Interaction Between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board Preceding the Drainage Canal Wall Failures and Ca
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JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, May 16, 2018 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA
JEFFERSON PARISH COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, May 16, 2018 1221 ELMWOOD PARK BOULEVARD JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA SPECIAL PRESENTATIONS BY: BUSINESS MEETING BEGINS AT 10:00 AM MEETING CALLED TO ORDER INVOCATION AND/OR PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE ROLL CALL - COUNCIL MEMBERS ROLL CALL - PARISH PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF DEPARTMENTS PARISH PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS COUNCIL PERSONS WISHING TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COUNCIL REGARDING A RESOLUTION(S) ON AGENDA/ADDENDUM AGENDA ORDINANCES TO BE DEFERRED 1. SUMMARY NO. 24759 - repealing Chapter 2, Article VI, Sections 2-811 through 2-818 of the Code and enacting Chapter 2, Article VI, Sections 2-811 through 2-818 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances relative to the Transportation Advisory Board. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18)(Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 2. SUMMARY NO. 24799 - amending Chapter 2, Article II, Division 2 of the Code relative to the recording and broadcast of meetings of the Jefferson Parish Council. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec. 2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 3. SUMMARY NO. 24894 - amending the Code to reduce and/or eliminate redundancies and fees with respect to requirements for emergency medical technicians. (Parishwide) (Deferred from 4/25/18) (Proposed ordinance was not pre-filed in compliance with Sec.2-34.2 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances) 4. SUMMARY NO. 24961 - amending Ordinance No. 18226, as amended, to amend Rule V Pay Plan of the Personnel Rules of the East Bank Consolidated Fire Protection District to add the position of Deputy Fire Chief. -
Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005
Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 by R.B. Seed, P.G. Nicholson, R.A. Dalrymple, J. Battjes, R.G. Bea, G. Boutwell, J.D. Bray, B. D. Collins, L.F. Harder, J.R. Headland, M. Inamine, R.E. Kayen, R. Kuhr, J. M. Pestana, R. Sanders, F. Silva-Tulla, R. Storesund, S. Tanaka, J. Wartman, T. F. Wolff, L. Wooten and T. Zimmie Preliminary findings from field investigations and associated studies performed by teams from the University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of Civil Engineers, as well as a number of cooperating engineers and scientists, shortly after the hurricane. Report No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01 November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 This project was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CMS-0413327. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation. This report contains the observations and findings of a joint investigation between independent teams of professional engineers with a wide array of expertise. The materials contained herein are the observations and professional opinions of these individuals, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or endorsement of ASCE or any other group or agency, Table of Contents i November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 Table of Contents Executive Summary ...……………………………………………………………… iv Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………... 1-1 1.2 Hurricane Katrina …………………………………………………………. -
Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2A Report
May 2010 Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2a Report Prepared for Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans in partnership with the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority- East, Jefferson Parish Department of Public Works, and the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Photo courtesy of USACE Graphics Water Prepared for: Sewerage & Water Board Prepared by: of New Orleans AECOM New Orleans, LA New Orleans, Louisiana Color 60149879.0005 May 7, 2010 Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Options 1, 2, and 2a AECOM Water i Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. ES-1 1.0 Option 1 – Construction of New Permanent Gated Pump Stations at the Mouths of the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals ................................. 1-1 1.1 Option 1 - Basis of Opinion of Probable Cost ..................................................................... 1-3 1.2 Summary of Findings for 17th Street Canal – Option 1...................................................... 1-4 1.2.1 Mechanical and Electrical .....................................................................................1-6 1.2.2 Geotechnical ......................................................................................................... 1-9 1.2.3 Real Estate ..........................................................................................................1-10 -
Did Nepa Drown New Orleans? the Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS? THE LEVEES, THE BLAME GAME, AND THE HAZARDS OF HINDSIGHT DOUGLAS A. KYSAR† THOMAS O. MCGARITY†† ABSTRACT This Article highlights the hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were “caused” by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers’ hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the “standard project hurricane” risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers’ decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a Copyright © 2006 by Douglas A. Kysar and Thomas O. McGarity. † Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. †† Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. -
New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: the 17Th Street Drainage Canal
New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal R. B. Seed, M.ASCE1; R. G. Bea, F.ASCE2; A. Athanasopoulos-Zekkos, S.M.ASCE3; G. P. Boutwell, F.ASCE4; J. D. Bray, F.ASCE5; C. Cheung, M.ASCE6; D. Cobos-Roa7; L. F. Harder Jr., M.ASCE8; R. E. S. Moss, M.ASCE9; J. M. Pestana, M.ASCE10; M. F. Riemer, M.ASCE11; J. D. Rogers, M.ASCE12; R. Storesund, M.ASCE13; X. Vera-Grunauer, M.ASCE14; and J. Wartman, M.ASCE15 Abstract: The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. -
Did Nepa Drown New Orleans? the Levees, the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight
05__KYSAR_MCGARITY FINAL.DOC 11/14/2006 8:38 AM DID NEPA DROWN NEW ORLEANS? THE LEVEES, THE BLAME GAME, AND THE HAZARDS OF HINDSIGHT DOUGLAS A. KYSAR† THOMAS O. MCGARITY†† ABSTRACT This Article highlights the hazards of hindsight analysis of the causes of catastrophic events, focusing on theories of why the New Orleans levees failed during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and particularly on the theory that the levee failures were “caused” by a 1977 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) lawsuit that resulted in a temporary injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers’ hurricane protection project for New Orleans. The Article provides a detailed historical reconstruction of the decision process that eventuated in the New Orleans storm surge protection system, focusing both on the political and legal factors involved and on the “standard project hurricane” risk assessment model that lay at the heart of the Army Corps of Engineers’ decisionmaking process. The Article then offers a detailed analysis of how and why Hurricane Katrina overcame the New Orleans levee system. As this analysis demonstrates, the argument that the NEPA lawsuit played a meaningful causal role in the Katrina disaster is not persuasive. Parallel lessons are then drawn for forward-looking disaster policy. The same problems of uncertainty and complexity that confound the attempt through hindsight to attribute causal responsibility for a Copyright © 2006 by Douglas A. Kysar and Thomas O. McGarity. † Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. †† Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. This Article has its origins in a report that the authors prepared in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as member scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform. -
Bayou St. John Comprehensive Management Plan
Bayou St. John Comprehensive Management Plan BAYOU ST. JOHN COMMITTEE Canoe & Trail Adventures Contributor: Byron Almquist Contact: Byron Almquist (504) 834-5257 [email protected] The role of this private enterprise is to provide outdoor adventures involving recreational and educational opportunities for New Orleans area residents. Mr. Almquist has been invested in the health of Bayou St. John since the 1970s as a business owner and an environmentalist. City Park New Orleans Contributors: John Kinabrew, Beth McFarland and John Hopper Contact: John Hopper [email protected] City Park, the botanical heart of the city, has jurisdiction over Bayou St. John water bottoms from Robert E. Lee Boulevard and the Harding Street Bridge. City Park lagoons depend upon flow from the bayou. Before Hurricane Katrina, the park conducted several volunteer programs including a fishing education program for inner city children. Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation Contributors: Anne Rheams, John A. Lopez, Ph.D. and Carlton Durfrechou Contact: Anne Rheams (504) 836-2215 [email protected] The Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation follows a citizen-based comprehensive management plan which focuses on the health of all waters connected to Lake Pontchartrain. The health of these water bodies not only depends upon water quality but also habitat functions for wildlife and recreation and education opportunities for residents and visitors. The Foundation spearheaded Bayou St. John planning efforts represented in this plan, and will continue to conduct water quality monitoring and encourage environmental education. Louisiana State University Agriculture Center/Louisiana SeaGrant Contributors: Mark Schexnayder and Albert P. “Rusty” Gaude III. Contact: Mark Schexnayder (504) 838-1170 [email protected] With the overall mission of offering innovation, providing education and improving lives, the Louisiana State University Agriculture Center assists New Orleans City Park with habitat enhancement, fish stocking programs, water quality monitoring and education activities. -
Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F
THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong and Why A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F. Andersen, P.E., M.ASCE Jurjen A. Battjes, Ph.D. David E. Daniel, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE (Chair) Billy Edge, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE William Espey, Jr., Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE Robert B. Gilbert , Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE Thomas L. Jackson, P.E., F.ASCE, D.WRE David Kennedy, P.E., F.ASCE Dennis S. Mileti, Ph.D. James K. Mitchell, Sc.D., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Peter Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE Clifford A. Pugh, P.E., M.ASCE George Tamaro, Jr., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Robert Traver, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE ASCE Staff: Joan Buhrman Charles V. Dinges IV, Aff.M.ASCE John E. Durrant, P.E., M.ASCE Jane Howell Lawrence H. Roth, P.E., G.E., F.ASCE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The New Orleans hurricane protection system : what went wrong and why : a report / by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. p. cm. ISBN-13: 978-0-7844-0893-3 ISBN-10: 0-7844-0893-9 1. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 2. Building, Stormproof. 3. Hurricane protection. I. American Society of Civil Engineers. Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. TH1096.N49 2007 627’.40976335--dc22 2006031634 Published by American Society of Civil Engineers 1801 Alexander Bell Drive Reston, Virginia 20191 www.pubs.asce.org Any statements expressed in these materials are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of ASCE, which takes no responsibility for any statement made herein. -
London Avenue Canal Floodwalls General Design Memorandum
London Avenue Canal Floodwalls and Levees General Design Memorandum prepared for the Board of Levee Commis~ioners of the Orleans Levee District Orleans Levee Board Contract No. 2049·0269 by Burk & As~ocialcl>, !tH'. WIl'U1('('I'S' 1'1~"ncl'l' F.I1VlrnnIJl('f'lW S..... 'lIiMI. April 1986 London Avenue Canal Floodwalls and Levees General Design Memorandum LIST OF SECTIONS Section I Introduction Section II Existing Conditions Section III Proposed Improvements SectionN Construction Priorities Section V Cost Estimates Appendix A Plan-Profile Plates AppendixB Hydraulic Study AppendixC Geotechnical Investigation (under separate cover) \ ' • j .) 1 ! 1 , I London Avenue Canal Floodwalls and Levees General Design Memorandum INDEX TO SECTIONS SECTION I - INTRODUCTION Paragraph Page • 1 Number Title Number i i GENERAL 1. Executive Summary 1-2 2. Alternative Plans 1-3 3. Costs 1-4 TABLES Table Page Number Title Number 1-1 Summary of Construction Costs Recommended Plan of Interim Floodwalls and Levees - Phase I 1-5 1-2 Summary of Construction Costs Recommended Plan of Interim Floodwalls - Phase II 1-7 1~3 Summary of Construction Costs " - , j Recommended Plan for Future Pennanent Floodwa1ls and Levees - Phase III 1-8 11 · i INDEX TO SECTIONS (continued) , i SECTION II - EXISTING CONDITIONS Paragraph Page Number Title Number GENERAL 1. Scope 2-2 2. Existing Levees 2-2 3. Pumping Station No.3 2-3 4. Pumping Station No.4 2-3 '1 ., , 5. Bridges 2-3 t! 6. Real Estate 2-4 PLATES Plate Number Title 2-1 Existing Conditions SECTION III - PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS Paragraph Page Number Title Number GENERAL 1. -
Decision-Making Chronology for the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity
DECISION-MAKING CHRONOLOGY FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN & VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT FINAL REPORT FOR THE HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS Douglas Woolley Leonard Shabman March 2008 ii Forward The one-two punch of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September of 2005 proved calamitous to a vast swath of the U.S. Gulf Coast across the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. While still offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina’s 175 mph winds created the highest storm surge yet recorded at landfall in North America. Katrina’s storm surge overwhelmed many of the levees and floodwalls for greater New Orleans designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, collectively known as the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LP&VHPP). The result was a human tragedy—more than 1,600 people killed or missing and presumed dead, with over 1,250 confirmed deaths in Louisiana alone. In economic terms, the flooding from Katrina represents the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Direct flood damages to residential, non-residential, and public properties and infrastructure in greater New Orleans approached $28 billion, with further indirect economic effects and long- lasting socio-economic disruption to the region. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the Secretary of Defense directed that that Army enlist the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a thorough review of the engineering aspects of the performance of the levees and floodwalls in place in New Orleans on August 29, 2005. -
POLICY and POWER in POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS by Emily Rosenman BA, Oberlin College, 2006 a THESIS
THE ROAD AWAY FROM HOME: POLICY AND POWER IN POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS by Emily Rosenman B.A., Oberlin College, 2006 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Geography) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) OCTOBER 2011 © Emily Rosenman, 2011 Abstract In this thesis I explore several intersections of hurricane recovery, urban planning, housing assistance, and neighborhood organizing in post-Katrina New Orleans. These intersections include the mobilization of particular kinds of evidence in redevelopment planning, the construction of “community” and “neighborhood” in the aftermath of disaster, and the changing geographical scale of community development in a post-disaster environment. Hurricane Katrina has inspired a huge amount of research; much of which has been written from either a policy or hazards/disaster perspective. I argue in Chapter 2 that the disaster literature on Hurricane Katrina can benefit from engagement with literature on urban governance and the politics of civic engagement. Similarly, I propose in Chapter 3 that economic analyses of pre- and post-Katrina data must be contextualized by the post-Katrina politics and social realities of New Orleans. In this chapter, I explore the effects of depoliticizing the issue of affordable housing in New Orleans. In engendering public uncertainty about the reliability of housing data, powerful landlords and politicians avoided a debate on housing access and instead focused legislative attention on a seemingly counterintuitive question: is there too much affordable housing in New Orleans? In this chapter, I find that a preoccupation with questions about the accuracy of housing data became a tool to shut down political debate and to present subsidized housing as a nuisance to New Orleans neighborhoods and, more threateningly, to the city’s housing market as a whole. -
Orleans Levee District State of Louisiana
ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT STATE OF LOUISIANA BASIC FlNANrTAT. STATEMENTS JUNE 30,2005 Under provisions of state law, this report is a public document. Acopy of the report has been submitted to the entity and other appropriate public officials. The report is available for public inspection at the Baton Rouge office of the Legislative Auditor and, where appropriate, at the office of the parish clerk of court. Release Date ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT STATE OF LOUISIANA Basic Financial Statements and Independent Auditor's Reports As of and for the Year Ended June 30,2005 CONTENTS Statement Page No. INTRODUCTORY SECTION Letter of Transmitta! 3 FINANCIAL SECTION Independent Auditors' Report on the Financial Statements 8 Management's Discussion and Analysis 10 Basic Financial Statements: Government-Wide Financial Statements: Statement of Net Assets A 21 Statement of Activities B 22 Fund Financial Statements: Balance Sheet - Governmental Funds C 24 Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances - Governmental Funds D 27 Reconciliation of the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances of Governmental Funds to the Statement of Activities E 29 Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balances - Budget and Actual - General Fund F 30 ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT STATE OF LOUISIANA Contents, June 30, 2005 CONTENTS (CONT.) Statement Page No. Supplemental Information Schedules: Balance Sheet - Proprietary Funds 31 Statement of Revenues, Expenses, and Changes in Fund Net Assets - Proprietary Funds H 32 Statement of Cash Flows - Proprietary Funds 33 Notes to the Financial Statements 34 Schedule Schedule of Per Diem Paid Board Members 1 72 Annual Fiscal Report to the Office of the Governor, Division of Administration, Office of Statewide Reporting and Accounting Policy, as of and for the Year Ended June 30,2005 poaro of Commissioners; OFTHE (Z^rlearas Hebee 2Btetrtct SUITE 202 - ADMINISTRATION BUILDING 6001 STABS AND STRIPES BLVD.