TANA FORUM REPORT No Retreat, No Surrender

2017 TANA FORUM REPORT No Retreat, No Surrender

Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reproduced as long as the Tana Forum Secretariat at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University is acknowledged as the source. Preface

Dear friends of the Tana Forum, Since 2012, it has been a tradition to provide our participants and readers with in-depth knowledge on the theme of each year. The State of Peace and Security in Africa report, presented annually by the Tana Forum Chairperson, has become a significant contribution to the field of peace and security. This year’s trends will fuel your thoughts on the mixture of progress and obstacles facing the sector today: • Various security indices on armed conflicts (total number, spread/distribution and trend analysis) • The lack of progress of peace agreements • Atomised violence and low intensity conflicts • An overview of African interventions in peace and security • Containment and rollbacks of violence extremism, focusing on three case studies: Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State (IS) • Political protests and riots It is also important to highlight some of the most salient security challenges: 1. In 2016, the threats posed by violent extremist groups were neutralized or reduced, with the main epicentres of attacks in Africa including Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area; al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar-Dine, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s katibat (battalion) al-Murabitun and IS elements in Northern Mali and the Sahel region; and IS in Libya (Sirte and parts of Benghazi), Tunisia and Egypt. 2. In spite of subsisting ceasefires and peace agreements, the peace processes in a number of countries stalled or broke down in 2016. The lack of progress reveals a complex interplay of failed implementation, belligerency amongst factions, lack of requisite political will, and emergence of new armed groups and factions. 3. New armed groups emerged or old armed groups were revived in countries such as Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan and Mozambique. This emergence/revival resulted in: insurgency campaigns and further exacerbated armed conflict in Nigeria; the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and affiliated new militia groups in the Delta region; Eastern DRC: Kamwina Nsapu (KN) militia formed in August 2016 and based in the province of Kasaï-Central. 4. The use, number and landscape of mass protests and street power to effect or influence changes in socio-economic and/or political circumstances increased in 2016. Protests are often a reflection of structural conditions and imbalances such as inequality, economic systems and inter-group dynamics and socio-economic and political issues have tended to trigger outbreaks. (Economic triggers: Sudan, South Sudan, Namibia, South Africa, Libya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Political triggers: Cameroon, DRC, Gabon, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).

I 5. Finally, the analysis of ownership by Africans in the provision of security provides a silver lining to Africa’s peace and security landscape with noticeable progress in ‘African Solutions’ (AfSol) approaches in managing armed conflict and insecurity. In Gabon, Burundi, Gambia, Libya and Sudan, the prospect of open armed confrontation or surges in the scale and intensity of violent clashes was averted or modulated by AU/REC-led mediation and political settlement initiatives.

I look forward to a vigorous debate on these and more issues.

Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairperson of the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

I Acknowledgements

Dr. Akin Iwilade University of Oxford / Dr. Ali Said Matano East African Community (EAC) /Ms. Amandine Rushenguziminega Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) / Dr. Amr Abdalla Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) / Amb. Ben Rutsinga AU Liaison Office to EAC / Dr. Cedric de Coning ACCORD & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) / Mr. Charles Akong The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) / Dr. Cyril Obi Social Science Research Council (SSRC) / Dr. Debalkew Berhe Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) / Mr. Désiré Assogbavi Oxfam International Ethiopia / Mr. Dickens Kamugisha Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) / Dr. Dorothé Njé United Nations University (UNU) / Mr. Francois Godbout Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) / Mr. Frederick Mhina Mngube East African Community (EAC) / Prof. Habtamu Wondimu Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) / Dr. Hesphina Rukato Development consultant / Mr. Innocent Ntabana Nile Basin Initiative / Ms. Kate A. Knopf Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) / Dr. Kojo Busia United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) / Eng. Ladislaus K. Leonidas East African Community (EAC) / Mr. Leonard Onyonyi East African Community (EAC) / Ms. Mbathio Samb United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) / Dr. Mercy Mwanikah Ojoyi Researcher / Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) / Dr. Nadège Compaoré York University / Dr. Noha Bakr American University in Cairo / Mr. Parek Maduot International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) / Mr. Patrick Kenzhile Economic and Social Research Foundation / Ms. Rhoda Tumwebaze Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) / Dr. Rhuks Ako Institute for Oil, Gas, Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development / Mr. Saidou Hamani United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) / Amb. Smail Chergui African Union (AU) / Dr. Solomon A. Dersso African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) / Mr. Stefan Bauchowitz GIZ / Dr. Sunday Okello Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)/ Mr. Tarila Ebiede Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) / Ms. Theo Sowa African Women’s Development Fund / Dr. Tim Murithi Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) / Mr. Volker Hauck European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) / Dr. Wale Ismail African Leadership Centre, King’s College London / Dr. Yonas Adaye Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) / Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Institutions Addis Ababa University / African Development Bank (AfDB) / African Union Commission (AUC) / Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) / Greenpeace Africa / Institute for Oil, Gas, Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development / International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) / International Crisis Group (ICG) / International Development Research Centre (IDRC) / International Water Management Institute (IWMI) / Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) / Tax Justice Network-Africa / The Mo Ibrahim Foundation / United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Report Team IPSS/Tana Forum Team Contributors

Dr. Kidane Kiros Ms. Billene Seyoum Dr. Wale Ismail Ms. Michelle Ndiaye Ms. Michelle Mendi Muita Dr. Akin Iwilade Prof. Charles Ukeje Ms. Elshaddai Mesfin Dr. Rhuks Ako Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael

Background Paper on NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: Conflict, Politics and Power

Contents

1. Introduction 1

2. Natural resources in Africa: The complex politics of extraction, revenue 2 distribution and violence

2.1 Natural resources and conflict financing 5

2.2 Resource type 7

3. Global power relations and natural resource governance 9

3.1 Emerging economies and resource extraction 9

3.2 Security of access and militarisation 10

3.3 Global social movements 12

4. The laws, norms and institutions in the governance of natural resources 13 Scale and K=kinds of fatalities in 2016

The Kimberley Process 17

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 18

Continental Initiatives: Agenda 2063 and the African Mining Vision 20 (AMV)

Non-extractive natural resources 23

5. Governing for the future: Strengthening current mechanisms 25

5.1 Democracy 26

5.2 Rule of law 27

5.3 Accountability and transparency 28

5.4 Efficient and equitable management of resource revenues 29

6. Conclusion 30

References 31

1. Introduction

Natural resource extraction shapes social, This background paper explores various economic and political relations in Africa in themes that link natural resource extraction multiple and complex ways. One of its most and governance to violent conflict in Africa. visible impacts is the tendency to generate It not just captures the state of practice in a spectrum of violent conflicts; ranging natural resource governance from the from low-intensity everyday tensions in vantage point of various key actors like the the Zambian copper belt to large-scale state, global governance institutions and civil insurgencies in the oil rich Niger Delta society but also explores the more recent of Nigeria. These conflicts tend to erupt ideational trends which could be important on the back of long term disruptions to indications of the future of governance local livelihoods that are caused both by processes in the sector. By situating the environmental implications of resource discourse within the broader context of extraction (Percival 1995, Jagger 2012) and peace building and conflict in Africa, the by (il)licit capital flows (World bank 2016) as reflections draw attention to the tensions well as tensions generated by inequitable and cooperation that the entire value-chain distribution of revenues as a lack of local of natural resource governance, rather than participation. As the complexities of just the extraction process, can potentially extraction and distribution of resources generate. deepen, the need to intervene in the governing of the process also naturally These issues are addressed through four increases, as do the attempts to accomplish sections. The first section broadly explores this (Grant, Nadege-Compaore & Mitchell the intersection between natural resources 2015). and conflict in Africa. It looks at how governance deficits have deepened the The incentives to construct credible correlation between resource extraction and sustainable governance processes and conflict, and notes the current state for natural resources emerge from both of affairs in that critical sector. It draws on locally specific circumstances as well as data from a variety of sources, including broader global governance agendas. These the grey literature generated by multilateral incentives focus on regulating not just the organisations, news media and NGOs, extractive practices of private companies to show what the natural resource sector (for instance, the Voluntary Principles on currently looks like. The second section then Security and Human Rights) but also the goes on to situate this discussion within the ways in which governments manage the context of global politics by addressing how resources that accrue therefrom (as in global resource politics impacts on natural Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, resource governance in Africa. It will also EITI). These multiple entry points to natural examine what the nature of transnational and resource governance have been described non-state based relationships involving a by Acosta (2010) as ‘the set of strategies retinue of non-governmental organisations aimed at improving the transparency and (NGOs), environmental social movements, accountability of governments and private indigenous rights movements, to name a companies during the licensing, exploration, few, mean for natural resource governance contracting, extraction, revenue generation and policy making. These are crucial in and allocation of natural resources’. terms of current perspectives with regard to Violent conflict further complicates these local ownership and inclusion as well as the governance processes and necessitates impact of multinational corporations and innovative strategies that can link resources capital on the ability of states to effectively to peaceful development (Alao 2007). govern their natural resources.

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 1 The third section focuses on the various legal sector intersects with public regulation and instruments (both binding and non-binding) public good. The section will also touch on and institutions through which states how these processes either exacerbate or manage natural resources. It will explore mitigate conflict. The final section explores how global norms on natural resource emerging ideas about and alternative futures governance are developed and highlight, on how to govern natural resources. It looks along with how they are incorporated into at how the current governing processes can legal and institutional infrastructures at the be strengthened and suggests new ideas national and sub-national (local) levels. It also that can link emerging global normative draws on important regulatory processes like consensus with local realities in order to the Kimberly Process and the EITI, and show create effective institutional frameworks. how regulatory benchmark by the private

2. Natural Resources in Africa: The Complex Politics of Extraction, Revenue Distribution and Violence

Michael Ross’ (2004) review of the agricultural resources have almost no impact literature on the relationship between on civil wars (Collier and Hoefler 2004). natural resources and civil wars highlights consensus on four main points. The first is In a study published by Oxford University’s that resources have different levels of impact Center for the Study of African Economies on conflict. In this regard, while oil increases (CSAE), Arezki, Bhattarcharyya and Mamo the likelihood of conflict, others like (2007) drew on a geocoded dataset to argue agricultural products have almost no impact. that unlike what is generally assumed, The second consensus is that while so called there is no empirical correlation between ‘lootable’ commodities like diamonds do resource discovery and the emergence of not necessarily induce conflict, they tend violent conflict. To say the least, this line to make violence intractable when it does of argument is difficult to sustain in the erupt. The third one is that there are certain face of widespread evidence of seemingly commodities, namely legal agricultural intractable violence that appears to be so products, that have no apparent link with apparently linked to the politics of resource civil war and finally that the correlation extraction and the accompanying social between resources in general and the onset inequalities. In the Democratic Republic of of civil wars is weak. Congo (former Zaire), for instance, more than five decades of violence over huge This work, as well as many like it (see Le mineral deposits have reportedly resulted Billon: 2001 and Snyder: 2006) focuses in the death of some three million people. on large scale civil wars as a measure of violence. Yet, there are many low level The Eastern provinces, especially North everyday violent conflicts which may not and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and hit international news headlines but are Katanga have been sites of prolonged nonetheless critical to the stability of fragile violent struggles by a multitude of local, states. Good examples are the farmer- regional and global actors over the control pastoralist conflicts in Nigeria’s ‘middle belt’ of the vast mineral deposits available. (Higazi 2016) as well as similar violence in This conflict has not just undermined the Kenya’s Turkana region (Lind 2003). These development of Congolese statehood, it examples also raise questions about the has resulted in some of the most alarming general assumption in the literature that environmental devastations seen in Africa

2 in the 21st century (Burnley 2011), including potential of generating violent contestations the depletion of aquatic life and water in that may ironically prevent them from the Congo River Basin reputed to be the actually being extracted. He described world’s second largest after the Amazon This the Darfur conflict as one such example cyclical causative pattern of natural resource in which violence erupts even before the exploitation and conflict is repeated in places natural resource becomes a key revenue as far apart as Nigeria’s volatile oil rich Niger earner. This pattern of violence linked to the Delta (Ako 2013, Iwilade 2015) and Sudan’s exploitation of natural resources can also be Darfur region (Behrends 2008). found in the Mano River Union countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea where Behrends (2008) even goes further to show the brutal civil wars of the 1990s and early that natural resources do not even need to 2000s were inextricably linked to struggles be physically extracted for them to generate over the control of timber, diamonds and brutal conflict. He argues that simply by rubber deposits (Richards 1996, Vigh 2006). being discovered, natural resources have the

Table 1: Selected African Civil Wars Linked to Resource Wealth, 1975-2003 Country Duration Resources Angola 1975–2002? Oil, diamonds Congo, Rep. of 1997 Oil Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1996–97, 1998– Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, marijuana, Liberia 1989–96 rubber, gold Morocco 1975– Phosphates, oil Sierra Leone 1991–2000 Diamonds Sudan (Darfur) 2003 Water, Oil

Figure 1: All resource related conflicts in Africa 1997-2014

Source: Kishi (2015)

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 3 Figure 2: Locations of resource related by over 90% since the 1960s and could conflict in Africa generate tensions in the future among the four countries - Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – whose citizens benefit as farmers, pastoralists and fishermen. It is also important to note however that resources like water could also serve to foster cooperation. The international dialogue around the use of the waters of the Nile between the ten countries through which it flows as well as ongoing cooperation in the Lake Chad basin indicates the potential of resources to be a source of cooperation rather than conflict. There is however a general consensus that there is a connection between social relations in states (or sites) with natural resources and the subsisting nature of governance. That is, where governance processes, institutions and actors are strong and equitable, the chances of natural resources generating violent conflict diminish significantly. Source: Kishi (2015). In this sense, one may argue that natural This disconnection between the CSAE resources are not conflict triggers in and of study and the general perception of the themselves, but that for this to be the case, the links between violent conflict and natural extractive and distributive logics governing resources as graphically shown by Figures 1 resource use must be embedded in broader and 2 above illustrates both the contentious and mostly contentious political contexts; nature of the politics associated with the for example, over race relations (Zimbabwe), extraction of natural resources as well as over class relations (Marikana South Africa), how explanations on the nexus between over minority rights (the Niger Delta) or over resources and conflicts have not been generational crisis (Sierra Leone). conclusive. In order to effectively trace the correlation This is more so when the other natural between natural resources and conflict, resources such as land and water, for therefore, it is useful to disaggregate the instance, are the subjects of violent discussion using by using specific markers contestations. Although these resources like conflict financing and resource type as are not discovered and extracted as oil and analytical frames. diamonds for instance, access to them Before doing that however, it is useful to instigate conflicts in much the same way briefly highlight the specific mechanisms and reasons. Governance issues including through which natural resources can regulatory, institutional and cultural conceivably generate violent conflict? frameworks that define and determine Many studies have attempted to show the economic access as well as their socio- conditions (or mechanisms) under which political ramifications culminate to instigate natural resources could be an indicator or escalate tensions and conflicts. As of violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler scarcity of these natural resources is likely 2004, Ross 2004, Humphreys 2005). These to increase, so is the likelihood of escalation mechanisms can be broadly grouped into of conflicts related to their management. For four. These are internal, external, resource instance, the Lake Chad, a major wetland in and space mechanisms. the semi-arid Sahel corridor has decreased

4 The internal mechanisms relate to those 2.1 Natural Resources and conflict triggers that relate directly to the Conflict Financing country’s internal political economy. For instance, are there significant ethno- As the preceding discussion suggests, religious (or racial) cleavages that could natural resources can have different impacts exacerbate the politics of natural resources? on social relations, depending on what is there an endemic problem of corruption in phase of violence is being examined. This is the extractive and distributive architecture especially true if one considers how the illicit of natural resources or more generally in extraction and commercialization of natural the country? Is the state strong or weak resources can provide long term financing in its capacity to maintain order and in its for conflict. For instance, where violence capacity to distribute public goods? (Collier erupts over political disagreements, as was and Hoefler 2004). The external mechanisms the case in the first Liberian civil war, access that could trigger violent conflict in a natural to and illicit market for natural resources can resource context relate to factors that derive profoundly impact on the severity, scope from the state’s relationship with foreign and duration of the violence. Invariably, interests. For instance, is there a substantial two main types of war economies develop external interest in the resource? How much (Taylor, 2013). The first, and more classic one, power do foreign multinationals wield in is that in national resources- skills, labour, the entire natural resource value chain? capital and natural- are mobilized to service Who possesses the expertise for extracting, the war effort of state and non-state entities. managing and marketing these resources? It is possible for a militaristic state to have (Alden and Davies 2006, Bradshaw 2009, a war economy even when not in active Ukeje and Ela 2013). The third one is conflict of a kind that threatens national resource mechanism. This covers a number survive. Many critics have contended that of issues ranging from whether the resource the United States runs such a war economy in question is a ‘lootable’ one like diamonds driven by its military industrial complex (Ross 2004) to whether it is scarce (Homer- (Hackemer 2001, Byrne 2010). Taylor (2013) Dixon 1994) or whether it is being developed argues that this type of war economy is for the future (Ross 2002, Behrends 2008). actually embedded in the very nature of Any of these could profoundly impact on the industrialised capitalism, and to that extent, nature of social and political contestations receives protection under international law. over resources. The second war economy is more relevant The final broad mechanism is the extraction in the context of the present discussion mechanism. This refers to the level of about natural resources. In this case, violence around extraction sites, the informal economic activities, including the nature of land ownership and claims and extraction and sale of natural resources co- the de-facto control of sites of extraction exist with widespread-armed violence. More (Alao 2007). While these are not exhaustive than simply co-existing, access to sites from descriptions of the different ways in which which the extraction of natural resources natural resources can intersect with violent can be guaranteed becomes the primary conflict, they do indicate the complexity goal of conflict entrepreneurs in ways that of the various triggers that analysts and make the resolution of political differences policy makers must look out for in order to extremely difficult. understand the resource driven conflicts. Over the last three decades, the nature of violent conflict has evolved significantly. For instance, while inter-state violence has become less common, internal insurgencies, civil wars and political instability have been

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 5 on the rise. This evolution has done much is relevant across varying natural resource to complicate the landscape of conflict contexts, from agricultural products like financing. In order for armed groups to be timber, rubber (Richards 1996) to diamond able to continue fighting, they need to be mining (Bone 2004). able to pay fighters, and sometimes provide services and infrastructure in the territories The control of mining sites does not however they control. The illicit trade in natural guarantee that armed groups would be able resources is one of the main avenues for to profit from illicit extraction of natural rebel groups to earn the funds needed to resources. They also have to be able to create pursue their war goals. A good example is the effective distribution networks as well as case of the notorious illicit diamond trade in plug into the global financial infrastructure. Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia. This aspect of the natural resource-conflict linkage underlines the important ways in In Angola, for instance, the rebel group which the formal (legal) and informal (illegal) UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi was said to systems of globalization can be deployed have earned an estimated 3.7 billion US in the service of illicit and violent ends. In a dollars in the sale of illicit diamonds in the World Bank report, Winer and Roule (2003), space of five years between 1992 and 1997. argue that the very same infrastructure This money was largely used to fund arms that has allowed unprecedented global purchases and to pay fighter salaries. The connectedness in legal cross-border trade impact of this trade was also felt outside and exchange has also made it very easy for of Angola itself as the smuggling routes armed groups to profit from criminal and/ in neighboring Zambia’s Mwinilunga and or violent activities. They have been able to Mongu regions often became unstable trade with companies, and sometimes even as different armed gangs competed for a states, as they launder the proceeds of those piece of the pie. This pattern is repeated in illicit trades. the DRC where the rebel movements RCD- Goma and RCD-Kisangani-MLC and their Many of the multilateral responses to the Rwandan and Ugandan allies, controlled the connection between natural resources and Equateur province, which is one of the most conflict have focused on this financing lucrative diamond-producing parts of the dimension. The logic is that if the funding DRC. In 1999, official exports were valued at infrastructure is effectively tightened and $261,361,308 (35 percent), while an estimated monitored, armed groups- the same applies $490,613,333 (or 65 percent) was smuggled for terrorist groups- would have fewer out of the DRC by armed actors. According incentives to extract natural resources and to Ndumbe and Cole (2005), more than 75 lesser funds to embark on protracted and percent of all the diamonds produced in the violent political contestations. Some of DRC before 2000 were smuggled out of the the key initiatives in this regards are the country. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) set up by the G-7 in Mary Kaldor’s (2013) postulation of a ‘new 1989, the 1998 Organisation for Economic wars’ thesis captures the argument being Co-operation and Development (OECD), made here quite aptly. Her work highlights Financial Stability Forum in 1999, and the how the line between crime and political 2000 UN Convention against Transnational conflict has blurred significantly in recent Organized Crime (The Palermo convention). times and the important role that non-state These initiatives address, only to an extent, actors play in this process. There are perhaps the financial architecture through which few places which symbolize this relationship conflict resources are funneled through the better than at sites of resource extraction international banking system. where the control of access is a major factor in the prolongation of violence. This point Attempts have also been made to prevent resources extracted illicitly from being

6 sold on the international market. The competition between pastoralists and Kimberly process for diamonds is one of farmers heating up significantly in the last such measures to determine the source of two years. all diamonds, whether or not they are the product of illicit extraction or are so called In the case of scarcity, scholars like Homer- ‘blood diamonds’. In order for these various Dixon (1999) and Kaplan (1994) have argued measures to work effectively, they need to be that it is the scarcity of natural resources that integrated and embedded within a broader generate violence rather than abundance. movement for peace and stability in the They argue that even where resources various resource-endowed regions. Broader appear to be abundant, the scarcity created questions of equity and social justice must by socio-economic distortions of livelihood also be fully addressed in those regions that the process of extraction often causes is otherwise the multilateral processes will bear the key trigger of violent conflict rather than little fruit. the fact of abundance. This suggests that conflict is likely to increase where access to resources becomes increasingly precarious as a consequence of scarcity. 2.2 Resource Type Climate change and rapid population Is the impact on conflict more significant if growth has increased the chances that the natural resource available or over which such vital resource scarcities will become stakeholders compete is easy to extract and more common (Kaplan 1994, Homer-Dixon distribute? So for instance, are resources 1994), thereby threatening stability in many like diamonds which can be extracted with parts of Africa. This is further exacerbated relatively crude methods, transported very by skewed water ownership and use ratios easily and sold very easily, more likely to which threaten to inflame nationalist and generate conflict than resources like oil materialist tensions among countries. which require more sophisticated extraction Kaniaru (2015) writes for instance that methods? These questions suggest that the whereas South Africa accounts for 80 per type of resource could have an effect on cent of water used in Southern Africa, it how they are able to shape social relations, owns only 10 per cent of total available water and invariably the likelihood to generate or resources. The implication of this is that it exacerbate conflict. has to depend increasingly on its neighbors for its water supply. While this may of course In a 2014 article, Koubi et al. noted two engender international cooperation, the categories of impacts that natural resource explosive mix of climate change induced type can have on conflict. The first category droughts, growing population and increased is where there is a scarcity of resources with industrialization of the surrounding typically low market value like cropland and countries means that they themselves will water. Even though such resources may begin to demand for more internal water use have low market value in relation to global at a time that supplies will drop dramatically. trade, they are often central to the livelihood The Okavango, Zambezi and Orange River and social mobility of the local consumers. Basins are critical potential hotspots of As a result, violent conflict over access to conflictual hydro-politics in this regard these resources can be brutal, long-running within Southern Africa. and intractable. A very good example of this type of resource based conflict can be found The second category identified by Koubi et in the Turkana area of Kenya where violence al. (2014) is the abundance of resources with over grazing land and cattle have claimed high market value. In this type of resource thousands of lives and caused instability. complex, the abundance of resources is likely This situation is also playing out in various to generate violent conflict as the market agrarian communities across Nigeria with value significantly raises the stakes for

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 7 competition so much so that the abundance to become intractable if the resource is of the resource merely incentivizes violent timber as against uranium, oil as against conflict rather than mitigate the impact of water? In this resource type scenario, the scarcity as discussed earlier. High worth extent of external interest can be expected resources like oil, diamonds and gold fall to increase significantly if the resource is into this category. It is not difficult to find globally strategic like oil. The militarization multiple examples across Africa where the of the Gulf of Guinea region is an important combination of high value and abundance case in point which illustrates the potential provide incentives for violent competition for wider stakeholder interests complicating over access and control. The examples of the conflict landscape if the resource is a Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Angola and DRC are strategic one (Ukeje and Ela 2013). One may particularly instructive in this regard. even argue that the international responses, with regards to the development of norms as These two categories suggested by Koubi and is captured in the third section of this paper, his colleagues do not however capture all the is more focused on ‘higher value’ resources various dynamics that resource types may such as diamonds and oil. introduce to conventional thinking about natural resources’ correlation with violent In spite of this apparent focus on globally conflict. For instance, they do not account strategic resources, there is growing interest for how the ease of extraction and the actual in other resources like land which are also physical properties of the resource can affect rupturing social and economic relations the way armed groups use natural resources. in profound ways. The World Bank (2010) If natural resources are difficult to extract reported for instance, that of the 45 million in that they need high levels of technical hectares of land being negotiated for large expertise and capital investments, one can scale commercial acquisitions globally in assume that rag-tag rebel groups will find 2009, about 70 percent were in Africa and it difficult to directly engage in extraction were being negotiated for by foreign interests. and sales. Yet, evidence suggests that in a This investor rush for land, as Ruth Hall (2011) number of hotspots where this is the case, described it, is often directed at land already armed groups can often find innovative ways occupied and used by local people (Sullie around this barrier. For instance, there is no and Nelson 2009), thus displacing thousands shortage of legitimate (if often unscrupulous) and ultimately generating violent resistance. business concerns that would quickly jump However, these land transfers have varying at the opportunity to risk doing business in impacts on local communities according such volatile regions. These companies can to the World Bank (2010) and some of them often provide the technical expertise and are acquired to attempt to resolve another markets in exchange for access to the sites resource related crisis- the energy crisis. As of resource abundance. They also build very Table 2 below indicates, a good percentage dynamic relationships with armed groups of the land grabbed by foreign interests are in ways that allow them to continue and used to service a growing biofuel industry. intensify resource extraction irrespective Unfortunately, while this tries to solve one of the carnage going on around them (Bray problem, it exacerbates another perhaps 2003). more urgent one, which is the food crisis. It is important to note that the food crisis is often Another question to consider is whether more pressing for the local communities it matters if the resource in question has whose lands and livelihoods are hijacked global strategic relevance? For instance, is by large corporations pioneering biofuels. it more likely for conflicts linked to resource

8 Table 2: Land Grabs for biofuels in Africa, 2013 Country Hectares Transferred Major Investor Benin 263,300 Italy Ghana 210,461 UK Guinea 106,415 UK Ivory Coast 47,000 Singapore Liberia 689,800 Singapore, Malaysia Mali 473,334 Libya, Saudi Arabia Mauritania 52,000 Saudi Arabia Niger 15,922 Saudi Arabia Nigeria 362,292 UK Senegal 375,570 India, China Sierra Leone 705,450 Vietnam, Portugal

Source: Elliot 2013 3. Global Power Relations and Natural Resource Governance

Like many other aspects of contemporary include the ‘new’ role of emerging international politics, natural resources are economies like China, India and Brazil; profoundly amenable to the complex nature the role of social movements, business of global power relations and competitions. and multilateral institutions in shaping From multinational companies to super norms; the continuing securitisation of powers, natural resources usually tend to resource extraction; and the gale of resource attract deep and extensive interests. With nationalisms manifesting in citizens’ this often comes significantly higher demands for greater control of natural likelihood of violent conflict. In order to resources and accruable benefits. feed the giant global industrial complex, natural resources have to be extracted, processed and distributed. Because they 3.1 Emerging Economies and are mostly located in places far and apart across the planet, the political boundaries Resource Extraction of statehood only serve to slow down the logic of access and distribution. Bradshaw Global politics has changed significantly (2009) touched on this point when he in the last decade with the growing clout argued that geographical factors such as the of emerging economies like China, India distribution of centers of supply and demand and Brazil in the extractive sectors of many of natural resources could potentially have African states. It is now difficult to have important implications for state and non- a discussion of global power relations state behaviour. How states perceive their and natural resources without engaging options and how they animate the choices with the seismic shift of power towards they make with regard to access to natural emerging economies. As the sources of resources, in turn, shapes the global politics new investment, these countries now of energy security. wield tremendous power in Africa’s extractive sectors and will thus be critical Some of the main signposts of the to the governance infrastructures that will contemporary global politics of extraction emerge over the next decade. As at 2009, for

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 9 instance, China was responsible for 30% of have been at the very core of this new global growth in the demand for oil, a figure scramble and that emerging markets are that means by 2030, it will be consuming now both the destinations and partners of some 15 million barrels of oil per day (Alden choice for many African states. One reason and Alves 2009). for this is that investments from states like China and India are cloaked with a language In order to firmly secure its continued of non-interference and shared history access to natural resources, the Chinese of marginalization. While this obviously government has linked its growing bilateral makes them less meddlesome partners, their infrastructure aid program to mining rights. efficient investments in elite or middle class For instance, China’s Export-Import bank aspirations for grand infrastructural projects funded major infrastructure projects in or presidential palaces means that they are Angola for $4.5billion in 2004 in exchange often able to quietly take over the space for oil; $3billion in Gabon in 2006 for being lost or abdicated by the West. manganese exploration; and $6billion for DRC infrastructure in exchange for copper and cobalt from the Kolwezi Copper Mine in 2008. These investments highlight 3.2 Security of Access and how China’s foreign policy has effectively Militarisation integrated both its diplomatic goals with the energy security concerns it has in relation One of the implications of this new scramble to its growing, resource hungry economy. for resources in Africa and its impacts on global strategic balances is the militarisation India is also making similar resource of many of the sites of resource extraction. focussed investments and foreign policy This militarisation is designed to ensure decisions as illustrated by the Indian energy security and preserve or build Prime Minister’s announcement in 2011 strategic alliances, yet, it seems to be of a $5billion credit line to African States. having the opposite effect as the growing Prior to that, Indian investments in oil instability of many of the sites of resource extraction had grown steadily, especially extraction would suggest. This has meant in Sudan through the ONGC Videsh (OVL). that energy security has become precarious According to Large (2010), India’s petro- for the destination industrialised and newly partnership with Sudan began in 2003 when industrialising states. OVL bought a 25 percent stake in Sudan’s main oil consortium. Further investments There is a growing deployment of foreign made Sudan one of the largest destinations troops in African states. Many of these for Indian foreign investment between 1995 deployments are linked to instabilities in and 2005. It fits within the broader energy sites of resource extraction and are often security logic that these investments focused explained away as part of the global war on securing India’s access to resources. on terror led by the United States. Figure II below shows the military deployments of Such investments by emerging economies the US and France, the two states with the have not been without controversy. For one, largest military presence on the continent they do no necessarily reflect the economic and illustrates how much foreign presence goals of the states involved but are part of there is on the continent. From Nigeria’s a broader global struggle by new powers oil to Niger’s uranium, it is interesting to to unseat- or at least compete on an equal note that virtually all of the states on this footing with- key western countries that map possess resources of global strategic have dominated global economic politics for relevance. While other considerations also decades. In the context of this competition, inform the deployment of troops, it is safe there seems to be a new scramble for the to assume that instability takes on a major natural resources of African states. Padraig significance if it occurs in a state with a Carmody (2011) writes that commodities globally relevant natural resource.

10 Figure 3: US and French Military Deployments in Africa 2014

Source: Halahke (2014).

Perhaps even more alarming than the deployment of troops by foreign states is the growing role of Private Military Corporations (PMCs) or Private Security Companies (PSCs) in resource rich sites. In the ways they are set-up, PMCs represent a very different type of danger for the stability of states as they often have much lower levels of accountability and are implicated in many of the most appalling human rights abuses that has been seen in the last decade.

Table 3: PMCs Linked to African Civil Wars, 1990-2008 Warring Groups War Onset/End PMC intervention Year(s) Rwanda 1994 Ronco 1994 Liberia/NPFL & ULIMO 1992-95 MPRI 1995 Specialist Services Int. 1991 Marine Protection 1992 Executive Outcomes 1995-96 Ibis Air International 1995-96 Sierra Leone/RUF 1991-96 Gurkha Security Guards Ltd. 1995 Control Risks; Group 4 1995 Sandline 1996 Lifeguard Management 1996 Teleservices 1996 Sandline 1998 Lifeguard Management 1998 Sierra Leone/Kabbah Faction 1998-99 Executive Outcomes 1998 Pacific Architects Engineers (ICI) 1998 Cape International Corporation 1998

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 11 Omega Support 1996-97 MPRI 1996-97 Kellogg Brown and Root 1996-97 Geolink 1997 DRC/AFDL 1996-97 Executive 1997 Outcome/Sandline 1997 Stabilico 1997 IDAS 1997 DSL 1998 Safenet 1998 DRC/RCD/MLC 1998-2002 IRIS Service 1998 Executive Outcomes spinoffs 1998 Somalia/SCIC 2006-08 ATS Tactical 2006-08 Executive Outcomes 1992-94 Angola/UNITA 1992-94 Capricorn 1994 Teleservices 1994 Stabilico 1998 Panasec 1998 IDAS 1998 Angola/UNITA 1998-2002 Omega 1998 IRIS Service 1998 Airscan 1998 Algeria/Islamic Front 1992-99 Eric SA 1992

Source: Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012: 817-8)

Table 2 above shows the wide range of many countries feel the need to securitize organised PMCs that are inserted into the sites. Unfortunately, militarisation does conflicts in Africa and whose activities serve not necessarily guarantee peace and stability to complicate the conflict landscape. These as it sometimes incentivises stakeholders organisations however do not show the to commit human rights abuses, ultimately entire picture of private armed groups or generating new forms of conflict. corporations involved in resource conflicts. For instance, in sites where there are no active civil wars but low-intensity insurgencies as 3.3 Global Social Movements in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, PMCs are often contracted to provide security for company Because the extraction of natural resources facilities and staff. The mid 1990s was a can and does often have profound particularly notorious period in Nigeria’s oil consequences for the environment, it delta where the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell, has become the focus of an increasingly was regularly accused of gross human rights powerful global movement. This movement, abuses committed through private armies including organizations such as Greenpeace they had been permitted to employ by the and Friends of the Earth, is global in its norm Nigerian government (Okonta and Douglas making and advocacy primarily because 2008). actors recognize that the consequences What the above suggests is that the of environmental degradation are extraction of natural resources is often such transnational in nature. As key players in the a volatile and destabilizing process that natural resource governance debate, global

12 environmental movements focus on a wide often tied to the distortions to livelihoods range of general or specific issues linked to that multinational corporations create when the environment. They have contributed they extract natural resources. In this regard, to the debate mainly by publicly holding the concern is more about the economic companies accountable for activities and cultural implications of extraction rather that undermine environmental security than the environment itself. Yet, this is not or by lobbying governments for greater always reflected in the global environmental regulation of the extractive sector. They agenda that tends to focus on broader have also advocated for local communities planetary issues like climate change. There whose livelihoods can often be destroyed is also the problem of dependency given and/or distorted by the actions of large that local movements often have to rely multinational corporations. on funding support from foreign donors; a relationship that robs local movements of While it would appear that there is a coherent ownership of the narratives on which their global environmental agenda that attempts advocacies derive. to impose norms and rules that regulate natural resource extraction and mitigate These structural dependencies nonetheless, its overall impact on the planet, this is environmental NGOs have effectively actually hardly the case. The environmental inserted themselves into the global politics movement is itself hardly immune from of natural resource extraction and have the structural power relations that African been instrumental to many of the norms, states have to contend with on the global institutions and regulations that we will be stage. Local environmental concerns are discussing in the next section.

4. Laws, Norms and Institutions in the Governance of Natural Resources

The discussion thus far illustrates the provides the basis for making suggestions complexity of the politics of natural for the future of natural resource governance resources in Africa and underscores the in Africa in the subsequent section. need to develop effective mechanisms to govern processes and outcomes. This As noted earlier, Africa’s natural resources section examines the existing national and have shaped the continent’s integration into international natural resource governance the global economic and political system. mechanisms and institutions currently in Three waves of this integration process may place to regulate access to and the control be identified, with each one governed by the of natural resources on the continent. prevalent political situation. The advent of It evaluates the current state of these trans-continental exploration by Europeans mechanisms especially from the vantage governed the first wave of natural resource point of inclusivity, transparency and extraction in Africa. Characterized by the furthering sustainable development in the imperialistic ambitions of the West, this continent. As noted previously, there has phase was marked by the forced exploitation been more traction on the international of natural resources across the continent regulation of ‘high value’ resources. Hence during the long period of trans-Atlantic this section examines in particular the slave trade in 1807. In that period, global national regulation of these resources as well commerce was essentially determined by as the evolution of key relevant international norms and directives from the West and norms. The discussion in this section coincided with the pre-colonial era.

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 13 The second phase of resource extraction initial phase of resource nationalism in was during the era of colonization when which newly independent African countries the regulations and laws governing access pursued nationalistic policies which and exploitation were designed by colonial aimed to assert “independence” from their governments to serve their own narrow colonial heritages. They considered their interests. During this period, colonial powers new positions as an opportunity not only such as France, Great Britain, Portugal, to get over the economic subjugation they Belgium and Spain, designed systems suffered under colonialism but also to wrest that facilitated the extraction of natural control of their economies from former resources for the benefit of their home colonial authorities. The exercise of absolute governments. For instance, in Nigeria, the ownership and control of natural resources Mining Regulation (oil) Ordinance of 1907 by governments in newly independent made by the British colonial government African states was considered integral to, and granted exclusive rights to exploit oil to evidence of, political independence. In quick firms, syndicates or companies that were successions, the new central governments “British”. Section 15 of the Ordinance stated vested in themselves the (same) absolute that: ownership and control of natural resources attracted by the substantial revenues that No license or lease shall be granted under would accrue to the state. the provisions of the Ordinance to any firm, syndicate, or company which is not None of the newly independent states at British in its control and organization, and this stage seemed to consider that these in the case of a company, all the directors laws were made by the colonial authorities shall be, and shall at all times continue to to wade off or at least limit local participation be, British subjects, and the company shall in the decision-making processes regarding be registered in and subject to the laws of natural resource management. Such colonial some country or place which is part of His regulations, for the most part, ignored the Majesty’s dominions, or in which His Majesty fact that local communities feel a sense has jurisdiction. of ownership of natural resources in their domains even if they lack the technical Notably, this principle was retained in the resources to exploit them. Consequently, 1914, 1925, 1950 and 1958 amendments to a plural system of management of natural the Mineral Oils Ordinance. In principle, resources became the norm on the until Nigeria was granted independence, its continent; one in which local perceptions oil was only to be exploited by the British guided by “ancestral heritage and identity Colonial authority. During the colonial era, as well as religious beliefs” competed with Western colonizing authorities such as the (and exists alongside) laws inherited from British controlled territories and resources colonial authorities that did not change in Africa building their economies based on much in the post-independence era. their naval capacity to enforce compliance and a global economy predicated on political The existence of a plural system regulating dominium. land ownership and by extension, access, has created challenges that have consistently Colonialism deprived communities of contributed to conflicts on the continent. decision powers concerning (valuable) The divergence between indigenous natural resources on and underneath the traditional laws and state laws that define land they depend on. Colonialism was ownership of natural resources has led not simply about economic subjugation to contentious relations within several but also about the ability to wrest control countries in Africa (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). of the local economy from African rulers. For instance, land is a vital natural resource The end of colonialism and the emergence in Africa and is appreciated for more than of post-colonial African states led to the

14 tits economic value and benefits. Land, is ownership and control of natural resources more fundamentally considered as a source is in itself not a bad thing – as the Botswana of familial and cultural identity; individual experience has proved –access to political and communal, as well as the link between power across the continent has become generations – past, present and future. Thus, synonymous with gaining control of natural for the majority of Africans - most of who resource revenues, mostly for personal inhabit the rural areas where most of the aggrandizement. Botswana, it seems, is the exploitation of natural resources occurs – only African country with a history of using the significance of land extends beyond its resource revenues to further strengthen the comprehension of post-colonial laws national institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson that tends to place value and considers and Robinson (2006) flag three elements that ownership and access based on its economic have contributed to Botswana’s success to value and benefits. include: (i) the existence of inclusive pre- colonial institutions such as the kgotla (or It is for this reason that national legal community forum) for airing public dissent frameworks tend to grant the State the and reaching consensus. For Acemoglu and authority to appropriate “value-added” land, his colleagues, it was not only the case that whether rich in forestry, oil, diamonds, or, this pre-colonial system was not impacted as more recent events have revealed, arable. in any significantly negative way by British Regarding arable land, it is becoming a colonial rule but also that it served the common phenomenon across the continent interests of the elite to maintain the status for the State to acquire vast estates of land quo after independence following the from local inhabitants for the purpose of discovery of diamonds. In essence, unlike mechanized farming, usually by foreign the rest of Africa where natural resource interests. Such land-grab has occurred with wealth became the impetus for convulsive resultant conflicts across the continent with elitist struggle for control of political power, a Rights and Resources Institute (2016) study the legal framework in Botswana has evolved concluding from a review of 37 case studies to promote the optimal use and benefit of from West, East and Southern Africa that resource revenues. 70% of the disputes related to private sector land and natural resource investments on The fundamental role that legal frameworks the continent began when communities play the mis (management) of natural were forced to leave their land while resource is at the heart of the qualitative 30% was related to compensation. When difference between Botswana and other considered against the backdrop of the fact resource-rich countries on the continent that about 70% of land grabbing occurs in (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). They Africa (Deininger et al. 2010), its potential argue that the resource curse is only a red for increasing the spate of conflicts on the herring; that it is the legal framework of continent cannot be ignored. This is more so resource-rich countries that determines that land grabbing has impacts on access to how much of autonomy or dependence they drinking water, a factor that also feeds into are on the resource and the consequences. the conflict dynamics with regards to local An overview of provisions of Botswana’s inhabitants access to their natural resources. Mines and Minerals Act (No. 17 of 1999) reveals that like most African countries, With regards other extractive resources, the ownership of minerals is vested in the the post-colonial laws emphasized State. However, the law cast aside ministerial state ownership with the intent that discretions that permitted the acquisition such resources would be used for the and transfer of mining properties in favour development of the country rather than of more transparent procedures. It also limiting the benefits to the immediate region revised the taxation regime to make the they are extracted. While embracing state industry more attractive to foreign investors,

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 15 without leaving them to act in ways that to the Angolan government. Almost a undermine the sovereignty of Botswana. similar framework, if less blatant, applies Furthermore, the regulatory framework in Nigeria, another country continuously promotes sustainable use of resource hit by resource-revenue scandals, as the oil revenues by, for example, following an minister is vested with wide discretionary implicit self-disciplinary rule contained powers that are open to flagrant abuse. It in the Sustainable Budget Index (SBI) that is not surprising that over the past three require mineral revenues to be used solely decades, several oil ministers in Nigeria have to expand the economy’s productive base either been implicated or indicted for on one rather than fund consumption expenditure corruption charge or another, and that none (Ako and Uddin 2013). of them have been convicted. On the contrast, regulatory frameworks Invariably, then, the institutional in other countries have contributed to the arrangement for natural resource governance opacity in natural resource management on the continent seems to reveal a plethora apart from fuelling unprecedented of inadequacies in the legal regime in many corruption in the sector. In Angola, for African countries. Angola’s Sonangol and example, three laws – the Access to the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Administrative Documents Bill, the National (NNPC) are two examples of the state-led Security Bill, and the State Secrecy Bill – but quasi-commercial institutions given adopted between 2002 and 2003 reduced the responsibility to manage the natural the efficacy of Constitutional provisions to resource sector– both as operators and tackle corruption (Ako and Uddin 2011). The regulators. Both institutions have been at the laws severely restrict access to information receiving ends of allegations ranging from thereby restricting the possibilities revenues mismanaged, unaccounted for, of exposing fraud and corruption of embezzled, and/or misappropriated. In one government officials. The State Secrecy instance, the Nigerian Extractive Industry Bill criminalizes possession of documents Transparency Initiative (NEITI) reported that that the government considers sensitive, the NNPC failed to pay US$15 billion in oil even if obtained lawfully by individuals not revenues to the State coffers. Top officials of employed by the government. Article 2 of the Corporation and in the oil sector as well the law specifically provides that ‘financial, as their cronies are standing trial in various monetary, economic, and commercial cases on charges related to fraud and money interests of the State’ can be classified laundering. The loss of natural resource as “secret.” This phrase can be broadly revenues to the national coffers; particularly interpreted as a euphemism that data on oil in countries that rely heavily on natural revenues (amongst others) are not for public resources, have been compounded by the scrutiny. global financial meltdown and declining global commodity prices. Furthermore, the law has extraterritorial reach; a move deemed to ensure that With grossly inadequate regulatory representatives of multilateral institutions, frameworks to manage national revenues, international NGOs, the international international benchmarks for the press, or other institutions couldn’t management of the natural resource publish materials that may be considered sector have become a prerequisite for the embarrassing or revealing by the government intervention of international financial (Ako and Uddin 2011). For instance, the institutions and aid agencies in Africa. Angolan government threatened BP with the A set of international norms regulating termination of its licence after the company, natural resource governance have since following pressure from Global Witness, developed that are integrated into national promised to publish figure on its payments legislative frameworks in ways that nudge

16 institutions to promote transparency and traded in the international market neither accountability in the natural resource originate from conflict areas nor that they sector. It is anticipated that these norms directly or indirectly, fund violent conflicts. will, in effect, ensure that the continent’s Since it was conceived and implemented, it resource base will serve as a fulcrum for has become an established norm within the poverty alleviation and national (sustainable) diamond industry and plays a fundamental development. Also, these norms aim to role in governing the conduct of institutions make it difficult for conflict actors and their involved in the buying and selling of the benefactors to fund violent conflicts with resource. natural resource revenues. The Kimberly Process (KP) and the Extractive Industries The trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ has Transparency Initiative (EITI) which both reduced significantly as a result of the directly relate to the extractive industry institutionalization of the KP since it has are used as examples of global norms that become difficult for non-state armed groups have an impact on the development of to mine and trade them. regulatory frameworks that contribute to However, President Trump’s plan (leaked to natural resource management in Africa. the press) to suspend the Dodd-Frank Act On the continental level, the Agenda 2063 by executive order has serious implications and the African Mining Vision (AMV), two for conflict in Congo. Suspending the Act homegrown visions that implicate natural will mean that section 1502 that requires resource management are discussed. While U.S. companies to avoid using conflict the AMV is limited to the extractive industry, minerals from Congo and surrounding mining to be precise, Agenda 2063 is a much countries will be ineffective for the duration broader vision. Thereafter, a discussion of the suspension. This means that US on evolving frameworks on the marine companies may trade in conflict minerals environment and land, two other important and by extension, seeing a new market, non- natural resources that have potential to state armed actors will re-emerge from the contribute to the conflict matrix on the shadows to exploit what they are sure to see continent. as an economic opportunity. Although some companies have already noted that they will continue to purchase ethical minerals, The Kimberley Process the viability of a market, however small, is portends danger of conflicts minerals The Kimberly Process (KP) emerged in and the attendant issues including violent response to the trade in “conflict diamonds” contestations over access. from countries experiencing civil war Thus far, the KP was able to achieve its such as Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone immediate aim, and by cutting off the (Bone, 2004). Under the regulation, the supply chain of non-state armed groups, United Nations prohibited private investors not only did the incentive to engage in from trading diamonds sold by the União resource-related conflicts reduce, States Nacional para a Independência Total de were in a position to increase revenues Angola (UNITA) (Bone, 2004). It originated from minerals. Nonetheless, other than from extensive international campaign led Botswana where the management of the by leading international Non-Governmental diamond industry is largely determined by Organizations (INGOs) such as Global Witness local indigenous policies rather than the and through the efforts of governments led consequence of global norms such as the KP, by Botswana and South Africa. Briefly, the example of resource-rich African countries Kimberly process sets out the standard for that have managed to close poverty gaps verifying the origin, quality and ownership and stave off resource-related conflicts of diamond minerals to ensure that those are few (Iimi, 2006). Unfortunately, where

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 17 the KP succeeded in increasing resource smelters/refiners that did not require tags or revenues accruing to the State, as in the due diligence checks on their supply chains case with Zimbabwe, incidences of gross in 2011. While the suspension was lifted in misappropriation were reported (One, 2016). May 2013, the government banned all cross- province mineral transfers in June 2012 to As a signatory to the KP that was partly combat smuggling. The application and responsible for rise in diamond production enforcement of this regulation has resulted by more than 500% between 2008 and 2013, in the overall decrease of mineral exports the country also witnessed a steady decline from east of the DRC. in revenues in that period. In 2011 and 2012, shipments of diamonds grew from US$238 A key lesson, then, is that the governance million to US$563 million but treasury of natural resource processes is determined contributions dropped from $81 million to less by global norms but by local and regional $45 million, with US$15 billion reportedly natural resource governance regulations, misappropriated from the sale of diamonds laws and institutions. This assertion does in 2016 alone. The failure to properly manage not deviate from the fact that global norms the resource revenues have fed directly into pave the way to address local or national pockets of popular protests witnessed across governance failures. The point being made the country over the last one decade at least. is that the manner national regulatory frameworks and institutions evolve and Nonetheless, the KP has succeeded in respond to global norms are central to the stemming the flow of conflict diamonds extent to which the intentions of these and has contributed to the evolution of international norms are attained. Countries other norms on the continent such as the like Botswana that have benefitted from International Conference of the Great Lakes resource endowments have done so based Region (ICGLR) Certificate for Designated on well-developed local regulatory and Minerals. The Certificate for Designated institutional structures. When they are in Minerals aims to function much in the place and enforced, local laws and institutions same way as the KP by awarding permitting are more effective in the governance of only shipments of designated minerals natural resources for the benefit of ordinary (tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold) that can people in ways that ultimately reduces the demonstrate “conflict free” origin, transport potential of such resources to instigate and/ and processing. The main aim of this or fuel violent conflicts. initiative, much like the KP, is to eradicate the use of resource revenues to fund violent conflicts in the region. The imperatives of the initiative are being harmonized and Extractive Industries integrated into national legislation as Transparency Initiative (EITI) stipulated by Article 22 of the Protocol of the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Like the KP, the EITI was an outcome of Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) in campaigns led by International Non- the Great Lakes Region. Governmental Organizations (INGOs) such as Global Witness, Open Society Institute, In 2012, Rwanda and DRC integrated the Oxfam, Save the Children and Transparency ICGLR RCM into domestic law. In May 2012, International. However, it gained popularity within four months of transposing the law, following the endorsement it received from the DRC government enforced the domestic the Tony Blair administration in the United law retroactively against two Chinese mineral Kingdom (Ocheje, 2006). The initiative was traders - TTT Mining (exporting as Congo designed to “improve the management of Minerals and Metals) and Huaying Trading natural resources, reduce corruption, and Company. Both companies were suspended mitigate conflict” (Haufler, 2010). for having sold untagged minerals to Chinese

18 There are 6 operational criteria within which objectives. A total of 27 African countries EITI seeks to achieve its core objective to - more than the number that joined the improve transparency in natural resource KP - have signed up to the EITI.2 Many governance. These are: countries signing up to the EITI, particularly those without relevant extant transparency 1. Regular publication of all material oil, regulations are obliged to establish new gas and mining payments by companies laws that primarily create institutional to governments (“payments”) and structures to implement the initiatives all material revenues received by principles. Consequently, national EITI governments from oil, gas and mining institutions have emerged across resource- companies (“revenues”) to a wide rich countries on the continent alongside audience in a publicly accessible, their existing natural resource governance comprehensive and comprehensible structures, legal and institutional. Although manner. the alignment of these laws to EITI standards 2. Where such audits do not already is a major factor in determining whether exist, payments and revenues are the a country has become more transparent subject of a credible, independent in natural resource governance, they are audit, applying international auditing necessary but grossly insufficient to promote standards. transparency. 3. Payments and revenues are reconciled For example, in Nigeria, despite the by a credible, independent administrator, promulgation of the Nigerian Extractive applying international auditing Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) standards and with publication of the (NEITI Act, 2007), lack of transparency administrator’s opinion regarding that and corruption in the oil industry are reconciliation including discrepancies, rife, contributing to conflicts in the Niger should any be identified. Delta area. In the latest report on Year 2014 report released in 2016, the national 4. This approach is extended to all oil corporation, the NNPC, was indicted companies including state-owned of not remitting over US$4.7 billion to the enterprises. federation’s account, while the report for the previous year had indicated that the NNPC 5. Civil society is actively engaged as a withheld over US$13.29 billion over a nine- participant in the design, monitoring year period. While the NEITI reports reveal and evaluation of this process and rampant corruption in the natural resource contributes towards public debate. sector, new oil-related corruption scandals 6. A public, financially sustainable work continue to unfold; including allegations plan for all the above is developed by the of fraud and money laundering against host government, with assistance from government officials, as highlighted earlier, the international financial institutions a factor responsible for the restiveness in where required, including measurable the Niger Delta region and contributing targets, a timetable for implementation, to the prevalent conflicts in the area. and an assessment of potential capacity constraints. 2 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, These criteria set out the norms upon which Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, the future of transparency in the extractive Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, sector was to be built. To be considered Togo and Zambia. ‘transparent’ therefore, companies and countries with natural resource are expected to sign up to the EITI and adhere with its

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 19 Notwithstanding the lack of transparency national guidelines to enhance transparency in the Nigeria, the country is deemed to be in natural resource governance. fully compliant, a clear indication that full compliance with EITI imperatives is not tantamount to good governance of natural resources. Nonetheless, it suffices to say Continental Initiatives: Agenda that the EITI has had considerable impacts 2063 and the African Mining on natural resource governance in Africa Vision (AMV) despite the challenges that are still manifest. The EITI has made it possible for stakeholders Africa has further seized the initiative in terms with different interests – governments, of norms building and implementation in the corporations, companies, NGOs, and so on– extractive sector with Agenda 2063 and the to collaborate more effectively. Even if there AMV, amongst others. Agenda 2063, adopted are still many proverbial rivers to cross, it in 2015 by the AU Summit, is a framework is pertinent that EITI is capable of shaping formulated for the purpose of guiding national legislation in ways that promotes Africa’s development in the next fifty years increased transparency and accountability adopted by the AU. It was developed from in natural resource governance. For extant African frameworks, programmes example, there is legislation in the works and declarations, consultations with a to ensure that there is full disclosure of broad spectrum of African stakeholders at company ownership details under the the grassroots level, synthesis of 35 national beneficial ownership scheme. Government and Regional Economic Communities institutions are also benefitting from the (RECs) strategic and action plans, situational influence of EITI; for example, the office of analysis and study of global mega trends. the Auditor-General in the DRC has become This bottom-up approach builds on the re-energized to deliver on its mandate with past experiences and initiatives as well as regards monitoring and reporting on public taking contemporary global trends into finance. consideration. Article 66(b) of Agenda 2063 clearly outlines the Agenda’s historical Two conclusions may be drawn with regards background and expressly refers to an the role of EITI in developing national legal African turning point wherein there is a regimes in Africa. First, is that in adopting determination to end wars and conflicts, to the EITI principles, countries are obliged to build shared prosperity, to integrate, to build implement legal reforms as preconditions responsive and democratic governance including the creation of national EITI as well as end the marginalization of the institutions to promote progress in adhering continent. to the imperatives of the initiative. Secondly, several countries are going through the There are a few instructive ideas that come motions of accepting and implementing through the above provision. First and global norms and institutions while foremost is that ending wars and conflicts, maintaining a level of opacity that allows many of them either over or funded by corruption to continue. Interestingly, the natural resources, is seen as integral to a Centre for the Study of Economies of Africa renaissance for Africa. Reference to shared (CSEA) posits that the multiplicity of laws prosperity will include the economic growth governing the management of natural of nations based on their natural sources resources – including international norms as well as common resources such as vast and national regulations – sometimes end up oceanic space that harbors the blue economy, creating the lacunae exploited to corrupt the the new resource frontier, for example. The process of transparency and accountability reference to the integration and building in the extractive sector. Hence, there is of responsive and democratic governance urgent need to harmonize the global and suggests that governance, broadly speaking

20 to include the management of resources, is to “have a prosperous Africa, based will be based on responsive and democratic on inclusive growth and sustainable governments with a responsibility to development” has implications for natural promote good governance. resource governance. Relevant goals and priority areas within this aspiration are Agenda 2063 Aspiration 1 of Agenda 2063 captured below:

Goals Priority areas Modern agriculture for increased productivity and Agricultural productivity and production. production Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic Marine resources and energy. growth Port operations and marine transport. Sustainable natural resource management Biodiversity conservation, genetic resources and ecosystems. Sustainable consumption and production patterns. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient Water security. economies and communities Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention. Renewable energy.

The vision and roadmap as laid out in and external actors involved in the extractive Africa’s Agenda 2063 provides a framework industry. For example, the high dependency to develop sectoral and normative, national, on international exports has failed most regional and continental plans into a African countries as they lack the capacity coherent whole which could form the basis to enhance the value of their commodities of natural resource governance in Africa. The locally thereby sacrificing opportunities different goals in the priority areas identified socio-economic development. in Agenda 2063 also demonstrates the ambition of policy makers in the continent Broadly, the key objectives of the AMV to maximize all forms of natural resources include: the enhancement of retained in the continent. value by promoting linkages; obtaining an adequate share of mineral revenue; With the adoption of the African Mining improving public participation and Vision (AMV) by the Assembly of Heads accountability; pursuing an integrated view of States and Governments of the African of rights of various stakeholders; and, valuing Union (AU) at the February 2009 Summit environmental resources. Other objectives held in Addis Ababa, it is expected that are to use mineral revenue efficiently; countries in Africa may be moving towards promote local development; encourage achieving the agenda 2063. The AMV is regional cooperation and harmonization; intended as a holistic approach to the and strengthening institutions by building exploitation of resources for development capacity and developing networks (AMV (AMV 2009). The key objective of the AMV 2009). is to recognize the use of mineral resources as a catalyst to broad-based growth and The objectives of the AMV indicate that its development, rather than a means to mandate goes beyond matters bordering on revenues that have not transformed the lives transparency to include those issues linked of Africans in the past decades. The Vision to the optimal utilization of the continent’s proposes a shift from the current model natural resources. By adopting a holistic inherited from the colonial era characterised approach to understanding and responding by a high dependency on global export of to the myriad issues that plague mineral resources, mostly to the former colonial exploitation in Africa, the focus of the AMV metropolis in ways that sustains an uneven is on the enhancement of retained value in relationship between African governments such a way as to retain substantial value-

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 21 added within- not outside - the continent. “create a mining sector that generates Again, Botswana’s beneficiation policy is an adequate income and rents to eradicate example of how an African country might poverty and finance African growth and take the initiative in promoting a value chain development”; a provision general enough (for its diamond industry) to the benefit for to be popularly supported but without the local population. concrete guidelines. Thus, the alignment of sectorial policies of mineral rich African Without detracting from the benefits that countries with the AMV goals is therefore global norms have had on Africa’s extractive often going to rather implicit. sector, the imperative to develop and implement homegrown norms capable of Secondly, resource-rich countries on the contributing to effective natural resource continent are faced with a plethora of governance is overdue. Such sets of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements norms would be expected to consider the (from traditional partners and new ones peculiarities of the continent’s situation and particularly China and India) with the designed in a way that is easier for African renewed global rush to Africa. Meandering countries to muster the requisite political these, in addition to the AMV and Action will to implement them. Agenda 2063 and Plan, will not be an easy task. With terms the AMV are both endogenous thus the AU’s of engagement in these “international” member states and the five regional blocs alliances looking more attractive – the can identify and ‘own’ both their processes Chinese investing heavily in infrastructure and outcomes. Africa has developed several in return, for example – it may take a mission statements often categorized as considerable time for the AMV and Action declarations, aspirations and visions that Plan to take a foothold in terms of actualizing can serve the continent well in terms if they its intents. This may lead to delays in the can be concretized. One may posit that the initiatives evolving to become norms in the AMV is already evolving from a “vision” to a real sense of the word. norm as it has become the basis for reform of mineral policies as well as establishing In summary, Africa needs to harness its legal and regulatory framework at the both drive for a renaissance by looking inwards to the national (e.g. Mozambique, Ethiopia, develop normative frameworks that address Lesotho and Tanzania) and regional level. the challenges that affect the ability to utilize With regards the latter, ECOWAS has begun its rich and diverse natural resource base to the process of developing an ECOWAS achieve economic growth and sustainable Minerals Development Policy (EMDP) that development. Resource related conflicts, was validated in June 2011. The EMDP especially those related to the extractive though considered separate from the AMV industry, are one of the main stumbling is related to, and shares important features blocks that must be addressed. With with it and the Action Plan. several countries having gone through the subsequent difficulties that these conflicts However, there are hindrances that may cause, there is more than enough experience limit the evolution of such visions and on the continent to develop a comprehensive mission statements to the level of norms set of norms that will provide the requisite that will precipitate the required changes changes in regional and national regulatory to Africa’s natural resource governance and institutional frameworks to promote structures. Using the AMV as an example, it the propoer exploitation and utilization of is suffice to say that the Vision and its Action Africa’s natural resources. Plan are quite vague and offer a number of ideas rather than a concrete governance framework that can be readily implemented. This includes, for example, goals such as

22 Non-Extractive Natural level to provide the necessary push for 2050 Resources AIMS to evolve from an expansive strategy document to a continental normative framework (Walker 2017). As noted previously, Africa’s natural resource base is extensive. In addition to the extractive Nonetheless Africa has a history of industry that has gained more prominence regional and multilateral arrangements to over the decades due to the huge revenues govern shared marine resources. The Nile associated with it. As a result, the norms that Basin Initiative (NBI) for instance is an regulate these other resources including intergovernmental partnership of 10 Nile the marine environment (including in- Basin countries, 3 established in February land water ways and resources of the sea), 1999 to “provide a forum for consultation land as well as forests and biodiversity, have and coordination among the Basin States been relatively slow in developing to the for the sustainable management and levels of regional and national responses, development of the shared Nile Basin water regulatory and institutional. In other words and related resources for win-win benefits” the management of these other resource (NBI website). In West Africa, the Niger Basin bases has been, generally speaking, more Authority (NBA), created in 1964, brings lax. together the countries 4 that are connected by the Niger River and its tributaries to promote In fact, the immense value these resources cooperation among the Member States and hold have sometimes been undervalued to ensure an integrated development of the until recently. For example, the sea as a Niger Basin in the fields of energy, water resource had till quite recently been regarded resources, agriculture, animal husbandry, as a means of transportation. However, with fishing and fisheries, forestry, transport, the conflicts occurring inland and new communications and industry. technology to explore resources resulting in huge discoveries of reserves of natural gas in This area that is already experiencing the marine environment, for instance, more conflicts, political instability, poverty, heavy attention has been given to this resource. reliance on natural resources is prone to even more conflicts, especially as it grapples There have been a series of attempts at the with the challenges of climate change AU level to develop a maritime strategy that (World Bank 2016). Notably, the NBA has a takes cognizance and places the right value developed a Climate Resilience Investment on the continent’s vast marine resources. Plan (CRIP) to tackle the challenges of The challenges of piracy in Africa’s climate change and improve the livelihoods Maritime’s space led to the evolution of the of the population that live in the Niger Basin AU-led 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (World Bank 2016). There is also the Lake Strategy (2050 AIMS) that the AU Assembly Chad Basin comprising of Cameroon, Chad, adopted in 2014. While expanding the scope Niger and Nigeria that is already enmeshed of the 2050 AIMS to include development in violent conflicts originating from the and governance issues is laudable, including Boko Haram terrorist group. These Basins the blue economy among the major goals of have played a significant role to promote the Agenda 2063 10-year implementation mutual co-operation in the management plan registered a sign of intent that Africa of marine resources and have an even more was preparing to ensure it reaped optimal a critical role to play in mitigating disputes benefits from its Maritime domain. However, the institutional structure to actively pursue 3 Members include Burundi, DR Congo, the realization of this important agenda is Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, The not in place. While several recommendations Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea participates as an have been made in this regard, nothing observer. concrete has taken place on the continental 4 These are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 23 and managing conflicts that are bound to level, beginning with ten (10) pilot countries. occur as the impacts of climate change Specific objectives of the project include the increasingly manifest. In the absence of development of a comprehensive baseline a continental framework that effectively that will form the basis for tracking progress manages the marine environment, the in implementation of the key decisions Basins have to live up to the modern day of the AU Declaration on Land; track reality by recognizing that water is also a progress made at the continental, regional conflict-prone resource. and national levels since the launch of the implementation of the Declaration; The AU officially recognized the “centrality document and disseminate best practices; of land to sustainable socio-economic and build capacity to sustain efforts of growth, development and the security of the member states in regular tracking and social, economic and cultural livelihoods” of reporting on land governance. Africans with the Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges In Africa. The Declaration In a nutshell, the development of normative adopted in 2009 5 noted that there was a need framework, at least at a continental to have “strong systems of land governance framework that may precipitate changes in rooted in principles of sustainability in an national frameworks that characteristically effort to ensure preservation, protection grant the state unfettered access to land and renewability of Africa’s land and related is slow. As discussed in earlier sections of resources”. However, progress has been slow this paper, land-related conflicts – whether continentally and regionally to address the precipitated by access to the land simplicita issues the Declaration highlighted. Indeed, it or to other resources harbored - obstruct is an onerous task to achieve the desired task the effective and optimal exploitation of adopting a continental Framework and natural resources. These conflicts have Guidelines on Land Policy that will ensure not only negatively affected the economic the effective management of land to ensure performances of many countries on the equitable access. continent, but is continually disrupting the social fabric of African societies, a tendency The AUC-ECA-AfDB Land Policy Initiative that portends more danger for the future (LPI) has launched a pilot project to track unity of the continent and member states. progress in the implementation of the AU Hence, it is time to refocus attention from the Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges. extractive industry to recognize the essence The project launched in March 2017 has of other natural resources both in the ways the broad objective to track the progress they can contribute to development but also that has been made on the continent with as they are conflict drivers to enable the regards implementing the key decisions development of an effective natural resource and commitments of the AU Declaration on governance structure for Africa. Land at continental, regional and national

5 Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XIII) Rev.1 adopted at the at the Thirteenth Ordinary Session in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 1 to 3 July 2009.

24 5.0 Governing for the Future: Strengthening Current Mechanisms

The natural resource sector in Africa has been impacts. Also, investments in the host- plagued by conflicts of varying dimensions communities have been inadequate with from mostly localized skirmishes between the quantum of compensation paid for pastoralists and farmers over access to land appropriated land, contaminated land and to those of extremely violent civil wars over waters, for examples, have been below and funded by resource revenues. The economic values leading to angst and conflicts as noted are not likely to reduce if violent reactions. the due attention and focus on governance strategies is not prioritized in Africa. Indeed, The situation is aggravated by the absence of the continent is not bereft of initiatives and rule of law leaving aggrieved parties without strategies but what is required is not simply legal and administrative recourse as well as the introduction of another framework to undemocratic management and decision- the fold but to address the issue of natural making in the natural resource sector. resource governance holistically. Regarding the latter, for example, land is often appropriated without consultation Issues to be considered is why the Continent’s of affected local communities; or host- natural resource sector has become the communities are not consulted with regards bedrock of violent conflicts rather than the resource revenue investments in their basis of development to alleviate widespread domains. Given the relationship these poverty. Fundamental issues relate to how communities have with ‘their’ land that is the experiences of resource-related conflicts also their fundamental natural resource, in Africa may benefit the development of a experience has revealed that reactions after continental framework to avoid recurrences a while turn violent. Lack of accountability of conflicts. Also, how can the framework and transparency also feed into the conflict be broad-based to ensure it captures the matrix as the situation empowers and range of the continent’s natural resources in emboldens corruption, misappropriation a holistic manner? How may the diversity of and embezzlement of resource revenues the continent – regional and national legal that ought to be expended on development- arrangements for instance, be harnessed to related projects and investments. In essence, develop a viable continental framework on these broad governance issues must be natural resource governance? factored into a framework on natural resource governance if resource-related Issues that cause conflicts in Africa’s conflicts are to be tackled. natural resource sector, broadly include the foreclosure of democracy, rule of law The next issue relates to how a framework and the inequitable distribution of national can be broad-based to ensure it captures the resources, as well as the lack of transparency range of the continent’s natural resources. and accountability in the sector. Most While the extractive industry has received resource-related conflicts are implicated by immense attention, no doubt because of the the inequitable distribution of benefits of the high value of its products, other resources resource. This may be the environmental must be accorded equal recognition and ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ of the resource; a situation protection. For instance, land is a resource typical of the extractive industry. While every African has a personal and communal the State and elite, in alliance with foreign connection with, yet it is arguably the most corporations, enjoy the benefits of the unprotected resource and one that sparks exploited resource, host-communities face conflicts more than the other resources. the debilitating negative environmental These range from the disputes over

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 25 appropriation of land for use of the extractive Basin. At the national levels, the experiences industry highlighted previously to land of countries on the continent may contribute grabbing as well those between pastoralists to shaping and influencing both continental and farmers that is on the rise as a result of normative frameworks and adaptation at the shortages in grazing land, a consequence of national level by other states. Botswana is a climate change in many areas. good example with regards the extractive industry while Cameroon is a good instance Also, more attention needs to be given of management of forestry management that to the marine environment and the vast other countries and the continent can learn economic opportunities it holds. The current from in developing legal and institutional lack of understanding on the conceptual arrangements. understanding and definition of the blue economy for instance must be overcome. It is imperative to take into cognizance all Thinking should move beyond considering the issues discussed above to address the the oceans as a means of transportation to challenges of natural resource governance the appreciation of biodiversity resources it in Africa in a manner that is sustained and harbors, to vast reserves of deep shore oil and sustainable will require adopting a holistic gas reserves, fisheries, etc. The challenges approach. While some of the merits of posed by piracy should also be considered existing norms cannot be discounted, as a fundamental issue because as the streamlining and integrating them into a resources of the maritime environment are holistic continental framework is more increasingly exploited, so is the likelihood desirable than an attempt to completely of increase in the rate of piracy. reinvent the wheel. The advantage of this kind of integration is that it avoids the Developing continental norms for a existence of a multiplicity of norms that, in continent with 54 countries is not an easy turn, makes it an onerous task for national task as these countries have different legal regulatory institutions to keep up with, adapt systems and backgrounds as well as cultures and implement. and institutional frameworks. However, the advantage of multiple systems should be Invariably, an African Natural Resource harnessed rather than it being considered Governance Architecture (ANRGA) is a disadvantage. At the regional level, with suggested as a framework to engage with regards management of in-water resources the broad management of the continent’s for example, cross-cutting lessons can be natural resources. It is proposed that the learned from the approach and experiences ANRGA should develop organically from both from normative and institutional Agenda 2063 with the key elements of good arrangements from the Senegal River governance (especially democracy, rule of Basin Organization, Okavango River Basin law, transparency and accountability, as well Commission, SADC Protocol on Shared as efficient and equitable management of Watercourse Systems, the Niger Basin resource revenues being core issues. These Initiative, amongst others. Regions are themes are notably expressed in Aspiration facing and prioritizing different challenges, 3 of Agenda 2063. In proposing the ANRGA, in some instances as the case with the the expectation is not for policy makers to Lake Chad Basin, including cross-border re-invent the wheel but to fuse existing- but conflicts. disparate- processes into a comprehensive framework. While this is not a situation common to all the Basin Authorities on the continent, those not facing this particular challenge can learn lessons to prevent or manage disputes that 5.1 Democracy occur to ensure that they do not escalate to the levels experienced in the Lake Chad The expectation is that within the context of

26 democracy in natural resource governance, fewer incentives for actors to act outside key principles of democracy such as collective these systems. Therefore, even though decision-making must be embraced and grievances over issues such as the impact elevated. In applying collective decision of exploration and production of natural making to natural resource governance, resources and the distribution of natural decisions leading to the exploration and use resource revenues may arise from time to of natural resources should take on board time, there will always be opportunities to the contrasting views of different actors democratically address these grievances that are expected to benefit or be impacted, before they lead to violent conflicts. by the exploitation of the natural resource. The Environmental Impact Assessment The absence or weakness of institutions that (EIA) laws that govern the exploration and manages grievances could pose a risk that extraction of natural resources is one such could undermine the stability of resource law that already promotes the principle of rich countries. Such institutions, as seen democratic governance, even if the latter is in the case study from Akassa, provide a only one aspect towards sound and efficient democratic framework for the resolution natural resource governance. of conflicts and the allocation of resources at the local level. Therefore, as Africa seeks The principle of democratic collective to develop a new vision that governs decision-making also needs to be consistent natural resources, it is important that this across the different cycles of natural new vision promotes the development of resource management, from exploration to strong institutions that can democratically production and how revenues are utilised. address the grievances associated with the This will limit the resort to armed violence management of natural resources. by local actors and communities constantly jostling to reap the benefit from lax natural resources governance framework. Nigeria’s 5.2 Rule of Law Delta region is one example where the dearth of democratic decision-making With regards to the principle of rule of law has triggered violent conflicts with local within natural resource governance, the communities claiming that they are left emphases should be on the equality before out of the decision-making process. Even the law along with unfettered access to within that mostly restive region, one judicial and/or administrative systems for cannot miss the contract that the relatively dispute resolution. Three elements of the peaceful Akassa community represents as a rule of law make its presence crucial for any unique model of community-led approach legal system; these are the supremacy of the to natural resource governance. Pro law and the absence of arbitrariness, equality Natura International Nigeria, a community before the law, and constitutional law as part development organization has worked with of the ordinary law of the land. Generally, rule Statoil; the main multinational oil company of law is often applied in its political context operating in Akassa to develop a unique and to ensure that political power is not abused. participatory model that allow communities In natural resource governance sphere, the to audit their own needs, plan projects and rule of law will function to ensure that laws monitor their implementation through regulating the sector do not allow individual established structures. This inclusive process and/or sectional interests of political actors can easily be reproduced elsewhere with to disadvantage the citizenry. If it ever does, only slight modifications. multinationals are held liable under the laws The lesson from Akassa is that when systems in the countries in which they operate. of democratic inclusions are factored into Regarding the former, the “above the law” natural resource governance, there will be

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 27 stance of the ruling elite in Africa has or radical reforms agenda in the use contributed immensely to the vicious cycle natural resource revenues. One reason of corruption in many societies. There is for this is because the current measures barely any African ruler (and their family) of accountability and transparency have in a country that is rich in natural resource mostly focused on declaring the earnings that has not been caught in the web of of natural resources and not in how such resource-revenue related corruption. With earnings have been utilized, or by whom. regard to multinational corporations, there are several examples of locals seeking justice Beyond reliance on payments to national in foreign jurisdictions regardless of the governments, accountability and immense costs and uncertainty involved transparency must also focus on how such simply because they cannot guarantee rule proceeds are used within the countries. of law in their respective countries. From Additional proposals may relate to the vetting Nigeria, cases relating to the operations of personal and corporate investment funds of oil multinationals have been instituted to ensure that they are not illegally obtained in England, The Hague and the USA while from revenues from illicit natural resource South African miners have sued in England. governance. This proposal will require the cooperation of the international community. The absence or weakness of institutions that This is because of the nature of the different manages grievances could pose a risk that laws that govern the movement of capital could undermine the stability of resource across different countries. These different rich countries. Such institutions, as seen laws have facilitated the flow of profits in the case study from Akassa, provide a from trade in illegally extracted natural democratic framework for the resolution resources. The international community of conflicts and the allocation of resources would need to develop a common at the local level. Therefore, as Africa seeks standard and mechanisms that enhance to develop a new vision that governs transparency of financial flows. Again, natural resources, it is important that this this is not really re-inventing the wheel as new vision promotes the development of most financial institutions scrutinize funds strong institutions that can democratically to ensure they are not from drugs and address the grievances associated with the money laundering. The measurement of management of natural resources. transparency and accountability within the context proposed could focus on identifying how much of natural resource revenues go into different sectors that are directly 5.3 Accountability and related to development or how a particular Transparency natural resource contributes to education, healthcare, infrastructure, arts and culture, The principle of accountability and and other sectors of the economy beneficial transparency is central to natural resource to the ordinary people. Such an approach governance. However, there is a need to would ensure that the use of natural design a framework of accountability and resources directly benefits ordinary people. transparency that reflects the local context and political realities on the continent. There are transparency indexes that seeks to measure accountability and transparency in the use of extractive natural resources in Africa. It is common for African countries to meet some of the requirements of transaparency and accountability indexes without embarking on any fundamental

28 5.4 Efficient and Equitable emergence of violent conflicts in resource Management of Resource rich countries is the perception of inequity in the distribution of resource revenues. Revenues There needs to be a democratic framework that reflects the diversity of interests and The efficient and equitable management actors within resource-rich countries. of natural resources is at the heart of Such a framework would recognize the virtually every initiative to promote the needs of local communities where natural efficient management; including the resources are extracted vis-à-vis the general proposed natural resource governance population of the country. It will also architecture framework. Although they run address environmental concerns and the through the different principles outlined impact of natural resource production on earlier, they are identified as separate the livelihoods of local communities where principles for the purpose of clarifying the resource production takes place. important of efficiency and equity in the use of natural resources. One factor that drive grievances and contributes to the

NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 29 6. Conclusion

This paper has taken a broad look at the politics of natural resource extraction and governance in Africa. It explored various themes through which the causative relationship between natural resources and violent conflict can be discerned. It also noted that the political economy of natural resources is embedded within the broader global power relations. It noted in particular that emerging economies like China are fundamentally shifting the locus of power within Africa’s natural resource landscape and that the implications of these new shifts are not yet fully understood. Nonetheless, they will have profound impact on the next few decades of resource politics on the continent of Africa. The important role that global environmental movements also play was discussed. It was noted that while it may appear that there is a homogenous global environmental agenda, it is in fact also framed by the same global relations of power that shape broader aspects of inter-state relations. These relations of power, it was noted, are inducing an increase in the militarization of resource extraction, a situation that has had dire implications for local human rights. The paper also discussed the growing role of private military contractors in this dynamic of securitization and argued that because they are hardly accountable to anything but the logic of profit, they complicate the landscape of conflict and extraction in profound ways. The important global norms, regulations and institutions that attempt to impose some form of order and accountability on the extractive sector was also discussed. Here, the paper argued that while regulation was critical to the effective management of natural resources in Africa, there are cases like in Angola where it in fact facilitates opacity and corruption. In this regard, the paper argued that regulation must be embedded within an infrastructure that can effectively monitor compliance and which promotes transparency. The paper examined the impact of global norms (the KP and EITI) and continental visions (Agenda 2063 and AMV) on the management of natural resources in Africa and conflicts. It noted that these frameworks have had mixed results. The paper in the discussion of the development of normative frameworks regulating non-extractive resources noted that progress is relatively slower due the uneven attention placed on the extractive industry. It noted that this is the case mainly because the extractive industry yields more revenues. This suggests that the broader legal, political and social environment plays a significant role in determining the success or otherwise of natural resource governance models. The implication is that interventions must look at the totality of laws as well as the social justice issues that drive resource governance. The paper suggested that there is a need to have a broad framework on natural resource governance for the continent. It recommended an African Natural Resource Governance Architecture (ANRGA) that should be developed organically from the Agenda 2063. The ANRGA would emphasize elements the key elements of good governance (especially democracy, rule of law, transparency and accountability, as well as efficient and equitable management of resource revenues) that are vital to governance, broadly speaking.

30 References

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NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 33 Walker, T. (2017). Reviving the AU’s maritime strategy. ISS Policy Brief 96, February 2017 Winer J. and Roule T. (2003). “Follow the Money: the fiancé of illicit resource extraction”, in Bannon I. and Collier P. (eds), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: options and actions, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2016). The World Bank Group’s Response to Illicit Financial Flows: A Stock Taking, Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank, 2010. Rising global interest in farmland: can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits? 8 September. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2016). The Niger basin climate resilience investment plan: a shared initiative for the benefit of the population – overview. World Bank Working Paper 2016 -http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/945801467988882421/Le-plan-d-investissement-pour-la- résilience-climatique-du-bassin-du-fleuve-Niger-une-initiative-commune-au-profit-des- populations-resume

34 NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, POLITICS AND POWER 35 Governing natural resources for security, stability and prosperity

These two significant In the same vein, the State of reports highlight the Peace and Security in Africa interconnectedness between a underlines the need for security, range of developmental issues stability and prosperity in light and the current state of play in of the conflicts and security the security landscape of the trends in 2017. continent.

Africa, while endowed with The Background Paper natural resources, is deemed provides an in-depth analysis cursed due to instabilities of the status of natural caused by the manner in resource governance in Africa which natural resources have in comparison to the rest of been managed. The cases of the world. It highlights the oil mismanagement in South undeniable nexus between the Sudan and minerals exploitation role of the state, citizens and in DRC are classic examples external actors in the natural of this paradoxical paradigm. resource governance debate. According to the African

Background Paper on NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: Conflict, Politics and Power STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 The Provision of Security in Africa: No Retreat, No Surrender

Development Bank, between govern and monitor resources at 40 and 60 per cent of on-going all levels from the local, national, internal armed conflicts are regional and continental levels. linked to natural resources. The continent is not short of Nevertheless, it is not that Africa tools required to facilitate the is cursed with its resources but management of its resources. rather that the continent has not Rather, Africa is still challenged taken control and ownership in by existing governance gaps governing and managing them. that remain one of the fueling factors of the current peace and security threats and trends. Resource governance frameworks such as the Kimberley Process and the Africa Mining Vision are already in place. Additionally, the AU and RECs/RMs are mandated to

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 The Provision of Security in Africa: No Retreat, No Surrender

Contents

Executive Summary 43

1 Introduction 46

1.1 Specific Aims and Objectives 46

1.2 Analytical Approach 46

1.3 Data Sources and Methods 47

1.4 Organization of Report 47

2. Natural Resource Governance Issues and Peace and Security in Africa 48

3. Broad Overview of Violence and Armed Conflict in Africa in 2016 50

3.1 The Dominant Kinds of Violent Events in 2016 52

3.2 Spatial Distribution of Violent Events in 2016 53

3.3 Major Actors in Conflict and Violence in 2016 55

3.4 The Scale and Kinds of Fatalities in 2016 56

3.5 Non-Violent Conflict Fatalities: Migrant Deaths 58

3.6 Cross-Cutting Structural Issues 59

4. No Retreat, No Surrender: Stalled Peace Agreements in 2016 62

5 The Spectre of Atomised Violence and Low Intensity Conflicts in 2016 67

6. Progress in African-centred Solutions in Peace and Security (AFSOL) 71

7. The Containment and Rollback of Violent Extremist Groups 75

8. The Year of Protests and Riots 79

9. Summary of Continental-Level Trends of Peace and Security in 2016 81

10. Recommendations 84

Executive Summary

Key Continental-Level Trends of Peace and Security In 2016

The following are the key observations The number of reported fatalities regarding continental-level trends in peace increased in Somalia and Sudan in 2016, and security in Africa in 2016. while Nigeria experienced a decline. According to ACLED, Somalia accounted • Overall, the ‘meta data’ of conflict and for 20% of all reported fatalities, and violence in Africa in 2016 was largely Nigeria accounted for nearly 16% of unchanged from 2015; albeit the levels total fatalities in 2016. Nigeria’s share for both years are dangerously high. declined considerable from almost 30% The continent recorded 17, 539 violent in 2015. events in 2016, compared with 17, 537 recorded in 2015. The range of violent • Government security forces and events includes battles, violence against political militias were the two most civilians, remote violence, strategic active categories of conflict actors in events, riots and mass protests etc. Africa in 2016. State security outfits accounted for 34% of conflict events in • The number of large scale wars and field 2016, a two percent increase over 2015. battles are either stagnating or declining, Government security forces were most but there is an increasing explosion active in conflict-affected states in the of non-state conflict agents and the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, violence perpetrated by them; militias, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan; for vigilantes, violent extremist groups and example, between 2015 and 2016, there spontaneous movements (rioters and was a geometric surge in government protesters). Moreover, conventional military activities in Sudan (from 332 battles with clear cut government versus to 460 events) and Ethiopia (from 155 opponents continue to decline while to 448). rioting, protesting, and violence against civilians remain high or increasing in • The scale of human fatalities in 2016 was some cases. 30,000, a decrease over 2015 (36,000) levels. According to ACLED, both the • Conflict-affected states like Libya, estimated total fatalities and reported Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria civilian fatalities from organized recorded the highest number of armed conflict events declined in conflict events in 2016. These countries 2016. However, civilians continued cumulatively accounted for a third (33%) to be targeted or caught in crossfires; of all violent conflict in Africa in 2016; violence against civilians across Africa a slight decrease from 35% in 2015, and increased for the second year in a row to 40% in 2014. In 2016, Somalia was by far 45%, up by three percentage points from the epicentre of violent event in Africa 2014 levels. It contrasts sharply with the in 2016 with over 2200 recorded events, overall decrease in reported civilian followed by Nigeria, South Sudan and share of conflict-related fatalities; Africa Libya. recorded on 8.050 civilian fatalities (27%) • Somalia displaced Nigeria as the in 2016. This is a significant decline (a topmost country for total fatalities 42.5% decrease) from the preceding (including civilians, soldiers, battle- year which stood at 37.5% of all conflict- related and other forms) from violent related fatalities. In fact, this is lowest events in 2016 (See Figure 1 below). share of civilian fatalities since 2002.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 43 • The topmost sources of risk and violence Sudan, while RENAMO’s fighting to civilians are political militias and state capability (and attacks) became more security forces; during the period 2011- evident in Mozambique in 2016. 2016, militias accounted for 58.2% of violence against civilians. In 2016, state • The changing character of violence and security forces perpetrated a quarter conflict also manifested in increased (25%) of reported civilian fatalities. instances of ‘low intensity’ conflicts or Communal militias (community-based ‘quasi-war’ situations. Examples of this armed groups) are equally deadly for in 2016 abound, including Mozambique, civilians; in 2016, they were linked to Burundi, Cameroon, Nigeria, DRC, 24.5% of reported civilian fatalities, Northern Mali, border regions across compared with about 11% in 2015. The the Sahel, etc. These situations are countries with most reported cases characterized by lower media coverage; of rape and gender-based violence in low levels of armed violence but equally 2016 were Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and deadly internecine violent episodes; and DRC. Of note is the decline in reported they are rooted in unresolved or badly cases of gender-based violence in the managed historical-political grievances. DRC. Most of the reported cases of They are also extremely fluid situation gender-based violence in Sudan were with huge potentials for escalation, often perpetrated by armed groups such as responding to short term triggers such pro-government militias, Janjaweed, as policy changes, electoral disputes, the Rapid Support Forces, the military and particular arrest or brutality and/ and other unidentifiable armed groups. or killings by security officials. In South Sudan, the complicit groups • Another evidence of the change in include the South Sudanese military and the character of violence and armed allied paramilitary groups, the SPLA/ conflict across Africa in 2016 was M-In Opposition, and several ethno- the surge in the number of riots and communal militias. protests (increased of nearly 5% over • Notwithstanding the unchanged overall 2015 levels) as evidenced by events in levels of violence in 2016, there was Tunisia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Mali, a marked qualitative change in the Gabon and Chad. More countries character of armed conflict and violence experienced protests in 2016, the in Africa; armed conflicts and violence countries affected cut across conflict- became more diffused as evidenced by affected and relatively stable ones; the noticeable increases in the number West Africa was least affected; and 2016 and spread of mass protests, and rise witnessed the increasing securitization in militia activities. Political militias of protests by governments through were involved in nearly a third (30%) rise in cases of crackdown, arbitrary of all organised armed conflict events arrests and detentions, shutdown of in Africa 2016. The Imbon-erakure of communication systems, etc. In 2016, Burundi was the most active in Africa mass protests gained traction as they as it was involved in 202 conflict events were ‘Weaponised’ and transformed in 2016, nearly double its record of 138 into ‘Street Power’ to bring about far- events in 2015. New armed groups reaching political changes. Going and militias that changed the conflict forward, it is logical to expect further landscape emerged in Nigeria’s Niger instances of riots and protest by citizens Delta region (Niger Delta Avengers, in years to come; events in Southern NDA); and in Eastern DRC (Kamwina Cameroon, DRC, South Africa, and Nsapu militia). Other splinter groups Nigeria in the first two months of 2017 were recorded in Sudan, and South are pointers.

44 • Africa experienced a fair share of stalled situations. In Gabon, Burundi, Gambia, peace agreements and processes in and Sudan, the prospect of open armed 2016 in places such as Libya, Mali, confrontation or surge in the scale and Sudan and South Sudan. Across these intensity of violent clashes was averted countries, the lack of progress or or modulated by AU/REC led mediation setbacks reveals a complex interplay and political settlement initiatives. of failed implementation, belligerency amongst factions, lack of requisite • Data and trends in the activities of political will, emergence of new armed violent extremist groups in Africa groups/factions, etc. in 2016 signpost a ‘game changing’ moment – that containment measures • Africa recorded progress in the use of undertaken by African states, the African-centred Solutions in Peace African Union and RECs, and foreign and Security (Afsol) in managing partners were achieving strategic results armed conflict and insecurity in 2016. in most cases. In 2016, the threats posed Notwithstanding the scale of violence by violent extremist groups were either and fatalities, there was evidence of neutralized or reduced. The majority progress in finding and using African of violent extremist groups active solutions (based on historical, socio- across Africa experienced in varying political and cultural orientations) to degrees, one or more of the following: peace and security challenges in 2016. loss of territory and constricting African states and institutions such spaces to operate, degraded capability as the AU and RECs, were active in to undertake ‘audacious’ and high- preventing, de-escalating and forging profile attacks, loss of fighters, collapsed negotiated solutions (through political or limited sources of support and dialogue) to violence and conflict infrastructures, etc.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 45 1. Introduction

This State of Peace and Security in Africa actors and interventions; and patterns (SPSA) Report is a background paper for the of continuities, changes and mutations 2017 Tana Forum. It provides contextual in 2016. information that informs the nature and quality of debate on peace and security ii. To document ‘game-changing’ dynamic issues broadly and in particular, the thematic in the peace and security environment focus of Tana Forum 2017 (Natural Resource in Africa in terms of underlying drivers Governance). The theme speaks to the and factors, regional variations, and gamut of laws, conventions and practices interventions, and connections with relating to the ownership and control of the regional, continental and global exploitation of natural resources, and the processes in 2016. management of receipt from such resources. iii. To provide background information As in previous years, this report sets the stage, and analysis for understanding natural guides the conversation and helps to shape resource governance issues and the debate on the linkages between peace processes in Africa’s peace and security and security trends and natural resource trends for 2016. issues in Africa. In doing this, this report iv. To highlight gaps in extant regional, 2 provides a succinct overview and analysis continental and global response of the most salient conflict trends and offers mechanisms to peace and security a nuanced understanding of the efforts and threats broadly and pinpoint options responses that are designed to manage for way forward. complex peace and security challenges on the continent. It also documents and 1.2. Analytical Approach presents the broad and thematic overview of peace and security in Africa broadly, and The analytical approach of this report in relation to natural resource governance involves the following: issues, in 2016. It covers the number and scale of armed conflict and violence, their -- Trend Analysis: The identification and spatial distribution (by country and region), breakdown of thematic events/threats, the fatalities recorded, and the outline of key actors/groups, area/geography affected, actors (government forces, armed opposition impacts, and responses/interventions. groups, militias, citizens, etc.). The report The trend observed for 2016 were also analyse the nature of responses and compared with 2016 and previous years interventions by states, the African Union to highlight similarities and differences. (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms, the United -- Level of Analysis: This is the dissection Nations, and foreign partners. of peace and security threats and underlying cross-cutting factors at 1.1 Specific Aims and three levels, namely national, regional/ continental and global. This enabled the Objectives analysis to uncover potential linkages, similarities, and differences in the i. To map Africa’s peace and security nature, and dimensions of particular landscape for trends of subsisting and peace and security issues in Africa in emerging threats; flash points; major 2016. 2 The author (Wale Ismail, [email protected]) wish to acknowledge Jacob Kamau (African leadership -- Disaggregated Underlying Drivers: This Centre, Nairobi, Kenya) for his excellent research assistance probes into the structural foundations in the course of producing this SPSA.

46 and causes of armed conflict and violent incidents in countries/regions of events across Africa in 2016. It enabled a interest in 2016. more nuanced analysis and exploration of connections between and among -- Existing International Datasets such as peace and security issues/threats in the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Africa in 2016. (ACLED) Project, Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, Uppsala Conflict Data -- Case Studies (flashpoints and Program (UCDP), UNFPA State of the examples): This is the use of empirical World’s Population Report, Mo Ibrahim instances, events and incidents in Governance Index/Report, Global Peace specific countries or regions as signposts Index, ADB’s Africa Economic Outlook, of a particular trend or scale of threat Human Development Index, UNFPA’s or unique dimensions. It enabled the State of the World’s Population, World analysis to provide detailed description Development Report, etc. and interrogation of trends observed in 2016. The choice of flashpoint 1.4 Organisation of Report was guided by factual and thematic relevance, and where possible, regional The rest of the report is divided into six parts; spread. the next section provides the broad statistical overview of armed conflict and violent events 1.3 Data Sources and Methods in Africa in 2016. It highlights the scale and distribution of violence, key actors, scale This SPSA was prepared through desk-based of fatalities, and cross-cutting structural research and content analysis of qualitative issues. Section four provides a theme-based and quantitative data from open sources. overview of stalled peace agreement and The range of data sources includes the processes in 2016 with case studies of Libya, following: Mali and South Sudan. Section five provides the overview of low intensity conflicts and -- Official Documents of national atomized violence with examples from governments, AU, RECs, UN, and other Mozambique, Cameroon, and South Sudan. inter-governmental institutions. Section six reports on progress made in -- AU-PSC and UNSC Resolutions and conflict management and peace processes Reports on particular countries, events/ in Africa through intra-African approaches incidents, etc. and solutions (African Solutions in Peace and Security, Afsol) using Gambia, Gabon -- Reports of Specialized Missions such as and Burundi as case studies. Section seven Peace Missions, Election Observation provides instances of containment and roll Missions, Human Rights Commission, back of violent extremist groups in Africa Expert Panels, etc. in 2016 with examples of counter-terrorism offensives in Lake Chad Basin (against Boko -- Academic Publications such as scholarly Haram), Horn of Africa (against Al-Shabaab), articles, books, monographs and op- North Africa (against Islamic State and eds on particular incidents/themes, its affiliates), and in Northern Mali/Sahel countries and regions. (against a number of groups). Sections -- Reports of Non-Governmental Actors eight and nine summarize continental level such as local and international NGOs, trends of peace and security in 2016, and CSOs, and major advocacy groups such provide recommendations for the relevant as Amnesty International, International stakeholders. Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, etc. -- Media Reports into particular events/

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 47 2. Natural Resource Governance Issues and Peace and Security in Africa

The link between natural resource and violent Still, natural resources harbour great conflicts in Africa has been a central theme potentials for Africa’s development where in security-development nexus since the and when the environmental fallouts are 1990s. The debate has evolved over the years, properly anticipated and managed; host shifting from scarcity to abundance and then communities appropriately consulted and governance issues. Natural resources have equitably benefitting; value chains created played key roles in major armed conflicts and enhanced; and receipts handled in between and within states, and emerged transparency and accountable manner. 3 The as the major driver of Africa’s quest for AU Peace and Security Council underlined development. Natural resources continue this in 2016 in its statement that “weak to shape the pattern of Africa’s international management and inequitable distribution relations at bilateral and multilateral levels. of these resources can be, among others, The onset of the ‘Africa Rising’ narrative in a key factor in triggering, financing and the last decade was directly linked to natural prolonging conflicts.” 4 The PSC also resources, especially in triggering high rates “stressed the imperative need for effective of economic growth in many resource-rich and transparent management, as well as countries. for equitable distribution of a country’s natural resources that ensures the interest Africa’s natural resource fields have attracted and wellbeing of the local population, a range of national, multinational and communities and the country at large.” 5 state-backed foreign companies seeking to capitalize on emerging demand and What are latest trend in natural resource supply dynamics. Domestically, power and its links conflict and violence in Africa? elites and local power brokers in many Five major patterns are discernible; first, the Africa countries have monopolized control scope of actors in the field has broadened over resource revenues, concentrating to include traditional (Western) and new, their personal wealth at the expense of local non-Western companies. The new entrants citizens. This has triggered armed uprisings include Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Russian, on the part of local communities. In fact, and South Africa companies. Of this, China many communities have become hostile to is the biggest player in Africa’s natural resource investments, challenge the right resource landscape; it has built elaborate of governments to licence exploitation, financial and trade infrastructures, and and disrupted exploration. Attempts by political frameworks (Forum on China- governments and sometimes in collusion Africa Cooperation).China has gained major with private firms, to enforce the right to concessions in oil and gas, iron ore, timber, exploration (often by crushing resistance manganese, cobalt and copper in a number by local communities) have led to violent of Africa countries, especially Sudan, Gabon, conflicts. On the other hand, armed groups Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, DRC, Ghana, and criminal networks have exploited the and Liberia. China and some of the entrants weaknesses of state institutions and natural

resource regulatory frameworks to illegally 3 UNEP 2015Addressing the Role of Natural tap from natural resource deposits by Resources in Conflict and Peacebuilding: A Summary of directly taking natural resources or deriving Progress from UNEP’s Environmental Cooperation for rents from illegal operators. In such cases, Peacebuilding Programme, UNEP Nairobi, Kenya, p..8. 4 Peace and Security Council 575th Meeting, Press natural resources proceeds have been used Statement, 11 February 2016, http://www.peaceau.org/ to finance and sustain armed conflicts. uploads/presss-statement-575th-11-02-2016.pdf 5 Ibid.

48 have added infrastructure financing, large Fourth is constricting spaces for civil society scale infrastructure works, and cultural groups and local communities to influence exchanges to their interest in Africa’s natural decisions on natural resource exploitation in resources. It is instructive that the entrance Africa. The huge scale of foreign investment of the new players has coincided with new in Africa’s natural resource sector has meant or exacerbated old conflicts in resource that many countries and government have bearing many communities and countries securitized the sector and exploration in Africa. For example, Chinese large scale sites. Civil society advocates and resource investment in the natural resource sectors bearing communities that protest lopsided has influenced the security dynamic exploration concessions are either wrongly in conflict-affected states such as DRC, termed as ‘anti-development’, saboteurs, or Zimbabwe, Angola, and Sudan.6 placed under legal restrictions or arrested.8 The second major trend is the emergence Fifth, there is a broad consensus that in of new African countries in the resource many cases, the short and medium term boom as more natural resource deposits benefits of natural resource boom have are discovered and exploration activities remained a mirage in many resource kick-started. In the hydrocarbon sector bearing communities and for most citizens for instance, Tanzania, Mozambique, in resource rich countries in Africa. Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Malawi, and Notwithstanding impressive economic South Sudan have joined the league of growth figures, the resource boom has failed countries with oil and gas deposits. The new to deliver corresponding social, economic discoveries have ignited old border disputes and human development gains, especially (e.g. Tanzania and Malawi over Lake Malawi) in resource bearing communities. In most or worsened relations between government cases, communities in and around natural and communities. resource fields are often some of the most deprived, and face many negative impacts, Third is emergence of national, regional including resettlement, environmental and continental frameworks intended to pollution, health hazards and the disruption harmonize standards and procedures for of livelihoods. Natural resources are natural resource exploitation and infuse contributing little to improve the overall greater transparency in the management welfare of local communities, in spite of the of receipts. The African Mining Vision (AMV) few jobs they may provide.9 and its implementation body, the African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), Much of the problem about natural resource were established in 2009 to streamline governance in Africa is underpinned by the governance of mining in Africa. Other four things, namely the limited (ineffectual) initiatives include the Kimberly Process, recognition of local communities as Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative legitimate stakeholders with major (EITI), African Peer Review Mechanism interests; the securitization of the sector (APRM), International Voluntary Principles by governments; limited and affirmative Initiatives, the Kofi Annan’s Africa Progress action to encourage and build the capacity Panel and the Thabo Mbeki-led High Level of local actors to participate in natural Panel on Illicit Financial Flows etc. Much of these initiatives continue to be plagued Architecture: Lessons to Inform a Shifting Agenda, SIIA with implementation challenges, and lack Policy Brief 90, pp. 1-2. of coordination and alignment of various 8 Blair, A. (2015) Africa’s Natural Resources: 3 Things Governments Need to Get Right, 02 April 2015, 7 processes and initiatives. https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2015/04/africas- natural-resources-3-things-governments-need-to-get- 6 Dollar, D. (2016), China’s Engagement with Africa: right/ From Natural Resources to Human Resources. Washington, 9 Henrich Boll Stiftung (April 2016). Rights and The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, p. xi Resources Building Community Voice in the Mining Sector, 7 Bello, O.(2014) Africa’s Extractive Governance Perspectives, Issue 1, p.5.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 49 resource exploration; and limited progress ownership trusts, ordinary members are in building value chains. In few instances often misrepresented by local traditional where schemes to increase the economic elites who follow their own narrow interests.10 participation of communities have been introduced, such as community share- 10 Henrich Boll Stiftung (April 2016), p.5. 3. Broad Overview of Violence and Armed Conflict in Africa in 2016

The headline data (‘Meta Data’) is that the total decreased from ten to seven, while the number of violent events, including armed number of full-scale wars decreased from conflicts, militia activities, insurgency, nine to seven in 2016. Some of the major protests, etc. in 2016 was unchanged wars in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2016 include from the previous year. According to the Sudan (Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue University of Sussex based Armed Conflict Nile); South Sudan (the Dinka-dominated Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, SPLM government and the Nuer-dominated the total aggregate of armed conflict and SPLM-IO); Somalia (Al-Shabaab conflict in violent events in Africa was more or less Somalia and spill-over into Kenya); and the same (unchanged) from 2015. The Nigeria (the Boko Haram conflict and armed continent recorded 17, 539 violent events confrontation between herders and farmers). in 2016, compared with 17, 537 recorded in 2015. The range of violent events includes In 2016, there were 16 active United Nations- battles, violence against civilians, remote led peace operations, involving 117,306 violence, strategic events, riots and mass personnel across the globe. The overall protests etc. It is instructive to note that the annual budget is estimated at $7.87 billion. distribution by categories of violent event This is in addition to peace operations for 2016 was also similar in large parts to by regional bodies, including the AU and 12 2015; for instance, African RECs. Some of the active peace operations in Africa in 2016 include the Correspondingly, the Heidelberg Conflict following: Barometer for 2016 reported that Sub- Saharan Africa witnessed a slight increase 1. UN Multidimensional Integrated in the total number of conflicts; 94 cases in Stabilization Mission in the CAR 2016, compared with 93 in 2015, representing (MINUSCA) with 13,098 personnel in almost 25% of the world’s political conflicts. 2016. Oceania recorded the highest number of 2. UN Multidimensional Integrated conflicts with a total of 123 (30 percent of Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA). total), Middle East and Maghreb (69 conflicts), Europe (62 conflicts), and the Americas 3. UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (54 conflicts). Globally, the total number (MONUSCO). of highly violent conflicts decreased from 43 to 38 in 2016, but Sub-Saharan Africa 4. AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur accounted for a third.11 (UNAMID) with 19,248 personnel in 2016. Moreover, the number of limited wars 5. UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with 434 11 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict personnel in 2016. Research (HIIK), (2017). Conflict Barometer 2016, Heidelberg, Germany, HIIK, p. 15. https://www.hiik.de/en/ konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2016.pdf 12 HIIK 2017, Conflict Barometer 2016, p. 23.

50 6. UN Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) Curiously, the scale of human fatalities with 3,656 personnel in 2016. in 2016 was 30,000, a decrease over 2015 (36,000) levels. According to ACLED, both the 7. UN Mission in the Republic of South estimated total fatalities and reported civilian Sudan (UNMISS) with 15,171 personnel fatalities from organized armed conflict in 2016. events declined in 2016; “approximately 27% 8. UN Interim Security Force for Abyei of all reported conflict deaths resulting from (UNISFA) with 4,719 personnel in 2016. organized armed conflict events (over 8,030 fatalities) resulted from violence against 9. AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with civilians in 2016, compared to more than 22,000 authorised personnel (actual 37% in 2015 (over 13,400 fatalities).” 13 deployment is estimated to be lower).

13 See ACLED (2017). Trend 1: Rates of Violence in 2016, http://www.acleddata.com/trend-1-rates-of-violence- in-2016/

Figure 1: Political Violence Events and Incidents in Africa 1997-2016

Source: ACLED, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Trend-1-Fig-1a.png

Beyond the meta-data, there are interesting parallels and details that emerge from a careful disaggregation of the data and eagle-eyed analysis of trends in 2016. It is expected that this will reveal more interesting details and issues of possible concern and interests alike for stakeholders within and outside of Africa. The disaggregation and trend analysis of the data for 2016 was guided by the following line of inquiries:

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 51 a. What kinds of violent events are 41.3% of all conflict events in 2016, compared predominant? 43.2% in 2015. When disaggregated further by types, violence against civilians was 45%; b. In which places (countries or regions) followed by clashes between and among are the violent events taking place the armed groups at 41%; and remote violence most? (13%). The distribution for 2016 aligns with c. Who are the major actors in conflict and those of 2015. Notwithstanding the slight violence in 2016? decline, the overall trend is consistent with patterns in recent years. d. What scale and kinds of fatalities, including civilians, were produced in Remote violence tactics and events including 2016? bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, mortar and missile attacks, etc. was e. What is the standout observation from also a major category of conflict activity; 2016? it accounted for 13% of conflict activity in Africa in 2016. This is similar to the record 3.1 The Dominant Kinds of for 2015 but a 3 percent increase from 2013. Violent Events in 2016 Importantly, remote attacks across Africa in 2016 showed increased deadliness; The proportion of violent events classified according to ACLED, the proportion of as organised armed conflict events (those reported conflict-related fatalities attributed involving clashes between armed groups, to remote violence increased from 7.5% of violence against civilians and remote reported fatalities in 2015 to 9.5% of reported violence) was the dominant category of fatalities in 2016. 14 conflict activity in 2016; it accounted for 14 See ACLED (2017). Trend 1: Rates of Violence in 2016.

Figure 2: Political Violence and Protest Events by Types in Africa 1997-2016

Source: ACLED, Trend 1 : rates of Violence in 2016, http://www.acleddata.com/trend-1-rates-of-violence- in-2016/

52 3.2 Spatial Distribution of and Togo. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram Violent Events in 2016 conflict continued in Lake Chad area for the sixth year running (though with lower number of attacks and fatalities), involving When disaggregated by regions, in the Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Nigeria Central Africa region, the conflict between recorded additional conflicts between the Anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka groups in herders and farmers in the Middle Belt area the CAR de-escalated (reduced violence) and other locations in the South. In Mali, to a limited war. Conflict also erupted in while the conflict between the government Gabon following disputed election results. and the Coordination of Movements of In North Africa, violent conflicts continued Azawad in the north de-escalated to non- in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya between and violent, violent extremist groups continued among armed groups (militias and violent to launch attacks against peacekeepers. In extremist groups) and government forces.15 Gambia, a new conflict took place between In East Africa and the Horn, the war the opposition, and the government under between the Islamist group al-Shabaab President Yahya Jammeh over election and the Somali and Kenyan governments results. Further violent opposition conflicts continued. This is in addition to conflict in were observed in Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte conflict between the autonomous region d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, of Puntland, the self-declared Republic of Sierra Leone, and Togo. Somaliland, and Khatumo State continued. In Southern Africa, violent protests took place There were on-going conflict and tensions in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe between the government and opposition over socio-economic issues, as well as parties in Kenya ahead of elections in 2017. xenophobic violence against immigrants In Ethiopia, anti-government protests in South Africa. In Mozambique and increased, with intermittent attacks against Angola, conflicts between the government government forces by the Oromo Liberation and opposition groups (former liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation movements) escalated from disputes into Front (ONLF). Violent conflicts continued violent crisis. in Sudan and South Sudan continued with escalation in the clashes between the SPLM Expectedly, conflict-affected states like Libya, and SPLM-IO in South Sudan. In the DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria recorded four limited wars continued in the Eastern the highest number of conflict events in 2016. Province, in addition to protests over These countries cumulatively accounted for postponed elections and suspected attempts a third (33%) of all violent conflict in Africa in to extend President Joseph Kabila’s terms of 2016; a slight decrease from 35% in 2015, and office. In Burundi, the conflict continued, 40% in 2014. In 2016, Somalia was by far the though de-escalated, over elections and the epicentre of violent event in Africa in 2016 extension of President Pierre Nkurunziza with over 2200 recorded events, followed office term. by Nigeria, South Sudan and Libya. It is estimated that Somalia’s profile of violent In West Africa, a new conflict erupted in event was equal to the combined total for the run up to elections and over election Nigeria, South Sudan and Libya in 2016.16 results, especially the refusal by the then incumbent Yahya Jammeh regime to Of interest, Somalia displaced Nigeria as accept electoral defeat. Additional violent the topmost country for total fatalities opposition conflicts were recorded in (including civilians, soldiers, battle-related Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, 16 ACLED Conflict Trends No. 55, February 2017, pp. 4-5, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/ uploads/2017/02/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.55- 15 HIIK 2017, Conflict Barometer 2016, p. 58. February-2017_pdf..pdf

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 53 and other forms) from violent events in 2016 from almost 30% in 2015.17 The reported (See Figure 1 below). The number of reported fatalities from political violence from Libya, fatalities increased in Somalia and Sudan in Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria equalled 2016, while Nigeria experienced a decline. 55% of all fatalities recorded in Africa in 2016, According to ACLED, Somalia accounted down from 58% in 2015. Somalia’s share for 20% of all reported fatalities, and Nigeria of over 20% of all battle-related deaths is accounted for nearly 16% of total fatalities in linked to clashes between Al-Shabaab and 2016. Nigeria’s share declined considerable AMISOM, and other communal militias.

17 ACLED February 2017, pp. 4-5,

Figure 3: Conflict-Related Fatalities by Country in Africa in 2016

Source: ACLED, Trend 4 : Trends in Violence by Country in 2016, http://www.acleddata.com/trend-4-trends-in- violence-by-country-in-2016/

54 3.3 Major Actors in Conflict and sitting governments. This reconfirms the Violence in 2016 episodic shift in key actors and perpetrators of conflict and insecurity in Africa from rebel groups in the period up to the 1990s, Government security forces and political to different types of militias. New armed militias were the two most active categories groups and militias that changed the conflict of conflict actors in Africa in 2016. State landscape emerged in Nigeria’s Niger Delta security outfits accounted for 34% of conflict region (Niger Delta Avengers, NDA); and events in 2016, a two percent increase in Eastern DRC (Kamwina Nsapu militia over 2015. This pinpoints the continued in Kasaï-Central province). Other splinter efforts and struggles by African states and groups were recorded in Sudan, and South governments (and regional organisations) Sudan, while RENAMO’s fighting capability to arrest the myriad of security challenges (and attacks) became more evident in confronting the continent. Predictably, Mozambique in 2016. government security forces were most active in conflict-affected states in the As violence and conflicts become more Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, Sudan, diffused, so has the range of actors across Ethiopia and South Sudan. According to Africa. Political militias were involved in ACLED, between 2015 and 2016, there was nearly a third (30%) of all organised armed a geometric surge in government military conflict events in Africa 2016. The Imbon- activities in Sudan (from 332 to 460 events) erakure of Burundi (militant youth wing of and Ethiopia (from 155 to 448).18 The reasons, the CNDD-FDD) was the most active in Africa nature and outcomes of the surge in military as it was involved in 202 conflict events in activities are different in the two countries; 2016, nearly double its record of 138 events in Sudan, the breakdown of ceasefire and in 2015. Other political militias include the lack of progress in political talks led to Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries renewed hostilities between the government (Benghazi, Libya); and the Seleka militia and and armed opposition groups in the first half the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation of 2016. In Ethiopia, the surge parallels the (RRR militia) in the Central African Republic. government’s efforts to contain protests in 19 the Oromia region, especially in October 2016 following wider police action against Rebel groups (armed opposition force) are the protesters in Bishoftu area. third most active conflict actor in Africa in 2016, constituting 20% of organised conflict. In 2016, the second dominant conflict The prominent ones include Al-Shabaab actors in Africa were political militias – (responsible for 7.5% of all conflict activity), groups or armed gangs using violence to followed by Boko Haram, Islamic State in seek relevance and influence the status quo Libya and the SPLA/M-In-Opposition in without necessarily seeking to overthrow South Sudan.

19 See ACLED (2017) Trend 5: Violent Conflict Actors 18 ACLED Conflict Trends No. 55, February 2017, p. in Africa in 2016, http://www.acleddata.com/trend-5- 6. violent-conflict-actors-in-africa-in-2016/

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 55 Source: ACLED, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Trend2-Fig1.png 3.4 The Scale and Kinds of This raises two curious questions, who are those killing civilians in Africa? Where Fatalities in 2016 are civilians being killed the most? The topmost sources of risk to civilians are When disaggregated further, violence political militias and state security forces; against civilians across Africa increased according to ACLED, the period 2011- for the second year in a row to 45%, up by 2016, militias accounted for 58.2% of three percentage points from 2014 levels. It violence against civilians. In 2016, state contrasts sharply with the overall decrease security forces perpetrated a quarter (25%) in reported civilian share of conflict-related of reported civilian fatalities.21 Communal fatalities; Africa recorded on 8.050 civilian militias (community-based armed groups) fatalities (27%) in 2016. This is a significant are equally deadly for civilians; in 2016, decline (a 42.5% decrease) from the preceding they were linked to 24.5% of reported year which stood at 37.5% of all conflict- civilian fatalities, compared with about 11% related fatalities. In fact, this is lowest share in 2015. The Fulani militias in Nigeria, and of civilian fatalities since 2002. 20 violence-against-civilians-in-2016 20 See ACLED (2017) Trend 3: Violence Against 21 ACLED (2017) Trend 3: Violence against Civilians Civilians in 2016, p. 1. http://www.acleddata.com/trend-3- in 2016, p. 1.

56 Murle militias in Sudan were the deadliest underscores the reduced frequency and communal militias for civilians in 2016; they intensity of Boko Haram attacks, and the killed 884 and 246 civilians in 2016.22 The battlefield successes recorded by Nigeria increased deadliness of communal militias and other members of the Multi-National is significant and it signposts the increasing Joint Task Force (MJTF) in the Lake Chad diffusion and diverse nature of violence Basin area in 2016. and conflict in Africa, and the threats posed to civilians. Curiously, the share of Beyond the killing, there are other harmful civilian fatalities attributed to rebel/armed physical and psychological consequences opposition groups dropped sharply to 20.77 of armed conflict and violence for civilians in 2016, compared with 52.3% in 2015. in 2016, of which sexual and gender- based violence was prominent. Sadly, Burundi recorded the highest number of any analysis of violence in Africa is never violent attacks (707) against civilians in complete without acknowledging how 2016, followed by Somalia (597) and Sudan sexual violence is being used as a weapon (578), respectively. However, Nigeria was of choice in virtually all types of conflict and the deadliest place for civilians in Africa in across territories. It is also an issue where 2016 as it produced 25.7% (2063) of all civilian data can be difficult to get. According to fatalities. In fact, the continental trend on ACLED, the countries with most reported civilian fatalities in 2016 was largely shaped cases of rape and gender-based violence by events in Northern Nigeria, namely in 2016 were Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and the activities of Boko Haram and armed DRC. Most of the reported cases of gender- Fulani herdsmen and communal militias. based violence in Sudan were perpetrated The combination of Fulani herdsmen and by armed groups such as pro-government militias singlehandedly perpetrated for 11% militias, Janjaweed, the Rapid Support of civilian fatalities in Africa in 2016. This Forces, the military and other unidentifiable was due to the series of armed clashes and armed groups. In South Sudan, the complicit killings in the Middle Belt/ Central region groups include the South Sudanese military and some Southern states over grazing and allied paramilitary groups, the SPLA/ and ethno-religious rivalries. What is also M-In Opposition, and several ethno- striking about the Fulani militias is their communal militias. The DRC, notorious for disproportionate share of civilian fatalities high incidence of rape in previous years, is (4.4%), compared with the share of organised estimated to have recorded a significant drop conflict activity (0.6%).23 Boko Haram (decrease of 59%) in reported cases of gender- perpetrated 10% (800 civilian fatalities) based violence in 2016. Given previous of all reported civilian fatalities in Africa trends, the data for the DRC requires caution during 2016; a significant decline from the as it does not suggest the disappearance of 43.8% (6,100 civilian deaths) in 2015.24 This the problem or a conclusive reduction in its intensity; it may still be high but only 22 See ACLED (February 2017) Conflict Trends No. under-reported for the year. It is only with 55, pp. 5-6. a consistent decline in reported cases over a 23 See ACLED (2017) Trend 5: Violent Conflict Actors period of three or more years that any strong in Africa in 2016. 24 See ACLED (2017) Trend 3: Violence Against claim on the reduction in the scale of the Civilians in 2016. problem in the DRC could be made.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 57 Source: ACLED http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Trend3-Fig-4.png 3.5 Non-Violent Conflict Fatalities: Migrant Deaths

Several thousand fatalities are recorded this data means that “on average, 14 people from non-conflict situations in Africa from have died every single day this year in the criminal activities, homicides, and inter- Mediterranean” in 2016.26 personal violence. While most of these are treated as part of the repertoire of internal Box 1: Data of Death/Missing Migrants in public order issues, illegal migration the Mediterranean across international borders, especially 2014: 3,279 deaths towards Europe has assumed geostrategic importance in recent years. A standout 2015: 3,789 deaths data for 2016 was the increase (highest as 2016: 5,098 deaths yet) in the number of fatalities recorded by illegal migrants through the Mediterranean. 2017: 559 deaths (Jan-March) According to the Missing Migrants project, Source: Missing Migrants Project, https:// the number of deaths and missing persons missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean from the multitude seeking to cross into Europe through North Africa, especially The increase in migrant deaths in the Libya, topped 5,098. As indicated in Box Mediterranean in 2016 underscored the 1 below, the spike in recorded fatalities in aftermath of the Arab Spring in North 2016 represents about 35% increase over Africa, especially the emergence of Libya 2015 levels, and 40% over 2014 fatalities. as the preeminent transit route for intending Importantly, the Mediterranean was the migrants.27 Since the fall of the Gaddafi deadliest forced migration route in 2016as government in 2011, Libya’s lack of effective it accounted for nearly 66-70% of the global central authority had made it attractive for (7763) fatalities recorded for missing or a number of organized criminal networks dead migrants.25 According to the UNHCR, involved in human trafficking. Other

26 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/ 25 Munich Security Conference (2017), Munich mediterranean-migrant-deaths-2016- Security Report 2017: Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?, p. pass-5000-161223130357172.html 46. http://report2017.securityconference.de/ 27 Munich Security Report 2017, p. 46.

58 underlying push and pull factors of forced competes with those violent conflicts; in migration through North Africa include most cases, migrant deaths in Mediterranean rise in environmental stress and limited surpassed fatalities from individual conflicts adaptive capacities to the effects of climate in Africa in 2016. Besides the reported change, Africa’s youth bulge, low fertility fatalities, there are numerous reports and rates and skills gaps in developed countries, cases of rape, kidnapping, executions and failing or collapsing states, armed conflicts other atrocities committed by militias and and insecurity.28 This makes some of the organized crime syndicates along the communities and countries in and around migration routes and in and around Libya. the Sahel most susceptible due to the Yet migrant fatalities are either ignored or get combination of two or more of these factors. fleeting mentioned in major policy debates Much of the migration route run through and interventions on peace and security in the Sahel and Sahara desert and it is not a Africa. Much of current efforts (interventions) surprise that migrants from Sub-Saharan are undertaken by the European Union. Africa were the highest recognisable group Given the increasing scale and strategic with 935 dead or missing migrants, although nature of migrants and fatalities recorded persons classified as mixed origin were through the Mediterranean, questions as to much higher (see Table 1 below). The North why and how to consider it a continental Africa and Horn of Africa had 228 and 30 peace and security challenge and efforts persons (nationals), respectively. to halt the northward flow, disrupt the organized human trafficking networks and The level of migrant fatalities compares and address the underlying structural causes 28 Munich Security Report 2017, p. 46. becomes pertinent.

Table 1: Recorded deaths in the Mediterranean by migrants’ region of origin, 2016

Region of Origin Number Dead and Missing Unknown 334 Mixed 3,174 Sub-Saharan Africa 935 Horn of Africa 30 Middle East and South Asia 397 North Africa 228 TOTAL 5,098

Source: Missing Migrants Projects, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean 3.6 Cross-cutting Structural years are more than 40% of adult population. According to the UNFPA’s State of the issues World’s Population Report, Africa accounts for 1.133 billion (16%) of the world’s 7.3 billion The incidence of armed conflicts and population. 29As indicated in Table 1 (below), violence in 2016 differ across Africa in Africa states have the highest proportion terms of the trigger issues, actors and overall of population aged 0-14, and 10-24 years dynamic. However they are reflect similar compared with the global average, as well underlying root causes linked to structural as twice the global average for fertility rate. weaknesses. The most prominent cross- cutting issues include the following: first is 29 UNFPA,2015. State of the World‘s Population 2015: Shelter from the Storm. New York:UNFPA, p. 127, https:// youth bulge – when young people under 24 www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/sowp/downloads/State_ of_World_Population_2015_EN.pdf

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 59 Africa is expected to produce 53% of addition in militias, armed groups, armed gangs, to the global population by 2050 with further and violent protests. Youth bulge has been ‘youthening’ of the continent’s population transformed into a security challenge thus expected to continue for another decade at far due to high unemployment and under- least.30 employment (in general and especially among youth), limited social mobility, easy So far, youth bulge has is proving to be a access to small arms and light weapons, challenge, rather than an opportunity in subsisting inter-group animosities, etc. For most Africa countries as indicated by the instance, most of the fragile and conflict- sheer number of young people involved affected states in Africa have some of the highest proportion of their population that 30 UNFPA. 2014. State of the World‘s Population are youth and/ or highest rates of youth 2014: Factsheet—Youth in Sub-Saharan Africa. New York: UNPFA, p. 1, http://www.unfpa.org/resources/state-world- unemployment – e.g. CAR, DRC, Kenya, population-2014-fact-sheet-youth-sub-saharan-africa Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Tunisia, etc.

Table 2: Demographic Table of Africa

Population 10-24 year- 0-14 year- 15-64 year- 65 year- Fertility Region (million) olds (%) olds (%) olds (%) olds+ (% Rate Algeria 39.7 24 29 66 6 2.9 Egypt 91.5 27 33 62 5 3.4 Libya 6.3 25 30 66 5 2.5 Morocco 34.4 26 27 67 6 2.6 Tunisia 11.3 23 23 69 8 2.2 East/ Southern 547 32 42 54 3 4.8 Africa West Central 403 32 44 53 3 5.5 Africa World 7349 25 26 66 8 2.5

Source: Compiled from UNFPA 2015, pp. 125-127.

The second cross-cutting structural coincidence that many fragile and conflict- issue is rise in the scale and intensity of affected countries in Africa are highly food environmental stresses associated with insecure, and produce the most forced the effects of climate change and limited migrants. Moreover, environmental stresses adaptive capacities across Africa. Much remain a direct factor in several violent of the Africa continent reels from rapid conflicts as affected population seek redress environmental change and stresses related to or compete for scarce resources, especially degraded soils, water resources, biodiversity in and around the Sahel. and increased frequency of extreme and unusual weather conditions. Such stresses Third is poor governance that often manifests amplify pressure on already fragile states, in the mis-management of economies exacerbating the failure to provide sufficient (corruption and economic decline), political food and water to populations.31 It is not a repression and authoritarian rule, violations of human rights, and attempts to manipulate 31 USA National Intelligence Council (2017) Global elections or change constitutional term Trends: Paradox of Progress, p. 224. www.dni.gov/nic/ limits. This has triggered mass protests, globaltrends

60 rebellions, and other violent reactions in true that SALW do not cause armed conflict some of the countries that experienced per se, however they are important ‘game violent events in 2016. According to the changers’ in turning grievances into violent US National Intelligence Council Global episodes, and increasing the deadliness Trends Report (2017), denationalization of conflicts. With the exception of mass and alienation arising from disconnection protests, it is hard to imagine any conflict from sociocultural mainstream; the inability situation without substantial use of SALW to participate in the political process; in Africa. diminished opportunities for marriage or the inability to attain perceived ‘deserved’ The final structural weakness is the rise socio-economic benefits and status will in self-help strategies by groups and remain consistent sources of grievance- communities to guarantee their physical driven violence in years to come.32 safety, socio-economic survival, political representation, and cultural survival. Fourth is the mismanagement of ethno- The prominent expression of this is the religious diversity in many countries. The formation of communal militias, defence absence of all-inclusive models of political forces, vigilantes, and warrior sects. The representation and participation (or the self-help mechanisms have increasingly undermining of such where the framework filled the spaces created by de-legitimized exists), and the general lack of tact in governments and state institutions; in the management of extremely delicate some cases, they have been co-opted by diversity issues have conditioned feelings governments thus averting violent clashes. of alienation, and under-representation. In Not unexpectedly, the rise in self-help most cases, this has undercut the legitimacy mechanisms has contributed to the rise in of governments and state institutions, and violence and armed conflicts across Africa increased real or perceived inter-group in 2016 and in previous years. inequality. This underlies violent events in countries such as Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, In subsequent sections, this report highlights DRC, Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, the granular details and thematic insights South Sudan, etc. from the statistical overview by identifying and reflecting on important theme-based Fifth are enabling factors, specifically the patterns from 2016. It also reflects on the availability and easy access to illicit small impact and implications (outcomes) of arms and light weapons, which transform some of the data presented above for mundane disagreements, grievances, and peace and security in Africa, and pinpoints tensions into violent, deadly affairs. It is critical policy and practical issues that estimated that there are over 100 million should hopefully engage the attention and illicit SALW in circulation in Africa.33 It is interests of policy actors, researchers, social commentators, development partners in 32 USA National Intelligence Council, Global Trends, Africa. p. 224. 33 See Matt Schroeder and Guy Lamb (2006). The Illicit Arms Trade in Africa: A Global Enterprise, African Analyst, Third Quarter.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 61 4. No Retreat, No Surrender: Stalled Peace Agreements in 2016

The process of ending armed conflicts and The implementation of the LPA stalled building peace and security is arduous due to the challenging political-security with inherent setbacks, and reversals along environment, lack of political will, and trust the way. Africa recorded a fair share of among signatories to the LPA. Key elements stalled peace agreements and processes of the LPA are yet to be implemented, in 2016 in places such as Libya, Mali, namely the setting up of interim security Sudan and South Sudan. Across these arrangements, delivery of basic services, countries, the lack of progress or setbacks formation of a new government (GNA); reveals a complex interplay of failed the establishment of a formalised structure implementation, belligerency amongst and command of the Libyan armed forces; factions, lack of requisite political will, and the appointments to senior military emergence of new armed groups/factions, and civilian leadership positions.36 Another etc. Admittedly, the nature of the challenges challenge to the LPA was the escalation in to the implementation of peace agreements militia activity in 2016 – Libya witnessed was rooted in the historical and political increased battles among militias (e.g. Bab peculiarities of each conflict. al-Tajoura Brigade, Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, Abu Salim Brigade and the National In Libya, little progress was made in the Mobile Forces) jostling for influence implementation of the December 2015 and control in and around Tripoli.37 It Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The is estimated that the number of militia political agreement made provisions for groups doubled between February and the establishment of key institutions such as June 2016, and Tripoli remained under the the Government of National Accord (GNA), control of a patchwork of armed groups the Presidency Council, Cabinet, House of with differing agendas and loyalties, from 34 Representatives and State Council. The both Tripoli and the surrounding areas.38 Presidency Council pushed to expand and As a consequence, widespread violation consolidate power in the first half of 2016 of human rights, including abductions, through the creation of new military units enforced disappearances, arbitrary (e.g. Presidential Guard) and the push to detentions, torture, and unlawful killing of formalize a new army structure (Bunyan civilians (including migrants) continued. Marsous). However, the Presidency Council 39Finally, the LPA, especially the institutions struggled to extend its outreach beyond it created (Presidency Council) suffered Tripoli throughout 2016 and a vote of no dwindling support due to the failure to confidence was passed on it by the Tobruk- address the acute security and economic based House of Representative (Parliament) in August 2016 as it rejected the proposed composition of the Government of National 35 36 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report Accord. of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, p. 1. 37 ACLED.2016.Real time analysis of African political 34 Institute for Security Studies.2016.Peace and violence, June 2016 Conflict Trends No.49, p. 3, http:// Security Council Report No.83, August 2016, p.15, https:// www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ACLED_ www.issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- Conflict-Trends-Report-No.49-June-2016_pdf.pdf report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-83 38 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report 35 United Nations Security Council.2016. of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, p. 3. Support Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, 39 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report p. 2, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support asp?symbol=S/2016/1011 Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, p. 7.

62 problems across Libya.40 There were the National Oil Corporation, thereby increased public protests against power cuts, insulating his forces from counter- lack of water, and financial squeeze in major attacks from the Tripoli government cities in September 2016.41 and to regain control and to create meaningful partnerships with key Natural resource issues, specifically the brokers Libya’s economic landscape.44 control of Libyan oil fields and receipts are central to the stalled peace process and -- In late September, the PFG attacked the the broader conflicts (including fleeting LNA positions at Sidrah and Ra’s Lanuf alliances and in-fighting among militias). in an effort to retake control of the area, Clashes, alliances and agreements have but they were repelled with the support been concluded and violated in relation to of airstrikes.45 calculations over access and control of oil fields. Armed groups have targeted oil fields The AU and UN continued to the strongly and terminals for financial and strategic engaged in the peace process by facilitating reasons. In fact, an armed group known as the December 2015 political dialogue the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) was that produced the LPA, and the AU’s created (assigned) by the presidency council establishment of the High Level Committee to protect critical oil fields and restore oil of Heads of State and Government to support 46 production, and take control of sovereign peace and reconstruction in Libya. In funds.42 Some of the attacks in 2016 related late 2016, new initiative to rescue the LPA to the control of oil infrastructures include – by encouraging national reconciliation, the following: political dialogue and the implementation of the LPA – was launched by a troika of -- In late 2015 and early 2016, IS-Libya the League of Arab States, the UN and the targeted and took full control of Ben AU.47 The implementation of the LPA (or its Jawad, and conducted a series of attacks failure) in 2017 will shape the prospect of on oil terminals at Sidra and Ras Lanuf, peace and security in years to come. clashing with the PFG. The IS attacks indicate a strategic move to use the In Mali, the implementation of the 2015 coastal road for rapid offensives and to Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation control the oil terminals (production signed by the government, the Plateforme and export) to finance war efforts.43 coalition of armed groups and the Coordination des movements de l’azawad -- In September, the LNA displaced the suffered considerable delays and setbacks LPG from key oil terminals of Ras throughout 2016. In particular, there Lanuf, Sidra and Brega. The Haftar-led were delays in the implementation of key LNA ceded control of the oil facilities to defence and security provisions such as the restructuring of the security sector, 40 Security Council Report.2016.Libya December 2016 Monthly Forecast. 30 November 2016. http://www. 44 ACLED.2016.Real time analysis of African political securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-12/ violence, October 2016 Conflict Trends No.52. http://www. libya_28.php acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ACLED_ 41 ACLED.2016.Real time analysis of African political Conflict-Trends-Report-No.52-October-2016.pdf p.4 violence, October 2016 Conflict Trends No.52, p.5, http:// 45 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ACLED_ of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support Conflict-Trends-Report-No.52-October-2016.pdf Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011 http://www. 42 Security Council Report.2016.Libya September un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1011 P.5 2016 Monthly Forecast. 1 September 2016. http://www. 46 Institute for Security Studies.2016.Peace and securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-09/ Security Council Report No.83.August 2016, p. 16, https:// libya_25.php www.issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- 43 ACLED.2016.Real time analysis of African political report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-83 violence, January 2016 Conflict Trends No.45 http://www. 47 Security Council Report.2016.Libya December acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ACLED_ 2016 Monthly Forecast. 30 November 2016. http://www. Conflict-Trends-Report-No.45-January-2016_pdf.pdf securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-12/ p.8 libya_28.php

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 63 cantonment of armed groups, divisions efforts to de-escalate tensions among armed and lack of trust among parties, boycotted groups which signed the Agreement for elections and the postponement of a national Peace and Reconciliation in Mali reconciliation conference. 48 As a consequence, the security situation The first quarter of 2016 recorded marked remained volatile (deteriorated) in 2016 – progress in the implementation of the peace violent extremist groups expanded their deal as steps were taken to advance political activities to Central and Southern Mali, and institutional reforms, decentralization and increased the frequency and intensity and the cantonment and disarmament, of attacks against civilians, MINUSMA, demobilization and reintegration processes. French troops, and Malian security forces.52 Also, the parties participated in all Moreover, there was a surge in armed deliberations of the Agreement Monitoring banditry, increasing the threat to civilians; Committee and renewed their commitment it accounted for accounting for 45% of all to accelerating the implementation of the incidents in Timbuktu and 25% in Gao agreement. Equally, parties to the agreement and Mopti.53 Inter communal clashes succeeded in de-escalating tensions and also increased as local gangs and militias avoided direct clashes through the Comité renewed hostilities over socio-economic de Suivi de l’Accord (follow up mechanism issues, especially in Menaka (Daoussak for the accord), and the efforts of MINUSMA, versus Fulani/Ibogaletane); Mpoti (Bambara the Malian government and Niger.49 versus Fulani) and Timbuktu regions.54 The multiplicity of armed groups, particularly The implementation slowed down and in the north, as well as their complex the peace deal stalled from April 2016 due and rapidly changing relationships and to delays in the establishment of interim widespread availability of small arms authorities in the north, repeated violations and light weapons are key factors in the of ceasefire in Kidal; failure to kick-start deterioration of security. cantonment (in spite of agreement on the membership of the oversight commission), In South Sudan the peace process suffered absence of joint patrols, and demonstration major setbacks in 2016 after initial optimism against MINUSMA and French forces.50 and muted progress in the implementation Disagreement over the validity of local of the August 2015 IGAD-brokered Peace elections in some northern towns in Agreement. At the start of 2016, the SPLM November led to the voluntary withdrawal by controlled government and the opposition the Comité de Suivi de l’Accord and calls for a SPLM-IO secured agreement in respect of high-level meeting of parties and mediators the power-sharing – the appointment of to review the slow implementation of the Riek Machar as First Vice President and peace agreement.51 Clashes among other distribution of ministerial positions for armed groups, especially violent extremist the Transnational Government of National groups and communal militias, despite Unity, TGNU.

48 United Nations Security Council.2016. Resolution However, major disagreement and 2295(2016) on Mali. S/RES/2295(2016), p.2, http:// deadlocked persisted regarding the www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2295(2016) 49 Security Council Report.2016.Mali October 2016 52 United Nations Security Council.2016. Resolution Monthly Forecast. 30 September 2016.(Online) http://www. 2295(2016) on Mali. S/RES/2295(2016), p. 2. http:// securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-10/ www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ mali_23.php RES/2295(2016) 50 Security Council Report.2016.Mali October 2016 53 United Nations Security Council.2016. Monthly Forecast. 30 September 2016. Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Mali. 51 Security Council Report.2016.Mali January 2017 S/2016/281, p.8, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. Monthly Forecast. 28 December 2016.(Online) http://www. asp?symbol=S/2016/281 securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/ 54 UN Security Council.2016.Report of the Secretary mali_24.php General on the Situation in Mali. S/2016/281, p. 8.

64 October 2015 re-districting plans by the in the country.56 SPLM government – the change to a 28 state structure from a 10-province plan Expectedly, land and oil resources play as contained in the August 2015 peace key roles in fuelling and sustaining violent agreement. The disagreement transcended conflicts in South Sudan. The contestations the major parties (SPLM government and over land parallel group and community the SPLM-IO) as it percolated to local identities that feed into broader political communities and ethnic groups over fears struggles. The importance of land and other the new structure was veiled attempt to natural resources (oil) was emphasized in secure undue territorial advantage for the the South Sudan Development Plan and the Dinkas (dominant ethnic group in the SPLM Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan government).55 as key factors of production and national development. Still, South Sudan is plagued by Natural resource issues feature prominently a dysfunctional natural resource governance in the series of violent conflicts in South system characterized by land tenure Sudan for a variety of reasons; first, the insecurity; and the lack of a fair, transparent country reflects the broader pattern in the and accountable land administration system. Horn of Africa with a predominance of The country also lacks a coherent legal and small subsistence farmers, agro-pastoralist institutional framework for managing rapid and pastoralist communities. Recent and urban expansion, return, resettlement and ongoing effects of climate change and the displacement of persons thereby leading limited adaptive capacities have increased to incessant disputes over boundaries the level of food insecurity and socio- delimitation, land grabbing, and access to economic vulnerability, and triggered grazing. contestations over land, water and access to pasture. The place of oil in the clashes Other underlying causes of the major armed between the government and the SPLM- conflict include the lack of political will, and IO is well established; 95% of government continued belligerency and commitment to revenue comes from oil receipts and the military solutions by the major parties (SPLM drop in oil prices in 2016 affected public and SPLM-IO) and their leaders (President finances by reducing foreign exchange Kiir and Riek Machar, respectively). Also, availability and triggering inflation. More restrictions on the deployment and importantly, some of the fiercest clashes operations of the UNMISS and humanitarian have been in and around oil-rich areas, agencies by the government and other namely Unity State. In most cases, South armed groups have also hampered peace 57 Sudan’s oil fields are managed by Chinese efforts. firms. For instance, heavy fighting resumed Political tensions and inter-ethnic acrimony in Bentiu (Unity State) in August 2016 over escalated into full scale violence in July 2016 the control of some of largest oil fields – the as SPLM government forces and SPLM-IO government sought to wrestle control from troops clashed in Juba. This triggered the the SPLM-IO. To underline the centrality of exit of Riek Machar from Juba and the oil to the conflict, South Sudan’s Petroleum Minister, announced plans to increase oil 56 Ecofinagency.2016. ‘South Sudan to increase production from 130,000 to 350,000 barrels oil production despite fighting – Petroleum Minister’, Oil and Gas, 19 December, http://www.ecofinagency.com/ a day, in spite of the ongoing armed conflict production/1912-36135-south-sudan-to-increase-oil- production-despite-fighting-petroleum-minister 55 Institute for Security Studies.2016. Peace and 57 United Nations Security Council Report. 2016. Security Report No.77.February 2016, p. 4. https://www. November 2016 Monthly Forecast for South Sudan, http:// issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council-report/ www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-11/ peace-and-security-council-report-no-77, south_sudan_25.php

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 65 resumption of large scale violence across civilians were systematically targeted by all the country.58 The majority of violent clashes parties, including reported cases of rape since July 2016 signpost the increasing and sexual violence in places such as Wau, ethnicization of violence –often constructed Juba, Bentiu, Leer, Malakal, Yambio and as Dinkas against other ethnic groups. This other locations across the Equatorias.61 It was fuelled by a series of events, namely the was estimated that renewed fighting had arming communities on the basis of ethnic displaced 1.6million persons internally and affiliation by the SPLM and SPLM-IO; the more than one million refugees scattered heavy involvement of Dinka soldiers in the across neighbouring countries, and July clashes in Juba; perceived favouritism increased the number of people at the risk of Dinkas in government appointments; of food insecurity to over 4.8million.62 perceived ethnic (pro-Dinka) logic of the re-districting plan; rise in ethnic-based Other indicators of the stalled peace process incitement and hate speech; and the rise and are the lack of progress in the establishment activities of ethnic associations, especially of the hybrid court and the deployment of the the Jieng Council (Dinka) and opposition regional protection force. The hybrid court to power sharing.59 was included in the 2015 peace agreement to try persons responsible for war crimes The collapse of South Sudan’s economy in and crimes against humanity. In spite of the 2016 increased social tensions and further SPLM government’s declared readiness to dampened the prospects of peace. The drop set up the hybrid court, little progress was in official revenue due to the collapse in oil recorded as the November 2016 deadline for prices, diversion of resources towards war the finalisation of the court’s mandate and effort (military spending estimated at 97% jurisdiction was missed.63 The establishment of government expenditure), and hyper- of the hybrid court stalled due to ongoing inflation (over 661%) led to the failure to pay violence, the exit of Riek Machar from the salaries, collapse of limited social service TGNU, and the inability to formally adopt delivery, and huge rises in the cost of living.60 the draft proposal for the implementation of the hybrid court.64 The geography of fighting expanded to include the Equatoria regions, Upper Nile, The deployment of a 4000 Regional Southern Liech (Unity State) and Western Protection Force (RPF) to protect civilians Bahr-el-Ghazal. The clashes involved a and strengthen the UNMISS was mooted network of armed groups, militias and by IGAD leaders following the outbreak forces loosely affiliated to either the SPLM of violence in Juba in July 2016. The RPF government or the SPLM-IO. The SPLM and was approved by the UN Security Council SPLM-IO forces accounted for 58.2% of all (under Resolution 2304, August 2016) and political violence and over 70.5% of conflict- consented to by the government of South related fatalities in 2016. As previously noted,

58 United Nations Security Council. 2016. Report of 61 United Nations Security Council.2016. the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established pursuant Special Report of the Secretary General on the review to Security Council Resolution 2206(2015).S/2016/793. 19 of the mandate of the United Nations mission in South September 2016, p.4. http://www.securitycouncilreport. Sudan. S/2016/951 10 November 2016, p.4. http://www. org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2016_793.pdf 8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_951.pdf. 59 United Nations Security Council. 2016. Report of 62 United Nations Security Council Report. 2016. the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, 2206(2015).S/2016/793. November 2016 Monthly Forecast for South Sudan. 19 September 2016, p.8. See also United Nations 63 Institute of Security Studies.2016.Peace and Security Council.2016. Report of the Secretary-General Security Council Report Issue No.86, November 2016.p.7, on South Sudan (covering the period from 1 April to 3 https://issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- June 2016), S/2016/552. 20 June 2016, p.4. http://www. report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-86. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C- 64 Institute of Security Studies.2016.Peace and 8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_552.pdf. Security Council Report, Issue No.85, October 2016. p.9, 60 United Nations Security Council. 2016. Report of https://issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, S/2016/793. p.9 report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-85.

66 Sudan in September 2016.65 In spite of highlight the arduous and complex nature pledges of troops from Rwanda, Ethiopia, of peace processes in Africa, and the cross- Zambia, Rwanda and Egypt, the RPF was cutting challenges of inadequate political yet to be deployed at January 2017.66 As will and limited trust, continued belligerency, at December 2016, the security situation and preference for military, rather than remained extremely volatile with the risk of political solution among conflict parties. The further deterioration in most regions. case studies also pinpoint structural blind- spots in the nature of peace agreements Overall, the three case studies reaffirm and current approaches and priorities of the indispensable role of regional and mediation and conflict resolution activities in transnational actors in sustaining or Africa, specifically the tendency to overlook undermining peace processes. They also subnational conflicts and small armed groups and militias. Perhaps this raises the 65 Institute of Security Studies.2016.Peace and need for strategies, tools and approaches Security Council Report, Issue No.84, September 2016. p.14, https://issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- to mediation and conflict resolution that report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-84. are more inclusive (especially of smaller 66 Security Council Report.2016.South Sudan: armed groups and militias) and deepen the January 2017 Monthly Forecast. 28 December 2016, http:// www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/ prospect of peace across different levels of south_sudan_27.php society. 5. The Spectre of Atomised Violence and Low Intensity Conflicts in 2016

Africa’s peace and security landscape in proxy wars, or the atomization of violence or 2016 was also dotted with array of what as part of the network of complex alliances could be described as ‘low intensity’ or among armed groups as is the case in South ‘quasi-war’ situations. This partly reflects Sudan, Eastern DRC, Sudan-Darfur, and the deadlock in some peace processes, and Northern Mali. evolving structural changes to the nature of violence and conflict in Africa. While In other instances, low intensity conflicts the phenomenon is not new, they appear straddle existing political, ethnic, religious to be increasing in number and spread, and geographical fault-lines, and the and intensity in 2016. Examples of this episodic spikes are often triggered by abound, including Mozambique, Burundi, opposition to government policies, Cameroon, Nigeria, DRC, Northern Mali, competition for power (elections), and the border regions across the Sahel, etc. These control of natural resources (land, water situations are characterized by lower and mineral resources). In a few cases, mass media coverage, sometimes completely protests and violent riots would qualify as low under the radar of mainstream media; low intensity conflicts. These forms of conflict levels of armed violence but equally deadly tend to involve armed gangs, and political internecine violent episodes; and they are and communal militias either mobilized rooted in unresolved or badly managed and used by political elites in the struggle historical-political grievances. They are for local and national political relevance, also extremely fluid situation with huge or embedded within communities as the potentials for escalation, often responding to arrow heads for protecting and advancing short term triggers such as policy changes, communal causes. We can x-ray a few electoral disputes, and particular arrest or examples in slightly greater details. brutality and/ or killings by security officials. In Mozambique, the range and scale of Alternatively, they may be sub-conflict political-security challenges, including the within a larger conflict either as a form of possibility of renewed large scale armed

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 67 conflict between the ruling FRELIMO over the protection of Anglo-Saxon government and the opposition RENAMO, language and cultural heritage. The political intensified in 2016. The conflict is historical foundations of the protest are linked to and political; it is linked to past rivalries the perceived marginalization of minority between the groups during the anti-colonial Anglophone population (estimated at struggle. The current episode was triggered 3.2million population), and their demand by disputed elections in 2014, and RENAMO’s for a federal system (autonomy), rather than demand for the right to set up autonomous a unitary structure.70 The immediate triggers government in the provinces it won majority of the crisis were peaceful demonstration seats. In addition, the conflict is linked to by lawyers and teachers protesting against the control of lucrative trade routes in and the use of French courts and laws and around RENAMO strongholds in the north. the absence of certain elements of the In spite of the declared commitment by the legal code in English, and the presence conflict parties to a negotiated settlement, of French-speaking teachers in English- the crisis has deteriorated over a series speaking areas and schools, respectively.71 of violated ceasefires and deadlocked The government also arrested leaders of and political talks. According to ACLED, political banned the Southern Cameroons National violence events increased both in intensity Council and the Cameroon Anglophone and geography – 92 events across 10 Civil Society Consortium, two prominent provinces were recorded in 2016 up from civil society groups in the region. The 19 such events across 6 provinces in 2015. brutal repression of the protests inflamed 67 Crucially, the attacks linked to RENAMO political tensions and aroused demands in 2016 spread to provinces across the for self-determination and independence north and central regions, especially places across Southern Cameroon. Cities such as where it had rarely or never carried out Bamenda and Buea have been epicentres attacks since 2013, such as Nassa, Cabo of riots and anti-government protests. The Delgado, Zambezi, Manica, Sofala, Tete and crisis continued into 2017 with more protests Inhambane. There have reciprocal violence and the repressive action by the government, against RENAMO and people suspected of including arrests and detention of civilians, supporting the group, leading to accusations and enforced communication blackout. of extrajudicial killings, looting, destruction of property, rape and other human rights In South Sudan, beneath the main conflict violations against the government.68 Within between the Sudan People’s Liberation this, violence against civilians increased by Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces and 700%, and civilian fatalities doubled over the the government’s Sudan People’s Liberation past two decades.69 Army Forces, there are several, more localised sub-conflicts involving multitude In Cameroon, spontaneous protests and of militias and armed groups.72 South Sudan clashes with security forces erupted in the mirrors a system of multiple conflicts in last quarter of 2016 in English-speaking which local battles serve community needs regions in the Northwest and Southwest as well as elements of broader, national

70 See International Business Times, ‘English- 67 ACLED (2017) Conflict Trends No. 55, p. 7. speaking Cameroon close to ‘guerrila warfare’ if crisis talks 68 ACLED.2016. Real time Analysis of African don’t happen’, 17 January 2017, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ Political Violence, October 2016. Conflict Trends No.52, p. 7, anglophone-cameroon-close-guerrila-warfare-if-crisis- http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ talks-dont-happen-1601782 ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.52-October-2016. 71 See International Business Times, ‘Tensions rise pdf in Cameroon as teachers demand ‘respect for Anglo-Saxon heritage’, 23 November 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ 69 ACLED.2016. Real time Analysis of African tensions-rise-cameroon-teachers-demand-respect-anglo- Political Violence, October 2016. Conflict Trends No.52, p. saxon-heritage-1593018 6, 72 United Nations Security Council Report. 2016. http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ November 2016 Monthly Forecast for South Sudan(online) ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.52-October-2016. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly- pdf forecast/2016-11/south_sudan_25.php

68 conflict between the SPLA-IO and the SPLA Central regions, and by armed groups in government. Actually the main conflict the Niger Delta. In both cases (and other parties involve loose coalitions of militias instances of subnational violence in and armed groups with different layers of Nigeria), natural resource issues related political objectives. to land and hydrocarbon resources, are major causes of violent conflicts. In the Apart from minority ethnic groups, there Middle Belt region, an estimated 30 attacks are sub-clans of the dominant Dinka and took place July-September 2016 between Nuer ethnic groups that oppose (fight) farmers and herders with over 222 deaths the main clan groups. From late 2015, and several injuries recorded. The clashes and throughout 2016, new or breakaway have continued into 2017 with similar armed groups emerged and/ or became clashes spreading further south, fatalities more assertive, often as a consequence rising above 300, displacement of several to national level dynamic, especially the communities, and disruptions in harvest.74 initial rapprochement between the leaders of SPLA-IO and the SPLA government. Some The renewed hostilities in the Niger Delta armed gangs, such as the Murle militia, exemplify the natural resource dimension subsist and engage in inter-communal cattle of violent conflict in greater detail. The raiding and revenge attacks within South historical foundations of the conflict in the Sudan (e.g. Jonglei) and across borders (into Delta are common knowledge, namely the Ethiopia, Sudan, etc.). Others emerge as a demand for oil bearing communities to consequence of the ‘redistricting’ plan by exercise greater control in the ownership the SPLA government – communal militias and exploitation, and increased share of emerged and violence erupted in Western receipts. This is in addition to enforcing and Central Equatoria, and Bahr-el-Ghalzal greater environmental standards and as ethnic groups such as Mundi, Baka and addressing decades of environmental Mondari saw the administrative change abuse and degradation by multinational oil from 10 to 28 districts as veiled attempts companies in the region. by the Dinkas (SPLA) to annex their land. Other groups that emerged to protest the In 2016, militancy and armed attacks new district plans include the South Sudan against international oil companies and Armed Forces (SSAF) from the Latuke ethnic oil production infrastructures resumed group in Eastern Equatorial, the Tiger after a six-year hiatus. The arrow head Faction New Forces (TFNF) from the Shilluk was a new group called the Niger Delta ethnic group in the Manyo County (Western Avengers (NDA) and its demands were not Nile); Arrow Boys re-emerged in Mundri, dissimilar from those of previous armed Napele and Sar Sibo; etc.73 The plethora of groups, namely, the implementation of sub-conflicts shows the limits of current the 2014 National Conference reports; macro-level mediation and peace efforts; it reinstatement of the Maritime University; is unlikely to resolve the complex local-level unconditional release of the Indigenous grievances and grievances across South People of Biafra (IPOB) leader, and the Sudan. As such, a more holistic approach reinstatement of the Presidential Amnesty that simultaneously addresses the macro and Programme that was suspended at the micro conflicts in South Sudan is needed. inception of the Buhari government. They also demanded for restructuring the country In Nigeria, multiple cases of atomized and implementing a form of government violence erupted or intensified in 2016. This that will allow states in the region to control includes violence by nomadic herdsmen their resources (with the possibility of (Fulani militias), communal militias in the 74 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report 73 ACLED (July 2016) Conflict Trends No.50, pp. 5-8, of the Secretary General on the activities of the United http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. 23 June 2016 ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.50-July-2016_pdf_ S/2016/566 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. final.pdf asp?symbol=S/2016/566 p.4

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 69 secession implied).75 The NDA and a host pipelines.78 This has secured temporary of other small armed gangs disrupted oil ceasefire and halt in the bombing of oil production (reduced daily output by 700,000 and gas infrastructures, however the risk barrels), sabotaged pipelines supplying gas of escalation remains very high. By the to Nigeria’s power plants (further worsening end of 2016, the NDA agreed to a ceasefire the epileptic electricity supply in Nigeria), and declared support for the dialogue and reintroduced political tension and air initiative with monarchs and declaration of insecurity in the region. The new wave of readiness for negotiation (without the of attacks hit the government hardest as it option of secession) by the president.79 The coincided with the drop in oil prices (led future dynamic of peace and security in the to major shortfalls in public revenues that region would depend on the extent to which triggered scarcity of foreign exchange, the government could rebuild trust with inflation and economic recession. communities from the region; restraint to resort to the severally ‘tried and failed’ military The resumed hostilities underlines the approaches; concrete outcomes and impact failures of the 2010 Presidential Amnesty of the dialogue process, manifested in visible Programme (PAP), namely, the failure to developmental tangibles; and the reform of address the root causes of the problem, the oil industry in ways that prioritize the failure to neutralise the network of conflict needs of oil bearing communities. entrepreneurs in the region, exclusion of some armed groups from the PAP, limited Overall, cases of atomised violence and progress in taming the excesses of armed low intensity conflicts raise three major groups and oil thieves, and futility of ‘buying’ implications (and learning) for peace and peace through cash and oil contracts in the security in Africa; first, they reveal the true Delta.76 scale and challenge of violence in Africa. It is a trend that is likely to be on the increase in The government responded with a dual the short to medium term, hence atomised strategy of negotiating with the attackers violence and low intensity conflicts while simultaneously enhancing security constitute one of the major challenges 77 measures. The government deployed that the AU, RECs, African states and other soldiers (but halted offensive military stakeholders will be confronted with in years operations), extended the amnesty program to come. It becomes necessary to explore to December 2017, and commenced the extent to which existing tools and consultation and dialogue with community mechanisms, including the APSA, could be leaders and monarchs from the Niger Delta. adapted to respond to this variant of conflict Simultaneously the military “Operation and violence. Second, the geography Crocodile Smile, to crack down on what it of atomized violence and low intensity called criminals responsible for attacking conflicts constitute invaluable sites for conflict prevention activities, especially to

75 David, Adetula.2016. Everything You Need To prevent escalation into large scale conflicts. Understand The Niger Delta Avengers And Their Quest Third, they expose the limitation of current For Secession. August 23, http://venturesafrica.com/ peacebuilding approaches and instruments everything-about-the-niger-delta-avengers-so-far-and- their-quest-for-secession/ that focus on and prioritise macro-level 76 Ukeje, C. (2016) ‘State Responses to the conflict and violence. Conflict prevention Relapse into Insurgent Violence in Nigeria’s Oil approaches and conflict management tools, Region’, APN Briefing Note, No.8, December 2016, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/ new_publication_3/%7BE8492705-40D4-E611-80C3- 78 Bello Muhammad.2017. Niger Delta: Nigeria’s oil- 005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf rich powder keg. 14 January http://www.dw.com/en/niger- 77 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report of delta-nigerias-oil-rich-powder-keg/a-37134909 the Secretary General on the activities of the United Nations 79 Nneka,Luke..2016. Nigeria’s Avengers claim Office for West African and the Sahel.S/2016/1072, http:// Niger Delta oil pipeline attacks. 8,July http://www.dw.com/ www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1072, en/nigerias-avengers-claim-niger-delta-oil-pipeline- p..4 attacks/a-19389276

70 including Afsol strategies would need to growing importance of atomised violence broaden focus and emphasis to reflect the and low intensity conflicts. 6. Progress in African-centred Solutions in Peace and Security (AFSOL)

An important silver lining in Africa’s and injuries to hundreds of people.80 Peace and Security landscape in 2016 was The AU and ECCAS had deployed a joint noticeable progress in the use of African- election observation missions whose post- centred Solutions in Peace and Security election report identified several flaws in (Afsol) in managing armed conflict and the electoral process: the restriction of civil insecurity. Notwithstanding the scale of liberties; the administration’s sway over the violence and fatalities, there was evidence electoral commission; a lack of balance in of progress in finding and using African the coverage of certain candidates by public solutions to African problems in 2016. media; and the fact that ‘the mission was African states and institutions such as the not allowed into vote collation centres. The AU and RECs were active in preventing, mission recommended changes, including de-escalating and forging negotiated ‘the establishment of an independent solutions (through political dialogue) to electoral institution with the primary and violence and conflict situations. In Gabon, sole responsibility of overseeing all phases Burundi, Gambia, Libya and Sudan, the of the electoral process.81 The AU PSC in prospect of open armed confrontation or its statement on 2 September underlined surge in the scale and intensity of violent the need to address the situation in Gabon clashes was averted or modulated by AU/ based on ‘consensus among all concerned REC led mediation and political settlement Gabonese stakeholders in conformity with initiatives. African states and institutions the relevant AU instruments’.82 It could be were able to develop and use strategies and said that the engagement by the AU and approaches to preventing and managing ECCAS before, during and after the election conflict and security challenges that were contributed to de-escalating the crisis. consistent with the historical, social, political and institutional realities of African states. Similarly in Gambia, political tensions We explore the progress is developing and protests erupted in the run up to the 83 and using African-centred Strategies and presidential election in December 2016. Solutions in Peace and Security in greater Unexpectedly, the defeat of the incumbent detail in the case of Gabon, Gambia and Yahya Jammeh regime and the initial Burundi. concession to the election result heralded optimism of a peaceful transfer of power. In Gabon, pre-election protests from July However the subsequent rejection of election 2016 ratcheted into widespread following the result by President Jammeh following announcement of the results of presidential polls at the end of August 2016. It involved 80 Radina Gigova.2016.Gabon Erupts in Post- protesters from opposition Union of Forces election Violence. CNN, September 2, 2016. http://edition. for Change against police; opposition cnn.com/2016/09/01/africa/gabon-election-protests/ groups rejected the results alleging electoral 81 Institute of Security Studies.2016. Peace and Security Council Report .Issue No.84 September 2016, fraud and manipulation by the ruling party pp.12-13 and President Ali Bongo. The protests led to 82 Institute of Security Studies.2016. Peace and arson attacks on the parliament and other Security Council Report. Issue No.84 September 2016, public buildings, looting, three fatalities p.12 83 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report of the Secretary General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. S/2016/566, p.3

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 71 some computation errors by the electoral Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (Mauritania) commission (but which did not change the in January 2017 persuaded President overall outcome) threatened to plunge the Jammeh to relinquish power and go on country into political chaos.84 exile in Equatorial Guinea based on an agreement (guarantee) of safe passage The ECOWAS, with the support of the AU and protection from harassment for him and the UN (UN Office for West Africa, and his associates. According to Marcel UNOWA) initiated mediation talks led by the de Souza (the President of the ECOWAS President of Nigeria (Muhammadu Buhari) Commission), the coordinated approach and former President of Ghana (John and skilled use of mediation and implicit Mahama). Together with the Chairperson threat of force that resulted in a peaceful of ECOWAS and President of Sierra Leone, restoration of democracy and security was the ECOWAS mediation team visited Gambia remarkable; “The operations [to resolve the twice to broker a peaceful resolution of the Gambian crisis and restored democracy crisis. The 50th Ordinary Summit of the and security] took place without shedding ECOWAS Authority in Abuja (17 December of blood, without any casualty, and without 2016) authorised the body to use all necessary any foreign intervention whatsoever. This means to ensure the respect of the will of is a clear indication that Africa can face her the people of The Gambia. Similarly, the own challenges and find solutions to her AU-PSC at its 647 Meeting declared support problems.”86 for the ECOWAS position and mediation, urged Gambian security forces to exercise The origin of the Burundian crisis is restraints and called on President Jammeh common knowledge; it was sparked by the to respect the will of the people by peacefully April 2015 decision by President Nkurunziza relinquishing power by 19 January 2017 of the National Council for the Defense of when his term expires.85 Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – to run for a ECOWAS focused on a political negotiation third term in office. This was deemed a clear to persuade President Jammeh to relinquish violation of the terms of the 2000 Arusha power, but also prepared for a backup option Peace Accords and the 2005 Constitution. of deploying troops should mediation talks This set off a chain of political-security failed. Troops and military assets from instability, including protests, a failed coup Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana were placed on attempt, killings and assassinations, and standby. The deployment of troops actually displacement of civilians. It also raised the started as the 20 January 2017 deadline stakes and the threat of renewed armed set for President Jammeh exit from power conflict. The situation has remained volatile approached and it looked unlikely that power ever since with violent clashes between would be transferred peacefully. regime supporters and opposition groups 87 However last minute shuttle diplomacy and allied militias. Civilians have been by President Alpha Condé (Guinea) and caught in street clashes, armed grenade attacks against police, militia violence 84 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report of the Secretary General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. 19 December 2016 86 See ECOWAS (2017) ‘ECOWAS Commission S/2016/1072, p.2 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. President welcomes the Peaceful outcome of the post- asp?symbol=S/2016/1072 electoral crisis in The Gambia’, 24 January 2017, http://www. 85 See “The 647th meeting of the AU Peace and ecowas.int/ecowas-commission-president-welcomes-the- Security Council on the post-election situation in The peaceful-outcome-of-the-post-electoral-crisis-in-the- Islamic Republic of The Gambia”, 17 January 2017, http:// gambia/ www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-647th-meeting-of-the- 87 ACLED.2016. Conflict Trends (No.48) Real time au-peace-and-security-council-on-the-post-election- analysis of African Political Violence, May 2016, p. 7, http:// situation-in-the-islamic-republic-of-the-gambia#sthash. www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ACLED_ QkrJV09c.dpuf Conflict-Trends-Report-No.48-May-2016_pdf.pdf

72 against internally displaced persons, raids powers of the AU to override sovereignty and arrests by government forces.88 In in grave circumstances as contained in the one particular incident in December 2016, AU Constitutive Act (Article 4h). Moreover, coordinated attacks on military posts in the imposition of targeted sanctions against Ngagara, Musga and Mujejuru recorded regime officials by the PSC had limited over 87 fatalities.89 Civilians continued effect.93 to be targeted in the form of enforced disappearances, extra judicial killings, The AU opted to push and support an human rights abuses and torture.90 inclusive political dialogue in Burundi through the Inter-Burundian Dialogue, and In spite of the volatile political-security to dispatch a high level dialogue delegation, condition and worsening humanitarian comprising of five Heads of State, to situation, Burundi recorded a decrease in the Burundi.94 This was expected to complement overall level of violence in 2016; the number and expand the deployment of AU human of conflict events declined from 847 in 2015 rights observers to Burundi.95 The AU High to 784 in 2016, and conflict-related fatalities Level Delegation96 secured the consent of also dropped by 56%.91 It is not impossible the Burundian government to increase that the emerging thaw in overall violent the number of human rights observers attacks could be linked to the progress, from 100 to 200, as well as commitment to albeit minute and still feeble, in mediation restart political dialogue with opposition and political negotiations by regional groups. As at November there were only 45 bodies. There were two tracks of political human rights observers and nine military negotiation and mediation in the Burundian experts in the country due to financial and crises, namely the East African Community logistical constraints and security concerns. (EAC) mandated political dialogue process Also, a comprehensive Memorandum of under the leadership of Former President Understanding on human rights monitoring Mkapa and the AU High Level Delegation. was yet to be signed.97 In 2016 there was strong rapprochement Admittedly, the Mkapa-led Inter Burundian between the Burundian government and the Dialogue was yet to make substantial AU following the AU’s change of approach progress largely due to the government’s – from pushing for strong international refusal to include opposition groups that action, including the deployment of a 5,000 were yet to renounce violence, specifically intervention force92 without the consent of the main opposition group – the Conseil the Burundian government to mediation, political dialogue and engagement focused 93 Institute for Security Studies.2016. Peace and on a negotiated settlement of the crisis. The Security Report No.76. December 2015/January 2016, p. 8, https://www.issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security- change of strategy was informed by political council-report/peace-and-security-council-report- dynamic within the AU, specifically at the no-76, Summit level, regarding the sanctity of 94 Institute for Security Studies.2016. Peace and Security Report No.78. March 2016. Dakar/Pretoria/Nairobi/ Burundian sovereignty versus the right and Addis: ISS, p.7, https://www.issafrica.org/research/peace- and-security-council-report/peace-and-security-council- report-no-78 88 ACLED.2016. Conflict Trends(No.48) Real time analysis of African Political Violence, p.8 95 Institute for Security Studies.2016. Peace and Security Report No.78. March 2016. Dakar/Pretoria/Nairobi/ 89 ACLED.2016. Conflict Trends(No.48) Real time Addis: ISS, p.8, https://www.issafrica.org/research/peace- analysis of African Political Violence, p.14 and-security-council-report/peace-and-security-council- 90 United Nations Security Council.2016. Resolution report-no-78. 2303(2016). S/RES/23013(2016) 29 July 2016, p. 1, http:// 96 The delegation included the Heads of State and www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- Government of South African, Mauritania, Senegal, Gabon, 4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2303.pdf and Ethiopia. 91 ACLED (February 2017) Conflict Trends No 55, p. 97 Institute of Security Studies.2016.2016.Peace and 4. Security Council Report, Issue No.87 Dec2016/Jan2017, p.8, 92 The African Prevention and Protection Mission in https://issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council- Burundi (MAPROBU). report/peace-and-security-council-report-no-87.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 73 National pour le respect de l’Accord d’Arusha also signed a new peace treaty focused pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi on financial issues, security measures et de l’Etat de droit (CNARED).98 Nonetheless, and border demarcation. This paved the it has opened some form of communication way for the reduction in oil transmission between the government and elements fees, resumption of trade and transport, within the opposition. renewed commitments to halt support to armed groups, redeployment of joint The AU’s engagement could be said to military forces along the Demilitarized constitute some form of progress, however Border Zone, reopening of border posts and tenuous, in securing the increase in crossings, and the establishment of direct number of human right observers and communication.101 military experts, and pushing for the restarting of political dialogue. The AU and In Sudan, a new peace deal (Roadmap EAC engagement with parties to the crisis Agreement) was signed in March-August could become the foundation for a viable 2016 between the government and various political settlement in the near future. This armed groups. The deal expressed a new contrast sharply with the experience of the commitment to negotiate a comprehensive United Nations; the Burundian government peace deal on the future of Darfur, Blue Nile consistently blocked the implementation of and South Kordofan. In spite of leading UN Security Council Resolution 2303 (July to unilateral ceasefires, the Roadmap 2016) that called for the deployment of 228 Agreement was weakened by the withdrawal UN Police officers to monitor the security (revocation of support) by the SPLM/A- situation and to support the human rights North, one of the largest armed groups, over monitoring activities of the Office of the the government’s questionable commitment High Commissioner for Human Rights.99 to the peace deal. A sub-national peace deal was also concluded between the Sudanese Other cases of progress in conflict resolution pastoralist tribes (Rizeigat and Ma’aliya clan) efforts include Somalia: negotiations over financial compensation following commenced among regions of greater clashes in East Darfur in April 2016. Somalia, specifically Somaliland, Khatumo state, and Puntland over contested provinces In the DRC, a peace deal was reaches between such as Sool, Sanaag and Cayn Section. At the ruling party (government of President the subnational level, a ceasefire agreement Kabila) and opposition groups over a new was concluded between the Hawadle clan timeline for elections (in 2017), composition and the Dir sub-clan Surre (Hiraan region); (power sharing) of a transitional cabinet and and a peace deal reached between the President Kabila’s continued stay in power Habir Gedir clan and the Blymal clan (lower until elections. At the subnational level, a Shabelle state) on the withdrawal of militias peace agreement concluded between the from contested areas. In both examples, government and the Alliance of Patriots mediation efforts were led or supported by for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) a combination of clan elders, government and the Nyatura militias over disarmament of Somalia and the AU-AMISOM.100 and demobilization in exchange for official amnesty.102 The governments of Sudan and South Sudan Overall, the three main case studies (Gabon, 98 Institute for Security Studies.2016. Peace and Gambia and Burundi) are instances of Security Report No.82. July 2016, p. 12, https://www. election-related crises and they pinpoint issafrica.org/research/peace-and-security-council-report/ peace-and-security-council-report-no-82 to varying degrees the importance of 99 Security Council Reports.2016.Burundi November normative frameworks and strong (or weak) 2016 Monthly Forecast. (Online) 28 October 2016. http:// political will to affirm their sanctity where www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-11/ burundi_7.php 101 HIIK 2017, Conflict Barometer 2016, p. 58. 100 HIIK 2017, Conflict Barometer 2017, p. 21. 102 HIIK 2017, Conflict Barometer 2016, p. 21.

74 and when tested. They also underscore adapting strategies and getting better at the imperative of proactive and timely managing election-related crisis. Perhaps engagement by the AU, RECs and other this calls for greater reflections regarding stakeholders in crisis situations. Third, the key principles (proactiveness, timeliness, they reconfirm the decisive role of African consensus building, strong political will, and consensus and concerted international building international pressure) that appear pressure in preventing and managing crisis to underlie the progress thus far, could be situations. Importantly, the case studies may transposed to the management of other also indicate that Africa (AU and RECs) are types of conflicts in Africa. 7. The Containment and Rollback of Violent Extremist Groups

The reality of violent extremist ideologies improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide and groups constituting credible threats bombings, or attacks against ‘soft’ civilian to peace and security in Africa predates targets (especially hotels, schools, markets, 2016; in fact it predates the 11 September etc.), crucially inside Mali, and in Niger and 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States Burkina Faso close to the Malian border. and the Global War on Terror that followed. However, data and trends in the activities The evidence of strategic containment of violent extremist groups in Africa in and roll back is visible, albeit in varying 2016 signpost a ‘game changing’ moment degrees, in most of the four corridors – that containment measures undertaken (covering more than twelve countries) by African states, the African Union and where violent extremist groups are active RECs, and foreign partners were achieving in Africa. Boko Haram was routed and its strategic results in most cases. There is fighting capabilities seriously degraded a global context to the containment and across Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad rollback of violent extremist groups as “a Basin area covering border communities US-led coalition of more than 50 countries in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The group has stripped Daesh of large swaths of its actually carried out the fewest attacks in 2016 territory…more than 50,000 Daesh fighters compared with the previous five years, and in Iraq and Syria, about 75%, have been killed much of its attacks in 2016 were limited to as a result of the coalition war.”103 softer, minimalist targets like remote villages and refugee camps, and use of suicide In 2016, the threats posed by violent extremist bombers, mostly my radicalized young girls. groups were either neutralized or reduced. The group sprung occasional attacks against In short, signs emerged (with greater clarity) military targets such as the April offensive that violent extremist groups were being against Nigeria’s 113th battalion in northern rolled back in greater numbers and frequency Kareto104 and June attack of Bosso, Niger, across Africa. In most cases, the majority of killing 28 soldiers and displacing 70,000 violent extremist groups active across Africa people.105 experienced one or more of the following: loss of territory and constricting spaces to Much of the containment and roll operate, degraded capability to undertake 104 The Guardian.2016. Boko Haram is losing ground ‘audacious’ and high-profile attacks, loss – but will not be defeated by weapons alone 13 May https:// of fighters, collapsed or limited sources of www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/13/ boko-haram-losing-ground-will-not-be-defeated-by- support and infrastructures, etc. Most violent weapons-alone-lake-chad-basin-summit extremist groups are increasingly reduced 105 Security Council Report.2016.Political and to launching guerrilla attacks through Humanitarian Briefing on the Lake Chad Basin. July 2016. (Online) http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/07/council- 103 Munich Security Report 2017, p. 50. briefing-on-the-lake-chad-basin.php

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 75 back was achieved by the coordinated the group’s deputy commander Mahad counter-offensive by the armies of Chad, Mohammed Karate was killed by AMISOM.109 Cameroon, Benin and Nigeria under the It is estimated that by August 2016, the USA’s MJTF Framework from late 2015. The drone strikes and coordinated operations coordinated counter-insurgency operations with Somali Army Commando Forces by the MJTF recaptured over 30 30 towns operations killed more than six members and villages, and on 24 December 2016, of Al-Shabaab’s top echelon.110 President Muhammadu Buhari declared victory over Boko Haram after the recapture Admittedly, Al-Shabaab regained some of Sambisa forest, Boko Haram’s erstwhile territories such as El Ade, Badhadhe, headquarters.106 Still, Boko Haram remains Gedo, Marka, and Garad (Puntland), most a living threat as it still controls some areas of this was due to voluntary withdrawal around the Mandara Mountains on the by AMISOM, Kenyan Defence Force and eastern frontier with Cameroon; has roving Somali National Army, rather than Al- 111 fighters that continue to launch surprise Shabaab combat successes or advances. attacks against remote villages; retains Al-Shabaab also launched series of bomb capability to launch suicide bombings; and attacks such as in Galkayo, and Mogadishu its leaders are yet to captured or killed.107 and recorded casualties that included civilians, government minister, members of In the Horn of Africa corridor, Al-Shabaab Parliament and soldiers at different times in and its affiliates have had their top 2016. All this were consistent with the group’s leadership degraded with implications for guerilla tactics. The alliance between Al- their operational effectiveness. Several Al- Shabaab and IS in Puntland has yet to alter the Shabaab leaders were killed in different strategic balance. 112 The successes recorded offensive by the KDF, USA, Somali National in degrading Al-Shabaab’s leadership in 2016 Army, and AMISOM; for example, Mohamud was due to better intelligence gathering, and Dulyadeyn (mastermind of the Garissa coordination between AMISOM, Somali University attack in April 2015), and Maalim National Army and affiliated militias, and Daud, head of Al-Shabaab’s intelligence hit foreign partners, especially the USA. squads, were killed by the Somali National Army and coalition forces.108 Similarly,

106 Security Council Report.2016. Discussion on the Lake Chad Basin Crisis. Jan 11 2017, http://www. whatsinblue.org/2017/01/discussion-on-the-lake-chad- 109 AddisFortune.2016. Al Shabaab’s Capability basin-crisis.php waning. July 19. http://addisfortune.net/columns/al- shabaabs-capability-waning/ 107 TheTelegraph.2016.Boko Haram loses grip on thousands of square miles of northern Nigeriahttp://www. 110 See Stratfor (2016). In Somalia, al shabaab allegedly telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ loses its leader. August 15 https://www.stratfor.com/ nigeria/11492530/Boko-Haram-loses-grip-on-thousands- analysis/somalia-al-shabaab-allegedly-loses-its-leader of-square-miles-of-northern-Nigeria.html. See also, United 111 ReliefWeb.2016. The resurgence of al-Shabaab Nations Security Council.2016. Report of the Secretary in Somalia and implications for the humanitarian sector. General on the activities of the United Nations Office for (Online) 23 March http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/ West African and the Sahel, S/2016/566, p.4, http://www. resurgence-al-shabaab-somalia-and-implications- un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/566 humanitarian-sector 108 Somaliaone.2016. Somali commando forces 112 Security Council Report.2016. Somalia: January kill top al shabaab leaders in Saakow. 15 August. http:// 2017 Monthly Forecast.28 December 2016. (Online) http:// somaliaone.net/2016/08/15/somali-commando-forces-kill- www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/ top-al-shabaab-leaders-in-saakow/ somalia_27.php

76 Table 3: Profile of Major Violent Extremist Groups in Africa

Name Location Objectives Activities Criminal: Abduction of Movement for unity Sahel foreign workers, and drug To Spread jihad in areas of and Jihad in West Mali trafficking. operation Africa (MUJAO) ‘South’ Algeria Insurgent: suicide bombings landmines Harakat as-Shabab Southern and central Insurgent: guerrilla warfare, Seeking to create an Islamic al-Mujahidin Somalia, Kenya, bombings, suicide attacks and state in Somalia (Al-Shabab) Djibouti and Uganda public executions/beatings Imposition of sharia Ansar Dine Impose sharia law across the Northern Mali law, killings, and suicide (Defenders of Faith) country bombings Insurgency: Suicide Jama’atu Ahlus- Nigeria (north-east Overthrow government and bombings, and mass Sunna Lidda’Awati mainly), establish strict Islamic Sharia bombings of civilian areas. Wal Jihad Niger and Cameroon law and regime. Criminal: civilian kidnapping (Boko Haram) (ransom) and robbery. Al Qaeda in the Criminal: kidnapping of for- Algeria, Mali, Libya, Key objective is to rid North lands of the Islamic eigners for ransom. Guerrilla: Tunisia Africa of Western influence Maghreb (AQIM) ambush, IED, and bombings. Restore ‘honour’ to the DRC, Central African Acholi ethnic group Install Lord’s Resistance Human trafficking, and Republic, government based on Army (LRA) civilian attacks Southern Sudan leader’s ‘version of ten commandments’

There was greater evidence of sustained combination of USA airstrikes and forces containment and effective roll back of loyal to the Presidential Council defeated violent extremist groups in the North IS forces in military battles, recaptured African corridor. In Tunisia, much of the all IS territories (over 300 kilometre), and threat posed by IS affiliated groups were killed over 650 fighters and injured another neutralised in 2016 through new security 2000 injured.115 Only smaller cells of violent measures introduced following attacks on extremist groups remain active but without police and military positions in Southern at strategic advantage or territory in Libya.116 town of Ben Guerdane in March.113 In Libya, In addition, the military interventions by Islamic State forces and affiliated militias France and UN-backed ECOWAS forces were routed in Banghazi and Sirte in 2016; in in the Sahel have resulted in temporary Benghazi, General Haftar’s Libyan National and tactical retreats of Al-Qaida affiliated Army (LNA) forces loyal to the House of fighters to Libya. Nonetheless, the threats Representatives, with the support of USA posed by violent extremist in the corridor air strikes, attacked and displaced IS and remain; IS affiliated groups, remnants of its affiliate Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura AQIM, and Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia) all Council (a coalition of Islamist armed groups cooperate and remain active in the border that includes Ansar al-Sharia).114 In Sirte, the

113 Amnesty International.2016. Tunisia: Severe libya_25.php restrictions on liberty and movement latest symptoms of 115 United Nations Security Council.2016. repressive emergency law 17 March 2916.( Online) https:// Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/tunisia-severe- Support Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, restrictions-on-liberty-and-movement-latest-symptoms- p. 5, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. of-repressive-emergency-law/ asp?symbol=S/2016/1011 114 Security Council Report.2016.Libya September 116 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report 2016 Monthly Forecast. 1 September 2016. http://www. of the Secretary General on the United Nations Support securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-09/ Mission in Libya. 1 December 2016. S/2016/1011, p. 5.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 77 regions, especially Southern Libyan Desert have been contained in the (in)incapability to and Mount Chaambi that is located between overrun the Malian state and/ or government Tunisia and Libya.117 as was the case in 2012. The Sahel corridor appears to buck the It is important to restate that the containment trend or at best showed the least evidence and/ or rollback neither extinguishes the of containment. The containment seems continued existence of violent groups nor less evident In Northern Mali and border diminishes the potential appeal of extremist communities in Mauritania, Niger and narratives and ideologies, especially in the Algeria; groups such as Al-Qaeda in the context of ongoing conflicts in the Muslim Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity World, strong crime-terror nexus, Africa’s and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar- ‘youth bulge’ and numerous structural Dine, Al Mourabitoun and IS elements weaknesses such as high unemployment, launched attacks within and around the poverty, unresolved socio-political region. On the one hand, there were instances grievances, etc.122 Also, foreign fighters of renewed operational cooperation and of African origin “unless identified, similarities among the groups, resulting in deradicalized, and reintegrated back into increased number of attacks. And on the society are likely to become the recruiting other hand, violent extremist groups would pool for tomorrow’s violent nonstate appear to have expanded their operational actors.”123 Evidence from other parts of the perimeter into Central and Southern Mali, world have shown that ‘winning the minds’ and across neighbouring countries such is even a greater challenge compared to as Niger, Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) and ‘winning the war’ with violent extremist Cote d’Ivoire (Grand Bassam).118 Within Mali, groups. Indeed, the threat of violent extremist they have targeted MINUSMA, the Malian groups and ideologies remain real and Defence and Security Forces, EUTM Mali serious in Africa, but compared to 2015 (and and the French forces, and in neighbouring previous years), it would appear that in 2016, states they have targeted hotels, schools, African states, citizens/communities, AU/ markets and other civilian centres.119 In the RECs and their strategic partners managed first quarter of 2016, MINUSMA recorded to arrest surge in threats posed by violent 20 attacks by violent extremist groups in groups, even if it is in the short term. which seven peacekeepers, one civilian staff member and two civilian contractors died.120 What is responsible for the progress in This was in addition to several kidnappings containment and roll back of violent extremist and armed attacks and fatalities all through groups? Is a model for containment and how 2016.121 Still, the violent extremist groups could it be replicated and sustained? How could the battlefield gains be transferred to 117 United Nations Security Council.2016. Report efforts to counteract the appeal of violent of the Secretary-General on the threat posed to Libya and neighbouring countries, including off the coast of Libya, by extremist ideologies among populations, foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining Islamic State especially youth across Africa? Are there in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated lessons to be learnt for Africa, especially the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 18 July 2016 S/2016/627, p.6, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. AU and RECs? It would seem that these are asp?symbol=S/2016/627. questions and issues that should engage the 118 United Nations Security Council.2016.Report of relevant stakeholders and institutions within the Secretary General on the Situation in Mali. S/2016/281, pp. 5-6, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. and outside of Africa. Perhaps, more detailed asp?symbol=S/2016/281 assessments would suffice. 119 United Nations Security Council.2016. Resolution 2295(2016) on Mali. S/RES/2295(2016), p. 2, http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2295(2016) 120 UN Security Council.2016.Report of the Secretary https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12542.doc.htm General on the Situation in Mali. S/2016/281, p. 6. 122 Munich Security Report 2017, p. 50. 121 United Nations Security Council.2016. Security 123 US National intelligence Council, Global Trends Council Press Statement on Mali. SC/12542-AFR/3463 2017, p. 223.

78 Overall, emerging learning from the Lake support of foreign partners in the form of Chad Basin pinpoints the centrality of intelligence gathering and fusion, training multinational effort to counteracting and equipment, funding, and operational violent extremist groups, especially due to support (airlift, air support and other force their transnational and trans-border modus enablers) are essential ingredients. It also operandi. Also, multiple levels of cooperation be that size matters; the MJTF, is relatively and coordination, including diplomatic, small – just five troop contributing countries political, and operational exchanges involved – could a recipe for better and more are prerequisites. The cooperation and effective operational cooperation. 8. The Year of Protests and Riots

The standout observation in 2016 was constitutional rules on term limits triggered surge in the number of riots and protests protests in Cameroon, DRC, Gambia, Gabon, (increased of nearly 5% over 2015 levels) Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In a number of as evidenced by events in Tunisia, South cases, protests erupted as a consequence of Africa, Ethiopia, Mali, Gabon and Chad. In overlapping economic and political issues, 2016, mass protests gained traction as they or protests fuelled by economic issues have were ‘Weaponised’ and transformed into ended up having political consequences. ‘Street Power’ –the preeminent strategy for effecting changes in socio-economic and/ An overview of regions shows the or political circumstances. In recent years multifaceted geography of riots and protests protests have proved effective in bringing across the continent. South Africa and about far-reaching political changes. The fear Tunisia recorded the highest number of of protests is now the beginning of wisdom protests in 2016 with 20% and 11.25% of total for many governments in Africa. As such, protest events in Africa, respectively. South both democratic and (semi-)authoritarian Africa and Ethiopia make up approximately governments have developed a variety of one third of total protest events, with this strategies to cope with dissent, ranging from share increasing to 50% when including 124 tolerance and accommodation – as during Tunisia and Nigeria. In North Africa, all the recent wave of protest in Morocco – to states witnessed high rates of protest activity outright repression – as in Cameroon, DRC, in 2016, confirming the longer trend started Ethiopia and Sudan. in 2011. In Algeria and Tunisia, the number of protest events was higher than in 2011, Of course, the triggers, nature, demands and raising concerns that local grievances may outcomes of the protests vary across and give rise again to wider collective actions. within countries, however they are reflect Despite a relative de-crease from the structural conditions and imbalances linked previous year, protest movements in Egypt, to inequality, economic hardships, inter- Morocco and Libya have also called attention group dynamic, and limited civil liberties. to the multiple weaknesses of these states. In 2016, economic issues linked to tax rises, inflation, poor social service delivery, Beyond the transformation of protests into withdrawal of subsidies and rising cost of street power, other notable changes in living triggered riots and protests in Sudan, 2016 are: first, increase in the number of South Sudan, Namibia, South Africa, Libya, events and countries affected, including Ethiopia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. spread across conflict-affected, fragile and Political issues such as corruption and seemingly stable countries. Protests took poor governance, group-based inequalities, place in the midst of armed conflicts in Mali, human rights violations, limited civil liberties, elections, and manipulation of 124 See ACLED 2017. Conflict and Violence Overview: Report 58 Feb 2017, p.4.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 79 South Sudan, and Sudan. Relatively stable limits). Admittedly, events in a few countries states such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Gabon (e.g. Libya) show the risk and possibility and Cameroon also recorded protests. of protests metamorphosing into violent Second, West Africa was least affected, armed conflict. All the same, this indicates compared to Central, East, North, and that Africa is entering a new phase in the Southern Africa. It is unclear of this is a mere continued evolution of conflicts and peace coincidence or an indication of stronger and security broadly. structural resilience linked to embedded norms of democracy and good governance. On the other hand, protests represent a Third, as a reflection of ‘street power’, most democratic conundrum; they indicate the protests witnessed increased politicization, deepening of democracy (a new phase or even when triggered by specific economic wave in Africa’s evolving democratization), issues. Most protests increasing targeted as well as signposting the weakness of political changes (regime change) as either governance institutions (as avenues for core demands or unintended outcomes. In airing grievances and effecting change) and short, the solution to the issues at the heart the poor implementation of existing regional of protests was increasingly viewed from and continental normative frameworks the narrow, yet strategic prism of changing on good governance and democracy. or rejecting incumbents of power. Finally, Protests are being used to renegotiate 2016 witnessed the increasing securitization the social contract, check the excesses of of protests by governments through rise in incumbents of power, and hold governments cases of crackdown, arbitrary arrests and accountable. Popular protests also indicate detentions, shutdown of communication displeasures and attempts to redress systems, etc. Going forward, it appears the socio-economic inequality and political resort to riot and protest by citizens is likely (inter-generational) marginalization. Mass to continue to rise in years to come; events protests in Africa in 2016 could also reflect in Southern Cameroon, DRC, and Nigeria a broader global trend of rise in populist in the first two months of 2017 are credible ideas and impulses, and ascent to a ‘Post- 125 signposts. Order’ system. Of concern is the fact that in certain situations and countries, protests What do protests and increases in 2016 could be manipulated or misused for narrow indicate? It is appropriate to explore what (inappropriate) objectives, or misdirected Africa and policy actors in general should or towards helpless victims as evidenced by could make of the spate of protests in 2016 continuous xenophobic violence against and early 2017. The rise in the number and African migrants in South Africa. spread of protests is a sign of progress, as well as subsisting challenges. On the one Overall, political consciousness and hand, protests appear to have increased demands for good governance are increasing in the context of decreasing or flat-lining across the continent due to the growth in number of violent armed conflict. In this internet penetrability, progress in school sense, protests could be rivalling or replacing enrolment and literacy rate, higher rural- violent conflict in the analysis and policy urban migration, rapid urbanization, surge interventions on peace and security in Africa. in the role of diaspora groups in the politics Given that most recent protests are short- of home countries, and greater use of social lived (lasting few days or weeks), and lead to media among Africans. Protests parallel the fewer fatalities, relative to armed conflicts. broad Global Trend observed by the USA Moreover, the AU and most RECs appear to National Intelligence Council as the ‘Paradox be evolving and adapting elements of APSA, of Progress’ that embodies the achievement specifically the mediation instruments, to of industrial and information age, delivering respond to certain types of protests (those danger and richer opportunities. According linked to elections and constitutional term 125 Munich Security Report 2017, pp. 7-8.

80 to the American National Intelligence and organized civil society groups have Council, “the next five years will see rising leveraged platforms such as Facebook, tensions within and between countries. Tweeter, Instagram, Blogs, WhatsApp Underlying this crisis in cooperation will be and other online chatrooms to transcend local, national, and international differences socio-cultural divides and mobilize about the proper role of government across citizens for protests. There is a sense that an array of issues ranging from the economy the transformation of protests into street to the environment, religion, security, and power is shifting the epicentre of political the rights of individuals.”126 power and the balance of sovereignty from regimes to citizens. Accordingly, protests In most cases, mobile telephony and access may lead to breakdown in law and order in to social media have become major enablers the short-term, but they could be important in the organization and outbreak of protests foundations for long-term peace and in Africa. Spontaneous social movements security in several African countries. 126 USA National Intelligence Council (2017) Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, p. ix. 9. Summary of Continental-Level Trends of Peace and Security In 2016

The following are the key observations recorded the highest number of regarding continental-level trends in peace conflict events in 2016. These countries and security in Africa in 2016. cumulatively accounted for a third (33%) of all violent conflict in Africa in 2016; • Overall, the ‘meta data’ of conflict and a slight decrease from 35% in 2015, and violence in Africa in 2016 was largely 40% in 2014. In 2016, Somalia was by far unchanged from 2015; albeit the levels the epicentre of violent event in Africa for both years are dangerously high. in 2016 with over 2200 recorded events, The continent recorded 17, 539 violent followed by Nigeria, South Sudan and events in 2016, compared with 17, 537 Libya. recorded in 2015. The range of violent events includes battles, violence against • Somalia displaced Nigeria as the civilians, remote violence, strategic topmost country for total fatalities events, riots and mass protests etc. (including civilians, soldiers, battle- related and other forms) from violent • The number of large scale wars and field events in 2016 (See Figure 1 below). battles are either stagnating or declining, The number of reported fatalities but there is an increasing explosion increased in Somalia and Sudan in 2016, of non-state conflict agents and the while Nigeria experienced a decline. violence perpetrated by them; militias, According to ACLED, Somalia accounted vigilantes, violent extremist groups and for 20% of all reported fatalities, and spontaneous movements (rioters and Nigeria accounted for nearly 16% of protesters). Moreover, conventional total fatalities in 2016. Nigeria’s share battles with clear cut government versus declined considerable from almost 30% opponents continue to decline while in 2015. rioting, protesting, and violence against civilians remain high or increasing in • Government security forces and some cases. political militias were the two most active categories of conflict actors in • Conflict-affected states like Libya, Africa in 2016. State security outfits Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria accounted for 34% of conflict events in

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 81 2016, a two percent increase over 2015. perpetrated by armed groups such as Government security forces were most pro-government militias, Janjaweed, active in conflict-affected states in the the Rapid Support Forces, the military Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia, and other unidentifiable armed groups. Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan; for In South Sudan, the complicit groups example, between 2015 and 2016, there include the South Sudanese military and was a geometric surge in government allied paramilitary groups, the SPLA/ military activities in Sudan (from 332 M-In Opposition, and several ethno- to 460 events) and Ethiopia (from 155 communal militias. to 448). • Notwithstanding the unchanged overall • The scale of human fatalities in 2016 was levels of violence in 2016, there was 30,000, a decrease over 2015 (36,000) a marked qualitative change in the levels. According to ACLED, both the character of armed conflict and violence estimated total fatalities and reported in Africa; armed conflicts and violence civilian fatalities from organized became more diffused as evidenced by armed conflict events declined in the noticeable increases in the number 2016. However, civilians continued and spread of mass protests, and rise to be targeted or caught in crossfires; in militia activities. Political militias violence against civilians across Africa were involved in nearly a third (30%) increased for the second year in a row to of all organised armed conflict events 45%, up by three percentage points from in Africa 2016. The Imbon-erakure of 2014 levels. It contrasts sharply with the Burundi was the most active in Africa overall decrease in reported civilian as it was involved in 202 conflict events share of conflict-related fatalities; Africa in 2016, nearly double its record of 138 recorded on 8.050 civilian fatalities (27%) events in 2015. New armed groups in 2016. This is a significant decline (a and militias that changed the conflict 42.5% decrease) from the preceding landscape emerged in Nigeria’s Niger year which stood at 37.5% of all conflict- Delta region (Niger Delta Avengers, related fatalities. In fact, this is lowest NDA); and in Eastern DRC (Kamwina share of civilian fatalities since 2002. Nsapu militia). Other splinter groups were recorded in Sudan, and South • The topmost sources of risk and violence Sudan, while RENAMO’s fighting to civilians are political militias and state capability (and attacks) became more security forces; during the period 2011- evident in Mozambique in 2016. 2016, militias accounted for 58.2% of violence against civilians. In 2016, state • The changing character of violence and security forces perpetrated a quarter conflict also manifested in increased (25%) of reported civilian fatalities. instances of ‘low intensity’ conflicts or Communal militias (community-based ‘quasi-war’ situations. Examples of this armed groups) are equally deadly for in 2016 abound, including Mozambique, civilians; in 2016, they were linked to Burundi, Cameroon, Nigeria, DRC, 24.5% of reported civilian fatalities, Northern Mali, border regions across compared with about 11% in 2015. the Sahel, etc. These situations are characterized by lower media coverage; • The countries with most reported cases low levels of armed violence but equally of rape and gender-based violence in deadly internecine violent episodes; and 2016 were Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and they are rooted in unresolved or badly DRC. Of note is the decline in reported managed historical-political grievances. cases of gender-based violence in the They are also extremely fluid situation DRC. Most of the reported cases of with huge potentials for escalation, often gender-based violence in Sudan were

82 responding to short term triggers such African-centred Solutions in Peace as policy changes, electoral disputes, and Security (Afsol) in managing and particular arrest or brutality and/ armed conflict and insecurity in 2016. or killings by security officials. Notwithstanding the scale of violence and fatalities, there was evidence of • Another evidence of the change in progress in finding and using African the character of violence and armed solutions (based on historical, socio- conflict across Africa in 2016 was political and cultural orientations) to the surge in the number of riots and peace and security challenges in 2016. protests (increased of nearly 5% over African states and institutions such 2015 levels) as evidenced by events in as the AU and RECs, were active in Tunisia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Mali, preventing, de-escalating and forging Gabon and Chad. More countries negotiated solutions (through political experienced protests in 2016, the dialogue) to violence and conflict countries affected cut across conflict- situations. In Gabon, Burundi, Gambia, affected and relatively stable ones; and Sudan, the prospect of open armed West Africa was least affected; and 2016 confrontation or surge in the scale and witnessed the increasing securitization intensity of violent clashes was averted of protests by governments through or modulated by AU/REC led mediation rise in cases of crackdown, arbitrary and political settlement initiatives. arrests and detentions, shutdown of communication systems, etc. In 2016, • Data and trends in the activities of mass protests gained traction as they violent extremist groups in Africa in 2016 were ‘Weaponised’ and transformed signpost a ‘game changing’ moment – into ‘Street Power’ to bring about far- that containment measures undertaken reaching political changes. Going by African states, the African Union forward, it is logical to expect further and RECs, and foreign partners were instances of riots and protest by citizens achieving strategic results in most cases. in years to come; events in Southern In 2016, the threats posed by violent Cameroon, DRC, South Africa, and extremist groups were either neutralized Nigeria in the first two months of 2017 or reduced. The majority of violent are pointers. extremist groups active across Africa experienced in varying degrees, one or • Africa experienced a fair share of stalled more of the following: loss of territory peace agreements and processes in and constricting spaces to operate, 2016 in places such as Libya, Mali, degraded capability to undertake Sudan and South Sudan. Across these ‘audacious’ and high-profile attacks, loss countries, the lack of progress or of fighters, collapsed or limited sources setbacks reveals a complex interplay of support and infrastructures, etc. Most of failed implementation, belligerency violent extremist groups are increasingly amongst factions, lack of requisite reduced to launching guerrilla attacks political will, emergence of new armed through improvised explosive devices groups/factions, etc. (IEDs), suicide bombings, or attacks • Africa recorded progress in the use of against ‘soft’ civilian targets (especially hotels, schools, markets, etc.), etc.

STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 2017 83 10. Recommendations

1. Build more inclusive peace accords 4. Time to consider ad-hoc coalitions and that addresses national and subnational security arrangements as models for conflicts simultaneously tackling violent extremist groups Evidence from 2016 reveals structural blind- Multinational cooperation anchored on spots in the nature of peace agreements adhoc security coalitions are central to and current approaches and priorities of counteracting the threats posed by violent mediation and conflict resolution activities extremist groups, especially due to their in Africa, specifically the tendency to transnational and trans-border modus overlook subnational conflicts and small operandi. Also, multiple levels of cooperation armed groups and militias. This raises the and coordination, including diplomatic, need for strategies, tools and approaches political, and operational exchanges are to mediation and conflict resolution that prerequisites. The adhoc arrangements are more inclusive (especially of smaller could indicate that size matters – small armed groups and militias) and deepen the partnerships improves agility, coordination prospect of peace across different levels of and effectiveness. They also indicate that the society. appropriate support from foreign partners in the form of intelligence gathering and 2. Adapt existing conflict management fusion, training and equipment, funding, tools to address ‘quasi-war’ situations and operational support (airlift, air support The cases of atomised violence and low and other force enablers) is essential. It is intensity conflicts reveal the true scale and crucial to consider arrangements such as challenge of violence in Africa. It is a trend the MJTF as a model for better and more that is likely to be on the increase in the short effective operational cooperation in peace to medium term, hence the need to explore and security. and adapt existing tools and mechanisms, 5. The AU and RECs to clarify, harmonise including the APSA, to respond to this and synergise conflict prevention tools variant of conflict and violence. in respect of structural causes of armed 3. Build on gains made in managing violence and conflicts election-related and constitutional-term The unchanged overall levels of violence, associated crises explosion in the number and spread of mass The progress made in managing election- protests, and rise in militia activities are related and constitutional term associated important issues in preventing conflicts, as crises in 2016 underline the importance of well as in post-conflict reconstruction and normative frameworks and strong political peace building. The statistical overview of will to affirm their sanctity where and when Africa peace and security landscape in 2016 tested. They also underscore the imperative reconfirm the enduring impact of structural of proactive and timely engagement by the weaknesses, and the need to urgently AU, RECs and other stakeholders in crisis resource and capacitate the AU and RECs situations. This calls for greater reflections in respect of post-conflict reconstruction on how key principles (proactiveness, and development. timeliness, consensus building, strong political will, and building international pressure) that underlie the progress thus far could be transposed to the management of other types of conflicts in Africa.

Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa April 2017 E: [email protected] W: www.tanaforum.org

P.O. Box 1176 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia E: [email protected] W: www. ipss-addis.org