VOLUME XXI 1996 Number 1 LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

1 IO°W 8°W

LIBERIA 8 °N- -8 °N

MONSERRADO

MA R GIB! 6 °N- -6 °N RIVER

MARYLAND

Geography Department 10 8 °W 1 University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown 1

Published by THE LIBERIAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, INC

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Editorial Policy

The Liberian Studies Journal is dedicated to the publication of original research on social, political, economic, scientific, and other issues about Liberia or with implications for Liberia. Opinions of contributors to the Journal do not necessarily reflect the policy of the organizations they represent or the Liberian Studies Association, publishers of the Journal.

Manuscript Requirements

Manuscripts submitted for publication should not exceed 25 typewritten, double -spaced pages, with margins of one - and-a -half inches. The page limit includes graphs, references, tables and appendices. Authors may, in addition to their manuscripts, submit a computer disk of their work with information about the word processing program used, i.e., WordPerfect, Microsoft Word, etc. Notes and references should be placed at the end of the text with headings (e.g. Notes; References). Notes, if any, should precede the references. The Journal is published in June and December. Deadline for the first issue is February, and for the second, August.

Manuscripts should include a title page that provides the title of the text, author's name, address, phone number, and affiliation. All research work will be reviewed by anonymous referees.

Manuscripts are accepted in English and French.

Manuscripts must conform to the editorial style of the latest edition of A Manual of Style (University of Chicago Press).

All manuscripts submitted for consideration should be mailed to C. William Allen, Editor Liberian Studies Journal -Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature University of South Carolina Spartanburg, SC 29303

All book reviews should be mailed to:

Augustine Konneh, Book Review Editor Liberian Studies Journal History Department Morehouse College 830 Westview Drive, S.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30314

Cover map: compiled by William Kory, cartography work by Jodie Molnar; Geography Department, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.

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LIBERIAN STUDIES JOURNAL

Editor C. William Allen University of South Carolina at Spartanburg

Associate Editor Similih M. Cordor Florida Community College

Book Review Editor Augustine Konneh Morehouse College EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Bertha B. Azango Warren L. d'Azevedo University of Liberia University of Nevada Reno

Christopher Clapham Thomas E. Hayden Lancaster University Society of African Missions

Svend E. Holsoe Corann Okorodudu University of Delaware Rowan College of New Jersey

D. Elwood Dunn M. Alpha Bah The University of the South College of Charleston

Momo K. Rogers Yekutiel Gershoni Middle Tennessee State University Tel Aviv University

Lawrence B. Breitborde Romeo E. Phillips Knox College Kalamazoo College

Henrique F. Tokpa Cuttington University College Edited at the Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature, i University of South Carolina at Spartanburg.

4 The editors and Advisory Board gratefully acknowledge the contributions of The University of South Carolina in the production of the Journal. PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompressor CONTENTS

THE LIBERIAN PRESS UNDER MILITARY RULE By Momo K. Rogers, Sr. 7

HISTORY REPEATED? THE LIBERIA- SIERRA LEONE BORDER, 1905 AND 1991 By Yekutiel Gershoni 33

TOWARD CULTURAL PLURALISM IN EDUCATION By Sakui W.G. Malakpa 50

BOOK REVIEWS

Sankawulo, Wilton. The Rain and the Night. London: Macmillian Education Ltd., 1979. By Robert H. Brown 72

Korte, Werner. ETHNISCHE TRADITION und MILITARISCHE INTERVENTION in AFRIKA: Essay uber den Putsch von 1980 in Liberia. Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 1995. By Dougbeh C. Nyan 86

RECENT PUBLICATIONS AND THESES 90

NEWS AND NOTES 93

DOCUMENTS 104

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE 167

A referee journal that emphasizes the social sciences and humanities, the Liberian Studies Journal is a semiannual publication devoted to studies of Africa's oldest republic. The annual subscription rate is $30.00, $15.00 for students and $45.00 for institutions, and includes membership in the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. All manuscripts and related matters should be addressed to The Editor, Liberian Studies Journal, Division of Fine Arts, Languages and Literature, The University of South Carolina at Spartanburg, 800 University Way, Spartanburg, SC 29303. Subscriptions and other business matters should be directed to The Secretary- Treasurer, Liberian Studies Association, Albany State College, P.O. Box 31222, Albany, Georgia 31795 -2791. Copyright 1995 by the Liberian Studies Association, Inc. ISSN 0024 1989

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In the previous issue of the Journal, we expressed a cautious and guarded optimism that peace was about to return to Liberia given the material difference between the Abuja Accord of August 19, 1995, and the other twelve peace agreements that preceded it. We were wrong.

As we prepared to go to press, Liberia had virtually fallen into anarchy with the escalation of violence which started April 6, 1996, when the safe haven status of Monrovia was shattered, and warring factions began another orgy of fighting and destruction.

The Liberian Studies Association maintains its stance not to take a political position of any kind, but to remain an impartial, scholarly organization. This editor is committed to, and believes in that basic principle on which the LSA was founded. However, history will not forgive us if we remain passive observers in the ghastly drama unfolding in Liberia. In this connection, we, as a scholarly organization whose primary purview is Liberia, must endeavor to document the situation as objectively as is humanly possible. Our News and Notes section in this issue is dedicated exclusively to providing a timeline of some of the major events affecting Liberia since April 6. Our Document section also provides the text of some of the key documents emanating from individuals, organizations and governments that relate to the most recent developments in Liberia.

Also in this issue, Momo Rogers has given us a good synopsis of the role of the press in the transition to democratic governance in his article, "The Liberian Press Under Military Rule. In view of the fact that the civil war in Liberia spilled over into neighboring Sierra Leone, Yekutiel Gershoni's article, "History Repeated? The Liberia - Sierra Leone Border, 1905 and 1991," is very timely, and resurrects a historical problem with a

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI,1 (1996) 5

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contemporary twist. Sakui Malakpa deals with yet another very important issue in his article, "Toward Cultural Pluralism in Education." Robert Brown has given us a critical but fair review of Wilton Sankawulo's novel, The Rain and the Night. We are also grateful to Dougbeh Nyan for his review of Werner Korte's book, ETHNISCHE TRADITION und MILITARISCHE INTERVENTION in AFRIKA: Essay uber den Putsch von 1980 in Liberia. The book, written in German, translates thus: ETHNIC TRADITIONAND MILITARYINTERVENTION IN AFRICA: Essay About the Coup of 1980 in Liberia, but you already knew that!

The editorial advisory board wishes to extend our thanks and appreciation to Alfred Konuwa who leaves his post as book review editor after several years of distinguish service. It was with great reluctance that we accepted his resignation. However, we have been very fortunate that the person filling the spot, Augustine Konneh, brings a record of scholastic distinction with him to the Board. We wish Alfred the best in his personal and professional lives as he continues to make contributions to the Journal and the LSA, and we welcome Gus and wish him success in his new post.

It has been confirmed by the President of LSA, Walter Wiles, that the 29th Annual Meeting of LSA will take place at Prairie View A&M University in Prairie View, Texas next year. Our host will be Massaia "Prince" Reffell, who is Assistant Professor in the Department of Engineering Technology in the College of Engineering & Architecture. There will be more detail on the conference as information becomes available.

We wish to acknowledge, with thanks, all those who have made, and continue to make contributions to the Journal by submitting material for publication, reviewing material, and providing valuable, sometimes critical, suggestions on how we can improve our publication.

Thanks. The Editor.

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The Liberian Press Under Military Rule

Momo K. Rogers, Sr.

Introduction

Liberia's first republic ended on April 12, 1980, when 17 noncommissioned officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia staged a military takeover that ousted the (William R.) Tolbert government. The change in government seemed to have been welcomed nationwide as long overdue. The young army officers said they had undertaken the coup to liberate and redeem the Liberian people from over 100 years of repressive rule by the True Whig Party, which was founded by journalist- turned -president Edward J. Roye. Roye had used his newspaper, the True Whig, to win the presidency in 1869. Roye's victory ushered in the True Whig Party, of which Tolbert was the last standard bearer.

The young army officers, led by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, may not have been aware of the fact that the ruling party they ousted was started by a journalist; nonetheless, they promised unprecedented freedom for the Liberian people, including freedom of the press. Their popular uprising had so galvanized the country that even the dormant press came to life. But, in less than five years, the symbiotic relationship between the press and the People's Redemption Council (PRC), as the young army officers dubbed their government, strained to the breaking point as the newly- energized press began to flex its muscle.

But first, there was the period of the honeymoon. Few days after the takeover, the weekly newspaper, Focus, edited and published by O. Eugene

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1 (1996)

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Shaw, spoke for most of the media. Under the headline, "Press Freedom At Last!" the article reported the first encounter between journalists and the newly appointed Minister of Information, Cultural Affairs, Tourism and Broadcasting, Mr. Gabriel Nimely:'

In a terse voice Minister Nimely announced that the press was being granted full freedom to report and inform without any painting, flowering and /or dressing. "Accurate and objective reporting is what we expect of the press," he said, "but you are wholly and solely responsible for what you write."

The article went on to note that this was "the news they (journalists) have been waiting and praying to hear for years." Perhaps because of the euphoria of the change in government, some of the journalists present at the press conference may not have realized that that same message had been given to other journalists in the past, especially that part about being "wholly and solely responsible for what you write," [My emphasis]. This statement can be found in the article of the Liberian Constitution that guarantees press freedom and it has been used by past administrations. So, if this was the "news" they were waiting for, it was stale news. However, what was new or news in Minister Nimely's statement came later in the same article when it reported that "The young minister declared the days for false praises and misrepresentation of facts to the public are gone. A change in direction in the method of reporting is now essential, he observed, adding, the press -must present the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in a straightforward and objective manner." To this end, the writer of the above article ended by interpreting what was considered a challenge thrown to journalists by the new government:2

Publishers, editors and reporters in the city (Monrovia) would do well to take advantage of this newly granted freedom to show Liberians in particular, and the world

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in general, that their (sic) does exist in this country media men and women capable of assuming the responsibility to adequately serve the public in their chosen profession.

Blossoming Newspapers

The first step taken towards that challenge by journalists to adequately serve the public was the proliferating appearance of newspapers. For example, during the period 1980 to 1990, when the PRC and its successor, the military-turned -civilian government of President Samuel K. Doe, ruled the country, over 35 publications appeared. Of these, 30 were supposedly privately -owned newspapers, of which eight were exclusively devoted to sports news. The remaining publications included one student -run paper, three magazines, three professional journals, and one government -run paper.3 Unfortunately, most of these publications were poorly edited and short-lived as many inexperienced journalists decided overnight to become newspaper publishers.

Nevertheless, majority of the privately -owned newspapers tended to demonstrate some degree of editorial independence, although a few were said to be clandestinely subsidized by some officials in the Doe government and some leaders of opposition parties. However, three of these newspapers stood out as truly independent and did exercise their new -found freedom, although at a price. They were the Daily Observer, Footprints Today, and Sun Times.

Short Honeymoon

The honeymoon between the press and the military government lasted only for a little over one year. In fact, the ten-year reign of President Doe's military- turned -civilian government can be characterized as the worst period of government -media relations, surpassing even the repressive Tubman

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regime that lasted 27 years beginning in 1944. Tubman's assault on Liberia's independent press began in 1955 with the so- called Plot that Failed. The press -government relationship under Doe was clouded by several attempts of the government to muzzle the press. These included the closure of newspapers, summary imprisonment of journalists, harassment of journalists, regulatory edicts, judicial actions, and an actual and unprecedented presidential sanctioning of the murder of a journalist.

In the beginning, like the article in Focus, the PRC government received favorable press. Official pronouncements were reported in praiseworthy fashions, especially those emphasizing the government's commitment to press freedom and other civil liberties. Between April 12, 1980, and the first newspaper closure, several government officials reiterated Minister Nimely's assertion of press freedom, but each time with some words of caution. The contradictory nature of these statements, while on the one hand assuring journalists of guaranteed press freedom, and on the other hand warning them to be responsible journalists, soon exposed the falsehood of the so- called symbiotic relationship that seemed to exist between the PRC and the press.

In April 1981, Justice Minister Chea Cheapoo was reported to have said that the government had "no intention of imposing censorship on the Liberian press," but warned that in revolutionary Liberia, "the PRC Government expects journalists to be factual and objective in their reports." The warning continued by noting that if a newspaper failed to present balanced reports to the public, "it would die a natural death." While he did not say how exactly this "natural death" would occur, the limitation on press freedom was implied when he added that "it must be understood that the right to freely express opinions is not absolute ... freedom of the press, therefore, must be exercised in respect of limitations imposed by law." 4

A month later, Col. Gray D. Allison, who had replaced Nimely as Information Minister, proposed to the government the setting up of a

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committee to work towards repealing all press laws that were considered oppressive. Speaking on the topic, "Freedom of the Press in Revolutionary Liberia," Minister Allison reaffirmed the PRC's commitment to press freedom, and cautioned that "journalists must adhere to the `element' of

credibility . He noted that sensational, reckless and irresponsible journalism would not be tolerated by government, and added, "freedom does not give news organs the right to engage in practices unacceptable to national interest."'

Four months later, contradiction in government policy on press freedom surfaced again when Minister Allison called a press conference to address media representatives. The lead paragraph of the story was reported in one newspaper as follows:6

Fears of press censorship gripped many Liberian journalists and public relations officers yesterday as they met at the Ministry of Information to receive a directive from the Minister, Lt. Col. Gray D. Allison, giving the Ministry the mandate to edit all releases and announcements by or about Government or its agencies.

This time, however, the journalists did not take the directive without questioning its validity. The article continued: "The Minister was asked how the government intended to fight corruption, if the press had to bring all such stories to him for scrutiny. He replied, "We are not talking about corruption; we said government policies that affect the lives of the people." A heated discussion, bordering on a "dramatic encounter" ensued between the Minister and journalists present. "One journalist told the Minister that the memorandum represented an attempt to curtail the freedom of speech which the PRC Government came into being to protect." The article went on: "Many argued that the Minister had placed the blame for conflicting

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information and expressions in government where it did not belong -- in the lap of the press. They contended that the problem was not with the press, but with the government officials themselves," [opt cit].

The uproar made by the journalists, published and broadcast widely, may have embarrassed the government, as, the next day, it was widely reported that Major General J. Nicholas Podier, the vice head of state, had emphasized that "press freedom should never be muffled in revolutionary Liberia." The article noted that "Major- General Podier, who is also Co- Chairman of the PRC, made this statement in sharp reaction to a memorandum issued Tuesday by Information Minister Gray D. Allison, which attempted to make the Information Ministry the "clearing house" for the dissemination of all government information in the country."' While the press release from Podier's office was critical of Minister Allison's directive, it nevertheless appealed to "local and foreign journalists in the country to be responsible, objective and factual in their reporting of events in Liberia." It was not long after that that the government concluded that, in fact, journalists were being "irresponsible" and that something had to be done about it. We will discuss some of the actions taken by the government later when we focus on various regulatory actions proposed by the Ministry of Information.

Then Came the Daily Observer

Newspapers that appeared prior to the coup were generally sycophantic in their coverage, poorly edited, and hardly newsy. After the coup, these papers existed for a while, being careful not to offend the new government. The noteworthy ones were the Sunday Express and the Bemol Times, edited by John F. Scotland, and The Liberia Inaugural and The Sunday People, edited by D. Syqueh Pyne Draper, Jr.' Soon to overshadow these papers would be the Daily Observer which first appeared in Monrovia on Feb. 16, 1981, published by veteran journalist Kenneth Y. Best, who became Managing Director of the Liberian Observer Corporation.

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Edited by the well -known journalist, Rufus M. Darpoh, the first issue clearly signaled a change in news coverage when its front page dealt with stories that seemed to be taboos during the Tubman and Tolbert eras. The three articles on the front page were headlined, "Firestone Studying Doe's Ultimatum," which dealt with the uneasy relations between government and the dominant multinational corporation; "West Point Dwellers Are Angry," which dealt with criticism of the government's National Housing Authority for insensitivity to the deteriorating conditions at West Point, a slum area in Monrovia; and "200 More Port Workers Dismissed," which revealed anti -labor actions being taken by management of the National Port Authority, a semi- autonomous agency of the government. Taking together, these stories gave the kind of reportage that was in line with Minister Nimely's message to "tell the truth, and nothing but the truth." The only problem was that the PRC officials did not believe journalists would take them on their words.

In fact, the Observer's debut editorial, titled "Putting Fear Behind Us," did just that. It was a clear signal that in Liberian journalism, business as usual would be a thing of the past. The editorial started off by thanking God for "the dream of so many Liberians --of an independent daily newspaper in our country. The next few paragraphs set the tone for the kind of journalistic practices everyone should have expected from both the publisher and editor of the paper:9

"AS WE BEGIN this venture, we enter into a contract with ourselves, our people and country to uphold truth, justice and freedom for all through the highest standards of journalism. We believe that a free press and responsible press are the safest guarantee of democracy and one of the most effective vehicles of political, economic and social progress.

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"WE STAND FOR freedom, justice, equality and fair -play. As a molder of public opinion, this newspaper stands ready to applaud any individual or institution, public or private, that says or does something which we deem to be in the public interest. By the same token, we also stand ready to criticize those whose statements, actions and attitudes are repugnant to good government and detrimental to the public good.

"THOSE WHO ARE attacked or accused by anyone in this newspaper will have the right to reply.

"IN TERMS OF ideology, we stand for the highest interests of our people, our country and Africa. We will support whatever we believe is good for Liberia, Africa and mankind.

"WE ARE DETERMINED to rise to the challenge of producing a high-quality paper which will bring the the news from all parts of our country to all of our people --a paper of which all Liberians everywhere can truly be proud."

And it did not take long before majority of the Liberian people began to hail the Observer as the people's paper. But it did not take long either for the PRC government to realize that this paper would be the proverbial "torn in its flesh." Speaking directly to the new military government, the editorial had this to say:

"GREAT REVOLUTIONARIES THROUGHOUT history ventured out in the face of the most difficult circumstances. Many risked, even gave

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their lives for the cause in which they believed.

"WHEN MASTER SERGEANT Doe and his daring colleagues set out on the historic night of April 11, 1980, they were prepared for the very worst for the Tolbert government had promised `ruthless' reprisals against the forces of opposition."

The editorial then went on to address what it termed the "sycophancy" of the Liberian people:

"LIBERIANS HAVE ALWAYS been obsessed with their personal survival. Too many of us have spent too much time protecting our own lives and possessions, without any regard whatsoever for principles. Too few of us have dared to take risks in favor of truth and justice.

"TOO MANY OF us have been easy prey to expediency and sycophancy, deluding ourselves with the frivolous excuse that 'the time is not ripe.' In short, too many of us have been too selfish.

The editorial then addressed the question of the status and role of the Liberian press in the so- called revolutionary period that had been ushered in by the April 12 coup:

"A FREE PRESS has an important and critical role in the realization of a true Liberian revolution.

"FOR NEARLY 60 years this country has lacked a free press. In a perennial attempt to keep itself in power, the repressive True Whig Party consistently

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blocked the development of democratic institutions in Liberia. It employed various means to do this, including fear, intimidation and outright persecution.

"THE TIME HAS come to break with the tradition of fear, complacency and defeatism, which have become the ingredients of our national character. Liberia and Liberians must become more fearless, more courageous more aggressive and more hopeful."

The editorial was well received amidst the euphoria of the so- called revolution that had swept the country. But soon, the publisher and staff of the Observer, like their colleagues operating other newspapers that took such independent views, would pay dearly for their convictions. And, paying most dearly would be the Observer itself which, between 1981 and 1990, was shut down by the Doe government almost once a year. Like the revolutionaries they spoke of in the editorial, their independence brought about many "risks," too; yet, in the tradition of earlier (at least 60 years earlier) Liberian newspapers, the Observer stood up gallantly to the military government. On one occasion, the Board of Directors of the Liberian Observer Corporation, publishing company of the newspaper, even threatened openly to sue the government, communicating with the Minister of Justice with "a claim for damages for wrongful closure."' Each time the government relented and allowed it to reopen, the paper started off where it left off, showing no sign of repentance as the government would have liked to see.

Newspaper Closure

Although least expected by the public, it was no surprise to observers of government -press relations that the first newspaper to be closed down by the PRC government would be the Daily Observer. From its birth,

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the Observer became embroiled in a love -hate relationship with the young military government. At first, with everyone caught up in the euphoria of the year-old Liberian revolution, the paper's coverage and editorials on national affairs were upbeat and mostly pro -PRC. However, in less than a year, the efficacy of the relationship, almost taken for granted in the beginning, was rudely tested when an unnamed PRC government official chided and derided both Best and Darpoh for "irresponsible journalism" and imposed a fine on the paper for publishing an article deemed unfavorable to the government. The official further had three expatriate members of the editorial staff deported." From then on, love was replaced by suspicion and growing hatred, with both sides literally taking off their gloves. Subsequently, in less than 10 years of the Observer's existence, the government shut it down over five times. In addition, there was a mysterious fire that damaged its building. The fire was allegedly blamed on thugs sympathetic to the government. No investigation was undertaken to confirm or deny the arson allegation.'

Momolu Sirleafs Unprecedented Action

In its off-and -on relations with the media, particularly the Observer which it had tried unsuccessfully to tame, the government was not prepared for the entrance on the journalistic scene of the independent Footprints Today, which made its debut in March 1984. The paper, published by lawyer- turned -publisher Momolu V. Sackor Sirleaf, and first edited by C. William Allen, became an overnight competitor to the Observer, thus providing two enterprising newspapers for the government to keep track of. In fact, whenever the Observer was shut down by the government, Footprints adequately took up the slack.

Although it was never officially shut down, in less than six months after its inception, both Sirleaf and sports editor Klon Hinneh were arrested and summarily detained without charge on August 1, 1984, for a front -page article with the headline, "Malpractices at Public Works," that appeared in their paper of that date? Ironically, the article was not really that critical of

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government. It was essentially a "relay of a complaint made to the National Security Agency, and that agency's reaction and recommendations to the complaint." Their imprisonment seemed to arouse the interest of many in the community, including a group of Liberian businessmen. The group, the Liberian Business Caucus, petitioned the government for their release, noting strongly that "as there has been no formal charge brought against the paper's publisher and his sports editor, they (the businessmen) can only assume that the action was taken against the two men without official endorsement, as it constitutes flagrant violation of Mr. Sirleafs and Mr. Hinneh's basic human rights" and thus (was) a "clear and convincing attestation to the expressed principles of government." Soon afterwards, the two journalists were released by the government.

Rather than being thankful to the government for their release as journalists in the past did, Sirleaf, who was also president of Footprints Enterprises, decided in 1985 to file a lawsuit against the government for their "false imprisonment." Accordingly, the July 16, 1985 issue of Footprints carried an article affirming that Sirleaf and Hinneh had sued the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Dr. J. Bernard Blamo, and the director of the National Security Agency, Mr. Sylvester Moses. That same day, Sirleaf and Hinneh were again arrested by agents of the Police Intelligence Unit on the orders of Justice Minister Jenkins K.Z.B. Scott, on charges of "breach of security and criminal malevolence."' The paper, however, continued to appear as pressure mounted from several quarters for the release of Sirleaf and Hinneh. The government, however, took its own time, first making them appeared before the Special Military Tribunal rather than a civilian court, and then ending their ordeal abruptly with an executive clemency after they had spent 55 days in detention at the notorious military post stockade in Monrovia.

Darpoh Goes to Belle Yella

Even more unconscionable than what happened to the Footprints

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editors was the arrest in 1984 of Mr. Rufus M. Darpoh and his subsequent detention at the Belle Yella military detention camp about 300 miles outside Monrovia. Darpoh, a veteran journalist, was arrested based on unfounded charges by the security forces that he was author of several unfriendly, byline -less articles that appeared in foreign publications. It is widely believed that one of these articles that was critical of the First Lady, Nancy B. Doe, and appeared in a newspaper in neighboring Sierra Leone, may have been the proverbial last straw that prompted the security forces to find a scapegoat for the anonymous publications. Darpoh spent six months in the camp, a place reserved only for hardened prisoners, and only accessible by small aircrafts and foot, before he was released due to intense national and international pressure.15l s

Darpoh, who first became involved in journalism in the early 1960s, had several battle scars to show over the years, from his days as a reporter on The Liberian Star (1964 -1974) to his uneasy return to the Ministry of Information (where he had begun his career when it was the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs) as editor of the New Liberian (1978 -1979, and again in 1980), and as the first editor of the Daily Observer in 1981. In 1985, he joined Mr Silvester Grisby, President of the Sunrise Group, and ventured into the arena of publishing the daily newspaper, the SunTimes, and a sister Saturday paper, The Sun. Mr. Grisby at the time was in government, serving in the office of Samuel Doe as Deputy Minister of State for Presidential Affairs in charge International Cooperation. Because of Mr. Grisby's ties to Samuel Doe, there were some questions raised as to the true independence of the Sunrise Group. However, the credibility of the newspapers was salvaged because Mr. Darpoh was at the editorial helm. Still not fully forgiven by the government for his early involvement with the Observer, Darpoh's paper was closely watched, and when it published the article, "Baccus Matthews Escapes Death," followed by an editorial that asked whether the incident was a planned attempt by unnamed individuals to eliminate this presidential opposition leader, the SunTimes ran afoul of the infamous (PRC) Decree 88A and the government quickly ordered the paper

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to be closed. Darpoh had hoped to publish the weekly Sun, but members of the Press Union of Liberia discouraged him after a few issues, fearing he may be arrested again.16

Non -Political Interference?

Besides jailing journalists, another tactic used by the government was the verbal and physical harassment of journalists. First, it started subtly, through speeches from several government officials, telling journalists that their responsibilities should be to the revolution. These speeches were followed by visits of the top leadership (including President Doe) to several newspaper offices, and finally, it became overt, with outright police and security manhandling of journalists.

Between 1980 and 1989, pronouncements were often made about the government's commitment to press freedom, although in each instance an underlying warning was given that journalists must practice "responsible journalism," defined in an April 1981 speech by Information Minister Lt. Col. Gray D. Allison as the need for "journalists to be mindful of the freedom of the individual as well as the freedom of the government. "l' He emphasized in the speech delivered during a reception he hosted for foreign journalists that to ensure that these "freedoms" are not violated by the press, he would not hesitate to "advocate non -political interference in the affairs of the press."

Without defining what "non- political interference" was, Minister Allison noted that "the dissemination of information must be carried out unbiased to effectively contribute to national development." In other words, as long as reporting contributed to the success of the government's policies and programs, journalists had nothing to fear (a frame of reference typical of past information ministers). It was not surprising, therefore, that other information ministers after Allison would add their own sense of what it is they defined as "non- political interference."

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Information Ministry's Actions and Press Reactions

In 1986, Information Minister Dr. S. Momolu Getaweh, himself once a journalist, observed that "since the ushering in of the multi -party system of government ... the biggest news items reported by some newspapers had been what some opposition leaders think and say." He then went on to caution the press "to guard against sensational and negative reporting of events in the country," charging specifically that "some so- called journalists even go to the extent of blackmailing public officials for the sake of financial gain and warned that the press must do away with this. "18 The Standard newspaper replied in a front -page commentary that Minister Getaweh "should commend the independent press for the stories he is complaining about, because they have helped the government to know the thinking and the plans of the opposition." The paper also called on the Press Union of Liberia "to shake itself and challenge the Honorable Minister to come out with evidence instead of allowing the Minister to make general statements of disrepute against journalists in the country.

In 1987, Information Minister J. Emmanuel Bowier issued a directive, effective Nov. 1, requiring all individuals engaged in the collection and dissemination of information in Liberia to carry accreditation cards. The Executive Committee of the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) immediately reacted by declaring that "it views the accreditation of journalists by the Ministry of Information as a form of licensing and therefore regards it as unacceptable. "20 The Committee's statement, read by PUL president Lamini Waritay, noted that "accrediting journalists presents a form of restraint that will have a chilling effect on journalists, and is therefore incompatible with Article 15 of the new constitution."

Physical Harassment

By the mid- 1980s, most journalists had not bought into the government's line of thinking, and such uncooperative journalists began to

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feel the physical, intimidating power of the government. On occasions, some journalists were physically barred from covering certain events, including court cases. Examples of physical violence against journalists abound: in 1981, a PRC member ordered the public flogging of the radio manager of the government -owned station ELBC;21 in 1986, police and government thugs attacked reporters and photographers, manhandling photojournalist Gregory Stemm of the Daily Star and Arthur James of the SunTimes, and searching and seizing the press bag of Dan Brown, chief news editor of radio station ELWA;22 and, in 1987, James Momoh, a photojournalist working for The Mirror newspaper was reportedly beaten by two plain clothes police officers (members of the CID) because they (CID Agents) suspected him of having certain things in his bag, particularly money. Momoh had just come out of the Ministry of Finance area."'"23

The level of physical violence had increased so much that by 1986, the Press Union of Liberia issued a press release in which it registered "its concern over the constant harassment and intimidation of journalists by the state security in the discharge of their (the journalists') professional duties. "24

Attempted Press Restrictions and Decree 88A

Operating from and by military decrees, the Doe government applied the same modus operandi to the press by promulgating several regulatory directives, including the infamous Decree 88A, bordering on outright censorship. The first such directive to indicate how the government wanted the press to operate was the statement mentioned earlier in which Information Minister Allison told journalists that the Ministry of Information would serve as a virtual "clearinghouse." In essence, this was the main thrust of the directive:25

With the Executive Mansion as the only exception, all releases and announcements from government Ministries and Agencies

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must first be approved by the Ministry of Information before they are broadcast on radio or published in the newspaper; Releases announcements on and about any Government Ministry or Agency taken directly to the media (Radio & Newspaper), must be rejected and sent back to the Ministry of Information for scrutiny before being publicly released."

It was reported that when journalists questioned his authority to give out such a directive, Allison "found himself constrained to assure the startled pressmen that his move, which, he said, had the approval of the Head of State, was not aimed at censoring the press." The wording of the directive, however, was not limited to just information released by government agencies as it purported, but obligated all media outlets to be responsible for information gotten from sources other than the ministry, as noted at the end of the above directive. Essentially, if journalists were to carry out the directive, it meant that they had to be their own "censors," not merely self-censors, but government censors. If accepted, it was meant to be the death of independent journalism in Liberia.

Perhaps the most far -reaching attempt to restrict both free speech and press freedom came in the form of Decree 88A, promulgated on July 21, 1984. The decree conferred sweeping powers on the security forces "to arrest and detain any person found spreading rumors, lies, and misinformation against any government official or individual either by word of mouth, writing or by public broadcast. "26 Under this "sword of Damocles," journalists continued to exert their independence, although always at a price to their individual freedoms and the survival of their media institutions. In 1986, after months of criticism, the decree was amended slightly,27 but it was never repealed until 1990 when civil war engulfed the country and the Doe government was overthrown.

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Such attempts to censor the press, although denied by the government, would surface from time to time in different forms. Examples have already been given above, but only one of these attempts was challenged successfully in the courts. It was the 1986 attempt by Information Minister Dr. Momolu Getaweh to impose a fine on a newspaper for "false publication," an action better left to the purview of the courts rather than with the executive branch of government. Minister Getaweh had fined The Standard newspaper $1,000 for publishing a story that the Ministry of Information proved to be false. Based on this investigation, Minister Getaweh ordered that if the fine was not paid within a given time, the paper should be banned until it paid the fine."'

Rather than paying the fine to avoid closure, Chea Cheapoo, a lawyer and former Justice Minister himself, who was also the publisher of the newspaper, sought a "restraining order" from the Supreme Court against the Minister's order, noting that the action of Minister Getaweh was "illegal" and the fine imposed "without due process of law." Supreme Court Justice J. Patrick Biddle, emerging from close -door discussions with both parties, told journalists that "a restraining order would be issued against the Minister to stay his banning order." The decision was based on the fact that "Decree 46, which established the Ministry of Information, does not give the Minister the power to punish or to impose fines. "29

Like other such restrictions, many editors and reporters became concerned that their newly found freedom would be taken away. As one unnamed newspaper proprietor remarked after the decision, "The Minister's action scares us. We never knew he had the power to fine, which means he has the power to destroy."'

National Communications Policy

In August 1989, the Government of Liberia enacted a national communication policy "that would (supposedly) regulate and safeguard

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Liberia's sovereignty in changing communications technologies."' The act also created a National Communications Commission (NCC) with a secretariat at the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, to be headed by an executive director. The NCC was created:

To regulate and devise policies to govern the creation and operation of all electronic and print media in Liberia;

To coordinate and enforce all communications policies and regulations within the country;

To appraise and review the programs and activities of all media institutions in the country;

To impose fines and revoke licenses of media institutions, decisions of which shall be subject to appeal to the circuit court.32

In an attempt at window dressing, the government included in the commission's membership -- the Press Union of Liberia, the National Bar Association, two members of the Legislature, heads of security institutions, among others. The commission was to be chaired by two cabinet members from the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication. It is worth noting that the heads of both of these ministries at the time, J. Emmanuel Bowier and Morris Dukuly, respectively, cronies of Doe, were the authors of the Legislative Act. The act sparked critical debate in the public and was challenged by opposition parties and the Press Union. On September 4, 1989, the Daily Observer published a story that the Press Union of Liberia had announced that it would not associate itself with the commission or become a member because it "is clearly aimed at subjecting the local media to unnecessary regulation and censorship" (Observer, p. 10).33

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In September, 1995, the Justice and Peace Commission of the National Catholic Secretariat organized a symposium to discuss the act with the view of having it amended or repealed "to the extent that it infringes upon press freedom and freedom of speech....i34 It is further interesting to note that the Justice and Peace Commission also held discussions on the matter with Morris Dukuly, Speaker of the Transitional Legislature, who co- authored the original act while serving as Doe's Minister of Post and Telecommunications. 35

The Courts and the Press

While the courts were generally a place of refuge for the press from government intimidations, beginning in 1987, the role of the courts became more uncertain as the judiciary also began to restrain the press. In October, the editors-in -chief of the Footprints Today and The Mirror replied to a citation for "Contempt of Court" filed against them by the Supreme Court,3ó in which they denied disrupting the Court by their presence; and, in November, the Probate Court Judge for Montserrado County, Harper S. Bailey, ordered journalists from several news media out of his court during hearing of a case of "criminal contempt." The judge told security officers to remove and humiliate any journalist who insisted on entering the court to cover the story.37

State -Sanctioned Murder?

The most unprecedented action taken by any Liberian government administration against a journalist was a murder which occurred soon after the aborted November 12, 1985 coup directed against President Doe's regime by his former PRC colleague, former Commanding General Thomas Quiwonkpa. After Doe forces regained the radio station and other strategic places, a witch -hunt was ordered to punish anyone associated with the attempted coup, including those who may have shown any elation for its success (and thanks to a video camera, many were captured on tape,

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rejoicing). One of those who would suffer the most from this retaliation was broadcast journalist Charles Gbeyon, who was news director of the government -owned Liberian Broadcasting System (LBS). Apparently, when the rebels took over the radio and television stations, Gbeyon, who was on duty that day, did an interview of the rebel leader, Gen. Quiwonkpa, and may have helped the rebels broadcast their messages.

For doing his job and carrying out the command of armed men who took over the LBS building, Gbeyon would pay the ultimate price --his life. It is said that after forces loyal to President Doe regained control and routed out the rebels, Doe payed a visit to the LBS and Gbeyon, thinking he was simply doing his job, went to interview President Doe. On seeing Gbeyon, President Doe became so enraged that he ordered his security people to get the journalist out of his sight. Eyewitnesses say Gbeyon was stripped to his underpants and put in a security vehicle in Doe's motorcade. From ELBS, Doe paid a visit to the National Bank. Gbeyon was last seen alive as he sat sandwiched between two soldiers in a military jeep -- part of the motorcade- - parked outside the National Bank. What happened after that is still shrouded in secrecy as only diehard Doe loyalists were allowed on the Executive Mansion grounds in the aftermath of the aborted November 12 Quiwonkpa coup. Some said that Doe had actually ordered Gbeyon to be killed. Whatever the order was, Gbeyon was supposedly shot or bayonetted to death on the fourth floor of the Mansion and his body tossed to the ground. Nevertheless, when the news of what happened to this journalist reached a shocked nation, the official version of how he was killed differed greatly. An Executive Mansion release noted that Gbeyon, suspected to be in cohort with the rebels, was ordered detained when he got to the Mansion, but instead of giving himself in, decided to resist arrest and in the struggle with the security forces, a gun he was allegedly carrying, went off accidentally, killing him! Other than this press release, and as was traditional in matters involving actions taken by President Doe, no official inquiry was ever ordered to ascertain the true circumstances of how this journalist met his fate in the Executive Mansion.38

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The Future

As Liberia enters its Third Republic at the end of the present civil war, the institution of the press would have made great progress as it had survived during the Second Republic under the repressive military regime of President Doe. Indeed, to the credit of journalists who worked against all odds during the Doe regime, it can be said that their work has strengthened the press as an institution within the Liberian society like no other time in its history. However, the physical survival of the press and its practitioners is not sufficient to guarantee its future. Nagging problems, which have always confronted the growth and development of the press in Liberia, continue to exist today. Among them, the lack of a viable economic base to generate advertising revenue, poor working conditions and subsistent salaries for working journalists and media managers, antiquated reporting and production facilities, and an increasing number of woefully trained journalists. The very existence of the press in the future depends on rectifying these problems.

On the plus side, however, interest in, and appreciation of the media, especially the newspaper, has continued to grow, despite the impediment of a high illiteracy rate in the country. The role played by newspapers during the ten years spanning the PRC and later civilian rule of Doe, especially in recording excesses of corruption and abuses of power measured up to the seriousness with which the inaugural editorial of the Observer addressed itself, and the height to which Liberian journalists of that period took their responsibility. Today, the growing dependence of Liberians both at home and abroad on getting a wide variety of information from the various media outlets, even during this protracted civil war, attests further to the survival of the media, particularly the print media, as an institution, and also augurs well in terms of its own protection from political and legal repression in the future.

Both during the Doe government and this present state of civil

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conflict, Liberian journalists have become much more aware of their rights and have demanded in many instances that those rights not be trampled upon. In other words, as in the pre -Tubman era, journalists stood up for their rights, even when it meant long periods of imprisonment and, in some cases, death. This new sense of dignity, however, has its downside as one of the future trends this writer has noticed, and which may not be so good for the future of journalism in Liberia, is the increasing involvement of journalists in political matters. While, in the past, the press was used as a stepping stone for some journalists to enter politics, the new breed of journalists today are becoming more and more outspoken on national issues in a most partisan way. The problem is, even if these journalists do not aspire to political offices, will such outspoken journalists know when to draw the line between their personal views and their responsibility to remain objective in the coverage of national issues? This is an area that will need to be closely watched by Liberian press historians. Some might even argue that this development should become a welcomed thing if the press is truly to remain the "public's watchdog," an American press ideal adopted long ago by Liberian journalists, even if the latter did not always practice this in its full sense.

Finally, it must be noted that, with a few exceptions, coverage of events leading to the multi -party presidential elections of 1985, showed that Liberian journalists can be non -partisan. In fact, most of the partisan comments found in newspapers were relegated to columns of either commentary or editorial. However, it is not clear to this writer that the same can be said about the post -election coverage of the reportedly rigged results. This could be an area for future, content analysis study.

Endnotes

'Focus, April 20 -26, 1980, p. 1.

'Ibid., p.2

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The number of newspapers devoting exclusively to sports news was unprecedented, since, until 1981, there were not such newspapers. The interest may have been due to the active participation in football (i.e., soccer) shown by President Samuel K. Doe, who often played the game.

4New Liberian, April 24, 1981, p.1. The Justice Minister made the comments before members of the Chamber of Commerce.

'Daily Observer, May 22, 1981, p. 3.

6Daily Observer, Sept. 30, 1981, p. 1.

'Daily Observer, Oct. 1, 1981, p. 1.

8Momo K. Rogers, "Liberian Journalism, 1826 -1980: A Descriptive History," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1988), p.197 -201.

'Daily Observer, Feb. 16, 1981, p. 4. (This was the paper's debut issue, Vol. I, No. 1.)

10Footprints Today, March 29, 1985, p. 1.

"Lewis Smith, "Liberia: Muzzling the Media," Africa Report, March -April 1987, p. 58. (The first closure of the newspaper occurred in late 1981. )

12lbid., p. 60.

13Daily Observer, Aug. 6, 1981, p. 1. (The two men were arrested on Aug. 1, 1984.)

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14Footprints Today, Sept. 27, 1985, p. 10.

15Op. Cit., "Liberia: Muzzling the Media," p. 60.

16Michael Massing, "Liberian Journalists Face Bleak Future," CPJ Update September/October 1985, p.2.

"Daily Observer, April 16, 1981, p. 1.

18The Standard, Aug. 12, 1986, p. 2.

19The Standard, Aug. 12, 1986, p. 2.

20The Mirror, Oct. 26, 1987, p. 3.

'Daily Observer, Aug. 27, 1981, p. 12.

22Daily Star, Aug. 21, 1986, p.8; SunTimes, Aug. 12, 1986, p.3.

23The Mirror, Oct. 27, 1987, p. 1,6.

24The Mirror, Aug. 21, 1986, p. 6, 8.

'Daily Observer, Sept. 30, 1981, p.1, 10.

26Opt. Cit., "Liberia: Muzzling the Media," p. 59.

27Daily Star, July 28, 1986, p.1; The Standard, July 28, 1986, p. 2.

'Daily Observer, Sept. 3, 1986, p. 1, 6.

29Daily Observer, Sept. 3, 1986, p. 6.

30Daily Observer, Sept. 3, 1986, p.6.

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31 News, September 1, 1989, p.1. (cited in Kappia, Joseph S. "Developmental and Political News Coverage in the Liberian Press," unpublished masters thesis, San Jose State University, December, 1989, p. 10.)

32lbid.

33Daily Observer, September 4, 1989, p. 10; See also The Herald, August 3 -9, 1989, p. 5. (Both cited in Kappia, p. 11.)

34Nyenuh, Alphonso W. Justice and Peace Commission Newsletter, September 12, 1995, p. 3

35Ibid, 3.

36Footprints Today, October 26, 1987, p. 8.

37The Standard, Nov., 24, 1987, p.1.

38Gbeyon's death was covered widely in local papers and foreign papers, including West Africa.

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History Repeated? The Liberia -Sierra Leone Border 1905 and 1991

Yekutiel Gershoni

In April 1905, Sierra Leonean units of the West African Frontier Force, the WAFF, launched a punitive operation into Liberia. Eighty -six years later, in April 1991, units of the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces, SLAF, crossed the same border and launched an attack on several Liberian towns. During the intervening 86 years, neither the international constellation nor local politics remained the same. The colonial era had given way to the post cold -war era. What had been the colony of Sierra Leone became an independent state in 1961 and the Liberian Republic underwent a series of political changes after the 1980 military takeover. Even the nature of the border conflicts differed. In 1905, colonial British forces were chasing local chiefs who had caused disturbances in one particular region along the border. The 1991 turmoil was an extension of the Liberian civil war and it embraced a large area on both sides the border.

Yet, despite the almost century-long gap between the two incidents and the enormous change in the internal political conditions as well as the international constellation, there are some striking resemblances. The aim of this article is to discuss these similarities from a historical perspective. The first part describes the Liberia -Siena Leone border line as a source of cooperation and the events that turned the border zone into a disputed region, first in 1905 and again in 1991. The last part focuses on the way that two leaders -- President Arthur Barclay of Liberia, at the beginning of the century, and President Joseph Saidu Momoh of Sierra Leone, toward the end of the century-- handled the crises.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1, (1996)

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The Border Line as a Focus of Cooperation

In neither the 1905 nor the 1991 incidents was the border itself the cause of the disputes, even though the conflict flared -up there. In both cases the border was a major focus of close cooperation between the parties involved. In 1903, the border between the British Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone on the one hand, and The Republic of Liberia on the other, had already been demarcated -- mostly along the Mano River -- with the full agreement and cooperation of both sides. ' The demarcation constituted a turning point in the history of the relationship between Liberia and Britain. It put an end to the border dispute which had soured their friendship for almost half a century. Following the demarcation, the diplomatic bond between the two countries was strengthened with the appointment of the first British consul -general in Monrovia, Braithwaite Wallis. British economic assistance to Liberia in the form of both money and advisors followed. Liberian interest at that time dictated a rapprochement with Great Britain, since the Republic was facing constant French encroachment into its hinterland. The Liberian government believed that it had a common interest with Britain, since the French advance endangered not only Liberia's hinterland, but also the hinterland of the British colony of Sierra Leone. With a common political interest, a border line agreed on and demarcated, and British diplomatic and material support promised, there was no apparent cause for the flare -up of a violent dispute along the Sierra Leone -Liberia border.

The trust and good relations between the Colony of Sierra Leone and the Republic of Liberia at the beginning of the century persisted later between independent Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sierra Leone inherited the colonial borders which had been demarcated by the British. Neither Liberia nor Sierra Leone raised any demand to redefine the border line. On the contrary, they made the border a symbol of cooperation and friendly relations. On 3 October 1973, President Siaka Steven of Sierra Leone and President William Tolbert of Liberia signed the Mano River Declaration

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establishing the Mano River Union (MRU) with the aim of promoting the two countries' "economic growth, social progress and cultural advancement through active collaboration and mutual assistance in various fields. "2 The MRU, based on the border line between the two countries, became a vehicle for regional cooperation when Guinea joined in October 1980.

The governments in Freetown and Monrovia respected the border line and regarded its demarcation in 1903 as the peaceful conclusion to the border dispute, and in 1973 as a source for cooperation. Their complacency was not shared by discontented groups, or "rebels." In the early part of the century, bands of Kissi warriors situated in the region of Kanre Lahun crossed into Sierra Leone and attacked Britain' s African subjects. In the latter part of the century, fighters headed by Foday Sabanoh Sankor, backed and supported by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), attacked villages and towns in the border zone. In both cases the "rebel" activities seriously destabilized what had previously been a fairly stable region. These activities had repercussions well beyond the border zone.

Features of the Disturbances

The Kissi unrest was a result of a power conflict within the Luawa chiefdom that was complicated after Paramount Chief Kailondo's death in April 1895. The presence of British and French colonial troops in the region intensified the already existing conflict. The various contenders to inherit the chiefdom tried to gain power by attacking one another and by allying themselves with either Britain or France.' The conflict went unresolved and was prolonged into the twentieth century by Kissi chiefs who ignored the border line and carried on attacks back and forth along the border, destabilizing the region. Their attacks were marked by a high level of brutality -- plundering villages and slaughtering their inhabitants -- and were dictated by traditional Kissi rules of warfare which including taking captives as slaves. For example, in 1905, Kissi warriors led by Chief Kafura entered

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the hinterland of Sierra Leone from the French zone, and plundered and destroyed 23 villages. These warriors killed, or captured and enslaved several hundred persons, forcing African farmers to flee their homes.'

The British and the Liberian governments decided to take action to pacify the destabilized border zone. Liberia, without a standing army of her own, had to rely on the British. In March 1905, President Arthur Barclay permitted a British military operation in Liberian territory on condition that Britain had no territorial rights there. With Barclay's permission, Sierra Leone contingents of the WAFF crossed the border into the Kanre Lahun District with the declared aim of launching a punitive operation against the Kissi "rebels ".5

The British punitive expedition was not able to overcome the Kissi and the border zone remained unstable.' This situation provided fertile ground for external intervention. The Governor General of French West Africa, Ernest Roume, believing that Liberia did not have any future as a sovereign state, took advantage of the disturbance along the Sierra Leone-Liberian border and, had already in 1904, ordered his colonial troops in Guinea to advance into the Liberian hinterland up to the Makona River.' Liberia, with only a small militia to protect its territory, opened negotiations with Paris in an attempt to find a diplomatic solution. However, Mr. Roume shunned that diplomatic gesture and, taking advantage of Liberia' s military weakness, ordered the French colonial troops to push further into the Liberian hinterland.'

Several features characterize the disturbances along the Sierra Leone -Liberian border in the beginning of the century: The conflict was internal and unrelated to the border line; there was a high degree of brutality; warrior traditions were used; the Sierra Leone military reaction was supported by Liberia; the turbulence in the border region was exploited by a third party.

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History Repeated?

Those same features characterize the border disturbances that broke out toward the end of the century. In 1991, the destabilization of the border zone was also the result of an internal conflict rather than a border dispute; this time, between the NPFL and the Liberian government. Charles Taylor, the head of the NPFL, like the Kissi chiefs at the turn of the century, ignored the international border line and backed Sankoh's encroachment into the Sierra Leone hinterland.

The 1991 encroachment into Sierra Leone territory was characterized by a high degree of brutality. According to newspaper reports, 60 merchants in the area were decapitated. Lebanese residents were kidnaped, and six of them battered to death.9 Obviously, such atrocities can be found in virtually any war since, by definition, violence can be considered an expression of deep, atavistic emotions common to all peoples and times. What makes these two situations so similar, however, is the use of African traditional modes of warfare, which evidently had never been eradicated. Sankoh's warriors were said to use a young naked woman who was rendered invisible by walking backwards with a mirror to see where she was going, for the purpose of planting charms in the enemy camps to cause their defeat.10 NPFL fighters who fought along with Sankoh were in the habit of wearing women's dresses, bras and wigs. This cross -dressing was a common practice among traditional warriors in various ethnic groups in Liberia."

The 1991 military reaction to the "rebel" attack and the Liberian political response seemed to repeat events that had taken place along the same border zone 86 year earlier. In 1991, SLAF units crossed the border in their operation against Sankoh's fighters who attacked villages and towns in Sierra Leone. In neither 1905 nor 1991 were Liberian government troops involved in the clashes, and in both cases, the Liberian government pledged full support for the Sierra Leone military operations. Edward Kessely, the then Liberian interim Defense Minister, said in April 1991 that the military

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actions taken by the SLAF on Liberian soil against what he called "thug, looters, rapists and murderers" were justified on the ground that Sierra Leone had the right to protect its territory and citizens. Kessely, in a way reminiscent of President Arthur Barclay, declared his confidence that the neighboring state had no territorial ambitions.12

In the colonial period, turbulence in the border zone provided fertile ground for intervention by the French. In 1991, turbulence in the border zone attracted Libyan intervention. Libya was drawn to the region also by the political vacuum that was created when the superpowers withdrew from West Africa at the end of the cold war. Although the Libyan intervention was not carried out directly and in public, as the French intervention had been, it was no less dangerous. It was Libya that trained and equipped the military forces led by Taylor and Sankoh. Sankoh's units overcame the small, ill- trained and ill- equipped Sierra Leone army and, with relative ease, occupied the main road between Liberia and Sierra Leone, crossed the Mano River Bridge, and took control of the strategic town of Zimmi, where they established their headquarters. From there, Sankoh continued his advance toward the Sierra Leone -Guinea border and, in April 1991, made his presence felt in four districts of Sierra Leone, comprising one -third of the country.13

The fact that the border line was not the source of conflict; the high degree of brutality; the use of traditional warfare; the Sierra Leone military reaction and the Liberian political support; and the exploitation of the turbulence by a third party -- were not the only features common to events at the beginning and at the end of the century. Also similar were the reactions to the conflict that developed in the border zone from the two heads of state-- Arthur Barclay, president of Liberia in 1905, and Joseph Momoh, president of Sierra Leone in 1991.

Two Presidents, One Problem

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President Arthur Barclay, who faced French encroachment into the Liberian hinterland in 1905, tried to check it by political means. He nominated the former British colonial official Harry Johnston as the Liberian government's chief negotiator. Johnston was sent to Paris to negotiate with the French government. He succeeded in November 1905 in concluding an agreement in which France recognized Liberia's sovereignty south of the Makona River. That agreement, however, did not stop French intrusion.14

Joseph Momoh, who 86 years later, faced Libyan intervention into Sierra Leone, also resorted to political means. At a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Dakar, Senegal, Momoh demanded that the participants pressure the countries that supported Taylor "and his renegades and bandits to stop doing so. "15 That political effort was no more successful than Barclay's diplomatic effort in 1905.

In both cases, the failure of diplomacy forced the two presidents to seek assistance from foreign countries. The disturbances along the Sierra Leone -Liberia border and the continuation of French intrusion led Liberia in the beginning of the century to seek help from Great Britain. With this aim, President Barclay visited London in August 1907. The British government responded favorably, drawing up a plan which, inter alia, focused on creating a standing army to enable Liberia establish her sovereignty in the border zone, and to check French encroachment.1ó A British officer, Major Robert Mackay Cadell, was appointed to establish and command what came to be called the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF)."

In 1991, President Momoh seemed to follow in Arthur Barclay's footsteps. Only, instead of Britain which was no longer the political big brother it had once been in West Africa, he turned to Nigeria. Like Britain at the beginning of the century, Nigeria was deeply involved in the subregion. When the Liberian civil war broke out in 1989, Nigeria was the main force behind the decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to intervene in the fighting. Nigerian army units formed

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the larger part of ECOMOG, the ECOWAS intervention force in Liberia, and a larger share of the initial financial cost was also underwritten by Nigeria." It was only natural for President Momoh to turn to Nigeria for help. On 7 April, two weeks after the invasion began, President Momoh visited Abuja to talk with the Nigerian head of state, Ibrahim Babaginda. Five days later, 1,200 Nigerian soldiers were sent to help the Sierra Leonean army control the border zone. In May, the number of Nigerian soldiers was increased from 1,200 to 2,800.19

The Nigerian commanders and troops stationed in Sierra Leone were faithful to their mission of aiding an ally government and did not try to intervene in Sierra Leone's internal affairs. This had not been the case in Liberia earlier in the century. The British commander of the Liberian army, Major Cadell, treated the force as Wit were his own private army, appointing several other British officers to command the LFF units and making new recruits swear allegiance to him rather than to the Liberian state. He and President Arthur Barclay repeatedly disagreed on how to deploy the LFF units.20 Cadell's usurping the president's governmental authority provoked great anger among the Liberian citizenry. Public meetings were organized in various towns and counties to protest Cadell's behavior which, by extension, was a protest of British policy. On 9 November 1908, residents of Maryland County gathered in the Justice Hall in Harper and raised questions about the unlimited authority over the LFF given to Cadell and other British officers. The participants authorized the county legislators to investigate whether the LFF had been established and was operating in accordance with Liberian law.21 A similar meeting was held on 30 December 1908 in the city of Virginia, Montserrado County. The participants there passed a number of resolutions. They called for a national protest to take place in Monrovia on 7 January 1909, with each settlement in the republic represented by ten delegates. They resolved to send a petition to the legislators demanding that Cadell be removed from his post, on the grounds that he recruited foreign officers into the LFF without proper

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authorization.22

Dissatisfaction with mounting British domination came on top of, and exacerbated the tension caused by the country's economic impoverishment and the unstable situation in the border zone. President Barclay was blamed, and voices were raised calling for his impeachment.' Barclay, an experienced politician, responded swiftly to diffuse what he saw as the main source of the grievances -- British highhandedness. On 17 December 1908, he ordered Cadell to relinquish his post.24 The president supported a bill put before the Legislature to abolish the law establishing the LFF under British command. A new law was enacted prohibiting the engagement of European officers from countries sharing a border with the Republic, and reserving the title of Commander of the LFF for Liberian citizens.25

The political opposition, serious as it was, did not come close to another threat to Barclay's regime: the LFF soldiers themselves. Chronically short of money, the Liberian government regularly put off paying the soldiers' salaries. Cadell, who was anxious to thwart the threat to his own position, took advantage of the soldiers' grievances and incited some of them to act against the government.2ó President Barclay quickly arranged the allocation of funds to pay the soldiers' salaries.27 This move literally pulled the rug out from under Cadell's feet and calmed the soldiers' unrest.

In Sierra Leone, more than eighty years later, President Momoh's reliance on a Nigerian military presence did not threaten his regime. However, it was interpreted as a sign of the government's weakness and considered as one more link in a long chain of failures for Momoh's government. The government was widely blamed for the "rebel" occupation of the country's most productive region, where the diamond and bauxite mines were located. That occupation halted the country's export of minerals and dealt a severe blow to its already scant budget.28 The scarcity of cash prevented President Momoh from supplying the Sierra Leonean army with

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military equipment needed in the war against the "rebels" who, were now using the proceeds from the mines to finance their own military operations. Soldiers' salaries were delayed, causing unrest and dissatisfaction among military personnel. In addition, there was increasing dissatisfaction within Sierra Leone with its one -party system, and President Momoh and his government came under growing pressure to change it to a multi -party democracy. The press, students and the intelligentsia in Sierra Leone all demanded multi -party elections. From the beginning of 1991, every edition of the weekly tabloid New Shaft called for a referendum on changing the one -party system.30 On 19 April, the Senior Staff Association of the University of Sierra Leone publicly expressed support for changing the country's political system in accordance with modern world political thinking.31

Momoh, the Sierra Leonean president, was an experienced politician and, like President Barclay did in Liberia earlier on in the century, he took steps to calm the public unrest. On 19 August, 1990 in an address to a special session of the ruling party, Momoh declared his support for political reform. A Constitutional Review Commission was set up to make constitutional amendments which would turn Sierra Leone into a democracy.32 Seven month later, the Commission recommended establishing a multi -party political system. President Momoh approved the recommendations and, on 23 May 1991, he issued a White Paper "which sets out a rapid programme for introducing multiparty politics by the end of this month. "33

Obviously, Barclay's and Momoh's political problems differed in nature and scope. Nevertheless, there are some similarities: protests were widespread, exacerbated by poor economic conditions; both heads of state used their political savvy to diffuse public pressure and, more important to this discussion, public unrest stemming from turbulence in the same border zone. However, the two presidents differed in one key aspect -- the response to grievances in the army. The Liberian president, Barclay, was able to put

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his finger on the real danger to his regime -- dissatisfied soldiers. He responded quickly to assuage the grievances among the LFF units. His prompt response saved his government and President Barclay finished out his term in office.

President Momoh, on the other hand, ignored the potential threat of dissatisfied soldiers. That oversight caused his downfall. On 29 April 1992, a group of young army officers headed by Captain Valentine Strasser arriving in Freetown from the border zone, took over the government. It was not a planned coup. The officers who carried it out had come to the capital to protest the government's failure to pay their salaries and allowances. In the course of their violent demonstration, they realized that they could take power. Africa Confidential described it as "a mutiny which led to a fully fledged coup d'etat. X34

It is not that Momoh lacked political savvy. One theory has it that the coup was coordinated by President Momoh himself According to this theory, the president feared that if he and his party lost in democratic elections, the new government might hold him responsible for economic malpractice and corruption.35 Although this theory is far -fetched, it shows the high degree of political sophistication and the ability to implement political maneuvers that were attributed to President Momoh. The Sierra Leonean president knew how to foil his political opponents just as well as the Liberian president more than eighty years earlier. However, unlike President Barclay, Momoh failed to see how dangerous the discontent of unpaid soldiers could be to a regime that had little public support.

Conclusion

Events which took place in the same region, but at different times, under different political situations, and in the context of different international constellations, are strikingly similar. Some of the similar characteristics can be accounted for by the fact that they follow universal

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patterns of human behavior and motivation, such as tendencies toward violence and seeking of self-interest. Violence and brutality are not unique to any particular region or people. States and individuals are prone to exploit situations for their own self-interest. At the beginning of the century, Kissi warriors plundered and slaughtered, France took advantage of the political vacuum in the Liberian hinterland to send its colonial forces to grab Liberian territory. Also, Britain was ready to aid the black republic for Britain's own colonial interests, and President Barclay came to terms with the opposition to his regime and complied with public demands in the struggle for his political survival. Toward the end of the century, NPFL and Sankoh's troops acted brutally; Libya used the political vacuum that formed in West Africa to increase her own influence in the region; Nigeria helped Sierra Leone in order to strengthen Nigeria's own grip on the region, and President Momoh yielded to public pressure and changed the political system in Sierra Leone in order to remain in power.

Universal patterns of behavior and motivation, however, do not explain the repetition of the use of traditional ritual warfare, such as cross-dressing. Foreign correspondents reported the events in the border zone with no special comment, but referred to the practice as "(transvestism), bizarre and unfathomable, further evidence of the ultimate 'darkness' and unknowability of Africa." However, according to African tradition, cross -dressing, or transvestism, as the foreign press termed it, is an expression of power. "Only the strong, the brave, the hard of heart can claim to be a warrior, a neither masculine nor feminine status. Warriors are free to play with gender identity, to draw power from the deliberate conflation of categories, to demonstrate that qualities of courage, strength, and supernatural prowess are not limited by biological endowment. X36 Here, the question remains: why NPFL and Sankoh's "rebels" equipped with sophisticated modern weapons deliberately returned to the use of traditional ritual warfare. Surely, their purpose was not to revive the Kissi tradition. The anthropologist Mary Moran, points out that "The power of the warrior is manifest in the ability to meld Western and indigenous, masculine and

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feminine, constructing the authentic not in opposition to the imported, but as an intrinsic part of it." Furthermore, Moran argues that by retrieving the power of the traditional warrior, the "rebels" expressed their protest against soldiers, who were regarded as agents of an oppressive state.37

Universal patterns of human behavior combined with indigenous African folk patterns can explain the similarities. Nevertheless, similarities between events, striking though they are, do not in themselves prove that history was repeated. History never repeats itself, and events along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border are no exception. Each of the events described above developed along autonomous lines toward different ends. In the beginning of the century, the violence along the border line was finally settled and both Liberia and Sierra Leone remained intact. Toward the end of the century, the two countries were torn up by brutal civil wars that fractured their social, economic, and political structures.

Endnotes

'Fisher to F.O, 11 October 1902, F.O. 47/32, Public Record Office (PRO).

'Mann River Declaration," Republic of Liberia Presidential Papers: Documents, Diary and Record of Activities of the Chief Executive, 1 August 1972 -31 July 1974. (Monrovia: Press Division of the Executive Mansion, 1975), pp. 400 -01.

3M. Alpha Bah, "The Nineteenth Century Partition of Kissiland and the Contemporary Possibilities for Reunification," Liberian Studies Journal, XII:1 (1987), 42 -45.

4Officer Commanding at Wulade to Officer Commanding

Sierra Leone Battalion, West African Frontier Force, enclosure 1 in No 17, 27 December 1996, CO 879 96 X/M 06487, PRO.

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5Probyn to Lyttelton, received 20 April 1905, 13290, c.o. Sierra Leone, Africa (West), no 780, PRO.

6Wallis to Probyn, 3 July 1905, F. O. 403/363, PRO.

'Contribution aux etudes preliminaires; de la delimitation franco -liberienne, Extrait du rapport politique de la Guinee. francaise, August 1904, 7F32, Frontiere franco -liberienne (Guinee), 1898 -1904, Archives National Paris (ANP). Extrait du rapport politique de la Colonie de la Guinee Francaise en Septembre 1904, 7F32, Frontiere franco -liberienne (Guinee), 1898 -1904, ANP.

'Johnston to Clarke, 25 October 1906, F .0. 367/13/37358, PRO. Johnston to Clarke, 26 December 1906, F.O. 367/13/43384, PRO. 9"Border Towns Invaded, "Africa research Bulletin (1 -30 April 1991), 10073.

"Strategic Attacks," Ibid, (1 -31 May 1991), 10113 .

10Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy. "Atlantic Monthly, 273, (February 1994) 2:46.

11Mary H Moran, "A Tribal Construction of Nationalism: Masculinity and Ritual Transvestism in the Liberian Civil War," 36th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston, 4 December 1993, pp. 10 -11. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the Zangbeto secret society, prevalent in the coastal area between Porto Novo and Badagry. The society is restricted to men only who perform quasi -military tasks as guardians of the society. Despite its masculine nature, its members are referred to as zansi, "wives of the

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night." Geoffrey Parrinder, West African Religion: A Study of the Beliefs and Practices of Akan, Ewe, Yoruba,. Ibo, and Kindred Peoples, (London: Epworth Press, 2nd edition,1969), 129 -130.

12 "Sierra Leone say Burkina Faso aiding Liberian rebel attacks on border," 4B Africa, ME/1037 ii, 4 April 1991, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), BBC Monitoring.

13The Sierra Leone standing army numbered no more than 3,000. It was equipped with Nigerian -made G3 rifles which had a tendency to jam. The RUF forces were armed with Russian-made AK47 automatic rifles. "Checking the Advance," West Africa (27 May -2 June 1991), 863.

"Johnston to Clarke, 25 October 1906, F.O. 367/13/37358, PRO. Johnston to Clarke, 26 December 1906, F.O. 367/13/43384, PRO.

'Fresh Clashes," Africa Research Bulletin, 28 (1 -30 November 1991), 10369 -370.

1"Memorandum of Interview between Mr. Clarke and President Barclay, 2 Sept.1907, F.O. 403, 390 Z/M 06338, PRO.

"David Michael Foley, "British Policy Towards Liberia, 1862 -1912." Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1965, 244 -316).

'$'Diversionary Tactics?" West Africa (29 April -5 May 1991), 650.

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19The Nigerian units joined several hundred soldiers who were sent from Guinea to support President Momoh's troops along the border. "Checking the Advance." West Africa (7 May -2 June 1991) 863. "Sierra Leone: Nigerian troop contingent arrives in Bo from Freetown," 4(B) Africa, ME/1O96 B /8, 12 June 1991, BBC.

20Cadell to Wallis, 27 February 1908, F. O. 458/23, 06352, pp. 1 -2, PRO. Foley, "British Policy," 274 -275.

21Instructions . . . voted on by the citizens of Maryland County ... , 9 November 1908, File 12083/269, Diplomatic U.S.A. Federal Archives.

Memorial, to the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the Republic of Liberia, Legislature assembled, 9 November 1908, file 12083/269, No.2, 3, Diplomatic U. S.A. Federal Archives.

23Lyons to E. Root, 8 January 1909, file 12083/150, No. 262, Diplomatic U. S. A. Federal Archives.

'Message of Arthur Barclay to the Second Session of the 31st Legislature, 15 December 1908, Monrovia, 1910. Foley, "British Policy," 291.

25Braham to Myring, 16 January 1909, F.O. 367/137/4701, PRO. 26Cadell to Barclay, 11 February 1909, Headquarters, Liberian Frontier Force, Monrovia, West Africa, File 12083/150, No 271, Diplomatic U.S.A. Federal Archives.

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27Foley, "British Policy," 213.

28J. Sorie Conteh, "Future prospects." West Africa (14 -20 January 1991), 15. Raymond Golpin, "The lost tribes," West Africa (10 -16

August 1992), 1348 .

29Hilton Fyle, "We need urgent help': Interview with Captain Valentine Strasser," West Africa (15 -21 June 1992), 1002.

3o "Sierra Leone: Saying No," Africa Confidential, 31 (1 June) 11:8.

31Kofi Akosah -Sarpong, "The heat is on, West Africa (4 -10 June 1990 ), 934.

32Kofi Akosah -Sarpong. "Momoh takes stock," West Africa (10 -16 Sept. 1990), 243 7. Kofi Akosah -Sarpong, "Momoh's new deal," West Africa (22 -28 Oct. 1990), 2698.

33IInstant democracy," West Africa (10 -16 June 1991), 940.

34Sierra Leone: Junior officers jump the gun." Africa Confidential, 33 (8 May 1992) 9:3.

35 "Justifying the coup." West Africa (25 -31 May 1992), 879.

36Moran, "A Tribal Construction of Nationalism," pp. 10 -12.

37Ibid. pp. 11 -12.

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Toward Cultural Pluralism in Education

Sakai W.G. Malakpa

The field of education gains enormously from other fields and disciplines. Consequently, plans, policies and methodologies aimed at maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of education should not ignore these other relevant fields and disciplines. For example, economics of education emphasizes many pertinent concepts and concerns; these include:

human resource development for both individual and over all socioeconomic advancement;

the process by which education is produced;

the distribution of education among competing groups and individuals;

a consideration of how much should be spent by society and any of its components on education;

the maximization of efficiency and effectiveness in such expenditures, and,

the selection of types of educational activities . which benefit from resource allocation in education (Harbison & Myers, 1965; Davis, 1980; Gurwitz, 1982).

As it focuses on these areas, economics of education increases its contribution to education by employing strategies such as cost -benefit or benefit -cost analysis (Lewis, Bruiinks, Thurlow & McGrew, 1988;

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1 (1996)

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Woodhall, 1970); resource -cost, cost efficiency and internal rates of return (Davis, 1980; Zodhaite, 1980; Poignant, 1967, Psacharapoulos, 1973).

Equally important to the field of education are the humanist and existentialist postulates which emphasize the development of the whole being and the advancement of his or her environment and culture (Frick, 1971; Schilling, 1986; Miller, 1984). From these perspectives, education has two major purposes:

(1) To help the individual become the best of whatever he or she can be (Vansickle 1990; Jones, 1986; Farmer, 1984), and

(2) to transmit culture (Chiang, 1986; Zialcita, 1990).

The emphasis on economics and culture is brought under one umbrella by the view that the real yardstick of development is the extent to which development and its corollaries satisfy "the socio- cultural needs of individuals and the community" (Makatiansar, 1979, 11). In other words, the true purpose of education is to improve lives and enhance culture (Education, 1980; Puri, 1992). This truism notwithstanding, a questionnaire survey finds that cultural education is not emphasized in many countries. Rather, educational systems aspire to assimilate cultures regarded as weak, inferior or subordinate (Puri).

In light of the foregoing finding and given the revelation that cultural enhancement complements education's goals of personal and socio- economic development, this article will discuss cultural assimilation as a failure of education to include and enhance the cultures of varied groups in the population. This discussion will focus on Africa in general, but specifically on Liberia. In the case of Liberia, the article focuses on the assimilation practices of settler groups and missionary organizations. Given the drawbacks of assimilation, the article presents cultural pluralism and the edu- cational method of multicultural education as viable alternatives to assimilation. We contended that by emphasizing this alternative in a post -war curriculum, Liberia will reap the benefits of a stronger and holistic

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education, increased cultural enhancement through education, and a heightened sense of inter -ethnic respect.

Cultural Assimilation

The importance of enhancing culture through education is accentuated because of the relevance and complexity of culture itself. In essence, culture is a people's entire way of living. Goodenough (1987) defines it as a way of perceiving, believing, evaluating and behaving. LeVine (1984) also regards culture as a shared organization of ideas that includes "the intellectual moral and aesthetic standards prevalent in a community" (p. 84). Moreover, it is a popular view that culture gives us our identity through our words, actions, postures, gestures, tone of voice, facial expressions, emotions, and techniques of defense (Hall, 1977).

Despite the invaluableness of every culture, some "dominant cultures" have engaged in cultural assimilation, In brief, this is a process through which cultural and ethnic groups regarded as "weak," "inferior," or "subordinate" are absorbed gradually into a dominant culture. The process ascribes to the "melting pot" or "amalgamation" theory which implies that once a group is absorbed, it loses its cultural patterns and becomes a part of the dominant culture (Gordon, 1964; Haring & McCormick, 1990). In this regard, the dominant group is not concerned with the maintenance of a common culture, but a culture that is common to all (Williams, 1989). Stated differently, inherent in the process of cultural assimilation is the notion that diverse cultural groups should be merged into a single culture with common lifestyle, values, language, and cultural practices (Haring & McCormick, 1990).

In the merging of two cultures through assimilation, the dominant culture determines the terms of assimilation. Thus, members of subordinate groups have little or no choice; if they want to share in the dreams and successes of society, they must assimilate. Furthermore, the dominant group decides the extent to which members of the subordinate group can assimilate. For example, in the United States where the melting pot theory was advocated directly and indirectly (Gordon, 1964), until 1967,

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miscegenation laws in many states prevented people of color from marrying whites or other of European backgrounds (Williamson, 1980; Gollnick & Chinn, 1994).

In essence, assimilation is a form of societal oppression. Hence, the education system maximizes its weakness and inefficiency when it perpetuates or fails to address this phenomenon. This is because school culture, a micro culture of the greater society, often shares some of the traits of the dominant culture. In this partnership, the school fails when it often function not only to confirm and privilege students from dominant classes, but also "through exclusion and insults, to disconfirm the histories, experiences and dreams of subordinate groups" (Girouox, 1989, p. xxx). This has been the case with most school systems in Africa.

Cultural Assimilation Through Education in Africa

Following explorers, European missionaries flocked to Africa as they deemed the civilization and Christianization of the African as "the white man's burden" (Fanfuwa & Aisiku, 1982; Rodney, 1971).

In accordance with their mission, missionaries built churches not only to proselytize but also to assimilate the Africans into a European way of life. However, as the missionaries were only minimally successful in converting adults; they focused heavily on African children for whom they built schools as a means of educating, Christianizing and civilizing. Through this process, they condemned the children's belief patterns as well as their music and other art forms. To illustrate, Chidwiti, a dance in Chama District, Northern Province in Zambia, was condemned as immoral and a work of the devil (Nkunia, 1979).

Unlike missionaries, colonizers in Africa whose mission included territorial expansion, exploitation, profiteering and civilization, ruled by coercion and manipulation. For example, they drew national boundaries without regards for ethnicity and traditional geographic boundaries (Carew, 1992). In addition, they pitted ethnic groups against each other thereby rendering them weak and of no threat to the colonial power. Moreover,

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they established schools to "educate" and "civilize" the Africans. Ultimately, this meant assimilating the Africans into European culture.

Cultural Assimilation in Education in Liberia

Like the rest of Africa, western- oriented schools in Liberia were started by missionaries. In Liberia, however, there were two types of missionaries: one group was comprised of those who, although part of the settler community, saw their mission as one of Christianizing and civilizing, not that of nation building (Kulah, 1994). Another group of missionaries included those who were affiliated with foreign churches and missionary boards. As the work of these groups accompanied or followed the establishment of settler communities and subsequent political entities, it contributed to the assimilation and civilizing efforts of the settler community.

The dual process of assimilation and civilization in Liberia was an open adoption method by which the indigenous people were admitted into "the preferred class." To enter this class and eventually become citizens, the indigenous people had to give up their traditional religions, become Christians, and adopt the western dress code. Thus, E.W. Blyden, the world -renown Liberian educator and writer, and other perspicacious individuals met with vehement opposition when they suggested that Liberia College -- a Baptist institution and later, the University of Liberia -- and other schools be established in the hinterland. Through this method, Blyden reasoned, the nation's educational system could adopt indigenous and some valuable aspects of the local cultures (Lynch, 1971).

As assimilation policies and practices were codified into law (e.g. the adoption of western code of dress), the settlers employed varied assimilation strategies. Dunn and Johnson - Sirleaf (1992) outline some of these strategies:

The apprenticeship system which was meant to socialize both recaptives and indigenous people into settler culture by bringing them under the

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guardianship of settler families;

education through civilizing -Christianizing ethos;

settlement policies, including the creation of settler communities within "native jurisdictions" to foster a civilizing influence;

interior administration and indirect hierarchical rule imposed on the indigenous people inhabiting the hinterland, regardless of the extent to which such a rule was compatible or incompatible with traditional institutional structures, and,

unification and integration policies which, ironically, saw pluralist expressions as a threat to national unity.

There is evidence to show that the above strategies were effective. In 1920, Jones, at the request of the Phelps- Stokes Fund, conducted a survey of education in Liberia. Among other things, he found that Americo- Liberians made virtually no substantial contribution to education in the country. Rather, they were interested in secretarial sciences and the like (Berman, 1972). As a result, Jones recommended, inter alia, that education in Liberia emphasized agriculture and the indigenous cultures. Despite this, in 1923, another survey by Sibley (commissioned by the Phelps- Stokes Fund at the request of the Methodist Church) arrived at findings similar to the 1920 survey. He therefore reiterated Jones' recommendations (Berman, 1972).

A major characteristic of assimilation by the settler -dominated political system was the ignoring, contradicting or repudiating of recommendations, research findings, and even government proclamations, policies and plans regarding the inclusion of indigenous people and their cultures into the national educational system. For example, the 1920 and 1923 surveys of education in Liberia were part of an effort to establish the

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Booker T. Washington Institute (BWI). Based on the recommendations emanating from these studies, Kakata was selected, in 1927, as a suitable site for BWI because of its fertile land and its closeness to native villages.

However, when the school was eventually established, the recommendations . were largely ignored. This rejection of research findings was documented in 1939 when, at the request of the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Minister in Liberia prepared a report on the situation at BWI. Among other things, the minister reported that the school leaned heavily toward colonial education policies in British West Africa (Berman, 1972).

Another criticism of the situation at BWI referred to the school's extreme western orientation. To be specific, BWI was modeled after Tuskegee in Alabama, and controlled by foreign philanthropists and clergymen who felt they knew what the Liberians needed more than the Liberians themselves (Berman). This problem was therefore beyond the control of school administrators and the Liberian government.

Apart from the situation at BWI, in 1953, the first major research was conducted in Liberia to formulate a course of study regarding the unique socio- economic and cultural needs of education in Liberia. However, the curriculum formulated from this study devoted twice as much time to art and music than to mathematics and science. Moreover, the social studies programs were external in nature as they emphasized training in European and American ways of life (Sawyer, 1980).

The condemnation of local cultures also obviated the inclusion of such cultures in to the curriculum. For instance, beginning in 1944, the government attempted to indigenize the curriculum. However, this effort could not succeed because the indigenous people's methods of education, socialization, and the like were condemned as primitive practices carried out "by backward people" (Varpilah, 1982, p. 264). Because of this crippling ethnocentrism, the 1962 establishment and subsequent expansion of a curriculum center did not make much difference; the curriculum still did not reflect a true Liberian culture (Varpilah).

Beyond curricula, the educational agenda set forth in Liberia's

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socioeconomic plans have been contradictory in so far as education and indigenous cultures are concerned. (See, among many others, The National Socioeconomic Plan of Liberia, 1976 -80; The Indicative Manpower Plan of Liberia, 1972 -80; Ministry of Planning Reports, 1976; 1972). On one hand, these plans call for conservation and promotion of indigenous cultures alongside the provision of universal basic education. On another hand, however, the educational programs which ensue are not consistent with the plans' pronouncements. For example, the educational system generally continues to ignore indigenous cultures. Moreover, schools established in the hinterland experience the highest rates of teacher and material shortages (Sawyer, 1980). Additionally, non -governmental schools established in the hinterland receive very minimal government subsidy. The lion share of such subsidies (79 %) go to schools established in Montserrado County. Of that amount, Ricks Institute alone traditionally received 27.5% (Sawyer, 1980).

Outside of the field of education, the Unification and Integration Policy of President William V. S. Tubman was another attempt by government to assimilate the indigenous people into the center. This was "coercive unity" which left many issues unresolved, including the notion of self-determination and equal access to the state and its resources (Dunn & Johnson- Sirleaf, 1992).

In short, ample evidence shows that the Liberian settler community made a conscious and concerted effort to assimilate and "civilize" the indigenous population whose cultures and traditional practices were stigmatized as primitive. This assimilation goal was pursued with fervor, including the development of varied strategies, the ignoring of research results and subsequent recommendations, and even the contradiction of pubic proclamations, policies and plans.

Assimilation by Missionaries and Church Establishments

Missionaries and organized churches to Liberia saw, as part of their mission, the need to assimilate and civilize the indigenous people. Accordingly, they ignored, even condemned the cultural practices of the people in preference for western education and civilized ethos. Naturally,

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this extricated the people from the ventures of the missionaries. For example, Sibley's survey of 1923 found the work of missionaries to be artificial, superficial and out of touch with the communities in which they were established (Berman, 1972).

Despite initial difficulties, missionaries were determined to succeed. Toward this end, they established church schools to attract the young. In these schools, however, the missionaries went beyond education and even Christianization; they condemned the students' cultural practices in an attempt to turn students into little Euro- Americans completely extricated from their cultural heritage. Of course, this method was later resented vehemently by students who were products of mission schools (see Awori, 1975).

The condemnation of Liberian cultural practices was exemplified by early Lutheran missionaries to Liberia who, like missionaries to other parts of Africa, said one thing and did another. On the one hand, they promised to preserve all the African customs and traditions that were consistent with Christianity. On the other hand, they "launched a frontal attack on almost every aspect of traditional African life -- including ancestor reverence, use of charms and fetishes, belief in pantheon of spirits, traditional bush schools and traditional medicine men, divination, trial by ordeal, and polygyny (Bradford, 1994, 16). They discouraged traditional music, dance, ritualism, festivals and secret societies (Bradford).

Kulah (1994) discusses the assimilation tendencies of other churches in Liberia. He focuses specifically on theological seminaries, giving brief but very relevant historical backgrounds and pointing out their disdain for African cultural practices in preference for general gravitation toward Euro-American ways of life. Because of this gravitation, in general, Liberian pastors are not prepared to deal with the people on issues such as sacrifice, dream interpretation and the relation between the living and the dead. Rather, some pastors are told that "the best way to help people become better Christians is to help them deny and forget their religious backgrounds" (Kulah, 103).

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As he maintains that theological seminaries in Liberia are too loyal to the curricula handed to them by Christian churches both inside and outside the country, Kulah (1994) insists that Liberian pastors need a Biblically sound and culturally oriented theological education. This possibility, however, is impeded by several factors relevant to the discussion of assimilation. First, achieving this goal is difficult because pastors are told that denying, even condemning one's cultural background is synonymous to being a good Christian and a good pastor. Problematic also is the condemnation of the traditional religion that gave the forefathers security, peace, confidence and stability. Condemning the culture therefore makes it difficult for many Liberian theologians to direct the people to the invaluable characteristics of the culture and subsequently to apply such characteristics in the interpretation of the Gospel for a richer Christian life (Kulah).

Drawbacks of Assimilation

In many ways, the process of assimilation is detrimental to the group being absorbed. For example, partial assimilation splits people into two cultures with different behaviors and expectations in each cultural milieu. They are coerced into this bi- cultural role in order to be allowed to work, go to school or participate effectively in both communities (Gollnick & Chinn, 1994). This is exemplified by the dilemma of a Liberian who becomes a Christian when his or her community practices African traditional religions. On the one hand, the church places a moratorium on his or her participation in African traditional practices. On the other hand, the community of which he or she is a part demands the Christian's participation in African religions. This demand is based on the individual's membership in the African family which requires him or her to be loyal to the community despite his or her exposure to other religions (Kulah).

As opposed to partial assimilation, a complete and successful assimilation leads to the disappearance of a cultural group distinct from the dominant culture; this is the goal of amalgamation and the essence of the melting pot theory. Furthermore, assimilation denies the cultural and socio- political contributions of "subordinate" groups in society (Gordon, 1964; Williamson, 1980; Haring and McCormick, 1990).

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The process of assimilation suppresses and eventually eradicates the

. values, meanings and histories of whole cultures (Williams, 1989). It forces members of subordinate groups to relinquish their cultural and ethnic identities. Likewise, assimilation denies the democratic notion of equal participation. In other words, cultural groups regarded as weak or politically and culturally subordinate are not allowed to form and flourish free from the oppression of others in society (Appleton, 1983).

An Alternative for Liberia

Liberia's secular and religious education systems -- with their Euro- American programs, policies and practices -- were largely assimilation in conviction, orientation, and scope. Consequently, the histories and cultural practices of the nation's ethnic groups were largely ignored. Hence, the nation's educational system failed in enhancing local cultures. This is probably why, until recent signs of improvements, cultural practices, indigenous names and even traditional foods were the targets of derision. Such attitude heightened ethnic sensitivity and probably paved the way to the debacle the country faces today.

The preceding likelihood is grounded on inferences drawn from other nations. For instance, racist and assimilation policies which forced black school children in South Africa to learn Afrikaans, the language of the ruling minority white, was the key basis of the Soweto demonstration by black children which, unfortunately, ended in a blood bath. Subsequently, Africans' resentment of Afrikaans and other assimilation practices swelled. This intensified the black people's struggle for equal educational, social and other services.

Like South Africa, for a long time, the education system in the United States ignored the histories and cultures of ethnic minorities. Rather, the system emphasized an amalgamation orientation which was resented by these ethnic groups. This resentment fueled the struggle for social equality and the recognition of the contributions, histories, cultures and equality of ethnic groups.

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The foregoing indicates that, whether through the greater society or the micro- culture of the schools, assimilation is unacceptable, especially since it seeks to suppress, exclude and/or absorb some members of society. Hence, a society which insists on assimilation only invites fiery resentment from the targets of this process. This resentment and a struggle for equality will not be abated until there are convincing orientation towards pluralism.

To achieve maximum success, it is impelling that the gravitation toward pluralism begin in the schools; that is, there must be inclusive and democratic methods of providing educational services for a cross section of the population. For example, by no means have South Africa and the United States achieved a social Utopia. However, resentment of assimilation and a consequent gravitation toward cultural pluralism have contributed immensely to the educational and social systems of these countries. In South Africa, African languages are taught as major subjects in the schools. Likewise, in the United States, multicultural education is emphasized in many school districts with a focus on the histories and contributions of the nation's varied ethnic, national and racial groups. This system provides greater awareness of the groups concerned, strengthens the curriculum and paves the way to an inclusive society and a broad -based education system. Similarly, in the post -war era, Liberia, with 17 ethnic groups, can strengthen its educational system and enhance inter-ethnic group understanding and respect by embracing cultural pluralism and multicultural education. It is therefore necessary to take a cursory look at these concepts.

Cultural Pluralism

This concept ascribes to the "salad bowl" or, in the Liberian sense, "soup pot" theory which recognizes and appreciates the presence, importance and contribution of every group and individual in society.

Accordingly, the educational goal of cultural pluralism is twofold: (1) to promote equality among groups in society, and (2) to allow individuals to maintain their cultural identities as they participate in the macro -culture of society (Gollnick & Chinn). Toward this end, Pratte (1979) offers three

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stringent criteria for pluralism: diversity, equality and behavioral commitment to the same.

Pluralism also promotes the existence and enhancement of people's common cultures (Walters, 1992). This is not a mere extension or subjective interpretation of what a group means, feels or believes. Rather, it is the maintaining of a people's identity by allowing them, as a group, to articulate, interpret and enhance their own meanings, values and methods.

The relevance of cultural pluralism makes it imperative that it be included in the school curriculum. Such inclusion will be a recognition that the cultural backgrounds of both dominant and non -dominant or oppressed groups in society are rich and worthy of preservation and transmission (Haring and McCormick). It further implies that, like dominant groups, indigenous or oppressed groups have a lot (if not more) to offer (Teasdale, 1992).

Cultural pluralism in education implies that society is strengthened and enriched by different cultural groups. This is articulated lucidly in the policy statement by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, AACTE:

To endorse cultural pluralism is to endorse the principle that there is no one model American. To endorse cultural pluralism is to understand and appreciate the differences that exist among the nation's citizens. It is to see these differences as a positive force in the continuing development of a society which professes a wholesome respect for the intrinsic worth of every individual. Cultural Pluralism is more than a temporary accomodation to placate racial and ethnic minorities. It is a concept that aims toward a heightened sense of being and of wholeness of the entire society based on the unique strengths of each of its parts. (AACTE, 1973, 246).

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Multicultural Education

This is the educational strategy which is designed to fulfill and extend the concept of cultural pluralism in schools. With this strategy, the cultural backgrounds of students are used to develop effective classroom instruction as well as an accepting school environment (Gollnick & Chinn).

Multicultural education ascribes to the concept of cultural relativism; this is an attempt to describe and convey the values and practices of a society from the viewpoint of the members of that society (Teasdale, 1992). Likewise, this educational strategy expands the concept of pluralism. For example, it focuses on culture, not ethnicity alone. By so doing, it recognizes the impacts of race, gender, class, age, geographic region, physical or sensory disability, etc., on one's participation in society (Gollnick & Chinn).

In multicultural curriculum, "education" is not limited to information from canonized textbooks nor does the "common culture" dwell exclusively on blind glorification of the past. Rather, the curriculum includes information from various aspects of the culture. At the same time, curriculum developers continue to study, analyze and critique the culture, allowing students to use the information to build for a future yet unimaginable (Walters, 1992).

In developing a multicultural curriculum, "culture" is seen as a process, not a possession or a product. As such, the curriculum highly values the insights and inputs of the different groups represented in both the classroom and the greater society. This approach enable students to benefit from varied perspectives (Walters).

Multicultural education is based on several concepts, views and assumptions, including:

The view that all students do benefit from exposure to different people, beliefs and ideas;

the provision of an opportunity for students to

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relate to, and evaluate new perspectives;

the conviction that there is value in promoting cultural diversity;

the notion that schools should be a model for promoting human rights and respect for cultural diversity;

the view that social justice and equality should be of paramount importance in the design and delivery of curriculum;

the assertion that attitudes and values for the continuation of a democratic society can be promoted in the schools;

and, the idea that schooling can promote the knowledge disposition and skills needed for proper redistribution of power and income among cultural groups (Haring & McCormick; Gollnick & Chinn; Teasdale).

An educator involved in multicultural education is encouraged to understand relationships and interactions among groups. This requires familiarity with the sources and impacts of racism, sexism tribalism, discrimination, oppression, power and powerlessness, equality and inequality, and stereotyping. Hence, components of multicultural education include ethnic studies, global studies, bilingual education, women studies, human relations, value clarification, special education, and urban studies. These are presented in two formats: (1) as integrated components of cultural education or (2) through cultural education as a separate discipline (Puri; Gollnick & Chinn).

A successful multicultural education program includes several basic characteristics. For instance, the composition of the teaching staff should

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reflect the make -up of the general population. The curriculum is unbiased, avoiding sexism, racism, ethnocentrism, and the like (Simon, 1989). Furthermore, it addresses the importance of culture alongside both the reality and richness of cultural differences. In addition, students are allowed to use their cultural backgrounds, experiences, and voices to develop new skills and explore the subject matter critically (Simon).

Multicultural education places demands on teachers which should be met if they are to work effectively with a culturally diverse group of students. For example, they are to give up the self-image of people who know and can disseminate everything important. Rather, they need to encourage and acknowledge differences of opinion, language, culture, ability, race and gender. These differences should be celebrated as logical sources for teaching and learning (Walters, 1992).

Additionally, teachers are encouraged to examine their own prejudices and presumptions (Teasdale, 1992). As teachers work with students from varied ethnic and cultural backgrounds, it is also important that they be aware of different learning styles and characteristics. In like manner, teachers are encouraged to know their own cultural backgrounds. This assertion is based on the conviction that the extent to which one understands, respects and appreciates other cultures depends on the degree to which the person is rooted in his or his own culture (Puri).

Summary and Conclusion

Hitherto, both secular and religious education in Liberia directly or indirectly engaged in cultural assimilation. This process is based on the conviction that the cultural practices, beliefs, methods, etc., of certain groups are inferior and therefore members of such groups should become a part of the dominant culture. This is a pompous ethnocentric concept which denies the democratic equality and cultural contributions of non -dominant groups in society. Hence, cultural pluralism is suggested here as a viable alternative for education in the post -war era. This is a means of acknowledging , appreciating and enhancing various cultural groups and practices in society. Multicultural education is the method by which the

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goals and objectives of cultural pluralism can be addressed in the school curriculum. This educational strategy stresses the significance of society's varied cultures. Consequently, it exposes students and teachers to cultural and group differences, emphasizing such differences as sources of teaching and learning. By this method, no cultural groups are warded out of the school system by arbitrary fences which limit, exclude and demean. Rather, as cultural groups and entities they are allowed to develop, contribute enormously to the macro culture which, in turn, becomes better, stronger and generally inclusive. This leads to incalculable positive social consequences.

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Wilton Sankawulo, The Rain and the Night. London, U.K.: Macmillian Education Ltd., 1979, 172 pages.

Originally titled The Legend of Chief Kortuma and submitted to the Department of English at the University of Iowa and its famous Writers' Workshop as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts in English, The Rain and the Night, Liberia's third full- length novel, was published in London in 1979 by Macmillian Education Limited.' The novel dramatizes events of an inter -ethnic war between the Kpelle and the Gola of Liberia during the nineteenth century.

The novel tells a story of Kortuma who assumes power upon the death of his father, Chief Gbolokai. On his deathbed, Chief Gbolokai tells his son, Kortuma, to "Save the land." In Chief Gbolokai's own words,

"I must answer the ancestors' call," Chief Gbolokai began. A cough. "Be strong. Save ... save the land." (p 7).

Thus the age -hallowed custom whereby the reins of power pass from the father to the son is preserved. Chief Gbolokai's injunction, "Save the land," constitutes the conflict of the novel. Moreover, this injunction has a double meaning: firstly, it means that Kortuma must literally "save" Kpelleland from being enslaved by Golaland; secondly, it means that Kortuma must sire a male heir to continue the Gbolokai lineage. And this injunction hovers over Kortuma like the sword of Damocles.

It is indeed fundamental to the very existence of the Kpelle and to the preservation of their political freedom that Kortuma should save Kpelleland from being enslaved by Golaland. During the era of pre- slavery

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1 (1996)

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or pre- settler Liberia, inter -ethnic wars were frequent among the various ethnic groups in the country. It was through inter -ethnic warfare that one ethnic group was able to achieve social -political, economic and psychological domination over another ethnic group. This tendency often culminated in the slave -trade along the West Coast of Africa. An ethnic group that established itself as a pre -eminent power, sold members of the vanquished ethnic group to European and American slave- traders. Consequently, Kortuma's fears that the Kpelle might be enslaved by the Gola if Kpelleland does not emerge victorious from an imminent inter -ethnic war are not unfounded.

After his father's burial and the performance of the necessary rituals, Chief Kortuma must resolve a major dilemma: saving Kpelleland from slavery and producing a male heir. In his dream, his father tells him that his second wife, Korlu, who has been barren for eight years, will bear him a male heir:

"Father," Chief Kortuma exclaimed, embracing his father. Withdrawing from his embrace, Chief Gbolokai looked at him with pity. "I sent for you," he told him, his eyes glistering. "I'll never forget you because you were good and kind to me in the world of mortals. When I said 'save the land,' on my dying day, you probably thought the Gola question uppermost in my mind. You were correct, but I am sure you can take care of the Gola. My main concern is the survival of the House of Gbolokai. You need a boy if this House will not pass away. Korlu, your second wife, will give you that child. Go to Kekula of Kuntaa early in the morning. He will tell you what to do...." (p. 28).

Chief Kortuma awakes suddenly. At this moment, Korlu knocks

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on his bedroom door. When she enters, he reveals the nature of his dream to her in the following words:

"Well, Kortuma began, "maybe you think this is another waste of time. But it isn't. My father himself assured me that you will bear a male heir. He said I should go to Kekula in Kuntaa right now to see about it." Korlu hung her head; her face grew cloudy and tears formed on her eyelids. "I don't want you to cry about it!" the Chief warned, flourishing the index finger of his right hand at her. "To be barren is no crime, and I don't think you are. Some witch might be bothering you --so there's no reason for you to burst into tears whenever someone tries to do something about it." (p. 30).

One sympathizes with and for Korlu because in traditional Liberian society, a woman's worth or value is determined by her ability to bear children. If she is barren, then she becomes a social outcast. In Korlu's case, her barrenness is attributed to witchcraft.

Thus, to forestall witchcraft, Chief Kortuma carries out his late father's advice. He visits Kerkula, the medicine -man, who informs him that Korlu is unable to conceive because she is bewitched. Kekula performs the necessary rituals, and Korlu actually conceives and gives birth to twins. One of the twins dies shortly after birth. The other dies at the age of two months; shortly after the naming ceremony. The baby's death saddens Chief Kortuma because he desperately wants a male heir to continue the Gbolokai lineage. Consequently, he decides to punish the witch who is responsible for the death of his twin sons.

To punish the witch who is allegedly the cause of his son's death, Chief Kortuma asks Flomo, a sorcerer, to perform a trial by ordeal.

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During the trial by ordeal, a woman goes into a trance and discloses that the witch is in a cemetery.

In traditional Liberian society, it isn't always possible to locate personal behavior which angers the gods or spirits. An alternative supernatural explanation is that evil influences seek to do the bewitched or sick person or the community harm. Frequently, these evil influences are conceived of in human terms or as spirits which take possession of human beings, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of witchcraft.

If it is not recognized that misfortune can occur by chance, then witchcraft provides an acceptable explanation for undeserved misfortune. Moreover, in traditional Liberian society, belief in witchcraft is by no means incompatible with what one should call natural explanations. There are obvious "natural" explanations of death caused, for instance, when a snake bites a human being. What is not obvious is why the paths of the snake and that particular person should have coincided. Once chance is eliminated as an explanation, the victim might well ask: `What have I done to deserve this ?" If the answer is "nothing," then the only other plausible explanation provided by the belief system of traditional Liberian society is that witchcraft has been at work. In case of death of this kind, or in cases of barrenness and illness, attempts may be made to identify the witch through whom the evil was passed, and the person or persons who had recently quarreled with the victim are the first to be accused. So, along with witchcraft, one invariably finds counter -witchcraft which may take the form of trial by ordeal followed by the punishment of the culprit or culprits. In the case of the death of Chief Kotuma's second twin son, the witch is able to thwart trial by ordeal by killing the woman who goes into a trance. Her death allows the witch to go scot -free because in death, she is unable to disclose the witch's name.

Having dispensed with this important family matter, Chief Kortuma turns all his attention to the war. Gayflor, who is cast in the

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roles of a zoe or medicine -man and a general in Kpelleland, declares war against Golaland. Although the Kpelle win the war, Gayflor receives a fatal wound in the beleaguered village of Kuntaa in Golaland. In spite of his troops' desperate attempts to save his life, he dies. Chief Dadie of Golaland also dies from a fatal wound inflicted by Gayflor. Kolleh, a messenger from the battlefield, brings Chief Kortuma a mixture of good and bad news:

"The heroes will be here this morning," he said breathlessly, bobbing his head for emphasis, both hands gripping his knees. "I came ahead to alert you so that you may prepare to meet them. We won the war three days ago. It was a long and hard struggle, but we did not want to betray your trust. The Master especially was determined to fight to the last man if need be, so long as he brought back victory. He was a strong man, an inspiring leader, a mighty zoe and a true hero...." "So Gayflor died!" the Chief started and twisted in his seat. His voice cracked, tears forming in his eyes, he said, "Tell me how he died." He wiped his face and assumed a brave and positive look. (p. 134).

This item of news disheartens Chief Kortuma. He grieves for Gayflor. But he is consoled by the thought that Gayflor dies a heroic death, for his death saves Kpelleland from slavery.

From this moment on, Chief Kortuma's life begins to take on a new meaning. His daughter, Yembele, graduates from the Sande Society and is engaged to Sengbe. On the day of her wedding, Gbanja, the new Chief of Golaland, comes to Kpelleland with dancers. The purpose of his

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visit is to make peace with Kpelleland. He addresses Chief Kortuma and the Elders of Haindi:

"Chief Kortuma," the tall man spoke in a mild voice. "Elders of Haindi, and all of you who are present here- - first of all, let me introduce myself. I am Gbanja, the new Chief of Golaland. I did not come to recount the tragic conflict which resulted in heavy losses on our side. We lost our Chief and our legendary hero; this means that we lost the war. As fortune would have it, the the council of Elders elected me to succeed Chief Daide. I came in the name of all the people of Golaland to try and restore friendship between our two lands. Whatever happened in the past, whether good or bad, cannot be undone. Chief Kortuma, let us make a new beginning (p. 166).

As a token of his sincere desire to be at peace with Kpelleland, Chief Gbanja offers Chief Kortuma a Gola virgin.

Stylistically, Sankawulo uses the point of view of the central intelligence. In other words, Chief Kortuma is the pivot, the single central intelligence used throughout the novel. He registers and evaluates everything that happens including to and in himself. Herein lies the strength of the novel. The other characters are important only for the impact that their words and actions have on Kortuma's consciousness. Kortuma's psyche, in short, provides the stage for the vast drama enacted in The Rain and the Night. Chief Kortuma is what his society has made him, for his most sterling qualities are his determination, self-confidence, resilience, sensitivity, and ability to respond to the demands of his family and society. For example, when he is confronted with a family matter such as the marital status of his father's widows, he gives it much thought and care by rationalizing that he already has three wives who present him with constant problems. Polang, his

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youngest wife, proves intractable. Korlu's barrenness is a persistent issue. Lorpu is an unfaithful wife. Consequently, he realizes that although polygamy has some advantages, it does have some drawbacks as well. To take on more wives would add to his mounting problems. He settles the matter amicably by telling his father's widows that he will take care of them until they remarry. Then, too, when the Elders warn him that his hesitancy or reluctance to declare war against the Gola will spell doom and gloom for the Kpelle, he responds immediately by declaring war against Golaland.

Sankawulo's language deserves special attention. It is a common fact that African writers, when writing in English, maintain a distinct African style. For example, the importance of imagery and proverbs in the African oral tradition has carried over into Sankawulo's novel. His use of imagery and proverbs are aspects of his style traceable to the African oral tradition. Though initially part of the oral tradition, these basic African stylistic features have carried over into Sankawulo's writing.

Senegal's Leopold Senghor, at the first Conference of Negro Writers and Artists held in Paris in 1956, noted that image and rhythm are the fundamental features of African style:

. . Any language is wearisome that does not tell a story, better still, the African Negro does not

understand such a language. . . . The European

is empiric, the African is mystic and metaphysical. . . . . The words are always pregnant with images.'

The title of Sankawulo's novel is a fine example of symbolic imagery. By looking at the organization of the book as a whole, and by concentrating on two chapters, one notes that symbolic imagery permeates Sankawulo's writing. For example, Chap. 1 opens with the symbolic image of the "rain ":

He leaped out of the house into the cold, drizzling

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night and wended his way among cows, goats and sheep that lay on their bellies in the village square, absently chewing the cud. (p. 1).

In essence, the "rain" sets the tone of the novel. Four pages later in Chapter 1, we encounter the symbolic image of the "rain ":

As they approached the Chiefs house, an outburst of rain suddenly besieged the village and the surrounding forest. The storm blew with a mighty force. It broke boughs and rustled thatched roofs. Loose thatch and leaves flew everywhere. The rain poured in torrents. Lightning flashed repeatedly. ... A rainbow appeared perilously on the eastern outskirts.Kortuma and the Master spied it now and then as they fought their way through the melee. All this proved to them, beyond doubt, that the Chief had gone. (p.5).

Be that as it may, the peace and tranquility in the village are disrupted when the storm breaks out. Besides setting the tone of the novel, 1 the "rain" also provides the story's leitmotif and cohesive force. For instance, when the vast drama unfolds in The Rain and the Night the "rain" creates a bleak and gloomy atmosphere. Ironically, the "rain" is an honorific as well as a hostile force of nature which seems to be humanly indifferent.

However, just as the action in which Kortuma is involved develops into the pattern of the plot of reversal, his situation at the end being the direct opposite of its beginning, so, too the "rain" reverses its meaning from a kind of rhetorical dialectic: from naturalistic coldness, it develops into a symbol of tragic warmth, of Kortuma's expanded consciousness. In his inimitable power of graphic description, Sankawulo depicts the imagery of

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the "rain" in Chapter 12:

As he walked to the village by himself, the men already gone ahead, Chief Kortuma was startled at a sudden change in the weather. It was slightly past noon, and the sky which had been clear, bristling with sunshine just a moment ago, turned completely dark. It began to drizzle. For a time he was uneasy until he understood that the darkness meant that the Ancestors were honoring him for the victory, and the drizzle was the tears of his men who fell in the war .... (p.114).

Thus, on the one hand, the rain symbolizes honor and tragedy "; on the other, it symbolizes Chief Kortuma's inner change and his basic escape from his ego or self-consciousness of humanity including the living and the dead war heroes. Therefore, Chief Kortuma is a classic example of the dynamic character in that he undergoes a significant change from a tense, insecure Chief to a calm, charismatic, thoughtful, and self-confident leader.

Throughout the novel, Sankawulo makes extensive use of figurative language. Note, for example, the following figures of speech:

Kortuma watched the gaunt, stiff body which looked like a figure carved from wood." (p. 7).

The kola trees around the village looked battered, the storm having ripped off many of their branches; yet they swayed gently in the soft morning breeze like heroes who, having lost the war remained undefeated. (p. 8).

The question of Chief Gbolokai's widows would

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spring up like a cobra and stare him in the face." (p. 54).

For a moment, she sat still like a statue and stared at him with a long face, her thick lips parted in disbelief." (p 63).

News travel in the jungle like fire in dry thatched roofs." (p. 70).

These figures of speech create images or "picture concepts" in the reader's mind. These images are further reinforced by the author's use of proverbs. The proverb may be applied to any situation where it may fit. The image it creates is a generalized, stable message clothed in the garb of a particular situation. For example, when Chief Gbolokai says that his son, Kortuma, should make a peace offering rather than a blood sacrifice because "In the mouth of a witch blood is very delicious," the reader has an image not just of the character of the father but of his ties to traditional Liberian culture that are part and parcel of Chief Gbolokai's cognitive system. Again, when the Kpelle people's attempt to prevent an inter -ethnic war fails, Chief Yekeh says: "You can't dig love and respect out of a person with a hoe," thus emphasizing the futility of reasoning with the Gola. With an inter -ethnic war imminent, the Kpelle Chief finds that his traditional wisdom and teachings are still part of his approach to life. All this information is succinctly summarized in the reference to the proverb.

Sankawulo uses these proverbs as an expression of that thought mode and as an attempt to communicate the connotative aspects of Liberian life not merely as an adornment to his writing. The proverb is a key element of oral African literature. Its teaching characteristics are inherent in its short form not influenced by a performer's variations as other forms such as poetry may be. It is a carrier of the philosophy and thought -patterns of culture. Thus, its use carries levels of meaning apart from its primary message. To

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count all Sankawulo's figures of speech, images, and proverbs would be to count just about every thought in the novel. The inevitable fact is that these carry varying levels of meaning in the varying "picture concepts" which they provide in the reader's mind.

In his essay, "The Role of the Writer in a New Nation," Chinua Achebe (1973) wrote: " ... for an African writing in English is not without its setback. He finds himself describing situations or modes of thought which have no direct equivalent in the English way of life. i3 Although the accents and premises are slightly different, Basil Matthews (1980), a scholar of international posture, made a similar assertion in the following extract:

... in Black use the thought is generated through the use of a picture concept (visualization) rather

than through the use... of theoretical statement. . .

In Black imagery, a picture of a thing as it really exists is put before the mind and imagination. In the Black method, one proceeds through visual thinking as against non -visual thinking.... in Black use thought is a living thing....4

Sankawulo seems to adhere to this Black aesthetic to the letter. Following the Aristotelian ideal expounded in the Rhetorica,5 the Western tradition has dictated that imagery, except in minute amounts, belongs properly to poetry--or at most to "creative writing." The present reviewer's critical examination of Sankawulo's use of imagery confirms this. The imagery he employs in The Rain and the Night conveys concrete denotative information and, through the metaphorical language, affective or connotative information.

There are other symbols in the novel, but they are symbols of power which Chief Gbolokai passes on to his son, Kortuma. These symbols

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includes (1) the gown which symbolizes Chief Kortuma's regal attire; (2) the cowtail which symbolizes his gavel used in rendering judgments involving cases of life and death; and (3) the ivory stool which symbolizes his royal throne.

The theme of the novel is the construction of peace and amity on the ruins of the tragedy of war.

Despite Sankawulo's attentiveness to style, there are, however, two weaknesses in the novel. First, the opening paragraph of the novel demonstrates a stock situation: the central character is introduced to the reader as he walks in torrents of rain, the thunder roaring and rumbling. Such an opening is so commonplace that it turns the beginning scene into a stock situation. Second, although Sankawulo's descriptive passages are indeed graphic, they are at times so long -winded that some are superfluous. Moreover, there are a number of grammatical infelicities in the novel. Happily, they are few. The following sentences are among the few that contain dangling participial phrases:

On entering the house, a group of goats scrambled up in a disorderly fashion, the sound of their clattering hoofs jarring his mind and body. (p. 1).

Depending on the nature of the problem, the eyes would roll in terror or relax in peace or be resigned in despair. (p. 32).

Despite the shortcomings of The Rain and the Night, it is an important work of art. Sankawulo's characters come alive very well. The strengths of Sankawulo's characterization apart, much of the novel works very well. He uses imagery, figures of speech and proverbs not as mere literary ornaments. Rather, he inlays them in the organic structure of the

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story.

Although doom and gloom were initially foreshadowed in the novel, the narrative ends on an optimistic note when the Kpelle and the Gola express a sincere desire for peace and amity. The Rain and the Night is one of Liberia's finest works of creative fiction. It creates a strong dramatic interest that is suspenseful and a well -drawn central character whose transformation in the course of the narrative rationalizes his actions and experiences and gives them relevance.

Endnotes

'The year 1952 is generally taken as a starting point of contemporary African-English literature in that it ushered in the publication of Amos Tutuola's novel, The Palm -Wine Drinkard. However, one can put forward an equally cogent argument to the effect that the year, 1891, is, in essence, the starting point of African- English literature with the publication of Joseph Walter's novel, Guanya Pau: A Story of an African Princess, Liberia's first novel. This novel must also be considered to be the first novel to be written in English by an African. This was brought to the attention of this reviewer by Dr. John Victor Singler of New York University.

2Grace Cooper, "A Look at Our Language," New Directions, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 1980), p. 14.

3Chinua Achebe, "The Role of the Writer in a New Nation," in G. Kilam (ed.), African Writers on African Writing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); quoted in Grace Cooper, "A Look at Our Language," New Directions, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 1980), p. 16.

'Basil Matthews, "Voice of Africa in the Diaspora," New Directions, 4 (April 1977), p. 16

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'Cf. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, translated by J. H. Freese (London: Heinemann Education Ltd., 1975) pp. 355 -357; and the Poetics, translated with an Introduction and notes by Gerald F. Else (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1970), Chaps. 21 and 22, pp. 56 -61. Also see Dr. Grace C. Cooper's article, "A Look at Our Language" in New Directions, Vol. 7 No. 3 (July 1980) pp. 14 -17. I owe her a debt of gratitude in this section of my interpretive analysis of The Rain and the Night. Her insightful discussion of black writers' use of language exemplified in their uncanny gift for imagery- writing is equally applicable to Sankawulo's use of imagery in The Rain and the Night.

Robert H. Brown University of Essex United Kingdom

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Werner Korte, ETHNISCHE TRADITION UND MILITARISCHE INTERVENTION IN AFRIKA- -Essay uber den Putch von 1980 in Liberia. Munster: Lit Verlag, 1995. 120 pp.

The 12th of April this year marked the 16th anniversary of the bloody military take over which dramatically altered the politics of Liberia. This event which tilted the political balance in the country has since been a question subjected to various forms of interpretations by authors of different academic disciplines. Thus, the accounts of the developments that preceded the coup, the nature and character of the enlisted men who staged it, the power struggle which ensued in the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and the chain of events which led to the demise of the Samuel Doe dictatorship have since undergone vigorous analyses.

Werner Korte's book, ETHNISCHE TRADITION UND MILITARISCHE INTERVENTION IN AFRIKA Essay uber den Putsch von 1980 in Liberia (ETHNIC TRADITION AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA-Essay About The Coup of 1980 in Liberia) is perhaps one of the few works which bases its analysis of the April 12 coup against the background of the cultural, ethnic, and traditional make -up of the noncommissioned officers whose action terminated 133 years of political hegemony of the elitist Americo -Liberian ruling class.

In generating the thrust of his thesis, the author begins by asserting on page 5 that:

"In dieser Arbeit geht es ... um Fragen der ethnischen Dimension militaerischer Machtergreifung und -ausubung."

(What is being dealt with in this work is the

Liberian Studies Journal XXI, 1 (1996)

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ethnic dimension of the military seizure and use of power).

Additionally, the author states on page 15 that his "zentrale Theses ist, dass die Ethnisierung der Politik Liberias eine Ursache im Putsch vom 12.4.1980 und im sich anschliessenden Machtkampf der Hauptprotagonistenhatte..." (His central thesis is that the ethnicization of Liberian politics underscored the reason for the coup of April 12, 1980, and in this connection, the power struggle among its major protagonists). Not only is the author's thesis polemic, but it also clashes with views held in other circles.

In contrast, thus, it is worth noting that the military seizure of state power in Liberia was a direct sequel of the harsh socio- economic realities which plagued the country for almost a century and a half and dichotomized the society on that basis.

On the one hand was the elitist status quo of the Americo- Liberians which created and maintained a very repressive political superstructure. Furthermore, it consolidated economic power by turning itself into a local bourgeois -like class that supervised the plunder of the natural resources and the exploitation of the people of Liberia in the interest of multinational corporations. On the other hand were the underprivileged who engaged the status quo in a fierce struggle for the decentralization of political power, the democratization of the nation, and the redistribution of the national wealth. This constituted the fundamental problem in the country. It affected and conscientized almost every sector of the Liberian society including the military in which the underprivileged quantitatively dominated. Hence, the overthrow of the status quo by some members of the military who, by historical coincidence were indigenous.

Korte is at his best in chapter 8 -- " Plannung, Vorbereitung Und Durchfuehrung Des Putsches" (Planning, Preparation and Staging of the

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Coup) -- where he unmasks Samuel Doe's erroneous, contradictory and self-glorifying account about how the coup was designed and executed. By presenting Thomas Quiwonkpa's version, the author also skillfully creates a scenario in which the two men engage each other in a debate as to what actually transpired before, during, and after the overthrow of President William R. Tolbert, Jr. Moreover, Korte effectively unveils the internal fight which ensued within the PRC and the government as well as the systematic elimination by Doe of his fellow Councilmen and civilian members of the government.

Readers may take interest in how the author delves into the ethnography of southeastern Liberia. Making use of the works of authors such as Heckmann, Massing, Kurtz, Schroeder, etc., the author makes a laudable effort in producing resourceful information about the cultural and traditional similarities as well as differences that exist among the ethnic groups which inhabit the southeastern part of Liberia. One shortcoming, however, is his attempt to link the power struggle and personal conflict between Doe and Quiwonkpa as being rooted in the cultural and traditional differences between the Krahn and Dan/Mano ethnic groups.

CIA

Korte's work in Appendix 2 concerning the herculean question of the CIA's allege involvement in the April 12 coup is highly impressive. On this question, there is no emphatic and direct theory advanced by the writer himself. Instead, the author bombards readers with an avalanche of theories and hypotheses of some renowned writers on Liberia. In this respect, readers are endowed with the opportunity of engaging in the ongoing debate on a question to which several opinions have already been expressed. Irrespective of the many theories, there seems to be a consensus that the United States militarily and financially supported Doe after the coup, may have turned him into a tyrant, and thus empowered him to eliminate anyone who opposed US interest in Liberia. To date, he U.S. State Department has

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neither confirmed nor denied the allege involvement of Uncle Sam in the April 12, 1980 coup. However, the fact that the Doe government received over half a billion dollars in military and development aid from Washington is well documented, and has never been in dispute.

Setting the record straight

Two notable errors need to be corrected: first, Quiwonkpa's attempted overthrow of Doe took place on November 12, 1985. It did not take place in "Dezember (December) 1985" as indicated on the first line on page 2. Second, on page 22, the author may probably be referring to resistance posed to the Liberian Frontier Force during President Arthur Barclay's administration by the Krus and the Grebos (not the Krus and Krahns as stated on line 4). This resistance culminated in the Sasstown and Tienpo wars respectively in the southeastern part of Liberia.

From outside looking in

Finally, viewing Liberia from the outside is very difficult. The country, although not fundamentally different from the rest of Africa, has some uniqueness in its history and politics. These nuances usually eludes academicians exploring the intricate politics of the country and its people if care is not taken. Against this backdrop, Werner Korte must be applauded for his painstaking research and effort. In Appendix 1, Korte sincerely admits the limitation of this book due to the inadequacy of materials, his intuitive initial perception of the situation immediately after the coup, and his late discovery of other dimensions, among others. Nevertheless, Ethnische Tradition Und Militarische Intervention In Afrika... " is good reading material and an additional source of information on Liberia and its complex internal politics.

Dougbeh C. Nyan, MD June 1996

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Adeleke, Ademola. "The Politics and Diplomancy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operations In Liberia." Journal of Modern African Studies 4 (1995): 569.

Bee, Joe M., and Aaron Von Williamson. The Liberian Civil War 1990 -1994. Chicago: JB Publishers, 1995. 110 pages.

Broderick, Cyril. "Changes in the Climate at Harbel, Liberia." Biological Agriculture and Horticulture 12.2 (1995): 133.

Browne, Herman B. THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A Dialectic Study of the African and Liberation Traditions. London: Avon Books, 1996. 370 pages.

Dolo, Emmanuel. Democracy Versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa's Oldest Republic- -Liberia. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1996. 198 pages.

Ellis, Stephen. "LIBERIA: 1989 -1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." African Affairs (1995), 94, 165 -197.

Hastings, Adrian. The Church in Africa: 1450 -1950. London: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Hogh, Birte, Nuahn T. Maribiah and Per Kragl Andersen. "Relationship Between Maternally Derived Anti- Plasmodium Flaciparum Antibodies and Risk of Infection and Disease in Infants Living in an Area of Liberia, West Africa, in which Malaria is Highly Endemic." Infection and Immunity 63.10: 4034.

Justice and Peace Commission. The Liberian Crisis. Monrovia: National

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1 (1996)

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Catholic Secretariat, July, 1994. 237 pages.

Lacey, Linda and hit Sinai. "Do Female Headed Households Have Different Shelter Needs Than Men? The Case of Monrovia, Liberia." Journal of Comparative Family Studies 27.1 (1996).

Kieh, George Klay, Jr. Ending the Liberian Civil War: Implications for United States Policy Towards West Africa. Washington, D.C.: TransAfrica Forum, 1996.

Kofron, Christopher P. and Angela Chapman. "Defforestration and Bird Species Composition in Liberia, West Africa." Tropical Zoology 8.2 (1995).

Konneh, Augustine. Religion, Commerce and the Integration of the Mandingo in Liberia. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1996.

Konneh, Augustine. "CITIZENSHIP AT THE MARGINS: Status, Ambiguity, and the Mandingo of Liberia." African Studies Review 39.2 (1996).

Korte, Werner. Ethnische Tradition und militarische Intervention in Afrika: Essay uber den Putsch von 1980 in Liberia. Munster: Lit Verlag, 1995. 120 pages.

Moose, George. "U.S. Resources and Response to Development in Liberia U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6.42 (1995): 750.

Peterson, Dave. "Liberia: Crying for Freedom." Journal of Democracy 7.2: 148

Reno, William. "The Business of War in Liberia." Current History 95.601

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Sarah J. Hole's Liberia." The New England Quarterly 68.4 (1995): 558.

Smock, David R. And Chester H. Crocker. AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: The United States Role in Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 1995.

Zartman, William. COLLAPSED STATES: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1995.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1(1996)

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Editor's Note. Beginning on April 6, 1996, the fragile cease fire in the Liberian civil war was shattered and remains so as we go to press. Below, we have attempted to provide a chronology of some of the milestones that mark key events since the escalation of hostilities. This is not an attempt to make sense of a senseless situation, it is just an attempt to record and document some of the events, and provide some type of time line.

1996 April 6 Fierce clashes in Monrovia after police and malitiamen loyal to the interim government try to arrest General Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO -J on murder charges. Fighting and looting puts many thousands of civilians to flight.

April 9 As fighting rages on in Monrovia, U.N. Observers and about 15,000 others seek refuge in a U.S. Embassy compound. Twenty -six Americans, including two children are evacuated and arrive safely in Freetown, Sierra Leone on the first flight from Monrovia.

April 11 Mobs break down the gates of the U.N. headquarters and looters attempt to jump the walls of the U.S. Embassy compound. ECOMOG peacekeepers join in a frenzy of looting and plunder.

April 12 16th Anniversary of the coup d'etat that ushered in military rule and a culture of violence in Liberian politics. As rebels rule the streets or Monrovia, the U.N., Red Cross and other international relief agencies announce their intentions to pull out of Liberia.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1(1996)

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April 14 Press reports confirm that Roosevelt Johnson and his ethnic Krahn militiamen were holding hundreds of people hostage in the Barclay Training Center, a military garrison in Monrovia. The hostages included 22 ECOMOG soldiers and 50 Lebanese. Charles Taylor calls of Johnson to surrender and release the hostages. Johnson refuses. Taylor holds press conference and calls Johnson a "terrorist."

April 15 Liberian government criticizes international community for pulling out of Liberia. Johnson considers offer of asylum from Nigeria. People in the BTC begin dying from cholera. U.S. Navy amphibious ships carrying about 1,500 Marines head towards Liberia's coast. Taylor pays visit to U.S. Embassy in a convoy of 200 bodyguards and issues a formal complaint about "improper" use of flares by U.S. marines around the embassy compound. Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi accuses the United States of not giving enough financial or technical aid to ECOMOG.

April 16 Troops loyal to Charles Taylor launch attack on BTC. At least five refugees are killed and one critically wounded in the fighting as Johnson's forces return fire. First reports of food shortages in the BTC. First group of refugees flee BTC.

April 18 Nigerian military ruler Gen Sani Abacha and Benin President Mathieu Kerekou appeal to warring fractions to "embrace peace for the sake of their people." Commanders of ECOMOG start peace negotiations at the U.S. Embassy. Talks include U.N. officials and representatives of fractional leaders. Cholera spreads

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to the 20,000 refugees in the U.S. embassy compound. James Jonah, a former U.N. under secretary- general who organized elections to end military rule in neighboring Sierra Leone, arrives in Monrovia to help negotiate an end to the fighting.

April 19 Johnson agrees to cease -fire and releases 78 foreigners trapped by the fighting. Cease -fire includes plan for peacekeepers to set up buffer zone around BTC. Two other vessels, the destroyer USS Connolly and the merchant ship USNS Bighorn, are diverted from the Mediterranean to link up with the USS Guam.

April 20 U.S. Marines arrive in Monrovia to protect embassy.

April 22 U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Twaddell and three other U.S. officials land in Monrovia to join peace talks. They promise $30 million in additional aid to peacekeepers. Liberians venture out to buy much -needed supplies at exorbitant prices.

April 23 Residents burn dead bodies in Monrovia. U.S. delegation meets with six -man Council of State.

April 25 A panel discussion on options to end the conflict in Liberia is hosted by the Constituency for Africa and Howard University Ralph Bunche International Affairs Center. Keynote speaker is Hon. Donald M. Payne of the Congressional Black Caucus. Johnson agrees to return arms seized from ECOMOG. U.S. delegation leaves Monrovia, arrives in Accra.

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April 26 Mass demonstration for peace in Liberia held in Washington, D.C. Taylor vows to gain control of BTC. Wilton Sankawulo, the Chairman of the Council of State, lays blame for the collapse of peace process at the feet of the international community. International Contact Group on Liberia chaired by Assistant Secretary of State George Moose meets in Geneva. James Bishop, a former U.S. ambassador to Liberia, publishes an article in the Christian Science Monitor titled "A Solution for Liberia: Send in the Marines."

April 29 Ten -day truce collapses. Heavy fighting reported in Monrovia. Taylor and Sankawulo flee Executive Mansion under hail of bullets from troops loyal to Roosevelt Johnson.

April 30 U.S. Marines protecting Embassy kill three Liberian gunmen who were allegedly firing towards the embassy.

May 1 Following the exchange of fire on Tuesday, April 30, U.S. ships anchored off Liberia move within three miles off the coast in an apparent show of force. Press reports confirm that "All quite on Liberian front...." George Moose returns to Washington after failing to see Taylor and Alhaji Kromah, leader of ULIMO -K, because of fierce fighting in the city.

May 3 ECOMOG forces whisk Roosevelt Johnson out of BTC. U.S. airlifts him out of Monrovia for peace talks in Accra scheduled for May 7 and 8. U.S. announces that Taylor and other warlord who refuse to attend the talks will be barred from U.S. shores. The threat of the ban is

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also extended to their families, close associates and others who are impeding Liberia's peace process and its transition to democracy. Taylor terms Johnson's departure a "surrender." Johnson's spokesman disagrees.

May 4 More fighting reported in and around Monrovia shattering hopes that Johnson's departure will bring a halt to the war. Taylor is quoted as saying, "The fighting now going on is intended to diminish the ability of Johnson's men to make war." First confirmed reports that ULIMO -J fighters were fighting in the nude. The term "butt naked" enters the war jargon.

May 5 Over 2,500 refugees sing the patriotic hymn, "The Lone Star Forever," as they wave from the deck of the Nigerian freighter Bulk Challenger. Behind them, Monrovia burns.

May 6 Taylor orders his loyalists to lay down their arms but acknowledges that it would take time for his command to reach the streets. U.S. Marines fire on more looters outside the embassy. Johnson holds press conference in Accra and accuse Taylor and Kromah of violating the Abuja Peace Accord signed in August 1995. Former leader of the INPFL, Prince Yormie Johnson, says in Lagos that ECOMOG should be empowered to enforce the peace in Liberia. Prince Johnson who headed the INPFL, a splinter group of Charles Taylor's NPFL, has been in exile in Nigeria since 1992. He is crediting with capturing and killing Samuel Doe in September 1990.

May 7 Scheduled Peace Talks in Accra crumble after most West African leaders fail to show up. Taylor and Kromah also stay away from talks. Ghanaian President, Jerry Rawlings

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warn Liberians that "their country is in mortal danger of being completely abandoned by the international community. Fighting spreads to the diplomatic community of Mamba Point.

May 9 The freighter Bulk Challenge is forced back to open sea by Ivorian officials. Even though the vessel is "leaky and not seaworthy," the officials say they fear a new flood of Liberian refugees. Relief agencies supply the ship with rice, bread, sardines, plastic sheeting, buckets and soap before it leaves the Port of San Pedro in western Ivory Coast.

May 11 Ghanian authorities refuse entry to the Bulk Challenge. Two other boats crammed with refugees leave the Freeport of Monrovia despite the Challenge's fate. One of the boats, the Victory Reefer, reaches Freetown and waits off the coast while Sierra Leonean officials ponder its fate.

May 12 Outbreak of cholera on the Bulk Challenge is confirmed. Ivorian Interior Minister Emile Bombet defends his government's decision to force refuse the vessel entry, saying its passengers included 2,065 Liberian guerrillas. It is reported that the vessel was also carrying some 200 Nigerian soldiers of ECOMOG but it is not clear why. Three deaths are reported on the vessel, including two as a result of an unexplained shooting incident.

May 14 Ghanaian authorities finally allow Bulk Challenge to dock in Takoradi after ten days at sea. Some refugees prayed, others sobbed upon reaching dry land. Passengers include Tom Woewiyu, Liberia's Labor Minister and a former official of the militia run by Charles Taylor.

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Also on board was Gayeh Fahnbulleh, the first deputy speaker and Chairman of Liberia's Interim Judicial Council. The number of Nigerian ECOMOG troops on board is downsized to 26 who said that they boarded as individuals "on pass." There were also 133 Nigerian civilians, 1,559 Liberians, 131 Ghanaians, according to UNHCR spokesman Francis Kpatinde; total, 1849, excluding the crew.

May 16 Krahn ethnic militiamen belonging to the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Liberian Peace Council join ULIMO -J men to defend Schefflin military barracks, 14 miles south east of Monrovia. George Boley, leader of the Peace Council, surfaces in Abuja and lays the blame for the renewed fighting at the feet of Taylor and Kromah.

May 19 Council chairman Wilton Sankawulo says on state radio that the Council is willing to reinstate Roosevelt Johnson to the government in the interest of peace.

May 20 The commander of ECOMOG, General John Inienger, says he has only half the troops he needs to stop the war. ECOMOG troops number an estimated 8,500. Inienger says he needs 18,000 and additional weapons.

May 22 U.N. Secretary- General Boutros Boutros -Ghali tells the Security Council that the fractional leaders have "(clearly) shown wanton disrespect for the United Nations, ECOWAS, and the international community; ... and their disregard for the aspirations of the Liberian people for peace. He adds that if ECOMOG withdraws from Liberia, the U.N. will also withdraw its small

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contingent of U.N. Observer Mission (UNOMIL) which currently consists of only 25 civilian and military personnel. 88 of the original 93 military observers were previously evacuated with the renewed fighting.

May 24 U.S. charges that looting in Liberia has reached "Olympian heights," and blamed ECOMOG. An attempt of a peace march by ordinary Liberians hoping to send a message to to the U.N. via the U.S. embassy, is disrupted by heavy fighting.

May 24 -27 An All- Liberian Leadership Summit is convened in Boston, Massachusetts. The meeting, hosted by the Liberian Community Association of Massachusetts, adjourned with four major resolutions: (1) Unity among Liberians and Liberian Organizations; (2) Massive Fund Raising; (3) Lobbying the U.S. government for direct involvement and a massive public petition drive; (4) Restructuring ULAA and making it an umbrella organization for all Liberian Organizations in the U.S.

May 27 ECOMOG blanket Monrovia and begin disarming fighters. Taylor calls for peace and says he is prepared to hold talks with Roosevelt Johnson and other rivals. A group calling itself the Mothers of Liberia announce a Memorial Day Matinee at the Beacon Theater in New York City to raise money to support the children who arrived in Ghana on the Bulk Challenge. The Council of State orders "all government forces" to surrender their positions to ECOMOG. Most fighters obey the order, abandoning their positions and riding off in relief agency trucks filled with goods looted during the fighting.

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May 28 Liberia's Ambassador to the U.N. William Bull urges the U.N. to dispatch troops to Liberia.

May 29 Liberian international soccer star George Weah tells Reuter that his cousins were raped and his Monrovia home burned down by guerrillas after he publicly supported a call for his war -torn country to become a U.N. trusteeship. The same call was made earlier by James Jonah. A team of Ghanian mediators arrive in Monrovia.

May 31 U.N. Security Council votes to accept the recommendation of the Secretary- General and extend the mandate of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until August 31, 1996. The Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1059 (1996).

June 3 Nigeria sends two naval vessels to Liberia to assist ECOMOG.

June 5 ULIMO -K leader Alhaji Kromah says Liberia should hold promised elections as soon as possible but adds that he wants proper disarmament and the return of refugees first.

June 6 Reports of an outbreak of fighting in Monrovia after a two -week lull that residents had hoped meant the fighting was over. UNHCR expresses concern about the fate of a Russian vessel somewhere off the West African coast said to be carrying 450 people, half of them Liberian refugees.

June 7-9 A conference called by the Coalition for Peace and Democracy meet at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and adopt three resolution on:

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(1) National Security; (2) Governance; (3) A Liberian Constituency in the U.S. The conference which represented a broad spectrum of Liberians also decided that "it is appreciative of the current position of the international community relative to the 1995 Abuja framework; the Conference is nevertheless of the view that pending the next ECOWAS Summit, alternative strategies to the peace process be seriously considered by all involved in the conflict.

June 8 A medical team led by Liberia's chief pathologist, Dr. Isaac Moses, exhumes and reburies 321 bodies. The group also reports that it has been discovering about 20 graves a day in locations throughout Monrovia.

June 9 The Russian vessel, Zolotitsa (Little Golden One) is found off the coast of Ghana.

June 11 Major aid groups announce further drastic reduction in their operations in protest of the civil war. They say that U.S. trade practices have fueled the violence

June 12 A renewed report of an outbreak of Tuberculosis and measles among the 16,000 people seeking refuge in a U.S. embassy compound is reported.

June 14 Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah express regret over the latest breach of the cease -fire. "We are all ashamed of the events of the last two weeks," Taylor says.

June 15 Nigerian Ambassador to Liberia, Joshua Irooha, tells the Pan African News Agency that his country is making arrangements to evacuate over 2,000 Nigerians trapped in

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Liberia by the fighting. Reports from Liberia say 15 people a day are dying from food shortages and disease around Tubmanburg, Bomi County.

June 16 Report of renewed fighting around Cape Mount in western Liberia between ULIMO -J and ULIMO -K.

June 17- Final journal entry: " 2277222292297 927777722292229972977"

Editor's Note: These were compiled from newspaper and magazine articles, wire reports, and information from the Internet.

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U.S. Senators Ask President Clinton for UN Peacekeeping Force

On May 23, Senators Feingold Feinstein, Simon, Leahy Moseley -Braun and Congressman Payne (chair of Congressional Black Caucus) sent an urgent letter regarding Liberia to President Clinton. The letter, initiated by Senator Feingold, requests heightened U.S. involvement in the search for peace and a UN peacekeeping force for Liberia.

Text of letter to President Clinton

May 23, 1996

President William J. Clinton The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We wish to express our deep concern about the recent tragic developments in Liberia and our belief that a new, bolder approach is needed from the United States and the international community.

We have strongly supported the role of the ECOMOG forces since their initial deployment. Given the most recent fighting, however, it appears that the West African peacekeeping operation does not have the adequate resources or capabilities to restore security to this war -torn country. In the absence of a strong peacekeeping force, the major factions have engaged in actions that seriously violate the terms of the Abuja Accord signed on Aug. 19, 1995. Demobilization efforts have been unable to proceed as scheduled, and major armed conflict has returned to Monrovia.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, I (1996)

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We believe that a long -term resolution of conflict in Liberia cannot be effectively realized without the strong involvement of the international community and the United Nations. We, therefore, urge you to propose and advocate among the other members of the UN Security Council the augmentation of the existing UN mission into a peacekeeping force to be sent to Liberia as soon as possible. The force, which should be drawn from interested African states, including troops from existing ECOMOG forces, should be placed under the authority of the United Nations. The United States an play a role in providing appropriate transportation and logistical assistance.

In our view, the presence of a more robust U.N. force could bring about a cessation of the current round of fighting and could help create an environment in which humanitarian assistance, demobilization and implementation of the political transition process outlined in the Abuja agreement can resume.

The United States has a long and unique relationship with Liberia and her people. For this reason, we have a responsibility to take the lead in helping formulate ways to address this tragic situation. Continued hostilities in the country will only add to the humanitarian disaster and lead to increased regional instability. Accordingly, we have a compelling national interest to take a more active role in securing peace.

Sincerely,

Russell D. Feingold Carol Moseley -Braun Patrick J. Leahy

Paul Simon Diane Feinstein Donald Payne.

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Following is the official text of a letter on Liberia from President Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, dated May 20, 1996:

On April 11, 1996, I reported that U.S. military forces equipped for combat had entered Monrovia, Liberia, for the purpose of evacuating American citizens and certain third- country nationals from that strife -torn city. This letter is provided, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, to update the Congress on the continued deployment of U.S. forces, including the response by those forces to several isolated attacks on the American Embassy complex on April 30, 1996, and May 6, 1996.

As of this date, U.S. forces have evacuated over 2,300 persons from Monrovia, including over 470 American citizens. The U.S. Special Operations and U.S. Army Europe forces that conducted the initial evacuations have been replaced by U.S. Marines assigned to a Marine Amphibious Ready Group offshore in the immediate vicinity of Monrovia. Approximately 280 Marines and other U.S. military personnel from the total U.S. force of 2,500 are currently ashore at the American Embassy complex. In addition to protecting American lives and property at the Embassy complex, the mission of these forces is to maintain the capability to conduct further evacuations if circumstances warrant.

On April 30, 1996, three separate attacks occurred against the American Embassy complex reportedly involving fighters from several factions. In the first encounter, a U.S. Marine was grazed by a round fired by one of the attackers. The Marines did not return fire, and the injured Marine was able to return to duty on the same day. In the second attack, a Marine was struck by plywood splinters dislodged by an incoming round. During this attack, the Marines returned fire killing two or more attackers. During the final encounter, approximately 40 to 50 attackers, while apparently engaged in a pursuit of fighters from another faction, fired on the Marines. After the Marines returned fire, one of the attackers fired again.

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The Marines again returned fire, this time killing two or more attackers.

Separately, on May 6, 1996, unknown factional forces fired upon the Embassy complex. The Marines returned fire with machine guns and

automatic weapons, driving off the attackers. No U . S. forces were killed or injured in this encounter. One member of the attacking force may have been wounded.

Finally, on May 11, 1996, a U.S. Marine walking on the Embassy compound was struck by a stray round. The Marine was slightly injured. He was treated and returned to full duty. This incident was the result of stray fire between warring factions and appears not to have been directed at the Marines or the Embassy.

The Marine commander reported that during these attacks, U.S. forces opened fire only upon persons who fired upon the Embassy complex. In the judgment of U.S. military commanders these attacks are sporadic incidents and do not represent an intent to mount a concerted or deliberate attack against the American Embassy or the Marines. We do not intend that U.S. Armed forces deployed to Liberia become involved in hostilities. Nonetheless, our forces are equipped and prepared to defend American lives and property if necessary.

Our goal is to redeploy U.S. forces once there is no longer a need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain an on -scene evacuation capability.

I have directed the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Liberia pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.

I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed concerning this important deployment of U.S. forces. I

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appreciate the support of the Congress in this action to protect American citizens and our Embassy complex in Monrovia.

Group Ask U. S. To Lead UN Intervention

Following is a statement by 14 American humanitarian agencies, released May 17 by InterAction, the American Council for Voluntary International Action, a membership association of more than 150 U.S. non -profit organizations. The news release is titled "In Response To The growing Crisis In Liberia, Call For The Creation Of United Nations Peacekeeping Force ":

The prolonged crisis in Liberia has forced nearly a third of the country's population to flee their homes and seek refuge abroad. An additional 40 percent of the population has become internally displaced within Liberia, depending on others for their survival. The nation's infrastructure is in ruins. Hundreds of thousands of children are unschooled and tens of thousands have been transformed by the warlords into "boy soldiers."

The most recent fighting has brought the conflict into Monrovia, resulting in a total breakdown of law and order. Relief agencies and international organizations which have been providing essential humanitarian services to the majority of the capital's citizens, were forced to leave Liberia. With their offices looted, their vehicles stolen and the lives of their staff at risk in the continuing chaos, it is not clear what assistance they will be able to provide. Relief activities in the countryside also have been disrupted by the spreading conflict.

Years of negotiations have failed to resolve the conflict among Liberia's warlords. The pleas of the Liberian people for peace continue to be ignored by those leading the various warring factions.

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In order to bring an end to the suffering of the Liberian people, the undersigned agencies urge:

That the United States government recommend to other members of the United Nations Security Council the formation of a United Nations peacekeeping force which would be sent to Liberia as soon as possible. The goal of this operation would be to restore security so that conditions can be created that make possible 1) the resumption of humanitarian assistance, 2) the demobilization of combatants, and 3) a political process which will lead to free and fair election of a government of national unity.

That the U.S. government take the initiative to see that, while units from other peacekeeping -force contributors are being mobilized, the ECOMOG units on the ground in Liberia be brought under the authority of the United Nations. After consultation with ECOWAS, the high command of ECOMOG would be replaced by personnel appointed by the United Nations Security Council. Once under United Nations command, ECOMOG would receive equipment, training and other services provided by donor countries through a fund designated by the United Nations solely for supporting U.N. security operations in Liberia.

That those West African governments which have provided refuge to almost a million Liberians be commended and encouraged by the U.S. government to maintain open borders for Liberians fleeing their country by whatever means. Particular attention should be paid at this time to the urgent humanitarian needs of persons fleeing violence by sea.

That the international community be encouraged by the U.S. government to provide more generous support to those West

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African governments assisting Liberian refugees. The U.S. government should increase its own level of support to those governments.

That political aspects of the peace process be addressed at a senior level by the U.S. government as acceptable levels of security are achieved by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Liberia. It is clear that Liberians and the international community have grave doubts about the viability of the transitional power -sharing arrangement that was created by the Abuja Accords. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the cooperation of the warring factions would be a component of a successful peace process. With this consideration in mind, the U.S. government is urged to ensure that the United Nations permits a role for the Transitional Government created by the Abuja Accords, only if the warring factions participate in a comprehensive demobilization program.

That the U.S. government take the lead in seeing that the donor community provides sufficient funds for a serious disarmament and demobilization program which will offer combatants the prospect of successful reintegration into civilian life.

That the U.S. government, in conjunction with the United Nations Security Council, take vigorous steps to see that nations in the West African region and elsewhere comply with the existing United Nations arms embargo on Liberia.

That the United States naval vessels currently off Monrovia, or replacements with similar capabilities, remain on station off Liberia.

Endorsed by: Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, Africare, American Refugee Committee, CARE, Church World Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Friends of Liberia, International Rescue

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Committee, Refugees International, Southeast Asia Resource Action Center, Trickle Up Program, United Methodist Committee on Relief, World Relief, World Vision US.

Text of a statement on May 28, 1996 by U.S. Ambassador Edward Gnehm, the deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, during a Security Council meeting to decide whether to continue the mandates of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL):

All of us have watched in horror over the past two months as Liberia has descended from hope into despair. Driven by warlords, Liberia has careened off the road to peace and national reconciliation.

Only a few months ago, we spoke hopefully of the Abuja peace agreement, of ECOMOG's pioneer role as a regional peacekeeping force and of the important contribution which the United Nations, particularly UNOMIL was making to the peace process. A transitional Council of State had been installed and we looked forward to election in August. We expected Liberia's leaders to complete the remaining steps required under Abuja so that Liberians could finally enjoy the peace they had sought for six long years of civil war. Now the secretary- general tells us in his report that fighting is seriously jeopardizing the Abuja peace process and has reversed the gains made over the past few months.

As Ambassador Albright observed after her visit to Monrovia in January, the problem in Liberia is a struggle among a few elites for power. In April, these faction leaders demonstrated their commitment to their own interests rather than the good of their people. They re- ignited the violence, turned Monrovia from a safe haven into a war zone, and looted the equipment of relief agencies whose only goal was to help the Liberian people. Today, fighters openly drive convoys of stolen United Nations and

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NGO -- non -governmental organization -- vehicles around Monrovia. My government was forced to conduct an emergency evacuation of most of the international community from Liberia. Only a few UNOMIL military observers remain and the fighting often precludes them from any attempt to carry out the most basic tasks of their mandate. We are outraged by the looting of the UN, the NGOs, the churches, the hospitals, and the homes of Liberian people.

What can we do? The answer is not to abandon Liberia. We agree with the views of the secretary-general in his report -- the international community must remain engaged in the efforts to provide relief and bring peace to the people of Liberia. The regional countries of ECOWAS -- Economic Community of West African States -- have taken the lead in this respect. The meeting of their foreign ministers in Accra on May 7 developed a plan to restart the peace process. This "Mechanism For Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement" provides concrete steps, including restoration of the ceasefire, withdrawal of all fighters from Monrovia, deployment of ECOMOG throughout the city and restoration of Monrovia as a safe haven, needed to re -start the peace process.

These steps are necessary if there is to be continued international involvement. This is the message that my government delivered to the Liberian parties through high -level delegations we sent to Monrovia in the past weeks. We commend the ECOWAS countries for their clarity of purpose and their dedication in the face of tremendous difficulties. We believe that the Security Council must support this important initiative by the countries of the region.

The Accra meeting has given Liberia yet another chance to return to the path of peace. Once again, Liberia's leaders must decide what course to pursue. We hope they will implement the recent agreements reached in Accra. The Liberian warlords must order their forces to disarm and leave Monrovia in peace. ECOMOG commanders must reassert their control of

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Monrovia. And the Council of State must begin to act like the transitional government envisaged in the Abuja agreement.

By the end of this week, the Security Council must decide on the future of UNOMIL

We are heartened by the continuing commitment of the ECOWAS states and by the steps ECOMOG has taken to deploy throughout Monrovia. We encourage them to continue such efforts. Therefore, we support extending UNOMIL's mandate for three months. We do so because we have not given up hope for Liberia; hope that Liberians will take hold of their destiny and recover their country from the grip of those who only wish to destroy it; hope that law and order can again be brought to Liberia; hope that Liberia can be liberated from war.

Over the next three months my government will be watching closely to see if any of these hopes are fulfilled. If not, we and the Security Council will have to re- evaluate our approach. Again, we urge all those in Liberia, particularly the faction leaders, to use this time to meet the conditions ECOWAS has laid out and offer their people the chance for peace they deserve.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1059 (1996) Extending the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 31 August 1996.

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Liberia, in particular resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January 1996;

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Having considered the report of the Secretary- General dated 21 May 1996 (S/1996/362) on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL);

Stressing that the escalating violence is in violation of the Abuja Agreement (S/1995/742, annex) and puts the peace process at grave risk;

Firmly convinced of the importance of Monrovia as a safe haven, and noting especially the recent broader deployment of ECOMOG in the city;

Emphasizing once again that the people of Liberia and their leaders bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving peace and national reconciliation;

Commending the positive role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia;

Noting the adoption of a Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement by the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers on 7 May 1996;

Expressing its appreciation to those African States that have contributed and are contributing troops to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG);

Commending also those Member States that have supported the peace process and ECOMOG, including through contributions to the Trust Fund for Liberia;

Stressing also that the presence of UNOMIL in Liberia is

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predicated on the presence of ECOMOG and its commitment to ensure the safety of UNOMIL military observers and civilian staff,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary- General dated 21 May 1996;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until 31 August, 1996;

3. Recognizes that the deterioration of the security situation on the ground warranted the Secretary- General's decision to temporarily reduce the strength of UNOMIL;

4. Notes the Secretary- General's intention to maintain UNOMIL deployments at their present level and requests that he advise the Security Council of any significant planned increase in the number of personnel deployed depending on the evolution of the security situation on the ground;

5. Expresses its grave concern at the collapse of the cease- fire, the resumption of hostilities and the spread of fighting into the previously safe area of Monrovia and its environs;

6. Condemns all attacks against personnel of ECOMOG, UNOMIL, and international organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance as well as the looting of their equipment, supplies and personal property, and calls for the immediate return of looted property;

7. Demands once more that the factions in Liberia strictly respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel, as well as international organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Liberia, and further demands that these

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factions facilitate such deliveries and that they strictly abide by the relevant rules of international law;

8. Calls upon the Liberian parties to implement fully and expeditiously all the agreements and commitments they have already entered into, in particular the Abuja Agreement, and in this regard demands that they restore an effective and comprehensive cease -fire, withdraw all fighters and arms from Monrovia, allow the deployment of ECOMOG, and restore Monrovia as a safe haven;

9. Stresses that continued support by the international community for the peace process in Liberia, including the participation of UNOMIL, is contingent on the Liberian parties' demonstrating their commitment to resolve their differences peacefully and on the fulfillment of the conditions set out in paragraph 8;

10. Stresses the importance of respect for human rights in Liberia;

11. Recalls the obligation of all States to comply strictly with the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia imposed by resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992 and to bring all instances of violation of the embargo before the Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April 1995;

12. Encourages the members of ECOWAS in preparation for their summit to consider ways and means to strengthen ECOMOG and to persuade the faction leaders to resume the peace process;

13. Urges all Member States to provide financial, logistical and other assistance in support of ECOMOG to enable it to carry out

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its mandate;

14. Calls on ECOMOG, in accordance with the agreement regarding the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIL and ECOMOG in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272) and with the UNOMIL concept of operation, to provide for the security of UNOMIL observers and civilian staff;

15. Express support for the resolve of the ECOWAS Ministers not to recognize any Government in Liberia that comes to office through the use of force;

16. Urges member States to continue to provide additional support for the peace process in Liberia by contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for Liberia;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Security Council closely informed of the situation in Liberia, and expresses its readiness, if the situation further deteriorates, to consider possible measures against those who do not cooperate with the resumption of the peace process;

18. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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Testimony of some witnesses before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Thurs., September 21, 1995

On Thursday, September 21, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted a hearing on the situation in Liberia, in Room 419 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Senator Nancy Kassebaum presided.

The following witnesses testified:

Panel I:

The Honorable George Moose Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs U.S. Department of State

Mr. John Hicks Assistant Administrator for Africa Agency for International Development

Mr. Vincent Kern Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Department of Defense

Panel H:

Ms. Janet Fleischman Washington Director Human Rights Watch/Africa

Dr. D. Elwood Dunn Professor of Political Science University of the South

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The Honorable James Bishop Director for Humanitarian Response, InterAction Former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia.

Text of briefing memo to Members, Committee on Foreign Relations

Recent Developments

Liberians, West Africans, and other members of the international community are hopeful that an agreement reached last month by warring Liberian factions will bring lasting peace. That goal has proved elusive, however, through six years of civil war, 12 previous peace accords, and nearly 50 meetings among the factions.

This most recent peace accord was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on August 19, 1995 by leaders of all seven of the warring factions in Liberia. The accord calls for a transitional government led by a six -member Council of State. This council is tasked with implementing a ceasefire and preparing Liberia for presidential elections in one year. The council membership is composed of the leaders of the three largest factions and three civilian representatives.

Those three factions are the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, and the two factions of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, ULIMO -J and ULIMO -K. ULIMO-J, sometimes known as the Liberian Peace Council (sic) is led by George Boley and is composed mostly of members of the Krahn ethnic

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group. ULIMO -K is led by Alhaji Kromah and is composed mostly of members of the Mandingo ethnic group.

The four other fighting factions agreed to forego seats on the Council of State in exchange for six cabinet posts. The Council will be chaired by Wilton Sankawulo, a professor at the University of Liberia who is not aligned with any of the factions.

Questions:

1. In past hearings before the Senate and House Subcommittee on African Affairs, transcripts revealed various Administration officials guardedly optimistic that the "X" peace accord held the promise of bringing the Liberian civil war to an end, with "X" standing for Yamoussoukro, Cotonou, etc. Why did those other accords fail, and what, if anything, makes the Abuja peace accord more likely to succeed?

2. How realistic, even under the best of circumstances, is the timetable set forth in the Abuja accord?

Background

In 1822, a group of freed slaves from the United States settled in the coastal areas of West Africa and founded Liberia. The country became an independent republic in 1847 and modeled its constitution on that of the United States. For 133 years, Liberia remained independent, stable and led by the so- called Americo- Liberians -- descendants of the original founders of the country. But stark contrasts in economic conditions and standards of living between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous ethnic groups led to rising tensions. In 1980, a military coup led by Samuel Doe overthrew the government and installed Doe as president.

After nearly a decade of widespread human rights abuses and .

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exacerbation of ethnic hostilities, Doe was himself ousted in 1990 by the forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor.

After eight months of faction fighting in Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed (though not unanimously) in August 1990 to intervene in Liberia with a joint military force under Nigeria's leadership. That initiative, called the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), had four main objectives: to impose a cease -fire, to establish a Liberian interim government leading to elections, to stop the killing of civilians and to ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. In October 1990, ECOMOG's initial force of 3,500 troops pushed the NPFL out of the capital city of Monrovia and installed Amos Sawyer as the president of an Interim Government of National Unity. Charles Taylor and the NPFL refused to recognize the interim government and established a separate, parallel government at his headquarters in Gbarnga.

ECOMOG came to regard Charles Taylor's NPFL as the most dangerous and recalcitrant of the guerilla groups and focused its offensive strategies against the NPFL. Nigeria, which was by far the largest contributor of troops and material to ECOMOG, was particularly hostile to the Taylor forces.

A number of distinct rebel factions emerged, many of them based along ethnic lines. Historic, internal, tribal, and political divisions have been greatly exacerbated by the continuing struggle for power. Factional violence, based as much on revenge as ambition, has simmered and periodically erupted. Wholesale profiteering and looting have been key factors in the continuation of the war. Failed attempts to reach a political solution and to rebuild civil society have restricted or halted humanitarian operations.

Although accurate figures are unavailable, the human suffering among

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Liberia's 2.6 million people has been widespread. The United Nations reports at least 150,000 war -related casualties, the overwhelming majority of them civilians. In addition, at least 700,000 people have fled to neighboring countries and 500,000 have been displaced within Liberia.

Questions:

1. How can the recently established Council of State address the ethnic divisions and suspicion that has been such a significant factor in Liberia's civil war?

2. How effective was ECOMOG as a regional intervention? Did Nigeria's de facto leadership of the intervention hinder the effort?

3. What role have the United Nations observers present under UNOMIL played in the Liberian conflict?

4. How have the factions and foreign commercial interests profited from the sale and exploitation of resources under factional control during the period of the war? Was there anything that the international community could have done better to discourage such commercial exploitation?

The Abuja Accord: Prospects and Obstacles

In a recent briefing to staff, Ambassador Dane Smith, Department of State Special Envoy to Liberia, described certain positive aspects of the current peace accord, as well as several potential obstacles.

Encouraging Characteristics:

-- In May and July 1995, Charles Taylor went to Nigeria and met with Nigerian Head of State Sani Abacha. It appears that the NPFL and Nigeria are more willing to work together than at any time in the past. Taylor is less

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concerned about threats to his personal security in Monrovia than he has been in the past.

-- Ghana, current chair of ECOWAS, and Nigeria, the anchor of ECOMOG, seem to be coordinating their efforts closely.

-- Formerly bellicose faction leaders seem to be focused on the political track rather than the military track. Liberians of all factions and ethnic groups are extremely weary of war.

-- ECOWAS is going to establish an office in Monrovia for the first time with the specific intention of monitoring and cajoling the State Council members to implement the peace accord.

Potential Problems:

- - ECOMOG, at a current strength of 7.200 troops, has extensive monitoring and disarmament responsibilities under the terms of the accord which it may be unable to meet. The ECOMOG force is extremely weak in terms of logistics and mobility. In some cases, entire battalions (500+ troops) do not have a single truck.

- - There has been little planning as to how and where demobilized troops will be encamped, fed, retrained, etc.

-- Neighboring countries have not effectively closed avenues for the continuing supply of arms.

- - Fighting between the ULIMO factions has broken out in recent days, already violating the ceasefire agreement contained in the accord.

- - The chairman of the Council of State is a political amateur who the factions may believe can be easily manipulated.

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Questions:

1. What do you see as the main obstacles as well as encouraging aspects of the current peace accord? [See how they compare with Ambassador Smith's

assessment in the section above . ]

2. Arms sales continue in this troubled region. What could the neighboring countries and ECOWAS as a regional organization do to stem that flow more effectively?

3. How will the recent fighting between rival ULIMO factions in the diamond -rich northwest area of Liberia affect the prospects for the Abuja peace accord?

4. What can the United States do to improve ECOMOG's logistics and transport capabilities in a timely manner?

Resource

The United States has provided almost $400 million in emergency assistance to Liberia since 1990. A preliminary assessment for further assistance is underway. Tentatively, the Administration plans to contribute between $10 and $12 million to a United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Liberia. USAID projects contributing $6 to $8 million in development and transition funds (assuming the 1992 Brooke Amendment waiver for Liberia can still be applied) for Fiscal Year 1996, in addition to continued funding for humanitarian relief and assistance. Other western nations have pledged or contributed significant resources, and an international pledging conference will occur shortly.

1. Does the Brooke Amendment waiver for Liberia which Congress passed in 1992 (S. J. Res. 271, P.L. 102 -270) to assist in the demobilization of

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forces and transition to democratic government still apply to the current peace process? If not, why not?

End of text.

LIBERIA'S TRANSITION TO PEACE BY D. ELWOOD DUNN STATEMENT MADE TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES SENATE, WASHINGTON, D. C, September 21, 1995

Madame Chair and members of the African Affairs Sub -Committee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, ladies and gentlemen.

I thank you most sincerely for the opportunity to testify on the subject of Liberia's current transition to peace. Allow me, Madame Chair, to express gratitude as well that over the past couple of decades Congressional leaders of both parties have been consistent in their support for improved governance in Liberia. Whether as Chair or Ranking Member of the sub -committee, you, Madame Chair, have evinced a deep understanding of Africa and your fairness has inspired hope among Liberians during their country's long night of despair.

Introduction

The Abuja peace agreement of August 19, 1995 offers a chance for a fresh start in Liberia. It is vital that momentum be maintained and that the requirements for speedy implementation be met. There is no greater imperative than immediate international collaboration with a critical leadership role for the United States in that collaboration if the prospects for peace are to be sustained.

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With the peace agreement now realized the task ahead is clear. It entails:

1. Sustaining the political settlement that the recently installed Council of State symbolizes;

2. Moving forward with the disarmament and demobilization agenda;

3. Preparing the basis for effective repatriation and resettlement of the internally displaced; and

4. Effecting free and fair elections for the ushering of a legitimate government of Liberia.

Conflict Highlighted

But understanding the nature of the conflict both at its inception and as it evolved is also required as we go forward.

Liberia is a modern African country that is heavier with history than most African countries. As a community of people, Liberians have experienced difficulty governing themselves.. While the popular literature, and even the press, has projected such difficulties in one -dimensional terms, namely, cleavages involving settler and indigenous Liberians, the reality has in fact been far more complex. In the unending quest at forging a nation since the early 19th century, Liberians have had to face a number of other social cleavages and pressures, some cutting across the settler /indigene divide. And the reality of human failings has been a constant feature of the nation -building enterprise from the establishment of the state in 1822 to the present. In the 1970s Liberia was in a reformism mode. It was also assailed

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by problems. In the end it was overcome by the problems.

A military regime came to power and pledged to establish stable and legitimate governance. But the promise is widely reported to have been betrayed. Instead, a model was resorted to which involved domination and ethnic balancing (making the composition of the government and its major agencies representative of the ethnic interests in the country). But the strategy could not be sustained because of inherent contradiction -- domination and ethnic balancing. The fact of the matter is that a Krahn ethnic core sought to manipulate all other ethnicities into accepting the new hegemony. When there was resistance President Samuel Doe resorted to state terror. When particularly individual Dahn and Mano Liberians persisted in resistance, more state terror was unleashed by Doe. Conflict soon became total as the President insisted on playing zero -sum politics in pursuit of hegemonic rule.

It was in this political atmosphere of total conflict that the NPFL insurgency was initiated. But the international backdrop of the insurgency was the waning of the Cold War. The national conflict was total; the U.S. showed disinterest while also sending confusing signals. As the state imploded, regional powers were obliged to respond. It was in these circumstances that ECOWAS/ECOMOG was inserted into the conflict to the eternal gratefulness of large numbers of Liberians.

But the regional intervention in time generated its own problems, and thus to the Liberian national conflict was grafted regional and subsequently international dimensions. These three levels have then tended to be mutually reinforcing as they interacted, willy hilly, to sustain the conflict.

It follows that if the interaction of these levels has sustained the conflict, its denouement will equally require their collaboration. I believe this is what the thirteenth peace agreement of August 19, 1995 represents -- power- sharing at the national level, position reconsideration at the regional

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level, and now we see substantive endorsement at the international level.

But more than endorsement is required. More than low -level engagement or some stand-offish contribution. Leadership is required at this level because of serious resource unavailability and other inadequate capacities at the national and regional levels.

Critical need for international engagement and crucial role for the U.S. in that engagement

As the international community grappled with world disorder in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Liberians were increasingly told to simply solve their problem, or given the ECOWAS involvement, the regional organization was expected to do the job.

In fact new and interesting scholarly literature is developing about regionalism and conflict resolution in our time. But I have seen no serious study of this kind that did not require a role for extra regional powers.

A recent World Bank study of seven countries returning to peace following civil war makes an even more substantive point. Only countries where expenditure per capita for ex- combatants was high did not experience a return to war. Those with a higher probability of successfully ending civil wars have had access to substantial resources committed by a patron or the larger international community.

This thirteenth Liberian peace agreement seems materially different from the previous ones. It includes all of the key players and involves a power - sharing arrangement that could be harnessed into a successful interim arrangement. This thirteenth agreement could succeed because:

1. The respective leaders themselves of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for

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Democracy (ULIMO -K) and the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), not their proxies, are serving on the new ruling Council.

2. The three men, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, and George Boley appear each to believe that they can win in free and fair elections, and are gearing up for those elections.

3. Acceptable representation in the interim arrangement seems assured for all of the other power contenders, especially the armed

ones .

4. The regional players seem to have struck deals of their own because of the increasing threat of the Liberian problem to regional stability.

Liberians and their neighbors have done their part. The need is critical that the international community engages to ensure irreversibility of what must still be seen as a fragile, embryonic process. And the United States of America must lead the international effort.

Why should the United States lead the international effort? It should do so because: 1. The long historic ties between the two countries has led the international community consistently to defer to the U.S. on things

Liberian .

2. Liberia has been America's closest ally in Africa especially during the Cold War years.

3. It is in the national interest of the U.S. so to lead because (a) the cost would be far less in comparison to the present and continuing humanitarian outlay; (b) collapse of the current peace would mean West African regional destabilization; and the U.S. cannot afford

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to withdraw from an African continent at the cutting edge of some of the major emerging issues on the post -Cold War agenda (Islamic fundamentalism; women's rights; human rights; refugees; democracy; development).

What should the U.S. do?

At least two things, in my estimation:

1. The U.S. should commit itself to lead and coordinate international efforts designed specifically to ensure timely implementation of the peace agreement of August 19, 1995. This will entail heightened public diplomacy, a review of implementation requirements and critical needs assessment in collaboration with national (Liberian), regional (ECOWAS) and other international (U.N. and other governments) authorities.

There are creditable reports about inadequate capacity on part of the United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia(UNOMIL) in the execution of its Liberia mission. The U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to Liberia has reportedly not yet seriously initiated discussions among the U.N. agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank on future rehabilitation and reconstruction plans for Liberia. ECOMOG's own capacity requires enhancement. The reported efforts to secure military contingents from Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo should be strongly encouraged, especially given the involvement of these countries at critical moments in the conflict. Their troop presence in demobilization exercises would enhance the process.

2. The second thing the U.S. should do is to consider providing critical funding necessary for the initial implementation of the peace agreement. It should then use such demonstration of commitment to

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influence other governments and international organizations. The world community responded to Liberia's humanitarian crisis in a most gratifying manner. Without this response the death toll from war and starvation would have been much higher. The U.S. led in providing some 80% of that resource. Liberians are grateful, and this Liberian wishes to register here thanks and deep appreciation. A need shift is now required. Unless the needed funding is forthcoming from the international community, the peace process could falter and collapse. The Cotonou agreement of 1993 is a grim reminder of an inadequately sustained peace effort.

The U.S. should couple these efforts with some symbolic gestures, such as undertaking to aid in the reopening of the Roberts International Airport, and strengthening its diplomatic presence in Monrovia with a view to providing technical assistance to the government of Liberia in the transition to elections.

Conditionality of International Assistance

Amid all the urgency with which we seek to make our case, assistance to Liberia should never be unconditional. All assistance must be conditioned by the imperative of bringing about a stable and legitimate government and the restoration of a vibrant civil society to Liberia.

The civil war has largely been a struggle for access to, indeed a monopoly of, state power. An imperfect interim arrangement is being forged and the requirements of international support is the focus of these remarks. Many issues central to the requirements of good governance; many issues related to massive human rights violation; many issues concerning priority of attention as between unarmed civilians (victims) and ex- combatants (perpetrators of the violence) have yet to be fully framed and addressed.

This is why the international community must condition its

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involvement on such vital requirements as:

1. The integrity of the implementation process;

2. Full accountability for all resources provided;

3. Competency and credibility of those charged with the task of disarmament and demobilization;

4. Credibility of the leadership of the electoral process that caps the entire interim arrangement.

International involvement under U.S. leadership should insist on these bare minimum conditions. They seem generally to be compatible with American foreign policy requirements. They could help provide a solid moral base upon which the Liberian people might rebuild their lives and reconstruct their country.

Conclusion

We may have finally stumbled upon the right formula for ending the Liberian nightmare. An accord signed by all the parties to the conflict is in hand. Its timely, appropriate and faithful implementation is the current focus of attention.

The will and resources of the international community are required to sustain the efforts of Liberian national and West African regional players. We urge American will and American resources to sustain peace in Liberia. The fragile and embryonic process currently underway could otherwise be reversed with consequences too ghastly to contemplate.

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D. ELWOOD DUNN

Dr. D. Elwood Dunn is a Professor of Political Science at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee where he has taught since 1981. He began his teaching career at Seton Hall University ( New Jersey), and has taught at Fordham University (New York) and Cuttington College (Liberia).

Elwood went to Sewanee after serving briefly as Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Liberia. He served the government of his native Liberia as an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and later as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs (Chief of Staff in the President's office).

His education includes a B. A. from Cuttington College, a certificate in Politics from the University of Lyon (France), and the M.A. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the American University (Washington, D.C.).

Among Elwood's publications are five books -- The Foreign Policy of Liberia During the Tubman Era (1979), Historical Dictionary of Liberia {with Svend Holsoe} (1985), Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (with Byron Tarr) (1988), A History of the Episcopal Church in Liberia (1992), and Liberia, Volume 57, World Bibliographical Series (1995); and numerous articles. His most recent work is "The Civil War in Liberia: Roots and Prospects for Resolution."

Dunn was Editor of the Liberian Studies Journal. 1985 -1995.

Since the coup d'etat of 1980 Elwood has collaborated with scores of Liberians and friends of Liberia in a common effort to bring good governance to Liberia. Such efforts have naturally accelerated since the country was plunged into civil war.

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TESTIMONY BY GEORGE E. MOOSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS HEARING ON LIBERIA BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA September 21, 1995

Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here today to talk about recent, promising developments in Liberia and the response of the United States Government to them.

But before I address developments in Liberia, I would like to take a moment to discuss an even more immediate issue, one that threatens to undermine our nation's leadership in world affairs.

Both Houses of Congress are considering drastic cuts to the foreign affairs budget which would deny the U.S. the resources necessary to carry out essential foreign policy objectives. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations last night, Secretary Christopher noted that the calls emanating from Congress for the U.S. to exercise leadership in world affairs cannot be answered if the Administration is denied the minimum resources necessary to get the job done.

For example, the Senate's Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations bill would slash the Department's basic operating budget by almost $300 million and force us to close some 50 embassies and consulates -- the equivalent of every post in Africa!

The Department has consistently sought to maintain a diplomatic mission in virtually every country around the world. This principle of universality in our diplomatic presence has been a key factor in achieving important foreign policy goals. In Africa, the patient and persistent diplomacy of our Foreign Service officers helped develop the widespread

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African support that was critical to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty earlier this year. The active participation of American diplomats on the ground has been instrumental to the negotiated end to civil wars in Mozambique, Angola and Liberia. The quick reaction of American diplomats facilitated the deployment of American medical teams to contain the outbreak of the Ebola virus in Zaire.

Our ability to meet the daily challenges to our national interest depends upon our people in the field. The fax machine can never replace the handshake in the conduct of foreign policy.

The State Department has not been-- and should not be -- exempt from budget cuts. In fact, our international affairs spending has been reduced by 45 percent in real terms over the last decade. No Bureau has felt the pinch more than the Africa Bureau, which already operates at minimal staffing and resource levels.

The appropriations measures currently pending in the Senate would slash U.S. assessed contributions to international organizations by almost $400 million and would limit our contributions to peacekeeping to only $250 million. Such cuts would hit international efforts to promote child survival and combat AIDS. They would cripple our ability to support vital peacekeeping operations in Angola and Rwanda and foreclose opportunities to restore peace in places like Liberia.

The Secretary has noted that, if the Senate accepts the budget levels approved by the Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Subcommittee, he would have no choice but to ask the President to veto the bill. As you consider this and other legislation relating to the conduct of our foreign affairs, I ask you to consider the implications of our abdication from a leadership role that only the U.S. can play, in Africa, and throughout the world. After nearly six years of civil war in Liberia and numerous efforts to

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encourage a peace agreement among the warring factions, dedicated persistence by Ghana's President, Jerry Rawlings, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, has paid off On August 19, the leaders of Liberia's armed factions signed a peace accord that resolves issues outstanding for many months. A ceasefire which went into effect August 26, as called for in the agreement, is generally holding. The Council of State was sworn in as scheduled September 1, and is already making critical decisions about Liberia's future.

Sharing in this success are previous ECOWAS Chairmen, the U.N.'s Special Representative to Liberia; The OAU's Special negotiator for Liberia, the Government of Nigeria, which hosted the last two peace conferences; all the countries that have promoted negotiations and contributed troops to the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG); and the UN observer mission (UNOMIL). The diplomatic efforts of the President's Special Envoy to Liberia, Ambassador Dane Smith -- who unfortunately was not able to be with me today -- have also made a significant contribution.

An Accord with a Difference?

We recognize that this is one in a long series of Liberian peace accords which have attempted to resolve the civil conflict begun in 1989, number thirteen if I am not mistaken. And there have been more than fifty meetings among faction leaders and with delegations from neighboring countries to conclude these agreements. The failures of these past accords inevitably make us cautious about the chances for this one to bring long sought -after peace to Liberia.

Nevertheless, there are elements in the Abuja Accord which we believe make it an accord with a difference. The first is the accommodation that appears to have been reached between two of the key protagonists in Liberia, NPFL leader Charles Taylor and the Government of Nigeria, which in the past has been a backer of Taylor's principal rivals. Mr. Taylor met with

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Nigeria Head of State, General Sani Abacha, on at least two occasions between the first Abuja conference in May and the second in August. The apparent consequence of these meetings is that Taylor now seems personally committed to making this accord work, and the Nigerians have staked their prestige on its success. Taylor, once fearful for his security in both Nigeria and Monrovia, now has visited both. Indeed, he has established a temporary headquarters in Monrovia only two blocks from the American Embassy compound. He now appears committed to seeking leadership in Liberia through political rather than military means. For their part, the Nigerians and their troops in ECOMOG appear to have accepted Taylor in this new political role.

With this critical piece of the puzzle in place, the leaders of Liberia's key armed factions quickly resolved lingering differences over composition of the Council of State. Charles Taylor agreed to give up his claim to Council leadership in favor of a neutral, non -political, non -military President, in the person of language professor, Wilton Sankawulo. Also critical, theleaders of the three main warring factions (the NPFL, ULIMO, and the LPC) agreed to sit on the council themselves, thus assuming direct responsibility for the critical initial phases of the implementation process, which involve disengagement and disarmament. The faction leaders also agreed to withdraw from the Council during the electoral phase of the transition if they become candidates.

Finally, differences among ECOWAS states over how best to resolve the Liberian conflict appear to be diminishing. The two Abuja conferences demonstrated greatly improved collaboration between Ghana and Nigeria, both of which have played key roles with respect to Liberia. Countries hosting Liberia's 725,000 refugees, principally Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, are anxious to see their return to Liberia. Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, where factional fighting has spilled across the borders with devastating effect, appear committed to ending the Liberian civil war. This harmonization of the positions of ECOWAS countries augurs well for the successful

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implementation of the Abuja Accord.

With both Mr. Taylor and the Nigerians now on board, the faction leaders beginning to work together on the Council of State to resolve the problems of implementation, and the ECOWAS countries committed to the peace process, this accord holds considerable promise. We believe it offers an unprecedented opportunity for bringing lasting peace to Liberia.

Challenges Ahead

Nevertheless, formidable challenges lie ahead:

1. Maintaining the cease -fire is essential. To assure this, the size and the capabilities of the ECOMOG and UNOMIL forces must be adequate. Logistical deficiencies and organizational and operational limitations could impede the ability of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, responsible among other things for cease -fire monitoring and investigation, from responding promptly to reports of cease -fire violations. Thus far, they have confirmed ceasefire violations in the northwest of the country between the Krahn and Mandingo factions of ULIMO, an armed faction; but otherwise, the ceasefire is generally holding.

2. Successful implementation of disengagement, disarmament and reintegration is critical to the peace process. An ambitious timetable calls for combatants to begin moving into assembly areas in November, to begin disarming by December 1, and to reintegrate into the civilian society thereafter. Despite agreement of faction leaders on this process, implementation plans are far from complete. There is also concern about the capacity of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, responsible for overseeing these critical steps, to provide effective supervision throughout the country.

3. Successful reintegration of faction fighters, many of them youths, as well as displaced persons and returning refugees, is also essential to restoring

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normality to Liberia. As of now, these steps, too, lack adequate planning.

4. Governance will be an immediate challenge. The Council of State has begun to take decisions regarding such critical issues as the reorganization of the national army, but it must continue to operate collaboratively if forward movement is to be maintained. Preparation must begin soon if elections are to be held successfully next August.

5. The tasks associated with reconstruction, from restoring health and education infrastructure to reestablishing agricultural support systems are also daunting.

U.S. Next Steps

s The challenge that confronts the United States and other friends and supporters of Liberia will be to respond quickly enough to give the peace

1 process a chance to succeed. As an essential first step, we voted with others in the U.N. Security Council last week to extend the mandate of UNOMIL until January 31. The Administration has begun an interagency process to identify resources the United States can bring to bear on the various aspects of the implementation process. We are looking for funds to help support ECOMOG. In particular, we are examining how we might help ECOMOG address its mobility requirements. My colleague John Hicks can talk about the two -pronged assistance strategy that USAID is developing aimed at recovery and democratization.

We will also be discussing with the UN the appointment of a special humanitarian assistance coordinator who would be able to pull together a coordinated assistance strategy that donors can support. Despite Liberia's enormous existing debt, we will be looking for ways to involve the international financial institutions in the reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. We have already begun to consult with other donors to encourage them to assist in the implementation of the peace accord.

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We also intend to continue our vigorous diplomatic support for the peace process. Special Presidential Envoy for Liberia, Dane Smith, will continue his direct involvement with the Liberian parties. We will continue to work with the neighboring ECOWAS states on their support for the process, to include their role in establishing an effective mechanism for controlling the flow of arms into Liberia. We have sought authority to support the establishment of a permanent ECOWAS representative in Monrovia, whose job it will be to help keep the implementation process on track. The Department will also accelerate naming a Chief of Mission for our Embassy in Monrovia. This hearing is an important step in sensitizing both the Congress and the public to the urgency of moving quickly to consolidate peace in Liberia.

Resource Constraints

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, I must stress once again that resource constraints could seriously undermine our ability to participate effectively in ensuring that this accord fulfills its promise of bringing lasting peace to Liberia. The outcome of Congressional action on the various pieces of the foreign affairs budget will make a significant difference in our ability to be helpful. We are grateful to you and to other members of the subcommittee for the role you have played in seeking to ensure that we have the means to support the expansion of peace and democracy in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa.

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STATEMENT OF JOHN F. HICKS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR BUREAU FOR AFRICA U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 21, 1995

Thank you, Madame Chair, for convening this hearing on U.S. policy towards Liberia. As always, I am honored to appear with my good friend and colleague Assistant Secretary Moose. From August of 1988 until June of 1990 I served as the USAID Mission Director to Liberia as a part of Ambassador Jim Bishop's country team. As one of our foremost experts on Liberia, I am happy to see that Ambassador Bishop will be testifying today. As the USAID Director in Liberia, I had the unpleasant task of closing down our program in that country five years ago. It is with considerable pleasure that I now find myself involved in supporting this current peace effort; and in helping to lay the groundwork for the U.S. Government's participation in Liberia's attempt to transition from crisis and conflict to rehabilitation, recovery and long -term sustainable development.

This afternoon, I will share with the committee, in some detail, U.S. Government plans and our strategy to address humanitarian concerns, such as refugee repatriation, demobilization and reconstruction in post -war Liberia. We regard this chance for peace in Liberia as an important challenge and opportunity. For with firm commitment from the Liberians themselves and support from the international donor community, death, destruction and human suffering can be brought to an end. And instead of continuing to spend millions of dollars to respond to emergency humanitarian needs, we can begin investing in the long term development of the nation. From 1990 to 1994, the U.S. alone pumped $380 million of emergency food aid and

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disaster relief assistance into Liberia. Our humanitarian assistance level in 1995 is approaching $60 million. However, we are encouraged by the signing of the Abuja Accord as discussed by Ambassador Moose, and we are well poised to initiate our transition assistance strategy.

This post -crisis strategy integrates continued food and non -food emergency relief to ensure domestic stability, food security, recovery- reintegration, and democratization activities to pave the way for sustainable development and a return to civil society. Our transition strategy will build on the existing partnerships that USAID has forged with other donors and international and local PVOs/NGOs working in Liberia. We will also draw from successful experiences we have had and shared with our international partners in Mozambique and other countries in transition.

It is in the U.S. national interest to do whatever we can to ensure that peace is maintained in Liberia. The six -year war has wrought untold misery on the country's entire population. Armed conflict has spilled over the borders of Liberia, especially into Sierra Leone, threatening the stability of the sub -region. The emergency aid which we and other donors have provided to alleviate suffering has been costly. We have provided critical immediate relief but little to foster recovery. U.S. engagement is critical to prevent further crises, promote longer term sustainable development, and avoid a further drain on our increasingly limited resources.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LIBERIA

The civil war has taken its greatest toll in terms of human lives and suffering. Over 150,000 Liberians have been killed during the past five years while tens of thousands have been mutilated, raped, orphaned, or otherwise traumatized. Almost one -third of the 2.5 million population has fled the country, while an estimated 1 to 1.2 million people have been internally displaced.

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The ethnic cleavages that have fueled the civil conflict continue to cause deep mistrust among Liberians and represent centrifugal forces that threaten national integration and pose an ever -present challenge to the fragile cessation of hostilities. The prolonged absence of a government with national legitimacy, combined with the collapse of the private sector and the export economy, have led to an almost complete reliance on United Nations agencies and the international and indigenous NGO community for the delivery of essential services. The war -ravaged economy, previously based on iron ore, rubber, timber, diamond and gold exports, is stagnant. Unemployment is at 80 to 90 percent across all sectors except government. The massive displacement of civilians and wanton destruction and looting have devastated the productive capacity of Liberia despite its rich natural endowments and potential self-sufficiency in food production.

Social, economic and administrative infrastructure, communications networks, water -supply systems, agricultural production capacity, and health and education services in Liberia have either completely collapsed or are severely disrupted. Prior to the civil war, in December 1989, Liberia's annual cereal production was approximately 300,000 metric tons. A recent FAO report estimated that 1994 rice production reached only 20,000 to 30,000 tons.

REPATRIATION, RESETTLEMENT AND REINTEGRATION: A List of Basic Needs

Between 1.0 and 1.2 million people are displaced within Liberia, most of whom are now in Monrovia and Buchanan. There are also 120,000 Sierra Leone refugees living in Liberia who have been displaced due to civil strife in that country.

Approximately 725,000 of the 2.5 million population have fled their country, and are now refugees in neighboring countries: 397,000 in Guinea; 305,000 in Cote d'Ivoire; 16,000 in Ghana; 4,000 in Nigeria; and 3,000 in

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Sierra Leone, (a number of these have left because of civil war in that

country). The challenge of . repatriating displaced civilians and of demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants is daunting and will require extensive coordination by all concerned parties.

Emergency assistance will continue for the immediate future. However, the focus will begin shifting to support longer term food security. Seed, fertilizer, tools and technical assistance will be needed to facilitate the return of farmers and their families to the land, the resumption of agricultural production and the eventual establishment of food self-sufficiency. Vocational training and the creation of employment opportunities in both urban and rural areas will be needed to restore refugees and former combatants to productive activities and decrease dependency on international aid. Resettlement and reintegration of the general populace and of vulnerable groups (widows, orphans, children and child combatants, and war traumatized victims) will require large scale assistance (including training) to municipalities and local communities for the provision of basic health care, water and sanitation, primary education, trauma counseling, and related social services. Civic education, including respect for human rights and women's rights, the promotion of local level participation, information dissemination, and political advocacy will be needed to support the process of political reconciliation and dispute resolution and to lay the groundwork for a transition to democracy.

IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES AND THE U.S. ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

Planning/Coordination Assistance

The next six months are critical. The massive scale of international humanitarian and transition assistance required will necessitate close coordination at all levels. Concerted efforts among the United Nations agencies, international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),

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the donor community and the private sector are crucial in light of large funding requirements and the complex political dynamics in Liberia. Coordination among the Economic Community of West African States Cease -Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), UNOMIL and the international assistance community will be required for disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants. Coordination among the UN High Commission for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the UN Development Programme, the donor community and NGOs is needed for effective repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced.

Our post-crisis transition strategy hinges on forging partnerships with all potential contributors of humanitarian assistance within the international donor community. The partnerships will also include international and indigenous NGOs and the local private sector -- essential elements in the formulation and implementation of participatory, community -level programs for the rehabilitation of social services, infrastructure and local political institutions. USAID's strategy stems from the fundamental premise that the path to sustainable development at the national level must build upon grassroots activities that involve and empower local communities.

As a first step in this planning process, the U.S. interagency assessment and planning team due to arrive in Liberia next week will assist in the design of an overall demobilization and reintegration plan. USAID experts will include representatives of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) (Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for Peace Office, and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), the Africa Bureau, and the Global Bureau's Center for Democracy. The team will produce a comprehensive set of recommendations detailing the magnitude of eventual demobilization and reintegration efforts, related personnel and support requirements, and an illustrative budget. The design of a demobilization and reintegration plan for former combatants is a first order consideration in all the transition -to -peace planning efforts.

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Food Aid Assistance

USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) currently is carrying out humanitarian assistance through food aid programs implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the World Food Programme (WFP). These activities include general distribution, vulnerable group feeding, school feeding and food for work activities. Our objective is to move from emergency feeding operations to rehabilitation and food security. Proposed activities are linked to self-sustaining agriculture development, food production, and local capacity building directly related to food security. It is anticipated that the FY 1996 food aid funding level of approximately $50 million, will expand the program to rural areas outside Monrovia and Buchanan, and will assist in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, resettlement of displaced persons, and return of refugees from neighboring countries. Three types of activities are envisioned:

(a) Vulnerable Group Feeding: Vulnerable groups, such as children under five years of age, pregnant women and lactating mothers, female heads of household, the elderly, orphans and the handicapped will be assisted throughout the transition period to provide a nutritional safety net.

(b) Food for Work (FFW) activities: Increased food production and employment opportunities will be paramount to the demobilization/resettlement process and to decreasing dependency on international aid while increasing food security, self-sufficiency and self-reliance in both urban and rural areas. The combination of food for work activities (income generation for self-sufficiency) and increasing food production (sustainability) will be key to the transition phase. After repatriation and resettlement take place, food for work activities will be necessary to increase food security. FFW programs will likely be managed through a consortium of non -governmental organizations (NGOs) in coordination with appropriate United Nations agencies. Technical assistance will also be needed to help put the land back under production, allowing

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Liberians to get back on the path to food self sufficiency.

(c) School feeding: Currently, Food for Peace supports emergency pre -school and primary school feeding programs for about 160,000 students. It is anticipated that this program will be expanded in 1996 to eventually include some 300,000 students. This program will provide a nutritional safety net for school-aged children and contribute to household food security.

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

USAID' s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) currently provides grants to numerous international private voluntary organizations (PVOs) for emergency relief activities in the areas of emergency shelter (tents and plastic sheeting), food (distribution, logistical support, provision of fertilizer, seeds and tools, and training), health (training for primary health care workers and lab technicians, and primary health care support), water and sanitation (direct support to local NGOs and communities), and aid to displaced and vulnerable persons. Grantees include Africare, Save The Children/UK, Action International Against Hunger/France, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Doctors Without Borders.

We anticipate a continuation of humanitarian assistance at levels consistent with FY 1995. Much of the emergency needs will shift from Monrovia to the rural areas as the displaced populations return to their homes and as improved access permits coverage of heretofore unreachable populations. Monrovia itself will likely move from an emergency to reconstruction phase rather quickly. Furthermore, emergency relief requirements throughout Liberia will diminish during the transition period as the peace process gains momentum.

USAID /OFDA has structured its grants to allow maximum flexibility for the location of the NGOs' projects. NGOs, which had been working in

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the countryside, were forced to relocate their programs because many areas outside Monrovia became inaccessible due to security constraints. As areas throughout Liberia become accessible and Liberians are once again able to return to their counties and villages, the needs for emergency assistance will shift from Monrovia to the rural counties in Liberia. NGOs will be encouraged to shift, once again, the location of their programs to meet the needs of the displaced as they return home.

If new emergencies arise in Liberia, OFDA will do its best to respond appropriately. Although OFDA is prohibited by law from providing assistance to armed combatants, emergency assistance can and will be utilized in assisting disarmed and demobilized fighters as part of OFDA's overall assistance to displaced/war- affected persons.

Post- Crisis Transition Strategy

Currently planned humanitarian assistance programs will contribute to the implementation of the peace process. We have concrete plans for providing over $60 million worth of food, medicines, and other basic commodities and services for the Liberian people in the coming fiscal year. This assistance will ultimately benefit repatriated refugees, internally displaced persons, disarmed ex- combatants, and other needy Liberians. We have over $2 million available in existing grants to UNICEF for transition support to the rehabilitation of war victims, both persons physically disabled and children orphaned, abandoned, or otherwise severely affected by the civil crisis. Finally, $1 million remains in two other grants to support a democratic transition in Liberia over the next twelve months. Direct oversight of our efforts in Liberia is provided by the USAID Representative headquartered at our Embassy in Monrovia, Mr. Lowell Lynch, who is here with me today.

In order to assist in the transition from emergency to recovery

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activities, USAID will implement a new reintegration -recovery program and a democratization program. These programs will continue to rely on leveraging resources, close coordination with international organizations, other donors, and the NGO community for the detailed planning of programmatic approaches.

The Reintegration -Recovery Program: Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation

USAID will focus on three aspects of recovery: 1) assistance for the transition and reintegration of former combatants to civilian life, including such activities as health and sanitation at encampments, the furnishing of seed, fertilizer and tool distribution, and agricultural and vocational training to assist former combatants to return to productive activities; 2) assistance for the social and economic reintegration of dislocated populations, including war trauma counseling and training, social services, basic health care, primary education and vocational training, especially for girls and women, and creation of productivity- increasing, income -generating employment; and 3) assistance to strengthen delivery of services at the local level, including the rehabilitation of local schools, health and sanitation facilities, training of personnel, and the provision of supplies and equipment.

The Democratization Program:

The objective of the democratization program will be to provide assistance to rebuild civil society, enhance citizen participation, and promote the transition to democratic governance. Activities will focus on: 1) civic education (citizen rights and responsibilities, political advocacy and information dissemination); 2) strengthening and mobilizing local NGOs to stimulate local level participation, citizen activism and self- governance; and 3) technical assistance to plan and execute free and fair elections, including constitutional and electoral law reform, voter education and registration activities, information campaigns and election monitoring.

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In addition to the above programs, in FY 1996, USAID will provide assistance from the War Affected Youth Support Program to assist demobilized former child soldiers, street children, working children and other disadvantaged war children. Vocational/literacy training and counseling as well as tracing of family will also be provided to help children and the communities heal from the traumatizing effect of the war.

THE FINANCE GAP

USAID's proposed assistance strategy, as detailed above, would total approximately $65 million in FY 1996, with the bulk of funds destined to continued food aid and emergency relief However, Liberia's needs for disarmament, demobilization, resettlement, reintegration and the eventual rebuilding of infrastructure far outstrip the resources the U.S. Government can bring to bear, especially in this era of across -the -board cuts in all foreign assistance accounts (DA, DFA, ESF, Disaster Assistance, and Peacekeeping Operations). The enormous level of resources needed for the transition will require a major international response. In the coming year alone, for example, $90 million is being requested for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations and $62 million is estimated for preparation of assembly areas for demobilization of former combatants.

Liberia is thus an excellent example of a basic dilemma facing the U.S. Government. At a time when we contemplate having diminished program resources and operating expense funds, how do we, as a government, respond to countries that experience a sudden turn around? We will provide a response to this hopeful turn of events in Liberia. However, our ability to assist as effectively as we would like, and to engage other donors in a country traditionally viewed as being within the U.S. sphere of influence will be constrained by the current resource environment.

Liberia also faces a plethora of financial and debt arrearage

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problems. Since 1989, the country has been under Brooke sanctions resulting from the non -payment by the Government of Liberia (GOL) of its debt arrears. The size of GOL debt arrears has only increased in the interval (some estimates are at almost $1 billion). For the foreseeable future, Liberia will be in no position to manage its debt without donor assistance. This will also necessitate renewed agreements with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which discontinued direct support after the civil war broke out. Dealing with these financial issues will be an urgent challenge requiring immediate attention of the new Government of Liberia and its international partners.

CONCLUSION

In closing, I would like to leave two thoughts with the Committee:

First, we are optimistic that USAID's structured emergency relief activities, coupled with targeted assistance for democracy and recovery/reintegration, will make a difference at a critical juncture in Liberia's transition from crisis to sustainable development. This integrated approach, which coordinates humanitarian and development assistance, will contribute to Liberia's political stability, food security and democratization process, laying the groundwork for broad -based sustainable development, the goal of all of our aid to Africa. The flexibility accorded to us in the Development Fund for Africa and in disaster assistance (FFP and OFDA) accounts allows us to be responsive to fast -changing developments, such as those in Mozambique, Angola, and now Liberia.

However, we must temper our optimism with the harsh realities and challenges which will face any expanded or longer term USAID involvement in Liberia. In addition to the political complexities, difficulties in coordinating UN, donor, and ECOMOG efforts, and the financing issues mentioned above, we must include in our dialogue with the Liberians a frank discussion of democratic governance.

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If the country expects to find and pursue a path to long term sustainable development, the new government must avoid the serious and systemic problems of corruption, lack of political will, and non -respect for human rights which plagued former regimes and led to the six -year civil war. These problems were so deeply embedded that the U.S. had already initiated the closeout of our economic assistance programs before civil war broke out in 1989.

On the USG side, USAID currently faces formidable pressures and uncertainties surrounding development assistance budget levels, the need to rightsize, focus and concentrate, and manifold urgent priorities in other geographic regions of the world. Our response will therefore be measured and our longer term involvement will be linked to continued political commitment and progress in Liberia, as well as to Congressional support.

Nonetheless, we believe that the historical and cultural ties between our two countries, dating to Liberia's founding in 1847, coupled with the urgent need to end this costly, devastating conflict which has destablized the sub -region, all argue for an initial strong U.S. commitment to help Liberia move from disaster to development.

Thank you.

TESTIMONY, VINCENT D. KERN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS BEFORE THE SENATE SUB -COMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1995

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk briefly about a glimmer of hope on a part of the African continent where that commodity

1 has been very scarce --the prospects for reconciliation in Liberia. As part of a series of regional papers, the Secretary of Defense has

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recently published a "Security Strategy for Sub -Saharan Africa." This report outlines DoD's strategy for promoting stability and peaceful change through diplomacy, peacetime engagement, forward presence, and rapid response capabilities. The policy goals are, of course, familiar to all of you on the committee: promoting peace; providing humanitarian assistance; fostering democracy and respect for human rights; and supporting economic growth and sustainable development. Within these goals, the Department of Defense focuses on conflict prevention, management, and resolution. We believe that active conflict necessarily prevents the fulfillment of the other goals and therefore intend in a modest way to actively support the nascent efforts of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peacekeeping efforts in the region.

Recent developments in Liberia offer the possibility of real progress. The August Abuja accord provides a framework for peace and democratic transition. Success will depend in large part on the commitment and involvement of faction leaders in implementing the accord. But the parties to the conflict and those states in the region which are participating in the process clearly will require assistance.

ECOMOG (the West African peacekeeping force) and UNOMIL (UN Observer Mission in Liberia; authorized strength is 52, UNSG plans to increase by an additional 42) have taken on the responsibility for supervising the implementation of the peace accord. Both of these organs face severe operational limitations and have failed in the past. However, our task now is to revisit the peace process in Liberia and empower Africans to take the lead. Unfortunately, but necessarily, we go into this without any guarantees.

From a practical standpoint, ECOMOG is the party to support and that is our preference. ECOMOG, with about 7,500 soldiers currently on the ground, has been relatively effective in its military role in maintaining calm within the Monrovia -Buchanan perimeter, along the Monrovia/Tubmanburg highway, and the Monrovia/Bo -Waterside highway leading to the Sierra

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Leonean border. The majority of ECOMOG forces have conducted themselves professionally during the past year. There are, of course, political sensitivities attached to the participation of Nigeria (the largest component) in ECOMOG.

What can the Department of Defense offer? In FY95 the USG provided $2.7m in non -assessed peacekeeping monies to Ghana in support of this effort. We have suggested that the Government of Ghana use $1.7m of this money to support and even augment its troop presence in Liberia, possibly adding a second battalion. The remaining $1m could be used for enhancement of equipment used by Ghanaian peacekeepers in Liberia. The possibility of using FY96 peacekeeping money to further support Ghana or other ECOMOG participants is there, but must await final Congressional action.

You are all familiar with the DoD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) disposal program. DoD can, at times assist by making available excess non -lethal property such as medical supplies, blankets, food, tents, and vehicles. We are exploring this avenue for the Liberia effort, but unfortunately, much of our excess has been allocated over the past several years. Further, more sophisticated items, such as vehicles, are often in disrepair, requiring the receiving country to purchase expensive spare parts packages. The recipient country is also responsible for transportation. This will be problematic in the case of Liberia.

The U.S. has a long and proud history of humanitarian assistance to those in need. DoD possesses a unique capability for providing critical, specific assets while working as part of a U.S. coordinated interagency, international effort. During FY95, the DoD Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, in support of NGOs and PVOs, shipped 320 tons of pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and supplies, and school supplies to Liberia. Again, although we are inclined to continue these efforts, FY96 budget uncertainties make it unclear as to exactly what we might be able to

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do.

In the immediate term, DoD proposes to participate in a USAID -led assessment team to help determine essential USG support to the encampment, demobilization, and reintegration process in Liberia during the implementation of the peace accord.

The war in Liberia has devastated the country and displaced over one million people. We are encouraged by what appears to be a breakthrough in the peace process. While our own resources are limited, we must, along with the rest of the international community, search for innovative and creative solutions to help Africans as they struggle with their difficult challenges. With the support of the Congress, DoD is ready and willing to play its appropriate role.

Thank you.

US Policy on Liberia Testimony of Janet Fleischman, Human Rights Watch /Africa before the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 21, 1995

Thank you, Chairman Kassebaum for holding these important hearings and for inviting me to testify. My name is Janet Fleischman. and I am the Washington director of Human Rights Watch/Africa, a division of Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental human rights monitoring organization with five regional divisions covering Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and the signatories of the Helsinki accords. Human Rights Watch/Africa has been monitoring and documenting human rights violations in Liberia for several years, since before the civil war began. Given the recent peace accord in Liberia, this is a particularly

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important moment to explore ways the U.S. can help to promote and protect human rights, which is the best assurance that a lasting peace will finally take hold.

For those of us who have been following the devastating events in Liberia throughout the war, the news of the latest peace plan has been met with guarded optimism. We cannot forget that a dozen prior agreements have failed to bring peace, but merely fueled the ambitions of faction leaders and the suffering of the Liberian people. One of the hallmarks of the Liberian war has been the proliferation of armed factions, all of which targeted civilians and were responsible for systematic human rights abuses, and none of which was fighting for any recognizable cause or ideology. The war has also been characterized by the extensive use of child soldiers, boys younger than 15 years old who were easy prey for all the factions. The massive displacement of the civilian population has been another tragic aspect of the war, leading to some 750,000 refugees and one million internally displaced, out of a pre -war population of some 2.5 million. Finally, the Liberian war has been carried out in a climate of utter impunity, with no one held accountable for the crimes committed against the Liberian people. The lack of protection for civilians from abuses by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions have been obstacles to lasting peace.

This new peace agreement seems to be Liberia's last, best hope The apparent commitment of the warring factions to disarmament, demobilization and the deployment throughout the country of ECOMOG and UN personnel bring hope that the rule of the gun will finally come to an end, and respect for the human rights of all Liberians will become a reality. Yet the experience of Liberia has shown that if human rights guarantees are not an integral part of the peace process, the factions will once again resort to abusing civilians in order to gain territory and power. Accordingly, the international community, and especially the US government must ensure that monitoring, documenting and reporting publicly on human rights violations

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perpetrated by any of the warring factions or by those involved in peacekeeping is a key component of US and international assistance for the peace process.

Liberia has a complicated cast of actors: The new Council of State. which includes all the main warring factions was inaugurated on September 1, taking power from the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), which had governed the capital, Monrovia, since March 7, 1994 backed by the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). The main warring factions are: Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which began the civil war with its incursion of December 1989; the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the army of former President Doe made up largely of the Krahn ethnic group; the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), made up primarily of former AFL soldiers, which split in March 1994 along ethnic lines, pitting the Krahn faction of Roosevelt Johnson (ULIMO -J) against the Mandingo faction, led by Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO -K); the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), another offshoot of the AFL, which has been fighting the NPFL in the southeast; and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) from Lofa County. ECOMOG, which is mostly Nigerian, has been in Liberia more than five years now, and while its presence has helped protect many of the civilians living in Monrovia, ECOMOG's reputation has been tarnished by its support for various anti -NPFL, Krahn -based factions.

In addition, in September 1993, the United Nations Security Council created a U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the Cotonou peace agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG. The Cotonou peace plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be composed of African troops from outside the West African region. By early 1994, some 800 Tanzanians were deployed in Kakata, and 900 Ugandans were in Buchanan. (These expanded ECOMOG troops were withdrawn during 1995.) This was the second attempt to introduce other African forces

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into ECOMOG as a way of diluting the overwhelming Nigerian nature of ECOMOG-- in 1992, the US financed a Senegalese contingent to join ECOMOG as a way of addressing the NPFL's concerns about handing over arms to an overwhelmingly Nigerian force.

In August 1995, a new peace agreement was signed in Abuja, amending and supplementing the Cotonou and Akosombo accords, which includes all the warring factions and provides for a new ceasefire. The new six -person Council of State is composed of Wilton Sankawulo as chairman; George Boley representing the LPC, the Central Revolutionary Council of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Lofa Defense Force; Alhaji Kromah representing ULIMO; Oscar Quiah representing the Liberia National Council; Chief Tamba Taylor; and Charles Taylor of the NPFL. The agreement provides for presidential elections to be held in one year, in August 1996. The international community, and particularly the United States, must act quickly to ensure that basic human rights guarantees are implemented in Liberia, so that a free and fair election can be organized.

US Policy

The US has always had a "special relationship" with Liberia, a country formed by freed American slaves which is the closest that the US came to having a colony in Africa. Signs of this unique relationship are everywhere in Liberia: the Liberian flag is modeled on the American one, the U.S. dollar was used as legal tender, Liberia's constitution was written at Harvard Law School and many Liberians have relatives in the U.S. Even the names of towns and streets reflect the U.S. connection -- Monrovia, the capital, is named after President James Monroe. During the brutal and corrupt reign of former President Samuel Doe, Liberia was the largest recipient of US aid in sub -Saharan Africa.

This relationship was not a one -way affair, as some US officials later claimed. Liberia was the only country in West Africa where the U.S. had

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landing and re- fueling rights for military aircraft on 24 -hour notice, and the Voice of America transmitter in Monrovia broadcast throughout West Africa. Under the regime of Samuel Doe, Liberia contributed to the U.S. Cold War strategy by expelling the Libyan Embassy and nine Soviet diplomats. The CIA and Defense Department also had facilities in Liberia for intelligence communications throughout Africa. In addition, private American investments in Liberia were substantial -- Firestone, for example, operated one of the largest rubber plantations in the world. (This is now owned by a Japanese company, Bridgestone.)

After years of supporting the Doe regime, the US withdrew from Liberia more or less completely once the war began in 1990. Many Liberians now harbor a deep bitterness toward what they see as their abandonment by the US government. In the summer of 1990, when the civil war was decimating Monrovia, US warships were kept off the coast of Liberia to help evacuate foreigners, but the US refused to intervene either diplomatically or militarily. Since US support for the Doe regime was instrumental in setting the stage for the conflict, Liberians have been disappointed that the US has not been more engaged in trying to secure the peace.

Throughout the war, the US policy has been to support the conflict resolution efforts of ECOWAS and the UN, to withhold recognition of any of the governments until elections could be held, and to promote ECOWAS and its peace plan. However, by deferring to ECOWAS, the US lost important opportunities to influence the negotiations and to insert human rights guarantees into the process. The U.S. has been the largest donor to the Liberian relief effort. (Other U.S. aid is prohibited by the Brooke Amendment, which suspends aid to countries that have failed to repay their loans to the US.) The U.S. has spent some $80 million in humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance to Liberia including assistance to the refugee communities outside Liberia. In addition, some $60 million has been provided for conflict resolution efforts such as financing the Senegalese and later the Ugandan and Tanzanian contingents

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to ECOMOG.

During 1994, the Clinton Administration sent several delegations to the West African region to deal with the Liberian crisis including National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who stopped in Accra during his visit to Africa in late 1994 during Liberian peace negotiations, as well as visits by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell. In early 1995, President Clinton appointed Ambassador Dane Smith to be his special envoy to Liberia, and he has made five trips to the region. His primary functions have involved moving the peace process forward and obtaining a regional consensus on stopping the flow of arms into Liberia. Given the critical importance of both these issues, this position must be given high-level attention in order to assure ongoing US involvement in these issues.

In an important move, in July 1995, the US detained Momolu Sirleaf, a high official of the NPFL, at Dulles Airport for violating Article 212F of the Immigration and Nationality Act which, by presidential proclamation, prohibits entry into the US of those individuals hindering the peace process. The presidential proclamation was issued on September 1, 1994, but this was the first time it was applied. Sirleaf was held for approximately 48 hours before being released pending a hearing, which is now scheduled for early November. The US action sent an unmistakable signal to the warring factions that they would not be allowed to continue using the US as a base for financing their war effort.

ECOMOG

The ECOMOG intervention succeeded in temporarily stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing, and is therefore regarded by many as a model of regional conflict resolution. Clearly, human rights benefits did flow from the intervention, and one would be hard pressed to visit Monrovia without

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hearing "Thank God for ECOMOG." However, ECOMOG has not integrated human rights protection and promotion into its activities, and this has proved to be a serious shortcoming. Pursuing peace without recognizing the centrality of human rights has left ECOMOG at several points during the war embroiled in a serious conflict: In the interests of ending the war and defeating a seemingly intractable adversary in the NPFL, ECOMOG has allied itself with other warring factions, which undermines its credibility and therefore its ability to bring peace.

The background to the hostility between the NPFL and the Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG dates back to the initial ECOMOG intervention in August 1990, when Charles Taylor accused Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida of attempting to rescue Liberian President Doe.

Taylor's NPFL soon targeted West African nationals from the countries participating in ECOMOG, including many Nigerians: it is believed that i hundreds were executed and hundreds of others were held in detention.

The situation exploded again in October 1992 when the NPFL attacked Monrovia. The urgency of the situation compelled ECOMOG to accept the assistance of other Liberian factions -- the AFL and ULIMO-- in fighting the NPFL. There have been many allegations that ECOMOG actually armed ULIMO and the AFL. Sources in the State Department and the Pentagon have confirmed that ECOMOG supplied -- or at least facilitated -- some arms to AFL and ULIMO. There were also many reports that ECOMOG provided transportation to ULIMO fighters.

A similar pattern emerged between Nigerian ECOMOG and the LPC, and later, with ULIMO -J. Reports indicate that the Nigerians were supplying arms and ammunition to these factions as a way to weaken the NPFL while profiteering on the side. ECOMOG has not sought adequately to control the abusive behavior of the forces with which it is nominally allied, or to investigate cases of human rights abuses committed by these forces,

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including forced recruitment of children, killings, beatings, systematic looting and harassment of civilians.

There have been many reports about direct ECOMOG involvement in looting and occasional harassment or detention of civilians, although ECOMOG has not been responsible for systematic human rights abuses in the territory it controls. There is no indication that ECOMOG has conducted investigations into these incidents.

There is considerable discussion now about enhanced US support for ECOMOG. ECOWAS is seeking some $90 million for its peacekeeping operation in Liberia, and an additional $42 million for demobilization. The US is now considering how it can respond to these requests, which also include ECOMOG's need for communications support and equipment. Given the history of ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia, close attention must be paid to ensure that their mission is conducted in an even -handed fashion without assisting or prejudicing any of the warring factions. Clearly, any future US assistance to ECOMOG must be contingent upon transparency of ECOMOG operations and strict scrutiny of ECOMOG conduct. It should also be noted that while new national contingents may be introduced into ECOMOG, such as Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast and Togo, the bulk of the ECOMOG forces remain Nigerian military and are therefore a highly problematic recipient of US assistance. This situation makes human rights conditions for the receipt of US assistance doubly urgent.

The United Nations

On September 15, UNOMIL's mandate in Liberia was extended until January 31, 1996, UNOMIL has a mandate to report on violations of the ceasefire and violations of humanitarian law, but since its creation in September 1993, it has not reported publicly about the situations it has monitored. It should do so. UNOMIL should also monitor the ECOMOG mission, since the two will be deployed together throughout the country, and

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the conduct of ECOMOG contingents will require scrutiny.

The UN has a critical role to play in Liberia. As an international presence deployed around the country, it can play an important role in monitoring the security situation. As part of the Disarmament Committee and the Cease -Fire Violations Committee, UNOMIL will be engaged is some of the most critical aspects of implementing the peace agreements.

However, human rights concerns have been notably absent from the UN's reporting on Liberia. Accordingly, many opportunities were missed to insert provisions for human rights protection into the peace process. The UN observers must fulfill their mandate to monitor and report on human rights violations. If possible, a human rights observer mission should be deployed throughout Liberia with the clear mandate to monitor, document and report on human rights abuses.

Child Soldiers

A disturbing characteristic of the Liberian war has been the use of child soldiers. International law --(the Protocols of the Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) -- forbids the use of children under the age of fifteen as soldiers in armed conflict. The African Charter on the Rights of the Child has a higher threshold, stating that no one under the age of eighteen can serve in armed hostilities. In spite of these clear provisions, thousands of children are being used as soldiers in Liberia.

There are no precise figures on the number of child soldiers in Liberia; even the total number of combatants in all the factions is unknown, but estimates range between 40,000 and 60,000 combatants. UNICEF estimates that approximately ten percent of the fighters are under the age of fifteen. The NPFL and ULIMO have consistently used children under the age of eighteen, including thousands of children under fifteen.

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Programs designed to demobilize and rehabilitate child soldiers should be a key target of US funding for Liberia. These boys, many of whom either joined a warring faction to survive or were forcibly recruited, and virtually all of whom suffered physical and psychological trauma, will require serious attention in the years to come. The US has an important role to play both in funding programs to reintegrate and rehabilitate child soldiers, and in providing experts who can assist the Liberians in this process.

Accountability for Past Abuses

Human Rights Watch/Africa believes that those responsible for egregious human rights abuses in Liberia must be held accountable for their crimes. As we have set forth in our policy statement on accountability for past abuses, it is the responsibility of governments to seek accountability, regardless of whether the perpetrators are officials of the government, the military, anti-government forces, or others. We also oppose any laws that purport to immunize those who have committed gross abuses from exposure of their crimes, from civil suits for damages for those crimes, or from criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment. One of the tragedies of Liberia is that the issue of accountability has been avoided in all the peace

negotiations .

Seeking accountability does not contradict calls for a conditional amnesty, which some Liberians have proposed. Human Rights Watch/Africa does not oppose an amnesty for the offense of taking up arms and for general acts of war, but strongly opposes an amnesty for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

We recognize the difficulty that some governments may face in holding members of their own armed forces accountable for human rights abuses, but we do not believe that these difficulties justify disregard for the principle of accountability. Despite these obstacles, the alternative is far worse. It is important to note that our position calling for investigation, prosecution and

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punishment of those responsible for gross abuses is premised on a

reconstituted court system that would conform to internationally recognized . principles of due process of law.

Even if Liberia is not able to pursue prosecutions at this time, that does not preclude a process of truth- telling. Some form of Truth Commissions could be established which would investigate and publish information about how the war was carried out, who were the victims and who were the perpetrators of the abuses.

Recommendations

The most important prerequisite must be disarmament and demobilization of all the warring factions. In order to address the fears of the factions that they may find themselves more vulnerable than their rivals, disarmament must be conducted in an orderly fashion based on real transparency. For the demobilized soldiers, especially the child soldiers, programs must be implemented that will enable them to get education or vocational training, which will help to reintegrate them back into their communities.

Since the security situation will be an important factor as refugees and demobilized soldiers return home, civilian human rights monitors under UN auspices should be deployed throughout the country to observe, document and report on violations of human rights and humanitarian law by any warring faction, as well as by ECOMOG. This reporting mechanism is critical, given the lack of a functioning justice system in most of the country.

A separate contingent of technical experts should be tasked specifically with helping to rebuild the justice system and advising the Liberian justice ministry in rebuilding courts, prosecutors' office, a neutral police force, and prisons. Similar teams have been built into the UN human rights effort in Guatemala, known as MINUGUA, which grew out of the peace process.

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It is imperative that UNOMIL fulfill its mandate to monitor violations of humanitarian laws and violations of the ceasefire. U.N. observers are authorized to report on violations of the ceasefire and of humanitarian law, and they must protest publicly when they are restricted in their movements.

In order to strengthen the UN arms embargo on Liberia, UNOMIL observers should be stationed at border points and at key airports and seaports in Liberia and in neighboring countries. This is critical to stop continued arms flows into the country, and to report if these flows are continuing.

ECOMOG should be called upon to launch an immediate investigation of the charges that members of the Nigerian contingent have been assisting some of the warring factions, and make its findings public. End of text.

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Robert Brown, Assistant Professor of English at the University of Liberia, is doing postdoctoral research at the University of Essex in the United Kingdom. He has published many short stories in Short Stories International in New York. In recent years, he has completed two novels titled As the Twig Bends and To Seek a Newer World. The latter book is now under consideration for publication. He holds a Ph.D. in Languages and Linguistics from the University of Essex.

Yekutiel Gershoni is head of African Studies in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University in Israel. He is presently on a sabbatical at the African Studies Center at Boston University.

Sakui W.G. Malakpa is Associate Professor of Education at the University of Toledo (Ohio).

Dougbeh Chris Nyan, a Liberian, is a medical doctor residing in Maryland. He is a former executive of the Liberia National Students Union (LINSU). He was imprisoned in September 1988 by the Doe regime. Upon his release, he pursued studies at the Medical Faculty (Chante) of the Humboldt -University of Berlin, where he earned a Doctor of Medicine (MD) in 1995.

Momo K. Rogers is Associate Professor of Journalism in the College of Mass Communication at Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro.

Liberian Studies Journal, XXI, 1 (1996) 167

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