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New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: the 17Th Street Drainage Canal

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New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: the 17Th Street Drainage Canal New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal R. B. Seed, M.ASCE1; R. G. Bea, F.ASCE2; A. Athanasopoulos-Zekkos, S.M.ASCE3; G. P. Boutwell, F.ASCE4; J. D. Bray, F.ASCE5; C. Cheung, M.ASCE6; D. Cobos-Roa7; L. F. Harder Jr., M.ASCE8; R. E. S. Moss, M.ASCE9; J. M. Pestana, M.ASCE10; M. F. Riemer, M.ASCE11; J. D. Rogers, M.ASCE12; R. Storesund, M.ASCE13; X. Vera-Grunauer, M.ASCE14; and J. Wartman, M.ASCE15 Abstract: The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from this study are of importance for similar flood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world. DOI: 10.1061/͑ASCE͒1090-0241͑2008͒134:5͑740͒ CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods; Failures; Levees; Drainage. Introduction these studies by the ILIT are available in ILIT ͑2006͒ and Seed et al. ͑in preparation͒. This paper addresses events that unfolded near the north end of the 17th Street drainage canal during and This paper is the third of a series of companion papers that, to- after the storm surge produced by the hurricane. gether, present the principal results of an investigation of the per- As shown in Fig. 1, the Orleans East Bank ͑downtown͒ basin formance of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems is one contiguously protected section. This protected unit contains during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck the New Orleans region on August 29, 2005. This event has been the subject of the Downtown District, French Quarter, Garden District, northern numerous studies including those from the Independent Levee Lakeview District, and Canal District. The northern edge of this Investigation Team ͑ILIT͒ and the Interagency Performance protected area is fronted by Lake Pontchartrain on the north, and Evaluation Task Force ͑IPET͒. More complete descriptions of the Mississippi River passes along its southern edge. The Inner 1 California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of 11 California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of 2 California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of 12 California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. Hasselmann Professor, Dept. of Geological Engineering, Missouri 3Doctoral Candidate, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO 65409-0140. 13Consulting Engineer, Rune Storesund, Albany, CA 94706. Univ. of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. 14 4Senior Consultant, Ardaman & Associates, 316 Highlandia Dr., Senior Project Engineer, CVA Consulting Group, Guayaquil, Ecuador. Baton Rouge, LA 70810. 15 5Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of Associate Professor, Dept. of Architectural and Environment California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-1710. Engineering, Drexel Univ., Philadelphia, PA 19104. 6Engineer I, PB Americas Inc., 303 2nd St., Suite 700, San Francisco, Note. Discussion open until October 1, 2008. Separate discussions CA 94107-1327. must be submitted for individual papers. To extend the closing date by 7Engineer, URS Corporation, 1333 Broadway, Suite 800, Oakland, one month, a written request must be filed with the ASCE Managing CA 94612-1924. Editor. The manuscript for this paper was submitted for review and pos- 8Senior Water Resources Technical Advisor, HDR Inc., 2365 Iron sible publication on May 10, 2007; approved on January 23, 2008. This Point Road, Suite 300, Folsom, CA 95630-8709. paper is part of the Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental 9Assistant Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, California Engineering, Vol. 134, No. 5, May 1, 2008. ©ASCE, ISSN 1090-0241/ Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407. 2008/5-740–761/$25.00. 10Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Univ. of 740 / JOURNAL OF GEOTECHNICAL AND GEOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING © ASCE / MAY 2008 Fig. 1. ͑Color͒ Satellite view of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin, showing depths of maximum flooding, and the locations of full levee breaches and distressed levee sections ͑adapted from Van Heerden et al. 2006͒ Harbor Navigation Channel ͑IHNC͒ passes along the east flank of mately +3 ft above mean sea level ͑MSL͒. The inflow from these this protected section, separating the Orleans East Bank protected three large drainage canal breaches produced a majority of the basin from New Orleans East ͑to the northeast͒ and from the floodwaters that eventually filled more than 80% of the heavily ͑ ͒ Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish directly to the east . populated Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin ͑ILIT Three large drainage canals extend into the Orleans East Bank 2006; Van Heerden et al. 2006͒. protected basin from Lake Pontchartrain to the north, for the pur- This paper presents the results of forensic investigations and pose of conveying water pumped northwards from the basin into analyses of the failure that occurred near the north end of the east the lake by large pump stations within the city. These canals, from west to east, are the 17th Street Canal, the Orleans Canal, and the bank of the 17th Street drainage canal. An incipient failure oc- ͑ ͒ London Avenue Canal. curred on the opposite side i.e., west bank of the canal, where During the Katrina event, a majority of the flow into the Or- levee movements indicate that another failure was developing. leans East Bank basin came through the three large breaches that This second incident will be discussed along with other geo- occurred on the drainage canals at the northern end of the Orleans graphically related events in the fourth companion paper of this East Bank protected area ͑ILIT 2006; Van Heerden et al. 2006; series ͑Seed et al. 2008b͒. In this paper, the interplay between IPET 2007͒. As shown in Fig. 1, one catastrophic breach occurred local geology, history of design, and construction, and the storm on the 17th Street drainage canal, and two catastrophic breaches surge loading at the east bank breach site are investigated, and the occurred on the London Avenue drainage canal. All three of these observed response of the levee system is explained. Several im- failures scoured to depths well below mean sea level, and they portant lessons are highlighted that will impact the repair and continued to admit flow into the city from Lake Pontchartrain upgrading of regional flood protection systems in the New Or- well after the initial storm surge had subsided, eventually equili- brating with the still slightly swollen waters of Lake Pontchartrain leans area, as well as in other regions in the nation and the world on the afternoon of September 1 at a water elevation of approxi- that also face levee-related risks. JOURNAL OF GEOTECHNICAL AND GEOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING © ASCE / MAY 2008 / 741 Fig. 2. ͑Color͒ Breach at the East Bank of the 17th Street Drainage Canal ͑USACE 1990͒ Failure and Breach on the East Bank the breach, both before and after the failure, are shown in Fig. 4 ͑ILIT 2006͒. The displaced small shed and home shown near the Fig. 2 shows an oblique aerial view of the large breach that oc- center of Fig. 2 are included in Fig. 4 for visual reference. The curred on the east bank of the 17th Street canal, with a military cross sections of Fig. 4 are not schematic illustrations. Rather helicopter lowering an oversized gravel-filled bag into the breach they are based on three-dimensional light detection and ranging as a part of the initial closure and emergency repairs. In the pho- ͑LIDAR͒ surveys, and visual mapping with measurements and tograph in Fig. 2, which was taken on September 2, 2005, it can be noted that the floodwaters have equilibrated, and the surround- ing inboard-side neighborhood is fully flooded. Also shown in the middle of the photograph in Fig. 2 is the large, relatively intact section of the original embankment that has slid laterally away from the canal over a travel distance of approximately 49 ft ͑with its crest fence still nearly vertical͒ and a small shed and a home that have been damaged near the inboard-side toe of this laterally displaced embankment section. Fig. 3 shows a second oblique aerial view, this time looking towards the southeast. The photograph in Fig. 3 has been anno- tated to show the approximately 49 ft of lateral translation of the nearly intact central section of the earthen levee embankment away from the canal. Fig. 3 also shows: ͑1͒ the still nearly level crest of the laterally displaced embankment section and the nearly vertical undamaged fence section, which indicates a lack of rota- tion of the overall displaced section; and ͑2͒ the top of the adja- cent concrete I-wall section, which appeared to have remained in contact with the laterally displaced earthen embankment section until lateral displacements had ceased, after which it partially Fig.
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