This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 70-6869

SAEGER, James Schofield, 1938- THE ROLE OF JOSE DE ANTEQUERA IN THE REBELLION OF PARAGUAY, 1717-1735.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1969 History, general

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE ROLE OF JOSE DE ANTEQUERA

IN THE REBELLION OF PARAGUAY, 1717-1735

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

James Schofield Saeger, B.A., A.M.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University

1969

Approved by

Adviser ^ ~7a Department of History ^ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people assisted me in this study. I would like to thank

Don José de la Pena and his staff at the Archives of the Indies in Seville.

I also wish to thank the directors and staffs of the libraries of the

School of Hispanic American Studies in Seville, North Carolina State

University, Duke University, Ohio State University, and Lehigh University.

1 must also acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Professor John J. TePaske of Duke University, who suggested this topic and guided this dissertation to its conclusion. I wish to thank Professor Robert H. Bremner of Ohio

State University for his help in so many ways.

ii ill

VITA

August 19,1938... . Born - Columbus, Ohio

1960...... B.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1962-1965...... Graduate Assistant, The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio

19 6 3 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1965-1967...... Instructor, Department of History, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina

1967-1969...... Instructor, Department of History, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field; Latin American History

Colonial Latin American History. Professor John J. TePaske iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... ii

VITA...... iii

Chapter

I. Introduction...... 1

II. A Struggle for Supremacy...... 23

III. Arrival of Jose de Antequera...... 42

IV. New Sources of Conflict...... 56

V. External Factors: Viceroy and Audiencia. . . . 73

VI. The Lines of Battle Are Drawn...... 88

VII, Antequera: Hour of Triumph...... 104

VIII. Antequera: His Downfall...... 117

IX, Death of Antequera...... 134

X. Conclusion...... 156

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 159 I

INTRODUCTION

The history of Spanish Paraguay began in 1516. In that year an expedition under Juan Djfaz de Soifs ascended the Rio de la Plata, the great River of Silver of southeastern South America. Solfs was searching for a water passage to the South Sea. He was captured and eaten by Indians, and his force was broken up. Several members of the expedition survived, and they repeated the stories they heard of fabulous riches just beyond the horizon, especially Inca silverwork. Other explorers came to the region in the nest two decades and verified these tales. Sebastian Cabot, who visited the area in 1526;. named it the Rio de la Plata. Rumors of the wealth to be found to the north and west motivated several Spanish attempts to conquer Peru from the east coast of South America. All of these failed, but they provided the basis for a permanent Spanish colony in the Plata region.^

In 1535 Pedro de Mendoza, a Basque noble, arrived at the mouth of the Rfo de la Plata with a force of eleven ships and 1,200 men. Mendoza acted under orders from Charles V to build forts, colonize the region, and establish land communications with Peru. It was he who established the town

Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay ; An Informal History (Norman, Oklahoma, 1949), pp. 34-50; Philip Raine, Paraguay (New Brunswick, N.J., 1956), pp. 19-24. 2

of Buenos Aires> He then sent a force to Peru under his lieutenant

Juan de Ayolas. Seriously ill, Mendoza embarked for Spain and died

en route. Before departing, he appointed Ayolas captain-general.

Ayolas sailed north on the Parana and Paraguay Rivars and

died at the hands of Guaycuru Indians. His main force remained behind

under his second-in-ccmnnand Domimgo Martfnez de Irala. These men, the

conquistadores of Paraguay, built a stockade on the east bank of the

Rfo Paraguay in August 1537. Over 1,000 miles north of Buenos Aires, they

named their new city Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion.^

Between 1537 and 1556 Domingo de Irala, the "Father of Paraguay," was the most powerful man in the Plata region; but his authority was fre­

quently challenged. His rule saw a succession of plots and counterplots.

In 1539 the colonists named Irala governor of Paraguay under the terms of a cedula from Charles V issued in September, 1537. This docra& ordered the colonists to elect their own governor if the office fell vacant.^

Irala's rule was interrupted for two years in 1542 with the arrival in Paraguay of the Great Pedestrian, Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, the newly appointed adelantado and governor of Paraguay. But Cabeza de

Warren, Paraguay. 34-50; R. B. Cunningham Graham, The Conquest of the River Plate (London, 1924), pp. 1-70; Luis L. Domfnguez, ed.. The Conquest of the River Plate (1535-1555). I, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt to the Rivers La Plata and Paraguay (London, 1891), pp. 1-91.

Ibid.; George Pendle, Paraguay; A Riverside Nation (London and New York, 1954),pp. 7-8.

Warren, Paraguay. 46. Vaca was an inept leader and on August 25, 1544, the province of

Paraguay experienced its first revolt. Citing Charles V*s cedula of

September, 1537, the Paraguayans, most of them loyal to Irala, overthrew the adelantado and re-elected Irala governor. This cedula applied only to a specific instance, but the conquistadores and their descendants for the next two hundred years would claim that it gave them the right to replace an intolerable governor.^

When Irala died in October, 1556 his legacy was a firmly estab­ lished colony. Irala had seen Asuncion become the first city of the

Plata region, after Buenos Aires was abandoned ini1541. He had parcelled out some 20,000 Guaranf Indian natives of the region in encomiendas^ to

320 of his followers. By 1556 the city of Asuncion covered an area of three square miles. It was the site of a cathedral, two parish churches, three monasteries, and two schools. Shortly before his death, Irala welcomed to Asuncion Pedro FernSndez de la Torre, the second titulary bishop of Paraguay. This event marked the establishment of the Roman

Catholic Church in Paraguay in its traditional form.^

Ibid.; Mangus MÔrner, The Political and Econcaaic Activities of the Jesuits in the La Plata Region. The Hapsburg Era (Stockholm, 1953), p. 53; Bernard Moses, The Spanish Dependencies in South America; An Introduction to their Civilization (New York and London, 1914), Vol. I, pp. 188-203.

The encomienda was an institution which Spaniards first used in lands reconquered from the Muslims. In America, the encomienda was a system in which the crown "commended" a certain number of Indians to worthy Spaniards. Each owed specific obligations to the other. The Indian had to labor a certain number of days for encranendero. who in turn was obligated to see to the physical and spiritual welfare of his charge.

Warren, Paraguay, 68-80; Ricardo de Lafuente Machafn, gobernador Domingo Martinez de Irala (Buenos Aires, 1939) passim. The majority of the people in early colonial Paraguay were

Indians belonging to the Tupf-Guaranf linguistic family, who probably

originated in the basin of the Rjfo Paraguay. By 1537 they had spread

out over much of eastern South America to Bolivia, most of coastal

Brazil, the interior of the Amazon, and the present republics of

Paraguay, Uruguay, and northern Argentina. Before 1537 the Carios,

the most advanced of the Guaranf tribes, cultivated maize and manioc.

They supplemented their diet with fish.and game and developed rudimen­

tary industrial arts like weaving cotton and making a few domestic imple­

ments. A sedentary people, the Guaranf exhibited few of the hostile

characteristics of the fierce Puelche and Abipones of Argentina or

Payaguas, Guaycurus, or Charruas who also lived in Paraguay. Thus

their conversion to Christianity and reduction to Spanish authority

and civilization were relatively easy tasks.^

Never fulfilling its founders' expectations as a route to

Peru, the area around Asuncion in the middle of the sixteenth century was a more desirable place to colonize than Buenos Aires because of the

climate and relative friendliness and adaptibility of the aboriginal

population. With plentiful supply of willing laborers, the colonizers

of Paraguay were also favored by good soil for agriculture, a mild

climate, forests, and grasslands. These partly compensated for the

region's absence of mineral wealth.

Colonial Paraguay consisted of an irregular triangle of roughly

Julian H. Steward and Louis C. Faron, Native Peoples of South America (New York, Toronto, London, 1959), pp. 325-334; Alfred Metraux, "The Guaranf," in Julian H. Steward (ed.). Handbook of South American Indians. Vol. Ill (Washington, D.C., 1948), pp. 69-94. 5 60,000 square miles, formed at the confluence of the Paraguay and Alto

Parana Rivers, spreading out from Asuncion in a radius of some one

hundred and twenty miles north, east, and south of the city. West of

the Paraguay River lay the nearly uninhabitable Chaco region, two-thirds

of the present republic. The Chaco's arid plains were hostile to human

life. They prevented Spanish attempts to reach the silver mines of

Upper Peru from the Plata region,^

"In the Spanish colonization of the New World," Elman R,

Service notes, "the encomienda system and the mission system were the

two most important means of institutionalizing control of the native

population , , ."10 Both institutions existed in competition with each

other in Paraguay, In the area around Asuncion, the region of primary

Spanish settlement in Paraguay, the colonists quickly extended Spanish

control over the natives by the encomienda. while the later Jesuit state

of thirty mission towns was in the Alto Parent basin, a region remote

and nearly inaccessible from central Paraguay, where the nucleus of the

later nation of Paraguay was in the process of formation.

In Paraguay geographic, economic, racial, and cultural factors

altered the encomienda so that "the ruling population and the Indians were brought into closer personal contact than the usual Spanish colonial

systems,Few new Spanish colonists or soldiers came to Paraguay

9 Preston E, James, Latin America (New York, 1959), pp, 281-284; Raine, Paraguay, 4; Enrique de Gandfa, Historié del Gran Chaco (Buenos Aires, 1929), passim,

10 Elman R. Service, "The Encomienda in Paraguay," Hispanic American Historical Review. XXXI (May, 1951), 230-251,

11 Ibid. 6 after the expeditions of the sixteenth century, and the original Spanish settlers gave way to a predominantly mestizo population. As miscegenation increased, the number of encomienda Indians diminished.

While racial hybridization produced the society of colonial

Paraguay, its economy was a product of its physical environment. Cul­ turally richer and technically superior to the aboriginal Guarani, the

Spanish conquistadores and their mestizo descendants were isolated from Spain and the major colonial centers of population and culture.

They recruited the Indians as sexual partners and as laborers. The

Spanish colonizers taught their trades first to Indians and then to mestizos. New expeditions from Spain in the sixteenth century brought artisans, and the number of services available to the colonists 13 increased.

The cathedral was the most important building in Asuncion.

Then came the town hall, the governor's house, and, later, the Jesuit college. The blacksmith's shop was the city's next most important building. There Paraguayan artisans forged guns, knives, and tools and minted iron money occasionally used in trade, although the pro­ vince was usually on a barter economy. In the town's shipyards,

Paraguayans constructed barks, brigantines, and caravels. These vessels sustained the river commerce with cities to the south, espe­ cially Corrientes, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires. This intercolonial trade in yerba, tobacco, and other agricultural and pastoral commodi­ ties was carried on despite the confiscatory taxes of mercantilist

Spain. It was a relatively small but vital part of the Paraguayan

12 Ibid.

13 Warren, Paraguay, 124-141. 7 economy, for it allowed the colonists to buy a few luxury goods imported from Spain by way of Panama and Peru and from the flourishing contra­ band trade in Buenos Aires.

Paraguay's economy never rose above the subsistence level.

Because of the province's remoteness, shipping costs were high. Exports might have provided an important source of revenue if the Paraguayans icoüld have sent them directly to Spain, but the prevailing mercantilist policy of the Spanish crown prevented this trade from ever developing to a great extent. The infrequent relaxations of these restrictions were of negligible importance to the Paraguayans because on these rare occasions the porteffos of Buenos Aires imposed prohibitive taxes on river commerce to check potential competitors.^^

Thus, colonial Paraguayans engaged mainly in agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Their goal was the economic self-sufficiency. Initially they took over the agriculture of the Guaranf, growing sugar, tobacco, manioc, corn, peanuts, and various kinds of fruits, which abounded. Later they raised cotton which, with leather, provided the two main sources of clothing. The grapes from their vineyards produced a wine of fairly high

14 Colonists from Asuncion founded Santa Fe in 1578 and Corrientes . in 1588 after fefounding Buenos Aires in 1580. The latter had surpassed Asuncion in wealth and political importance by 1600. The inferior position of Asuncion contributed to the Paraguayans' perception that they were victims of discrimination. Pierre Charlevoix, The History of Paraguay. Containing . . . a Full and Authentic Account of the Establishments Formed There by the Jesuits . . . (London, 1769), Vol. I, 206-231.

15 Warren, Paraguay, 124-141; Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (Net; York, 1947), pp. 313-334; Clarence H. Haring, Trade and Nayigatio/i between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 140-143. Ifi 8 quality.

Stock raising was a vital part of the economy. Soon after Pedro de Mendoza brought hogs to the Plata region, pork was an important part of the Paraguayan diet. Horses arrived with each ne^7 expedition of the sixteenth centuiry, thrived, and multiplied into large herds after 1550.

Paraguayan ranches also maintained cattle, although their herds never rivalled those of the Jesuit mission province where the terrain was more favorable. Still, beef was an important source of food, and hides yielded a variety of leather goods.

Paraguay's most important product was yerba (Ilex Paraguavensis).

"the herb of Paraguay." It came from a small tree native to the region.

When roasted, powdered, and boiled, its leaves produced a mildly narcotic tea. Yerba mat^ was highly prized throughout the Plata region and as far 18 away as Chile and Peru.

Yerba trees grew wild several places in Paraguay. The best yerba (verba caamini) came from stands (verbales) in the Jesuit mission province just south of the Tebicuary River near the reduction town of

San Ignacio Guazu, Santa MariTa, Santa Rosa, and Santiago. The civil province produced an inferior brand (verba de palos). The yerbales which were exploited by enterprising Paraguayan encomenderos were located a hundred and fifty miles north of Asuncion. There was no communication by land between the yerbales and Asuncion, and the expeditions periodically

16 Félix de Azara, Viajes por la America meridional (Madrid, 1923), Tœno I, pp. 147-157.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.. pp. 134-137; W, H. Koebel, Paraguay (London, 1916), pp. 284-290. 9 sent out from the capital had to travel up the Riv^r Paraguay against the current at least ten days before sighting stands of yerba. The harvesting expeditions, which also roasted and ground the leaves after gathering them, consisted mainly of encomienda Indians plus some nomi­ nally free laborers who worked for Paraguayan merchants to whom they were constantly Indebted.

Reaching their destination, the parties of yerba workers

(beneflcladores) found life always harsh and usually dangerous. Swarms of mosquitos were everywhere. Located In marshy terrain, the yerbales were breeding grounds for disease. They were also within the territories of the unconquered Guaycuru and Nbaya Indians. Withstanding mosquitoes, diseases, and Indian attacks, the gathering parties still had to confront the "tigers" and poisonous reptiles and Insects that Inhabited theyer­ bales. The customary length of a yerba expedition was four to six 20 months, an eternity for the men who had to endure it.

Laborers were always In short supply. The mortality rate amopg yerba workers was high, and miscegenation had already reduced the number of Indian mltayos.^^ The encomemderos of Paraguay, who were often yerba

19 Ralne, Paraguay, 55; J. P. and W, P. Robertson, Four Years In Paraguay: Comprising an Account of that Republic under the Gov- ernment:of the Dictator Francla (Philadelphia, 1838), Vol. II, pp. 91-101.

20 Ibid.

21 Those were Indians bound by the encomienda mltaya. the formal encomienda established by Domingo de Irala. Laws protecting the rights of mltayos were usually Ignored In Paraguay. The other type of Paraguayan encomienda. the orlgluarlo, was a more Informal relationship In which encomenderos acquired Guaranf women as domes­ tic servants and concubines. Service, "Encomienda In Paraguay," 230-238. 10 merchants, too, were anxious to tap new sources of labor, and after the

1630's they increasingly coveted the Indians of the Paraguayansmissions of the Jesuits.22

The Jesuit mission provinces of Paraguay were the most contro­ versial aspect of the colonial history of the la Plata region. It was actually never a part of the civil province. Civil ecclesiastical officials in Asuncion had no jurisdiction in the mission province. Few even visited there. The area of the Jesuit missions, therefore, was a separate province within the Spanish Empire.23

Founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1540, the Company (Society) of

Jesus sent its first three missionaries to Paraguay in 1588 to convert the natives to Roman Catholicism and teach them the ways of European civilization. Accomplishing little until IJIO, Jesuits then made rapid strides in Guayrâ, a region located along the Parana-panema, a tributary of the Alto Parana. Their principal tool for conversion was the mission, an institution employed everywhere on the Spanish frontier by several religious orders.2^ For the newly converted Indians, the mission was intended to serve as "an intermediate state between primitive barbarism and European civilization."23

22 Pablo Hernandez, Organizaci6n social de las doctrinas de la Companfa de Jesus (Barcelona, 1913), Vol. II, p. 167.

23 C.R. Boxer, Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola (London, 1952), p. 70.

24 MBrner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 59-77.

25 Haring, Spanish Empire in America. 197. 11 For twenty years the Jesuits enjoyed great success in Guayra despite formidable obstacles. By 1629 they had congregated 100,000

Guarani Indians into some twenty mission towns. Then between 1627 and

1631, marauding mamelucos from Ssfo Paulo, raiding the Jesuit establish­ ments in search of slaves, laid waste the experiment in Guayra. The paulistas carried off 60,000 Indians in four years and so terrified 26 others that another 10,000 fled the missions to avoid slavery.

Forced to abandon Guayra in 1631, Jesuit missionaries led the remaining 30,000 converts down the Parana River into southeastern Paraguay.

There, between the great bend of the Parang and the Uruguay Rivers, in the present Argentine province of Misiones, they established the mission province which lasted until 1761. Called the Jesuit province of Paraguay, it actually included Jesuit establishments (including colleges, ranches, 27 and farms as well as missions ) in the whole Plata region.

The Jesuit "reductions" of Paraguay grew to maturity in the next seventy years. Tens of thousands of Indians were reduced to a sedentary life. The paulista threat soon disappeared after Father Antoni®

Rufz de Montoya urged the Council of the Indies to give Jesuits per­ mission to arm their neophytes. The Council gave them the privilege to ignore the decrees prohibiting aborigines from carrying weapons, in effect throughout most of the Spanish Empire, although it warned the

Jesuits to prevent their neophytes from using their weapons against

Spanish colonists. On several later occasions, though, both Jesuits and

26 Môrner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 59-77.

27 Ibid. 12 crown officials found It convenient to disregard this warning. By 1642 the mamelucos stopped harrasslng the missions entirely, and by 1650 each reduction had Its own armed force, consisting of a contingent of Infantry and one of cavalry, trained by Jesuit lay brothers and armed with swords, 28 muskets, lances, and even artillery.

The mission province was flourishing by 1650. It reached Its fruition by 1700, when some 100,000 Indians lived In thirty mission towns.

The mission towns resembled their Spanish counterparts. Each contained a main square surrounded by a church, arsenal, workshops, storehouses, and homes for the missionaries and converts. The neophytes theoretically governed themselves under Guaranf officials. Actually the Jesuit curate and his assistant strictly regulated life for all their Indians.

The goal of each mission was economic self-sufficiency. Produce from the missions Included sugar, tobacco, grain, fruits, cotton, wax, and honey. The missions also produced the finest yerba In the Plata re­ gion. Money from the sale of yerba made the churches of the Jesuit province the finest In the Plata region. Rumors of the Jesuits' great treasures hidden In the reductions constantly circulated. These were highly exaggerated, but the Company's wealth was considerable.^*

Hostility between th two provinces of Paraguay existed from the beginning, becoming Increasingly bitter after 1620. The separation

28 Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. I, 374-410.

29 MlSrner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 198-202; Warren, Paraguay. 81-100.

30 Warren, Paraguay. 81-100; Mb'rner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 167-168. 13 of Buenos Aires and Paraguay in that year increased the commercial and 3L strategic importance of Buenos Aires and hastened Asuncion's decline.

It might have made better sense to rail against king and council for repressive legislation or to attack the cabildo of Buenos Aires for levying confiscatory taxes on river commerce, but the Jesuits were closer at hand. Their undeniable success galled the Paraguayans.

The reductions' legal status was also a source of friction be­ tween the two provinces. Neither Paraguayans nor Jesuits conquered the mission Guaranfs. Rather their conversion and reduction was voluntary.

Jesuit missionaries persuaded them to live in the missions under the

Company's protection by the "Sword of the Word." Thus their allegiance to the Spanish crown was also considered voluntary, although irrevocable.

This allegiance theoretically extended to royal officials in Lima,

Chuquisaca, and Asuncion. In practice this theoretical allegiance was illusory, and the principal Jesuit objective was to prevent colonial officials, lay and clerical, from having any concern with the missions' affairs.32

The mission province was a closed society. Spanish Paraguayans were legally prohibited from visiting it and were forbidden to trade or even travel within its borders. Similar legislation applied to Indian towns elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, but the Paraguayan Jesuits zeal­ ously enforced the codes segregating their Indians from all outsiders.

Occasionally Paraguayan governors and bishops made ceremonial visits to

31 Warren, Paraguay. 101.

32 Boxer, Salvador de Sa. 70-71. 14 the Jesuit province. Carefully screened beforehand, the few officials frcMn Asuncion Invited to the reductions saw and heard only what the

Jesuits wanted them to learn. With no direct knowledge of life, labor, and society In the reductions, the Paraguayans had to accept hearsay.

And allegations of great crimes of the Jesuits were plentiful.

The Company had numerous politically motivated enemies who were jealous of Its power and Influence. Other religious orders resented Its wealth.

Its religious accomplishments, and the arrogant superiority of some of

Its members. £x->Jesuits, expelled from the order for failure to meet Its high standards, circulated libels against It. Thus originated many stories of Jesuit abuses and of secret riches within the mission province.

From these and other sources sprang reports of atrocities against colonists casually performed by Guaranfs. It was said that the Indians' knowledge of the Jesuit policy of Ignoring when not d

These stories and suspicions were told and repeated and grew more ominous In the retelling.3^

The rumors were incendiary because the realities of the situa­ tion sufficiently distressed the Paraguayans. For one thing, the Para­ guayans began to covet the Jesuits' Indians soon after the mission province was firmly established In the 1630's. Hostility between the

33 Mangus MÜrner, éd.. The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Latin America (New York, 1965), pp. 11-15.

34 Ibid. 15 two provinces Increased yearly. When the Paraguayans charged that the

Company's goal was to destroy them, to usurp their rights and privi­

leges as well as the sovereign's, and to create an independent mission

empire,35 the Jesuits replied that Paraguayans who would depopulate

the missions to exploit the labor of the Indians were greedy and irre­

ligious men. Who else would stop the great task of conversion for per­

sonal profit?36

Though partly resulting from Paraguayan envy of royal favoritism

of their rivals, the bitterness between the provinces also sprang from

various other advantages enjoyed by the Company and its members. The

Company's successes were due partly to the fact that the order recruited

men of rare ability in temporal things like commerce, industry, and warfare. Often they were foreigners. A second reason for their pre­

eminence in the yerba trade, just one of many pursuits at which they

excelled in the Plata region, was that they had a monoply over the best

yerbales in South America. They could control the market. Also their

location on the Alto Parana and Uruguay rivers gave them superior

access to the yerba markets downriver. In addition, the Spanish crown

exempted the mission province from paying the heavy sales taxes and

customs duties required of the Paraguayans. Observing these benefits,

the Paraguayans, who also knew that their rivals had thousands of

33 AGI, (Archivo General de Indies, Seville, Spain), Audiencia de Charcas (hereafter Charcae), Legajo 323. Auto del Cabildo Justicia y Reximiento de la Ciudad de la Asuncion, Asuncion, August 7, 1724.

36 Pedro Lozano, Historié de las revoluciones de la provincia del Paraguay , 1721-1735 (Buenos Aires, 1905), Vol. I, pp. 1-9. 37 16 Indians, working without pay, were outraged.

This situation, the Paraguayans felt, was unjust for men whose ancestors secured the Plata region for the Spanish crown. The colonists occasionally asked the crown for legislation to put them on an equal basis with the missions, but they were too poor to send their representatives and advocates to Spain very often. After the

1640's increasing numbers of Paraguayans believed that the crown should replace Jesuit missionaries with secular priests or itself assume control of the missions. It then should allow the Paraguayans to exploit the la­ bor supply and work the gold and silver mines, which the Jesuits allegedly 38 were hiding.

Arguing with more emotion than reason, the Paraguayans asserted that anti-Jesuit, pro-Paraguayan legislation would have two beneficial effects: First, it would increase crown revenues by adding thousands of tribute-paying Indians to the tax rolls. Second, — and of greater concern to the Paraguayans— acquisition of the Jesuits' Guaranfs and verbales would transform the impoverished civil province into an economically viable entity.^9

The Paraguayans' arguments, though specious, had some basis of

37 Mbmer, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 1^7-168, 199-201.

38 "Informe del General D. Mathfas Angles y Gortari a los Ilustres Senores Inquisidores Apost6licos del Santo Oficio de la Ciudad de Lima, "Coleccion general de documentes que contiene los sucesos tocantes 6 la segunda epoca de las conmoclones de los regulares de la CompàîfTa en el Paraguay . . . (Madrid, 1769), Pieza IV, pp. 1-63.

39 Ibid. 17 support. Paraguay would have reaped few additional benefits from nationalization. Isolated, without mineral resources, and subject to a repressive mercantilist system, it would still have a subsistence economy. Nevertheless, a few merchants would have profited. And at least the Paraguayans would have removed their principal rivals. Jesuits said that the men who would gain by their loss, Paraguay's most promi­ nent and persuasive citizens, were conspiratorial sophists who subverted their ignorant fellow citizens,but this claim was excessive. The commercial rivals of the Jesuits were merely more articulate than their neighbors. Most Paraguayans felt racial and cultural bonds. Host spoke Guarani, at least at home. They all faced similar hardships and encountered the same enemies. They all had a deep sense of identifi­ cation with their region. This common identity would become an aggres­ sively defensive nationalism after 1800.

In the middle of the seventeenth century a Franciscan Bishop of Paraguay widened the gulf between the Paraguayans and the Jesuits.

The actions of the Franciscan friar, Bernardino de Cârdenas, against the Jesuits in the 1640's forecast those of Jose de Antequera in the

1720's, and the anti-Jesuit attitudes and responses of the Paraguayans during

Cirdenas affair resembled those of the comuneros almost ninety years later

Cardenas arrived in Asuncion in 1642, the newly consecrated

Bishop of Paraguay. Like many Franciscans, he was contemptuous of the

40 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 1-9.

41 Charles A. Washburn, The History of Paraguay . . .(Boston and New York, 1871), Vol. I, pp. 89-107. 18

Jesuits. An avaricious man with a mercurial temper, he quarreled with the Paraguayans' governor, Gregario de Henestrosa. Apparently their dispute began over the question of how illegal profit taking the bishop could claim. The clash of personalities developed into a struggle for control of the province. Aseries of confrontations between the two men ended in Cardenas' laying an interdict upon the city of Asuncion after exccmmunicating the governor and his followers. He later included all

Jesuits in Paraguay in the decree of excommunication. His approach to the Jesuits of Asuncion, residents of the college maintained by the

Company in the provincial capital, was to prohibit them from performing any public religious ceremony. Then he demanded that all candidates for holy orders swear their obedience to him personally.

The bishop made no secret of his desire to expel all Jesuits from Asuncion. He said the impoverished secular church should get all revenues frcxn the college's holdings, especially its real estate in

Asuncion, large and productive ranches in the surrounding countryside, and the approximately fifty slaves who maintained the ranches. Many commentators have concluded that "secular church" and "Bernardino de cârdenas" were synonymous

After two years of turmoil. Governor Hinsstrosa defeated the

Bishop. In October, 1644, supported by several hundred Guaranf soldiers from the missions, he made Cardenas his prisoner and banished him from

Paraguay. Cardenas, however, composed a list of charges against the

42 Ibid.; Warren, Paraguay. 101-109; Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. I, 410-463; II, 1-67.

43 Ibid. 19 Jesuits and also against Hinestrosa while in exile in Corrientes. His allegations against the Company merely articulated the anti-Jesuit atti­

tudes and assumptions of many Paraguayans. Because the bishop had them printed, later generations of Paraguayans would read his arguments and cite them as fact. Antequera repeated them in the 1720's; so did the

rebels of the 1730's; and Jesuit advocates in eighteenth century Paraguay

often brought petitions to the crown refuting them.^^

In 1649 Bernardino de Cardenas returned to Asunci^, when Diego

Escobar Osorio, who replaced Governor Hinestrosa in 1647, permitted him

to come back to his diocese. Then Osorio died, and Cardenas was elected governor by the citizens of Paragmy, attracted to his outspoken stance against the Jesuits. The governor-bishop quickly expelled all Jesuits

from Asuncion and expropriated their college's property. Paraguayans hailed the bishop's actions by sacking the college.

But Cardenas' governorship was brief. The Audienc&a of Charcas

ordered the oidor Andres de Leon y Garabito to pacify the province, and the

oidor sent Sebastian de Leon y Zarate to Asuncion with 3,000 Guaranf troops.

After a brief skirmish in which eighteen Paraguayans were killed, Leon y

Zarate put down the uprising and restored the Jesuits to their college in

Asuncion. Other than a formal reprimand from the Audiencia, no action was taken against Cardenas; and he returned to his native Chuquisaca in

1651.^^

The Cardenas affair was a significant episode in the history

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid. 20 of the province. Until expulsion of the Jesuits from South America in

1767, Paraguayans recalled in anguish, fear, and outrage that their

Guarani troops had marched against residents of the civil province.

Cardenas' published allegations continued to provoke wrathful outbursts for another century, and his expulsion of the Jesuits set an example that the Paraguayans repeated in 1724 and 1732.

By the eighteenth century Paraguay was still a remote outpost of the Spanish Empire. Its government was organized and administered like many other lesser Spanish provinces such as Florida, Nicaragua, or Carta­ gena. A governor (gobernador) was the chief magistrate of the province.

He was judge and legislator as well as chief executive. As captain-general, he also was the ranking officer of the militia. Laws issued by the King and Council of the Indies were interpreted by his superiors, the Audencia of Charcas and the viceroy of Peru. The laws strictly regulated his official conduct, but the governor usually ecercised a great deal of lati­ tude in the performance of his duties. Because even his immediate supe­ rior#, over a thousand miles away, had little knowledge of the situations confronting a governor of Paraguay, he often disobeyed those laws which were difficult to enforce. His superiors rarely questioned his judgment except ill times of crisis.

Governors of Paraguay were appointed by the king upon nomina­ tion by the Council of the Indies, the principal agency directing colonial affairs. The first requirement of a man aspiring to the governorship was to meet the purchase price, for the sale of offices in the Spanish empire

47 KMring, Spanish Empire in America. 148-153; Recopilacion de leyes de los reynos de las Indies (Madrid, 1681), Libro V; titulo ii, passim. 21 was an important source of revenue. The viceroy of Peru could appoint an interim governor if the office fell vacant. The Audiencia of Charcas too made interim appointments, a function often dictated by n e c e s s i t y . ^8

Of vital concern to the Paraguayans was the cabildo or town council of Asuncion. The regular concerns of cabildos in Spanish America included public works, water supply, allocating building sites and garden plots, the organization of Indian labor, and police regulations. Also

/ the town council of Asuncion claimed the right to appoint governors in emergencies. In addition to filling temporary vacancies in the governor­ ship, the Asuncion cabildo often created them by removing undesirable officeholders. The number of officers of the cabildo fluctuated, and for a man to hold more than one office was common. The Asuncion cabildo elected annually two alcaldes ordinarios, justices of the peace with jurisdiction of first instance. They occasionally presided over meetings of the ca­ bildo. Regidores. or alderman, exercised appellate jurisdiction in cer­ tain cases. Originally limited to two years in offices, regidores often held the office in perpetuity by the 1700's. Other municipal offices included that of alcalde de la hermandad. who was a justice in criminal cases and a constable; alferez real, the royal standard bearer, whose duties as coordinator of military operations, defender of widows and orphans, and voting member of the cabildo indicate that his office was more important than its title implies; a secretary; a controller; a supervisor of weights and measures; and several more.^9

48 Haring, Spanish Empire in America. 148-153.

49 Antonio Zinny, Historia de los gobernantes del Paraguay. 1535-1887. (Buenos Aires, 1880), pp. 1-101; Warren, Paraguay. 135-136; Recopi- lacion. Lib. iv; Tit ix, passim.; J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (London, 1966), pp. 108-112. 22 The Audiencia of Charcas and viceroy of Peru were the American superiors of the governor of Paraguay. The Audiencia was an appellate court which had acquired extensive legislative and administrative powers by the eighteenth century. The viceroy of Peru was the king's personal representative and the supreme authority in Spanish South America. He too had judicial, legislative, and administrative powers. The viceroy of Peru and the Audiencia of Charcas frequently disputed each other's authority over Paraguayan affairs. Usually the tribunal or magistrate who took the initiative prevailed, although the statutes clearly out­ lined the viceroy's superiority.^0

The lack of any clear-cut lines of authority or common agree­ ment on which of the two authorities the Paraguayans should obey when the Audiencia's orders conflicted with the viceroy's was a major factor in the Paraguayans revolts of the 1720's and 1730's. Had they worked together at the outset of the Paraguayan troubles, they might have pre­ vented the revolt, but each party to the Paraguayan dispute obeyed the order of the higher authority which supported its case, and the juris­ dictional dispute between audiencia and viceroy helped to instigatecand prolong the antequerista uprising.

50 Haring, Spanish Empire in America. 89-101; Charles W, Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia (Gainsville, 1957), pp. 1-3; John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration. 1782-1810; The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of La Plata (London, 1958), pp. 237-239. II

A STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY

The Paraguayan rebellions Led by José de Antequera inthe 1720's and members of the Asuncion cabildo in the 1730's began with a four year struggle for political and economic control of the province between the two most powerful men in the region, José de Avalos y Mendoza and Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda. A native of Paraguay, Avalos was the wealthiest man in the province and for most of his life the ^ facto arbiter of provincial affairs. He caused the removal of four different governors between 1705 and 1721. His actions, opinions, and motivations were typical of most of the citizens (vecinos) and other inhabitants (meradores) of the province.^

A native of Puerto de Santa Marfa in Andalusfa, Diego de los

Reyes came to Paraguay at the end of the seventeenth century. He mar­ ried Francisca Benftez, a member of one of Paraguay's oldest and wealthi­ est families. The Benftez,family were known in the region because of their sympathy for the aims and aspirations of the Jesuits. One of Fran­ cisca' s uncles, Pablo Benftez, was father superior of the Jesuit missions

Antonio Zinny, Historia de los gobernates del Paraguay. 1535-1887 (Buenos Aires, 1887), pp. 95-104; Padre Pedro Lozano, S,J., Historia de las revoluciones del Paraguay. 1721-1735 (Buenos Aires, 1905), I, pp. 7-16; Padre Antonio Astrain, S.J., Historia de la Companfa de Jesus en la asistencia de Espana (Madrid, 1925), VII, pp. 479-505; P. Pierre Charlevoix, The History of Paraguay (London, 1769), II, pp. 134-137; Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay ; An Informal History (Norman, Oklahoma, 1949), pp. 110-113. 23 24 of Paraguay, and another. Father Bias de Sylva, was in charge of the

Company's commerce in the Plata region. A third uncle. Father Natias de Sylva, was Dean of the Cathedral Chapter of Asuncion. By 1711 Reyes was prosperous enough to purchase high office. Already a justice and constable (alcalde de la hermandad), he bought the office of Governor and Captain General of Paraguay. He was to succeed Juan Gregorio Bazan O y Pedraza, the present governor-designate.

Reyes succeeded to the governorship in February, 1717 at the time of Bazan y Pedraza's death. He was determined to be a strong governor, to cultivate good relations with the Jesuits, and to increase his own wealth and his family's. Most Paraguayans, including their natural leader

Avalos, knew that harmonious relations with the Jesuits were exceedingly difficult to maintain, and to govern according to Jesuit dictates would cause them severe hardships.

Governor Reyes' approach was conciliatory at first. One of his first official acts in 1717 was to offer Avalos the post of lieutenant governor. He apparently hoped to silence his opposition by naming its most vocal and powerful member as his second-in-command, but Avalos de­ clined the offer in order to maintain his freedom of action. Instead

For a comprehensive discussion of this practice see J. H. Parry, The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs (Berkely and Los Angeles, 1953), passim.

Mat^as de Angles y Gortari, "Informe â los Ilustres Senores Inquisi- dores Apost6licos del Santo Oficio de la Inquisicion de la Ciudad de Lima," (Potosf, May 10, 1731) in Coleccion general de documentes que contiene los sucesos tocantes a ^a segunda €poca de las commociones de los regulares de la Ccmpanfa en el Paraguay (Madrid, 1769), III, Pieza IV, pp. 19-20, 23. AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205, Traslado de la Real Cedula de Merced de Gobernador y Capitan General de la Provincia del Paraguay. Madrid, June 3, 1711. 25 Reyes appointed Jose Delgado of Villa Rica, whom most of the Paraguayan encomenderos and regidores of Asuncion detested.^ Reyes and Avalos each felt that he would ultimately achieve victory, that his bases of support were firm, and that compromise was neither necessary nor possible on any important issue. Between 1717 andl721 events in Paraguay revolved about the antagonisms between Reyes and Avalos in which the two men, their families, and the parties for which each spokesman became increasingly hostile and estranged.

The first major dispute between the two concerned the fate of the Payagua Indians, a tribe of pirates who had preyed on Parana river traffic between Asuncion and Corrientes since the sixteenth century.^ In

1714 Governor Bazan y Pedraza, with the consent of a special council of war (consejo de guerra) attended by all the important military and civilian officials of the province, gave the Indians a royal guarantee of peace and friendship and allowed them to settle at a river camp site called

Tacumba forty leagues south of Asuncion. In return the Indians promised to stop their raids and to convert eventually to Christianity.^

4 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto proveydo por don Diego de los Reyes, Gobernador y Capitan General, sobre los desacatos de los vôinte y quatros don Joseph de Avalos y Mendoza y don Joseph de Urrunaga, Asuncion, May 4, 1717; AGI, Charcas Eè&ajo 321. Titulo de Teniente General, Justicia Mayor y Capitan a Guerra, Asuncion, June 14, 1718; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Acuerdo Capitular del Cabildo Justicia y Reximiento de la Asuncion, June 17, 1718.

5 Julian H. Steward and Louis C. Faron, Native Peoples of South America (New York, 1959), pp. 415,421.

6 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323, Acuerdo del Consejo de Guerra, Asuncion, May 8, 1714; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 18, 20; Mangus Mbrner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the Plata Region (Stockholm, 1953), pp. 13-14. 26 Reyes took office February 6, 1717. Two weeks later, acting

on the advice of Father Pablo Restivo, rector of the Jesuit college in

Asuncion, he decided to reverse his predecessor's decision, to seize the

Fayaguas at Tacumba, and to remit them to the Jesuit missions for bap­

tism, conversion to Christianity, and reduction. The governor personally

led four hundred soldiers overland and sent one hundred and fifty more down

river on sloops and rafts. Reyes believed that this show of force would

so intimidate the Payaguas that they would meekly submit to the vastly su­

perior Spanish army, but the appearance of the Spaniards only panicked the

Indians, who began shooting arrows in all directions. A Paraguayan soldier

fell wounded, and his comrades opened fire with muskets and cannon. Most

of the warriors escaped, but many women and children drowned when their

canoes overturned as they attempted to flee. Only seventy Indians were

captured. The prisoners were lodged for a time in Asuncion and then were

sent to the Jesuit missions.^

This affair disturbed the inhabitants of Paraguay for several

reasons. Some of them said that to march against the Payagudp when they

were under a royal guarantee of peace was an ignoble and dishonorable

act; furthermore, the attack at Tacumba was a provocation for the survi­

vors to wage a bloody war against them. The new raids, more serious

than those prior to 1714, brought all commerce on the river to a stand­

still and prevented the inhabitants of Paraguay from tending their live­

stock and tilling their fields. Moreover, Reyes’ opponents said the

example of Tacumba ended whatever possibilities there had been to convert

7 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Confesion del Alcalde provincial don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda, Gobernador que fue de la Provincia del Paraguay, Asuncion, September 17, 1721. 27 AtXd pacify other non-Christian Indians of the region. In his defense

Reyes later pointed out that there was no cause to believe that the

Fayaguas would always have adhered to the shaky truce which they made in

1714. Their past history indicated that they would resume their raids whenever they found it convenient.®

The principal affront to the colonists was the role the Jesuits played in the affair. Reyes had initiated the march on the advice of

Jesuit counsellors, and the spoils of the campaign, the captured Indians, went only to the missions. It was common knowledge that the Jesuits had repeatedly tried to enlist royal support and the aid of crown officials in Paraguay for a just war (guerra justa) to convert the fierce Indians of the Chaco to Christianity and also to convert the Payaguas.® The colo­ nists feared that Tacumba foreshadowed a long series of campaigns against the Indians which would cause loss of lives and serious harm to the eco­ nomic life of an already poor province. These fears were compounded by

Reyes' affront to the encomenderos when he sent the captive Payaguas to the Jesuit missions. Had he distributed them among Avalos and his friends, the ensuing assaults on Asuncion by the surviving Indians which had been provoked by the attack would likely have caused little friction. The encomenderos would probably have been more than willing to endure them in return for a chance to increase their dwindling labor force. The

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323, Sumaria de los capitulos de los cargos contra el Gobernador del Paraguay don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda puestos por don Tomas de Cardenas, becino de la misma provincia. Asuncion, September 14, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205, Don Juan de Mena Ortiz de Velasco, Regidor de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Para­ guay, informe a S.M. del miserable estado en que se halla la pro­ vincia del Paraguay por los excesos del gobernador don Diego de los Reyes Balmaseda, Asuncion, October 12, 1720.

Morner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits, p. 160. 28 Paraguayans were even more Irate because It was their commerce and not the Jesuits' which suffered the more from the raids. Although the pil­ laging Indians did kill four members of theCompany, including Bias de

Sylva, Jesuit embarcations were usually well guarded by Guaranf troops.

After Tacumba, the Paraguayans were certain that their governor was more concerned about the welfare of the inhabitants of the Jesuit mission prov­ ince than their own.

Although, during the next four tumultuous years in Paraguay, the governor's espousal of those Jesuit objectives which most Paraguayans felt unjust and injurious to their security was the source of most disputes, the governor's fractious character made a tense situation even worse. Ava­ los' determination to keep his influence in the province paramount was just as great as was Reyes' zealous resolve that the regidor's machinations must stop. Their rivalry, therefore, injected a personal feud into the colonist-

Jesuit dispute. One of the bitterest personal quarresl between the two men arose over the disposition of the estate of the late Governor Bazân y Pedraza, who had died intestate. In cases like this, officials of the royal treasury were appointed executors of the deceased man's estates.

The official (juez de comisidn de cuentas) assigned to oversee the dis­ position of Bazan's goods was Antonio Rufz de Arellano, Avalos' son-in-law.

When he asked the governor to lend him a vessel and Indian sailors to transport the records of his investigation of Bazan's affairs to

10 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205, Carta del Cabildo Justiciary Regimiento de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay a S.M., Asuncion, October 8, 1720; Angles y Gortari, "Informe" 21, 23; Astrain, VII, 479-505, passim.

11 C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, (New York, 1947), p. 297. 29 IQ ^ Corrientes, Reyes refused. He said the juez de comision*s real purpose was to get free transport for his own and his father-in-law's goods and that he, Reyes, would not be a party to an attempt to defraud the govern-

1 O ment. Despite the fact that this type of controversy was common, the disagreement between Reyes and Rufz de Arellano was an important event in the contest between the governor and his most formidable rival. To deny

Arellano's request was to insult Avalos.

Five months after becoming governor, Reyes "visited" the new town of Caruguaty one hundred leagues upriver from Asuncion, a settlement which Governor Baz^n had given him the responsibility for completing in

1716. Because the new poblacion was suffering from a severe winter (June-

August, 1717), Reyes sent a boatload of provisions north to alleviate the distress. When the shipment was delayed by heavy rains, the settlers in

Caruguaty blamed their new governor. They said he was responsible for the flota's lack of water, for the hardships the sailors had to endure, and for the behavior of his son, Carlos de los Reyes, who, as commander of the expedition, caused several Indian sailors to be beaten for disre­ spect and disobedience. Reyes' critics cited Carlos Reyes' orders as proof of his father's cruelty to the Indians in the civil province of

Paraguay. They said this aspect of Diego's administration alone should have been sufficient to prevent him from serving in an official capacity any longer. But when the governor ordered that the encomienda Indians in

12 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Exorto del Juez Subdelegado Visitador de Gajas Reales Capitan Antonio Ruiz de Arellano a don Diego de los Reyes, Gobernador y Capitan General de la Provincia del Paraguay, Asuncion, April 21, 1717.

13 AGI,Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto proveydo por el Maestre de Campo don Diego de los Reyes, . . . Asuncion, April 21, 1717. 30 Paraguay rendering personal service be rotated every month, they also

grumbled. The issue, of course, was not cruelty to Indians. It was the

governor.14

Another of the allegations made by his opponents against Reyes was that he illegally used the powers of his office to enrich himself. He

did, but it would have been unusual if he had done otherwise. He claimed

that the numerous embarkations carrying Paraguayan goods to market had

lowered their prices in Corrientes and Santa Fe and that their profusion

also caused great hardships for the Indian sailors. To correct these ine­

quities and abuses, he ordered that only three large fleets a year might

travel to the river ports to the south. Thus he gained absolute control

over the province's exports and also dealt a blow to the fortunes of Avalos

and other merchants. The governor and his teniente general Jose Delgado

also made personal profits from the sale of weapons sent to Paraguay for

defense against Indian attacks.

To bolster the region's defenses against possible attacks by

Indians and Brazilian marauders, Reyes ordered the erection of two new

14 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Confesion de don Diego de los Reyes, Asuncion, September 17, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 206. Informe de la Real Audiencia de la Plata a S.M., Plata, December 6, 1725.

15 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Testimonios de los testigos tachados para ser parciales y duedos del gobernador, Capitan Miguel de Torres, Alcalde Ordinario; Capitan Joseph de Tilleria, Piloto de una embar- cacion; Maestre de Campo Joseph Rojas Aranda; don Estevan de Salas Martinez, Oficial Real; Regidor don Martin de Chavarri; Sargento Mayor Alonso Caballero; Capitan Joachin de Robles y de los no tacha­ dos Sargento Mayor Juan Morales; Sargento Mayor Francisco de Aranda; Sargento Mayor Francisco Delgado; Sargento Mayor Marcos Martinez; Sargento Mayor Diego de Jara; don Mateo Benitez; don Miguel de Soroeta; don Pedro de Casai; don Francisco Quinones; Francisco Garcia Roa; y Simon Pintos, Asuncion, August 21 - September 14, 1721, 31 forts (presidios). PéKon and Ârecutacua. Despite the fact that don Diego

personally bore a significant portion of the cost of their construction, the

additional taxes he levied for the fortification enraged his opponents.

Reyes later denied that he ahd levied new taxes. On the contrary, he said,

he had removed or lowered many taxes, especially the excessive tribute pay­ ments that oppressed the Indians. He failed to mention, however, the cries

of righteous indignation by the encomenderos to whom the Indians made their

tribute payments. He testified that the alleged imposition of new taxes were only requests for donations from three shipowners. Although he was

technically correct, the request was so difficult to refuse that it was actually an order to "donate" four hundred pesos for each large shipment and two hundred for a smaller one. And the three shipowners from whom he

exacted the donations were Jose de Avalos, Antonio Rufz de Arellano, and

Jose de Urrunaga, another wealthy encomandero and regidor of Asuncion.

The most important encomenderos had had enough. The regidores

José de Avalos, Antonio Rufz de Arellano, and José de Urrunaga, the alguacil mayor Juan de Mena Ortiz y Velasco, and Capitan Ramén de las Lianas declared that they would neither pay any taxes nor would they fulfill their feudal obligations to serve in the functions of wars and provincial defense until

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta del gobernador del Paraguay a S.M., Asuncion, November 29, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Informe del Maestre de Campo don Diego de Los Reyes a S.M., Corrientes, AKo de 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Confesion de don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda, Asuncion, September 14, 1721.

17 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 2-7; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Dictamen fiscal posterior relativo a los cargos acumulados contra el goberna­ dor del Paraguay don Diego de los Reyes Balmaseda, Madrid, June 9, 1722; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto Proveydo por el Gobernador don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda, Asuncion, September 26, 1719; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Confesién del veinte y quatro don Joseph de Avalos y Mendoza, Asuncion, September 26, 1719. 32 the Audiencia either approved the governor's acts or removed him. For

two years Reyes prevented his critics' appeals for relief from his "tyranny"

from reaching the Audiencia. As Captain General he commanded the soldiers who guarded the ordinary access-routes to the province to require all

travelers who left Paraguay to show specific written permission from the

governor and all visitors and immigrants to the region to exhibit all of­

ficial documents in their possession and all their personal correspondence

as well.

The beginning of the end of the Reyes' government came in

February, 1719, when Diego exiled Avalos to the presidio of Arecutacua, jailed Jose de Urrunaga and Francisco Rojas Aranda, another regidor and

encomendero. and instituted civil and criminal proceedings against them.

He declared Avalos and Urrunaga guilty in September and placed them in the

/ 1 Q public jail of Asuncion. ^

By imprisoning General Avalos and attempting to prevent him

from appealing his conviction to the Audiencia of Charcas, the governor

finally overstepped his authority. In October dona Ignacia del Valle,

Avalos' mother, wrote the Audiencia that Reyes' hatred of her son and his friends and his envying and coveting the Avalos's wealth were the

18 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto proveido por el General Joseph Delgado Teniente del gobernador, Justicia Mayor y Capitan de Guerra, Asuncion, September 15, 1719; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Declaracion de Capitan Juan de Mena, Vecino fuedetario y Alguacil mayor proprie- tario de la ciudad de la Asuncion. May 19, 1718; AGI, Charcas, Le­ gajo 321. Mandato del Gobernador don Diego de los Reyes, Asuncion, May 19, 1720.

19 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Mandamiento de prision del General Joseph de Avalos y Mendoza por el Gobernador don Diego del los Reyes, Asuncion, February 13, 1719; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto del Gobernador del Paraguay, Asuncion, September 14, 1719; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda da quanta a S.M. de los tumultadores sediciosos, Asuncion, November 29, 1720. 33 real reasons for the incarceration of the two regidores and for the governor's confiscation of both their property and that of Rufz de

Arellano, who had escaped to Potosi. Because the governor was obstruct­ ing her son's defense, dona Ignacia wrote, the Audiencia was obligated to send someone to Paraguay to remove Reyes from office and exonerate her son.20

During the next year the seven charges, which most of the mem­ bers of the Asuncion cabildo brought against Reyes at the Audiencia, and the governor's unwillingness or inability to mollify the oidores combined to cause the Audiencia to issue orders for his recall. Proceeding on the advice of José de Antequera y Castro, who was the acting crown attorney or prosecutor (fiscal) at Charcas, the Audiencia appointed José de Garcéa

Miranda, an official of the Santa Cruzada, a tax for indulgences, for the

Audiencia of Charcas, to travel to Paraguay to investigate not only del

Valle's charges but also Reyes' entire governorship.21 Garcfa Miranda arrived in Asuncion in late April, 1720, but he was prevented from ever carrying out his instructions by Reyes' continual harassment and obstruc­ tions. He reported to his superiors that Reyes had in fact improperly imprisoned the two regidores, that he had personally acquired their for­ tunes, which he then gave to his son Carlos to take to market in Santa Fe,

20 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de la senora Dna. Ignacia del Valle a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncién, October 19, 1719.

21 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 206. Copia del Decreto de los senores Présidente y Oidores de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, January 23, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Repuesta fiscal del doctor don José de Antequera y Castro, Plata, January 16, 1720. 9 9 34 and that he had illegally blocked their appeals to superior tribunals.

Reyes, however, said that his actions were entirely justified because the

Audiencia of Charcas was prejudiced in favor of the Paraguayan encomen- 2 o deros, an allegation which, though partially correct, did nothing to

enhance his case in the eyes of the judges in la Plata.

The Audiencia had been seriously at odds with Governor Reyes

since 1718. In that year the présidente and the oidores of the Real Audi­

encia de la Plata had sent Domingo de Irasusta y Orozco to conduct a ju­

dicial review (residencia) of the deceased Governor Bazfin y Pedrza.

Irasusta reported that Reyes had blocked his every effort to perform his

duty. He also wrote that Reyes' extreme tactlessness, his excessive zeal,

and his obvious ineptitude had caused most Paraguayans of all social

classes to oppose the governor. Irasusta furthermore advised that the

several official proclamations in which the ecclesiastical and secular

cabildos of Asuncion had described Reyes' superior conduct in the perform­

ance of his duties should not be regarded as valid expressions of the

sentiment of the people of Paraguay. These were, the 1uez de residencia wrote, the only conceivable conclusions that could come from these two

22 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Exhorto del Maestre de Campo Joseph de Garcia Miranda al Maestre de Campo don Diego de los Reyes, Goberna- dory Capitan General de la Provincia del Paraguay, Asuncion, May 4, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Exorto de don Diego de los Reyes al sànor Maestre de Campo Joseph de Garcia Miranda, Juez de Comision de la Santa Cruzada y Receptor de Penas de Camara de estas Provincias, Asuncion, May 6, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Copia de la carta del Maestre de Campo Joseph de Garcia Miranda a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncion, May 29, 1720.

23 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Carta de don Diego de los Reyes a S.M., Asuncion, November 29, 1720. 24 35 bodies which were under Reyes' absolute tyranny.

After Reyes' refusal to cooperate with Garcfa Miranda in 1720, the Audiencia decided to remove the governor from office. In September,

Francisco Javier Terrazas, an attorney attached to the Audiencia who was acting for Avalos, Urrunaga, and Rojas Aranda, asked the court to nullify all official acts in Paraguay since Reyes had taken office in February, 25 1717. At the same time the Audiencia received a recommandation from

Jose Garcfa Miranda that Reyes, Delgado, and also Lufs de Escobar, a friend of Reyes' who had acted as the fiscal in Avalos' trial and who had also served as a witness against the accused, should be severely fined; moreover, they should be required to appear in Chuquisaca within five months to explain their unusual behavior. °

On September 20, 1720, the lawyer Francisco Javier Terrazas formally placed six civil and criminal charges against Reyes before the court on behalf of don Tomas Cardenas, a cousin of both Antonio Rufz de

Arellano and Jose de Avalos. Cardenas, acting on Arellano's orders, had eluded Reyes' soldiers and made his way to Charcas to initiate the

24 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Carta del Venerable Dean y Cabildo del Obispado del Paraguay, don Matias de Silva, don Juan Fernandez de Aguero y don Juan Gonzalez Melgarejo a S.M., Asuncion, August 30, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Carta de don Domingo de Irasusta y Orozco, juez de residencia del Paraguay a S.M., Asuncion, Septem­ ber 30, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Carta del Cabildo Justicia y Tegimiento de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay a S.M., August 30, 1720.

25 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Escripto presentado por don Francisco Javier de Terrazas en nombre del General Joseph de Avalos y Mendoza; el Sargento Mayor Joseph de Urrunaga y el Capitan Francisco Rojas Aranda, Regidores de la Ciudad de la Asuncion, Plata, September 4, 1720.

26 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto de revista de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, February 6, 1721. proceedings which resulted in Reyes' dismissal.

Cardenas' first charge was that Governor Reyes had upset the relatively peaceful conditions in Paraguay enjoyed during the Bazan y

Pedraza term of office. In 1717 the new governor attacked the Payaguas in violation of the royal guarantee of immunity from Spanish encroach­ ment. Although he greatly exaggerated when he said that Reyes killed more than 1,000 Indians, most of whom were either aged and infirm or women and children, his charge was accepted at face value. He alleged that after the attack don Diego than coerced the Spaniards who were wit­ nesses to the event to testify falsely that he had acted beneficently and that Paraguay had prospered after the assault on Tacumba. Additionally and to the detriment of Paraguay's security, C&rdenas said, Reyes then initiated additional attacks which further provoked the Indians; and the

Payagua warriors, most of whom had escaped, began a series of hostile ac­ tions throughout the province in which they murdered several people, raped countless women, and stole cattle and horses. This not only resulted in the loss of many lives, but also caused a severe blow to the commerce of

Paraguay. Because the citizens and other inhabitants had constantly to be on their guard against Indian .attacks, they were unable to tend to their labors in their fields and verbales necessary to sustain life in the province. Also the shipowners of Asuncion, afraid that the Payaguas would destroy their boats and thus reduce them to poverty, refused to allow their vessels to leave the provincial capital.

Cardenas' second charge was that Reyes had impoverished several

27 "Memorial Ajustado de los Autos, y hechos de la Provincia del Para­ guay, remitido por la Real Audiencia de la Plata al Excmo. Sr. Mar­ ques de Castelfuerte, Virrey del Peru, en defense de las operaciones del Sr. Pesquisidor D, Josef de Antequera y Castro, September 4, 1728," in Coleccion general de documentes. Tomo III, Pieza I, pp. 9-15. 37 pueblos of Christianized Indians by forcing the men of these villages to

Rather verba for the governor's own private gain. Cardenas maintained that

Reyes' apparently positive contributions to the province's well-being of money and services for the construction of the new town Caruguaty were only for the purpose of transporting the governor's private stock of verba. He said that the governor had not even bothered to pay those men he had em­ ployed in this task. The third allegation made by Cardenas on behalf of

Arellano, Avalos, Urrunaga, Mena, and other encomenderos was that Don Diego had engaged in commerce with several foreigners whom he had allowed to enter the province in violation of various royal cedulas. The fourth charge was that Reyes had imposed new taxes on the people of Paraguay without the nec­ essary legal authority to do so and that his:lieutenant (teniente general),

Jose Delgado, whom Reyes had ordered to enforce the new taxes, had murdered a Christian Indian in the town of Villa Rica. Also Delgado had allegedly profited from the sale of various goods shipped to Paraguay from Spain under a royal monopoly, including arms necessary for colonial defense. The fifth charge was that Reyes had illegally assumed office without obtaining the necessary, explicit royal dispensation to serve as governor while married to a resident of the province under his jurisdiction. His marriage to an inhabitant of Paraguay without having previously obtained permission from

Spain had therefore disqualified him from taking office under the Laws of the Indies. The sixth charge was that the governor's harrassment of the province's postal services and of interprovincial traffic generally had dealt a mortal blow to the economy of the province.

Although Reyes' lawyer in Charcas, Procurador Juan de Calancha, countercharged that Cardenas' family ties to both Avalos and Arellano should disqualify him from having any part in the proceedings or even from making the charges, the Audiencia supported Cardenas' contention 38 that kinship with Avalos was no legal obstacle because, said the officials at Charcas, most of the charges against the governor were for offenses he had committed prior to the incarceration of Avalos. The Audiencia also overruled Calancha's objection that Cardenas had journeyed to Charcas il­ legally (sin licencia del gobernador), was therefore a criminal, and thus incapable of bringing suit against anyone. The oidores said that, in view of the governor's obstructing the roads, this had been the only recourse that

Cardenas had to rectify his grievances. The trip, in fact, was not a crime but an obligation which would have been imperative for any loyal subject of the king.^®

In November, 1720, the President of the Audiencia of Charcas, don 29 Gabriel Antonio Matienzo, and its oidores, issued the following orders to the cabildo of Asuncion:

1) That Reyes should show the cabildo a specific dispensacion de la naturaleza de su mujer from the king within one hour after receiving the

Audiencia's order and that the- regidores should then immediately remit it to Charcas; 2) That, if Reyes did not exhibit it to the members of the cabildo immediately, he be considered officially removed from the office of governor of Paraguay, the functions of which would then be temporarily per-

OQ formed by the alcalde de primer voto; 3) That the imprisoned regidores

28 Ibid.. p. 16.

29 Gregorio Nurfez de Rojas, Juan Brabo del Rivero, Francisco Sagardia y Palencia, and Baltasar de Lerma y Salamanca.

30 This clause of the real provision, in effect, ended Reyes' terra of office. The oidores knew that Reyes did not have specific permission from the king to marry a native of Paraguay, although they also knew of his dispensation from a previous viceroy of Peru; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 206. La Real Audiencia de los Charcas informa a S.M. de los motivos que tubo para haber separado a don Diego de los Reyes por el defecto de despensacion de la naturaleza de su muger, Plata, December 7, 1725. 39 be set free and that all goods confiscated by the governor be returned to their origia&l owners, except for three hundred pesos which Avalos owed to the Santa Cruzada; 4) That Reyes, Delgado, and the fiscal. Escobar, pay fines of twelve thousand pesos, four thousand pesos, and one thousand pesos, respectively, for their treatment of the regidores. Avalos, Urrunaga, and

Arellano; 5) That in the future, governors of Paraguay should not censor private correspondence and especially that they not prevent aggrieved par­ ties from appealing local decisions to theAudiencia.

The president and the oidores ordered the officials of the

Asuncion cabildo to notify them within five months if Reyes disobeyed.

They appointed José de Antequera y Castro to investigate the situation in

Paraguay and to correct any irregularities he found. They ordered Pedro

Vasquez y Velasco, the permanent fiscal of the Audiencia of Charcas, to sub­ stantiate Antequera's findings.

In January the oidores ordered Antequera, "Protector of the

Indians" (fiscal protector de los Indies), to leave for Paraguay immedi­ ately. They gave him a sealed order to open in the ayuntamiento of Asuncion before the members of the cabildo if the charges against Reyes were true.

Since they knew Reyes lacked specific marital dispensation and was therefore guilty, this was merely a formality. The document Antequera carried was an order to the regidores of Asuncion to accept him as governor when Reyes'

31 AGI, Charcas, Legajo321. Auto definitivo provefdr nor la Real Audi­ encia de la Plata,&PlatailBoyemberl5i^l721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Real Provision de la Audiencia de los Charcas al Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la Asuncion, Plata, November 18, 1720; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto de acuerdo de la Audiencia Real de la Plata, Plata, November 20, 1720. 40 trial ended.Antequera and the members of the town council would incur a fine of four thousand pesos each if they disobeyed any of the Audiencia's instructions.33

V , When on March 3, 1721, Reyes received the order to show his legal wife within an hour, he flew into a rage. He shouted to the regidores. who were assembled to execute the Audiencia's orders, that he was as supreme in

Paraguay as the king was in Madrid. He adjourned the cabildo. threatened those regidores who would obey the Audiencia's orders with violence, gathered a squadron of soldiers to prevent anyone else from complying with the or­ ders, and swore an oath that he would maintain himself in office. He would obey, he said, all directives from the viceroy in Lima, but only those. He would, though, disregard those from the Audiencia of Charcas because the two authorities were diametrically opposed, and it was incumbent upon him to obey the superior one. Almost as an afterthought he circulated his cedula of appointment from the king and the order he obtained in 1712 from the

Viceroy-Archbishop of Quito, Diego Ladrdn de Guevara, giving him specific permission to serve as governor while at the same time being mar­ ried to a resident of his jurisdiction. 34 Although the regidores Sebastian

32 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Traslado de la,Real Provision de la Audi­ encia de la Plata al Cabildo de la Asuncion, Plata, January IS, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Respuesta fiscal de don Pedro Vasquez de Velasco a los senores Présidente y Oidores de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, November 14, 1721.

33 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto de Revista de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, February 6, 1721.

34 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Traslado del Ascuerdo Capitular del Ca­ bildo de la Asuncion, March 3, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. A- cuerdo capitular y de pedimento del Maestre de Campo don Diego de los Reyes y Balmaseda, Gobernador y Capitan general de esta provin­ cia, Asuncion, March 11, 1721. > 41 Fernandez Montiel and Alonso Caballero Bazan and the alguacil mayor Juan de Mena futilely protested, the other members of the cabildo, Miguel de

Torres Ch^ez, Diego Yegros, Dionsio Otazu, Ramtfn Caballero Baz^n, and

Reyes' brother-in-law, Andres Benftez, either concurred with the governor's decision or meekly submitted to his threats.

Between March and July, 1721, Reyes continued to govern in

Asuncion, but his days were numbered. His guilt had already been deter­ mined by the Audiencia, his removal from office had been arranged, and his

successor had been appointed. When Antequera arrived in Asuncion, Reyes'

opponents in the cabildo and those whom he had removed from office like

Avalos and Urrunaga would have the legal sanction they needed to force him

to step down. They would also have a new governor whose anti-Jesuit sym­

pathies coincided with their own.

35 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Carta de Regidor don Sebastian Fernandez Montiel a la Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncion, March 11, 1721, Ill

ARRIVAL OF JOSÉ DE ANTEQUERA

José de Antequera y Castro was governor of Paraguay from 1721 to

1725 and led a Paraguayan army into battle in revolt against viceregal au­ thority in 1724. This young man, whom the Audiencia of Charcas had appointed to serve as judge (juez pesquisidor) in Reyes' pesquisa and to succeed him, was born in Panama in 1693, educated at the Jesuit college in Cérdoba, and earned his Licentiate from the Faculty of Law (Licenciado en Derecho) at the University of San Marcos in Lima. As ayouth, he lived for several years in Chuquisaca where his father served as an oidor of the Audiencia of Charca. After completing his education, he worked briefly at the court of Philip V in Madrid in several minor capacities and then returned to the

New World.^ His facile intelligence, his ability to display his erudition without appearing pompous, his handsome appearance and attractive personality, and his great powers of persuasion allowed him to win the affection of both men and women. His youthful zeal, exuberance and energy were also qualities 2 that would make him a natural leader when he went to Paraguay. These same

1 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Confession de don Joseph de Antequera y Castro, natural de la Ciudad de Panama, Fiscal Protector de Chuquisaca y de edad treinta y ocho aSos, Lima, Junell, 1731; Astrafn, Historia de la CompaKfa de Jesus, VII, 509-516.

2 Antonio Zinny, Historia de los Gobernantes del Paraguay, 1535 - 1887 (Buenos Aires, 1887), pp. 103-115; Astrajfn, Historia de la CompaK^a de Jesus, VII, 509; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 13.

42 43 qualities, however, would create a great amount of jealously and personal hostility toward him.

In November, 1716, the king appointed him Protector of the

Indians (Fiscal Protector de los Indios) for the area under the jurisdic­ tion of the Audiencia of Charcas. Although he asked the Council of the

Indies to waive his obligation to pay the customary remission to the royal treasury of one-half the first year's salary (media anata) usually required as a condition of appointment for most colonial officials, the authorities in Spain apparently were unsympathetic to his request. The Council later reported to the king that Antequera had faithfully paid it, although it also granted him special dispensation to marry a native of Chuquisaca. In

1718 he was awarded the office of Fiscal Protector for life with an annual salary of three thousand pesos.^

After receiving final confirmation of his commission from the

Audiencia to prosecute and judge Reyes and then to succeed him as governor,

Antequera prepared his departure and left Charcas on January 24, 17211 His first important stop on the journey to Paraguay was Santiago del Estero, a city under the jurisdiction or the governor of Tucuman. There he found several merchants who were awaiting his arrival because he carried letters of credit for them. They entertained him lavishly and gave him provisions for the next leg of his journey. He then made his way to Santa Fe where

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 157. Parecer de la Camara de Indias, Madrid, December 23, 1716; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 166. Memorial de don Joseph de Antequera y Castro a S.M., Plata, February 16, 1718; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 179. Titulo de fiscal perpetuo de las Charcas, con uso de gar- nacha y 3.000 pesos de sueldo anuales, Madrid, January 13, 1718; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 158. El Consejo de Indias représenta a S.M. lo que se le ofrece sobre la instancia que hace el doctor don José de Antequera . . . cerca de que se le concéda lecencia para casarse con natural del distrito de la Audiencia de Charcas, Madrid, March 10, 1718. 44 he met other merchants who anxious to gain his friendship because they

wished to send goods to Paraguay to be bartered for yerba and livestock

in Asuncion. They contracted a business partnership with him in which

each of the parties was to provide complementary goods and services for

the other. The merchants would help Antequera to gain the wealth they

believed he was seeking, and he would lift Reyes' restrictions on Para­

guayan commerce which had hindered the flow of trade goods in the other

provinces of the Rfo de la Plata area.^ These men and merchants in Corri­

entes, with whom he later made similar arrangements, advised him that the

man whose conduct he was to investigate was a tyrannical zealot who was

supported by all the power-and the cunning that the Company of Jesus could

muster.5

As Antequera proceeded through the mission country, the Jesuits

prepared festivals in his honor. They also gave him an escort of Guaranf

neophytes and all the provisions and refinements necessary to complete his

journey in comfort. In the missions, Antequera acted to conciliate the

Jesuits. He told the missionaries that he had great love for the Company

and would give its members all the support he could.^

Antequera came to oppose the order later. He said that the main

4 See Chapter II.

5 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 12-15; "Carta Segunda. Politica y Legal Satis- faccion del Senor Maestro Don Fray Joseph de Palos, Obispo Taliense, y Coadjutor del Paraguay," Carcel de Corte de Lima, January 30, 1728, in Coleccion General de Documentes, III, Pieza III, p; 242, (Hereafter cited as Antequera "Repuesta"); Angles y Gortari, "Informe . . .," Ibid.. 6.

Î Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. II, 138-139; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 15-16. 45 reason he became hostile to the Jesuits in Paraguay was his first-hand observation of their commercial activities and their arrogant political behavior. Their yerba and livestock commerce was prejudicial to the in­ habitants of the region. Of even more vital concern to the welfare of the king, the privileges of the Paraguayan Jesuits were an affront to the honor and independence of the crown and a continuing burden on the royal treasury. In fact, he charged, the commercial activities of the CompWnfa de Jesus were the most serious problem he had to confront in Paraguay. He later saw his mission as to limit the Society's economic and political be­ havior to conform to the Laws of the Indies, and this, he believed, was the sole reason for the persecution he subsequently had to endure after the

Company brought about his overthrow in 1725.^

If the missions had been required to pay all taxes like the alcabala from which they were exempt, it is questionable whether or not royal revenues would have shown any great increase. The Paraguayan economy probably would have made no significant growth or development if the mission

Indians had been required to pay as much tribute as encomienda Indians in the civil province, but most of the settlers in the Plata region still be­ lieved that the Jesuits secretly harbored untold wealth in their mission empire, possibly the richest gold or silver mines of the kingdom. Even discerning private individuals and crown officials who were skeptical a- bout the rumors of fantastic subterranean riches in the mission province assured each other that the company's conmerce in yerba, cattle, mules, and goods manufactured by the reduction Indians had yielded enormous prof­ its to the Company. And men anxious to acquire wealth, ambitious to advance the interests of the crown or, like Antequera, desirous of combining the

Antequera, "Respuesta", 242-250, 46 two aspirations often cast a covetous eye on the mission territory.

After he left the mission countiry, Antequera travelled to the

Tebucuary River where he met Jose de Avalos and several of his friends.

They told him that Governor Reyes had lefjz Asuncion in order to make an inspection of the Jesuit reductions along the Parana River. Avalos was anxious to obtain a favorable decision in the case pending against Reyes, and he was not above using flattery and bribery to achieve it. He had prepared a grand reception for Antequera at the ranch of a kinswoman, but when the party arrived, they discovered that the lady had just died during childbirth. Antequera and Avalos had to push on to Asuncion. As they en­ tered Asuncion the following day, July 23, 1721, to the firing of cannon, they encountered the lady's funeral train. This, Jesuit chroniclers have written, was an evil omen. When Reyes learned of Antequera's impending arrival, he rushed back to Asuncion but too late to do any good. Antequera was already master of the capital, and Avalos had his ear.^

As soon as he arrived, Antequera offended certain clerics who supported Reyes, were allied with the Jesuits, and were those most likely to be offended by Reyes' judge and successor. Antequera's first stop was the cathedral. His behavior there "suggested to the most sensible reflec­ tions no way to his advantage." His hat remained on his head. Although the Dean of the Cathedral Matfas de Sylva (the uncle of Reyes' wife dona

Francisca), who governed the diocese in the absence of the Bishop of Para­ guay, received him respectfully, Antequera fell into a rage when he

8 Ibid.; Astra^n, Historia de la Companfa de Jesus, VII, 510; Antequera, "Memorial," 35. 47 discovered that neither a carpet, a cushion, nor a chair of state awaited

him.9

On July 30, 1721, Antequera presented to the Asuncion cablldo

the Audlencla's dispatches Informing the town council of his appointment

of iuez pesqulsldor. A few days later he began Reyes' pesqulsa. He first

suspended Diego from office and ordered him to remain In Los Altos, a vil­

lage seven or eight leagues (c. thirty miles) from Asuncion so that the witnesses against him might freely testify without fear of reprisal. Since

the Audlencla had determined Reyes' guilt even before Antequera left for

Paraguay,the trial was only a formality and Its outcome a foregone con­

clusion.

On September 14, 1721, Antequera declared Reyes guilty and

showed the cablldo the sealed order which contained his appointment as

Governor and Captain General of Paraguay to succeed Reyes. He assumed

the functions of office, and ordered that Reyes be placed under house ar­

rest In Asuncion. Three days later he heard the opening statements of

Reyes' confeslon. a "confession" In which Diego denied all the accusations

9 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta dlrlglda al Virrey por los Prelados de la Asuncion fray Eusebio Chaves, Prior de Predlcadores, fray Pedro Volasco de Santa Marla Présidante . . . de la Merced, don Mathias Sanchez, . . . don Mathias de Sylva, comlsarlo de la Inqulslclon, doc­ tor don Joseph Caballero Bazan, Asuncion, November 10, 1722. One of the stories that chroniclers tell of Antequera's perfidious and oppor­ tunistic nature Is that a few days after Antequera's arrival In Asun­ cion, a party of hostile Indians drew near to Asuncion, some of them crossing the Paraguay River to ask for aid against unnamed enemies. When a few Spaniards returned with them back across the river, they fell Into a carefully prepared ambush In which nine Spaniards were killed. Antequera allegedly then announced that he had not come to make war against the Indians and that It was the business of the local officials to provide for the safety of the city. Then Reyes' oppo­ nents, seeking to take advantage of the Indian attack and of Reyes' absence offered to acknowledge Antequera as their general. He accept­ ed and there was no opposition. Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. II 138-140.

10 See Chapter II. 48 made against him except the charge that he lacked specific permission from the king to be married to a native of the province while serving as gover­ nor.

Antequera then confiscated most of Reyes' goods, except for five hundred head of livestock which he allowed Francisca Benitez to keep, he said, so that she would not starve. He removed several of the deposed governor's subordinates, kinsmen, and other followers from office and con­ fiscated their goods. These included Jose Delgado, Sebastian Fleytas, and

Ignacio Otazu. The sentences against them were carried out by Juan de Mena, the bailiff (alguacil mayor), who, as the weeks passed, became Antequera's most trusted and faithful subordinate,1% The governor continued the inves­ tigation and trial until September, 1722, at which time he submitted the records of the trial and the results of his findings and his recommendations to the Audiencia.13 In the meantime he had received word that in April, 1721,

11 This was not unusual. When Antequera was questioned in 1731 about his role in the revolt of the comuneros, he said that he had taken no part in the affair; nevertheless, his denial was called his "confession."

12 Antequera, "Respuesta," 54-59, 82-84; Lozano. Revoluciones. I, 30; "Respuesta del Obispo Coadjutor del Paraguay a la precedence carta confirmando los asertos de Antequera . . ." Asuncion, March 18, 1727, in Zinny, Gobornantes. 123-148.

13 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 206. La Real Audiencia de la Plata informa a S.M. sobre los motivos que tubo para haver separado del gobierno del Para­ guay a don Diego de los Reyes por el defecto de dispensacion de la naturaleza de su muger, Plata, Cecember 7, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Instruccion que sa de observer el Marques de Casa Concha, juez nombrado por el Excmo. SR. . . . Virrey de estos reinos para aberiguar los procedimientos de los S.S. ministros de la Real Audiencia de la Plata en la comision que dieron a don Jose de Antequera y en la inquie­ tudes del Paraguay, Lima, March 9, 1729; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. El Ldo. don Jose de Casimiro Gomez Garcia, fiscal de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, juez pesquisidor para la averiquacion de los cargos que resul­ tan contra los seSores don Gregorio Nunez de Rojas, Ldo. Juan Brabo de Riuero, oidor que fue . . . , Dr. don Francisco Sagardia y Palencia y don Pedro Vasquez de Velasco, (}a fe y testimonio de la verdad, Plata, May 6, 1729; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. El Virrey del Peru, Marques de Castelfuerte da cuenta a S.M. de tener nombrado la Audiencia de la Plata a don Joseph de Antequera Castro . . . Lima, March 25, 1725. 49 Fray Diego Morcillo, the Viceroy of Peru, had appointed him interim governor of Paraguay to succeed Reyes when the latter finished his five-year term in February, 1722. During the next four years, Antequera frequently cited this appointment to prove that he was the legal governor of Paraguay, even after he learned that the viceroy had ordered his recall.

The new governor first offended those few Paraguayan merchants and encomenderos who had profitted from their political support of and their commercial dealings with the former officeholder. These men were members of the Gonzalez, de Sylva, Caballero, and Benftez families, who were related to

Reyes by marriage. Antequera's most provocative act, however, was arousing the powerful opposition of the Society of Jesus by his vigorous prosecution of Reyes, the Jesuit's ally and advocate, whose political and economic in­ terests were linked to those of the Society by family and commercial ties.^^

By his adamant and effective opposition to four separate attempts by the

Jesuits to restore Reyes to office from 1721 to 1724 and by his attempt to impose the authority of the civil government of Paraguay on the Jesuit

14 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de fray Diego Morcillo Rubio y Aunon, virrey de estos reinos . . . Lima, April 4, 1721; Astrafn, Historia de la Companfa de Jesus. VII, 511-14; Although the right to appoint governors was specifically reserved to the ki ag, the viceroys could make interim appointments when an office fell vacant, The crown had earlier appointed don Bartolomé Aldunate, a resident of Buenos Aires to succeed Reyes. He was unable to serve, however. because of a criminal case pending against him resulting from his beating his wife to death with a club and severely injur ing one Jose Rufz de Arellano after returning home one evening t o discover the two together in his bed; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 158. El Consejo de Indias informa a S.M., Madrid, December 16, 1718; AG I, Charcas, Legajo 180. Real Cedula al gobernador de Buenos Aires d on Bruno Mauricio de Zavala, Balsafn, July 7, 1722; AGI, Charcas Legajo 181. Real Cedula as Virrey del Peru, Arénjuez, May 5, 1723.

15 Lending money to governors of Paraguay was one of the Society's principal means of ensuring that its will be done in Paraguay; Mb'rner, Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits. 208. 50 mission province, Antequera helped to intensify the fear and the contempt which the officials of the mission province held for him and caused them to make increasingly vigorous attempts to secure his removal. He repeatedly stated that the missions must render obedience to the crown|s officers in

Asuncion. But freedom from interference by the civil authorities was a cardinal principle of the Jesuits in Paraguay, although they usually paid lip service to the legal formalities.^^ It was the Jesuits' voluntary, theoretical, and nominal allegiance to the governor of Paraguay that Ante­ quera tried to convert to a real, formal, and absolute relationship. His stand against the Company and its friends in turn brought to the surface the Paraguayan citizens' and householders' long-festering hatred for the

Society,and the anti-Jesuit attitudes became pro-Antequera ones. Al­ though this support allowed Antequera initially to maintain effective control over the province's affairs, by late 1723, the colonists' increasing antipathy toward the Jesuits would make Antequera a prisoner of the very

16 "Theoritically the Jesuit reductions in Paraguay owed a voluntary allegiance to the Spanish crown .... This voluntary allegiance was likewise extended, theoretically at least, to the crowns' repre­ sentatives at Charcas, Asuncion, and Buenos Aires. In practice, this allegiance was largely nominal, although the Jesuits often suc­ cessfully appealed to Madrid for support against the encroachments of the colonists. Their principal objective was . . . to organise a theocratic state within a state, acknowledging nominal allegiance to the Spanish crown, but secure from unsolicited intervention by colonial high courts, governors and bishops." C. R. Boxer, Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola. (London, 1952), pp. 70-71.

17 While some of their grievances against the Company were founded in reality, others, like the rumors of the reductions' gold mines, were complete fabrications, although the nature of the mission province, hermetically sealed against the outside world, did nothing to dispel the constantly circulating legends. More significant than those Jesuit privileges which did distress the civil province to some degree was a convenient scapegoat that the Paraguayans could use to ration­ alize the backward cultural and economic state of their affairs. 51 passions he had encouraged. The result was first the armed uprising of the antequeristas in 1724 "for the king and against bad government" and then a similar attempt led by native Paraguayans in the 1730's.

Antequera» like countless other local officials in the Spanish

Empire, quickly began to use the considerable powers of his office to in- 18 crease his personal wealth. He temporarily suspended commercial traffic on the Paraguay and Tebicuary rivers until he assumed control of it. This gave to him and to allies like Avalos and Urrunaga a greater opportunity for financial gain. But Antequera's profitable business activities in the province usually spelled economic disaster for those who enjoyed the greatest commercial successes in the years immediately prior to 1721: Reyes' friends and business partners, the wealthier religious houses of the province and especially the Jesuits. Like his predecessor, Antequera controlled the yerba market, fixing prices at alternating rates so that his agents could buy cheap and sell dear. He ordered many of the goods confiscated from

Reyes and Delgado, including a number of Reyes' precious gems, to be sold at public auction, and purchased them himself at a fraction of their true value. He forced not only Reyes' friends but also several other Paraguayans to sell him goods which had recently arrived from Spain, valuable commodities in that remote outpost largely characterized by a subsistence economy. These 19 he resold at a high profit. Antequera later said that all these orders were legal! the auctions were held to pay the fines the Audiencia had levied

18 Haring, Spanish Empire in America. 143.

19 "Carta del Obispo del Paraguay a don Jose de Antequera, " Asuncion, March 18, 1727, in Zinny, Gobernantes. 125-127; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta . . . Asuncion, November 10, 1722; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 27-28. 52 against Reyes and Delgado; their proceeds had been used to pay the expenses of government, one of which was the governor's salary.^® The crucial dif­ ference between Antequera's profit-taking and that of most of his prede­ cessors was that the persons he injured, Reyes, his friends and kinsmen, were supported by a powerful organization which had the influence necessary to convince the authorities in Lima and Madrid to reverse the course of events in Paraguay. Antequera's sudden rise to affluence only gave further evidence of the validity of his opponents charges, and because he allowed supporters like Avalos and Urrunaga to take a slice of the pie, he intensi­ fied the enmity between the Jesuits and the Paraguayan encomenderos.

Although the Paraguayan encomenderos' interests and those of

Antequera were not identical, an alliance was quickly formed between them.

Antequera's initial purpose was to gain the governorship of the province, ■ and then his main goal was to hold the office as long as possible. He sin­ cerely believed that his attempt to revolutionize royal administration in the province by imposing the authority of the civil government in Asuncion on the Jesuit missions was in the crown's best interest. Many of his con­ temporaries elsewhere in South America and in Spain as well had come to

91 similar conclusions.

The encomenderos' primary objective was to end the Jesuits' perquisites that they considered prejudicial to their livelihood: their

20 Antequera, "Respuesta," 82-87.

21 Both Martin de Barua, the governor who succeeded Antequera as governor in 1725 and the unfortunate Bartolomé Aldunate formally proposed that the crown assume the responsibility for administering the Jesuit mis­ sions. Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. II, 329-341; Astrafn, Historia de la Companfa de Jesus. VII, 545; P. Pablo Hernandez, Misiones del Paraguay : Organizacidn social de las doctrinas de la Companfa de Jesds. (Barcelona, 1913), I, 460. 53 monopoly over the reductions labor supply; their freedom from the payment of tribute; the permission to trade directly with Spain, given them by the crown; and their continuing acquisition of the best new lands in the prov­ ince. The basis for the alliance between the encomenderos and Antequera was their mutual opposition to Diego de los Reyes or any other future gov- 29 ernor who might follow Jesuit dictates in crucial matters.

One of Antequera's commercial enterprises earned him hostility of Eusebio Chaves, prior of the Dominican convent in Asuncion and, through

Chaves' influence, the enmity of a significant number of the city's more powerful clerics. These men, already offended by Antequera's constant wenching and his occasional disregard for sacred ritual, reacted with out­ rage when Antequera opened a shop in the city's main square to sell the goods he had confiscated and those he had purchased. To observe at least the appearance of legality, Antequera acquired a silent partner because of the existing royal injunctions that governors not engage in any commerce in the area under their jurisdiction. He installed a Dominican friar,

Cayetano Borja, a friend of his who had recently arrived in Asuncion from

Lima, as proprietor. When Chaves ordered Borja to abstain from commerce and to retire to the convent of his order. Fray Cayetano's reply was an in­ subordinate and impertinent refusal, which was followed by gubernatorial threats of bodily harm to Chaves if the prior continued his demands.

The

22 Ibid.. 26-28.

23 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta del fray Eusebio Chaves a S.M., Asuncion, February 25, 1723; Fulgencio R. Moreno, Ciudad de la Asuncion (Buenos Aires, 1926), p. 194; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 18-20, 27-38. 54 governor and an Important segment of the Paraguayan clergy who were Chaves* friends deepened when Jose asked Chaves to donate one of the convent's slaves, a fourteen-year old mulata. to help with the chores about the governor's house. Concerned about the girl's virtue, Chaves refused the request be­ cause, he said, Antequera wanted the girl only to sate his lustful appetites.

The truth of this particular allegation is open to question. Antequera did need more servants than he then had, and he gladly accepted when Chaves of­ fered to give him the girl's mother. That he was an energetic womanizer of considerable prowess, however, is incontestible. Nevertheless, the effect of this aspect of his character upon the inhabitants of the province was probably to enhance his reputation as a leader of exceptional abilities.

Antequera's most serious troubles, however, were a result of those acts causing the Jesuits to take reprisals. The fulcrum about which the conflict between Antequera and the Jesuits turned was his treatment of ex-governor Reyes. After an eight-month imprisonment in his own house, Reyes decided to escape from Paraguay. Since his primary goal was to reestablish 2 «5 himself in office, he knew that his future prospects, viewed from the per­ spective of his present confinement and poverty, were very limited if he stayed in Paraguay. He knew, furthermore, that Antequera was about to send 26 him to Charcas where the Audiencia would pass final sentence, and he knew

24 Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 67-69. Astrafn, Historia de la Companfa de Jesus. VII, 516.

25 Although Reyes' quinquenio had expired in February, 1722, he was assured of another term of office because of Aldunate's misfortune. His representatives in Spain were about to conclude the purchase of another five-year term for him; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 207. Memoerial que en virtud de poder se présenta a Su Magestad por don Lorenzo de la Mar y Liberona, Madrid, 1722; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 180. Real Cedula a la Audiencia de los Charcas, Balsafn, June 28, 1722.

26 Antequera, "Memorial," pp. 174-175. 55 that he would receive no mercy from the oidores. Disguised as a servant,

he slipped through the cordon of soldiers guarding his house on the night

of April 15, 1722, and made his way to a prearranged spot where Jesuits from

the college in Asuncion had provided horses for his escape. From here he

fled to the safety of the Jesuit reductions of the Parana River and then on

to Buenos Aires, where he planned to leave for Spain in order to plead his 27 case personally before the king,

Reyes' escape infuriated Antequera and the encomenderos. and it

frightened the witnesses who had testified against don Diego. When he

heard the rumor that the Fathers of Mercy were harboring the fugitive, An­

tequera stationed a guard of soldiers around their convent. Shortly after­ wards, he was told the true account of Reyes' escape, and he issued stern

warnings to all the inhabitants of the civil pnd mission provinces not to

give any aid or comfort to the f u g i t i v e . ^8 Now i t was Antequera's turn to

await the future with anxiety, because of the existnece of a rival claimant

for his office.

27 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del fray Pedro, Obispo de Buenos Aires a virrey, Buenos Aires, July 28, 1722; ACI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta en la que don Juan de Mena, vecino feudetario, Al- gtacill. Mayor Proprietario de la Ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay y su Procurador General représenta a S.M. la aflictiva prision que padiese mas tiempo de ano y medio y los motivos de la misma. Careel de Corte de Lima, January 10, 1728; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 32-37; Charlevoix, History of Paraguay, II, 144-145.

28 Ibid.; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 32-37. IV

NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT

In the winter (June - August) of 1721, Carlos Reyes escaped from

Paraguay as Antequera was travelling to Asuncion to try his father. He made his way to Lima, where Viceroy Morcillo gave his father!s case a sympathetic hearing. Although he was a Franciscan, Morcillo did not share the antipathy toward the Jesuits exhibited by others of his order. He consistently used his official powers as viceroy to advance the interests of the Church, and especially those of the Jesuits. After learning of the success of his mis­ sion, Carlos Reyes sent the viceroy's orders in favor of the elder Reyes to Buenos Aires through Potosf instead of through Chuquisaca. This tactic prevented the Audiencia of Charcas from obstructing his mission, and the president and oidores at La Plata remained unaware of young Reyes' activi­ ties in his father's behalf until it was too late to stop him.l

When Diego de los Reyes reached Buenos Aires in May, 1722, events forced him to cancel his plans to sail for Spain. He found that Diego

Morcillo, the viceroy of Peru, had issued two orders, the first in Septem­ ber, 1721, and the second in February, 1722, making Reyes governor of Para­ guay again. The orders directed him not only to finish his five-year term

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Carlos de los Reyes al gover- nador de Buenos Aires don Bruno Mauricio de Zabala, Santa Fe, December là, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de los sector es Présidente y Oidores de la Real Audiencia de la Plata al Excmo. Sr. Virrey Fr. Diego Morsillo sobre el estado de los negocios del Paraguay, Plata, October 11, 1723. 56 but also to continue in office after February, 1722, as interim governor^ 2 until the king appointed a permanent successor.

Morcillo, it appears, was jealous of his authority and sternly . : warned the Audiencia of Charcas that the appointment of a governor was his exclusive prerogative; the Audiencia had exceeded its authority by appoint­ ing Antequera to head the Paraguayan government. In his view an even more serious offense had been the Audiencia's illegal nomination of Antequera to succeed Reyes and to try and sentence him at the same time. The dual nature of this appointment was clearly prohibited by the Laws of the Indies. Mor­ cillo said that it was known throughout Peru that those in Paraguay accusing

Reyes of malfeasance and misfeasance in office were base men; therefore, the charges against him must be untrue. In fact, the viceroy said, he had in his possession letters from certain Paraguayan Jesuits which proved that Reyes had been an excellent governor. Thus, he decreed, every royal officer in

Peru must see to it that Reyes and his subordinates be returned to their former posts, and all his subjects must assist in restoring goods confiscated by Antequera to their legal owner. Furthermore, Reyes and his lieutenant.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del frai Pedro, Obispo de Buenos Aires, al virrey, Buenos Aires, July 28, 1722; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. De- spacho de Don frai Diego Morsillo Rubio de Aunon, Virrey Governador y Capitan Gnrl. de estos Reinos y Provincias del Peru, Tierra firme y Chile a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, October 13, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Despacho de Don frai Diego Morcillo . . . a la Real Audi­ encia de la Plata, Lima, March 3, 1722.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de Don frai Diego Morsillo Rubio de AiÆon, Arzobispo de la Plata del Consejo de Su Magestad, Virrey Govr y Capitan General de estos Reinos y Probincias del Peru, Tierra firme y Chile, Lima, October 9, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de Don frai Diego Morsillo Rubio de Aunon . . . February 26, 1722. 58 Delgado, should be paid all their salaries which presently were in arrears.^

Reyes received this news in Buenos Aires from his son Carlos, who had obtained copies of these orders, originally destined for the Audiencia of Charcas, by bribing Juan de Liendo y Ocampo, Morcillo's personal secre­ tary. Because the viceroy's orders had not been properly notarized and also because Morcillo had not consulted the Audiencia of Lima before he issued his decrees, officials at Charcas as well as Antequera and his partisans in

Paraguay later said that they were obviously a result of collusion and sub­

terfuge among the viceroy, his secretary, young Reyes, and the Company o|

Jesus. The Audiencia of Charcas and Antequera maintained that they were therefore invalid.^

Armed with the viceroy's orders that he be restored to his former office, Diego Reyes left Buenos Aires in late May, 1722. His first stop was

the Jesuit reduction of Nuestra Se&ora de la Candelaria, the capital of the

Jesuit mission province, located on the left bank of the Alto Paranfi River near the site of the present-day Argentine city of Posadas. There Reyes' claim as the legitimate governor of Paraguay was recognized by the Father

Superior of the Jesuit missions of Paraguay, Pablo Benftez, dona Francisca

Benitez' uncle. From the safety of Candelaria, Reyes decreed that all would-be travellers to and from Paraguay be notified that they must pass

through the mission capital first to swear their fealty to him personally.

To ensure that no one doubted the seriousness of his intentions, he stationed

Ibid.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de los se'nores Présidente y Oidores de la Real Audiencia de la Plata al Excmo. Sr. Virrey Fr. Diego Mor­ sillo sobre el estado de los negocios del Paraguay, Plata, October 11, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Carlos de los Reyes al governador de Buenos Aires don Bruno Mauricio de Zabala, Santa Fe, December 18, 1723. 59 soldiers from the reductions, led by a few Paraguayans exiles and fugitives still loyal to him, to enforce his decrees and to guard the trails leading overland to Asuncion. He then prepared to travel to Paraguay to reassume his former post.^

In mid-September, 1722, Reyes wrote Antequera and the members of the cabildo of Asuncion informing them of his intentions and sent the gover­ nor and the town council unofficial copies of the viceregal dispatches order­ ing Diego's reinstatement. ^ Actually, Morcillo had sent his orders to

Chuquisaca, where he believed, or at least hoped, that they be carried out by O the Audiencia of Charcas.

Meanwhile, Reyes' younger son. Deacon Agustfn Reyes, in late Sep­ tember, 1722, presented his father's letter and the viceroy's orders to

Antequera at a public festival being held in the main square of Asuncion, where the governor showed it to his supporters in the cabildo. The munici­ pal officials, stating that neither the viceroy's order nor Reyes' letter had been properly notarized, agreed with Antequera's judgement that they

"did not carry conviction," i.e.. that they were forgeries, and that the

6 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la ciudad de la Asuncion al muy Excmo. senor Fray Diego Morsillo, Virrey del Peru, Asuncion, November 29, 1722; Antequera, "Memorial," 189; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 37.

7 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de don Diego de los Reyes al Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay, Nuestra Senora de Fe, September 16, 1722.

8 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Despacho de Don frai Diego Morsillo Rubio de Aunon, Virrey Governador y Capitan Gnrl.de estos Reinos y provin­ cias del Peru Tierra firme y Chile a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, October 13, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Despacho de Don frai Diego Morcillo . . . a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, March 3, 1722. 60 people of Paraguay were not obligated to obey them. The Paraguayan leaders said that they still recognized the injunctions issued by the Audiencia of

Charcas in 1720 and 1721 in which it had been stated that Reyes was unfit to serve. Their firm judgement was that Diego must never be allowed to return to office, for the province's welfare as well as their own. In any event,

Reyes could not resume his post at the present time because he was now a con­ demned criminal and a fugitive from justice. They argued that Antequera obviously was the legal governor; he had been appointed not only by the

Audiencia of Charcas but by the viceroy as well. The dispatch allegedly issued by the viceroy of Peru must then be a forgery. Many of the province's officials, including Avalos, Urrunaga, Mena, Ruiz de Arellano, and most of its other prominent citizens agreed with the governor as a result of their own opposition to Reyes and the Jesuits. There were some Reyes sympathizers like Andrés Benitez, Diego's brother-in-law, who kept silent for fear of reprisals from Antequera and his party. Some Paraguayans, including Juan

Caballero de Anasco, Martin de Chavarri, and other?, wanted most of all to be on the winning side, and supported whoever was in power, denouncing what­ ever party was currently out of favor.^

The leading antequeristas claimed that because the supposed vice­ regal orders were obviously forged, the Paraguayans were still obligated to obey the Audiencia of Charcas. These claims were probably just rationaliza­ tions for doing what they pleased to further their own interests. If their conduct in 1724^^ is any guide to their opinions in September and October,

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declarazion del Capitan don Pedro del Casal, residente en Buenos Aires y vecino de la Asuncion del Paraguay, Buenos Aires, December 11, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta al virrey de don Esteban Urizar y Arespacochaga, Salta, October 4, 1723; Ante­ quera, "Memorial," 190; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 41-44. 61 1722, one must conclude that the issue of whether or not the viceroy had

ordered Reyes' restoration was an irrelevant factor in their decision to

oppose Reyes' return to power. They were determined to block Reyes from

returning under any circumstances except as prisoner. It is likely, how­

ever, that the rest of the province's inhabitants, especially those of lower

rank living in and near Asuncion, did believe the antequeristas* allegations

that Reyes' commission was a forgery and that the viceroy's real wish was

for Antequera to govern the province. In any case, most Paraguayans either wholeheartedly agreed with Antequera or silently acquiesced in the regidores'

decision to beg Morcillo not to insist on Reyes' restoration and to warn the viceroy that he could not impose the tyrant Reyes on Paraguay without resort­

ing to war and reducing the province to a state of total ruin. The people

of Paraguay continued to express their loyalty to Antequera until late 1724 when the threat of a six-thousand man army from the reductions made his posi­

tion untenable.Even then, the Paraguayans' absolute hatred for Reyes

caused Bruno de Zavala, who twice subdued the revolutions of Paraguay, to

order that Reyes be removed discreetly to Santa Fe, ignoring a royal cedula

ordering reappointment.

In 1722 and, in fact, until late 1723, the claim made by Antequera

and his followers that their actions were legal carried some truth. The

Audiencia of Charcas, believing Morcillo's decision hasty and unwise, repeat­

edly asked Morcillo to rescind his decrees. The oidores told the Paraguayans

to ignore the viceroy's instructions, and they kept Antequera informed of

11 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Cabildo . . . de la Asuncion al. . .Virrey del Peru, Asuncion, November 29, 1722; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declaracion del Capitan Julian Guerrero, Procurador General de la Asuncion, Corrientes, September 5, 1724; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 72, 62 their continuing support for his position. Antequera's colleagues at Charcas

reminded the viceroy that Antequera was serving under the terms of the in­

terim appointment given by Morcillo himself. In addition, they reported,

Antequera was meritoriously fulfilling his obligations to the crown. More-

over, he enjoyed the approval and confidence of the people of Paraguay. 12

By September and October, 1722, Antequera, Avalos, Mena, Urrunaga,

and Ru^z de Arellano were not the only residents of Paraguay who were restive

about the possibility of Reyes' return to office. The ecclesiastical cabildo

of Asuncion and the secular cabildo of the near-by town of Villa Rica, both

afraid of the consequences of a second Reyes government, exhorted Antequera

to stop Reyes from carrying out his threatened return to power.The Jesuit

chronicler Pedro Lozano writes that the plea to Antequera from the prelates

of Asuncion was the result of three malicious lies that Antequera had told

them. The governor falsely reported, says Lozano, that the Jesuits were as­

sembling an army of eight thousand Indians to effect Reyes' restoration. The

second lie was his allegation that in the past the Jesuits had often sent

troops against the civil province on only their own authority. Lozano asserts

that every one knew that on those occasions when the Jesuits and their Indians had fought the Paraguayan colonists, they acted under orders from superior

12 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de . . . la Real Audiencia de la Plata al . . . Virrey del Peru, Plata, October 11, 1723; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 47-50.

13 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta dirigida al virrey por los Prelados de la Asuncion, fray Eusebio Chaves, Prior de Predicadores; fray Pedro Volasco de Santa Maria, Présidente . . . de la Merced; Mathias Sanchez; Rector de este colegio del Paraguay; don Mathias de Sylva, comisario de la Inquisicion; doctor don Joseph Caballero Bazan, Asuncion, Novem­ ber 10, 1722; Antequera, "Memorial," 176-177; Antequera, "Respuesta," 20, 69; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 49-52. 63 tribunals of both Charcas and Lima. Finally the governor alleged that a

Jesuit priest from the reduction of San Ignacio Guazu, Father José Tejadas, had tried to entice the Paraguayan soldiers sent by Antequera to guard the crossing at the Tebicuary River twelve leagues north of San Ignacio into defecting to Reyes. Tejadas' supposed attempt at sedition, Lozano writes, obviously could never have happened because Tejadas was sick in bed at the time.^^

Although, as Lozano says, the first two charges were inaccurate,

Antequera and the Paraguayans believed them to be true when they were made.

They were now emotionally and psychologically conditioned to believe most of the rumors circulated against the Jesuits. Antequera's third allegation may or may not have been true. If, because of illness, Tejadas did not act pro­ vocatively in 1722, his hostility toward the Paraguayans was well known and was clearly evidenced two years later. In 1724 he assembled Guaranf troops and gathered arms and munitions for an army led by Baltasar Garbfa RoS, sent by the viceroy to restore Reyes. In 1724 Tejadas also issued intelligence reports to Garcfa Ros about the movements of the Paraguayan army and about 15 its fighting capacity.

During the last week of September, 1722, Antequera, armed with public expressions of support from important clerics and layman in Asuncion and Villa Rica, raised an army of six hundred men and set out for the Tebi­ cuary River and the four Jesuit missions to the south of the Tebicuary. To oppose Reyes' reentry, Antequera sent Captain Jose de Areco, a justice of the peace (alcalde de la hermandad) ahead of his main force. Areco's mission was

14 Ibid.; Antequera, "Memorial," 176-179.

15 See Chapters VI and VII. 64 to determine the authenticity of Reyes' commission and to ask him to present his credentials in person to authorities in Asuncion. But Areco was accom­ panied by two hundred Paraguayan soldiers commanded by Captain Ramon de las

Lianas. A native of Cadfz, Lianas had deserted from a ship which had put in at Buenos Aires a few years before and escaped to Asuncira. In 1722, he was an ardent antequerista and was to become an important leader of the Para­ guayan rebellion of the 1730's.

Not recognizing the strength and emotional intensity of the oppo­ sition to him within Paraguay, Reyes, accompanied by a few relatives, priests, and a retinue of servants, had journeyed from the heart of the mission coun­ try between the Alto Parana and Uruguay rivers north into Paraguay until he reached the Dominican hacienda at Tabapy. This ranch was located about forty miles southwest of Asuncion and was the most valuable property of the Domi­ nican convent in the capital. Upon his arrival, Reyes ordered the inhabitants df Tabapy and the residents of the surrounding area to take up arms and help him return to office; but he quickly observed the absence of any popular support for his return. When he learned that Lianas and Areco were rapidly approaching Tabapy with a sizeable army, ReyeSsconcluded that his present effort was, at best, premature; and he retreated back to the mission country and safety in the reductions along the Uruguay River. This refuge was secure not merely because it was under the nominal jurisdiction of the governor of

Buenos Aires but also because the Jesuit Guarani army still in reserve made the area surrounding Candelaria virtually impregnable. Reyes' retreat in

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta dirigida al Virrey por . . . Eusebio Chaves . . . Pedro Volasco de Santa Maria . . . Mathias Sanchez . . . Mathias de Sylva . . . Jose Caballero Bazan, Asuncion, November 10, 1722; Antequera, "Memorial," 175-177; Antequera, "Respuesta," 69; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 47-52. 65 1722 was, however, only a strategic withdrawal until the day when he would

force the Paraguayans to accept his return,and the Paraguayans knew It.

The Asuncion cablldo later reported that riots followed In the wake of Reyes' retreat. The Inhabitants of the countryside through which

Diego had travelled, as well as the people of Asuncion, vocally expressed their fear for their Immediate personal safety and their anxiety about the 18 volatile state of affairs In the province. But It Is not clear whether the residents of southern Paraguay feared possible later reprisals from Reyes or

the approach of the unruly troops In the Areco-Llanas' advance guard and those In the main body of troops with Antequera.

When Lianas and his men arrived at Tabapy, they were enraged to find that Reyes had eluded them. They abused the Indian residents of the surrounding region and also several reylstas whom Diego had left behind when he fled Tabapy. The Paraguayans led by Lianas also helped themselves to the fruits of victory from the battle they had not had to fight. First they bound Reyes' servants, Guaranf porters supplied by the Jesuits, and clubbed them mercilessly. They then turned their wrath on Agustfn de los Reyes, a deacon (In the Roman Catholic Church, a cleric In orders next below a priest), who had been his father's travelling companion on part of the journey from

Buenos Aires and also the emissary between Diego and the Paraguayans. After he had given Antequera the viceroy's order to reinstate his father, Agustfn

17 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de don Diego de los Reyes Valmaseda, Governador Capitan General del Paraguay al Padre Pollcarpo Duffo de la Companla de Jesus, Itapua, October 17, 1722; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 39.

18 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Cablldo . . . de la Asuncion al . . . Virrey, November 29, 1722; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de la Real Audiencia de la Plata al Sr. Virrey, Plata, March 13, 1723; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 39. 66 Reyes had hurried from Asuncion to Tabapy.

Before the elder Reyes left Tabapy, he had entrusted his wagons

and supplies to his son. When Lianas and his men arrived, they took the

deacon prisoner, smote him about the head and shoulders with sticks, and

confiscated the baggage and provisions which his father had left behind.

The Reyes party afterwards claimed that these goods were not subject to dis­

position by any layman, not even an officer of the crown, because they were

the patrimonial possessions of a cleric, were thus not subject to civil law,

and might never legally be alienated by a civil official, Antequera, attempt­

ing to excuse his subordinate Lianas' conduct and exonerate himself, asserted

that the laws governing relations between lay officers of the crown and cler­

ics did not apply in this case because Agustfn Reyes' title had been fraudu-

lently obtained. Later the Audiencia of Charcas supported this claim. 20

Lianas also took captive two other clerics. Father Jos^ Caballero

Baz^n, the resident priest of the near-by Indian town of San Buenaventura

de Yuguardn and the Dominican Jos^ Fris of Tabapy. Fris' mistake was having

given refuge to Reyes, and Caballero's offenses included having warned Reyes

of Lianas' approach and supplying him with horses so he could escape. His

19 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay fray Joseph de Palos a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncion, Novem­ ber 4, 1724; Antequera, "Respuesta," 54-57, 65-79; Lozano, Revolu­ ciones, I, 42; "Respuesta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay â la precedente carta confirmando los asertos de Antequera y justific^n- dose en que su deber como pastor de sus ovejas no le permitfa obrar de orto modo," March 18, 1727, in Zinny, Gobernantes, 123-148.

20 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Diego de los Reyes al Padre Policarpo Duffo, Itapua, October 17, 1723; "Respuesta del Obispo coadjutor . . ." Asuncion, March 18, 1727; Antequera, "Respuesta," 54-79; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Respuesta Fiscal de la Real Audi­ encia de la Plata al Excmo. Sr. virrey, Plata, March 1, 1725. 67 Initial punishment was the expropriation of his personal possessions by

Antequera.21 Fris and Caballero were then conducted to Asuncion in chains along with Agustfn Reyes and the Indian servants. All were temporarily imprisoned in the cathedral. The only penalty Lianas received for his ill- tempered outbursts and the excesses of his men was to receive a mild rebuke from Antequera for having allowed the three prelates to be s t r u c k . 22

The forty-four year old Caballero Bazan was removed from his parish by Father Alonso Delgadillo, Antequera's principal clerical supporter. He installed Geronimo Verdejo, a young (twenty-six year old) Antequera partisan, at Yuguaron to replace Caballero.^3 Delgadillo became the vicar-general of the province soon after, replacing Matfas de Sylva, whose kinship with Reyes and espousal of Diego's cause had set off a series of rancourous disputes with Antequera, which ended only after the governor threatened Sylva with bodily harm if he continued to obstruct the government of Paraguay. Sylva resigned his office. The vicar-general was the highest-ranking clerical official in Paraguay. The province had been without a resident bishop for the past thirty years. Normally in the absence of the bishop, the dean of the cathedral chapter in Asuncion would have carried out those duties usually performed by the bishop, but the current dean, Sebastian de Vargas, was

21 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Informe a S.M. de los clerigos y sacerdotes del Obispado del Paraguay, firmado por Fray Joseph, Obispo coadjutor, Asuncion, October 26, 1724.

22 Antequera, "Respuesta," 54-57, 65-79; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 37-44, 142ff; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Respuesta Fiscal de la Real Audi­ encia de la Plata al Excmo. Sr. Virrey, Plata, March 1, 1725.

23 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Informe a S.M. de los clerigos y sacer­ dotes . . ., Asuncion, October 26, 1724. 68 demented, although he did have lucid moments.

Several years later, Antequera, replying to charges of misconduct and treason made by José* de Palos, who came to Paraguay in 1724 as Bishop- coadjutor, wrote that he deserved no censure for Lianas' actions nor for the following privations suffered by the three clerics. He had not ordered

Raméh to manhandle the prelates. In fact, he was not certain that the alleged beatings had ever taken place. He admitted that he knew it was against the law for civil officials to interfere with regular clerics; but the case of Caballero, Fris, and Agustfn Reyes had been unique. These three men had given aid and comfort to a fugitive from justice, a convicted criminal. Not actually denying that the three hed been imprisoned, Ante­ quera, rather, begged the question by demanding to know in what jail they were locked. The public jail was the only one in Paraguay, he noted, and even the Jesuits admitted that the three had never been inside it.^5 (Ac­ tually they had been locked in the cathedral.)

Antequera's denial of the charge that Delgadillo replaced Caballero

Baz^n because he helped Reyes to escape was equally unconvincing. Cabellero, he wrote, was removed from office by Delgadillo (who, he insisted, was cer­ tainly competent to judge the case) for incompetence. He never gave his parishoners, who suffered from a total lack of spiritual comfort, any in­ struction in the Christian religion nor made the attempt to see the needs

24 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta dirigida al Virrey por . . . Eusebio Chaves . . .Pedro Nolasco Santa Maria . . . Mathias Sanchez . . . Mathias de Sylva . . . Joseph Caballero Bazan; Antequera, "Memorial," 182-183; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 37-44.

25 Antequera, "Respuesta," 35, 54-79; "Respuesta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay . . ."; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Informe a SM de los clericos y sacerdotes del Obispado del Paraguay . . ., Asuncion, October 26, 1724. 69 of his flock. Even If he had, it would have been a meaningless gesture because Caballero was both poorly educated and stupid. Antequera even denied that Caballero had earned a doctorate in theology from the Univer­ sity of C&rdoba as Bishop Palos later claimed.Antequera's protesta­ tions of innocence notwithstanding, the fact that Caballero was removed

from his parish for aiding Reyes is as incontestible as is the fact that he came from a family whom everyone knew to be staunch Reyes' partisans.

Although Reyes had fled from Tabapy, Antequera's army was still in the field in October, 1722. By the middle of the month, it had grown to a force of one thousand men armed with swords, muskets, and cannon. As he marched south, Antequera demanded that the residents of the villages and towns through which he passed recognize him as their governor and to deny their allegiance to Reyes. Because Antequera's soldiers confiscated cattle and horses on their march south, his detractors charged that he was not only a traitor, but also a thief. Because his troops allegedly committed numerous willful acts of vandalism, which actually were expropriation^of } the cattle, horses, and mules necessary to feed and equip his army, he was supposedly an inept leader unable to control his troops. And, he was cursed with a perverted sense of justice, which he exhibited when he per­ sonally whipped several Indians from Yuguaron who had assisted Reyes.^7

As the Paraguayan army approached the four Jesuit missions just south of the Tebicuary River, Antequera received a letter signed by the four priests from Nuestra Senora de Fe, Santa Rosa, San Ignacio Guazu, and

26 Antequera, "Respuesta," 35, 69; Antequera, "Memorial," 182-183; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Informe a SM de los clericos y sacerdotes del Obispado del Paraguay . . ., Asuncion, October 26, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Fray Joseph, Obispo Coadjutor del Paraguay, a Su Magestad, Asuncion, June 28, 1725.

27 Ibid.; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 52-55; Antequera, "Respuesta," 69-75. 70 Santiago. In the letter Fathers Policarpo Dufo, Jose de Tejadas, Francisco de Robles, and Antonio de Ribera begged the governor not to punish their

Indian charges for assisting Reyes. Any attempt to chastize the neophytes would cause heresy, war, and treason. The Indians would fight to defend

their homes and their lives. The Jesuits reminded Antequera that the king himself had awarded the Indians the title "loyal and faithful vassals"

(fieles V leales vasallôsï. For Antequera to persist in his present folly

surely would be to incur the king's w r a t h . ^8 Antequera, however, could not

have failed to notice that this was a thinly veiled threat of armed resis­

tance and retaliation against him and the Paraguayans. Since the governor knew how rigidly the Company enforced discipline within its reductions, he must have concluded that it would have been the Jesuits, and not the sub­ missive, docile Guaranfs, who would have given the order to fight.

On October 19, 1722, the day after he received the warning from

the four Jesuits, Antequera called off his march. He announced that he

had great affection for the Company and bore the Jesuits no ill will. Nev­

ertheless, he issued a warning to them. He said his army would return to

the missions to chastize both Jesuits and Indians if, in the future, they

refused to recognize the authority of his civil government in Asuncion.

Thus, the outline of the conflict between Antequera and the Company of

28 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de los P.P. Policarpo Duffo, Joseph de Tejada; Francisco de Robles y Antonio de Ribera, Santa Marfa de f I, October 18, 1722.

29 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del P. Luis de la Roca de la Com- pania de Jesus a don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Santos Ap&stoles, January 4, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 166. Memorial a S.M. del P. Jeronimo Herran de la Compania de Jesus, Procurador General de la provincias del Paraguay . . ., Madrid, October 14, 1726; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 59-60. 71 Jesus was clear. After October, 1722, the position of each side became increasingly rigid, ultimately leading to war. The governor was determined to convert his nominal authority over the missions into a ^ facto one, while the Jesuits were just as determined that no representative of the civil government should interfere with their freedom of action. 30

Before Antequera left the missions, he met with the Indian offi­ cials who nominally governed the four missions. He said he would not pun­ ish them for recognizing Reyes since their only errors had been their ignorance and blind obedience to their masters, but he warned them to keep the peace and ordered them to cultivate friendly relations with the Spanish citizens of Paraguay. He insisted that henceforth the mission Indians must prove that they were loyal vassals of the king by obeying all orders from

Jose de Antequera, the king's personal representative in Paraguay.

In November, as Antequera and his men were returning to Asuncion ,

Jose de Avalos fell ill and died. Originally Antequera's most ardent and powerful supporter, Avalos had by now grown restive over the present course of events, and his influence in Asuncion had waned. His death removed an important voice of reason and restraint from the Paraguayan scene. Whatever his faults, Avalos had been able to appraise the situation realistically and to determine accurately how long the viceroy would permit his orders to be flouted. He knew that Paraguay's remoteness would protect its inhabitants for only a year or two, and he realized that the viceregal will must ulti­ mately be obeyed.

30 Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 60.

31 Antequera, "Respuesta," 163; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 60-61.

32 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 62-64. 72 The people of Asuncion gave Antequera a triumphal reception when he returned to the capital. They acclaimed him "Father and Defender of the Nation." The prominent antequeristas. especially Juan de la Mena, Jose de Urrunaga, Antonio Ruj^z de Arellano, and Sebastian Fernandez Montiel worked assiduously to advance the common people’s devotion to their gover­ nor. Antequera himself assured the people of Paraguay that he would not rest until he had freed them from the threat of Reyes' tyranny for all time and that he would gladly sacrifice his life on their behalf. He told them that because he had the full support of the Audiencia of Charcas, their common cause would triumph.

33 Ibid. V

EXTERNAL FACTORS ; VICEROY AND AUDIENCIA

With each passing month after December, 1722, external factors over which Jose de Antequera had little or no control more and more defined his legal status. They ordained his ultimate misfortune and narrowed the limits on his freedom of action. The jurisdictional dispute between the viceroy of Peru and the Audiencia of Charcas increasingly influenced and determined events in Paraguay. After Viceroy Diego Morcillo decided to re­ scind Antequera's appointment as interim governor of Paraguay and support

Reyes' claim to the office, he issued a series of stern, then angry commands to the judges at Chuquisaca, to Antequera, and to the Paraguayans to carry out his directives. As soon as the viceroy discovered that the officials at

Charcas and the men controlling Paraguay had refused to obey one decree, he would issue another restating his previous orders, adding new and more burden­ some conditions for them to meet and imposing progressively more severe pen­ alties if they failed to comply.

Insisting that the viceroy misunderstood the true nature of the situation in Asuncion, the Audiencia of Charcas continued to oppose Reyes' reinstatement in letters of protest to the viceroy and to the king. The audiencia halted publication of the viceregal decrees and suppressed the knowledge of their contents. Later, after there could be no doubt what

Morcillo's intentions were, the Audiencia of Charcas still persisted, or­ dering Antequera and the Paraguayans to maintain the status quo until it 73 74 could persuade Morcillo to change his mind.

By the 1720's the Audiencia of Charcas had acquired wide powers,

partly because of its remoteness and partly because of its historical de­ velopment. Its officials had grown accustomed to dealing with affairs of

the provinces and towns under their jurisdiction without interference from

Lima. They were educated in Spain, where they were bornyLandzwere proud of

their European origins. They were usually men whose level of intellect was

superior to most other colonial officials, and they enjoyed great intellec­

tual and social prestige. Most were paid as well as their counterparts in

Lima. The Laws of the Indies had assigned the viceroy and audiencia in Lima

a legal status superior to the court at Charcas and vested in them final

powers of decision-making when the two authorities were in conflict. By the

eighteenth century, however, "... the audiencia of Charcas came to assume

all the appearance of an organ of government and to enjoy an indeterminate

power in its vast territory.In 1721 the seventy-nine-year old Morcillo had formerly served as Archbishop of La Plata (Chuquisaca), had been the

interim viceroy of Peru for two months in 1716, and had been installed in

the viceregal post that he would occupy for four years in January, 1720.%

On October 9, 1721, he first expressed his official support of Reyes while

reprimanding the judges at Chuquisaca and Antequera. Four days later, in a

John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782-1810; The Intendant System in the Viceroyaltv of La Plata (London, 1958), pp. 238-242. See also Efrafm Cordozo, "La audiencia de Charcas y la facultad de gobierno," Humanidades, XXV (1936), pp. 137-156.

Sebastian Lorente, Historia del Peru bajo los Borbones. 1700 - 1821 (Lima, 1871), pp. 34-42; Rub^n Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato (Siglo XVIII). 1700-1790 (Lima, 1956), pp. 67-122. passim; Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histdrico biogr^fico del Peru, Tomo VIII (Lima, 1934), pp. 16-28. 75 letter to the Audiencia of Charcas, he told the oidores that their order

to remove Reyes was absolutely without justification. It was true, he

admitted, that Reyes had neglected to get specific royal approval to govern

Paraguay while married to a permanent resident of the province; but it was

not important, Morcillo said, because Reyes obtained the proper dispensation

in 1712 from the viceroy of Peru, Diego Ladron de Guevara. In 1718, a year

after Reyes had taken officô, another viceroy, the Prince of Santo Bono, con­

firmed this grant. These two viceregal grants made it unnecessary to obtain

royal permission. Since Reyes' marriage did not prevent him from serving

legally, the Audiencia should regard him as the legal governor of Paraguay.^

Upon receiving this communication from the viceroy two months later,

the Audiencia of Charcas disagreed again. They wrote that to restore Reyes

to office would be severely detrimental to the province's welfare. Dissension was rife in Paraguay. The inhabitants of the region would not countenance

Reyes' tyranny any longer. The oidores' consciences and devotion to duty,

therefore, obligated them to retain the viceroy's decree in Charcas until

Fray Diego knew all the facts surrounding the affair. He could then render

a truly just verdict.^ In February, 1722, Morcillo again stated that only

after a most serious study of the matter had he decided to support Reyes'

claim to be the legal governor of Paraguay, and he rebuked members of the

Audiencia for their insubordination. They should have put his previous

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Despacho de don fray Diego Morsillo Rubio de AuSon . . . Virrey de estos Reinos . . . a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, October 13, 1721. Morcillo said that he had come to this conclusion because of a memorial that don Carlos de los Reyes had pre­ sented to him the previous July on his father's behalf which pointed out the previous decisions rendered in Lima.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de la Real Audiencia de la Plata al virrey, Plata, December 19, 1721. 76 orders into effect immediately upon having received them. He was shocked that they had had the audacity to appoint a governor on their own authority.^

The following May the Audiencia again implored the viceroy to de­ cree that Reyes must never return to Paraguay's most important office. The

Paraguayans were happy with their new-found freedom. His removal had em­ boldened them, and they were now even more impassioned opponents of Diego than formerly. They were in a mood forceably to resist any attempt to re­ store him to office, which would expose the province to total ruin. More­ over, to restore Reyes would be an insult to the officers of the Audiencia, and this show of disrespect for authority must be avoided. The oidores pointed out to Morcillo that Antequera had assumed his present post not only because he was ordered to do so by his colleagues in Charcas, but also be­ cause this had been the wish of the viceroy. In any event, the Audiencia held that it was only common sense to accept the existing situation and to legalize it. Reyes' allotted five-year term of office having expired two months earlier (the previous February), Antequera was presently living in

Paraguay and was completely performing his duties as governor. Aside from these considerations, the Audiencia argued, there were still five other charges pending against Reyes which were far more serious than the accusa­ tions about the illegality of his marital status.^ Still Morcillo was un­ impressed by the courtes arguments and, in July, again proclaimed his support for Reyes.^ Here the dispute between Fray Diego and the authorities in

5 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto del virrey . . ., Lima, February 27, 1722.

6 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de la Real Audiencia de la Plata al Sr. Virrey, Plata, March 13, 1722.

7 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Virrey a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, July 9, 1722. 77 Charcas remained until early the next year.

In February, 1723, Morcillo rendered what he hoped would be his final verdict on the Paraguayan situation. He had now received the records of Reyes* trial, completed in September, 1722, remitted them to the Audien­ cia and then forwarded them to Lima for the viceroy's consideration. He also had in his possession letters from Antequera*s clerical opponents in

Asuncion and Buenos Aires and several more from Paraguayan Jesuits. In addi­ tion, he had received petitions (memoriales) on behalf of Reyes begging him to correct the injustices and to compensate Diego for the hardships he had suffered. Using extremely harsh language, Morcillo excoriated those in

Charcas and Asuncion who had aided Antequera. Once again he expressed support for the Reyes faction. He added that he believed the ministers at

Charcas had been prejudiced against Reyes from the outset of the dispute.

Was it not possible, therefore, that they had a personal stake in the struggle? Antequera*s preliminary verdict against Reyes, said Morcillo, a verdict in which the Audiencia had concurred, was the certain result of any case tried by a hopelessly biased judge. The Audiencia*s ongoing and in­ subordinate support for one of its own proved that that body was equally as prejudiced and as unworthy as its appointed representative in Paraguay. An­ tequera* s government was an intolerable affront to the viceregal office and must be immediately terminated. There could be, Morcillo ordered, no ap­ peal by Antequera either to Charcas or to Lima.®

Morcillo said that Antequera was also guilty of other crimes. He had reduced Reyes* wife and sons to penury. He also unlawfully imprisoned

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de don fray Diego Morsillo Rubio y Aufion . . . Virrey, Gobernador y Capitan General de estos Reinos y Pro- vincias del Peru, Tierra firme y Chile, Lima, February 22, 1723. 78 Sergeant Major Miguel de Torres, the first alcalde of Asuncion, for five

months and Captain of Cavalry Eugenio Cabanas and Captain of Infantry José

de Espinosa for a shorter period of time merely because they had testified

on Reyes' behalf. Several other of Reyes' appointees suffered unwarranted

suspensions from their posts, including the scrivener Caspar de Bustamente,

Sergeant Majors Sebastian de Fleytas, and Alonso Caballero de Anasco, and

Comisario de Caballeria Diego Baez for nothing more than being friendly to

Reyes. The judge-governor had also made laudatory statements about Avalos,

Urrunaga, and Ruiz de Arellano. These were obvious lies. The motives guid­

ing the actions of thses men were as base as Antequera's.^ Furthermore,

Antequera's commercial activities, as they appeared to the authorities in

Lima, were not merely a scandal but were illegal.

The archbishop-viceroy next addressed himself to the untoward be­

havior of the members of the Audiencia of Charcas. The officials at Chuqui­

saca, he said, were as guilty of malfeasance as Antequera. Their first

mistake, which both transgressed the limits of legality and insulted the

viceregal office (and thus Morcillo himself), was having permitted Reyes'

rivals to place their allegations against Diego before the court for con­

sideration. Their second was having then permitted the case to come to trial.

They knew full well that two different viceroys had given Reyes the necessary

dispensation, and they should have refused to consider this, the major

Mathias Angles y Gortari, however, wrote that before he arrived in Paraguay in 1727, he expected to find that Arellano and Urrunaga were men as evil as Luther himself but that he was astonished to discover that they were upright, honorable, even noble gentlemen; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," p. 43.

10 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de don fray Diego Morsillo Rubio y Aunon . . . Virrey, Gobernador y Capitan General de estos Reinos y Fro- vincias del Peru, Tierra firme y Chile, Lima, February 22, 1723. 79 charge. Because the allegation was spurious, the Audiencia should have been naturally suspicious of the other five, some of which were absolutely false while others were at best based on half-truths. The oidores had then reached a conclusion unwarranted by the evidence and had rendered an unjust verdict, even after examining all the records of Reyes' trial. Morcillo now had these in his possession, and they clearly indicated that Diego had been an exemplary governor. The oidores must therefore be either incompetent judges or criminals. These bizarre proceedings had merely compounded the original felony, which had been to appoint a judge to hear a case against a man whom he was to replace. When they had appointed Antequera governor, they usurped a power the crown granted only to viceroys.

To rectify the situation, Morcillo ordered, the Audiencia must instruct Antequera to leave Paraguay within twenty days and appear in Charcas within five months after he left Asuncion. He was to pay a fine of eight thousand pesos for his wrongdoing and to leave in Paraguay whatever property he had acquired since 1721. The oidores must also ensure that Reyes and

Jose Delgado be restored to their former posts and that all their confiscated possessions be returned to them. Moreover, they were to be paid their back salaries dating from September, 1721. In addition, the judges in la Plata must send a responsible investigator to collect evidence against Reyes' ad­ versaries so that the viceroy and the Audiencia of Lima could pass sentence on them. The Audiencia of Charcas, Morcillo said, should frame a "royal pro­ vision" containing all the above orders and send it both to Antequera and:to the Asuncion cabildo at once. This should then be proclaimed to the people of Asuncion and the rest of the province so no one could doubt about the viceroy's intentions. Finally,the Audiencia of Charcas should take no further

11 Ibid. action regarding Paraguay without specific orders from the viceroy. 12 M

Before these viceregal directives could reach Charcas, however, the officials there rendered several decisions which vitally affected

Antequera's future and that of Paraguay. Its decisions of March 1723 were diametrically opposed to the orders the viceroy had given less than a month earlier. The decisions in March convinced Morcillo that the oidores were guilty of flagrant insubordination and that he must therefore rely on offi­ cials other than those at Chuquisaca to impose his will on Paraguay. These orders also proved ultimately fatal to the Antequera administration because they outlined the unwise course of action he was already predisposed to follow and led to his disastrous end. Theepresident and oidores of the

Audiencia of Charcas believed that Paraguay was in "imminent danger of to­ tal destruction" because of the continuing consternation in the province caused by Reyes' attempt to return to power in 1722. The Paraguayans were confused and uncertain, first of all, because of the existence of two rival governors. Even more important, thpy were terrified by the prospect that

Reyes might return. The reasons why they had deposed Reyes were still valid, the oidores said.^^ At the present time, moreover, hatred of Diego was not a sentiment limited to those few Paraguayans who had been responsible for bringing charges against him but was in fact voiced by all the inhabitants of the province. Furthermore, in 1722, when Reyes had escaped from Asuncion and then attempted to return, despite the Audiencia's orders to the contrary.

12 Ibid.

13 i.e., 1) That the charges against Reyes were proved; 2) That he had already completed his five-year term; and 3) That the viceroy had already appointed his successor, who was presently serving. 81 he had proved that he was a dangerous Insurrectionist. The Audiencia told the viceroy that Antequera had been completely justified when he tried to apprehend the fugitive in October, 1722. At the same time, it ordered both the antequeristas and the Reyes party to make no change in the Antequera gov­ ernment and to do nothing else that might cause the least disturbance. The oidores specifically ordered Antequera to remain in office until they sent him word of their approval of a new viceregal appointee. They also gave him permission to appoint an ecclesiastical judge to try Jose Caballero Baz/n, the priest at Yuguaron who had helped Reyes escape.

In March, 1723, the Audiencia of Charcas was in a difficult posi­

tion. It strove, on the one hand, to justify its previous decisions re­ garding Paraguay, to protect Antequera, one of its members, and to placate the viceroy. On the other hand, in order to solve the problem of who would rule in Paraguay without risking bloodshed, it was forced to disobey the viceroy's order to restore Reyes.

In a letter to the viceroy, the officials at Charcas, who were now showing some anxiety about the consequences of their past actions, admitted it was probably time for Antequera to resume his duties at the Audiencia.

They pleaded, however, for the viceroy to appoint a new and impartial interim governor whose ability and integrity were equal to Antequera's. In their appeal, they said that their appointment of Antequera was justified by a cedula promulgated by His Majesty on June 29, 1720, in which the king granted

14 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto proveido por la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, March 13, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Real Provision con fuerza de sobrecarta dirigida a don Joseph de Antequera de la Audi­ encia de la Plata, Plata, March 13, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto de la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Plata, March 22, 1723. 82 them extraordinary powers to be used in such serious emergencies as when

great distances and undue delays would preclude prompt and effective vice­

regal action. And they also reminded Morcillo once again that their appoint­

ment of Antequera had been initially coordinated with Fray Diego's wished IS and not in opposition to them.

On May 10, 1723, the viceroy ordered Baltasar Garcia Ros, the

lieutenant governor (teniente del gobernador) at Buenos Aires, to travel to

Paraguay in order to oversee the successful conclusion of his decree of the

previous February which ordered Reyes, Delgado, Diego de Baez, and other of

Reyes' friends whom he did not mention by name to be restored to office. He

also ordered Garcia Ros to remove from their posts Maestre de Campo Sebastian

Fernandez Montiel and others whom Antequera had appointed to military and civ­

il offices. Garcfa Ros was to order Antequera to leave Paraguay immediately

after Baltasar's arrival and to appear in Lima within eight months for a trial

before the viceroy and the Audiencia of Lima. He was not to enter Chuquisaca

on his journey from Asuncion to Lima. Morcillo added this latter provision

to prevent further obstructive tactics by the Audiencia of Charcas. If Ante­

quera or any of his followers attempted to obstruct Baltasar, Morcillo,stipu­

lated, Antequera was to be deprived of his post as Protector Fiscal de los

Indios of the Audiencia of Charcas and suffer a fine of ten thousand pesos.

His refractory subordinates were to be removed from their posts, stripped of

all their titles, and fined four thousand pesos.

Two weeks later Morcillo received the Audiencia's letter of March

13, 1723, and he replied the same day (May 26). Although he again casti­

gated the oidores for their failure to condemn Antequera, he recognized the

15 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de la Audiencia de la Plata al Virrey del Peru, Plata, March 13, 1723.

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto del Virrey del Peru, Lima, May 10, 1723. 83, wisdom and accepted the validity of their most important request as a tactical

necessity. In early June he appointed a new governor for the troubled

province. He named Baltasar Garcfa Ros, then Lieutenant Governor of Buenos

Aires, to serve as interim governor of Paraguay. If Garcfa Ros were unable

to serve, then Francisco Bracamonte, the lieutenant governor in Santa Fe was to execute the order. Baltasar, who had governed the province for a

year (1706-1707) almost two decades earlier,was to preside over affairs

in Asuncion until the crown made a permanent appointment.^®

By July Antequera realized how precarious his postion was, and he was alarmed over Reyes' threat to his safety. Because Reyes was free from

the control of Antequera or the Audiencia of Charcas and was backed by the

military might of the Jesuits and their allies, he could rally a few adher­

ents to his cause. In a small province like Paraguay, whose affairs were

always dominated by an elite few, the determined opposition of only a hand­

ful of men was a very real threat. Their potential danger to Antequera

would be especially serious if they should rally to the Jesuit cause under

the personal leadership of Reyes, for they could subvert those Paraguayan

leaders eager to end up on the winning side. Earlier, the governor had in­

tercepted ■ several letters from Reyes to his son Agustfn, in which Diego

relayed the news of the several viceregal decisions rendered between October,

1721, and February, 1723, and which also announced his intention to return.

17 See Chapter VI.

18 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Virrey del Peru a la Audiencia de la Plata, Lima, May 26, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto del Virrey del Peru, Lima, June 7, 1723; Zinny, Gobernantes. 99-100; Jos& Torre Revello, "Los gobernadores de Buenos Aires (1617-1777)," Historia de la nacion Argentina, III (Buenos Aires, 1932), Ricardo Levene, ed., pp. 359-360. 84 On the fifteenth of the previous month (June, 1723), however, Antequera

had received the Audiencia's order to remain at his present post. When

he learned that Reyes was on his way to Corrientes to enlist the support

of the royal officials there, he decided to have his rival forceably re­

turned to prison in Asuncii^n where he would cause no further trouble.

To recapture Reyes, Antequera, in early August, 1723, sent Caye-

tano Borja, the Dominican friar who operated the governor's business enter-

prisesuin Asuncion, to Corrientes. Borja's ostensible mission was to conclude

commercial transactions between Antequera and several merchants in that city,

but his real mission was to make the preparations necessary for the safe en­

try into the city of the troop of Paraguayan soldiers whom Antequera was

sending to kidnap Reyes. The thirty men Antequera dispatched to Corrientes were commanded by Ramén de las Lianas and included several other important

antequeristas, including Julian Guerrero, Prudencio de Posadas, Vicente Calvo,

Francisco Matallana, Matfas Romero de Santa Cruz, and Juan de Mena.^^ Bor­

ja' s mission was a fruitful one. He insured the success of the Lianas ex­

pedition when he solicited the aid of Jos^ Marques de Montiel, a merchant

of Corrientes and a business partner of Antequera. On the night of August

21, 1723, as Lianas' party appeared at the city's gates, Borja and Marques de Montiel convinced the night-watch that the men requesting entrance to

Corrientes were messengers on official business, carrying letters from

19 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 91-93.

20 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declaracion del Maestre de Campo Julian Guerrero, Corrientes, September 5, 1724. When Guerrero gave this testimony, he was a prisoner of the royal officials in Corrientes. In January, 1724, Antequera sent him to lead a contingent of Para­ guayan cavalry to support Governor Zavala's attack on the Portuguese , city Colbnia dd3t Sacramento, and Zavala had had him arrested for his / part in Reyes' kidnapping. 91 85 Antequera to the cabildo of Corrientes.

Breaking into the house where Reyes was staying, they roused

Diego from his bed at gunpoint and took him prisoner. This capture was

not only a blow to his plans, but was personally humiliating. Diego was

clad only in his underwear, and his captors refused him permission to put

on other clothes. They also capturedseveral important documents that

left no doubt that the authorities in Lima and Madrid intended to give the

next government of Paraguay to the Reyes-Jesuit faction. These records

included three letters to Reyes from Francisco Arana, the king's personal

secretary, indicating that the crown was favorably disposed toward Diego's

continuance in office (the assumption being that he had never legally been

deprived of it); four letters from Lorenzo de la Mar Liberona, Reyes' agent

in Madrid relating his activities on Diego's behalf in Spain; and copies of

two of the viceroy's dispatches (March 3, 1722 and February 27, 1723) or- 22 dering Reyes' restoration to office. It was obvious that Reyes meant to

serve another five-year term of office and that his own influence and the

powerful support of the Company of Jesus in Paraguay, Lima, and Madrid were sufficient to achieve this end.

Lianas returned Reyes to Paraguay and placed him in the public

21 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Don Francisco de Hoguera Salguero, Teniente de su serforîa en Corrientes, da cuenta al Gobernador don Bruno Mauri- cio de Zavala, Corrientes, August 22, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Testimonio de don Geronimo Fernandez, Alcalde ordinario de primer voto de la Ciudad de las Siete Corrientes, Corrientes, August 22, 1723.

22 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Testimonio del Capiton don José de Pilco- mini, Secretario de Cartas de don Diego de los Reyes, Corrientes, August 22, 1723; Antequera, "Memorial," 192. jail in Asuncion.In fact, however, Antequera's intention was not to

keep Reyes in prison in Asuncion permanently but to send him to the Audi­

encia of Charcas for the final disposition of his case. When the governor

requested permission from authorities in Corrientes and Santa Fe to send

Reyes to Charcas through these two cities, their municipal officials, act­

ing on the orders of their immediate superior. Governor Zavala of Buenos

Aires, refused to cooperate and doomed Reyes to two more years of imprison­

ment.^^ Antequera later tried to justify his having sent his troops ille­

gally into another governor's jurisdiction. He said that although Corrientes was under Zavala's authority, the fact that Reyes had been condemned and

sentenced by the Audiencia of Charcas made Reyes' illegal flight a concern

of all the officials in the entire district under the Audiencia. He was,

therefore, obligated to remand the fugitive to custody by whatever means were available.^5

23 This confinement, Reyes' partisans claimed, was not only rigorous and unpleasant but it was also an affront to the honor and dignity of so noble a gentleman since the jail had formerly been a place for the incarceration of such low types as barbarous Indians captured in battle and obstreperous Negro slaves. It was, however, the same carcel in which Reyes had imprisoned Jose de Avalos four years earlier; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Peticion de don Caspar de Bustamente, vecino de Buenos Aires, por parte de don Diego de los Reyes al gobernador de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 321. Auto del Teniente General del Paraguay don Joseph Delgado, Asuncion, September 15, 1719.

24 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Teniente de su sdnorfa en Santa Fe don Francisco de Ziburu al Gobernador de Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, October 13, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Gerdnimo Fernandez, alcalde de primer voto al Gobernador de Buenos Aires, Cor­ rientes, November 13, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto proveido por don Bruno Mauricio de Zavala, Buenos Aires, October 16, 1723.

25 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Joseph de Antequera al Gober­ nador de Buenos Aires, Asuncion, October 23, 1723. 87 Thus ended the active participation of Diego de los Reyes y

Balmaceda in the affairs of Paraguay. Never again was this man, the source of so much trouble, to plày an important role in the province. In the months that followed Baltasar Garcia Ros tried to return his friend to office but failed miserably. Even in 1725 Bruno de Zavala found hostility toward

Reyes running so deep in Paraguay that he could not immediately free him from prison. When he finally emerged from his confinement, he left Paraguay forever. That the Audiencia of Lima finally exonerated him from all charges was little solace. He died in Lima several years later, a broken man. VI

THE LINES OF BATTLE ARE DRAWN

After the Paraguayans spirited Reyes from Corrientes to Asunci&n

in August, 1723, the two parties involved in the struggle for Paraguayan hegemony could no longer reconcile their differences. Viceroy Morcillo was

determined to carry through his solutions for the Paraguayan problem with­

out interference from the Audiencia of Charcas, and after mid-1723 he began

to subvert its influence in Paraguayan affairs. Henceforth, he sent his

orders through Potosf to the governor of Buenos Aires. The Jesuits were as

obdurately determined to maintain their independence from the civil authori­

ties in Asuncion as Morcillo was to create an aura of inviolability around viceregal prerogatives. In Asuncion Antequera was convinced that his col­

leagues at the Audiencia of Charcas would protect him; and he apparently

felt that the wheels of Spanish justice would grind too slowly to cause him harm. But little-by-little he became trapped by his supporters' impassioned

hatred for the Jesuits. All this while, Reyes remained a prisoner in Asuncion,

the symbol of all that the Paraguayans hated and of all that the Jesuits and

the viceroy wanted to retain.

In October, 1723, the governor of Buenos Aires, Bruno Mauricio de

Zavala, received Morcillo's order, issued on the seventh of June. It com­

manded him or his lieutenant governor, Baltasar Garcfa Ros, to assume the

interim governorship of Paraguay. Born in Durango, Spain, Zavala was a

crusty old veteran of military campaigns in Europe. He had served in Flanders as captain of cavalry for fourteen years and returned to Spain in 1704. In 88 89 1707 he fogght in the Battle of Lerida, in which he lost his right arm.

Appointed governor of Buenos Aires in 1716, he took office July 11, 1717, serving continuously until 1735. When he got Morcillo*s orders to pacify

Paraguay, he was preparing to dislodge the Portuguese who had advanced from

Colonia del Sacramento to Montevideo, both across the Rfo de la Plata from

Buenos Aires.^

Thus the responsibility for restoring order in Paraguay fall to

Baltasar Garcfa Ros. Born in 1674 in Valtierra in Navarre, Garcfa Ros had fought in the Spanish campaigns in Italy and had served as a colonial offi­ cial in the Plata region for several years. He had been interim governor of both Paraguay (1706-1707) and Buenos Aires (1715-1717) and had shown con­ siderable ability as a soldier and an administrator. But in 1723 his appoint­ ment to Paraguay was a poor choice. Since 1706 he had been a close personal friend of Reyes, and this friendship was common knowledge in Paraguay. When the Paraguayans learned of his commission, they naturally concluded that he would be partial to his friend. Having studied the documents they found in

Corrientes when they kidnapped Reyes, they also knew that any, interim ap­ pointment of Morcillo would be only an interregnum between Antequers's ad­ ministration and a second Reyes term imposed on them from S p a in .%

By October, 1723, Zavala had severed most of the remaining communi­ cations between the men in Asuncion and the outside world. He ordered his lieutenant governors in Corrientes and Santa Fe to embargo all commerce with

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Instruccion de lo que ha de observer el Coronel don Balthasar Garcfa Ros, Buenos Aires, October 16, 1723; Torre Revello, "Los Gobernadores de Buenos Aires," 359-60.

Ibid., 358-359; Zinny, Gobernantes. 99-100; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Balthasar Garcia Ros al Virrey del Peru, Buenos Aires, September 4, 1723. 90 Paraguay and to stop travellers from entering the province. Acting on orders issued by Zavala, the officials in those two cities refused a re­ quest from Antequera and the cabildo of Asuncion to send Reyes to the

Audiencia of Charcas through the territory under their jurisdiction.^ With these political and commercial ties now broken, the Paraguayans came to feel an even deeper sense of bitterness than before. As their frustation increased, they were driven to take increasingly defiant stands and to commit themselves to actions that moved closer and closer to treason.

Antequera himself, however, believed that his activities during the crucial years of 1723 and 1724 were completely in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Laws of the Indies. His only crime, he wrote, was to obey the orders issued by the Audiencia of Charcas between 1720 and March,

1723. Had he obeyed Morcillo's orders instead of the Audiencia's, he would only have found a jail in la Plata rather than one in Lima as his reward.

It was outrageous, he said, for him to be prosecuted (he believed persecuted) for trying to collect tribute (tributes)^ and tithes (diezmos)5 from the

AGI, Charcas, Legajo323. Carta de don Bruno de Zauala al Virey, Buenos Aires, October 2, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto del Goberna­ dor de Buenos Aires don Bruno Mauricio de Zauala, Buenos Aires, Novem­ ber 13, 1723. AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Francisco de Ziburu a don Bruno Mauricio de Zabala, Santa Fe, November 13, 1723.

Tributes were a yearly payment made by the Indians to the king as ac­ knowledgement of his suzerainty or to encomenderos upon whom the king had bestowed this privilege. It was to be paid by every adult male Indian of the ages between eighteen and fifty. Since there was almost no money in Paraguay, tribute was commonly rendered in the form of personal service, the practice to which the Jesuits objected more than any other.

Diezmos were ecclesiastical tithes which Pope Alexander VI had allowed the crown to levy and collect in the Indies. The Paraguayan Jesuits had traditionally been exempt from paying them: Se§, e.g., Lillian Estelle Fisher, Viceregal Administration in the Spanish American Colonies (New York, 1967), pp. 99, 187, 199-200. 91 Jesuit missions at the same rate that they were obtained from the rest of his jurisdiction. Then, he made a rather immodest, but altogether charac­ teristic comparison: His having told the people of Paraguay that it was only right and just for the Indians living in the Jesuit missions to pay proper tribute to the officials of Asuncion, he said, was analogous to

Christ's teaching his disciples the necessity of obediently rendering trib­ ute untO-.Gaesarv-J-In fact, he had never even tried to prevent the Jesuits from usurping the best lands in the province, a notorious and continuing practice which seriously depressed the Paraguayan economy, because neither the Laws of the Indies nor his superiors at Charcas had indicated that this was a proper course of action. His restraint in this matter, he wrote, should prove to anyone concerned with justice that everything he did had been ordered by the Audiencia of Charcas or the kings of Spain.^

When Antequera was later accused of treason by José de Palos, a

Franciscan who came to Paraguay in 1724 as bishop-coadjutor, the former gov­ ernor vehemently asserted that the allegation was unwarranted, unjust, and untrue. He had told the Paraguayans about their right to appeal an unjust order three times to higher authority before they were legally obligated to carry it into effect; but this was not, as Palos charged, the same thing as inciting the people of Paraguay to revolt against the crown. Antequera ques­ tioned how people who legally supplicate from the orders of a superior trir bunal could be traitors.? Since people might appeal to the king three times

6 It is significant that he did not say, "The Audiencia, the viceroy, and the king." Antequera, "Respuesta," 243-245.

7 "Pues en que esté lo injusto de esta accion, y como la nota V.S. Ilus- trisima estas obediencias, y halla senda para que sean traydores y perturbadores de la paz péblica los Subditos que suplican, fundados en justicia, del mandate del Superior . . .?" Antequera, "Respuesta," 245. 92 before any punishment could legally be initiated, they ought to have the

same right of appeal from an order by the vice-king.® When it helped his defense, he stood on the letter of the law— or the letter of those laws which

suited his purpose--while ignoring those which embarrassed his position.

In mid-November, 1723, Baltasar Garcia Ros, unaware of how most

Paraguayans utterly opposed his mission, left Buenos Aires accompanied by

his chaplain Clemente Quinones; and he travelled up the Parana River to

Corrientes. On December 14 he sent a messenger from Corrientes to Asuncion with letters informing Antequera and the members of the cabildo that the viceroy had appointed him interim governor of Paraguay. Garcia Ros apparent­

ly assumed that the Paraguayans would accept him as the legitimate governor,

because he took no steps to back up his letters with force. Evidently, he

believed that if the Paraguayans' sense of duty counted for but little, at

the very least the implied, but unstated, threat of military support from

the Jesuit missions would cow them into submission. Without waiting for

them to reply to his letters, he left for Asuncion.^

But Garcfa Ros' assumptions were wrong. The Paraguayansopposed

him as inalterably as Reyes. Their conclusion that he would favor the Jesuits

and restore Reyes was valid. Their determination to resist was reinforced

by the arrival of the news that Carlos Reyes had recently carried additional

letters from the viceroy to the Jesuit missions. In these Morcillo had reaf­

firmed his support of the elder Reyes. From the safety of the missions, Car­

los had tried to rally Diego's supporters in the civil province, including

Ibid.. 243-250.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Memoria del Licenciado don Clemente Qui'Sones, Corrientes, September 6 , 1724; Qui%ones was don Baltasar's chaplain and accompanied him on his two trips to Paraguay in 1723 and 1724; see also, Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 109-110. the Asuncion Jesuits, whom he wrote to enlist their help. The Asuncion cabildo, the military leaders of Paraguay, and most of the province's in­

fluential citizens, beset from all sides by these ominous warnings of dis­ aster, nevertheless announced that they preferred to die in battle with honor and dignity than to see a restoration of the tyranny of Reyes and his family.Diego had not only offended their honor but he had also hurt

them financially.

The citizens of Paraguay did not overemphasize the strength of the movement they faced. Carlos Reyes had obtained Morcillo's appointment of

Garcfa Ros, they said, because Baltasar would do whatever the Reyeses and

Jesuits asked. The viceroy had heard only one side of the dispute, and what he had heard was a monumental lie. The Paraguayans had recently received

letters from friends in Buenos Aires from which they had learned of Morcillo's

intent to provide soldiers from the missions to support Garcfa Ros if he

thought necessary. The spectre of hordes of invading Indians was probably what disturbed the people of Paraguay most. The rumor that Garcfa Ros was assembling an army of eight thousand Guaranfs spread throughout the province.

Although it was not true, it was accepted as fact. If the "barbarians" marched on the province, horrible bloodshed would be the result if the Para­

guayan officials did not take immediate steps to stop it. If the men in

power would not, there were others who would. On two occasions when Ante­

quera was outside the city, Juan Zamudio, Reyes' jailer, barely prevented desperate attempts to murder Reyes. The would-be assassins were not even

10 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Policarpo Dufo de la Compa^îî^a de Jesus al P. Provincial Lufs de la Roca de la misma compdSfa, Aposto- les, October 26, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del PL Pablo Restivo al P. Policarpo Dufo de la Cornpama de Jesds, Asuncion, October 26, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de la Audiencia de la Plata a S.M., Plata, September 28, 1724. 94 deterred by the heavy guard surrounding the jail. It was even whispered that if for some reason Antequera should pardon Reyes, neither of them would grow older.

Faced with the necessity of deciding what to do about Garc/a Ros, the Asuncion cabildo met without the governor on December 11, 1723, to discuss the alternatives which were open to them. In the end they decided to instruct

Antequera to call the meeting of a cabildo abierto. 12

Two days later the "open town meeting" convened. It was attended by one hundred and eight men, all of the highest rank. Among those present were Juan de Garay, now the prior of the Dominican monastery in Asuncion, the

Franciscan Juan de Montemayor (Guardian dm San Francisco), the Mercedarian

Jose de Yegros (Comendador de la Merced). Father Pablo Restivo, rector of the

Jesuit college, Antonio Gonzalez de Guzman, a secular cleric and opponent of

Antequera, and Alonso Delgadillo. When Antequera's most intimate advisor, Juan de Mena Ortiz y Velasco, the alguacil mayor, announced that Baltasar Garcfa

Ros was in Corrientes and that his primary concern was to ascertain whether

Reyes could be safely restored, the enraged assemblage shouted its defiance

11 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Rector de la Asucnidn de la Compa%fa de Jesus, Pablo Restivo al Pi Provincial Lufs de la Roca, Asuncion, December 7, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta de IP. Pablo Restivo al P. Policarpo Dufo, Asuncion, October 30, 1723; these letters, from the most important Jesuit in Asuncion, indicate just how limited Antequera's power was and the great degree to which his actions were restricted by his impassioned but fickle supporters during the last few months of 1723.

12 See Haring, Spanish Empire in America. 172; "For the discussion of matters of grave importance, such as local defense in time of war, there was sometimes called together a wider assembly of the more notât ble citizens, including the bishop and the principal clergy, to delib­ erate with the cabildo in . . . an'open cabildo' (cabildo abierto) . . , customarily the meeting was called by the governor or his deputy, but cabildo might take the initiative by requesting him to issue the summons." 95 almost in a single voice. The citizens who were present cried that they would rather face death than see Reyes or Garcia Ros govern them. Then

Antequera addressed the gathering. He first informed them of their right

to three appeals. Then he said that he would gladly resign if they be­

lieved that this would help their cause. But they begged him to carry on as their leader until the viceroy appointed a truly impartial governor. Only

the royal standard bearer (alferez real) Dionisio de Otazd, the inspector of weights and measures (fiel ejecutor) Andrds Benftes, a Reyes' kinsman, and

the regidores Martfn de Chavarri and Juan Caballero de A&asco opposed the decision, and they were deprived of their offices--temporarily--for their

trouble.13

Beginning in Late December, 1723, and continuing throughout January,

1724, Antequera , from Asuncion and Garcfa Ros, encamped at the Tebicuary

River, heaped recriminations upon each other and ordered each other to leave

the province. Each maintained that he was the legitimate governor of Para­

guay. AlthoughGarcia Ros tried to get copies of his commission circulated

in the province in the hope that he might awaken popular support for the viceroy's orders, the power of Antequera's partisans was by now nearly abso­

lute, and they prevented Garcia Ros' messenger, Gonzalo Ferreyra, an alcalde

of the Santa Hermandad. Ferreyra in turn showed Baltasar the order sent from

13 Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 111-114; Antequera, "Respuesta," 176-178; Antequera, "Memorial," 207-208; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 41-42; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Testimonio del Regidor Capitan Juan Ca­ ballero de Anasco, Asuncion, October 16, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Testimonio del Regidor don Nartfn de Chavarri, Asuncion, September 9, 1724. Charcas in March, 1723, for Antequera to continue.

A week later Garcfa Ros again demanded to be received as governor.

This time he sent Antequera the viceroy's original dispatch, but Antequera replied that he doubted the document's authenticity. If it were valid, he said, Balthasar should come to Asuncion unescorted. If not, he should return home. Since Balthasar's retinue was comprised of only a few servants and his chaplain, he decided to withdraw, leaving Paraguay on January 28, and finally arriving in Buenos Aires in April 12, 1724.^5

The crucial role in Garcia's first attempt and first failure to dis­ lodge Antequera from his position was that of the Company of Jesus. The

Jesuits' failure to provide him with troops from the reductions was the most important reason why Baltasar's mission was unsuccessful. Although in June,

1723, the viceroy had requested all subjects of the King of Spain residing in the Plata region (and especially the Paraguayan Jesuits) to give Garcfa

Ros all the help they could, Morcillo had not specifically ordered the

Jesuits to supply the new governor-designate with soldiers from the missions.

Lufs de la Roca, Father Provincial of the missions, in a letter to Baltasar, had said that it would be extremely unwise for the Company to supply him with Indian soldiers at the present time. Currently the mission army was at

14 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto proveydo por don Baltasar Garsia Ros, Gobernador y Capitdn general del Paraguay y Juez para el cumplimiento de diferentes ordenes del Excmo. Sr. Virrey del Peru, Corrientes, Sep­ tember 1, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Memorial de don Juan de Mena Ortiz y Velasco, Procurador general de la Asuncion, al Virrey del Peru y Real Audiancia de los Reyes, Lima, 1727; Lozano. Revoluciones. I, 114-11/, — —— — — — —

15 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto proveydo por don Baltasar Garsia Ros September i, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Memo- 114-117 “ Mena . . . Lima, 1727; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 97 less than full strength because Roca had sent Governor Zavala three thousand of his best men to repell the incursion on Montevideo by Portuguese settlers from Colonia. Because of disease and desertions, only about two thousand of them had reached their destination; but the mission army was three thousand men under its normal complement. Although the missionaries still commanded a sizeable army, it was needed to defend the missions. While the Jesuits recognized don Baltasar as legal governor of Paraguay, Roca continued, rais­ ing an army large enough to make a successful assault on Asuncion in the space of a few weeks and at the same time withholding knowledge of it from the

Paraguayans would be absolutely impossible. In the past when there had been significant troop movements in the missions, the Paraguayans had always learned about them almost immediately. If the colonists heard news of maneuvers in the reductions, Roca warned, they would execute Reyes.

Roca advised Garcfa Ros to be patient. Ultimately he must and would prevail. Roca assured Baltasar that when the men serving under Zavala re­ turned, the Jesuits would have sufficient soldiers at their disposal both to provide an adequate defense for the missions and to make a successful assault on Asuncion. It was therefore advisable, strategically, for Baltasar to post­ pone his commission for a few months. If he were to wait a while and, with help from the Jesuits, assemble an army slowly and quietly, there would be a much greater chance of catching the Paraguayan "rebels" unprepared. A month later Roca added that it would take only a small provocation for the antequer- istas to expel the Jesuits from their college in Asuncion. He believed that this was not worth the risk, especially since he had serious doubts about the

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Luis de la Roca, Provincial de la Companfa de Jesds del Paraguay, a don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Santos Ap&stoles, January 4, 1724. 98 success at that moment of Baltasar's venture. He assured Garcia Ros, however, that the loyal Jesuit vassals of His Majesty would in time give all the help he needed and that their aid would ultimately ensure his victory.

Besides the Jesuits' refusal to supply him with troops, there were other factors which persuaded Baltasar to postpone his mission. One was news of the antequeristas' military capabilities. Father Jose Tejadas had written him that although there were men in Paraguay who would like to support the

Jesuits and the Reyes-Garcfa Ros interests, including one hundred and forty from Villa Rica, Antequera and his supporters had effective control over

Asuncion and Paraguay. With just a little warning, they could surely raise an army adequate to repel him. Baltasar was even more inclined to delay his venture after considering word directly from Asuncion. Father Pablo Restivo warned him not to come to the capital and never to trust Antequera and the

Paraguayans. Restivo wrote that after he bad relayed the news of the viceroy's orders to the members of the cabildo, he had seen their mood grow ugly. If

Garcfa Ros were somehow to arrive in Asuncion to show his credentials, the citizens would formally receive him and legalize his accession to office, but they would then unceremoniously dump him into a boat they already had prepared for the occasion and ship him downriver. Most significant they would execute

Reyes, an order already drawn up by Antequera. 18

Restivo then reminded Baltasar of the terrible events that had oc­ curred in 1649. In that year the governor-designate Sebastian Leon y Zarate

17 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Provincial Luis de la Roca a don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Candelaria, February 14, 1724.

18 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Billete del PI Joseph de^Tejada de la Compania de Jesus, a don Baltasar Garcfa Ros, San Ignacio, February 11, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Rector de la Asuncion Pablo Restivo de la Compania de Jesus a don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Asuncion, January 7, 1724. 99 had entered Asuncion at the head of an army of Indian troops supplied by the Jesuits to remove Bishop Bernardino de CSrdenas, then serving as gov­ ernor. On that occasion, Indian soldiers, who were, Restivo said, barbarous by their very nature, killed at least eighteen Spaniards and untold numbers of Indianiresidents of the city. Although this tragedy had occurred seventy- five years before, the memory of it was still fresh in the minds of the asuncenos. Restivo said that Garcfa Ros should also consider the fact that

Le6 n y Zarate commanded only six hundred Indians. But now, Garcia Ros would need at least two thousand, because the Paraguayans were presently stronger militarily than in 1649 and were far more determined to resist. Because

Restivo lived in Asuncion, he was more vulnerable to reprisals from the

Paraguayans than were the Jesuits in the mission territroy, but he was also sympathetic to the claims of the antequeristas. He reminded Garcia Ros that, although his mission was an honorable one, he must be resilient. Res­ tivo believed that Antequera's actions during the past three years had never been bad enough to risk the expulsion of the Jesuits from the city and even further violations of his "sacred religion." Although the Paraguayans op­ posed Diego Reyes' and Baltasar Garcfa R0 9 , Restivo said, they were not rebelling against the king. Restivo suggested that, perhaps, Baltasar could span the gap between himself and his rival with a bridge of silver pesos but added that he seriously doubted this ploy would succeed.

Upon his return to Buenos Aires in April, Garcfa Ros received new orders from Governor Zavala. Again he was to leave Buenos Aires at once and return to Paraguay. Three months earlier. Viceroy Morcillo was nearly apo­ plectic after reading a letter from Esteban Urizar de Arizipacochaba, the

19 Ibid. governor of Tucum£n. The letter described the kidnapping of Reyes from

Corrientes in August, 1723, and told of Antequera"s continuing disobedience.

Morcillo thus issued a new decree repeating many of the provisions of his previous orders concerning the government of Paraguay but made some impor­

tant additions. Morcillo announced that he had just received word from Spain

that Diego de los Reyes was to be re-appointed permanent governor of Paraguay and was to serve until further notice. The viceroy again ordered that either

Governor Zavala or Garcfa Ros, if Zavala were still occupied in ridding

Montevideo of the Portuguese interlopers, must personally enforce this decree in Asuncion. Both men must give the order their immediate attention. Who­ ever went to Paraguay was to subdue the rebels by force, use all available men from Buenos Aires, Paraguay, and Tucuman, and take over as interim gover­ nor of the province. When passions had subsided, Diego Reyes should be re­ stored to office. The viceregal appointee was also charged with capturing

Antequera and sending him to Lima under heavy guard. In addition, he must punish Antequera"s followers so that a similar situation would not occur again. Saying emphatically that Zavala and Garcfa Ros should do whatever was necessary to effect the directive, Morcillo then indicated that extraordinary or even technically illegal measures would meet with his approval if the mission were successful. Zavala, however, was convinced that circumstances still required his presence in the south and that his subordinate was equal to the task. Thus, he once again delegated the responsibility to Baltasar

Garcfa Ros.^®

20 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Esteban Urizar y Arzipachoaga al Virrey del Peru, Salta, October 4, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto del Virrey del Pertf, Lima, January 11, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto provefdo por don Bruno de Zabala, Buenos Aires, April 11, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declarazi&n de don Baltasar Garcfa. Ros»:GorCientes, September 2, 1724. 101 On his second attempt to pacify the province, Baltasar was given additional discretionary powers to make civil and military appointments. This time he also decided to travel up the Uruguay River to journey through the mission province to gather his army. Accompanying Garcfa Ros on this departure from Buenos Aires was Fray Jose de Palos, the new bishop-eoadjutor of Para­ guay. Born in Morilla in Valencia, Palos entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, taught philosophy and divinity in a college in Spain, and afterwards

"governed almost all of the considerable convents of his order in Spain.

He had served in Mexico and then became provincial of the Franciscan order

(Provincial de oan Francisco) for the Viceroyalty of Peru. In 1721 the king appointed him coadjutor of Paraguay and titulary bishop of Tatillum in Maura- tania. Consecrated as bishop in Lima, January 24, 1724, he then set out for

Charcas to complete necessary formalities there before the Audiencia. When he arrived at Buenos Aires, he found Zavala and Carcia Ros making final prepa­ rations for the Paraguayan expedition, and they asked him to join them. De­ claring that it was unbecoming for a new bishop to arrive accompanied by an invading army, Palos tried to persuade Zavala to defer military action until he, Palos, could negotiate a peaceful settlement. Zavala, however, refused to delay. He simply could not ignore the sense of urgency in the viceroy's orders. On May 6 , 1724, therefore, Palos left Buenos Aires with Garcfa Ros, but on June 20, at the southernmost Jesuit mission in Paraguay, Yapeyu, the bishop parted company with the leader of the counter-revolutionary expedition.

He purportedly desired to inspect the Jesuit missions in his diocese, but his

21 Ibid.; Charlevoix, History of Paraguay. II, 172. 102 real reason was to await the outcome of Baltasar s mission. 99

Earlier, Zavala had provided Baltasar with what he assumed was support sufficient to subdue the rebels. He consigned two hundred and fifty carabines (carabinas) and muskets (fusiles) and two hundred kilos (quintales) of powder to Garcfa. He also ordered the Jesuit fathers provincial and su­ perior to supply as many fully armed and provisioned Indian soldiers as

Baltasar thought necessary. In addition, Zavala instructed the lieutenant governor of Corrientes to raise at least two hundred Spanish soldiers from the local militia to lead the attack. Since Zavala again had to stop all commerce and travel to Paraguay, it seems likely that the order which he issued to this effect the previous year, had not been absolutely obeyed.

Although Zavala's true purpose was to obey the viceroy's order to restore

Reyes, his public announcement was that Garcia Ros would become the new gov- ernor of Paraguay. 71

In June, 1724, when Baltasar arrived in the reduction of Yapeyu, he asked the Jesuit officials for two thousand Guaranf soldiers who were to meet him at the Tebicuary River on August 1. There he hoped to join forces with the soldiers from Corrientes. He finally reached the Jesuit reduction

22■■ ■■ . Ibid., 172-174; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 135-138; AGI, Charcas, Le­ gajo 158. Consulta del Consejo de Indias a S.,., Madrid, May 19, 1721; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 159. Consulta del Consejo de Camara de las Indias?. Madrid, December 11, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta de don Fray Joseph de Palos, Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay, â S.M., Asuncion, July 6 , 1726.

23 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Decreto de don Bruno de Zavala, Buenos Aires, May 4, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Zavala al R. P. Pablo Benitez, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Zavala al R.P. Luis de la Roca, April 12, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Auto proveido por don Bruno de Zavala, Buenos Aires, April 16, 1724. 103 of Nuestra Senora de Fe on the left bank of the Tebicuary on August 4 and found the army from the missions already waiting for them. This

Jesuit force was led by the Jesuit FathersFolicarpo Dufo and Father Antonio de Rivera. Awaiting the arrival of the two hundred correntinos and also

the soldiers he had requested from the Paraguayan town of Villa Rica del

Espfritu Santo, Baltasar lingered at his camp site along the Tebicuary for three weeks.While he waited, the Paraguayans prepared.

24 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Exhorto de don Baltasar Garcia Ros al Padre Provincial Luis de la Roca de la Compania de Jesus, Yapeyu, June 20, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Exhorto de don Baltasar Garcia Ros al Padre Superior de las Missiones Thomas Rosa, Yapeyu, June 20, 1724. VII

ANTEQUERA: HOUR OF TRIUMPH

In July, 1724, the inhabitants of Asuncion had become both confused and disturbed. They learned that Garcfa Ros intended to force himself upon them as temporary governor and then restore Diego de los Reyes permanently to the office. Their unrest soon gave way to cries of alarm over the Indian army which was threatening them. As they grasped the realities of the situation, they were outraged that authorities in Madrid and Lima were so callous and unsympathetic to their many fervent declarations opposing Reyes' reappoint­ ment. Finally, they decided to defy the authorities and to thwart Garcfa

Ros' mission, even if it meant war.

The Paraguayans had ample notice of Garcfa Ros' intentions. As­ suming that pacifying the province would be an easy task, Baltasar made no effort to conceal his preparations. He ignored warnings from reliable sources in Asuncion that the Paraguayans would resist if he led an army into Para­ guay, concluding that a show of force would very likely cool the tempers of the hotheads in the city. If not, he thought, his force could subdue what­ ever rabble army the Paraguayans might muster.^ This was a serious miscalcu­ lation.

Antequera, "Memorial," 214-215; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Rector Pablo Restivo de la Compania de Jesus a don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Asuncion, January 7, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta de fray Juan de Garay Prior de Santo Domingo, al Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay don Fray Joseph de Palos, Asuncion, July 27, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta respuesta de Fray Joseph de Palos al Prior de Santo Domingo Juan de Garay, Santa Ana, August 6 , 1724. 104 105 The caldron started to bubble when the few Reyes sympathizers remaining in Asuncion boasted that their leader was about to be vindicated.

The situation became ominous after Antequera's soldiers intercepted letters describing the exact nature of Garcfa Ros' commission and was intensified after Father Pablo Restivo, rector of the Jesuit college in the provincial capital, confirmed this information. Restivo admitted to Maestre de Campo and a leading antequerista, that the contents of the stolen letters were indeed accurate. Restivo also voluntarily reported that the army which

Garcia Ros was assembling at the Tebicuary River would include two thou­ sand Indians from the reductions and a small detachment of Spaniards from

Buenos Aires, one hundred Paraguayans who were still loyal to the viceroy, and two hundred soldiers from Corrientes. The antequeristas then learned that the royal officials in Corrientes, acting on an order from Governor

Zavala, had made a prisoner of the Procurador General of Asuncion, Julian

Guerrero, a supporter of Antequera. This treacherous act, they said, was a direct affront to their honor. At the beginning of 1724, Antequera had sent two hundred Paraguayan soldiers, led by Guerrero, to help the gover­ nor of Buenos Aires dislodge the Portuguese intruders from Montevideo. The governor, Bruno de Zavala, though, had shown his ingratitude by having Guer- rero incarcerated before he could return to Paraguay.^

At a meeting of the Asuncion cabildo on July 22, 1724, presided over by the governor, Antequera and his most devoted followers, Miguel de

Antequera, "Memorial," 206-207; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto de don Joseph de Antequera y Castro, Governador y Capitan General del Paraguay, Asuncion, July 21, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. De- claracion del Capitan Julian Guerrero, Procurador General de la Asuncion, Corrientes, September 5, 1724. 106 Garay, Juan de Mena, Jose de Urrunaga, and Antonio Ruf% decArellano, decided to call together the province's leading citizens in a cabildo abierto^ in ordet to insure the support of those Paraguayans already sympathetic to their cause and, more important, to rally the fainthearted and uncommitted.^ Juan de

Orrego y Mendoza, Juan Caballero de /uiasco, and Martfn de Chavarri, also mem­ bers of the town council, concurred in the decision to convene a cabildo abi- erto; but the last two later testified that they agreed to this decision and to the other acts of the cabildo leading to the battle against Garcfa Ros only under duress.^

For the next two days, Garay, Mena, Urrunaga, and Ruiz de Arellano worked assiduously to ensure that the men whom they had invited to the cabildo abierto would be in a hostile frame of mind and highly charged emotional state when the meeting convened. Proselyting the capital's leading citizens, the regidores recalled the dark days of Reyes' government and pictured a bleak fu­ ture if don Diego were returned to office. They said that Garcfa Ros was a tool of the Reyes-Jesuit party and that he would be Reyes' puppet if he became governor. In any event, Baltasar had always been an ally of tie Jesuits. The antequeristas reminded the people of Paraguay that when Garcfa Ros governed

The cabildo abierto was an extraordinary assembly which was convened in­ frequently and only for a specific purpose. It might be attended only by those people who were invited.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto de acuerdo del Cabildo, Justicia y Rexi- miento de la Asuncion, Asuncion, July 22, 1724.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Exclamacion hecha por el Regidor Capitan Juan Caballero de Anasco proprietario de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay, ante el Obispo fray Joseph de Palos, Asuncion, October 16, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Carta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay fray Joseph de Palos a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncion, September 9, 1725, the province nearly two decades earlier, he had disobeyed a royal c^dula awarding the annual services of three hundred mitayos from the Jesuit reduc­ tions to several Paraguayan encomenderos. His only reason for having done so was his desire to satisfy the Jesuits. Moreover, this same Garcfa Ros had just finished returning to the Reyes family those goods which the=Governor of

Paraguay, in his capacity as juez pesquisidor. had ordered the royal officials in Santa Fe to confiscate,^

When the cabildo abierto met outside Antequera's quarters on July

24, its members were under the absolute sway of the governor's supporters.

Since further exhortation was unnecessary, Antequera withdrew after greeting the vecinos. He and his subordinates wanted the assemblage to believe it had reached its decisions without coercion or influence by the governor. The mem­ bers of the cabildo abierto swore to fight to the death to defend their home­ land, their king, and their families. They would never, they vowed, accept

Garcfa Ros or Reyes as their governor, nor would they ever again follow any ad­ vocate for the Company of Jesus, When Antequera returned to the meeting, he was asked to proceed in accord with the regular cabildo to take whatever steps were necessary to implement the decision of the cabildo abierto.^

On August 6, news reached Asuncion that Garcfa Ros had just arrived at the passing-point of the Tebicuary River, The next day Antequera met with the cabildo to decide upon an immediate course of action, to list the Para­ guayans' grievances against the Jesuits and the Company's pawns, and explain why the people of Paraguay were forced to assemble themselves into an army and

Antequera, "Memorial," 208; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 130, 145-148,

Ibidit Antequera, "Memorial," 215; AGI, Cuarcas, Legajo 324, Auto de acuerdo del Governador y todos los demas ofiziales de la provincia del Paraguay, Asuncion, July 24, 1724, 108 take the field. This accord, signed by Garay, Mena, Caballero de A“Kasco,

Urrunaga, Orrego, and Ru^z de Arellano, directed all the military forces of

Asuncion, all soldiers guarding the rivers and other access routes to the province, and all those stationed on the frontiers on guard against Indian attack to form a unified command under the leadership of Captain-General

Antequera. This Paraguayan army was to find the invading force and destroy it in defense of "King, Codm Law and Country." This, they said, was the judgement reached by the cabildo abierto on July 24, and its decision must be carried out.®

The cabildo charged that it was not the Paraguayan but the Jesuits who had caused the present conflict. The current threat from Garcia Ros was only one of a long series of attempts by the members of the Company to destroy the civil province of Paraguay. Since their arrival in the province, over one hundred years earlier, the Jesuits had continually tried to enslave the

Paraguayans, frequently with threats and occasionally by force of arms. The

"missionaries" had usurped whatever profits the province yielded. While the

Paraguayans worked, they remained impoverished. The missions took the profits and the Company prospered. For over a century, the Jesuits had carefully acquired the best lands of the province, in most cases without a just title, and then they expelled the vecinos who had formerly occupied them. They had never allowed any Paraguayan to work the Company's lands nor even to enter the mission province. The Jesuits had not allowed the Paraguayans to cultivate

their land or exploit their verbales when the inhabitants of the civil prov­ ince were economically distressed. Despite the Company's claim that its mem­

bers had obeyed the Laws of the Indies and had tried to work with governors of

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto capitular de acuerdo del Cabildo, Justicia y Regimento de la ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay, Asun­ cion, August 7, 1724. 109 Paraguay, there had been only a very few gubernatorial visitations of the

reductions in a hundred years. Because the Jesuits had virtually sealed off

the reductions and because their monopoly of commercial traffic in the Plata

region was almost absolute, Paraguayan travelers and merchants were condemned

to traversing terrible swamps and dense forests.^

The Paraguayans always had struggled to pay the customary taxes re­

quired by the crown, but the missions were totally free from these exactions.

Their exemptions from royal tribute were a scandal and a burden on the royal

treasury. Moreover, it appeared as if they refused to recognize the Real

Patronato. Their Indian charges never recognized the authority of the king

or his legally appointed representatives but only that of their clerical

masters,

On the few occasions the Jesuits had allowed governors of Paraguay

to conduct visitations of the missions, they had assumed that each visiting

official to be an ally. Two or three visiting governors had been initially

intractable, but the Jesuits withheld food and shelter from them until they

agreed to write a favorable report. Other civil and religious officials who

had visited the missions saw only what the Jesuits wanted them to see. If a

governor of Paraguay proved uncooperative, the Jesuits conspired to bring

about his removal. Since matters of criminal justice arising from offenses

committed in the missions never came before the officials in Asuncion, the

Indians were able to commit horrendous, untold crimes against the inhabitants

of the civil province,

9 Ibid,

10 Ibid,

11 Ibid, , 110 Now, the cabildo said, the objective of the army led by Garcia Ros

and Fathers Dufo and Rivera was to subjugate the Paraguayans and to acquire

the best lands around Asuncion. This was more than men of honor could toler-

ate. The people of Paraguay must fight. 12

On the same day, August 7, the members of the Asuncion cabildo

issued a second declaration and carried it out by force of arms. They said

that since the Jesuits and their Indians threatened the destruction of Para­

guay, the Jesuits residing in Asuncion must leave the city. Because they were in league with the invaders, they must depart within three hours so that

they could neither cause further disturbances nor subvert the people of the

city. When the secretary of the cabildo, Juan Ortiz de Vergara, presented Fa -

ther Pablo Restivo with this order, Restivo said that expelling the faculty

and staff of the Jesuit college from the city would be a violation of their

ecclesiastical immunity from prosecution by civil officials. Because the king

had granted this immunity, Restivo protested, he and his subordinates could

not leave without a specific order from the king. As these negotiations were

going on, however, Jose de Urrunaga and Antonio Rufz de Arellano deployed foot

soldiers, cavalry, and cannon around the college. Deciding that further pro­

testations would not only be futile but also dangerous, Restivo led Fathers

Antonio Legote, Leandro de Armas, Hilario Vrfsquez, Jose Pascual de Echagüe,

Francisco Lopez, and Faustino Orrea out of the city. The Jesuits were to re­

main exiles from their college in Asuncion for more than three years.

Antequera then roused the people of Paraguay to fever pitch by

12 Ibid.

13 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto segundo del Cabildo, Justicia y Regi- miento de la Ciudad de la Asuncion del Paraguay, Asuncion, August 7, 1724; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 148-165. Ill publishing an edict stating that Garcia Ros had promised to award his Indian troops the best lands of Paraguay and had given them permission to violate

Paraguayan women. He then led his army, now numbering three thousand creoles,

Indians, Negroes, and mulattoes, out of Asuncion on the night of August 8, 1724.

Four days later he came face to face with Garcia Ros' army still encamped at the Tebicuary River. Baltasar had penetrated no farther than this because, after crossing the river on August 5, he had encountered the opposition of an advance guard of two hundred men led by RamGn de las Lianas and had withdrawn to the south bank of the river. When the two commanders saw the opposing ar­ mies, they ordered their artillery to fire, but the result was inconclusive.

The gunners were able to kill only one horse. Deciding that further artillery exchanges would only waste powder, the two armies settled down to a thirteen- day war of nerves.

Antequera was searching for a weak spot in his adversary's army and sent out patrols to discover where it was most vulnerable. Garcfa Ros was awaiting the arrival of the two hundred soldiers from Corrientes, who might turn the tide in his favor, since the Guaranfs from the reductions fought well only when Spanish troops were properly deployed at strategic posi­ tions. Feeling the need for reinforcements, on August 14, he requested four hundred more Spanish troops.For the next ten days, Antequera and Garcfa

14 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del P. Pablo Restivo al P. Superior Thomas de Rosa, escrita desde el camino que va del Paraguay a los Doc- trinas de la Compania de Jesus, September 28, 1724; Antequera, "Res­ puesta," 88-90; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 165-169.

15 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Billete de don Baltasar Garcfa Ros al Sargento Mayor de Tobati Felix de Urquizola, Tebicuary, August 14, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de don Miguel de Garay, don Ramon de las Lianas, don Juan de Mena y don Antonio Ruiz de Arellano a la Audiencia de la Plata, November 13, 1724. 112 Ros exchanged communiques. Each charged that the other was the sole cause

of the unrest in Paraguay, and each demanded that his rival immediately leave

the province.

Although Fathers Dufo and Rivera commanded their Indian troops,

final authority was vested in Garcfa Ros, who had the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the various detachments and deciding when and how to commit them to battle. Dufo, River, and other Jesuits warned him

that the Indians would become restless and bored during a protracted wait and that they would grow weary of the deprivations suffered by an army in

the field. The Jesuits cautioned that they might desert or even defect to

the enemy and that the Indians would surely find ways to amuse themselves which would damage military discipline. Although this was sound advice,

Garcfa Ros ignored it. He had acquitted himself well in several past bat­

tles against frontier Indians and against the Portuguese at Colonia, but on

those occasions he had been a subordinate officer. Basically he was an in­

ept commander. The assumptions on which he proceeded and the crucial deci­

sions that he made, including his judgements that the Paraguayan army could

easily be defeated, that there would be mass defections from Antequera,

that he would need an army of only two thousand men, and that he should await the correntinos, resulted in disaster. When Antequera finally at­

tacked, Garcfa Ros had not even distributed his; supply of arms and munitions

to his troops.

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Relacion de don Juan Ortiz de Vergara, escribano publico de la Asuncion, Tebicuary, August 14, 1724.

17 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Declaracion de don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Governador y Capitan General del Paraguay y Juez para el cumplimi­ ento de diferentes hordenes del Excmo. Sr. Virrey, Corrientes, 113 On the evening of August 24, a number of Guaranf soldiers, bored

with the routine, anxious for diversion, and curious about the nature and

extent of Antequera's army, drew near to the Paraguayans' sentry line and

immediately were taken prisoner. But Antequera, convinced that they could

provide him with an advantage, ordered his soldiers to treat them courteously.

He received the Indians in his tent and informed tham that the following day

would be one of universal rejoicing by all the king's subjects. It was, he

said, the birthday of both King Louis I (who reigned briefly in 1724) and

of Saint Louis, whose name the king bore. He then ordered the Indians re­

leased, -and they returned to Garcfa Ros' camp. Nest Antequera ordered his

lieutenants to prepare an attack for the next day.^®

Late the following morning, prompted by Antequera's ploy, many of

Baltasar's Indians began to prepare a celebration in honor of the king with­

out informing their commander; others bathed and swam in the river. Seeing

that his plan worked, Antequera ordered his soldiers to. advance slowly toward

the opposing army, so that the Indians would not become suspicious and

sound the alarm. The guileless Guaranis thus remained oblivious to the

Paraguayans' true purpose until it was too late. 19

September 1, 3-724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del ’. Francisco Robles al P. Antonio Rivera, Santa Rosa, August 16, 1724 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del P. Francisco Robles al P. Antonio Rivera, Santa Rosa, August 19, 1724.

18 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declaracion de . . . Garcia Ri )s . . . Cor- rientes, September 1, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. !raslado del Auto del Cabildo de la Asuncion, Tebicuary, August 25, 1 '25; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 191.

19 Ibid. 114 As the Paraguayans drew near to his camp site about noon, Garcfa

Ros was in his tent dining with his chaplain, Clemente Quinones, and Fa­ thers Dufo and Rivera. Suddenly, the Paraguayan cavalry charged, and the battle was joined. Garcia Ros, with Qui*nones at his side, rushed to his horse. He tried briefly to rally his army, but it was clear that the tide was running in favor of the antequeristas on all flanks. So Garcia Ros and Quinones galloped away from the scene of the battle to the mission of

San Ignacio. Riding toward Corrientes the next day (August 26), they came upon the two hundred Spanish soldiers from Corrientes upon whom Garcia Ros had originally pinned his hopes for victory.^0

Like Garcfa Ros, Fathers Dufo and Rivera withdrew when they saw the Paraguayan onslaught, but they quickly returned to try to rally their troops and to succor the wounded. Some Indians bravely tried to resist the attack, and three hundred were killed in the attempt. Others fled to safety. Many of the Guaranis and their leaders, Dufo and Rivera, were taken prisoner. Two Spaniards, including Teodosio de Villalba, who had joined Garcfa Ros with a small contingent from Villa Rica, were also killed.

Only twenty-six Paraguayans lost their lives. The prisoners were sent back to Asuncion where the Indians were given to several encomenderos. Dufo and

Rivera were sent to the ecclesiastical cabildo of Asuncion to determine, if they were in fact the priests they claimed to be. The Paraguayans seized all of Garcfa Ros' correspondence, including the viceroy's order to restore

20 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Declaracion de don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Corrientes, September 2, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Memorial de don Baltasar Garcia Ros, Corrientes, September 6, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Memoria del Lcdo. don Clemente Quinones, Corri­ entes, September 6, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Declaracion del P. Policarpo Dufo ante Thomas Zorilla del Valle, Notario, Asuncion, August 30, 1724. 115 Reyes to office and captured most of his army's livestock, provisions, one hundred and eighty-two muskets, fffty carbines, two hundred-weights of powder, and four hundred-weights of cannon balls.

Not content merely with routing Garcia Ros' army, Antequera led his forces toward the territory surrounding the reductions of Nuestra Sëîfora de Fe, Santa Rosa, San Ignacio, and Santiago to warn the Jesuits and their neophytes not to attempt such folly in the future. He ordered the officials of each of the four towns to send him enough Indians in encomianda to pay for his army's expenses. In the past, he said, the officials of the towns had disobeyed the explicit orders that Antequera had given them two years earlier and had refused to recognize his authority. Now they must pay for their disloyalty. They must learn to obey the orders of the Governor of

Paraguay. Antequera's decision to journey to the missions, however, was probably more a result of the fact that it would have been unwise for him to allow the Paraguayan encomenderos' demands for more Indian laborers to go unfulfilled than his wish to establish the hegemony of the civil

21 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del P. Superior de las Misiones del Parana y Uruguay Thomas Rosa al Governador do Buenos Aires don Bruno Mauricio de Zavala, Corrientes, September 8, 1724; AGI, Char­ cas, Legajo 374. Carta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay Fray Jo­ seph de Palos a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asuncion, November 4, 1724; Astraxn, Historia de la Companfa de Jesus. VII, 529-530.

22 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto proveydo por don Joseph de Antequera, Governador actual y Capitan General del Paraguay, Inmediato del Pueblo de Indios Nuestra Se%ora de Fe, August 31, 1724; AGI, Char­ cas, Legajo 324. Auto del Gobernador del Paraguay Joseph de Antequera, Santa Rosa, September 3, 1724; AGI Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto pro­ veydo por el Gobernador del Paraguay don Joseph de Antequera y el Cabildo della Asuncion, Nuestra Senora de Fe, September 4, 1724; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 252-261. 116 government over the missions.

On September 4, 1724, Antequera departed for Asuncion at the head of his victorious army. This was his moment of t r i u m p h .

23 Ibid. VIII

ANTEQUERA: HIS DOWNFALL

Antequera's moment of triumph in September, 1724, was also the beginning of his downfall. His supporters in Paraguay and elsewhere were beginning to desert him. The members of the cabildo began to lose confi­ dence in him after he reluctantly showed them the viceregal dispatches captured from Garcia Ros indicating the powerful forces opposing Antequera.

The new Bishop of Paraguay, Jose de Palos, was on his way to Asuncion to convince all but the most devoted antequeristas that their leader had out­ lived his usefulness. The Audiencia of Charcas was no longer able to give any further support to a man who had expelled the Jesuits from their col­ lege, fought an army sent by the Viceroy of Peru, and taken two Jesuit priests prisoners. When,, in November, 1724, the members of the cabildo learned that the newly installed viceroy of Peru was demanding Antequera's recall, the latter's claim to be the legal governor of Paraguay was no longer viable. He remained in Asuncion for another four months, but he was merely marking time.

The man who was to determine the fate of Jose de Antequera in 1725 and 1726 and ultimately the lives and careers of Antequera's Paraguayan fol­ lowers was Jose de Armend^riz, the Marqu/s de Castelfuerte, who arrived in

Lima from Spain to replace Diego Morcillo as viceroy of Peru on May 14,

1724. A crusty old soldier and a stern disciplinarian, the new viceroy approached the disputes in his jurisdiction as if they were questions of military justice. Castelfuerte's primary concerns were to restore order 117 118 in Paraguay and to reestablish respect for viceregal authority. Viewing the disturbances in Paraguay, he concluded that his first obligation was to cause Antequera's immediate removal from Asuncion and then to make an example of him by imprisoning him in Lima. This, Castelfuerte hoped, would warn the Paraguayans against any further defiance of vice-regal authority.^

In July, 1724, two months after taking office, Castelfuerte is­ sued new instructions for the pacificationsof Paraguay. He specifically commissioned Bruno de Zavala, the governor of Buenos Aires, to put down the rebellion of the antequeristas. Castelfuerte ordered Zavala to con­

script at least a hundred soldiers from Buenos Aires, to raise an army of at least four thousand troops from the Jesuit missions, and to proceed to

Asuncion to compel the rebels to submit to his authority by force of ams.

Zavala must then arrest Antequera, fine ten thousand pesos, and send him to

Lima under a heavy guard. He should also fine each of the alcaldes and the reaidores of Asuncion who had participated in the uprising four thousand pesos. Zavala was then to free Diego de los Reyes from prison, restore him

to Corrientes, the site from which the antequeristas had kidnapped him. Un- 2 der no circumstances should he restore Reyes to the governorship of Paraguay.

Bernard Moses, The Spanish Dependencies in South America. II (New York and London, 1914), p. 281 ff; Sebastian Lorente, Historia del Peru bajo los Borbones, 1700-1821 (Lima, 1821), pp. 34-42; Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil del Paraguay. Buenos-Aires. ^ Tucuman (Buenos Aires, 1816), p. 271; John Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Bourbons (Durham, N.C., 1966), pp. 79-81. See also Jos^ de Armend^ris, Marquis de Castel Fuerte, Relacion del estado de los rey- pos del Peru (Lima, 1736), Vol. Ill of Memorias de los vireyes que han gobernado- el Peru durante el tiempo del Coloniale EspaXol (Lima, 1859), pp. 1-369.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Copia de Carta del Virrey del Peru, Marques de Castelfuerte al Gobernador de Buenos Aires, Lima, July 14, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Traslado del despacho de Joseph de Armenda- ris Marques de Castelfuerte a don Bruno Mauricio de Zavala, Lima, July 18, 1724. 119 Castelfuerte ordered Zavala to be governor of Paraguay while in

the province and delegated to him the authority to appoint a new, long-term

interim governor of his choosing whom he could count on both to continue

the pacification effort and to remain loyal to the authorities in Lima.

Either Zavala or the new interim governor might then cancel the fines of

the guilty regidores if he judged that this would contribute to stability

and effective government in Paraguay. Under no conditions, however, could

he waive Antequera's fine or release him from custody. Castelfuerte had

decided not to restore Reyes to office as the crown had ordered because,

as he later wrote the king, the Paraguayans' opposition to R^yes and his

family had been the most important cause of the antequerista revolt. He

believed that restoring Diego to office would only cause a recurrence of 3 the recent disturbances in Paraguay.

When Zavala received these instructions from the viceroy October

9, 1724, he already favored removing Antequera from the Plata region for

his outrageous treatment of Zavala's lieutenant Baltasar Garcfa Ros. Three

days before receiving the viceroy's orders, don Bruno had written to Cas­

telfuerte describing the debacle that Garcfa Ros had suffered at the Tebi­

cuary. Zavala told him that the antequeristas had sacked the four near-by

Jesuit missions causing the Indians to flee to the hills, where they returned

to a "state of nature," and he requested the viceroy to grant him the au­

thority to proceed against Antequera. Then, in late October, 1724, Zavala wrote Antequera and the Asuncion cabildo. informing them of Castelfuerte's

directives. He assured the Paraguayans , however, that he would not restore

3 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 217. Carta del Virrey Marques de Castel- Fuerte a S.M., Lima, November 1, 1724. 120 Reyes to office and would remove him from the province. Also Zavala promised them that he would then appoint a new interim governor of Para­ guay whose impartiality would be beyond reproach.^

During the nest few days Zavala wrote to the Jesuit provincial,

Lufs de la Roca, the Father Superior of the Jesuit missions of Paraguay, and others enlisting their support for his forthcoming effort. Zavala or­ dered the Company to raise an army of six thousand Guaranfs and to supply them with a full complement of arms and mounts. The Jesuits were to assem­ ble their troops in Candelaria and ship them down the River Parana when

Zavala gave the order.^ Hoping to prevent the escape of his most important quarry, Zavala also ordered his lieutenants in Santa Fe and Corrientes,

Francisco Bracamonte and Geronimo Fernandez, to post a permanent guard of fifty men to prevent Antequera's flight through the environs of the two cities and to make sure that he would not seek refuge in them.^

Zavala's courier to the Paraguayans, Captain Pedro Gribeo, reached

Astrafn, Historia de la Compa&fa de Jesus. 711, 533; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Governador de Buenos Ayres, don Bruno de Za­ vala al Virrey, Marques de Castelfuerte, October 6, 1724; AGI, Char­ cas, Legajo 323. Copia de carta escrita por don Bruno de Zavala al Cabildo de la Asumpcion . . ., annunciandole la orden del Virrey Marques de Castelfuerte de ir a tranquilizar dicha provincia, Buenos Aires, October.23, 1724.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Bruno de Zavala . . . para el P. Thomas de la Rosa de la Compania de Jesus, Buenos Aires, October 23, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Governador de Buenos Ayres . . . al P. Provincial Luis de la Roca de la Compania de Jesus comunicandole la facultad que ha recibido del Virrey para ir a paci- ficar la provincia del Paraguay, Buenos Aires, October 25, 1724.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. El escribano Francisco de Merlo da fee y testimonio de la verdad sobre los auttos de la expedicion al Paraguay de don Bruno de Zavala, Buenos Aires, October 26, 1724. 121 Asuncion with his commander's instructions November 23, 1724, and presented them to the Bishop of Paraguay, Jos^ de Palos, who had arrived in Asuncion the previous month, Palos promptly relayed Zavala's corre­ spondence to Antequera and to Juan Ortiz de Vergara, secretary of the

Asuncion cabildo, who scheduled a meeting of the cabildo three days later.

It was necessary to wait three days before convening the town council in order to allow the cabildantes time to get from their ranches in the coun­ tryside to Asuncion.7

When the cabildo met on November 26, 1724, all its members, ex­ cept one regidor:-Francisco Rojas Aranda, absent because of illness, expressed their earnest desire to comply with Castelfuerte's orders. They said that they recognized Zavala's honesty and appreciated his candor in the present situation. They also said that his decision not to reappoint Reyes or any other advocate of the Company of Jesus would contribute to a peaceful reso­ lution of the current conflict. The Paraguayans would gladly receive Zava­ la's nominee; for a new and truly impartial governor was what they had always wanted. Another consideration which prompted the Paraguayans to express their loyalty to the viceroy and to declare their intention to obey his orders was that Zavala had not expressed a desire to force the return of Restivo and the other Jesuits to their college in Asuncion. An addi­ tional factor persuading them to accept the legitimacy of the new viceregal decrees was, as Antequera later pointed out, the fact that these were the first which had been issued in proper legal form, with the consent of the

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto capitular de los senores del Cauildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la Asuncion, Capitan Miguel de Garay, Maestre de Campo Ramon de las Lianas, Alcaldes ordinaries, Capitan Juan de Mena, Alguazil Mayor, Capitan Juan Cauallero de Anasco, Sargento Mayor Joseph de Urrunaga, Maestre de Campo General Martin de Chavarri y Vallejo, Capitan don Antonio Ruiz de Arellano, regidores, Asuncion, November 26, 1724. ft 122 Audiencia of Lima (rubricados del acuerdo),

The size of Zavala's intended force was probably not the factor which determined the Paraguayans' decision to obey him. The men of Para­ guay decided not to resist him before they learned that his army would num­ ber twice as many soldiers as the one led by Garcfa Ros, although they did ask him to come without an army. Since most of their complaints against the Reyes family and the Asuncion Jesuits had already been met, the Para­ guayans had no further use for Antequera. He was now a liability. When the most powerful men in Paraguay agreed to receive Zavala peaceably, An­ tequera had no choice but to accept their decision.^ Now even Antequera probably did not want to oppose Zavala. He certainly guessed that Bruno would lead an army far superior numerically to the one the Paraguayans defeated in August, 1724, and he believed that Zavala was a much abler leader than Garcfa Ros. For the governor to contest an invading army with­ out strong support from the most influential Paraguayans would be suicidal, and Antequera was no Brutus. Even at the height of his power in 1723 and

1724, he knew that his actions were severely circumscribed by his allies in the cabildo. especially Jos^ de Urrunaga and Antonio Rujfz de Arellano, and the need for a firm base of support was even greater in the period from late November, 1724, through February, 1725. Antequera did ask that Zavala come to Paraguay without an:_army but this does not prove that he wanted to

Ibid.

Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Cabildo de la Asumpcion al Gouernador y Capitan General Bruno Mauricio de Zauala, Asuncion, November 27, 1724; Antequera, "Respuesta,” 213-215. maintain himself in office, as the Jesuits charged,^® His effort to persuade Zavala to come to Asuncion without an army of Guarani’s from the missions was a genuine reflection of the fears of the Paraguayans, in whose recollections the eighteen Paraguayans killed by Jesuit-trained

Indians in the Cardenas affair^^ seventy-five years earlier had multiplied many times over. They were still terrified by the possibility of a simi­ lar manifestation of the wrath of the Jesuits and their charges. After

November, 1724, Antequera's primary concern was to escape from Paraguay and to evade capture long enough to get to La Plata, where he believed the oidores would support his actions and exonerate him.

On December 30, 1724, Bruno Mauricio de Zavala set out from

Buenos Aires to subdue the Paraguayan rebels, apprehend their leader, and put the province at rest under a new governor of his own choosing. As he began his journey, his force consisted of one hundred and fifty soldiers from Buenos Aires, six cannon, and four barges. This was the nucleus of a much larger force. Arriving in Santa Fe in early February, he chose a resident of that city, Martin de Barda, as the new interim governor of

Paraguay. A peninsular Spaniard from Barcelona, Barda was then engaged in the yerba trade with Paraguay and was a man whom the Paraguayans knew would not be a Jesuit puppet. Barda was a business partner of Ramon de las

Lianas, currently an alcalde of Asuncion. Lianas knew that Barda opposed the Company's political and economic activities in the Plata region and

10 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Fray Joseph, Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay al P. confesor de Su Magestad, Asuncion, June 30, 1725; Antequera, "Respuesta," 212-213; Lozano, Révolueiones. I, 287-295.

11 See Chapter I. 124 also that he advocated assumption of control over the Jesuit reductions by the Spanish crown. 19

By early March, 1725, Zavala had joined forces in Corrientes with the six thousand Guaranfs raised by the Jesuits. There he con­ scripted an additional two hundred men and prepared to invade the prov­ ince to the north. As Zavala readied his army for battle, however, events in Asuncion made it unnecessary for him to resort to combat,

Knowing that his time had come and hoping to get to the safe refuge that he anticipated in Chuquisaca, Antequera commandeered three boats and left Asuncion on March 5, 1725, He was accompanied by Juan de la Mena, Sebastian Fernandez Montiel, Alonso Gonzalez de Guzman, Miguel

Lopez Duarte, Francisco Moringo, Diego de Yegros, and Antonio hSpez Car- vallo, Antequera conscripted forty Indian rowers for the three barges, and, he took several porters to carry his personal goods and also the official records of his term in office, which the now ex-governor believed would prove his innocence. The departure of Antequera and his most loyal

followers was a major contribution to the later success of Bruno de Zavala's mission,

12 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323, Carta de don Bruno de Zabala, Gouernador de Buenos Aires a don Antonio Sope%a, Buenos Aires, December 12, 1724; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 214, Carta del Gobernador de Buenos Ayres don Bruno de Zavala a don Francisco de Arana. Buenos Aires, December 14, 1724; Lozano, Revbluciones, I, 297-298,

13 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324, Carta del Governador de Buenos Aires al Virrey Marques de Castelfuerte, Corrientes, March 28, 1725; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 297-298,

14 Ibid,; 311-314; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 481, Carta del Obispo coadju­ tor del Paraguay don Fray Joseph de Palos a S.M,, Asuncion, May 25, 1725; Antequera, "Respuesta," 219; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324, El Gobernador de Buenos Aires don Bruno de Zabala représenta al Virrey tocante a la pacificasion del Paraguay, Buenos Aires, October 29, 1725; Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil del Paraguay, Buenos Ayres 2 Tucuman, II, (Buenos Aires, 1816), pp, 273-308, 125 Antequera and hie party first sailed south almost to Corrientes, where the guards which Zavala had posted nearly thwarted their escape. But they avoided capture by hiding on the west side of one of the many islands situated just north of the confluence of the Parana and Paraguay rivers and then sailed past Corrientes that night. After several days they reached a sight ten leagues north of Santa Fe. There they sent their boats and rowers back to Asuncion and began a circuitous overland journey toifard

Chuquisaca.15

A serious blow to Antequera's plans to reach the safety of Chu­ quisaca occurred some two weeks later. Riding along the bank of the River

Segundo, he and his men approached the outskirts of Cc^rdoba, the most prosperous city of the northwestern Rio de la Plata and the seat of the famous Jesuit University of Cordoba. The party of fugitives, now travel­ ling in carts acquired along the way, heard the distant clamor of several hundred men advancing upon them with obviously hostile intent. Members of the militia of Cordoba, they had specific orders to patrol the countryside in order to intercept Antequera and arrest or kill him. Jesuits from the

University of Cordoba had supplied the force with horses and weapons, prom­ ised a reward of five hundred pesos to whoever killed Antequera (but not to the man who merely arrested him), and guaranteed that the successful assassin would remain anonymous. Warned by the noise of their would-be captors' horses, Antequera and his friends took a desperate chance by jumping into the river and swimming to the safety of the opposite bank.

In the process, however, Antequera lost all of his personal correspondence from the past five years and a great many official documents which, he

15 Ibid.; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 313-314. 126 imagined, would prove his innocence. The pursuers, afraid of drowning and unwilling to hazard the same risk merely for money, remained on the oppo­ site bank.lG

Antequera said that the Cordobans were reluctant to pursue him partly because they sympathized with the plight of a man unjustly perse­ cuted by the Jesuits. This sympathy, he believed, had caused them to make an excessive amount of noise to warn him of their presence in time for him and his followers to escape. He also said that his escape was a miraculous event which Providence had ordained. Describing his deliver­ ance from his enemies, he wrote, " . . . with unwavering faith, I threw myself into it [the River Segundo], putting myself in the hands of God, and I forded it without getting wet and without even getting the soles of my feet damp."^^ It would seem that the man who boasted that he taught the Indians of Paraguay to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's could also walk on water— or rather above the water.

Hastening away from the River Segundo, Antequera led his fol­ lowers into the city of Cordoba that night using the protection of dark­ ness to avoid being apprehended. At three o'clock in the morning, April

7, 1725, the harried party reached the Franciscan monastery of Cordoba where they obtained refuge.^®

16 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Memorial de don Juan de Mena, Procurador General de la Asumpcion del Paraguai dirigida al Excmo. Sr. Virrey del Peru y la Real Audiencia de los Reyes, Lima, 1727; Antequera, "Respuesta," 219-220, 251-252; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 340-341.

17 Antequera, "Respuesta," 251-252.

18 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Petizion hecha por el Ldo. Fran­ cisco Xavier de Therrazas a la Real Audiencia de la Platta en nombre del Doctor don Joseph de Antequera, Plata, May 17, 1725. 127 As Antequera was desperately trying to get to Chuquisaca, Bruno de Zavala was carrying out the terms of Castelfuerte's commission. On

March 19, Zavala, although still prepared to contest any force the Para­ guayans might throw against him, received word of Antequera's departure from Asuncion, which the Asuncion cabildo had sent less than an hour after the antequeristas embarked. This news finally convinced Zavala that he would not have to use force to discharge his obligations. Only after he learned that Antequera had fled Paraguay did Zavala stop doubting the

Paraguayans' protestations of their loyalty to the viceroy and willingness to receive his emissary amicably. Now he came to view sympathetically the entreaties from the Asuncion cabildo and Bishop Palos asking him to leave his army behind and enter Asuncion with only a task force. Although ha had received these pleas previously in February, he then suspected that

Antequera had initiated them to keep himself in power. But when Zavala learned that Antequera was no longer able personally to incite the Para­ guayans to further acts of rebellion, he concluded that he could best solve the Paraguayansproblem by proving to the Paraguayans that he bore them-ho ill-will.

Like most other contemporary observers of the Paraguayan rebel­ lion led by Jos^ de Antequera (with the notable exception of Matfas Angles y Gortari), Zavala at first overestimated the importance of Antequera's

19 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Governador de Buenos Aires al Virrey Marques de Castelfuerte, Corrientes, March 28, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. El Gobernador de Buenos Aires don Bruno de Zabala représenta al Virrey tocante a la pacificasion del Paraguay, Buenos Aires, October 29, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 374. Exhorto del Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la Asumpcion del Paraguay al fray Joseph de Palos, Obispo de este Obispado, Asuncion, January 23, 1725. oc\ 128 role in it. ^ He did not, however, make the mistake of underestimating how intensely the Paraguayans hated the Jesuits, their Indian charges, and their reductions in the Plata region. Thus Zavala wisely decided to leave his Indian troops at the Tebicuary river and journey to Asuncion with only a few Spanish soldiers. As he later informed Viceroy Castelfuerte, the

Guaranfs from the Jesuit missions did not respond to discipline under any

Spanish officer other than a Jesuit. Because they were not unaccustomed to an occasional foray of looting and pillaging against Paraguayan settle­ ments, they would have provoked the people of Paraguay, who were by now eager for peace, resigned to cooperating with Zavala, and looking forward to Bari^a's governorship. Moreover, Zavala said that as few as three thou­ sand dedicated Paraguayans, who were the best soldiers in the kingdom of

Peru, could defeat his six thousand Guaranis with little difficulty.

On April 29, 1725, Bruno de Zavala entered Asuncion and the city's lay and clerical officials welcomed him with a public festival and a formal reception. After the ceremonies were over, Zavala prepared to carry out the terms of his commission. On May 2, he gave the viceroy's dispatches to the first alcalde of Asuncion, Ram^n de las Lianas, who had them read at a meeting of the cabildo the same day. Again the cabildantes swore their allegiance to the viceroy and promised to uphold Zavala's

20 Angles y Gortari, "Informe,"; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de don Bruno de Zabala al Virrey, Marques de Castelfuerte, Buenos Aires, October 6, 1723; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Mandato de don Bruno de Zauala Cauallero del horden de Calatrava, Mariscal de Campo de los Reales Exerzitos de Su Mag.d. y su Governador y Capitan General de estas Probincias del rrio de la Plata, October 9, 1724.

21 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. El gobernador de Buenos Aires don Bruno de Zabala represents al Virrey , . . , Buenos Aires, October 29, 1725. actions and to assist him In any way they c o u l d . 129

Zavala had been In Asuncion only a few days when he decided that he could put only some of the viceroy's orders Into effect. He would have to Ignore those which the Paraguayans hated the most, he said, because the major cause of the recent rebellion, the Paraguayans' antipathy for the

Reyes-Jesuit party, was still the most potent political force In the prov­ ince. As a gesture to Paraguayan sentiment, Zavala let Diego de los Reyes remain In prison for four days after his first meeting with the cabildo.

Then, on May 6, he ordered Reyes' release and caused his Immediate removal to Santa Fe. With the air still charged with anger and resentment against the Company, Zavala declined to restore the Jesuits to their college In

Asuncion or to their ranches near the city, even refusing to let Individual

Jesuits re-enter the provincial capital. Another of Zavala's attempts to provide an enduring peace In Paraguay was his waiver of the four thousand peso fine against the alcaldes and regidores who had supported Antequera.

Their cooperation with him In Aprll-June, 1725, Zavala said, was sufficient proof of their rectitude. He also maintained that their harmonious rela­ tions with him were an Indication of how arbitrary and tyrannical Antequera's government had been, although Zavala's actions Indicate that he was well aware that Paraguayan creoles had been more Influential than Antequera In the decisions reached and actions taken In Paraguay during the past five years. Appeasing the cabildantes. therefore, was an astute approach to the problem. Imposing a burdensome fine on the leaders of the province would likely have led to retaliation, thus destroying Zavala's carefully constructed

22 Ibid. 23 130 settlement.

On June 25, 1725, Zavala formally invested Martin de Barda with the governorship of Paraguay, which concluded don Bruno's duties in Para­ guay, With his mission at least a qualified success, he began the long journey back to Buenos Aires on June 29, 1725.24

While Zavala was in Asuncion, José de Antequera was frantically trying to reach Chuquisaca. He still hoped that his former colleagues, the members of the Audiencia of Charcas, would support the actions of their appointee and protect him from prosecution. From the Franciscan monastery in Cdrdoba, Antequera sent Sebastian Fernandez Montiel and two others to

Chuquisaca to plead his case at the Audiencia. Arriving in Chuquisaca, however, Montiel encountered so many soldiers patrolling the streets on

Viceroy Castelfuerte's orders to seize and imprison the fugitive anteque­ ristas. that he had to take refuge in a Dominican monastery.25

Montiel was still able to secure vital information and relay it to Antequera. Bribing a royal courier, Sebastién obtained copies of sev­ eral of Castelfuerte's decrees; these left no doubt that the:viceroy was

23 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 205. Carta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay frai Joseph de Palos a la Real Audiencia de la Plata, Asun­ cion, May 25, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto proveydo en la Asumpzion por don Bruno Maurizio de Zauala, Asuncion, June 25, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 222. Carta del Cabildo . . . de la Asuncion del Paraguay a Su Magestad, Asuncion, September 17, 1726.

24 Ibid.

25 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Petizion . . . a la Real Audiencia de la Platta en nombre del Doctor don Joseph de Antequera, Plata, May 17, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Petizion de don Sebastian Fernan­ dez Montiel, Maestre de Campo General de la provincia del Paraguay y refugiado en el Convento de Sto. Domingo en la ciudad de la Platta a la Rl. Audiencia de los Charcas, Plata, May 18, 1725. 131 resolutely determined to solve the Paraguayan problem by imprisoning

Antequera to make an example of him. Montiel also got a copy of a provision from the Audiencia of Charcas in which the oidores repudiated Antequera. The judges opposed Antequera for having led an array against Garcfa Ros. But, they said, his expulsion of the Jesuits from Asuncion and his arrest and manhandling of Fathers Dufo and Rivera were unpardonable, possibly treason­ ous acts, and no one could defend the perpetrator of such outrages in good conscience. After sending this news to Antequera, Montiel prepared for a long stay at his refuge.26

By the time Antequera heard from Montiel, Captain Ignacio Ledesma

Cavallos had ringed the Franciscan monastery in Cordoba with a heavy guard of soldiers. In addition, Ledesma Cavallos proclaimed a four thousand peso reward, offered by Castelfuerte, for Antequera's head. This news might have caused even the fainthearted to dream of getting close enough to An­ tequera to kill him, and it did frustrate the negotiations Antequera was conducting with Antonio Arrazcaeta, commander of the crown forces in Cor­ doba, and Isidro Ortiz, the bailiff of Chuquisaca, to arrange free transit to Charcas for him and his companions.^7

Now the antequeristas* hopes of being exonerated by the Audiencia of Charcas began to dissolve. Two of Antequera's followers, his personal secretary Antonio L^pez Carvallo and Diego de Yegros, became so discouraged that they deserted their onetime governor. Hoping to atone for their part in the rebellion, they denounced him to the authorities, maintaining that

26 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Real Provision con fuerza de so- brecarta de la Real Audiencia de la Platta, Plata, February 26, 1725; Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 346.

27 Ibid.. 342-344, 350-355. 132 they had followed him only after he threatened to separate them from their lives and their property. The authorities accepted the testimony of Yegros and Carvallo even though their duplicity was as transparent as their men­ dacity.^®

With Paraguay in a state of relative tranquility, most royal officials in Peru were now reluctant to punish former rebels who renounced

Antequera's leadership, because they assumed that the Paraguayans could cause no further trouble without Antequera to lead them. This commonly- held assumption was based on a failure to comprehend fully the passions which had caused the Paraguayans to rebel and an incorrect judgement of An­ tequera' s part in it. It led to the dangerous conclusion that punishing a few unrepentant rebels would be a warning to the Paraguayans, sufficient to prevent them from any new defiance of viceregal authority. Therefore, the viceroy reasoned, Antequera and the four Paraguayans who were still loy­ al to him personally and who resolutely maintained that their behavior had been upright, legal, and just (Mena, Gonzalez, Moringo, and L^pez Duarte) must be punished for defying royal and viceregal authority, to set an ex­ ample not only for the Paraguayans but also for all other malcontents throughout the realm. 2 Û

Despite his knowledge that all the authorities in the viceroyalty of Peru were solidly united against the five fugitives from Paraguay, A - tequera still wished to go to Chuquisaca. He believed that circumstances in Paraguay fully justified his behavior and that he himself could convince his superiors of his loyalty and innocence. Having already avoided arrest

28 Ibid.. 346; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de la Real Audiencia de la Plata a S.M., Plata, December 7, 1725.

29 Armendariz, "Relacion," 302-304. 133 for six months, he could have escaped to Brazil, and he likely would have done so had he not been so certain of the justice of his cause. In late

October, 1725, Antequera and his followers disguised themselves, slipped through their guards with the help of Leandro Ponce de Le^n, brother of the dean of the cathedral chapter of Cordoba, and set out for Chuquisaca, just before the outbreak of popular demonstrations by the people of Cdr- doba in favor of "Antequera the Liberator."

Travelling northwest to La Rioja and then north along the Andean

Cordillera, Antequera, Mena, Gonzalez, L^pez Duarte, and Moringo finally reached La Plata, where they gave themselves up to the Audiencia of Charcas on January 9, 1726. A few days later the oidores ordered the prisoners re­ moved to Potosf to prevent them from escaping and to safeguard Antequera from potential assassins motivated by the viceroy's four-thousand peso reward. On February 17 the antequeristas* jailers and guards escorted their charges out of Potosf and set out for Lima. As the party arrived in the

City of Kings, April 16, 1726, crowds of curious onlookers gathered to catch a glimpse of the man who, it was rumored, had proclaimed himself

King Joseph I of Paraguay. Viceroy Castelfuerte then ordered Antequera separated from his companions and placed in the jail of the viceregal court

(circel de corte). Here Jose de Antequera would spend the next five years in relative freedom and modest comfort, proclaiming his innocence and defending his conduct while governor of Paraguay.

30 Antequera, "Respuesta," 231-255; Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 355-357.

31 Ibid.; Armendariz, "Relacion," 304; Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato (Siglb XVIII), 135; Warren, Paraguay, 117. IX

DEATH OF ANTEQUERA

Between April, 1726, and May, 1731, Jose de Antequera was confined to the city of Lima as a prisoner of the viceroy of Peru. During the great­ er part of the five years, he lived in moderate comfort. He devoted these years largely to the preparation of a legal defense of his conduct of the governorship of Paraguay. Neither the strength of his defense nor the mer­ its of his argument, however, played a part in the final disposition of his case. Viceroy Castelfuerte and the Audiencia of Lima rendered their ver­ dict out of pel tical expediency with little regard for Antequera's guilt or innocence.

The Company of Jesus played a large role in the outcome of his case. Hoping, at best, for a sweeping condemnation of Antequera and his

Paraguayan followers, Jesuits in Paraguay, Peru, and Spain worked zealous­ ly to ensure that Antequera not be exonerated.

The choice of a site for the trial was crucial. Antequera him­ self wished to be tried in Spain. He reckoned that lay authorities and many influential clerics in Peru were prejudiced against him by the barrage of allegations made by members of the Company and by Bishop Palos and that he could never gain a sympathetic or even an impartial hearing of his case in

134 135 Peru.l Initially the authorities in the metropolis also wished to hold the trial in Spain. On July 1, 1725, king and council decreed that An­ tequera should be sent to Madrid because his hearing was too important a matter to be left to colonial officials.%

The possibility that Antequera could argue his case in Spain to a successful conclusion disturbed the Jesuits. They believed that Ante­ quera, an eloquent speaker, might present trenchant criticisms of the political and economic activities of the Jesuits in the Plata region. He would likely report that the abuses resulting from the favored status of the mission province of Paraguay were an insult to the majesty of the

Spanish crown. He probably would argue that they were also a significant limitation on royal power. Thus he might give credence to similar reports from other sources, and this horrified the Company.

On February 10, 1725, Father Jer6nimo de HerrSn, a general agent sent every few years by the mission province to the court in Spain, sailed from Buenos Aires on a British ship bound for London. Accompanied by his assistant, Juan de Azola, Herran travelled from England through France and

Jose de Antequera y Castro, "Carta primera del senior Doctor Don Joseph de Antequera y Castro al Ilmo. Sr. Maestro D. Fr. Joseph de Palos, 0- bispo del Paraguay," Coleccion general de documentes. Tomo III, Pieza II, pp. 1-9.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 181. Real CSdula, San Ildefonso, July 1, 1725.

Antequera, "Respuesta," passim; For a discussion of important and controversial supplications requesting the crown to appoint officials of the civil government and members of the secular clergy to assume responsibility for administering the Jesuit missions, see Charlevoix, History of Paraguay, II, 329-341; Astrafn, Historia de la Compa^fa de Jesus. VII, 545; Hernandez, Misiones del Paraguay. I, 460; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 58-63; Zinny, Gobernantes del Paraguay. 149-152, 165-166. 136 arrived in Madrid in October, 1725, to argue for the prosecution of

Antequera in America and to ask the crown for additional guarantees against

the hostile Paraguayan colonists.^ Herrin accurately gauged the primary

interests of the audience to which he directed his plea, presenting his

case with the skill so often characteristic of Jesuit a d v o c a c y . ^ First,

he reminded the king and Council of the Indies of the Plata region's stra­

tegic importance. Next, he stressed the seriousness of the threat to Span­

ish domination in the area then posed by the encroachment by Brazilian

colonists spreading out from ColGnia dW Sacramento.^ That the whole area was not presently a Portuguese possession, Herrin pointed out, was only

because of the valiant contributions of the Jesuit Guaranfs, who had helped

defeat the Portuguese-Brazilian interlopers on three separate occasions without costing the crown a single maravedf. Allowing the Paraguayans to

persist in humiliating the mission province, he said, would give tacit ap­

probation to their activities. As a result, the neophytes would flee their missions. This would leave the entire region militarily vulnerable and would also probably invite foreign invasion.?

4 Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 359; Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 7, 19.

5 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 166. Memorial impreso de Jeronimo de Herran de la Companfa de Jesus Procurador general por las provincias del Para­ guay a Su Magestad, Madrid, October 14, 1726. This document was at­ tached to a royal decree addressed to the Council of the Indies, but it was presented approximately a year before this date; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 159. Consulta del Consejo de Indies a Su Magestad, Madrid, February 4, 1726.

6 C.R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), pp. 246-251; War­ ren, Paraguay, 97-98.

7 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 166. Memorial . . .de Jeronimo Herran . . . a Su Magestad, Madrid, October 14, 1726. 137 Describing Antequera as a symbol and rallying point for

Paraguayan discontent, Herran begged the peninsular authorities to issue

a formal denial that the Paraguayans had suffered gross injustices at the

hands of the Jesuits. These calumnies circulated by the Paraguayans against

the Company, said the Jesuit agent, sprang partly from their natural mali­

ciousness but were rooted in the base desire of greedy Paraguayans to ob­

tain labor service from the neophytes in the mission province. The king

could, Herran argued, rectify the present state of affairs if he acted de­

cisively. First, the king must place the fifteen Jesuit reductions nominally

governed from Asuncion under the jurisdiction of the Buenos Aires governor­

ship, an office whose occupants had always enjoyed good relations with the

Company.® Second, the crown must deal severely with the traitor Antequera.^

The clear implication was that Antequera must remain in America so as to

prevent his criticism of the Company from spreading any further.

The Council of the Indies was unwilling to alarm the Company of

Jesus unduly. The major interest of king and council in the Antequera af­

fair was to dispose of the matter as. quickly and efficiently as possible.

In 1726 there appeared to be little justification for making what seemed

to be a temporary disturbance in a minor province into a cause c^l&bre by

rendering a decision favorable to Antequera. In any event, the King of

Ibid.• In addition to military support from mission soldiers for gov­ ernors of Buenos Aires, another factor motivating this approach was the absence of hostility toward the Company by the colonists of Buenos Aires because the prevailing economic conditions and numerous slaves (10 to 30 percent of the population) gave the porteltos little reason to look longingly at the missions for additional laborers as did the Paraguayans. See James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York, 1964), pp. 36-63.

AGI, Charcas, Legajo 166. Memorial . . . de Jeronimo Herran . . . a Su Magestad, October 14, 1726. 138 Spain and the Council of the Indies did believe that Antequera was guilty of treason. Thus, the king granted both of Herran's requests.

In April, 1726, King Philip V reversed his decision that penin­ sular rather than colonial authorities should judge Jose de Antequera and ordered Viceroy Castelfuerte to institute proceedings against Antequera in

Lima immediately. To find Antequera guilty of treason was imperative, the king reasoned. He said that the Paraguayans' transgreasLon of human and divine laws, committed in the course of the battle against a royal army, and their numerous offensive acts and malicious calumnies against the

Company, its property, and neophytes necessitated this judgement: the

Peruvian authorities must execute Antequera as soon as possible. But they should first allow him to present his case fully. The king cautioned the viceroy not to act precipitously but to secure the consent of the Audien­ cia of Lima for his actions before sentence was passed.Granting Father

Herran's other request in November, 1726, the king ordered the governor of

Buenos Aires to assume jurisdiction over all the Jesuit missions in the

Plata region, an order which reached the two la Plata provinces in 1729 and was put into effect the following year. The Paraguayans later viewed this separation, correctly, as a Jesuit victory. 12

To the Marquas de Castelfuerte, thus, passed the vexing problem

10 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Copia de Real Cêdula, Buen Retiro, April 11, 1726; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 181. Real Cêdula, San Lorenzo, No­ vember 6, 1726.

11 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Copia de Real CSdula, Buen Retiro, April 11, 1726.

12 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 181. Real cSdula, San Lorenzo, November 6, 1726; Warren, Paraguay, 117-118. 139 of prosecuting the former governor of Paraguay. On the one hand, Antequera's

presence in the City of Kings caused serious probiema, because many lime%os

believed him an innocent victim of Jesuit persecution;^^ and the viceroy

did not want to antagonize his constituents if he could avoid it. On the

other hand, the cedula ordering Antequera's executions, which arrived in

Lima in September, 1726, left no doubt as to the royal will, and the Lima

Jesuits were clamoring for its swift implementation.^^ Apparently Castel­

fuerte hoped to mitigate the problem by delaying final disposition. Using

this tactic, which was successful until 1731, he avoided sparking the li- meîfos into open revolt against him. Unfortunately, the one avenue which would have appeased his subjects--exonerating Antequera— was closed to the

viceroy.

Castelfuerte's approach was to see that Antequera's trial dragged

on interminably. He first named his consultant, Luf’s Ambrosio de Alarcon,

to take charge of the case against Antequera but quickly excused him af­

ter Alarcdn reported that he was not convinced that Antequera was g u i l t y . 15

To succeed Alarcdn, the viceroy appointed Jose Santiago Concha, Marqués de

Casa Concha, the senior oidor of the Audiencia of Lima, who assured Castel­

fuerte that he believed that the five prisoners were guilty of high treason.

13 Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia de la CompaMfa de Jesés en el Peru. Tomo IV, 1703-1767 (Burgos, 1965), pp. 55-56.

14 Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms / 18634^® (microfilm). Relacion de lo que acaecio en el Reyno del Peru en la Ziudad de Lima, sobre la muerte que se dio a On. Joseph de Antequera y Dn. Juan de Mena, que por no- ticio se a sabido, Lima, 1731.

15 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Virrey Marques de Castelfuerte a Su Magestad, Lima, October 3, 1727.

16 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Representacidn del Marques de Casa Concha al Virrey Marques de Castelfuerte, Lima September 15, 140

During Antequera's lengthy confinement, the most serious accusations against him cpme from Jose de Palos, Bishop-coadjutor of Para­ guay. Despite the fact that Palos had not been in Paraguay until the last five months of Antequera's governorship, he believed himself qualified to charge Antequera and to give the Spanish and Peruvian authorities an accu­ rate picture of Paraguay's four tragic years under the usurper.1? Relying on testimony from Reyes' kinsmen, pro-Reyes clerics whom Antequera had of­ fended, and Jesuits from the Asuncion area, the bishop accused Antequera of heresy and of treason. How, Palos asked, could any man of the True Faith commit such blasphemous acts as causing the removal of Father Caballero from Yuguaron or the expropriation of the patrimonial possessions of Deacon

Agustdfn de los Reyes? Antequera's expulsion of the Jesuits from Asuncion and his subordinates' treatment of Fathers Dufo and Rivera after the Battle

IQ of the Tebicuary, he said, were unquestionably heretical.

Antequera's crimes against the state were almost as serious as those against the Church. By advising the Paraguayans that they had the right to appeal an unjust order three times before they were obligated

1727. The other prisoners were Juan de Mena, Antequera's principle adviser, Francisco Moringo, Miguel Lopez Duarte, and Alonso Gonzalez. See Chapter VIII.

17 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Fray Joseph Obispo coadjutor de la probincia del Paraguay a Su Magestad, Asuncion, June 30, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Fray Joseph de Palos al P. con­ fesor de Su Magestad Gabriel Bermudez, Asuncion, June 30, 1725; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta de Fray Joseph Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay al P. confesor de Su Magestad Gabriel Bermudez, July 2, 1725.

18 "Respuesta del Obispo coadjutor del Paraguay a la precedents carta confirmando los asertos de Antequera . . . ," in Zinny, Gobernantes del Paraguay. 123-148. This was an open letter printed in Côrdoba by the Jesuits and circulated throughout Peru. 141 to obey it, he had rekindled old passions and instilled in his followers the traitorous impulses which now threatened to destroy the province.

On January 30, 1728, Antequera completed his answer to the bish­ op's charges in an open letter entitled, "Carta Segunda. Political y Legal

SatisfacciSn del Senor Doctor Don Joseph de Antequera y Castro, a la Carta-

Respuesta del Ilustrisemo Se#or Maestro Don Fray Joseph de Palos, Obispo

Taliense, y Coadjutor del Paraguay." Franciscans in Lima saved the missive and later published it in Spain under royal auspices in a four-volume col­ lection of documents^® critical of the Paraguayan Jesuits two years after their expulsion by Charles III. Three hundred and seventy-three pages long,

Antequera's "Reply" contains his version of all the controversial events of his government. His skillful explanation of his record as governor of

Paraguay and his logical assembling of facts to prove his innocence (in which he is not always, successful) clearly reveals his intellectual facili­ ty. This letter also provides revealing glimpses of his character and is convincing proof of his superior education. Citing legal precedents to justify his official conduct beginning with "Genesis," Antequera quoted numerous authorities, including the Roman Emperors Trajan and Hadrian, St.

Thomas Aquinas, Jesus Christ, the Recopilacion de Indias, and even the

Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suârez. In the process, he refuted each of

Palos' accusations.

His intellectual gifts notwithstanding, Antequera in this letter

19 Ibid. . / 20 Coleccion general de documentes que contiene los sucesos tocantes a la segunda epoca de las conmociones de la Companfa en ef Paraguay. 142 contributes most to an understanding of the events in la Plata, Paraguay, and Peru by his repeated assertions and illustrative examples of himself as a loyal subject of the king of Spain and as a devoted son of the Roman

Catholic Church. Two hundred and fifty years later, the sincerity of his avowals seems entirely credible. However guilty of misconduct he may have been, he never thought of himself as a rebel against either Church or State.

Again he contended that the actions which caused his present mis­ fortune were a direct result of the various orders he received from the

Audiencia of Charcas, a claim he had often made in Paraguay. Had he obeyed the orders sent from Lima by Viceroy Morcillo, he wrote, he would have been forced to disobey the audiencia of which he was a member. His reward for obeying Morcillo would have been imprisonment in la Plata instead of

Lima.

Not satisfied with merely defending himself, Antequera also tried to destroy the credibility of his accuser. He accused Palos of lying and pointed out the biases of the bishop's informants. He then said that fi­ nancial considerations might have influenced Palos, because the Jesuits were the sole supporters of the Paraguayan bishopric.

Actually, neither Palos' accusations nor Antequera's impassioned defense had great bearing on the determination of Antequera's face. This was settled finally by a new revolt in Paraguay in 1730 and 1731. In the meantime, the Peruvian authorities busied themselves by collecting still more evidence.

A year earlier, in 1727, the presiding judge, the Marqués de

21 This assertion is confirmed by Angles y Gortari, "Informe," 43-49. 143 Casa Concha, sent Matias Angles y Gortari, the lieutenant-governor of

Cdrdoba and royal deputy presiding over the town council, to Paraguay to take depositions against Antequera and his followers. Evidently the assign­ ment was only a formality. As Casa Concha told the viceroy, Antequera*s own recollections, freely given, were themselves sufficient for a guilty verdict against him under the terms of the king's cedula.

Arriving in Asuncion in May, 1728, Angles y Gortari examined thirty witnesses who were supplied by the Bishop of Paraguay along with

Palos' assurances that Angles could rely on them to testify against Ante­ quera. Angles completed his mission in two months. With little faith in the reliability of his witnesses, whom he considered perjurers, he sent transcripts of testimony taken in Asuncion to Casa Concha, who received it in 1729 and gave it to the viceroy.^3

Two years later, Anglis recorded his true judgement of the causes of the Paraguayan revolt and of its leaders.Although some of Angles'

22 Lozano, Revoluciones, I, 423; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 323. Carta del Marques de Casa Concha al Marques de Castelfuerte Virrey del Peru, Lima, September 15, 1727.

23 Lozano, Revoluciones. I, 422-428; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Marques de Casa Concha al Virrey del Peru, August 12, 1729; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta respuesta del virrey al Marques de Casa Concha, Lima, August 16, 1729.

24 This document was recovered from the archives of the Inquisition in Rome and entitled "Informe que hizo el General D . Mathias de Angles y Gortari, Corregidor de Potosi, sobre los puntos que ban sido causa de las discordias sucedidas en la Ciudad de la Asuncion de la Pro­ vincia del Paraguay, y motivaron la persecuciùn de D. Josef de Ante­ quera de porte de los Regulares de la ComaTifa" by the Franciscan editor who compiled the Coleccion general de documentes. Some Jesu­ its have disputed its authenticity. See, e.g., Pablo HernSndez, Misiones del Paraguay, II, 348. The author, however, is convinced that it is authentic and agrees with Mangus Môrner's judgement that, despite its obvious exaggerations, "... the document bears witness to considerable inside knowledge of the affairs of the Jesuits." Po- litical and Economic Activities of the Jesuits, 14. 144 observations about the miésion province and his statistics regarding the number of missions, their wealth, and payment of tribute are inaccurate, his report is a revealing document. The viceroy of Peru, however, never saw it. Angles wrote it in secret to the Holy Office of the Inquisition, he said, so that his true observations would be accurately recorded while at the same time withholding knowledge of its contents from potential troublemakers throughout the viceroyalty, who might use it to create fur­ ther disturbance.25 The Company of Jesus, he wrote, was the sole cause of the recent disturbance and of several similar developments of lesser magni­ tude,in previous years. Obliquely defending Antequera, Angles wrote that the real leaders in Paraguay, Jose de Urrunaga, Antonio Rufz de Arellano,

Miguel de Garay, and Francisco Rojas Aranda were "defenders of reason" and

"men of honor" and were inclined to justice, while Martin de Chavarri, An­ dris Benftez, Dionisio Otazu, and Juan Caballero de AKasco, whom Bruno de

Zavala had designated to serve as regidores, were but weak-willed tools of the Jesuits and were without discernable popular following. The real lead­ ers of Paraguay, he said, had opposed Diego de los Reyes and Baltasar Garcia

Ros to promote justice, a rare commodity in Paraguay, where the Jesuits dom­ inated political and economic affairs in the Plata region solely for their own benefit.26

With the reception of Angles' initial report in 1729, the authori­ ties in Lima had enough evidence to render judgement on Antequera and more than enough to find him guilty as the king had ordered in 1726. Yet they deferred their verdict for two more years.

25 Angles y Gortari, "Informe," passim.

26 Ibid. 145 Having spent three years as a prisoner of the viceroy of Peru,

Antequera had renewed several past friendships dating back to his college

days in Lima. In addition to the Franciscans, bitter, outspoken rivals of

the Jesuits, who had taken up his cause, Antequera had acquired the sym­

pathy and respect of a number of Lima's prominent citizens.One particu­

lar friend, however, Antequera would have done well to avoid.

Fernando Momp5 y Zayas was, like Antequera, a prisoner of the viceregal court, but his confinement was for less important offenses. The

two men had met earlier in Chuquisaca where Mompo practiced law before the

Audiencia of Charcas while Antequera was Protector of the Indians and acting

prosecutor. They were seen together frequently in Lima. Apparently, they were cordial but not close.

On May 12, 1729, Momp^ escaped from custody^^ and after many months arrived in Asuncion where he felt he would be free from prosecution

because of the province's remoteness. Writing to Antequera from Santa Fe

in 1730, Momp'S sent his greetings. He reported that while passing through

Chuquisaca, he had given Antequera's wife the seventy pesos with which Jose had entrusted him before his flight from Lima.^® The next year, Lima

27 Biblioteca Nacional, Ms / 10723 (microfilm). Francos sucesos a contenido en Lima a%o de 1731 sobre la muerte de Don Joseph de Ante­ quera y Don Juan de Mena, Lima, 1731.

28 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Respuesta fiscal, Lima, May 26, 1731; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Certificacion dedon Phelipe Ximines escriuano del Crimen de esta Real Audiencia, Lima, May 31, 1731.

29 Ibid.

30 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de Fernando Mompo y Zayas a don Joseph de Antequera y Castro, Santa Fe, April 25, 1730. 146 magistrates declared that this correspondence conclusively proved the existence of a treasonous conspiracy between Mompl^ and Ântequera.

While travelling to Paraguay, Momp^ learned that an important change in the government of Paraguay was about to take place. The viceroy had designated his brother-in-law and personal secretary, Ignacio de Soro- eta, who had come with Castelfuerte from Spain to Peru, as the new governor of Paraguay to succeed Martfn de Barua.^^ Shortly after Momp^ arrived in

Asuncion, he made friends with most of ;the Paraguayan leaders who had been

Antequera's friends and supporters, including Fernando Curtido, in whose house Mompo took up residence.

MompS's news of the intended change of the government of their province enraged the Paraguayans. They recalled that in 1727, Viceroy

Castelfuerte had ordered Governor Barua to restore the Jesuit college in

Asuncion and their ranches and farms in the surrounding countryside to the

Company's possessions, an order which was carried out in 1728. They were still furious over the order that future governors of Paraguay would not have even nominal jurisdiction over the Jesuit missions within the former territorial limits of their province. For the viceroy to replace a trusted and able governor with one of his apparently needy relatives was not only insulting, but also revealing, because it proved how totally unconcerned

OO the Peruvian vice-king was of their welfare.^

31 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Exmo. Senor Virrey al Cauildo del Paraguay, Lima, May 8, 1729.

32 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 327. Carta del fray Joseph Obispo del Paraguay al virrey del Peru, Candelarfa, February 15, 1731.

33 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto de los sres del Cauildo Jus- ticia y Reximiento de la Ziudad de la Asuncion, Asuncion, December 9, 1731. 147

The Paraguayans were now resolutely opposed to having any governor but Barua and begged tha authorities to allow him to remain at his post or suffer terrible consequences. In late 1730 as Governor-desig­ nate Soroeat was nearing the Tebicuary River, the fire of revolt again spread through Paraguay. Now the leadership was more diffuse; it included former antequeristas, like Rufz de Arellano, Lianas, and Curtido, joined by new and younger men who had grown to maturity during the governorships of Antequera and Barua.

When Soroeta reached the Tebicuary in December, 1730, he found two hundred Paraguayan soldiers awaiting his arrival. Throughout December and most of January they kept the vice-regal nominee detained under careful watch, refusing to acknowledge the validity of his appointment. Then, in late January, 1731, they transported him to Asuncion. The escort grew from two hundred to an estimated four thousand before reaching the city. 35

By now Barua had resigned his office. He had often stated his belief in the truth of the Paraguayan^' claims of having suffered terrible injustices at the hands of the Jesuits and their pawns for over a century, but he was unwilling to include himself formally among those who believed that these indignities justified revolution. When the Asuncion cabildo begged him to resume office, he refused. The cabildo, whose stance and membership, not unlike that of the town council of the Reyes' era, was now an unwilling instrument of the rebels, who had surrounded the tov?n hall and

34 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Auto de los sres del Cauildo . . . de la Asuncion, Asuncion, December 9, 1731.

35 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de don Ignacio de Soroeta al virrey del Peru, Santiago de Chile, May 4, 1731. 148 shut the alcaldes and regldores inside until they agreed to make the statements dictated by the rebels.

After four and a half days under house arrest in Asuncion, Soroeta realized that he had no future in Paraguay and he fled the city at the end of January, 1731, accompanied by Bishop Palos. In"@arly May he arrived in

Santiago de Chile, giving the viceroy his version of the new outbreak of revo­ lution, which, he said, was undoubtedly the result of a conspiracy between

Antequera and Fernando Mompo.Their presence in Lima during the first three years bf Antequera's imprisonment and in Paraguay among the ranks of the lead­ ers of the revolution could not have failed to impress don Ignacio deeply.

Soroeta's estimate of Mompo's importance to the revolutionary cause was echoed by Bishop Palos^® and later by Jesuit chroniclers and his­ torians, but the assertion is questionable. By August, 1731, this alleged agitator had been arrested by Lufs Barreiro, who briefly ruled over the cabildo and whose primary goal was to keep faith with the Spanish crown.

Mompo then had been sent in chains to Buenos Aires, and had escaped to Brazil and obscurity. But the Paraguayan rebellion, whose leaders now called them­ selves the "community" while their opponents called them the "commune," con­ tinued until 1735.39 Therefore, it would be unwise to assign overwhelming

36 Ibid.; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Acuerdo del Cabildo Justicia y Resimiento de la Asuncion del Paraguay, Asuncion, January 15, 1731; AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del Cabildo de la Asuncion al vir­ rey, Asuncion, January 25, 1731.

37 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta de don Ignacio Soroeta al virrey del Peru, Santiago de Chile, May 4, 1731.

38 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Carta del fray Joseph Obispo del Paraguay al virrey del Peru, Candelaria, February 15, 1731.

39 Warren, Paraguay, 119-123; Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato (Siglo XVIII). 1700-1790 (Lima, 1956), pp. 142-148. 149 influence on Paraguayan affairs to a man who resided in the province for a relatively short period of time. It would also be unwise to conclude that the hostilities beginning in 1730 were incited by Antequera, currently in the perilous position of viceregal prisoner, who was not a native of

Paraguay, and who had not even resided in the province for the past five and p-half years.

The Peruvian officials apparently did not consider the possibility that the entire province of Paraguay had revolted spontaneously. Castel­ fuerte received Soroeta's report on May 27, 1731, and it sealed Antequera's fate. The viceroy, outraged by the indignities suffered by his son-in-law, ordered the Audiencia of Lima,to meet continuously, stopping only to eat and sleep, until they could render a verdict against Antequera.

The proceedings against Antequera and his most important and most trusted subordinate, Juan de Mena, were actually a second trial. The first, the investigation of their activities between 1721 and 1725, had been com­ pleted in 1729. Although the judges were ordered to bring a verdict of guilty, they nevertheless went through the formalities of examining all the evidence. They took testimony from Antequera and the four Paraguayan prisoners; from two officers of the Audiencia of Lima, Lorenzo Antonio de la Puente and Felipe Ximenes, the fiscal of the civil section and the scribe for the criminal section of the court; from Ignacio Gallegos, an oidor of the Audiencia of Chile who was a character witness for Antequera. They listened to two jailers, Tomas Reinoso and Francisco Astudillo, who had intercepted two letters from Mompo to Antequera. In addition, they exam­ ined representations and depostions from many other lay and clerical

40 BN, Ms / 10723. Franco sucesos . . . sobre la muerte de Don Joseph de Antequera . . . , Lima, 1731. 150 officials and from private citizens in Paraguay, Peru, and Chuquisaca.^^

An examination of the records of these proceedings and of the eventful days in Lima between May and September, 1731, which run to some eighteen hundred-odd manuscript pages, reveals no substantive proof that implicated Antequera in the Soroeta affair. A number of witnesses giving hearsay testimony reported that they naturally "assumed" or "just supposed" that Antequera, acting through MompS, had again incited the Paraguayans to defy viceregal authority. Except for Antequera, none of the witnesses even mentioned the Paraguayans' historical tradition of an independence so fierce as to border on anarchy. No one thought it significant that for over tt;o centuries the Paraguayans had claimed the right, supposedly granted by

Charles I, to depose an unworthy governor. The viceroy and the Audiencia of Lima hoped that the executions of Antequers and Mena would set an exam­ ple which would cool the passions of the Paraguayans.^2

In the last month of his life, José de Antequera y Castro bore the torments of his confinement with dignity. On July 2, 1731, thevice­ roy commanded his soldiers to place the prisoner in a tiny cell, shackle him, and feed him a diet of bread and water. He was constantly watched by six soldiers, who were not permitted to speak to him.43 On June 23

41 AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Testimonio de los Autos obrados en esa - Ciudad Sobre del Segundo Reuelucion de la Provincia del Paraguay en ordern a no Resiuir a el Gouiernor de aquella Provincia a Dn. Ignacio Soroeta Governador provisto por este Superior Gouierno, Lima, 1731.

42 Armendériz, "Relacion," 306-321.

43 Biblioteca Nacional, Ms / 18634&0. Relacion de lo que acaecio . . . sobre la muerte que se dié a Dn. Joseph de Antequera y Dn. Juan de Mena . . . , Lima, 1731. 151 Castelfuerte doubled Ântequera's guard because of growing unrest in Lima

caused by the Ântequera trial. Â number of prominent limenos petitioned

the viceroy to grant clemency for Ântequera. Rumblings of discontent and warnings of impending disaster filled the streets and squares. Most of

the city's monks and nuns were doing continual penance hoping to obtain

a verdict of not guilty.^4 Franciscans begged the viceroy to ignore the

allegations which, they said, Bishop Palos had maliciously fabricated.

Father Ântonio Cordero, the Commissary of Peru, said that Palos was a venal,

corrupt man, a disgrace to the Franciscan order who would pay for his great

crimes in the Âfterlife. Ânother Franciscan, Father Âlonso de Mesia, begged

for an intercession of divine mercy for Ântequera. Âfter saying a mass for

Ântequera at the convent of Santa Marfa, Mesfa told his parishoners that

Viceroy Castelfuerte was a latter-day Judas and Casa Concha a Pilate.45 Op-

probium as strong as this was bound to have an effect upon the citizens of

Lima, especially when uttered from the pulpit.

On July 3, 1731, five of the six judges of the Âudiencia of Lima

found Ântequera and Mena guilty of high treason. The oidor Cabreros, main­

taining that the evidence was insufficient to prove them guilty, abstained.

Viceroy Castelfuerte condemned Ântequera to be beheaded and Mena to be

garroted.46

Ât one o'clock that afternoon, the viceroy, the oidores, and other

court officials went to Ântequera's cell to inform him of their verdict.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid. 152 Upon hearing his sentence pronounced, Jose knelt quietly, crossed his arms,

and bowed his head. Seeing Antequera's humility, the receiver of fines, who had accompanied the viceroy and judges to the jail, broke into tears,

disrupting the proceedings until Antequera had calmed him by saying that

he had expected no better. At two o'clock Antequera and Mena were taken

to a chapel; there Antequera delivered a brief oration and asked for for­

giveness of his sins.^^

Castelfuerte was fully cognizant of the ugly mood of the citizens

of Lima. On July 4, he sent to Callao for reinforcements, soldiers, muskets,

powders, and shot, and ordered every one in the city to remain indoors until

the executions were over. He specifically ordered all the Franciscans except

those attending Antequera to remain inside their parish church. He also

called for an immediate end to the clemency petitions. There would he no

pardon.

At dawn, July 5, 1731, Antequera's jailers delivered him to the

two companies of soldiers, infantry and cavalry, whom the viceroy had desig­

nated to escort him to the scaffold with fixed bayonets and swords drawn.

Veiled in black and holding a crucifix, Antequera was mounted on a mule,

attended by two Franciscans on one side and a Dominican and a Carmelite

monk on the other, with several other clerics front and rear. A herald led

the procession to the scaffold, proclaiming Antequera's impending execution

for being an agitator and a traitor. As the prisoner, his escorts, and

clerical attendants neared the scaffold erected in the main square of Lima,

they saw a great crowd of people extending into the adjacent streets and

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid. 153 appearing from every door and balcony. The noise from the crowd grew

louder. Suddenly the crowd became a mob and broke riotously into a

screaming torrent. Tumult, shouting, and death were everywhere.

The specific cause of the riot is unclear. Contemporary testi­ mony and historical accounts partial to the Jesuits and Viceroy Castel­

fuerte report that a Franciscan lay brother, ascending the scaffold and crying, "Mercy1 Mercy! Mercy in the name of God," sparked the disorder.

But Franciscan witnesses, sympathetic supporters of Antequera and opponents

of the Jesuits and viceroy, maintained that the heretofore orderly crowd broke into a full scale riot when one of the guards, a soldier named Cota, panicked at the sight of so many people and impaled Antequera upon his

bayonet. Then Cota and the other guards, so this version of the event

goes, shot Father Nicolas Fulano Pacheco, a Franciscan priest who embraced

the wounded Antequera as he fell from his mule. This atrocity set off the crowd and caused the viceroy to order his soldiers to finish off Antequera and then to rake the mob with musket fire.^l

In any case, the major events of the day are clear. Antequera was killed as a result of the eleven wounds from bayonets and musket balls and beheaded. Then his mutilated body was displayed from the scaffold. Im­ mediately thereafter, the viceroy ordered his soldiers to fetch Juan de

49 Ibid.

50 Biblioteca Nacional, Ms / 12977. Carta del P. Pedro Lozano al P. Procurador general Sebastian de San Martin sobre los extranos suce­ sos que pasaron en el Paraguay en los ultimos meses del aflîo 1731, segun lo que escribieron varios P.P. jesuitas y el obispo D. Fr. Jose Palos, Cordoba del Tucuman, 30 enero de 1732; Armendâriz, "Re­ lacion," 311-312; Biblioteca Nacional, Ms / 18634&0. Relacion . . . sobre la muerte que se di5 a Dn. Joseph de Antequera . . ., Lima, 1731.

51 Ibid. 154 Mena, whose execution was scheduled for that afternoon. They found him

in a chapel receiving the last rites and transported him to the square where a scaffold shorter than Antequera's awaited him. The garroting or­ dered for Mena proved too slow to suit Castelfuerte, and he had the exe­ cutioner behead Mena and then display his head to the crowd.

In addition to Antequera and Mena, two Franciscans, Father Nico­

las Fulano Pacheco and Juan de Arenas died in the riot, as did the Indian

soldier Cota and an unnamed Negro slave. Scores of bystanders fell wounded.

After the tumult ended, the bodies of José de Antequera y Castro and Juan de Mena Ortiz y Velasco were interred in Lima, Antequera at the chapel of

San Juan de Letran and Mena at the chapel of San Vicente F e r r e r . ^3

For months afterwards. Viceroy Castelfuerte and the Franciscans

remained bitter enemies. The viceroy asked José Feliz, the Franciscan

representative, to surrender the lay brother or brothers guilty of inciting

the riot to the civil authorities, but Feliz replied that he could not com­

ply with the order because such a man (or men) as the viceroy described did

not exist. Feliz actually went so far as to request the Pope to excommuni­

cate the Marques de Castelfuerte. ^4

Ultimately the power of the single-minded viceroy prevailed. The

King and Council of the Indies not only refused to accept the validity of

charges brought against him by the Franciscans but also commended him for

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 -AGI, Charcas, Legajo 324. Testimonio de Fr. Joseph Feliz del orden Nro. P. San Francisco, Procurador General de la Provincia delos doce Apostoles del Peru, Lima, July 5, 1731. 155 acting decisively to prevent further bloodshed. The peninsular authorities then ordered the guilty Franciscans punished, and in 1734 the ecclesiastical cabildo of Lima formally censured six members of the order, including José

Feliz, and ordered Comissary Antonio Cordero removed from his post and returned to Spain.55

55 Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato, 140. X

CONCLUSION

The Antequera revolt was the result of many factors. Most important of these were the people of Paraguay who followed Antequera and sometimes pushed him to more extreme positions than he might normally have taken. They had long believed that their principal opponent was the Company of Jesus, and they usually expressed their grievances against the Jesuits in economic terms. They especially opposed the Jesuit monopoly over the labor supply of the mission province, their usurpation of virgin lands, acquisition of lands formerly held by colonists, and their commercial activities throughout the Plata region as well.

Often the Paraguayans found the Company a convenient scapegoat.

That Paraguay was remote and isolated was an unchangeable reality. That it was isolated from the main arteries of trade and navigation was a re­ sult of the mercantilist policies of the Spanish Crown and not the Jesuits.

When José de Antequera came to Paraguay in 1721, he provided a focus for the Paraguayan grievances. An erudite man and also an ambitious one, An­ tequera, a creole himself, was highly receptive to the colonists' opposi­ tion to the Jesuits, nearly all of whom came from Europe, many from outside Spain.

In the early stages of the rebellion, Antequera acted with the support of the Audiencia of Charcas, while the Reyes-Jesuit faction enjoyed the support of the aged viceroy of Peru, Diego Morcillo. The two

156 157 governmental authorities were often in conflict in the eighteenth century, and this was especially so in the years 1720 to 1724. The opposing orders issued to the Paraguayans by the Audiencia of Charcas and the viceroy can­ celled each other out, and the result was governmental paralysis. This situation allowed a major rebellion to develop in Paraguay over long­ standing economic, political, and social, but not religious, conflicts between the civil province and the Jesuit mission province.

When the forceful Jose de Armend^riz, Marques de Castelfuerte replaced the elderly and ineffectual Diego Morcillo as viceroy of Peru, viceregal power was again ascendant in fact as well as in law, and hostili­ ties in Paraguay stopped temporarily. But Castelfuerte himself contributed to a new outbreak of rebellion in Paraguay in 1730 when he appointed Ignacio

Soreta to govern the province. Hearing of the renewed hostilities in Para­ guay in 1731, Castelfuerte had little choice but to execute Antequera.

The people of Paraguay remained in a state of rebellion for four years after Antequera's death. In 1732, citizens of the province again expelled the Jesuits from Asuncion. The next year they also refused to accept another governor-designate, Agustfn de Ruiloba, and they killed him when he failed to recognize the legitimacy of their claim to have the right to choose their own governor. Finally, in 1735, Bruno de Zavala, still gov­ ernor of Buenos Aires, pacified the rebellious Paraguayans after bringing the province to the point of commercial ruin by the successful imposition of an economic blockade. The province never really recovered from this total isolation from the outside world, which lasted from 1731 to 1735.

Never again did the people of Paraguay display that vitality and indepen­ dence of spirit which had so characterized their existence since the days 1 ' 158 of Domingo Martinez de Irala.^

The Company of Jesus, which had long contended with the Paraguayan colonists for hegemony in the region, suffered a similarly disastrous fate.

In 1767 Charles III expelled the Jesuits from all Spanish dominions and later recalled the fate of Jose de Antequera, King Charles decreed that

Antequera had been a loyal minister of the Spanish crown and ordered the payment of a life income to the surviving members of his family from the 2 revenues of former Jesuit properties in Peru and Paraguay. The Para­ guayan rebellion was put down in 1735 partly because the Paraguayan rebels had exhausted their human, economic, and emotional resources. But, their insurrection was doomed from the beginning. Not aimed at independence, the rebellion of Antequera and the comuneros was nevertheless a step in that direction, and it was premature by nearly a hundred years.

1 Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato. 143-148; Lozano, Revoluciones. II, passim.

2 Vargas Ugarte, Historia del Peru; Virreinato. 147. 159

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