracing generosity with which he, on and since he was a well behaved lad he stayed us light: "0 Christ! Great and most Holy behalf of Christ, invites all to partake of the Paschal with his pastor for ten whole years! When the old Paschal 0 Wisdom, Word, and Power of God! Joy. For surely, even as all have failed - some reverend closed his eyes in eternal sleep, Peter Grant that we may more perfectly partake of more, others less - St. John echoes the glorious went to Prussia and then to America. Since he you in the never-ending day of your Kingdom!" gift we have been given in the feast of Pascha: was a hard worker, he managed to save some "And of His fullness we have all received, and What we have received in this sacred money, always with the notion of returning to his grace for grace" (IN 1:16). pascha is not ritual, but life! Then let us, as native village, claiming his share from his brother, followers of the risen· Christ, walk always, not as buying some more land, building a new house, Each of us is invited to partake of the children of darkness, but as children of the light getting married, and raising a family. fullness of this joy and enter into the feast of the and chikten of the day. Let us witness to this light Resurrection. Let us therefore receive the words of which overcomes the darkness of sin and death. And he had managed to do all that the :grace shining forth: from the lips of the Golden­ Even as we share the joys and blessings of the previous spring. He had married the prettiest girl in Mouthed like a "beacon enlightening the paschal night that fills all things with light, let us be the village, and she might even have been the universe" and "with rejoicing enter Into the Joy a joy and blessing to one another, bearing lights, richest! He had completed his military service, had of our Lord, - for Christ is Risen!" lighting the way for others~ Having taken light from fulfilled his obligations, and could now live the Ught that is never overtaken by darkness, "let peacefully and happily. This entrance begins with the baptism with your light so shine before men, that they may which we have been baptized and the cup from see your good works, and glorify your Father And now this spring gave promise of a which we drink - proclaiming Christ's death and Who Is In Heaven': (MT 5:16) good year. His crops were all planted and in good confessing Christ's resurrection. As we entered CHRIST IS RISEN! INDEED HE IS RISEN! shape, his orchards were blooming, and his dear into the holy passion of Christ, we sang on Palm With love in Christ, Sunday, ''When we were buried with you in Continued on Page 4, Column I / ~. baptism, 0 Christ God, we were made worthy Metropolitan THEODOSIUS and members of the Holy Synod Lr ~ PAGE 2 CARP ATHO--RUS FRIDA Y ,MARCH 31. 2000 An interesting in-depth analysis of the Soviet Union as a federation of "equal, sovereign discredit him by the Party apparat and other climatic events that began in 1985 in the former Soviet republics." contenders for the post merely served to Soviet Union up to the present day. This is the one To most, this program looked like a sure strengthen his image as the hounded sufferer for hundred first installment of the story from Moscow formula for another edition of zastoy, or Brezhnev­ the truth and for people's happiness. But the Party News. type stagnation, its mothball odor was too strong: was not giving up. Ryzhkov was actually proposing socialist recipes Not long before the voting day, on June 10, The Crash of an Empire Which, in the people's experience, had failed Pravda published an article'by three (more or less) dismally and continued to fail all around them. distinguished scholars based on an analysis of A Colloquial Chronicle, Russia, 1985-1991, Part In simple terms, the people had had more than 70 of Yeltsin's speeches and his 101. enough of Ryzhkov's SOcialism, with its empty shop autobiography Confessions on a Given Theme. counters, and were prepared to gamble on an The descriptiorT of Yeltsin's character that emerged Election of Peasant Czar uncertain future into which Yeltsin was luring them. from this analYSis was far from flattering-and On a gray, slushy, miserable day I was But then I may be exaggerating the importance of uncomfortably close to the truth. standing at a bus stop waiting for a bus that might these rational considerations: It may simply be that His mental processes were said 1:0 be never come, when I heard some of the other the people ~st didn't like Ryzhkov, who was too marked by the dominant stereotype of looking out sufferers in the small crowd mumble words that closely ass~ated with Gorbachev and the Party­ for enemies responsible for his personal failures; a made a big cold toad stir in the pit of my stomach: their hea~ went out to the man who so tough style of decision making; and the prevalence "Yeltsin ... accident...accident my fooL."1 moved dramatically- one might say histrionically, was of the emotional sphere over the rational one, of closer to the mumblers and soon got the full story: fighting agalilst those evil forces of the past. emotions over logic (a "feminine" type _of Yeltsin's car had been involved in an accident The fielding of Vadim Bakatin, a former character), and of tactical vision over strategic. downtown, right on Tverskaya. Yeltsin himself was provincial fi"t secretary and KGB head who, on Yeltsin's communication skills came in for in hospital badly smashed up, not expected to live, very slim ~dence, enjoyed the reputation of a even harsher criticism: The scholars commented but here someone objected-no, that was not true, liberal, was J;)bviously a Gorbachev ruse to split the on his -poor lexicon, long-winded, jumbled he only had concussion and a thigh injured, to democratic ;vote. Bakatin was much slicker than sentences that led nowhere, tongue-tied ramblings which another rejoined gloomily, Vsyo ravno ne Yeltsin the boll in a china shop and might appeal to with frequent "parasite" words like his trademark, uspokoyatsya, poka ne udelayut ('~II the same the less imp.
Recommended publications
  • Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: a Comparison

    Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: a Comparison

    WELFARE REFORMS IN POST-SOVIET STATES: A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL BENEFITS REFORM IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN by ELENA MALTSEVA A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Elena Maltseva (2012) Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan Elena Maltseva Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto (2012) Abstract: Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skillful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives.
  • Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation

    Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation

    Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation J. MICHAEL WALLER "They write I'm the mafia's godfather. It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state." -Otari Kvantrishvili, Moscow organized crime leader.l "Criminals Nave already conquered the heights of the state-with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia group." -Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin.2 Introduction As the United States and Russia launch a Great Crusade against organized crime, questions emerge not only about the nature of joint cooperation, but about the nature of organized crime itself. In addition to narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and racketecring, Russian organized crime poses an even greater danger: the theft and t:rafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To date, most of the discussion of organized crime based in Russia and other former Soviet republics has emphasized the need to combat conven- tional-style gangsters and high-tech terrorists. These forms of criminals are a pressing danger in and of themselves, but the problem is far more profound. Organized crime-and the rarnpant corruption that helps it flourish-presents a threat not only to the security of reforms in Russia, but to the United States as well. The need for cooperation is real. The question is, Who is there in Russia that the United States can find as an effective partner? "Superpower of Crime" One of the greatest mistakes the West can make in working with former Soviet republics to fight organized crime is to fall into the trap of mirror- imaging.
  • Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

    Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

    Russia • Military / Security Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No. 5 PRINGLE At its peak, the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) was the largest HISTORICAL secret police and espionage organization in the world. It became so influential DICTIONARY OF in Soviet politics that several of its directors moved on to become premiers of the Soviet Union. In fact, Russian president Vladimir V. Putin is a former head of the KGB. The GRU (Glavnoe Razvedvitelnoe Upravleniye) is the principal intelligence unit of the Russian armed forces, having been established in 1920 by Leon Trotsky during the Russian civil war. It was the first subordinate to the KGB, and although the KGB broke up with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the GRU remains intact, cohesive, highly efficient, and with far greater resources than its civilian counterparts. & The KGB and GRU are just two of the many Russian and Soviet intelli- gence agencies covered in Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence. Through a list of acronyms and abbreviations, a chronology, an introductory HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF essay, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries, a clear picture of this subject is presented. Entries also cover Russian and Soviet leaders, leading intelligence and security officers, the Lenin and Stalin purges, the gulag, and noted espionage cases. INTELLIGENCE Robert W. Pringle is a former foreign service officer and intelligence analyst RUSSIAN with a lifelong interest in Russian security. He has served as a diplomat and intelligence professional in Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. For orders and information please contact the publisher && SOVIET Scarecrow Press, Inc.
  • The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 1) Introduction

    The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 1) Introduction

    IntroductionKramer SPECIAL ISSUE: The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 1) Introduction ✣ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was remarkable because it occurred so suddenly and with so little violence, especially in Russia itself. Even now, more than a decade after the fact, the abrupt and largely peaceful end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seems nearly miraculous. History offers no previous instances in which revolutionary polit- ical and social change of this magnitude transpired with almost no violence. When large, multiethnic empires disintegrated in the past, their demise usu- ally came after extensive warfare and bloodshed.1 As late as mid-August 1991, just before an attempted coup d’état in Moscow, few if any observers expected that the Soviet Communist regime—and the Soviet state as a whole—would simply dissolve in a nonviolent manner. Many long-standing Western theo- ries of revolution and political change will have to be revised to take account of the largely peaceful upheavals that culminated in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Despite the enormous signiªcance of the Soviet collapse, Western schol- ars have not yet adequately explained why and how it occurred. Although a plethora of articles and books on the subject have been published over the past eleven years, the cumulative results of this research have been modest.2 The basic chronology of events from 1985 through 1991 is well-known, but the details of many crucial episodes (such as the failed coup of August 1991) are as murky as ever. There has not yet been a systematic, in-depth assessment 1.
  • The Kgb's Image-Building Under

    The Kgb's Image-Building Under

    SPREADING THE WORD: THE KGB’S IMAGE-BUILDING UNDER GORBACHEV by Jeff Trimble The Joan Shorenstein Center PRESS ■ POLI TICS Discussion Paper D-24 February 1997 ■ PUBLIC POLICY ■ Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government INTRODUCTION The KGB, under many different sets of graduate student at the Pushkin Russian Lan- initials, evokes frightening memories of the guage Institute in Moscow during the 1979-80 Soviet period of Russian history. A garrison academic year, later as Moscow correspondent state within a state, it provided the terror that for U.S. News & World Report from 1986 to glued the Soviet Union into a unitary force for 1991, Trimble observed the changes not just in evil. Few bucked the system, and dissent was the old KGB but in the old Soviet Union and, in limited, for the most part, to whispers over this paper, based on his own research, he ex- dinner or under the sheets. Millions were herded plains their significance. At a time in American into the communist version of concentration life when we seem to be largely indifferent to the camps, or transported to Siberia, or simply rest of the world, we are indebted to Trimble for executed for crimes no more serious than having his reminder that the past is not too far removed the wrong economic or ideological pedigree. from the present. The KGB, by its brutal behavior, came to be The question lurking between the lines is identified throughout the world with the Soviet whether the changes in image are in fact system of government. When the system, with changes in substance as well.
  • RC 56 00.Qxd

    RC 56 00.Qxd

    Center for Social and Economic Research CASE Reports Russia: Political and Institutional Determinants of Economic Reforms Marek Dabrowski, ed. (CASE) Vladimir Mau (IET) Konstantin Yanovskiy (IET) Irina Sinicina (CASE) Rafal Antczak (CASE) Sergei Zhavoronkov (IET) Alexei Shapovalov (CASE) No. 56/2004 Moscow – Warsaw, March 2004 The views and opinions expressed here reflect the author(s) point of view and not necessarily those of the CASE. Country Study carried out under the GDN global research project on 'Understanding Reform'. Key words: economic reforms, transition, Russia, reform sequencing, political reforms, institutional reforms, political economy. Review by José María Fanelli, PhD © CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw 2004 Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury DTP: CeDeWu Sp. z o.o. ISSN 1506-1647, ISBN: 83-7178-336-1 Publisher: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research 12 Sienkiewicza, 00-944 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (48 22) 622 66 27, 828 61 33, fax: (48 22) 828 60 69 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.case.com.pl Contents List of Tables and Figures . 5 1. Introduction . 9 2. History of the Soviet/Russian political and economic reforms 1985-2002 . 14 2.1. The end of the communist 'economic miracle' . 14 2.2. The destabilizing effects of the 'Perestroika' period 1985-1991 . 16 2.3. 'Revolutionary' period of reforms, end of 1991-1994. 18 2.4. The fragile and illusory stabilization of 1995-1998 . 22 2.5. Post-crisis period (1999-2003) . 24 2.6. The overall record and list of unresolved problems. 25 Appendix 2.1. The Main Reform Events and Players, 1990-2003 .
  • The Criminal Time Bomb: an Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafia on the Newly Independent State of the Ormerf Soviet Union

    The Criminal Time Bomb: an Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafia on the Newly Independent State of the Ormerf Soviet Union

    Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 9 Fall 1996 The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafia on the Newly Independent State of the ormerF Soviet Union Peter Daniel DiPaola Indiana University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation DiPaola, Peter Daniel (1996) "The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafia on the Newly Independent State of the Former Soviet Union," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol4/iss1/9 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union PETER DANIEL DIPAOLA" INTRODUCTION In 1989, the Western world celebrated the apparent triumph of democracy and capitalism over communism. Overnight, the "evil empire"' became a potential partner. In fact, some Western thinkers were so overcome that Francis Fukuyama maintained the fall of communism signaled "the end of history."2 Unfortunately, the optimistic predictions of 1989 have not come to pass. The Russian economy has responded slowly to reform.3 Communists and ultranationalists are regaining strength in the Russian government." More ominously, organized crime is threatening to overwhelm Russian politics, economics, and society.
  • Russian Politics and Society, Fourth Edition

    Russian Politics and Society, Fourth Edition

    Russian Politics and Society Having been fully revised and updated to reflect the considerable changes in Russia over the last decade, the fourth edition of this classic text builds on the strengths of the previous editions to provide a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis on Russian politics and society. In this edition, Richard Sakwa seeks to evaluate the evidence in a balanced and informed way, denying simplistic assumptions about the inevitable failure of the democratic exper- iment in Russia while avoiding facile generalisations on the inevitable triumph of global integration and democratisation. New to this edition: • Extended coverage of electoral laws, party development and regional politics • New chapter on the ‘phoney democracy’ period, 1991–3 • Historical evaluation of Yeltsin’s leadership • Full coverage of Putin’s presidency • Discussion of the development of civil society and the problems of democratic consolidation • Latest developments in the Chechnya conflict • More on foreign policy issues such as Russia’s relationship with NATO and the EU after enlargement, Russia’s relations with other post-Soviet states and the problem of competing ‘near abroads’ for Russia and the West • The re-introduction of the Russian constitution as an appendix • An updated select bibliography • More focus on the challenges facing Russia in the twenty-first century Written in an accessible and lively style, this book is packed with detailed information on the central debates and issues in Russia’s difficult transformation. This makes it the best available textbook on the subject and essential reading for all those concerned with the fate of Russia, and with the future of international society.
  • Glasnost in Jeopardy Glasnost in Jeopardy

    Glasnost in Jeopardy Glasnost in Jeopardy

    GLASNOST IN JEOPARDY Human Rights in the USSR April 1991 A Helsinki Watch Report 485 Fifth Avenue 1522 K Street, NW, #910 New York, NY 10017 Washington, DC 20005 Tel (212) 972-8400 Tel (202) 371-6592 Fax (212) 972-0905 Fax (202) 371-0124 Copyright 8 March 1991 by Human Rights Watch All Rights Reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN 0-929692-89-6 Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 91-71495 Cover Design by Deborah Thomas The Helsinki Watch Committee Helsinki Watch was formed in 1978 to monitor and promote observance of domestic and international compliance with the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Chairman is Robert L. Bernstein; Vice Chairs, Jonathan Fanton and Alice Henkin; Executive Director, Jeri Laber; Deputy Director, Lois Whitman; Washington Representative, Catherine Cosman; Staff Counsel, Holly Cartner and Theodore Zang, Jr.; Staff Consultant, Ivana Nizich; Orville Schell Intern, Robert Kushen; Intern, Jemima Stratford; Associates, Sarai Brachman, Mia Nitchun, and Elisabeth Socolow. Helsinki Watch is affiliated with the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, which is based in Vienna. Human Rights Watch Helsinki Watch is a component of Human Rights Watch, which includes Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Africa Watch, and Middle East Watch. The Chairman is Robert L. Bernstein and the Vice Chairman is Adrian W. DeWind. Aryeh Neier is Executive Director; Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director; Holly J. Burkhalter, Washington Director; Susan Osnos, Press Director. Executive Directors Africa Watch, Rakiya Omaar; Americas Watch, Juan Mendez; Asia Watch, Sidney R. Jones; Helsinki Watch, Jeri Laber; Middle East Watch, Andrew Whitley.
  • The Electoral System of the Russian Federation

    The Electoral System of the Russian Federation

    The original of this publication was published as the research commissioned by the Policy Department for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament within a framework contract with IRIS. The original version was published separately by the EP (Policy Department for External Policies) in 2011 (number PE 433.688). Copyrights belong to the European Parliament April 2011 THE EU-RUSSIA CENTRE REVIEW The electoral system of the Russian Federation Issue Seventeen CONTENTS Executive summary 4 Introduction 6 Background 6 The evolution of electoral law 7 Roles of legislative and executive branches 9 The Federal Assembly 9 Presidential powers 9 Elections under each President 10 The Yeltsin years 10 New constitution – President versus Parliament 10 Development of political parties under Yeltsin 11 The first three legislative elections 11 Presidential elections 1991 – 1996 13 International Reactions 13 Assessment of the Yeltsin period 15 The Putin years 16 Rise of United Russia 16 Presidential Elections 2000 - 2004 17 Changes during Putin‘s presidency 17 Control of the Media 18 International reactions 18 Assessment of Putin‘s presidency 21 Medvedev‘s Presidency 21 Modernisation Strategy 22 Electoral changes under Medvedev 22 Recent developments 23 Assessment of Medvedev‘s presidency 23 Political parties and electoral support 23 2 Russia‘s party system 23 Law on political parties 23 Funding of parties 24 Role of parties 25 Voter turnout 27 Voter attitudes 28 On political opposition 28 On electoral rules 28 On a personal cult of Putin 28 International reactions 28 Conclusion 29 Annex I: Presidential Election Results 1991-2008 33 Annex II: State Duma Election Results 1993-2007 35 Annex III: The Levada Centre surveys – Public Opinion 37 Bibliography 41 3 A study for the European Parliament by Professor Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College, London, member of the Advisory Board of the EU-Russia Centre1.
  • The KGB Documents and the Soviet Collapse: Part II

    The KGB Documents and the Soviet Collapse: Part II

    The KGB Documents and the Soviet Collapse : Part II Victor Yasmann, American Foreign Policy Council Vladislav Zubo k The National Council for Eurasian and East European Researc h 910 17th Street, N.W . Suite 300 Washington, D .C. 20006 TITLE VIII PROGRAM Project Information : * Contractor : American Foreign Policy Council Principal Investigator : Victor J. Yasmann & Vladislav Zubo k Council Contract Number : 813-1 5 Date : November 2, 1998 Copyright Information Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER) . However, NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, i n written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements eithe r (a) for NCEEER's own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows : (1 ) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individual s to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with th e Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the publi c access to documents held by the United States Government . Neither NCEEER nor the United State s Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale . * The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Counci l for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U .S.
  • The SVR Russia's Intelligence Service

    The SVR Russia's Intelligence Service

    Conflict Studies Research Centre C103 Table of Contents After the PGU 2 Primakov's Ideal Job 5 Saving the SVR 6 The Downsizing 7 Survive & Impress 8 The SVR's Legal Basis 9 The New Areas of Interest 10 The CIS 10 The Main Opponent & Its Allies 12 After Primakov 15 The Tasks 16 Training New Agents 17 The New SVR 18 The Future 19 1 C103 The SVR Russia’s Intelligence Service Gordon Bennett There are friendly states but there are no friendly intelligence services After the PGU The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the disappearance of the most powerful security organisation ever created - the KGB. The KGB’s omnipresence in the USSR and its extensive network abroad was the result of the Soviet leadership's determination to control the population inside the USSR, and until the mid 1980s, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, to propel its version of communism as far and as wide as was politically, militarily and financially feasible. The KGB was the sword and shield of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its occasional Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a research organisation forced sometimes to produce analysis which had nothing to do with its statutory mission and which appropriate institutes in Moscow could have done better1. The political need to pamper the KGB translated well into almost unlimited funds, facilities, the ability to place KGB personnel in any Soviet organisation, inside or abroad and job offers no other organisation could match2. Its foreign intelligence gathering and processing body was known as the PGU, the Russian acronym for the First Chief Directorate.