APPENDIX 15

PROBLEMS IN THE ARGOS NARRATIVE, §§76–84

Date of the campaign and its motivation

1 Paus 3.4.1, perhaps drawing on Lakonika, says that Cleomenes attacked Argos immediately (aÈt¤ka) on becoming king, i.e. c520. The best argument in favour of this is that he took on a difficult task in a bravura attempt to show that he was worthy to hold the kingship, despite the rival claim of Dorieus (note to §§49.2–55 paras 4, 8). But most historians reject this late Spartan tradition1 and place it in the mid 490s,2 for several reasons: (a) it helps make sense of the double oracle, the Milesian part of which prima facie anticipates the fall of Miletus in 494.3 (b) It is easier to make sense of subse- quent events: the “slaves” taking and then losing power, §83; per- haps the Argives using their defeat as the reason (or excuse) for not officially sending troops to Aegina, §92.2; and the use of nevst¤, “recently”, attributed to them in 481–0 when they spoke of those losses (7.148) when refusing to help against Persia (for the word, see Appx 10 n. 6). (c) At §92.1 the Argives fine Sicyon and Aegina for supplying the Spartans with ships: and that reads more easily if it

1 Writers of Spartan history were late, and the value of what they recorded is pro tanto suspect. Huxley (1962) 19 suggests that Pausanias may have used Sosibios (FGrH 595, perhaps late second century). The story in Socrates of Argos that Demaratos was also there (para 6) is not persuasive, at least on the dates proposed by Forrest (1980) 21: Cleomenes succeeded c520, when Demaratos’ father Ariston was still king; Demaratos did not succeed until c515; cf on ÉAr¤stvni, §61.1. 2 E.g. BM 162; CAH IV2 497 (Hammond), so HG 196, 201; Jeffery (1976) 125, id CAH IV2 335, 364; CAH V2 101 (Lewis, with some reservations). For a defence of Pausanias’ date see Wells (1923) chap IV; he accepts the Telesilla story, infra, as true (cf Appx 6 n. 10). Stadter (1965) 52, following Jacoby, argues that Demaratos was added to the story after an incident at Argos in 271, when Pyrrhus king of Epirus was killed by a projectile thrown by a woman from above (Paus 1.13.7, Plut Pyr 34). The ransom trick does not help, since there was no Argive coinage even in 494; they start in c475–c468: Kraay (1976) 96. Ransom could have been paid in bullion or coins from elsewhere, e.g. Aegina. 3 See Appx 6, esp paras 8–10, noting the possibility that Cleomenes’ consulta- tion of Delphi (next note) was a few years before actually invading, and the double oracle was given shortly afterwards. 572 appendix 15 had happened not long before the events just described, the fighting between Athens and Aegina, which on any view probably happened in the period 493 to 484: Appx 12 paras 5–6. (d) In Herodotus’ narrative, only Cleomenes is there.4 (e) There is much merit in the point made by Jones (1967) 53, Jeffery (1976) 125, that a 50 year truce after Thyrea would expire in c496. (f ) If Telesilla was there, whatever her role, the later the date the easier it is to accommo- date her.5

2 Understanding Cleomenes’ motive and plan involves several prob- lems; when he set out, he could not have foreseen that he would be able to eliminate a substantial part of the Argive army. Did he indeed hope to capture the city, and so compel her to join the Peloponnesian league, and did he persuade the ephors that he could (cf on §§76.1 and 82.1)? Or was his aim to incorporate Argive ter- ritory into Laconia (but see para 3 ad fin)?6 That he might want to make his mark as the new king has been noted supra; but a victory over Argos would enhance his position at any time. There were probably always internal political tensions within Sparta: cf note to §§49.2–55 paras 3–4. Did he do it out of personal ambition, or was there a substantial body of Spartiate opinion behind him wanting to “nullify a major rival for hegemony of the Peloponnese” (Cartledge (1979) 149); or were both the case?7

4 In Herodotus, it was Cleomenes who had the oracle, and he alone led the expedition. This is consistent with it being after the law of 506, that only one king should lead the army. But there are cases of one king doing it before then: note to §§49.2–55 para 3. The 510 expedition was said to be in response to an oracle, but that of 508 was not. 5 It is also arguable that Herodotus’ narrative reads better if Cleomenes had been on the throne for a good time. 6 Tomlinson (1972) 95–6, who dates the attack to 494 and after the fall of Miletus, suggested the alternative, or perhaps additional, aim of neutralising possible Argive support for Persia; Cartledge (1979) 149, infra, left it open. That is very doubtful, as few Greeks would see Persia as a threat to Hellas in the mid 490s. 7 There was probably an emotive side to the hostility between Sparta and Argos. Both probably said that Aristodemos and his brothers had shared out the Peloponnese (cf on §52.1). Sparta’s control of Messenia had already given her Cresphontes’ lot in addition to her own, and she also sought to appropriate Agamemnon (cf ibid and note to §§49.2–55 para 5). But Argos could claim that she had inherited the lot of Temenos, and was also successor to Agamemnon: see Jeffery (1976) 134–6, 164. Kelly (1976) 41–2, 44–5, questions the reliability of the “lot” references, but the story of Tegea at Plataea, 9.26–7, shows how powerful tradition could be in such matters. Although it is unclear how far Argos’ authority extended (paras 17–18), she blocked Sparta’s claim to total hegemony in the Peloponnese.