COLLO.. :,<.,r;. :

cc i -J r I.- .. P*!,!, REVISED, UPDATED, AND EXPANDED EDITION lì.

A MODERN HISTORY OF

Natlon and State in thè Horn of Africa

I. M. LEWIS,

Westview Press ^'5?x BOULDER & LONDON >^'*. \ K :%: jv^i

• -/ /o/ /.-Ay v>; CONTENTS

Preface to che 1988 Editìon vii Preface to thè First Edition ix Chapter

I The Physica! and Social Setting 1 II Ecfore Partition 18 This Westview softcover editìon il printed un aud-frue pnper and bound in softcovecs thac III The Imperiai Partition: 1860-97 40 curry thè bighe» rating of thè National Aurxìation of State Textbook Adminìstracors, in tons» Iration wich thè Association of American Publiihcrs and thè Hook Manu faci uters' IV The Dervish Fight for Freedom: 1900-20 63 Inscitutf. V Somali Unificatìon: The Italian East*Afrìcan Empire Ali rights reserved. No pare of chis publkarion may be reproduced oc transmitted in any 92 forni or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, rccording, or any in for m uri un Storage and retrieva! System, wichout pcrmìssion in wticing from thè publisher. VI The Restoration of Colonia l Frontiere : 1940-50 116 VII Trusteeship to Independence: Copyright © 1965, 1980, 1988 by I. M. Lewis From 1950-60 139 Vili The Problems of Independence Fine published in thè United States of America in 1988 by Wesrvicw Press, Inc.; Frederick 166 A. Prjegcr, Publisher, 5500 Cenerai Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301 IX The Somali Revolution: 1969-76 205 First edìtion published in 1980 by Longman Group Limited; chapters 1 through 8 published X Nationalism, Ethnicity and Revolution in thè in 1965 by Weidenfeld ;»nd Nkolson Horn of Africa 226 Maps Library of Congress CaraJoging-in-PublicatÌon Data 267 Lewis, I. M. Notes A motlvrn hìstory of Somalia. 270 Includw index. Index I. Somalia—History. 1, Tirle. II, Series. 289 DT403.L.Ì95 1988 967'.73 87-21589 ISBN 0-K13 3-7402-2

Printed and bound in che United States of America _^ The paper ustd in this publication meets thè requirements of che American (poj National Standard for Permanence of Paper fot Printed Library Materials Z39.48- 1984.

654321 PREFACE TO THE 1988 EDITION

As BIOGRAPHER oSf Third World cultures, anthropologists have often endeavoured to piece together such historical evidence as they could find to provide a historical settìng for their accounts of contemporary society and culture, Such amateur excursions into history have frequently occurred not only in thè historicaUy oriented Continenta l and American anthropological traditions but also in thè British social anthropological tradition despite its ostensibly ahistorical, Durkheimian bias." In thè absence, usually, of much documentary evidence, such anthropological histories have, perforce, concentrated on orai sources, thus virrually inventing that imporcant modem specialisation - orai history." No special apology, therefore, is needed to introduce this history of an African ethnic group, based on orai and documentary sources and written by an anthropologist who can claim no special historical expertise. What is more remarkable abour thè present exerdse is that it involves an anthropologist writing about an ethnic group which has become a modern nation-state (or more accurately two states: thè and thè Republic of Jibuti) and whose connexion with this culture and its representatives spans thè period from thè birth of modern Somali politicai parties in thè early 1950s to thè present. I first met members of thè Somali natìonalist organisations campaigning for independence before embarking on my doctoral field research in thè 1950s and, durìng fieldwork in Somalia (1955-1957), had thè privilege of getcing to know many of thè future politicai elite. 1 thus developed thè strong sympathetic interest in Somali nationalist asptratìons which is reflected in this book.

"Cf . I. M. Lcwis (ed.), History and Sodai Antkropology, London, 1968; "The future of thè past in British social anchropology', Vienna Contribultoas to Elbnology and Antbropology, Band 2, 1985. "S«, e.g., J. Vansìna, Orai Traditìon: a attdy iti bistorii a l mttbodology, Chicago, 1965.

vii PREFACE TO 1988 EDITION PREFACE TO My attempts to document and understand subsequent Somali THE FIRST EDITION polìtica! developments bave, naturally, not always been received equally favourabl yby ali those concerned. Somali policicìans, lìke thcir colleagues elsewhere, are more apprecìative of adulation than of analysìs. However, I have in thè main been more or less tolcrated by most Somali governments since independenc ein I960. THIS STUD YOF in thè Horn of Africa traces Here thè generai attitude seems to have been that expressed to thè unfolding of a process rare in thè recent history of thè con- me once by Prime Minìster 'Abd ar-Razaq Haji Husseyn when tinent - thè transformation (albeìt stili incomplete) of a traditional he ìntroduced me to bis cabinet as 'that chap who writes about Afriean nation into a modern state. This phcnomenon ìs rendcred us. We don'c always like what he says, but thè importane thing ali thè more strìking by its juxtaposhìon with a rivai tradition o£ ìs that he writes about us!' Ahhough I have visited Somalia politicai sovereignty in neighbouring Ethìopia, a state built on frequently since thè military coup of October 1969, I would be conqucst and comprising many difTerent nàtions» peoples and less than honest if I concealed thè fact that my relations were tribes. Although in pre-colonial Africa, both nation-states (like hiippier with thè preceding civilian governments. However ,as I Somalia) and pluralist, multi-natìonal states (like ) were think my Somali friend s appreciate, I have given what support equally common, European colonization and decolonization I could to those wider Somali interests which ttanscend particular altered decisively thè balance in favour of thè lattet type. Today, governments - thus endeavouring to discharge part of thè debt with thè exception of thè Somali Democtatic Republic, Botswana which I think anthropologists owe to those they scudy. and Lesotelo, sub-Saharan Africa's traditional nations and tribes The welcome growth in Somali Studies over this period and are not autonomous, but encapsulated in multi-national states especially from thè late 1970s (after Somalia's breach with thè fonned haphazardly and wìthout regatd to ethnic boundaries in • Soviet Union) also reflect sthese politicai developments . The tenth thè European partition of thè continent. Indeed, thè "rnap of anniversar yof thè 'revolution' in 1979 provided thè occasion for Africa* today is virtually identica! with that under European a government-sponsored internatìona l symposium in colonization at thè turn of century. It is this ptevailing cultura! on 'Somalia and thè World1. This, in turn, led to thè formation hetetogeneity, with thè growth of ethrùc friction and conflict of che Somali Studies International Assodation, which holds triennial since independence, which makes Afriean states so fragile and so congresses (Mogadishu, 1980; Hamburg, 1985; Rome, 1986). vehemently attached to thè territorial fromiets which alone This multidisciplinary ,multìnational enterprise - in which Somali establish their identity, If this accounts for what amounts to a scholars play an increasìngly promìnent role - is a far cry from kind of £rontier-fetishism, it also cxplains thè pervasive pre- thè smalì, largely expatriate cottage ìndustry which was ali chete occupation with *nation-building\è very understandable was when I began my studies. struggle to achieve a culturally homogeneous unìty which would transform these colonial artefacts ìnto viable nation-states. This I. M, Lewis December 1987 aspitation is not, as some theorists of nationalism daim, a mete imitation of European nationalism - nineteenth-century or otherwise - but rather harks back to thè pre-colonial era when Africa consisted of a misture of authentic nation-states (like Buganda) and of multi-national states (lìke Ethiopia). The con- temporary prevalence of thè latter pluralist type, reminiscent in many respects of thè Habsburg empire, should not be allowed to

IX Vili PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TION PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TION distort our vision of thè past and its connexion with thè present, aspirations thè remaining three Somali communities then under The growth of modera Somali nationalism whìch is our primaty foreìgn mie in thè French territory of Jibuti, in Harar Province of concern here, and its conflìct with Ethiopian (or Amhara) Ethiopia (mainly thè ), and in thè northern province of nationalism, has to be seca against this wider background if its (then stili British). Other African nationalists in theìr special features are to be fully underst'ood. Here thè contras! wìth Habsburg-style states sought to transform their fragile sribal Ethiopia ls criticai. Despite its ancient Chrìstian legacy, its mosaìcs ìnto cohesive natìons. For thè Somalìs, in contras't, thè Semitic languages and its long-standing if intermittent conneadons problem was - through self-determìnation for thè three remaining with Europe, Ethiopia is essentially a traditional, pluralist African Somali colonìes - to extend thè frontìers of thè state to embrace conquest state. It owes its exalted status in African eyes to a thè whole nation, a process with familiar parallels in Europe. In uniquc, if fortuitous, combination of virtues. Having defeatcd a traditional African terms, as we have emphasized, this aspiration European atmy (thè Italians at Adowa in 1896), it nof only sur- was as legitìmate as that enshrined in thè formation of pluralist vived thè scramble for Africa but gained from it, participatìng states. directly in thè partidon of Somali and other territory, almost as However, as our study attempts to demonstrate, thè juxtapo- an equa! partner. Its biblica! connerions, as Marcus Garvey sition in thè Horn of Africa of two expansionist states (Ethiopia and appreciated and contemporary Rastafarìans commemorate, made thè Somali Republic) based on thè two contrasting principles of Ethiopia a potent symbol of Black Power. This image was state formation inevìtably creates a fundamental structural conflict cnhanced rather than diminished by thè sympathy which Ethiopia of ìnterests and aspirations whìch is more deeply grounded and attracted as a consequence of Mussolìnì's ìll-starred attempt to refractory than thè routine 'border problems' that plaguc inter- create an Italian East African empire on thè ève of thè Second state relations in Africa. With thè achievement of ìndependence World War. The career, remarkable by any standards, of Haile frofn European rule, thè principle of self-determination which was Selassie, Ethiopia's last and most famous Emperor, greatly con- formerly so strìdently voiced by African nationalists has receded solidated and magnified this unique legacy. As well as this into thè background (except in relatìon to those last bastions of brilliant endowment, Ethiopia enjoyed thè additional advantage European power in Rhodesia and South Africa), to be replaced of embodying in traditional African form thè Habsburg style of by thè principle of thè inviolability of Africa's frontiers. Thus, state which colonization and decolonmtion left as thè dominant partly no doubt because of Ethiopia's special status, and partly straìn in thè continent. because their own states are of thè pluralist, territorially-bounded If Ethiopia thus entered thè modern African stage with ali thè type, African leaders have shown litde indination to see thè attributes necessary for playìng a. leading rote, it could not readily Somali dispute as a self-determination issue meriting serious dispense wìth thè expansionist dynamic enshrined in its traditional attention and sympathy. This is understandable and, as I have politicai strutture. This rivalled and challenged thè expansionist suggestcd, reflects thè fortuitous bias in favour of trìbally hetero- principle patently present in thè constitution of thè neighbouring geneous states produced by thè colonial experìence. The strains Somali Republìc. The creator of modern Ethiopia, Emperor this model imposes in Zaire, in Ethiopia, in Nigeria and numerous Mcnelik, had in thè nincteenth century participated directly with other cases are increasingly evident. It seems probable, moreover, Britain, Francc and Italy in thè dismemberment of thè Somali that thè powerful currents of ethnicity and locai level nationalism natìon and its division into five colonial territories. The formation whìch are today so prominent in Europe and America are lìfcely in 1960 of a Somali state, based on thè principle of self-determina- to encourage rather than discourage parallel movements in tìon (here in efiect Somali-determination) applied to thè formar Africa. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is debatable and British and Italian Somali territories, established a state which was certainly outside thè scope of this book. It seems, however, ìnherently incomplete. It left outside thè goal of Somali.nationalist inevitable that if Africa is to overcome its systemic instabilities,

xt PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION covering thè period up to 1978, it is a pleasure to record thè concessìons may have to be made to its ethnìc problems - whether remarkable growth of an indigenous school of Somali history through deyolution or some other process. Certainly thè acute spearheaded by thè brillìant self-taught hìstorian, Sheìkh Jama problem poscd by thè antagonism betwéen Ethìòpian and Somali Umar *Ise, whose splendìd volumes on Sayyid Muhammad irredentism ìn thè Horn of Africa will not dìsappear by being 'Abdille Hassan ate, by any standards, models of scholarship. * ìgnored, This is not a matter that can be satisfactorily resolved I have limited chapter notes and references to a minimum, by short-tetm mìlitary expedients. What is needed is a radicai seekìng only to document or dìlate upon a few irnportant points, politicai solution based on a full and accurate appreciation of thè and to cali attention to some of thè more useful sources. Many of unique features of this intractable issue. If this book can con- thè works cited contaìn lists of other relevant publications. tribute in any way towards this outcome, it will have more than Fuller bibliographies are contained in my Peoples of thè Horn of served its purpose. Africa, London, 1969, pp. 177-89 and my review of research My more specific aim is to provide a sociologically and anthro- trends in thè Journal of Semitìc Stadies, 1964, Voi. IX, No. i, pp. pologically informed history of thè Somali people. In contrast 122-34. to many other cases where politicai aspìràtions inspire cultura! My use of both written and orai material is largely cotiditioned cohesion and nationalism is invoked as a means rather than an by my social anthropological field researc^i in Somalia in 195 5-7, end, here I argue cultural nationalism has in contrast become in 1962, 1964 and 1974 - not to mention briefer visits in thè increasingly polìticized. But ì£the history of Somali nationalism intervening years. My originai research in what was then thè is thè major focus of this book, I have also tried to explore a British Protectorate was supported by thè Colonial number of subsidiary questions. In this unusual case of multiple Science Research Council, then by thè Carnegìe Trust and in 1974 colonizatìon (by Brìtain, France, Ethiopia and Italy), I have given by thè British Academy. I owe an inestimable debt to ali these some attention to thè different , and often conflkting, interests bodies and to a succession of Somali governments, Somali and policies of thè colonial powers, and to thè contrasts which officials and friends whose generosity far exceeds my capacity to can be seen betwéen thè various systems of rule established by repay it adequately. I have been studying Somali culture and them. I have also sought to elucidate thè circumstances of thè society fot twenty-five years and, in thè anthropological traditìon, holy war waged by Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan against have participated in (to some limited extent at least) as well as thè colonizers betwéen 1900 and 1920. Here I have made con- observed historical developments m this period. Whìle vìsitìng siderable use of unpublished tradìtional source material and have thè Somali Democratic Republic in 1974, as a guest of thè Somali tried to indicate somethmg of thè complex interplay of per- National Academy and thè Ministry of Higher Education, I was sonalities, clan attachments and religious rivalries which forms delighted to find, quite by chance, a group of Somali teachers thè essential background to any full comprehension of Sayyid engaged in thè preparation of textbooks in thè new Soniali script, Muhammad's aims and achievements. translating passages from thè earlier version of this book. I hope This brings me to thè problem of sources. Although there is a that this new, enlarged volume may prove equally useful. consìderable, indeed formidable, body of detailed writing on I.M.L . Lando?!, Somali linguistics, ethnography and sociology, and in Italian particularly an estensive generai literature, history rcmains poorly served. With a very few honourable exceptions, therc ìs scarcely a detailed study of any period, and few works which *See also Dr. Ali Abdìrahman Hersì's cecent Ph- D. thesis ('The Arab Factor ìn Somali History', University of California, Los Angcles, 1977). This bold show insight into thè cultural complexities of internai history. So work, whose publieation is eagerly awaited, is cspecially important fot its it was in 1965 when thè first edition of this book was published. estensive use of newly discovered or previously neglected Arabie sources. In this revised edition, to which I have added two new chapters Xlll xu CHAPTER I

THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING Buaggan waxa aan u hibaynayaa dadka Soomaaliyeed, kxtva taarnkhdooda sarrteeya tyo kwva qoraba, antga oo galladcelin uga dhigayaa sidii wocnqyd ee oy itgu soo dbaweeyeen dalkooda. Waxa kak oo aan ugi deeqayaa gabadhayda 'Joaana', l&onayaqaan T)almara oo ku dbalatay Soomaaliya, Thel^and baatanna kujìrta raadraaca taariikhda Afrika. WITH A POPOLATIO numberìnN g pcrhaps four and a half mìllion, thè Somali-speaking people can scarcely be regarded as a large nation. Yet they form one of thè largest single ethnic blocfcs in Africa, and though sparsely dìstributed on -thè ground, live in continuous occupation of a great espanse^ of territory covering almost 400,000 square mìles in thè north-east corner, or 'Horn', pf thè contìnent facing Arabia. From thè region of thè Awash Valley in thè north-west, this often arid territory occupied by thè Somali stretches round thè periphery of thè Ethiopian highlands and along thè Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coasts down to thè Tana River in northern Kenya. This region forms a well-defined geographical and ethnic unit which see as a naturai base for a sovereign state, although today ìt is split up into four separate parts. In thè ex-French Republic of Jibuti, which became independent in 1977, Somalis make up about half thè locai popula- tion (e. 200,000 in 350,000) ;in thè adjoining country of Ethiopia (mainly in Harar and Baie Provinces) they number probably almost one million; in thè Somali Republic itself their strength is approximately 3,250,000^ and finaìly, in thè North-Eastern Region of Kenya,2 they number aboùt 2jo,ooo. Outside this region, other Somali are settled as traders and merchants in many of thè towns and ports of East Africa (e.g. in Naìrobi); in Aden, in whose history they played an important role; and throughout Saudi Arabia and thè Gulf States. Farther afield, thè roving exìst- ence which Hfe at sea affords has led to thè establishment of small and fluctuating immigrant Somali communìties in sudi diverse European ports as Marseilles, Naples, London, and Cardiff. In their dry savanna homeland, thè Somali are essentially a A MODERN HISTORY-OF SOMALIA THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING prìncipal crops are sorghum, Indian corn, sesame, beans, squashes thìn bone structure and decidedly long and narrow heads. Skin and manioc; as well as fruìts, and sugar-cane, which, however, are colour show? a wìde range from a coppery brown to a dusky mainly cultivated in thè plantations owned by large corporations. black. In their facial features particularly, thè Somali also exhibit The chief export crop is thè banana produced by a number of evidence of their long-standing relations with Arabia; and, in thè Italian and Somali companies on a quota System controlied by thè south, amongst thè Digìl and tribes, physical traces of Somali government. Outside this fertile southern zone between their past contact with Oromo and Bantu peoples in this region. thè rivers there are no comparable arable resources, although thè Traditionally, however, Somali set most store by their Arabian , notth-west of thè country now supplies a valuable sorghum har- connexions and delight in vaunting 'those tradìtions which prò- ! vest and grain productìon is expanding as well as date cultìvation. claìm their descent from noble Arabian lineages and from thè Despite this generai division in physical features and produc- family of thè Prophet. These cìaìms, dismìsscd by Somali national- tivity, both northern and southern Somaliland are subject to a ists today as fanciful , are nevertheless part and parcel of thè similar cycle of seasons associated with thè rotation of thè N.E. traditìonal and profound Somali attachment to, Isiam. They com- and S.W. monsoons. Apart from a variety of minor locai wet memorate thè many centuries of contacts betv^en thè Somali and periods, thè main rains fal l twìce yearly - between March and Atabian coasts which have brought Isiam and many other June, and between September and December - throughout thè elements of Muslim Arab culture. region. The dry seasons are sìmilarly distributed: but while thè Thus, thè Somali language4 contaìns a considerable number of hottest rime of thè year on thè northern coast falls in thè summer, Arabie loan-words, and Arabie ìtself is sufficiently widely known thè south is by contrast pleasantly coot at this perìod. In thè to be regarded almost as a second language. Nevertheless, al- volcanic wastes of thè Jibuti Republic, thìs faìrly regular cycle of though urrwritten until i9yz,s Somali retaìned its dìstìnctivencss seasons loses most of its coherence, and thè weather is generally as a sepatate and extremely vigorous tongue possessìng an un- less predictable except in its torridity. Mogadishu (pop. 350,000), usually ridi orai lìtèrature. Within Somali, thè widest dialect capitai of thè Somali Republic, and thè other ports of thè southern difference is between thè speech of thè northern pastoralists and of Indian Ocean coast have a dimate which though often humid is thè Digli and Rahanweyn cultivators. These ctiffe rto much thè pleasant in thè cool season. same extent as Portuguese and Spanìsh. Yet, since many of its speakers are also famìliar with standard Somali, thè existcnce of this distìnctìve southern dialect does not alter thè fact that, from Tèe People thè Jibuti Republic to Garissa on thè Tana River in Kenya, stan- Ethnically and culturally thè Somali belong to thè Hamitic ethnìc dard Somali provìdes a single channel of communication and a group. Their dosest kinsmen are thè surrounding Hamltic (or as common medium in which pOems and songs compete for popu- they are often called 'Cushìtic*) peoplcs of thè Ethiopian lowlands, larity. Poetry, it should be added, today as much as in thè past, and Eritrea - thè traditionally bellicose 'Afar (or Danakil),' thè plays a vital part in Somali culture, and thè estensive use of radio Oromo (Galla), Sano, and Beja. Their immediate neighbours to broadcasting has enhanced rather than dimìnished its significante. thè north are thè pastora! 'Afar with whom they share Jibuti and Often a poem is not merely thè private voice of thè author, but who extend into Eritrea and Ethiopia. To thè west, in Ethiopìa, frequently thè collectìve tongue of a pressure group, and propa- thè Somali are bounded by thè culti vating and pastora! Oromo; ganda either for peace or for war is more cffectively spread and in thè south by thè Boran Galla of Kenya. through poetry than by any other means.* Although there is much variation amongst them, thè physical The distinction between thè speech of thè Digil and Rahan- features which immediately strike thè eye and seem most generally weyn and their more nomadic countrymen to their north and characteristic of thè Somali people as a whole, are their tali stature, south is one feature of thè wider cultura!, geographic, and hìstorical A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING primary division in thè Somali natìon between thè 'Samale' or cultivating bias than any other Somali group, their habitat is Somali proper and thè Sab. The former make up thè bulk of thè primarily restricted to thè fertile region between thè two rìvers nation., and their name (Samale) has come to include thè Sab, where their pastora! and cultivating secrions mingle not only with perhaps in thè same fashion as thè word 'EngHsh* is applìed by each other but also with pastora! nomads of thè other Samale clans. foreigners to ali thè inhabitants of thè British Isles. This larger In additìon to these divisions of thè Somali natìon whose distri- fraction of thè Somali nation consista of four princìpal groups of butìon and relative strengths are vital to an understanding of both clans or 'dan-families*. Descent in Somaliland is traced in thè male past and present events, there are a number of smaller ethnic com- line, and each of these units has a separate founding ancestor from munities which requlre to be mentioned. The most numerous whom, traditionally, its members trace their descent and take their (some 80,000 strong) are Somalized Bantu scattered in cultivating collective name. villages along thè Shebelle and Juba Rivers and in pockets be- The Samale clan-families comprise thè , Isaq, , and tween them. These derive in part from earlicr Bantu and Swahili- , ali of whom are primarily pastora! nomads and variously speaking groups, as well as from former slave populations freed by distributed throughout die land. The Dir clans (*Ise and Cada- thè suppressìon of slavery at thè end of thè nineteenth century. bursi) are mainly concentrated in thè western part of thè northern Although they stili retain today much of their physical distinc- regions of thè Somali Republic (thè former ), tiveness, socially these communities are becoming increasingly in thè Jibuti Republic, and thè cast of Harar Province of Ethiopia : absorbed in thè wider Somali society. The best-known groups are a smaller nucleus also occurs in thè south in District, and thè Shidle, and Shabelle on thè Shebelle River, and thè Wa-Gosha between Brava and thè Juba River. The Isaq (who in conjunction (or Gosha) and Gobaweyn on thè Juba. Less numerous but wìth thè Dir probably number almost three quarters of a million) economically and politically more important is thè immigrant live mainly in thè cenere of thè northern regions of thè Republic, Asian community (some 40,000 in thè Republic, about 12,000 in but in their grazing movements extend also imo thè Ethiopian thè Jibuti Republic) whìch consists chiefly of Arabs (many of Haud. To their cast, thè Isaq mingle with thè Dulbahante and families domiciled on thè coast for centuries) and a smaller number Warsangeli divisions of thè Darod who, with a strength of perhaps of Indìans, Pakistanis, and Persians. Similarly largely occupied in onc and a half million, are thè largest and raost widely distributed trade and commerce and also in development and technical aid is of ali thè Somali clan-families. As well as thè eastern part of thè thè small European community, numbering about j,ooo in former British Somaliland Protectorate, thè Darod occupy thè Somalia and i j ,000 in thè Republic of Jibuti. The few permanent Eastern, NugaI and Regions, most of thè Haud and European settlers live mainly as farmers and estate owners in thè Ogaden; and finally, although interrupted by a large wedge of south of Somalia. Hawiye in thè centre of thè Republic and thè Digil and Rahanweyn between thè rivers, extend eventually into thè North-eastern Region of Kenya. The Hawiye, who boast probably more thàn half Mode of fife and sodai institutìons a million persons, live to thè south of thè Majerteyn Darod in Although thè proportion of people who pracrise some form of Mudug, Hiran, and round Mogadishu. They extend some way cultivation is higher, probably not much more than an eighth of across thè Shebelle basin where they mingle with thè Sab tribes, thè total Somali population are sedentary cultivators, and thcse and also, like thè Darod, are found again in strength in thè nor- mainly thè southern Digil and Rahanweyn tribes. Thus for thè thern part of Kenya. majority, in thè arid conditions of thè north, centre, and estreme With a total population of little more than half a million, thè •outh (Northern Kenya) of their country, nomadism is thè prevaii- Sab tribes are less numcrous, less widely distributed, and contain Ing economie response, and mode of livelihood and social institu- only thè two major divisions already mentioned. Having a stronger tions in generai are tighdy adjusted to thè scant resources of an THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING man's mìlch camels are herded by his unmarried brothers, sons and nephews, moving widely and rapidly about thè country far A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA from thè sheep and goats which, in thè dry seasons especially, unenviably harsh environment. In thesè regions, with their home- bave to cling closely to sources of water. Particularly in thè dry wells as a focus of distribution, thè pastoralists move over many seasons, when long and frequent treks back and forth between thè miles in thè ycar, driving from pasturage to pasturage and water- pasturcs and wells are requircd, camel-herding is an arduous and point to water-point their flocks of sheep and goats and herds of exacting occupation and t one well calculated to foster in thè young camels, and, in some southern areas particularly, of cattle also. carnei boys ali those traits of independence and resourcefulness Of this mixed patrimony, although thè Somali pony remaìns thè which are so strongly delineated in thè Somali character. prestige beast par exeellence, it is their camels which Somali most With this dual System of hcrding thè nomads move about their esteem. These are carefully bred for mìlk and for carriage. Milch country with theìr livestock in search of pasture and water, order- camels provide milk for thè pastoralist on which alone he often ing their movements to conform as closely as possible to thè depends for his diet; burden camels, which are not normally rid- dlutribution of these two necessities of life. Pasturage is regarded den except by thè sick, transport his collapsible hut or tent and ali mi a gift of God to man in generai, or rather to Somalis, and is not his worldly possessions from piace to piace. Camel-hide is used to considered to belong to specìfic groups. Generally, people and make sandals to protect his feet on thè long treks across thè coun- itock are most widely deployed after thè rains when thè grazing is try.^ But these uses do not in themselves account for thè way in fresh and green ; while in thè dry seasons they are forced to con- which thè pastoralists value their camels or, despite thè long- centrate nearer thè wells and make do with what grazing can be standing an d wide use of money as a currency, explain why it is found in their proximity. Only thè herds of milch camels with their primatily in thè size and quality of his camels that a man's sub- «ttcndants to some extent escape from this seasonaj curtailment of stance is most tellingly measured. This striking bias in Somali cul- movemcnt, and even they must also be placed in areas where they ture is best expressed briefly by saying that in their social as well as can convcniently satisfy their less frequent but more substantial economie transactions thè pastoralists operate on a carnei standard. watering needs. Rìghts of access to water depend primarily upon Thus thè exchange of substantial gifts of livestock and other 11» abundance and thè case with which it can be utilized. Only wealth which cements a marriage between a man and a woman and where water is not freely available, and where thè expenditure of their respective kin is ideally, and often stili in practice, conducted much labour and effort is required before it can be used, are m thè medium of camels. 7 It is also in camels that thè value of a cxclusive rìghts asserted and maintained, if necessary, by force. man s lifc and thè subordinate position of women are expressed in And while in thè generai nomadic flux there is no rigid localìzation matemi tcrms. Generally thè blood-compensation due when a nf pastora! groups and no appreciable development of ties to man is killed is rated at one hundréTcamels, while a woman's lìfe lotulity, thè 'home-wells' regularly frequented in thè dry seasons, is vamed at half that figure. Lesser injuries too are similarly com- •nd thè trading setdements which spring up ali over Somaliland pounded in a standard tariff of damages expressed in difFerent wherever people congregate even temporarìly round water, prò-' amounts of camels. Although in these traditional terms sheep and vide some check to a more random pattern of pastora! mobility. goats are regarded as a sort of small change, they evoke none of Subject to thè vagaries of thè seasons and thè very variable thè mtcrest and attention which men bestow on their camels and dlltfibution of rain and grazing, there is some tendency for thè mdeed are consìdered primarily as thè concern of women. clini, which are thè largest effettive politicai units with popula- This differencc in attitudes is consistent with thè fact that thè tloni ranging from 10,000 to over 100,000 persons, to be vaguely milch camels and sheep and goats usually form two separate hetd- lllociated wìth particular areas of pasturage. Clamare traditionally ing umts. A man's wife, or wìves, and children move with thè Itti by Sultans (in Somali: Suldan, Baqar, Garad, Ugas, etc.). This flocks which previde them with milk and thè few burden camels necessary f or thè transport of their tents and efFects . With their greatcr powcrs of endurance and resistance to drought, a A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA tìtle, which evokes something of thè pomp and splendour of \E PHYSICAI. AND'SOCIAL SETTING Islamic states, ili accords with thè actual position of Somali clan leaders, who are normally little more than convenìent figure- heàds and lacf cany firmly institutionalized power. Indeed for and scarcely less vital principle which is used to evoke and give thè majority of northern Somali clans, thè position of Sultan, precise definition to thè diffuse ties of descent. As recorded in thè though often hereditary, is hardly more than an honorific titlé genealogies whìch children learn by heart, descent presents thè dignifying a man whosc effective power is often no greater, and individuai with a wide range of kinsmen amongst whom he sometimes less, than that of other clan elders. It is in fact thè selects friends and foes according to thè context of his interests. elders - and this in its broadest connotation indudes ali adult Thus, sometimes he acts in thè capacity of a member of his clan- men - who contro! clan affairs .With a few special exceptìons, a family, sometimes as a member of a constituent clan, and some- hierarchical pattern of authority is foreign to pastora! Somali times as a member of one of thè large number of lineages into society which in its customary processes of decision-making is which his clan is divided internally. But, withìn this series of democratic almost to thè point of anarchy. It must at once be diffuse attachments, his. most binding and most frequently mobil- added, however, that this markedly unstratìfied traditional politi- ized loyalty is to his V/ya-paving group*. This unit, wìth a fighting cai system does recognìze a subordinate category of people known strength of from a few hundrèd to a few thousand men, consists as j-z&'who fulfi l such specialized and to thè nomad degrading of close kinsmen unìted by a specific contractual alliance whose tasks as hunting, leather- and metal-worldng, and haircutting. The terms stipulate that they should pay and receivc blood-compen- sab who practise these occupations form a minute fraction of thè aation (Arabie, àija] in concert. An injury done'by or to any mem- total populadon and, traditionally, vere separated from other ber of thè group implicates ali those who are a party to its treaty. Somali by restrictions on marriage and commensality. Today thè Thus if a man of one group is killed by a man of another, thè first enfranchisement of these Midgans, Tumals, and , is far ad- group will collectively daim thè damages due from thè second. vanced and most of their traditional disabilities are disappearing. 8 At thè same rime, within any group a high degree of co-operation With thè absence of institutionalized hierarchical authority, and mutuai collaboratìon tradìtionally prevails. Somali pastora! groups are not held together by attachment to To grasp thè significance of thìs politica! and legai entity - chiefs. This principle of govcrnment which is so important in so whose members do not necessarily camp or move together in many other parts of Africa is here replaced by binding ties of thè pastures - but which is nevertheless thè most clearly defined patrilinea! kinship. Somali politicai allegìances are determined by polìtica! unit in pastora! society, Ìt must be appredated that thè descent in thè male line; and, whatever their precise hìstorical nomadic Somali are a warlike people, driven by thè poverty of content, it is their lineage genealogies which direct thè lines of their resourccs to intense competition for access to water aiid politicai alliance and dìvìsion. Although Somalìs sometimes com- grazing.* Even under modern admìnistration self-help stili rctains pare thè functions of their genealogies to a person^jasldrcsA in m neh force as thè most effective sanction for redressing wrongs Europe, to understand their true significance it has to be realized »nd adjusting politicai and lega! issues between groups. Hence, that far more is at stake here than mere prìde of pedigree. These with thè difficulty under present conditions of adequately polìcing genealogies define thè basic polìtica! and legai status of thè in- much of thè country, thè security of thè individuai pastoralist's dividuai in Somali society at large and assign him a specific piace pcrion and property depcnds ultimàtely upon his membership of in thè social system. I Jlja-pay'mg group. At thè same time, thè existence of this well- While descent in thè male line (/o/) is thus thè traditional basis tl e fi ned social group does not preclude thè formation of wider of Somali social organization, ìt does not act alone but in con- klnihìp allìances as occasion demands, Thus, within a clan, élìya- junction with a form_ oCfioUticaLcogtract_(èer) .It is thìs second, ptylng group opposes diya-pAying group; but when thè clan is •tticked by an esternai enemy, its. various sections unite in io common cause to protect their interests. Beyond thè clan, thè wlden kinshit p ties are those whìch unite kindred clans as members ii A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PHYSICAI .AXD SOCIAL SETTING of thè same dan-family. In thè traditional social System, however, several centuries, and thè ìnnovatìng influence of agriculture has thè sbc clan-families into which thè Somali nation is divided (thè been strengthened and reinforced by such additìonal factors as Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod ; and thè Digìl and Rahanweyn) are thè great admixture of peoples and cultures which has taken piace generally too large, too wìdely scattered, and too unwìeldy to act in this region. For, besìdes a small core of thè descendants of as effective corporate politicai units. But in thè modern situation of people of originai Digli stock, thè Sab represent an amalgam of party politicai competìtion, such extended kìnship links acquired many different elements of which thè most disparate are perhaps new vitalìty and sìgnificance. those deriving from Bantu and Oromo sources. And despite thè fact that thè great bulk of thè Rahanweyn are today people of northern nomadic provenance, representatives of almost every Cttltivation northern Somali dan beìng found amongst them, many traìts of In thè better watered reaches of thè western part of thè Northern thè old mixed Digìl and Rahanweyn culture have survived and Regions of thè Somali Republìc and in Harar Province of Ethio- are now those characteristic of this group as a whole. Thus it is pia, where sorghum millet is grown over an extensivc area, this thè Digil-Rahanweyn dialect of Somali, and not that of thè pastoral regime has undergone a number of modifications. Here majority of more recent settlers, which is often spoken here; withìn thè past two or three generations, following thè example although many people speak both this and"* northern Somali. of thè neighbouring Oromo farmers, Somali pastoralists have Similarly, and equalìy distinctive, however unimportant ìt may turned to plough cultivatìon, and stable agricultural villages have sound, while amongst thè northern nomads tea is thè universal replaced thè nomads* temporary encampments. With a growing dish appropriate to every social occasion and in thè austere sense of attachment to territory, tìes of neighbourhood are nomadic life synonymous with feasting, amongst thè Digil and beginnìng to be acknowledged, which, although no formai change Rahanweyn thè corresponding delicacy consìsts of green coffée in thè traditional politicai System has yet taken piace, constìtute a beans cooked in ghee. As thè coffée beans are eaten, and passed novel prmciple of grouping. This is evident in thè organization from guest to guest in wooden dishes, thè scaldìng ghee in which on a basis of co-residence, as mudi as of kinship, of such locai they have been cooked is rubbed over thè arms and hair and agricultural activities as harvesting and thè excavation and main- snuffed up thè nostrils with a characteristic and inimitable gesture tenance of thè ponds on whìch these cultivating settJements of satisfaction and pleasure. depend for their water supplies. With this development goes also a More sìgnificant for thè present purpose, however, is thè fact change in thè bias of livestock husbandry : here cattle largely re- that in contrast to northern nomadic society, there is gireater place camels, and oxen are trained to thè plough. The transition, social stratification amongst thè Sab. In generai three classes of however, is by no means absolute for many farmers are eìther land-holders are recognìzed : putative descendants of thè originai transhumant, or, although themselves sedentary, maintaìn herds groups, long-standing accretions, and .finally, recently adopted of camels which are sent out to graze in thè charge of younger dients. Those of thè first category ìn every Digil and Rahanweyn kinsmen. Farmers indeed frequently invest profits from thè sale clan possess thè most secure rights to arable land and play a of sorghum in camels ; and apart from these dìstinctìons there is dominant part in ritual. Those in thè other categories, and little difFerence in culture or social organization between thè especially in thè last, traditionally enjoy less secure possessìon of pastoral and cultivating sections of a clan. land. Membership in any clan is acquired by a dient undertaking The influence of agriculture in modifying thè traditional pattern to accept ali thè obligations, including that of solidarity in thè of life is taken a stage further amongst thè Digìl and Rahanweyn blood feud, bindìng his protectors. Only so long as these duties cultivators, of thè south of thè Republic. Here thè tilling of thè are fulfilled can a dient traditionally continue to cultivate thè soil, in which a hand hoc is used, has a tradition going back land which he has been allocated by his hosts. At thè same time, A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING as might be anticipated, thè institutiqn of chieftainship is more This sense of a commonality of interests, over and above thè developed, and thè traditional lineage structure of thè north is cultural and'historical features which divide thè two halves of not so marked. In some cases, indeed, loyalties based on common thè natìon, is traditionally represented in thè natìonal genealogy residence and common land-holding 'are more important polit- in which ultimately every Somali group finds a piace. Here Sab ically than those defined by kìnship. Thus many of thè names of and Samale are represented as btothers of common descent from dans and sub-sections in this area refer direcdy to territory and a line of ancestors which eventually links thè Somali as a whole denote what are essentìally territorial aggregations. Etymologi- to Arabia and prodaims theìr single origin. The distinction be- cally, thè name 'Rahanweyn* itself means simply large crowd'. tween thè cultivatìng life of thè Sab clans, and thè pastora! Finally, while often in thè past Galla and Bantu serfs (now almost nomadism of thè Samale, is fittingly explained by a number of completely assimilated) provìded some of thè labour for cultiva- picturesque legends and anecdotes in terms of thè different tion and house construction, these and other actìvìties for which characters attributed to their respectìve founding ancestors. collective enterprise Ìs necessary are today entrusted to work- partìes of young men recruited on a basis of residence rather than Re/igton and society kinship. Thus thè division betwcen thè Sab and Samalc, which is thè Despite thè prevalence of war, feud, and fighting, particularly widest cleavage in thè Somali nation, depends not only on thè amongst thè nomads, not al! men aie warriorsì Those who devote difterent economie ìnterests of thè two groups but also upon their their lìves to relìgion and in some sense practìse as men of God cultural divergencies. Traditionally these distinctions are en- are known as wadads or sheikhs, and thus dìstìnguished from thè rcmaìnder and majorìty of men who, whatever secular callìng trenched -by thè nomad's assumption of proud superiority and contempt for his southern countrymen, and thè latterà corres- they follow, fal l ìnto thè category of warriors (warankb> *spear- ponding resentment and isolation. Yet despite this, thè gulf bearers'). This generai division stili retains validity despite thè between thè two communities is not so wide as might at first proliferation of occupations available today. Men of relìgion, or appear, or as insuperable as each sometimes Jikes to suggest. As sheikhs - to use thè Arabie title which Ìs usually applied to thè has been said, many of thè Sab are in reality of northern pastora! more learned among them - fulfi lsuch important tasks as teaching origin; many again speak both dialects of Somali. Moreover there thè young thè Quran and thè elements of thè faith, solemnizing marrìage ruling according thè Shariah matrimoniai Ìs much that draws thè two groups together economically. Many and to in dis- of thè southern cultivators not only bave pastora! clients, but are putes and ìnheritance, assessing damages for injury, and generally also sometimes clients to pastoralìsts. Nomads moving across thè directing thè religìous life of thè community in. which diey live. territory of cultivators frequently exchange their milk in thè dry Essentially their róle Ìs to mediate between men; and, through thè man seasons for thè right to pasture their herds on thè farmers* fields. Prophet, between and God - with thè help of the.many Similar transactions also regulate thè use of water-holes by both locai saìnts to whom Somali look for suppprt in thè preferment of parties. In addition thè Sab trade much of their grain with thè their pleas for divine aid and succour. Ideally, whatever their nomads: and many of those pastoralists whose grazìng move- rf#)w-paying and dan oblìgations, men of religion are assumed to ments ìmpìnge on this fertile area have adopted, or are adoptmg, stand outside secular rivalry and conflìct, although in practice ìn cultivation, despite their traditional scorn for agricolture, just as thè circumstances of Somali life this eipectarion ìs rarely if ever in thè north-west, where ìt scems to be profitable, nomads are fully sustaìned. What is significant here, however, is that in con- turning to thè plough. Finally, thè Swahili rivenne communities trast to thè position in so many other Muslim countries, Somali are also similarly involved in this increasingly ramified network sheikhs are not normally politicai leaders and only in exceptìonal of ùes of mutuai advantage between pastoralist and farmer. circumstances assume politicai power. A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING Although thè settled condìtìons and more hierarchìcal politicai brieny touched on here are important for thè understanding of organization of thè southern cultivating Somali might secm to what follows. The modern as well as thè ancient history of Som- affbrd more purchase to thè theocratic ordinances of Isiam, Ìt alia* cannot be properly understood or appreciated, save in thè would be very mistaken to imagine that Isiam rests lightly upon most superficial terms, unless thè progress of events is viewed thè pastoralists. Por if in some respects thè circumstances of against this very particular social background. Only in relation to southern cultivating society conform more closely to thè theo- thè unremittìng struggle for survival in a hostile environment, cratic Muslim pattern elsewhere, there is no distinction between where men are engaged in a seemingly unending cycle of alliance thè two communìties in their observance of thè five 'pillars* of and counter-alliance, is it possìble to interpret both thè past and their faith - thè profession of belief in God and thè Prophet, thè present reaction of thè Somali to locai and external events. daily prayers, fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage. Nor, cer- Modern developments have wrought great changes. But, in thè tainly, are thè nomads any less pious or devout than thè cultiva- absence of far-reaching urbanization, it is only quite recently tors. The true position is rather that each community has adopted (since thè mid-i^óos) that radicai or extensive changes have begun Isiam in slightly differen tways corresponding to dìfference s in to erode thè traditionai fabric of society. The interplay between traditionai social organization. 10 Thus, for example, while in thè these and traditionai forces is examined in thè final chapters of north many lineage ancestors have been accommodated in Isiam this book. as saints, in thè south where lineage organization is ìess strong and important, these are replaced by a multitude of purely locai figures who have no significance as founders of kinship groups. Hence, notwithstanding these regional variations, for thè Somali as a whole, it is not too much to say that in many important respects Isiam has become one of thè maìnspi'.igs of Somali culture; and to nomad and cultivator alike thè profession of thè faith has thè force almost of an initiation rite into their society. Thus while thè Somali draw many of their distinctive charac- teristics, especially their strong egalitarianism, their politicai acumen and opportunism, and their fierce traditionai pride and contempi for other nations from their own traditionai culture, they also owe much to Isiam, And Ìt is typical of their mutuai dependènce upon these two founts of theìr culture that thè highly pragmatic view of Ufe which nomadìsm seems to foster is tem- pered by a deep and, as it must seem to some, fatalistic trust in thè power of God and His Prophet. Abovc ali, Isiam adds depth and coherence to those common elements of traditionai culture which, over and above their many sectional divisions, unite Somalis and provide thè basis for their strong national conscious- ness. Although thè Somali did not traditionally forni a unitary state, it ìs this heritage of cultura! nationalism which, strengthened *'l'hroughout this book, unless otherwise indicated, thè tcrms 'Somalia' and by Isiam, lies behind Somali nationalism today. 'Snnuliland' are used intetchangeably to denotc thè territory occupied by thè The features of Somali culture and society which have been Snmali-speakin gpeoplc. io BEFORE PARTITION volved considerable displacements of other populations, and thè Somali sphere was only extended by dint of continuous war and boodshed. Those who were mainly involved, other than thè CHAPTER II Somali, were thè ethnically related Oromo peoples - or some of them - and a mixed negroid or Bantu population which, prìor to thè ìncursions of thè Hamitic Galla and Somali» appears to have BEFORE PARTITION possessed part of thè south of what is today thè Somali Republic. Thìs people known to-the early Arab geographers as thè Zanj, and apparently mainly concentrated in thè fertile land between thè two rivers, seems to have consisted of two principal elements. UNTIL THE late ninetcenth century thè history of thè eastern The major part was made up of Bantu cultivators livìng as Horn of Africa is dominated by thè protracted Somali expansion sedentaries along thè banks of thè Shebelle and Juba and in fertile from thè north, and thè rise and decline of Muslim emporia along pockets between them. They figure in Oromo and Somali tradi- thè coast. To a certain extent each of these two themes has its tion, partìcularly in thè folk history of those Digil and Rahanweyn own particular history, but at no tìme over thè centuries was one clans who entered this area from thè north anA settled amongst entìtely independent of thè other. The graduai enlargement of thè Zanj as a kind of aristocracy. Something of their life and social their territory by thè Somali was not achieved by movements Ja organization is preserved also in a late Arabie compìlation known thè hinterland only, nor were events on thè coast without their as thè *Book of thè Zanj'. 1 These sources are supplemented by effèc t in thè interior. About thè tenth century, however, when more tangible evidence. Remnants, partly SwahìH-speaking, re- our brief account opens, thè pressure of events ran from thè coast inforced by ex-slaves from thè south and from Zanzìbar, survìve towards thè hinterland. But by thè mid-nineteenth century, a today in five dìstinct communities along thè Shebelle River and in state approaching equilibrium had been attained between thè two on thè Juba. Others again are found near Baidoa in thè outward pressures of movements in thè interior and thè inward hinterland between thè rivers, and also in Brava district in whose trend from thè coast: if anything, indeed, thè balance was tipped ancìent capitai a Swahili dialect, Chìmbalaai, is spoken to this day. in favour of thè hinterland which had come to exert a domìnant The second component of this pre-Hamitic population, appar- politicai influence over thè coastal settlements. Por thè history of ently much less numerous than thè riverine cultivators, was a thè coast documentary evidence from various sources is avail- hunting and fishing people lìving a precarious nomadìc existence. able, at least in some periods ; but for events in thè hìnterland thè Their present-day descendants, much affected by Hamitic ìnflu- historian has to rely much more heavily upon thè testirnony of ence, survive in a few scattered groups in and in thè orai tradition. Fortunately, orai records are on thè whole suf- south of thè Republic where they are generally known as Ribì (or ficientiy abundant and consistent in their essentials, to enable thè Wa-Ribi) and as Boni (or Wa-Boni). Their mode of life and their broad outlines of thè Somali dispersal to be traced with what is physical appearance invite comparison with thè Bushmen of other probably a considerable degree of accuracy. Certainly thè evidence areas of Africa, but their precise ethnic affilìation is stili obscure. at present available leaves no doubt that thè graduai expansion Politically and economically they seem to have been attached in over thè last ten centuries of thè Hamitic Somali from thè shores small groups to thè Bantu sedentaries, and stili today small of thè Gulf of Aden to thè plaìns of northern Kenya is one of thè hunting communities of this stock are found living under thè most sustained, and in its effects , far-reaching movements of tutelage of more powerful Bantu groups in thè south. population in thè history of North-East Africa. By about thè tenth century it seems that these two peoples, Thìs was not a migration into an enrircly empty land. It in- who are not necessarily thè autochthonous inhabitants of thè area, 18 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA BEFORE PARTITION did not extend north of thè Shebelle, and were in contact with throughout thè coastal ports, is thè Somali counterpart to thè more thè Oromo tribes, who, in turn, were already under pressure from extensive Swahili society of thè East African coast to thè south. thè expanding Somali in thè north-east corner of thè Horn. This Typical of these centres of Arab influence in northern Somali- distribution gleaned from orai tradìtion is supported by thè de- land are thè ancient ports of and . Zeila first appears scriptions of thè early Arab geographers who refer to thè Mamme in thè record of thè Arab geographers at thè end of thè ninth peoples (thè Galla and Somali) of thè north and centre by thè century when Ìt is mentioned by Al-Ya'qubi» and later writers classical nanne 'Berberi*, and distinguish them in physical features descritte it in increasing detail. Berbera, which conserves thè and culture from thè Zanj to their south. name given in classìcal times to thè northern coast as a whole, is probably of similar antiquity, but its history is much more ob- The coastal settlements scure: it is first mentioned by thè Arab geographers in thè thir- teenth century. Thereafter, beyond thè fact that durìng thè perìod Before tracìng thè sustained surge southwards which dìsplaced . of Portuguese domination in thè Red Sea thè town was sacked most of this Zanj population, and led eventually to thè present in 1518 by Saldanha, little is known of its history untìl thè elght- distribution of peoples in thè Horn of Africa and indirectly m eenth and nineteenth centuries. Similar obscurity surrounds most part to those in Ethiopìa, ìt is necessary to consider first thè early of thè history of thè ancient port of Mait, on thè eastern coast in phases of Arab settlement along thè coast. This is essential since Erigavo District, and one of thè principal centres of early Somali Arab colonization introduced a more diversified technology, and expansion. a more centralized System of government, which, however re- Thus at present, of thè northern ports as a whole, most is stricted its*influence, undoubtedly made itseif felt even in nomadic known of Zeila. This town was politically thè most important of areas. Finally and most important of ali, thè new immigration thè Arab settlements, in thè north and owed its economìe pros- brought Isiam, thè unifyìng force which played so significant a perity, at times considerable, to its geographical position as one part in thè sixteenth-century conquest of Abyssìnia, and which of thè chief ports of thè Abyssinian hinterland in thè trade with remains thè living faith of thè Somali and of many of thè peoples Arabia and thè Orient. Through Zeila locai Somali produce, of present-day Ethìopìa. At thè same time, indirectly ìf not always consistìng chiefly of hìdes and skins, precious gums, ghee, and directly, thè absorption of Arab settlers seems to nave gìven an ostrìch feathers, and slaves and ivory from thè Abyssinian high- impetus to, or to have precipitated, thè movements of expansìon lands, were exported : and doth, dates, iron, weapons, and china- of thè Somali and Oromo. ware and pottery imported, Politically, Zeila was origìnally thè There is little doubt that Arabìan penetration along thè nor- centre of thè Muslim emirate of Adal, part of thè state of Ifat, thern and eastern Somali coasts is of great antiquity. It probably which lay in thè plateau region of eastern Shoa, From thè time antcdates thè Islamic period; and certainly shortly after thè hegira at which thè port enters Islamic history, Ìt had apparently a mixed" Muslim Arabs and Persiana were developing a string of coasta] Arab, Somali, and Danakil ((Afar) population. In thè course of settlements in Somaliland. From their condition today, from time, no one knows exactly when, these thr.ee separate elements traditional sources, and from such documentary evidence as is to some extent fused to form a distinctive Zeila culture and Zeila available, Ìt is clear that in thesc towns Arab and Persian mer- dialect which was a blend pf Arabie, Somali, and *Afar .No doubt chants and prosyletizers settled usually as locai aristocracies, bring- other minor ethnic elements were also represented; Persìans and ing thè faìth, marrying locai women, and eventually merging with Indians seem to have settled in thè port at an early period, but thè thè locai inhabitants to form a mixed Somali^Arab culture and maìn elements in thè Zeila culture were Arab, Somali, and *Afar. society. This new culture represendng varying degrees of mìxìng While these northern coastal centres were developing, Arab and blending at different periods, and by no mcans uniform settlers were opening, or consolidating, a similar series of ports

21 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA

in thè south. Of thesc thè most important were Mogadishu, thè . , , . .„. c , -wv^e present evidence, or to be more present capitai of thè Republìc, Brava, and Merca - ali commerciai with thè locai Dir Sonai WP deta]led tradition towns largely dependent for their prosperity upon thè entrcpòt precise, its lack »W« » '«*• " ^™ which surrounds ^ trade between Abyssinia, Arabia, and thè markcts of thè East. th and expansion The evìdence of thè Arab geographers and locai inscriptions and that it should be interprcr Darod and documents indicate that by thè first half of thè tenth century Arab of the Darod and Isaq cto doubt about and Persian colonizers had establistied themselves at Mogadishu Isaq themselves in considerable numbers, some years prior to thè foundation of thè authenticity ot thè «*«»£; ^^ ^ Dir and Kilwa on thè East African Coast. Similar sources suggest that On tfai . interpretanon. ^™™ their Dromo neigh- Merca and Brava are of comparable antiquity. Thus, in both thè Darod, and later the Isaq. ««P« m P nts which ^ dis . north and south, by thè tenth century a ring of coastal emporia bours and the great sene* « p olk tj . adition had bcen created, largely as a result of Arab enterprise, and established the latter may V* ^'^"^f ^ movement. through these ports Isiam and Arab trade had gained a foothold today offers Itole infbrmanon«ite ^^• ° that mount . which, Consolidated and strengthened in succeeding centuries, It would not be ^euorubfc »^~ ^ ìmmigra . » rf ^ was to become thè foundation for Muslim expansion in North ing population pressure, «V» severe ^^1^ East. Africa. non, and perhaps exaccrb., ^ £ ^^ rf ^ pastures . prompted a generai Som*™ messian?c and milltant And this was no doubt iiirnxerc u»y The first wave of Soma/i expansion fcrvour of early Isiam. movement of popula- About thè tenth century while these developments were proceed- If the motives wmch in»f^ ^ f al ^^ is for . ìng on thè coast, some areas of southern Somaliland were stili tion are sti a matter o^^'^^ ns o | migratio n indicate that occupied by thè Zanj, while thè land in thè centre and north was tunately weìl-estabhshed. ^traa / nttowards occupied first by various Oromo tribes and then by thè Somali. in their gradualandby no ^^^ ^ descended From Somali orai tradition and other locai evidence it seems that thè south the Somali folloy«a ' u d - tributa ries, Galla communities occupied part of northern Somaliland prior to from the north down thè vaUe yoi the ^ eD !^ thè Somali, and that about thè tenth century, thè Dir Somali, or along the line of coastal wells on thè In ^ an ; universally regarded as thè oldest Somali stock, were already in These vital water-lines wcrc traversed by group after group possession of much of thè northern coastal strip and exerting Somali as a whole moved forward. ^«rnrv ti A .t. r- >j j T «„ «rew in numbers and t«ritory,u-- pressure on thè Oromo to their south. As thè Darod and Isaq #*» Somaliland, striking off west- But thè first major impetus to Somali migration whìch tradition vacated the north-eastern ^^ ^ powcrful . lse and Gada- records is thè arrivai from Arabia of Sheikh Isma 'il Jabarti about wa rds and to thè south. In and not without many set-backs, thè tenth or eleventh century and thè expansion of his descendants, bursi clans piished of Etiopia and the Jibuti thè Darod clans, from their early seat in thè north-east corner of luto what is today several hundred Somaliland. This cannot be dated with certainty, but thè period To anticipate for a suggested here accords well with thè sequence of subsequent milcs behind tfaem in and seventeenth centuries events. It was followed perhaps some two centuries later by thè moment; it seems that : ~ d T had prO ceeded to arrivai from Arabia of Sheifch Isaq, founder of thè Isaq Somali, these movements by ~> taken over much who settled to thè west of thè Darod at Mait where his domed thè pomt where thè two - P of £thiopia . Thus nf northern Somahland the dans of tomb stands today, and who like his predecessor Darod, married cc y, probably by the dose ^^ se 22 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA BEFORE PARTITION

northern Somaliland had assumed approximately their prcsent Tòt boìy vars against Abyssinia distribution, although thè graduai drift of population from thè Ecfore pursuing these SomaH migrations, we must refer briefly to north stili continued. thè prolonged struggle further inland between thè expanding In step with these Somali movements in thè north, thè Oromo Abyssinian Kingdom and thè loose congeries of Islamic states vere increasingly thrust -westwards and southwards and ultimately ìnduding Ifat, Dawaro, Baie and Hadiya, lying to thè south-east into Ethiopìa, where, however, their main invasion did not tate of thè Christian Amhara Highlands. Hoc our reconstruction of piace until thè sìxteenth century. 2 As thè Galla withdrew, not events from orai tradition is supplemented by written records without fierce resistance, thè Bantu Zanj werc in turn driven from both Christian and Muslim sources. These show that by thè farther south. At thè same rime, thè Somali were maìntaining their thirteenth century thè Muslim state of Ifat which induded Adal pressure and, in thè early stages of their expansion, some groups and thè port of Zeila was ruled by thè Walasnm^ a dynasty then managed to infiltrate through thè main mass of thè Galla. In this daiming Arab origins. Early in thè fourteenth century, Haq ad- way, by as early as thè thìrteenth century, some sections of thè Din, Sultan of Ifat, tutned thè sporadic and disjointed forays of Hawiye had established themselves dose to thè Arab settlement of his predecessors into a full-scalc war of aggressjon, and apparently Merca. The occupation of this by thè Hawiye at time region thìs ìs for thè first time, couched his cali to arms in thè fdfan of a religious rccorded by thè geographer Ibn Sa'id, and this Ìs thè earliest war against thè Abyssinian 'infidds'. At first thè Muslims were known mention of any Somali group. 3 Locai tradition throws successful. Christian territory was invaded, churches razed, and further light on thè position and suggests that these Hawiye Christians forced to apostasize at thè point of thè sword. In 141 j, intruders had already been preceded by other Somali groups in- however, thè Muslims were routed and thè ruler of Ifat, Sa'd cludìng several sections of thè Digil. These earlier pioneers had ad-Din, pursued and eventually killed in bis last stronghold on apparently settled for a time on thè Shebelle River, and had then thè island off thè coast of Zeila which to this day bears his name. crossed thè river to move towards thè coast. Thus, in thè thir- From this period thè Atab chroniders refer to Adal as thè 'Land of teenth century, thè position apparently was that thè coastal regjon Sa'd ad-Din». This crushing defeat, and Sa'd ad-Din's martyr- between Itala and Merca was occupied by thè Hawiye Somali: dom, for his death soon carne to be regarded in this light, took farther south and towards thè interior lay thè Digil; and finally to piace in thè reign of thè Abyssinian Negus Yeshaq (1414-19) ™ thè west thè Oromo were stili dominant. it is in thè songs cdebrating his victories over thè Muslims that In this generai area locai tradition has most to say of thè , thè name 'Somali* is first recorded. a clan tracing descent from a noble.Arabian patriarch on thè same The Abyssinian victories and thè temporary occupation of pattern as thè Darod and Isaq, but related maternally to thè Zeila itself dealt a severe blow to thè Muslim cause: Sa'd ad- Hawiye. Under a hereditary dynasty, thè Ajuran Consolidated their Din's sons fled to Arabia where they found refuge with thè King position as thè masters of thè fertile reaches of thè lower Shebelle of . Yet they were able to return afte* a few years; and thè basìn and established a commerciai connexìon with thè port of Walashma* dynasty then assumed thè ride of Kings of Adal, and Mogadishu where some of their own clansmen were also settled. moved their capitai to Dakkar, to thè cast of Harar, tarther from The fortunes of this Ajuran Sultanato thus appear to have been thè threat of Abyssinian attack. After almost a hundred years of dosely linfced with thosc of Mogadishu, and thè Ajuran reached tranquillity Adal had tecovered suffidently for a new onslaught thè summit of their power in thè late fifteenth or early sixteenth against thè Christians, and in imam Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazi century when Mogadishu was ruled by thè Muzaffa rdynasty/ an (or 'Gran 1) (1506-43), thè Muslims had at last found thè charis- aristocracy related to thè Ajuran if not actually of Ajuran stock. matic leadership they sought. The origins of Ahmad Gran, 'thè Later, thè two centres dedined about thè same time; but this is again to anticipate. left-handed' as he was known to Muslims and Christians alike,

24 BEFORE PARTITION A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA Although thè Muslims, with Harar as their new headquarters, are appropriately obscure, s But under his leadership resounding continued thè struggle, they were unsuccessful, and thè glorious vlctories were won. Equìppcd with cannons imported through victories of thè Imam were never repeated. Both sides had now to Zeila, his armies penetrated eventually into thè heart of Abyssinia contend with a new menace in thè forni of thè massive Oromo after a series of savage batdes which are stili vivìdly recalled today. invasion from thè south-west. In these drcumstances Adal de- Somali contingente played a notable part in thè Imam?* victories clined rapìdly, and from Harar thè capitai was transferred in i j 77 and Shihab ad-DÌn, thè Muslim chronicler of thè period writing to thè oasis of Aussa in thè scorching Danakil deserts where it was betwcen 1540 and 1560, mentions thcm frequently.6 Most promi- hoped to be securè from further Abyssìnian attack. Here, however, nent were thè Darod dans of thè faction who were ,now in it was regularly harried by thè Galla invaders who by this time had possession of thè ancient port of Mait in thè cast, and expanding swept through Abyssinia ; and it was ultimately overthrown by thè westwards and southwards rrom this centre. This Darod support locai nomadic Danakil ('Afar), its ancient dynasty disappearing was reinforced by tìes of marrìage, for thè Imam was related by towards thè end of thè seventeenth century. marriage to one of thè Darod leaders. The Isaq Somali are not Adal's confines have thus a shifting and fluid history, and mentioned by name, but one brandi of them appear to have par- although Somali played so strìking a part in thè sixteenth-century ticipated ìn thè laaafs campaigns; and some Dir groups were also • conquest of Abyssinia, ìt is not yet clear to what extent they involved. Yet thè bulk of Gran's Somali forces were drawn from formed part of this Muslim state at other periods. Sìnce, however, thè Darod dansmen, one of whose leaders was his namesake and in addìtion to Zeila, Berbera, and Mait, at least twenty other often confused with thè Imam himself. It was probably about thìs Muslim towns flourished in thè fifteenth and sixteenth centuries period too, that thè Majerteyn Darod dan developed their sul- in thè Somali hinterland, Ìt seems that at this tìme at any rate thè tanate which carne to control much of thè coast of north-east Muslim state must have exerted some influence on thè Somali of Somalia and whose later history consequently bdongs to that of thè coastal settlements generally. these regions. 7 The effettive partidpation of these pastora! Somali nomads, renowned 'cutters of roads* in thè words of thè Muslim chronider, The aftermath of thè boly wars with Abyssinia indicates thè grcatness of thè powers of leadership - spiritual as Ahmad Gran's campaigns had at least two major efFccts on thè wcll as temperai - of thè Imam. For thè northern Somali have history of Abyssinia and thè Horn. First, Ahmad's appeal to thè never had strongly developed hierarchical gbvernment and were Turks led to thè Turkish occupation in 155 7of Massawa and certainly not accustomed to joining together in common cause on Arkikio in what is now Eritrea. And although thè initial Turkish so wide a front. Few indeed are thè occasiona in Somali history attempi to extend their authority into Abyssinia was defcated to when so many disparate and mutually hostile dans have combined thè extent that in 1655 thè Turkish garrison was withdrawn from together with such great effcct ,however ephemeral their unity. Massawa, and a locai Beja chieftain instaUed as Ottoman re^- As might readily have been antidpated, this extraordinary out- resentative, Turkish pretensions to thè coast lingered on to be- burst of Muslim enterprise was not long sustained. Both sides come extremely ìmportant again in thè nineteenth century. invoked foreign aid; thè Abyssinians turning to thè Portuguese Secondly, and more immediately, Ahmad's campaigns scem to now at thè height of their power in thè Red Sea, while thè Muslims some extent to have prepared thè ground for thè great Galla sought support from thè Turks. After some further suceesses, invasìon from thè soutih-west which followed his dcath. The imam Ahmad unwisely dismissed his Turkish contingents and in Oromo in conquering hordes thrust far up into northern Abyssinia I54Z was routed near Lake Tana by Galawdewos, thè reìgning where they became an equa! scourge to Muslims and Christìans Empexor of Abyssinia. The Imam was killcd and Galawdewos's alìke. This new factor, thè subsequent recovery of Abyssinia, and victory marked thè turning point in thè fortunes of Abyssinia,

26 BEFORE PARTTTION A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA have been very gieatly reduced by their massive drive into Abys- thè declìne of Adal appear to have effectively closed thè gateway sinia, had losf cto thè Somali ali their former territory in Somalì- to further Somali expansion in thè west, thus causìng thè Somali land to thè north of thè Juba River. Of their former presence, press increasingly upon their southern Galla to neighbours and however, they left behind firm evidence in thè many minority hence sustaining, and even reinforcing thè latter's massive inva- groups of Oromo origin whìch are found today in various degrees sion of Abyssinia. of absorption amongst thè Rahanweyn and Dìgil Somali of thè By this time some Darod and Dir groups had apparently installed Shebelle and Juba regions. themselves in thè Harar-Jigjiga region. And in thè south, as thè Finally, groups of Dir Somali whose displacement from thè cast Oromo withdrew on one front to attack on another, northern and centre of northern Somaliland must by now have been almost Somali settlers gathered in ìncreasing numbers. New groups of complete, reached thè south. Their most important representatives Hawiye immigrants fought their way to thè Shebelle and be'gan to here are thè Bimal who, encountering thè Digli, fought and over- challenge thè àuthority of thè Ajuran, eventually overwhelming came them, and eventually established themsdves near Merca them. The city of Mogadishu was also invested and thè ancient , where they are today. Thus by thè eìghteenth century southern Muzaffa r dynasty overthrown. Both documentafy and orai evì- Somaliland as far south as thè Juba River had assumed more or dence piace these events early in thè seventeenth century. 8 After less ìts present ethnic complexion. "* their defeat thè Ajuran and their allies thè Madanle - to whom so But thè main Somali advance did not long halt at thè Juba. many striking wells and stone works are attributed - were harried Darod from thè north and Ogaden continued to fìush south, often south eventually into what is today thè North-Eastern Region of against thè fierce resistance of those who had preceded them." Kenya where they appear to have been amongst thè earlìest Eventually these new northern invaders reached thè Shebeìle, and recorded mhabitants. Here they were joìned later by thè Boran began to press heavily upon thè Digli of thè region early in thè and Warday Galla who established a locai ascendancy which was nìneteenth century. Their progress was arrested, however, by thè only finally overcome by thè massive wave of Somali migration in Rahanweyn, from about 1840 onwards under thè strong leader- thè nineteenth century. But this is to anticipate. ship of thè clan bàsed on thè Shebelle. This opposition About thè time of thè overthrow of thè Muzaffa r dynasty in forced these new Darod immigrants to move up to thè Juba and Mogadishu, it appears, again from locai traditìon, that mudi of broughtthem into contact with thè Galla on thè right bank of thè thè zone between thè Shebelle and Juba rivers, induding Bur rivet. Although so much of their territory had been lost Ìn Somali- Hacaba, was stili mainly in Galla hands. Thus thè situatìon was land, thè Galla were stili tenaciously clinging to what land was left now that, from thè coast about Mogadishu westwards towards thè to them, and from their centre at Afmadu, launched occasionai hinterland, thè country was occupied first by thè Hawìye, then by raids across thè river into what was now Somali territory. Their thè Galla, and finally by thè Rahanweyn Somali,9 Partner north, in power in this region was thus by no means yet broken; and from Majertcynia, a strongly entrenched party of Galla at Galkayu were time to time their raiding partìes menaced thè Somali religious finally dislodged about thè middle of thè century. centre at Barderà, founded in. i8zo on thè middle reàches of thè In thè following decades thè Rahanweyn continued their pres- Juba. Thus thè new Darod invaders encountered a formidable sure and, probably about thè end of thè seventeenth century, suc- neighbour whom, for thè present, it was more expedient to appease ceeded after hard fighting in driving thè remaining Galla from than to provoke. Hence having gained their protectìon, parties of their stronghold at Bur Hacaba. These Galla withdrew westwards, Darod dansmen crossed thè river as clìents and allies of thè eventually crossìng thè Juba and moving on to its right bank. Oromo. The trans-Juban Oromo seem to have welcomed this new This, of course, ìncreased thè pressure upon thè Zanj whose support and to have turned it to advantage in their relations with tradìtional capitai, Shungwaya, was at this time in thè Juba region. thè turbulent Akamba and Masai to their west. Thus by thè turn of thè century, thè Oromo, whose strength must

28 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA BEFORE PARTITION As tìmc passed, thè Darod movement continued and further wards, had now lost much of their cohesion and were rapidly Darod clansmen entered thè area, sought alliance with thè Galla, being infliltrated by other Somali. Finally, thè southern Boran and crossed thè river to join their kinsmen. Thus thè strcngth of Galla were being thrust north-west by thè continued Darod thè Darod immigrants under Oromo protection gradually in- pressure. creased. This situation of uneasy Darod-Galla alliance, however, By 1919, feeling between thè Darod and those Warday Galla continued for some tìme and is that described by thè French who had been moved across thè Tana River reached such a pitch explorer Charles Guillain when he vìsited thè southern Somali that it was again necessary for thè British authoritìes to intervene. coast in 1847. Much thè same posidon is recorded also by thè ill- The consequence was an undertakìng by both sìdes, known as thè fated German traveller, von der Decken, who, in i86j, made Somali-Orma (Galla) agreement, which allowed thè Galla who history by sailing up thè Juba River in hìs shallow-draught steam- remained with thè Darod on thè left bank to choose finally between accepting thè formai position of serfs, or of moving across thè shìp Welft only to founder in thè rapids above Barderà. ' ' It was apparently in this same year that a severe epidemie of smallpox river to join their free kinsmen, Those who decided to cross thè amongst thè Galla provided thè opportunity for which their Tana were obliged to leave behind them with their Somali patrons Darod, neìghboars had obviously been waiting. Almost ìmmedi- half thè cattle which they had acquired durìng thcìr bondage. ately, thè Darod fel l upon their Galla hosts on ali sides and in- Under these conditions it is perhaps not surpsising that few of thè flictèd very heavy losses. The few Oromo who survived fled to thè Warday Galla moved. south; and, by thè turn of thè century, most of thè southern Galla Some twelve years later, further unrest broke out among thè had been cleared from die area, retaining footholds only at Galla subjects of thè Darod, and a rumour began to circuiate that Wajir andBuna. A new factor now made itself felt in thè form of thè Somali were about to disregard thè 1919 agreement. Whether desperate Ethìopian raids into thè Ogaden and down thè Juba. on this account, or for other reasons, about eight hundred Oromo This, with further waves of new Somali immigrants - some of dependents with ten times as many head of Uvestock made a for- whom had sailed down thè coast by dhow - maintained and even lorn bid for freedom, trekking towards thè Tana River at thè very increased thè Somali pressure. Indeed, by 1909, parties "of Darod height of thè dry season. The result was disastrous ; nearly half immigrants had pressed as far south as thè Tana River with Uve- their number perished, and thè few who survived were ignomin- stock estimated to number as many as fifty thousand beasts. iously returned to thè left bank of thè river. In 1936, thè agree- By 1912 ,when administratìve and mUitary posts were opened ment ended and thè government of Kenya tacitly recognized that, by thè British in this turbulent northern part of thè East African except for those on thè right bank of thè Tana, thè Warday Galla Protectorate, thè situation was stili fluid. The Darod were stili on with whom thè Somali had so long been strugglìng had been thè move and were now seeking to dominate completely thè whole finally assimilated. Of thè Oromo who had once occupied so much region from Buna in thè west, through Wajir, to thè Tana in thè of this territory, only thè Boran and Gabbra remained. south-east. Many of those non-Hamìtic WaBonì hunters who Thus ended thè great serìes of migrations which, over a space of had survived thè tides of migration and battle had now become thè some nine hundred years, had brought thè Somali from their serfs of thè Darod, and most of thè Warday Galla who remained northern deserts into thè more fertile rcgions of thè centre and had to be moved across thè Tana River to prevent their extinction south and finally into thè semi-desert plaìns of northern Kenya. by thè Somali. A good number, however, chose to stay with their These movements had far-reachìng social repercussions. Through former Darod subjects as clients, thus completely reversing thè contact with thè Oromo and thè absorption of those Galla who earlier position when thè Oromo had been masters of Jubaland. To remained behind, and with an added leaven from thè earlier Bantu thè west, thè once powerful Ajuran, who after their defeat ìn thè communities, thè Digil and Rahanweyn tribes emerged with their seventecnth century had been so ignominiously harried south- distìnctive characteristics. From thè Bantu they adopted cultivation,

31 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA

and from thè Galla temporarily adapted their system of agc-grades BEFORE PARTITION to their expanding militaryneeds. In much thè samc way, thè Darod Naf Earopean intensi in thè coast who later crossed thè Juba brìefly assumed thè Galla warrior age- grade System, and like thè Ràhanweyn, later dìscarded ìt, While this great upheaval was taking piace, with thè exception for At every stage in their expansìon thè tactics employed by thè a time of Adal in thè north and of states such as those of thè Somali were based upon their traditional evaluatjon of politicai Ajuran and Geledi in thè south, it was only on thè coast that any power in terms of military strength. While at various tìmes and degree of centraìized government was established and maintained, smatt family places, groups and lineages, thè spear-heads of thè however irregularly, over long periods of time. It < nos w necessary greater clan migrations, accepted thè protection of their numeric- to revert to this theme and to examine thè final fortunes of thè aliy dominant Oromo hosts, as soon as they were sufficiently coastal centres before thè partition of thè . strong they overthrew their patrons and made them their subjects. Afrer thè decline of thè Adal state, Zeila retained its commerciai Wherever by force of numbers and arms they could, thè Somali position as thè main outlet for thè ancient caravan routes from thè triumphed. Both sides seem to have relied on similar weapons, hinterland, particularly those descendìng from thè Abyssinian mainJy spear and leather shìeld sometimes reinforced perhaps with highlands through Harar, although in thè sixtee^nth century trade bow and arrow, The Somali may, howeyer, have enjoyed superi- •was severely dìsrupted for a time by thè Oromo invasions. In thè ority in thè use of a few matchlock guns, although it is doubtful if following century Zeila, and apparently to some extent Berbera thìs was very sìgnificant. Probably, more sigm'ficantly , their also, fell under thè authorìty of thè Sharifs of Mukha and both warriors were sometimes mounted on horseback, a technique ports were thus nominally incorporated in thè Ottoman Empire. which thè Oromo Jater adopted and used to good effec tin their And this was stili thè position when Sir Richard Burton visìted massive migratìon into Abyssinia. Yet it was probably above ali thè coast in 1854 in thè course of his celebrated expedition to their overwhelming numerical superiority, and thè dynamism Harar which, in contrast to Zeila, was stili an independent Muslim which their movement acquìred, which enabled thè Somali to principality. conquer so much territory at thè expense of thè Oromo. Thìs and Zeila's governor was now a Somali, Haji Shirmarfce 'Ali Salih other considerations suggest that those Galla whom thè Somali (of thè Habar Yunis clan), who had begun his remarkable career as smote and put to flight - mainly Akìshu, Raitu, and Arussi in thè thè captaìn of a training dhow. Having acquired wealth and repu- north, and Warday and Boran in thè south - dìd not represent thè tation, thè Haji obtained thè office of governor about 1840 from main mass of thè Oromo nation, 12 but were rather sparsely dis- thè hereditary holder Sayyid Muhammad al-Barr, represcntative of tributed outlying groups far from their traditional homelands in thè Ottoman Pasha of Western Arabia. His success was also thè south-east of Ethìopia. Finally, in considering thè character of" apparently facilitated by thè gratitude which he had earned from thè Somali expansion, it should be remembered that this was not thè British government of Bombay for protecting thè lives of thè a concerted operation under a single direction: it was a disjointed crew of thè Mary Ann t a British brig attacked and plundered by scries of clan and lineage movements in which were many there thè locai Somali at Berbera in 1825 .Notwithstanding Haji *Ali's cross-currents of migration as group jostled group in thè scardi intervention, this incident had led thè British to blockade thè for new pastures. Nor does this sequence of Somali and Oromo coast regularly until 1833 ,when £6,000 in compensation had been movement exclude thè possìbility that thè ultimate origina of both recovered from thè Somali. In thè meantime, in 1827, a commer- peoples may be traccd to thè same area on thè upper reaches of thè Juba river. ciai treaty had been signed between thè British East Africa Com- pany and thè locai Habar Awal clan. In 18 j 4* Burton records that Haji Shirmarke, tali and, despite his sixty-odd years, strong and active, had not forgotten-the military exploits of his youth and contemplated'the conquest of

33 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA BEFORE PARTITION Berbera and Harar. He lìved modestly, however, in an indifferent which of thcir sections should control thè port. At thè same time, mud and wattle 'arìsò, and not in one of thè grander double- thè Habar Yunìs clan was also advancing daìms to thè lucrative storeycd stone houscs of thè town. His 'secretary* was a Swahili trade which thè town commanded. slave; and although he was hìmself illiterate, his eldest son Before this, and prior to thè Brìtish settlement at Aden in 1839, Muhammad, married to an Arab woman, had been educated at thè Ayyal Yunìs and Ayyal Ahmed lìneages of thè Habar Awal Mukba and proved to be something of a scholar. The town, clan had held Berbera and jointly managed its trade, sharing m thè Burton found, Haji 'Ali governed with a light hand, and thè aid of profits on ali commerciai transactions as 'protectors* (abans) of a tough Hadrami soldier and forty mercenarìes from Hadramaut, foreign merchants from Arabia and India. When under thè stimu- Mukha, and Aden, ali armed with matchlock and sword. The Kadi lus of developments at Aden thè port's prosperity markedly admìnistering Islamìc law was at this time a Hawiye Somali whose ìncreascd, thè numerically dominant Ayyal Yunis drove out their predecessors, from about 1670, had been Sayyids from Arabia. rivai kinsmcn and declared themselves commerciai masters of The dimensions of Zeila Burton compares to Suez, sufficient to Berbera, This led to a feud in which each side sought outside help; hold a few thousand inhabitants, and provided with six mosques, thè defeated Ayyal Ahmad turned to Haji Shirmarke 'Ali and his a dozen large white-washed stone houses, and two hundred or Habar Yunis dansmen for support. With this backing, they were more thatched mud-and-watde huts. The ancient wall of coral then able to re-establish themselves and to expel thè Ayyal Yunis rubblc and mud defending thè town was no longer fortified with who moved to thè small roadstead of Bulhar, some miles to thè guns, and in many places had become dilapidated. Drinking water west of Berbera. By 1846, however, thè menace of otber clans had had to be fetched from wells four miles from thè town. Yet tradc led thè two rivai Ayyal lìneages to compose fheir differences and was thriving: to thè north caravans plied thè Danakil country, Haji *Ali's services had been dispensed with: he had been cBritish while to thè west thè lands of thè *Ise and Gadabursi clans were Agent* at Berbera in 1842. traversed as far as Harar, and beyond Harar to thè Gurage country This struggle and earlier vicìssìtudes had left their mark on in Abyssìnia. The main cxports were slaves, ivory, hides, horns, Berbera, for while thè bare ground for about a mile on either side ghee, and gums. On thè coast itself Arab divers were active collect- was strewn with broken glass and pottery, thè debris of former ing spenge cones. And provisions were cheap. generations, thè area of thè town actually inhabìted, 'a wretched Burton soon found that this orderly town life at Zeila did not dump of dirty mud-huts', occupìed only a fraction of thè ancient extend far beyond thè gates of thè city. The nomadic clans, contours. And thè old aqueduct from thè wells at Dubar eight through whosc pastures Burton and his companìons passed on their miles to thè south-east had long ceased to bring sweet water to thè way towards Harar, recognized no politicai dependence upon town. Zeila. Indeed raids and skirmishes occurred under thè very walls of thè city. Having formed this unfavourable impression of Berbera, Bur- ton and bis companions left thè Somali coast for Aden which they While in 18 5 5 Zeila thus contìnued thè coastal tradition of insti- teached on 9 February, 18 5 j. Aprii of thè same year, however, saw tuted authority under Somali although politicai a governor, its Burton back again at Berbera as thè leader of a new expedition, influence was a mere shadow of what it had once been, at Berbera wìth thè object of exploring thè Ogaden hinterland. In thè two thè position was very different. Here Burton found that thè pro- months in which he had been absent thè appearance of thè port cess of nomadic encroachment had gone much rurther and thè had greatly changed. It was now filled with bustle and activity: town was in fact no longer polìtically distinct from its nomadic 'The emporium of East Africa was at thè time of my landing in a hìnterland. In February 1855 ,when Burton, having suecesstully state of confusion. But a day before, thè great Harar caravan, completed his exploration of Harar, entered Berbera he discovered numbering three thousand souls, and as many cattle, had entered that thè Habar Awal clan were in posscssìon, but dìvided as to for thè purpose of laying in thè usuai eight months supplies, and 34 35 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA BEFORE PARTTTION

purchase, barter, and exchange were transacted in most hurried its long tradition of far-flung connexlons between Abyssinia and and unbusiness-like manner. Ali day, and during thè greater part Arabia, thè locai ports had generally a narrower sphere of in- of thè night, thè town rang with thè voices of buyer and seller: to fluence. Events in thè Christian kingdom of Abyssinia hardly specify no other articles of trame, joo slaves of both sexes were in ìmpinged upon them, and thè chief esternai factors affecting their thè market. Long lines of laden and unladen camels were to be fortunes were thè politicai situation in thè Indian Occan and that seen pacìng thè glarlng yellow shore : already small parties in their Somali hìnterland. of travellers had broken ground for their return journey: and thè Thus Mogadishu, which in thè tenth century consisted of a loose foni heap of mat hovels, to which this celebrated mart had been federation of Arab and Persian families, had by thè thirteenth reduced, was steadily shrinking in dìmensions.*13 become a sultanato ruled by thè Fakhr ad-Din dynasty. Three Burton and his companìons were not allowed long to contem- centuries later these rulers were supplanted by thè Muzaffar plate this scene. On 1< Apriij , 18 5 j,in thè early hours of thè morn- Sultans and thè town had become dosely connected with thè ing, several hundred Somali spearmen launched a savage attack related Ajuran Sultanato in thè ìnterior. In this period Mogadishu upon Burton's camp. In thè ensuing mélée, Lt Stroyan was killed, was attacked but not occupied by thè Portuguese. The true con- and Lt Speke (later to gain fame for his explorations of thè Nile querors of thè ancient city were those new Hawiye Somali settlers source) severely wounded : Burton himself received a spear-thrust \o defeated thè Ajutan and brought thè downfall of thè Muz- in thè mouth. Yet despite thè numerical superiority of their assail- affa r dynasty in thè early seventeenth century. By this time ants, Burton and his companlons managcd to escape to Aden, and Mogadishu had split into two rivai quarters, H!amarweyn, and thè expedition was abandoned : Burton never returned to Somaii- Shanganì in which thè new invadere were establìshed. land. He is stili remembcred, however, with a mixture of amuse- At thìs time thè rise of Omani influence in thè Indian Ocean ment and admìradon as 'Haji 'Abdallah', thè guise he assumed for introduced an important new factor ìnto thè situation ; and by thè his journey to Harar, and as one who reguiarly led thè prayers in close of thè seventeenth century Mogadishu, with thè other East thè mosques, and could hold hìs own with any sheìkh. African ports., had come under thè protection of Oman. In 1814, The British authorities at Aden reacted promptly to thè incident however, thè governor of Mombasa declared his town indepen- in thè manner of thè times. Two vessels of thè India command dcnt and sought British support from Bombay. After a delay of were dìspatched to blockade thè coast until Stroyan's murderer nine years, Capitain Owen's fleet arrived off thè East African coast and Speke's attacker were surrendered to justice. The following and in 1824, Owen established his famous but short-lived Trotec- ycar thè elders of thè Habar Awal clan announced that Stroyan's torate'. Mombasa'a rebellious example now affected thè people of assailant had been executed by hìs own kin and offered 15,000 Mogadishu, and in 1815 Owen obligingly visited thè port offerìng dollars as compensation. Then in November, a treaty was signed British protection against thè anticipated Omani reprisal. This was with thè Habar Awal in favour of British commerce at Berbera refused, but at thè port of Brava to thè south of Mogadishu, Owen and to provide for thè eventual appointment of a British Resident. was more successful. Mudi thè same series of events had followed thè plunder of thè In thè followìng year thè situation changed radìcally, and with brig Mary Anne off Berbera in 182; when Shirmarke 'Ali had thè refusai of Owen's government to ratify his protectorate, intervened. Now, however, thè link between Aden and thè British intervention disappeared as suddenly and almost as in- northern Somali coast had been strengthened and thè basis laid explicably as it had come. The rebellious towns of East Africa for future British activity. Conditìons on this remote coastline were now left to face their Omani overlords alone. In 1828, vere no longer a matter of indifferenc eto thè Imperiai Powers. Mogadishu was bombarded and compelìed to capitolate. But Meanwhile thè southern Somali coast had similarly become when, shortly after, thè Muscat state was divided, Mogadishu and exposed to new foreign interests. Here, in contrast to Zeila with her sister ports of thè southern, or 'Benadir*,14 Somali coast

37 BEFORE PARTITTON A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA one a Somali, and thè other an Arab who spoke some English. passed under thè jurisdiction of thè Sultan of Zanzibar. Finally, between Brava and Mogadishu, at Merca, thè Somali in- Meanwhile, beyond thè Benadir Coast to thè north, thè Majer- trusion was complete and this port was led by a member of thè teyn Sultanate had apprently retained its independence from locai Bimal dan; here thè only Zanzibar representative was an outside interests. In 1839, however, foran annual allowance of 360 aged customs officiai .Recently thè town had been devastated by dollars, thè Sultan sìgned a treaty at Aden with thè British, guaran- thè Sultan of thè Geledi in thè course of strife between his dan teeing to protect thè lives and property of ships wrecked off his and thè Bimal, and thè citizens of Brava were now preparing to coast.ir> By thìs time che Sultanate was also in contacc with Oman, counter-attack: in thìs situation Guillain wisely decìded not to though not it seems formall yunder Omanì jurisdiction. prolong his visìt. These various centres along thè coast were visited by thè Prendi Thus by thè middle of thè nineteenth century, thè southern explorer, Charles Guillain, captain of thè brig Ducouedìc, between Benadir coast as a whole recognizect thè suzeraìnty of Zanzibar, 1846 and 1848. As a whole thè Benadir ports, Guillain found, although thè Sultan's power was vague and uncertain compared acknowledged both thè authorìty of thè Sultan of Zanzibar and with thè direct influence exerted by thè Geledi who dominated that of thè Somali Geledi clan in thè hinterland who, as masters of thè hintetland. Yet thè Geledi did not generally dispute Zanzibar's thè Shebelle, were now at thè height of their power. And while posìtion, and thè two Sultans were fricnds rather than rivals thè Sultan of Zanzibar was no doubt potentially more powerful, maìntaining between them a delicate balance of control over thè because better armed, than his Geledi colleague, it was easier for Benadir. Partner to thè south thè Sultan of Zanzibar's writ ran thè latter to give direct effec tto his authority. Thus it was typical more directly, so that, for example, when in 1868 after thè rout of of thè delicate distribution of power between thè two Sultans that, thè Galla Warday, new Darod reinforcements arrived to swcll when in 18 70 thè Sultan of Zanzibar wished to build a fortress for thè further Darod thrust south, and carne from thè north by sea hìs representative at Mogadishu, thìs required thè consent and to Kismayu, they sought and obtained thè Sultan's authority. assistance of thè Geledi. To thè north beyond thè Benadir ports, thè Majerteyn Sultanate, At thè i time of Guillain's sojourn, however, although thè while having connexions with Oman, remained politically inde- ancient cotton-weaving industry was stili profitable, ' s Mogadishu pendent. Zeila, and less definitely Berbera, however, were stili was largely in ruins. A recent scourge of plague and famìne had formally part of thè Turkish Empire, though both weie now reduced its population to a mere 5,000; and Hamarweyn and Shan- heavily involved in trade with thè British at Aden, and in thè case ganì, thè two quarters of thè city, were at variante and cadi under of Berbera linked with Britain by commerciai treatìes, a separate leader. The Sultan of thè Geledi had in 1842 been ìn- Thus.by thè mìddle of thè nineteenth century thè Somali coast vited to mediate and his action then had led to an uneasy truce was no longer isolated, and locally it was now rather thè nomads between thè two factions. By contrast, thè Sultan of Zanzibar's of thè hinterland who controlied thè ports than thè other. way authority over thè town was slight and hardly more than nominai. about. To a large extent thè coastal and hinterland traditions had In 1843, a Somali had been appointed as governor by thè Sultan merged, and thè centre of politicai pressure had swung from thè of Zanzibar and furnished with two soldiers to collect thè taxes ; coast to thè ìnterior. The new esternai links between thè coast but after a short time thìs officia ihad relinquished his office, and and thè outside world, however, served in thè following decades now at thè time of Guillain's visit, thè only Zanzibari represen- of thè nineteenth century to pavé thè way for a new colonia! tative was an old Arab with an Indian assistant as tax collector. impact in which thè pressure, initially at Icast, was again mainly The governor for thè Benadir coast as a whole was stationed at from thè coast towards thè hinterland. Brava which, compared with Mogadishu, impressed Guillain with its prosperity. This city of 5,000 souls, while acknowledging thè overlordship of Zanzibar, was effcctively led by two pcrsonages, 39 38 THE IMPERIAL PARTITION: 1860-97 i would any occupation of thè Somali coast bc justified. This attitude on thè part of Whitehall towatds thè Somali coast, given differen temphasis by different administratìons in England, was stili thè guiding policy when events had driven Britain to CHAPTE RIII cstablìsh a Somaliiand Protectorate in 1887. This evaluation is also reftected in thè character of thè Anglo-Somali treaties of protection. It figures strongly in thè negotiation of thè 1897 THE IMPERIAL PARTITION: 1860-97 ; treaty with Ethiopia, and ìt later bred a traditìon of parsimony and neglect which dominateci British action in her Somali Pro- tectorate throughout most of its life. .Yct although Britain's Tèe first phasc of Ifaperial Partttion utilitarian interest in her Protectorate was always limitcd and secondary, this did not detcr thè government from using her IN THE YEAR followmS g thè middle of thè nineteenth century, holdings in Somaliiand as a convenient counter in batgaining for Somalia was rapidly drawn into thè theatre of colonial competit- bigger stakes wìth Ethiopia in 1897. tion between Britaìn, France, and Italy. On thè African contincnt The other powers who began to display interest in thè Red itself, Egypt was also involved; and later Abyssinia, expanding Sea coast had more definite and more directly imperiai ambitìons. and consolidating her realm in this period. By 1897 thè partition In this region BritaùYs maìn rivai was,, first, France. In 1859 thè of Somaliiand was virtually complete; and though subsequent Prendi consular agent at Aden obtained thè cession of thè Danakil adjustments occurred, thè frontiers of thè new Somali territorics port of Obock. Three years later a treaty was drawn up by which had been defined, at least theoretically. Such gaps as remained in France purchased thè port outright from thè 'Afar and thè thè division were later adjusted in subsequent colonial consolida- French flag was hoisted, But it was not until 1881, eleven years don. Only thè frontiers remained to be demarcated, a piaccicai after thè opening of thè Suez canai, that France took advantage step which turned out to be infinitel ymore difficul tthan could of her lonely stake at Obock and thè Franco-Ethiopian trading have been envisaged in 1897. company was instalied there. In thè ìnterval, Italy had replaced Britain's interest in thè Somali area stemmed from her posses- France in claiming Red Sea territoty, while Britain's Liberai sion of Aden which had been acquired by force in 1839 as a ministers were far from pressing imperiai claims. Empowered by station on thè short route to India. With its poverty in locai thè Italian Foreign Mìnister to select a piace on thè Red Sea coast resources, thè Aden garrison was almost entìrely dependent upon for an Italian settlement, Giuseppe Sapete, a former missionary for of was a con- northern Somaliiand supplìes meat. There also in Ethiopia, in 1869 obtained an interest in thè port of Assab on siderable Somali community at Aden, many of whom found thè Erìtrean coast. In thè following year, Assab was bought out? employment with thè new rulers there. The Aden authorities and right from thè locai 'Afar by an Italian shippìng company which thè Bombay government were thus directly concerned that orderly ^ proposed to run services through thè Suez canai and Red Sea conditions should prevaii on thè Somali coast, and more espcci- J| to India. Britain did nothing to contest these Italian gains. ally that thè'feeder caravan routes from thè interior, and thè ports Meanwhile, however, no doubt prompted by thìs foreign of Berbera and Zeila, should function freely. But although trav-, interest, Egypt revived Turkey's ancient claims to thè Red Sea ellers like Burton and locai officials at Aden might advocate », coast. By 1866 Turkey had transferred thè Red Sea ports of Suakin definite British occupation of thè Somali coast, their plans fcll, and Massawa to thè government of thè Khedive Isma'il, and thè on deaf ears in Westminster. The British government was only latter claìmed that this new jurisdiction also embraced tìie Somali interested in Somaliland's meat supply as a necessary ancillary to coast.' In thè following year thè governor of thè Sudan visited thè garrisoning of Aden. Only if this were seriously threatenetV

40 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE IMPERIAL PARTITION : 1860-97 thè Red Sea ports and also Tajura, Zeila, and Berbera, seeking The Egyptians, it seems, had little difficulty in establishing their declarations of fealty from thè locai Icaders. In 1869 an Egyptian authorìty over thè ports of Zeila, Bulhar, and Berbera, though vessel visited Berbera, and in thè following year Muharnmad their ìnfluence over thè nomads of thè interior was more limited. Jamal Bey was sent to thè Somali coast to raise thè Egyptian At this time thè Somali had no firearms, and had to depend for flag at Bulhar and Berbera. their security upon thè traditional spear and dagger. In addition, The Egyptian occupation provoked immediate Britìsh protests. despite their sense of cultural identity, they dìd not constitute a While not herself seeking to occupy Somali territory, in thè in- single politicai unìt. Foreign aggression thus encountered not a terests of thè safety of thè Aden garrison*s meat supplies, Britain nation-state, but a congeries of disunìted and often hostile clans did not wìsh to see any other power established on thè opposite which themselves were regularly divided by bitter internecine side of thè Gulf of Aden. Indeed to this end emissaries had ai- feuds. The Egyptians consequently experienced no united oppo- ready been sent from Aden to intrigue amongst thè Somali sition, although they had serious difficulties with individuai clans against Egypt, and in 1869 British agents had successfully frus- and lineagcs throughout their brief naie of thè coast (1870-84). trated thè cession of harbourage to France by one of thè eastern At Zeila ruled Abu Bakr Pasha, a locai 'Afar , who had been Somali clans. The India Office accordingly urged that measures Turkish governor of thè town before thè arrivai of thè Egyptians, should be taken to preserve Somali independence from Egypt. having earlier supplanted his Somali predecessor Haji *Ali Shir- But thè home government refused to sanction any military actìon, marke. Abu Bakr was actìvely engaged in thè slave trade, stili although resistance to Egyptian claims to thè coast cast of Zeila considerable at this time, and was regaided by thè British at Aden was maìotained through diplomatic channels from 1870 to 1874. as favourablc to thè interests of their French rivals. The governor During this period thè area under eifective Egyptian jurisdiction at Berbera was an Egyptian, *Abd ar-Rahman Bey, whose mie, rapidly expanded. In Eritrea, Annesley Bay was occupied in 1873 according to thè vigilant Aden authorities, was oppressive and and Keren in 1874, and thè allegiance of thè locai peoples there unjust: certainly it aroused thè hostility of his Somali subjects. and on thè Somali coast won. Between 1874 and 1876 this for- And despite thè community of religìon between thè Egyptian ward policy was continued; Abyssinia was attacked and expedi- colonìzers and their Somali subjects, at both Zeila and Berbera tions sent to thè Somali coast south of Cape Guardafili, although there were thè inevitable difficulties with thè nomadic clans of no effettive dominion was established there. As events turned thè interior. The new adminìstration sought to manage thè out, thè Abyssìnian ventures faìled, but thè Egyptians succeeded appointment of Somali clan Sultans, and in ordcr to secure some in expanding behind Zeila and established a garrison in thè degree of contro! over thè smaller clan segments appointed ancient commerciai city of Harar. headmen (Akils) to rcpresent them. These Egyptian candidates By this time, faced by other less predictable rivals, Britain had were not always acceptable. In 1883 ,there was trouble with thè come to regard thè Egyptian occupation as more in keeping with Gadabursi clan over thè recognition of their leader, Ugas Nur, her interests than hostile to them. Accordingìy, in 1877 a conven- who was eventually sent to Egypt, where, if tradition is accurate, tion was signed with thè Khedive by which Britain recognized he was fèted by thè Khedive and presented with a gift of firearms. Egyptian jurisdiction as far south as Ras . This arrangement Other similar ìncidents occurred. Lord Salisbury described as 'our only security against other Euro- Yet, however distasteful their regime to thè eyes of thè British pean powers obtaìning a footing opposite Aden*. The convention at Aden, thè Egyptians dìd succeed in creatìng tangìble evidence included thè precautionary provision that cno part of thè Somali of their presence on thè Somali coast. This was especìally thè case coast. . . should be ceded on any pretext whatever to a foreign in thè field of public works where much was achieved by corvée power*, a stipulation which was later to be written into Britain's labour. The port facilities of both Zeila and Berbera were greatly treaties of protection with Somali clans. improved; piers and Ughthouses were erected; and at Berbera

4* 43 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE IMPERIAI, PARTITION : 1860-97 thè ancient Dubar aqucduct was restored to supply fresh water had occupied Sue2, Ismailia, and Port Said. Yet thè possibility to thè town. The Egyptians also naturally encouraged Isiam and stili remained that thè Mahdists would obtaìn control of thè several new mosqucs were built during their tenure of thè coast. eastern Sudan and thè port of Suakin. In an atmosphere of rumours. Whatever its merits or demerits, however, thè Egyptian regime of a French bìd for thè Eritrean port of Massawa after thè with- was abruptly terminated by thè MahdTs revolt in thè Sudan which drawal of thè Egyptian garrison in 1885 ,Britain encouraged necessitated a concentration of Egyptian resources and a drastic Italy to slip in and made thè necessary juridical arrangements curtailment of outlying responsìbilities ìn Eritrea, Harar, and thè with thè Turks. By February i88j Italy had proclaimed her pro- Somali coast: or, at least, so ìt seemed to Britain. The consequent tectorate on thè Eritrean coast from Assab to Massawa. Egyptian evacuadon of Harar, Zeila, and Berbera took piace in This establishment of thè Italian colony of Eritrea well to thè 1884 and immediately raised again thè question óf how these north of thè farthest extension of thè Somali area did not of areas were to be administered to thè advantagc of Britaìn. course give Italy a stake amongst thè Somali. But thè fiirther MeanwhJle France and Italy had also been actìve. Recent thrust of Italian expansion inland soon led to encroachments French acquisitions in Madagascar and China, and thè collapse within Abyssinia and to thè treaty of Ucciali signed between thè of thè Anglo-French condominìum in Egypt gave France an two countries in 1889, a treaty which in thè eyes of Italy estab- impetus to establish a base on thè Red Sea route which was now a lished an Italian protectorate over Abyssinia. The same year saw vital link in her overseas communìcadons. The time had come to Italy's first direct acquisìtion of Somali interests, and Italian in- rescue Obock from thè oblivion of its moribund trading com- fluence established on thè littoral to thè north-east and south-east pany, and to create an efficien tcoaling station. This was ali thè of Abyssinia .By thè treaty of Ucciali itself, moreover, Italy be- more necessary since, in thè climate of acute Anglo-French rivalry came directly concerned in thè partìtion of thè Somali nadon. of thè period, thè Britìsh authorities at Aden now refused to allow French transports to coal at thè port. Léonce Lagarde, who laid thè foundations of thè French Còte des Somalìs, and who played The estabtisbwent of thè Bntìsh and French Protectorates so prominent a part in thè expansion of French influence in If from thè British point of view Italy seemed to provide a suitable Ethiopia and N.E. Africa, was nomìnated governor of Obock replacement to Egypt in Eritrea, thè same soludon was not in June 1884. applicable at Harar or on thè Somali coast opposite Aden. The In thè same perìod Italian influence at Assab, owned stili by thè problem of thè future status of these areas was complìcated; no Raffael e Rabattino shipping company, was Consolidated and one friendly or fully acceptable to Britain seemed to want t'iem.» extended. At first thè British reaction to these Italian moves was The Egyptians were not prepared to conduci thè evacuation of hostile; but by 1882 when under British pressure Italy had agreed their garrisons themselves; Turkey showed no willingness to to recognize Egyptian sovereignty to thè north and south of her resumé control of Tajura and Zeila; and thè locai clans of thè settlement, thè Italian government fdt sufficientl yconfiden t of Somali coast, who of course were not consulted, were manifestly its position to daim Assab openly and thè port was bought from incapable of maintaining their ìndependence and guaranteeing thè company. Notwithstanding continued misgìvings in some permanent peace and order at Berbera. quarters as to Italy's ambitions, thè British government began to It seemed also likely that thè Egyptian withdrawal ìtself would move towards thè position of viewing Italian involvement as a provoke disorder. Major Hunter, Assistant Resident at Aden and convenient counterpoise to French expansion which was regarded Consul for thè Somali coast since 1881, reported that thè sudden as infinitely more threatening. The British Liberai government evacuation of thè Egypdan garrison from Harar would be likely was by now in any case prepared to take more effectiv emeasures to lead to a struggle between thè Somali and Oromo and that thè to safeguard thè use of thè Suez canai. By July 1882 British troops retreating Egypdan forces would almost certainly be attacked

44 45 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THEIMPERIALPARTITION 1860-97: by 'Ise and Gadabursi Somali clansmen on thè road to Zeila. of our independence, thè preservation of order, and other good Harar itself would be open to attack and would present an attrac- and sufficien t reasons.' Nor did thè ckns concerned expressly tive target for thè growing ambitions of King Menelìk of Shoa. cede their land to Britain; they merely pledged themselves never On thè Somali coast thè news from thè Sudan was causing Test- to cede, sdì, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupauon, save lessness amongst thè Somali at Berbera. Apart from thè growing to thè British Government, any portion of thè terntory presently menace of thè French at Obock, affair sat Zeila, however, were, inhabited by them or being under their control'. momentarily at any rate, more placid. Yet thè generai effec tof The Somali dansmen did, however, gtant to thè British Gov- thè Egyptian withdrawal was likely to be disruptive and to pro- ernment thè right to appoint British Agents to reside on thè mote unrest. Somali coast. A furthcr supplementary treaty was signed with In these circumstances ìt was reluctantly decided that direct each of thè five clans in 1886 which referred to thè desire of each Bridsh action was needed to ensure thè safety of thè trade-routes side for «maintaining aad strengthening thè relations of peace and to safeguard thè Aden garrison's meat supplies. A British and friendship existing between them', and which announced mission led by Admiral Hewitt was dispatched to Abyssinia in that thè British govemment undertook to extend to thè clans- 1884 to secure King John's co-operation in thè evacuation of thè men concerned and to their territorio Uè gracious favour and Egyptlans from Harar. And after an Italian ironclad had visited "otection of Her Ma;** thè Queen-Empress'. A fortereause Berbera and staged a somewhat equivocai incident at Zeila, oblked each clan nct to enter into relations with anyforeign Major Hunter was authorized to make thè necessary arrange- power «cept with tfc eknowledge and coment of Btitain.* ments with thè locai Somali clans for a British occupation. Tired Once these arrange=ents were completed thè way was; clear. of thè Egyptian mie, and perhaps already sensing thè expan- But despite thè enth-iasm of thè Aden officials who had been sionist moves of Abyssinia and of other foreign powers which preparing for an occ=ation of thè Somali coast for some time, they were soon to experience so much more forcibly, thè Somali anfwho had especkS trained a party of about forty members clans seem to have readily consented to British protection. By of thè Aden polke, ì^tructions were issued that thè occupanon thè end of thè year formai treaties, replacing thè earlier Anglo- was to be as unobtóe as possible: there was to be no attempi Somali trade agreements, had been signed with thè 'Ise, Gada- 7o xtend British co^l inland. By thè end of 1884 three Bntish bursi, Habar ,' Habar Awal, and Habar Tol Ja'lo 'Vice-Consuls' ™e -tablished on thè Somali coast. One was clans. stationed at Berbera ^ith an assistant at Bulhar; and another at These new Anglo-Somali treaties vere presumably regarded Zeila where a joint c-Qdominium had temporanly been agreed by theìr Somali signatories as contractual alliances of thè samc fo witrT Turkev, ac= Abn Bakr Pasha, thè

46 47 THE IMPERIAL PARTmON : 1860-97 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA as thè officia iMuslim judge in piace of two *self-styled* Kadis who at Berbera as 'parentalV Under Walsh, building material which were both Arabs and extremely anti-British. was scarce in thè town was obtaiaed by issuing carnei drivers While this modest but surprisingly effettive aclministratìon with a rope sling by means of whìch trìey were to bring two was bcing established, thè Egyptian garrison withdrew from boulders Berbera whenever they carne in from thè interior. ìnto Hatar without serious incìdent in 1885 and'Abdallah Muhammad, Before entering thè town, thè nomads of thè hinterland were en- a Harari, was left as governor of thè city with a British adviser. couraged to deposìt their weapons at thè polke station and an At thè same time, thè French were active at Obock: and their ingenious procedure was devised to discouragc violence. If two rìvalry with thè British, especially through their intrigues at men were caught fighting, they were separated and deptived of Zeila conducted by thè enterprising French Consul with thè their arms. They were thcn obliged to dig a grave. When this was support of thè Danakil governor, had become acute. Here thè completed to thè satisfaction of thè police, their arms were re- positìon of thè locai British officiate was complicated by their turned and they were urged to resumé their dispute on thè under- government's reluctance to come to a clecision on thè future standing that thè vìctor would bury his adversary. Walsh found status of Zeila. that under these condìtìons thè most bellicose of warriors pre- Under thè inspìration of thè forcefu l Lagarde, thè French ferred to forget their differences ,at least temporarily: thè whole statìon had been extended to thè northern shore of thè Golf of story was then broadcast in thè town by thè town crier. Tajura after thè departure of thè Egyptians. Early in 1885 thè With such methods as these and thè aid of a small force of French asserted that their dominion extended beyoad Tajura to about a hundred Somali Coast Police armed with rifies, order was dose on Jìbuti, and Britaìn replied with a counter notification of maintained quite effectively at Berbera and Bulhar. The safety of hcr Somali Protectorate from Berbera to a poìnt wìthin thè sphere ttade with thè interior was ensured by thè activitìes of an claimed by France. Having gained a treaty of perpetuai friendship irregular force of armed caravan guards paid by thè merchants (which included an unambìguous and total cessìon of land to whose caravans they escorted. And at Berbera thè Ayyal Yunis, France) wìth thè *Ise of Ambado and Jibuti, France answered and at Bulhar thè Ayyal Ahmad were stili thè offìcialiy recognized by extending ber claim to thè latter port, agents for ali foreign traders : they exercised a monopoly in thè This wrangle, conducted wìthout regard for thè interests of organization of caravan trade with thè interior. . thè locai ìnhabitants, now looked as though ìt might lead to open Partner inland thè maintenance of order sometimes required conflict; and indeed by thè end of 1885 Brìtain was preparing to punitive expeditions organized with thè aid of supplemcntary rcsist an cxpected French landing at Zeila, Instead, however, of a forces from Aden. Here thè normal conditìons of periodical decision by force, both sides now agreed to negotiate. The result and clans and upon raidìng looting between caravans were aggra- was an Anglo-French agreement of 1888 which defined thè vated by popular sympathy for thè MahdFs cause in thè Sudan. boundaries of thè two protectotates as between Zeila and Jibuti : This was furthered by thè activities of locai agents of thè Senusi fout years latet thè latter port bccame thè officia icapitai of thè Muslim Order and by Mahdist emissarìes: fortunately for thè French colony. The effec tof this new arrangement was, of course, British,, however, these were often at loggerheads and thus did to divide thè 'Ise with whom both France and Britain had tteaties not make thè immediate impact they might otherwise have clone. of *protection*, thè British treaties being designcd to protect thè Early in 1885 ,however, thè Zeila police who had becn taken over 'independence* of thè rìan and gìving Britain no outright claìm from thè Egyptians mutinìed; but serious trouble was averted by thè intervention of thè Indian Infantry who had been statìoned to 'Ise territory. at Zeila to cover thè Egyptian withdrawal from Harar. A minor riot followed at Berbera. To counteract thè eifects of religious propaganda, a pro-British sheikh was unobtrusively appointed 49 THE IMPERIAI, PARTITION: 1860-97 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA in thè lucrative arms trade with thè Abyssinian rulers, having Thè Italioti spbere paid lìttle attentìon to an Anglo-French convention of 1886 prohibìtìng thè import of arms, France's ally, Russia, which vied The Italiana, used conveniently as allics in thè face of French with Italy to make Ethiopia her protectorate, Ukewise poured opposition, were now in a posìtion to cxtend their claims inland arms and military advisers into thè country. This influx of from their colony of Eritrea. The effec tof this with thè added war material which on thè Italian readìng of thè Ucciali treaty menace of thè Mahdia in thè Sudan was, like thè carlier Egyp- accorded with Italian interests, was in succeedìng years to be tìan invasìons, to give a further impetus to Abyssinian unity. To applied to thè consolìdation of Menelik's realm, and finally en- counter thè growing Abyssinian resistance to thek expansion, thè abled thè Emperor to assert his country's ìndependence. In thè Italians sought to play off King Menelik of Shoa agaihst John of process, Somali clans whìch hitherto had lain outside thè ancìent Tigre who held thè title of King of Kings. Italy supported Menelik Abyssinian hegemony were incorporated Ìn thè new Ethiopìan and armed and encouraged him to contest John's title. The two empire. Icaders, howcver, concluded a dynastic alìiance, agreeing to a In thè year in which thè ambiguous treaty of Ucciali was con- division of their anticipated conquests, and John accepted that cluded, Italy established direct claims to thè Somali coast on thè on his death Menelik should take thè title of Emperor. In 1887, Indian Ocean to thè cast of thè British sphere. In February, a after thè ardent Muslim ruler of Hatar, *Abdallah Muhammad, had treaty was concluded between , thè Italian conveniently caused his soldiers to massacre a party of Italian Consul at Zanzibar, and Yusuf 'Ali, thè Majerteyn Sultan of explorers, Menelik seizcd thè city and appointed his cousin Ras Obbia, 6 by which thè latter placed his country and his possessions Makonnen as governor. In a message to thè British at Aden, under thè *protection and government 1 of Italy in return fot an Menelik made it clear that he regarded *Abdallah Muhammad as a annuity of 1,800 tallers, Two months later, a similar convention latter-day successor to thè sixteenth-centuty Musiìm conqueror was signed with Yusuf 'Ali's kinsman 'Isman, thè hereditary Ahmad Gran, and that 'Abdallah's defcat, Hke Gran's, was a vindi- Sultan of thè Majerteyn clan at Alula. And at thè end of thè year cation of Christian sovereignty. (1889) Italy rounded off these new Somali acquisitions when thè Meanwhile King John was engaged ìn keeping both thè Imperiai British East Africa Company sublet thè southern Benadir Mahdists and thè Italians at bay. After what amounted to an ports which it held in lease from thè Sultan of Zanzibar. The Italian victory, although an indecisive one, in 1888 ,John was Somali terrìtory to thè south of thè Juba remained within thè killed in thè following year on thè battlefield of Metemma against British Company's domain, until 1895 when, after thè suppression thè Dervishes; and thè Italians succeeded in making thè treaty of thè rebeluon which thè incompetence of its officials had pro- of Ucciali with Menelik who had now assumed John's title. The voked, thè I.B.E.A.C. suirendered its charter, and thè establish- Italian version of this treaty was interpreted as making Abyssinia ment of British colonial rule was proclaimed. Thus Jubaland, as an Italian protectorate, but Menelik claimed that thè Amharic thè area was called, became for thè time being part of thè British version did not oblige him to conduct ali his external relatìons East Africa Protectorate. thiough Italy. This inconsìstency, howéver, was not to come to The Italian claim to thè Benadir coastal strip, for this was ali light until later. For thè moment, thè Italians, who had gained it was, was strengthened in 1892 when thè Sultan of Zanzìbar formai recognition of their sovereignty over Eritrea, felt con- ccded thè ports of Brava, Merca, Mogadishu, and Warsheikh fident of their positìon and made arms and ammunition freely directly to Italy for a terna of twenty-five years, thè annual rent available to Menelik: loan capitai was also granted, and Ìn 1890 being fixed at i6o»ooo rupees. The Italians -were free to derive Italy sponsored Abyssinian membership of thè Brussels General what profit they might from thè coast and to admìnister it, but Act which empowered her as a Christian state to import munì- it stili remained thè property of thè Sultan. In thè interval, tions legally. French merchants had already long been engaged A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE IMPERIAI PARTITION, 1860-9: 7 Filonardi had deserted his consular post to form thè commerciai ^mdualexpansion. But in 1896, afteronlythreeyearsof existence, of V. Filonardi e Co., to which Italian government enterprise thè t lic Company's slender financìal resources proved inadequate and entrusted thè management of its Benadir The first holding. It was forced to wind up its affairs .By thè end of thè year, in Italian station was opened in 1891 at Adale (called Itala by thè ttdtlition to Itala, six other stations had been opened: two, Italìans) where thè locai Somali leaders had signed a treaty of (ìiumbo and Warsheikh, were like Itala mere outposts with no protection with Filonardi. Here thè new rulers of thè coast were Italian officiai; but at Brava, Merca, Mogadishu, and Lugh there represented by an Arab agent, and a small garrison of twcnty wcrc now Italian Resìdents in command. native soldiers. These were thè modest beginnings of thè colony The collapse of Filonardi's Company followed thè resounding which thè Italians were to use forty-five years afterwards as their llulin nrout at thè battle of Adowa which decisively shattered prìncipal base for thè conquest of Ethìopia. Ilwly' ambiguouR s claim to a protectorate over Ethiopia. Italy While thè Company thus assumed ìts functions on thè Benadir managcd, however, to retain her Eritrean1 colony, and despìte thè coast, Italian explorers were also active. In 1891 Robecchì- furore at home which greeted thè news of Menelik's victory, she Brichetti trekked from Mogadishu tò Obbìa, and thence crossed «lil iclung optimistìcally to her new Somali possessions. Indeed, through thè Ogaden to Berbera. In thè same year Baudi di Vcsmc wlll ithè help of thè small flotìlla of warships stationed in thè Red grossed and Candeo thè Ogaden and in thè process obtained re- Nf H unt iIndian Ocean, preparations were being made to defend quests for Italian protection from elders of thè Ogaden clan. At llw Hctmdir agaìnst a possible Ethiopian attack. And aftempts were thè end of thè following year, Prìnce Ruspoli set out from Berbera ni N Ol>cin gmade to extend Italian infiuence inland. In November to traverse much thè same area, but from thè opposìte direction. llyft ,withou twaitingfortheconsentoftheSultanof thè Geledi, When he reachcd Barderà on thè Juba in Aprii 1893, he concluded M part yIcd by Cecchi, thè Italian Consul at Zanzibar, set off to a treaty of protection with thè Somali of that region. These re< onnojtr ethè left bank of thè Shebelle River. The expedition Italian pioneers were not thè first Europeans to visit ali thè regions Putirt idisastrously at Lafole where its members were ambushed included in their explorations : in 1885 a party of Englishmen had Ity Somali clansmen, only three of thè seventeen Italians escaping reached thè Shebelle from Berbera despìte difficultie swith thè wlll ithcìrlives. Aden authorìties; and between 1886 and 1892 thè Swayne TliI» set-back did not, however, deter thè Italian government brothers had surveyed much of thè country between thè northern whicK interpreted thè situation as calling for an intensification of coast and thè Shebelle River. But unlike their Italian colleagues, thè work of 'pacifica tion'. Consequently, until a new company these Bridsh explorers did not enter into protectorate agreements ci mli lbc found to assume thè burden of administerìng thè Benadir, with thè clansmen they encountered. (fioraio Sorrentino, commander of thè cruiser Elba, was appoìn- More orthodox conventions were established with thè Filo- tnl ni Special Commissioner to restore order, and more native nardi Company as it began to extend its jurisdiction. The coastal tronpf lwere hurriedly shipped to thè coast from Massawa. By Somali, however, did not always welcome thè new rulers. In Octo- Nnvembcr 1897, Sorrentino^ reprisals for thè ìncident at Lafole ber 1893, at Merca, as Filonardi and his companions were about lim iconvinced thè Sultan of thè Geledi of thè wisdom of accept- to board thè Italian warship on which they were travelling, having lllj j thè new colonizers and thè Special Commissioner's mission successfully signed a treaty with thè leaders of thè town, onc of Wm complete. Six months later, despite thè continued lack of thè party was attacfced and mortally wounded. In reprisal, twelve •nthuflias min Italy for further colonial adventures, thè 'Benadir Somali elders were taken prisoner and thè city heavily bombarded. fìompany* was ready to take over where Filonardi had left off. There were other occasions also when thè Italian warships plying Mkc ita predecessor, however, this new organization soon found Eritrea, Aden, Zanzibar, and thè Benadir ports found that such tlm t it had neither thè means nor thè resources to conduci thè methods had a salutary effec t and focìHtated thè Company's UMilcrtakin profitablyg , and succumbed in 1905 when thè Italian

52 53 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE IMPERIAI. PARTITION: 1860-97 government at last rcalìzed that if anything was to be made of thè luto ncgotiatìons with Great Britain over their respective boun- Benadir, it would have to assume direct responsibility. ilurlcfl In. March of 1891 an Anglo-Italian protocol was sìgned The acquisitici! by Italy of her two "northern Somali protec- whìih dcfme d thè boundary between East Africa and Italian torates and her lease of thè southern Benadir ports, although she Somuliland an, d thè Italian government proceeded to press for a was at first hardly in a position to assert her authorìty, naturally tuilhe rdelimitation between her and Britain's Somali territorìes. raìsed thè question of how thè frontiers between these and Britain's Ai lite rime Britain was not as anxious as Italy to settle this matter Somaliland Protectorate should be drawn. The jssue was in «m i cimscqucntl yembarked upon delaying tactics, However, in fact much wider than this for it also included thè more important May i Hy 4a protocol was signed defining thè respective spheres of question of how much territory Italy had gained as protector of liilluenec. Abyssinia, on her interpretation of thè' Ucciali treaty which \\ this time Menelik had succeeded in givìng some colour to Britain accepted but France contested. Interest was focused maìnly hi* clttìmsove Somalr i clans advanced in his circular letter of 1891. on Harar and Zeila. France sought to divert thè lucrative trade 'l'hr ennques tof Harar in 1887 had been followed by thè subjuga- from Harar to thè ports of her new colony. Britain endeavoured, tlun di ' thè turbulent locai Oromo peoples. These achievements within thè scope of her limited interests on thè Somali coast, to encoura^e dthè Abyssinians to turn their attention towards their keep thè trade flowing along thè ancient caravan route to Zeila Nomal ncighboursi . From Harar, Ras Makonnen's forces began in her Protectorate. Italy, in her turn, regarded Harar as part of fi i rii Kin gnot only amongst thè *Ise, Gadabursi, and Habar Awal her Abyssìnian protectorate and coveted Zeila, thè naturai outiet l'Ittim but. also to thè cast and south-east amongst»the Somali of of Harar's trade. tilt I laud and Ogaden. This placed thè Brìtish Protectorate Italian interest in thè Harar-Zeila area was emphasized as «uihoritic sin an awkward position, e&peciall yafter a small early as 1890 when thè Italian government expressed concern AliyfHÌnianforcehadopenedapos in 189t 1 at Biyo Kaboba on thè about thè possìble consequences at Harar of a punitive expedition M ii tini sid) e of thè Protectorate's western border. Italy insisted in thè Britlsh Protectorate against thè *Ise clan. In September lim i sil ncgotiationi s with Abyssinia should proceed through of this year, Menelik wrote to thè King of Italy pointing out that her, uni iBritain acceptcd this position protesting vainly to thè thè Amharic version of thè Ucciali treaty allowed him to make lluliun ass incident followed ìncident. Although thè clans con- use of thè Italian government in hìs relations with foreign powers cerncd turncd to thè Protectorate authoritìes for support, nothìng but did not compel him to do so. The Italian government replied pllrctiv cwas done, despite thè fact that thè Abyssinian pressure by dispatching Count Antonelli to ta'fc ethè matter up with thè mult i easily have been countered with lìttle cost in arms. The Emperor. Another ohject of Antonelli's visit was to induce punnibilit ofy arming thè Somali to protect themselves was raised, Menelik to address a circular letter to thè powers defining thè •ut) incvitably dismissed. ancient boundaries of Abyssinia. This remarkable document was This unwillingness to honour fully thè terms of the.Anglo- dìspatched and received in 1891: in Somaliland it claimed 'thè Sninal iprotectorate treaties, however distasteful to thè locai Province of Ogaden, thè Habar Awal, thè Gadabursi, and thè Hrliis hauthorities, was of course consistent with thè officiai 'Ise* (thè last three Somali peoples being clans with whom Britain, Urliìa hattìtude towards thè Somali coast. The effec t was to and in thè case of thè *Ise, France also, had treatìes of protectìon). fctren^then Abyssinia's hand, and Italy's as Abyssìnia's protector, The letter also contained thè challenging declaration: 'Ethiopia dllhoug hthere was now growing British scepticìsm as to Italy's has been for fourteen centuries a Christian ìsland in a sea of rrft lìnfluenc wite h Menelik.7 pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa The negotiations which led to thè 1894 Anglo-Italìan Protocol between them, I do not intend to be an indifferen tspectator.' ilUuusse da possible surrender of thè *Ise and Gadabursi clans Nevertheless, it was as protector of Abyssinia that Italy entered fllmig with thè port of Zeila to thè Italians in exchange fot Italian

54 55 THE IMPERIAI. PARTITION: 1860-97 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA d' iw 1 1thè Juba River as Lugh. Hcre thè head of thè locai Somali concessions in their northern Somali protectorates. In thè event, liut ihad requested protection. from thè Sultan of Zanzibar and however, this course was not followed, and thè decision eventually litu ibccn provided with ten muzzle-loaders which enabled hìm to agreed to, amounted to a recognìtion that thè Ogaden lay withìn Wftlntai hins position for a time. About 1893, however, hìs village thè Italian sphere, 8 and thè Haud in thè British. Three years later w*« ovèrrun by an Ethiopìan attack and he sought help from thè Britain was severely to curtaìl her newly defined rìghts in thè Haud. Italian aon thè coast, The pìoneers Bottego and Ugo Ferrandì rendici! Lugh in 1895 and occupied thè town after beating offan The treaties of 1897 with Ethìopia Utlilupta attackn . Bottego then continued his trek towards Lake Rudol fand Shoa where he was killed, while Ferrandi stayed to The Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896 completely destroyed thè ftilmlnititcr thè Company's new station at Lugh, later known as Italian claim to a protectorate over Abyssinia: thè irksome treaty Lugli l 'crrandi. In 1 896 a further Ethiopian.attack was successfully of Ucciali had served Menelik wett. The Christian state of Ethiopia nili cui» , to which Menelik's genìus had contributed so mudi, had now Thu» , with Russian offtcer s attached to their forces,9 thè become a sovereign power whose position and aspìrations had to Klhlopian shad continued their forward thrust and enlarged their be taken seriously if European imperiai interests were to prosper. ìphvrc of influenc esince 1894. Now, not mereìy ìn thè north, but This France had long appreciated and had already reaped thè OV tf must of their western periphery, thè Somali clansmen were fruìts of conciliation. Britain, howevera remaìned unconvinced •Ipericncing Ethiopian pressure, which though foi tne most part until thè Italian débàcle at Adowa drove thè point home. Then Ifreguln andr spasmodic in its application nevertheless produced events in thè Sudan, and increasìng Ethiopìan encroachments in ft ronsMcrabl eeffect -And caught between thè conflicting ambitions Somaliland, made it imperative for thè British government to of ihc l'.thiopian son thè hìnterland, and thè French, Bruisti, and treat directly with thè real masters of thè hìnterland. Accordingly tulUi», on thè coast, individuai Somali dans and Uneages sought in 1897, Rennell Rodd, thè First Secretary in thè British Agency in In pmfi tfrom this rivalry by playing one side off against another. Cairo, was instructed to go to Addis Ababa to settle these and *Th* elicci of this was to weaken thè generai position of thè Somali other wider issues with thè Emperor. orn ilo cncourage thè entrenchment of foreign interests. By this time, as has been seen, thè 'Ise and Gadabursi clans were In (he north, thè 1894 Anglo-Italian delimitatìon of territory, divided between Britain, France, and Ethiopia in their affiliation. wl\lrh had not been communicated to Menelik, had not in any way Some of thè 'Ise were under French 'protection', some under tmprnved thè growìng tension between thè Protectorate authorì- British, and others, further to thè interior, open to thè de fatto tlt» unt iRas Makonnen at Harar. With thè increasing Ethiopian ìnfluence of Ras Makonnen at Harar, The Gadabursi were premure ,matters indeed had worsened, and by thè beginning of similarly divided between thè British and ; their clan- |I^7 wcte moving towards a climax. Ras Makonnen refuscd to head, Ugds Nur, paid an annual fee of 100 sheep to Ras Makonnen lllow thè British Protectorate administration to act against thè « on thè understanding that his dansmen would not otherwìse be '!•• ovcr on inddent which had occurred on territory which he disturbed. He received gifts and drew a salary from both thè eUtmcd belonged to Ethiopia, and he reinforced his point -with a Ethiopians and thè British. In thè centre of northern Somaliland, thfttt tto assen Ethiopian authority by force. The British Resident thè Isaq clans, which in thè course of their grazing movements in It Ailen ,who had been trying to settle thè dispute with Makon- thè Haudencounter thè Ogaden clan, were experiencing periodical flim, wfli sinstructed by his government to refrain from further Ethiopìan raids. Some of thè Habar Awal clan had been threatened pninmunication wits h Harar, since thè whole issue of thè Protec- with attack unless they ofFered tribute. Even thè religious centre ' frontiers would be dealt with by thè Rodd mission to at was regularly menaced. To thè south, Ethiopian raiding parties had pcnetrated as far 57

56 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA 1 THE IMPERIAI. PARTITION: 1860-97 In a statement in thè House of Commons, thè Rodd mìssìon was hand, thè ancient caravan route between Harar and Zeila which described as bcing sent to Ethiopia : *to assure King Menelik of was already threatened by thè proposed railway from French our friendly intentions, to endeavour to promote amicabìe politi- Somaliland, was to remain open to thè commerce of both nations, cai and commerciai relatìons, and to scttle certain questions which and in Ethiopia itself Britain was to be accorded most favoured had arisen between thè British authorities on thè Somali Coast and nation treatment in trade and commerce. However striking these thè Abyssinian governor of Harar'. Although thè wider aims of trade arrangements may have seemed at thè time, in practice they thè Missìonwere to reassure Menelik as to Britain's interests in thè amounted to little;.French commerce was already strongly en- context of Anglo-French rivalry on thè Nile, and to secure at trcnched in Ethiopia, and thè Jibutì railway soon cornpletely least Ethiopian neutrality in thè war against thè Khalifa in thè cclìpsed Zeila's trade. Sudan, thè settlement of thè British Protectorate's frontiers was The discussìon of thè Protectorate's frontiers proved exceed- described as one of thè prìncìpal objects of thè negotiatìons.. How- ìngly difficult .The Emperor advanced claims for a reconstitution ever, thè actual terms in which thè Protectorate's frontiers were of thè 'ancient frontiers* of Ethiopia and referred to his circular to be defined and thè concessions which might bave to be made Ictter of 1891, a document of which Rodd disdaìmed knowledge. were of relatively minor importance if Rodd could succeed in At first Menelik pressed for thè inclusion of thè British Protector- establishing friendly relations with Ethiopia. Britain was not pre- ate within his empire, but he eventually yielded ground and agreed pared to defend thè 1894 frontiers if this would entail any con- to Rodd's proposai that thè actual definition of thè Protectorate's siderable expenditure: indeed thè possibìlity of abandoning thè boundaries should be left for settlement to Rodd and Ras Makon- Somaliland Protectorate altogether had already been raìsed. The nen at Harar : Artide II of thè Treaty provided that thè frontiers Aden authorities, however, had insisted that this drastic course thus decided should be attached to thè treaty as an annex. A prior was impossible, and so thè problem remained of retaining thè annex agreed to at Addis Ababa, foreshadowed thè concessions Protectorate in a form sufficìen tto satisfy Aden's requirements in that Rodd was to make at Harar. This stipulated that such Somali meat imports but within boundaries acceptable to Menelik. clansmen who, as a result of any adjustmen tof boundaries might Severa! French missions had already preceded thè British Mis- eventually become Ethiopian subjects, were to be well treated and sion to Addis Ababa, but Menelik received Rodd hospitably. And assured of 'orderly government*. Rodd was impressed by thè Emperor, of whom he records some- The dìscussion of boundaries with Ras Makonnen at Harar was what patronizingly, that he ended *by feeling a great respect for agaìn tedious and dìfficult . But in thè end a compromise was thè strong man of Ethiopia, who madc a genuine effor tto under- reached by which, whilé abandoning her claim to some 67,000 stand thè position and overcome his mistrust of his own in- square miles of land in thè Haud, Britain was able to retaìn experience'.10 Menelik's conduct of thè negotiatìons, however, Margeìsa and part of thè hinterland within her Protectorate. This suggest that he required little tutelage in diplomacy. Although represented a considerable concession to thè Ethiopian claims Rodd succeeded in gettìng Menelik to pledge himself to prevent which, though not in 1897 supported by any finn Ethiopian occu- thè passage of arms to Mahdists whom he declared thè thè pation on Somali soil beyond Jigjiga, 11 could not be challenged enemies of Ethiopia, subsequent events show that thè Emperor without thè use of force, a course which Rodd rightly understooc» continued to conduct clandestine negotiations with thè Dervishes. his government would not countenance. No agreement was reached on thè definìtìon of Ethiopian It is important to emphasÌ2e that thè terms of thè agreement boundaries in thè Sudan, And thè price Rodd had to pay was con- were carefully drawn up to yield Ethiopian recognition of thè new siderable. Britain authorized thè transit of arms and ammunition boundaries of thè British Protectorate. The lost lands in thè Haud for thè Emperor's use, and waived customs duties at Zeik on which were excised from thè Protectorate were not, however, goods destined for thè use of thè Ethiopian state, On thè other rcded to Ethiopia; not did thè agreement bind Britain to 58 59 THE IMPERIAL PARTITIOX: 1860-97 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA ihcre were protesta in England as well as misgivings amongst thè recognize Ethiopìan sovereignty over thè territory which had locai Somali Coast admìnìstrators, these carried little weight in thè been relinquished. 12 This one-sidedrecognition was indeed already Cuc eof thè imperatives of imperiai strategy. Frorn this wider point implied in thè wording of thè annex to thè trcaty which Menelik of vìew, given Britain's secondary interest in Somaliland and het had acccpted at Addis Ababa guaranteeing orderly government refusa ito undertake any financial commitrnent there which went and equitable treatment to those Somali who might, ìn thè future» hcyond thè purpose for which thè Protectorate had been created, become Ethiopian subjects. Moreover, thè adroit form of words Rodd had in reality rnerely yielded to thè inevitable. A notable adopted by Rodd, is consistent with thè terms of thè originai sittemp thad at least been made to secure Ethiopìan goodwill, and Anglo-Soraali treaties of protection which it will be recallcd did Kthiopian recognitìon had been obtained for thè British Somali- not, in fact, cede Somali territory to Britain. The treaty also - and land Protectorate wìthin frontiers which were stili consistent with this was essential - dìd not in any way compromise thè Italian thè requirements of thè trade to Aden. That this had been achieved claims agreed to between Britain and Italy in 1894. at thè price of unìlaterally abandoning protectorate treaties with The eventual effect ,of course, clearly envìsaged by Rodd and Sornali clansmen, was, of course, unfortunate, but whatever mis- his government of this unilateral withdrawal or curtailment of givings Rodd himself may have had were reassured when an inter- protection by Britain, was to piace thè Somali clansmen concerned vicw with Lord Salisbury revealed that thè Foreign Minister was in a positìon in which they would not be able to maintain their 'not much preoccupied by Abyssinìan encroachments in Somali- independence from Ethiopia. It was merely a matter of time before Ethiopia followed up her spasmodic thrusts and transformed her land'.Nevertheless13 , thè Government of Bombay which was directly infiltration among thè Somali imo a definite occupation. This responsible through Aden for administering thè territory was not contingency was clearly provided for in thè third annex to thè cntirely satisfied and prophesied that trouble with thè Somali, treaty which stipulated that thè clans on each side of thè new who had not been consulted and knew nothing of thè treaty, British Protectorate frontìer should have access to thè grazing would be lìkely to follow. Any additional expenditure which areas and *nea rer wells' both within and outside thè British sphere ; might thereby be incurred should not, Bombay urged, fall upon during such migratory movements they were to be under thè its exchequer. The point was taken, and thè Foreign Office ,which jurisdiction of thè appropriate territorial authority. However, had been responsible for thè treaty, assumed responsibìlity for thè Rodd and thè other British officiat econcerned thought that thè Protectorate in thè following ycar, ìn time to bear thè burden of Ethìopians would be slow to take advantage of what they had in thè first phase of thè twenty years rebellion which broke out two effec talready gained; it was considered that in practice things years later. would continue much as they were with thè Haud remaining as a Thus 1897 saw thè definition of thè British Somali sphere in sort of buffe rzone used by thè British clans only temporarily for relation to Ethiopia. But it was not until 1934, when an Anglo- grazing. The effect sof thè graduai adoption of agriculture by thè Ethiopian boundary commissìon attempted to demarcate thè western Somali clans were not envìsaged, for this process had boundary, that British-protected Somali became aware of what hardly yet started. A more serious objection which might more had happened, and expressed their sense of outrage in distur- reasonably have been anticìpated was thè effec tof thè centuries' bances which cost one of thè commìssioners his life. This long old trend of population movement away from thè highly eroded period of ignorance, far from indicating acquiescence, was facili- north towards thè centre and Haud. This graduai drift of popula- tated by thè many years which elapsed before Ethiopia established tion was to bring increasing numbers of British ptotected Somali any semblance of effective administrative control in thè Haud and into what was now effectìvely thè Ethiopian sphere. Ogaden. These and other more immediate objectìons to thè effects of thè Yet 1897 remains thè cruciai year in thè imperiai history of thè treaty were, howevct, of only locai importante, and although 61 60 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA Horn of Africa; and thè boundary agreements made then have left a legacy of indeterminacy and confusion whìch stili plagues thè relations between Ethiopia and thè Somali Republic. Nor was it only thè British who unilaterally abregated some of theìr protec- CHAPTERIV torate oblìgations towards Somali. The Lagarde mission to Menelik, which had preceded Rodd's, had also discussed boundary questions and reduced thè extent of thè Còte des Somaìis to thè THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: satisfaction of thè Emperor, In return, commerciai guarantees 1900-20 were obtained which included agreement on thè construction of thè proposed railway from Jibuti, thè new capitai of thè £3te, to thè Ethiopian hinterland : thè effec tof this was to make Prendi Somaliland thè officia ioutlet for Ethiopia's trade. The Growth of Muslim brotberhoock Farther to thè south, though as yet only weakly establìshed, BEFOR EFOLLOWIN GSayyid Muhammad 'Abdìlle Hassan's Italy was determined to cling to her new Somali interests, and remarkable struggle to free his country from foreign dominatìon, forced, after her defeat at Adowa, to reach a boundary settlement it is necessary to pause for a moment to review thè social and acceptable to Ethiopia. This was negotìated by Major Nerazzini religious context in which thìs patriotic movement arose. Isiam who had earlier conducted with Menelik thè negotiations for thè in Somaliland has long been associated wìth thè brotherhoods or Italo-Ethiopian peace treaty.14 And although ìn that treaty tariqas (literally, *the Way') which express th'S Sufi, or mystìcal Menelik described himsclf as 'Emperor of Ethiopia and of thè view of thè Muslim faith, a view which, since it exalts thè charis- Galla countries', making no reference to his pretensions in matìc powers of saints, ìs particularly well adapted to thè Somali Somaliland, Italy was forced to reduce her claims to thè Ogaden clan system in which clan ancestors readìly become transposed into which Britain had accepted in thè Anglo-Italìan Protocol of 1894. Muslim saints. So well developed indeed had these religious In fact, thè Italian sphere was defined vaguely as lying within an orgaruzations become in thè nineteenth century, that thè Somali area up to i So miles from thè coast and running from thè bound- profession of thè faith was now synonymous with membership of, ary of thè British Protectorate to thè Juba River, north of Barderà. or more frequently, nominai attachment to a Sufi brotherhood. At thè time, when thè Italian position was so weak, this hasty The esoteric content of , however, was not strongly division of spheres of interest may have seemed advantageous to developed locally, although cadi religious Order had (and has) a both parties ; certaìnly in later years it fostered thè growth of a distinctive liturgy for ìts adherents to follow in their worship of tradìtion of uncertainty and conflict which led to thè Walwal God. Despite their common aim of promotìng religious as incident and Italo-Ethiopian war, and is stili unresolved. opposed to secular values, thè relations belween differen t Orders Nevertheless, for thè tìme being at least, France, Britaìn, and are charactemed by rivalry ccntrìng on thè respective religious Italy, had now pruned their Somali possessions to dìmensions merits and mystical powers of intercession of their founders, acceptable to Ethiopia, and thè stage was set for thè march of Generally, thè Orders have a loose hierarchical organisation, and locai events. For thè next twenty-three years these were dominated many, though not ali, Somali Sheikhs and men of religìon occupy by thè religious war against thè Christian 'ìnfidels' led by Sheikh positions of religious authority within thè Order which they Muhammad *Abdille Hassan in which Somali, who for thè most follow. part had so far seemed to accept those new imperiai developments More significantly, notwìthstanding their own rivalries, in theìr of which they had knowledge, fiercely strove to regain their lost membership and following thè brotherhoods cut across clan and ìndependence. tribal loyalties, seeking to substitute thè status of brother in 62 63 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-20 rcligìon for that of clansman, so that men \vho are divided by Juba and Shebelle rìvers. At this time, one of thè most important clan affilìation may share common adherence to thè same religious centres in thè north was Sheikh Maddar's (1825-1917) large Order. In this way, by their very nature, thè Muslim Orders con- Qadiriya settlement at Hargeisa amongst thè Habar Awal clan tribute to national unity through Isiam and seek to overcome thè containing representatives of most of thè Isaq clans, This was a sectional rivalries which separate men in their secular activities. haven of peace in a turbulent area, strategically placed at thè However, given thè circumstances of Somali Hfe and society in intersection of thè caravan routes leadìng from thè coast to which, lacking any large centralized politicai units, thè only thè Ogaden.* Other Qadiriya settlements were established in thè security was provided by small bands of kinsmen, thè loyalties Ogaden itself, while others again lay farther south in Somalia. of kin and clan remained paramount. Thus thè transcendental Ahmadiya centres were similarly widely distributed; and, outside appeal to unity through Isiam which thè Orders preached, these locai settlements, almost thè entìre Somali population was although it found a response in thè cultural nationalism of thè divided in religious affiliation between thè two Orders. Somali, remained only a potential force overridden by thè more Competìtion between thè two brotherhoods was considerably restricted politicai realities of everyday life. Indeed it was only increased when thè militant Salihiya branch of thè Ahmadiya realìzed, and then only partially, in a few religious communitìes Order, founded at Mecca by Sayyid Muhammad Salih(i85 3-1917), and teaching centres established usually in those regions where was introduced into Somaliland towards thè end of thè nineteenth thè brethren could support themselves by cultivation and cattle- century. It was to this reformist and puritanicaj movement that rearìng. Elsewhere, thè Orders merely provided, as for thè most thè Somali Sheikh Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan belonged, and part they stili do today, a congregational basis for worship; and under its banner he developed thè campaìgn to free hìs country in ali large settlements of population each brotherhood has usually of 'infide!' dominion. jts own mosque. Historically, thè first Order to be introduced into Somaliland was thè Qadiriya, thè oldest Order in Isiam, founded in Baghdad Tto rise of SayyìdM.uhamm(id 'Abdiì/e Hassan w.here its origìnator Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilanì died in A.D. Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan, according to his family's records,' 1166. It is not yet certain when thè Qadiriya carne to Somaliland, was born on 7 Aprii, 1864, at a small watering-place between but by thè nineteenth century ìt was strongly established and had Wudwnd and Bohotle in thè Dulbahante country of thè eastern splìt into two powerful locai branches, one associated with thè part of thè British Somaliland Protectorate. His grandfather, name of Sheikh *Abd ar-Rahman Seyla *i who died in thè Ogaden in Shcikh Hassan Nur, of thè Ogaden clan, had left his homeland 1883, and thè other with that of Sheikh Uways Muhammad who lo settle amongst thè Dulbahante in 1826 and had marrìed there. was assassinated in 1909. The former branch held sway in thè At thè early age of seven, Muhammad began to learn thè Quran north, in thè British Protectorate and thè Ogaden; while thè latter under a locai teacher, and by thè age of ten, when his grandfather was entrenched in thè Benadir and south of Somalia. The other died, could read thè Quran and became his teacher's assistant. main Order of importance locally is thè Ahmadiya, founded at Some five years later, having decided to dedicate his life to religìon, Mecca in Arabia, by Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris ai-Fasi (1760-1837). he set up as a teacher on his own account, and by thè early age of Thìs modera reformist movement with its sudsidiary branches nineteen had won thè title of 'sheikh' for his learning and piety. had, by thè end of thè nineteenth century come to rivai that of About this time Sheikh Muhammad left his home to travel thè longer established Qadiriya.1 widely in scardi of learning, visiting, as was customary, such Between them, these two Orders had by 1900 a score of locai seats of Isiam as Harar, and Mogadishu - where a tree, in permanent community settlements scattered throughout Somali- whose shade he ìs said to have prayed regularly, is remcmbered land, but concentrateci mainly in thè fertile regions between thè In this day: healso travelledasfarafielda sthèSudanandNairobì.

64 65 THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-20 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA Sheikh 'Abdille Arusi, remarking, it is said, that he marvelled at Some nine years or so passed thus, devoted to learning and teach- thè strength of thè town's foundations which had prevented ing. About 1891 he returned to his home amongst his mother's Berbera from being turned upside down. To this veiled comment people, thè Dulbahante, and there married a woman of his own on his lack of immediate success in gaining adherents, Sheìkh clan, thè Ogaden. Three years later, in company with thirteen other Muhammad replìed that indeed thè townwas blessed in possessing sheikhs and friends, Sheikh Muhamtnad set out to go on pil- strong religious foundations. However, Sheikh Muhammad urged grimage to Mecca and spent about a year in Arabia, visiting also - that whereas formerly he had followed Sheikh f Abdille Arusi, it is said - thè Hejaz and Palestine. At Mecca, Sheikh Muhammad now he exhorted his teacher to follow him and share thè blessings met Sayyid Muhammad Salih and fell under thè speli of his of thè new Order. teaching. Consequently having joined thè Salihiya Otder, thè Not long after this very characterìstic Somali inquisitìon which Sheikh returned to Somaliland to preach its message, and settled had made clear to thè leadets of thè established Qadirìya thè for a time at Berbera where he married his second wife. Here with rcvolutionary character of Sheìkh Muhammad 'Abdìlle's rnessage, tnessianìc zeal he taught and preached, denouncing smoking, thè thè Sheikh carne into contact with thè French Roman Catholic chewìng of thè stimulant Kat plant,* and generally condemning ali mìssion^which had opened a statìon in thè north of thè Protec- eccessive indulgence and luxury and exhortìng his countrymen to toratc in 1891. This was origìnally at Berbera, but had now moved return to thè strict path of Muslim devotion, to Daìmole, inland on thè road towards Sheikh.»The story goes Sheikh Muhammad's actìvities and his enthusiasm for thè new that Sheikh Muhammad met a boy at thè mìssion school and Salihiya Order attracted considerable attention in this port where usked him his name. To hìs amazement and wrath, thè boy thè majority were staunch adherents of thè older Qadiriya replied 'John 'Abdillàhi*. Another account relates that thè Sheikh brotherhood. Tradition records that about 1897 a colloquy of met a party of boys from thè missìon who when asked what clan sheikhs and religious leaders was held to discuss Sheikh Muham- thcy belonged to - thè stock Somali inquiiy to elicìt someone's mad's theological position and to examine his aims. The meeting idcntity ,replied *the clan of thè Fathers* (in Somali, reer faddar}, took piace in thè house of one of thè leadìng notables of Berbera. thus apparently denyìng theìr Somali identity (many of thè boys Amongst those present were Sheikh Muhammad*s fortner teacher, were actually orphans), Sheikh *Abdille Arusi, and Sheikh Maddar, head of thè Qadiriya However apocryphal these accounts may sound to modern community at Hargeìsa. Sheikh Maddar, it is recorded, opened thè ears, in Somali terms they are highly credible, and without doubt proceedìngs by asking Sheikh Muhammad thè name of thè Order they commemorate encounters with thè mission which served to which he followed. Sheikh Muhzmmad replied, apparently, by confimi Sheikh Muhammad's belief that Chrìstìan colonìzation remarkìng that it was laid down in Isiam that for each generation sought to destroy thè Muslim faith of his people, This fired his God had provided one pre-eminent saint (thè quth al-%aman\d patriotism and he intensified his effort sto win support for thè that for his generation this was his master Sayyid Muhammad Salihiya, preaching in thè mosques and streets that hìs country was Salih whose *Way* he was teaching. Sheikh Maddar agreed that it in danger, and urging his compatriots to remove thè Englìsh was thè orthodox teaching that each generation had its great saint 'infidels ' and their missionaries. He also inveighed against thè of Isiam, but reminded Sheikh Muhammad that whoever he practice of drìnking alcohol which thè foreigners had introduced. followed, and whatever he preached, God would judge him At first there was considerable resistance to his cali, especially on according to thè strict ordinances of thè Divine Law. This, of thè part of thè Qadirìya who resented Sheikh Muhammad's course, was a warning not to transgress thè law of Isiam, and carne messianic claims for thè Salihiya, and his ìmplication that their from one renowned for his piety and strict devotion. Order - whose founder had died so long ago - was no longer Other members of thè assembly then called upon Sheikh cndowcd with spiritual life and vìgour. At thè same time, under Muhammad to prove thè power of his new Order with a sign, 6? 66 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT POR FREEDOM : 1900-20 thè new and very modest Brìtish rule of thè coast, commerce was and gratuitously savage raids of Ethiopian military parties from flourishing (some 70,000 head of sheep, were being exported Harar were provoking strong resentment and creating a situation annually to Aden) and many of thè traders and merchants of in which a number of leading Somali sheìkhs ìn thè area were Berbera consequently were too content with their prosperìty and exhorting their congregations to mount a holy war against thè too intent on improving it further to listen to Sheikh Muhammad's encroaching 'infidels'.* That Sheikh Muhammad should now seek uncompromising message. to marshal these currents of patriotìc fervour and give this aim In these circumstances in 1898 Sheikh Muhammad *AbdÌlle cfìcctive leadership seemed likely. In Aprii 1899, he was officially withdrew to his materna! home amongst thè Dulbahante who, un- reported to have at his command a force of some 3,000 men. In like thè Isaq and Dir clans in thè west and centre of thè Pro- August, thè news was that he was solicitìng thè Isaq Habar Tol tectorate, had no treaty with thè British, and there built a mosque Ja'lo and Habar Yunis clans for support. To forward this aim, with a Salihiya teaching centre. He also travelled widely amongst Sheikh Muhammad succeeded in making peace between these two thè pastoralìsts preaching his cause and warning his countrymen ckns and his maternal kìnsmen, thè Dulbahante. And with this that thè Qiristian mìssionaries would destroy their religion. At tichicved ,a great assembly was held at Burao amongst thè Habar thè same time, he acquired a wide reputation as a peace-maker in Yunis and Habar Tol Ja'lo. Here with a force estimated to number inter-clan strire and his remarkable gifts as a poet began to be l.ooo at his command, Sheikh Muhammad formally deckred a recognized thus further enhancing hìs fame. He also began to holy war against thè Chrìstian colonizers - partisularly against thè gather weapons - mainly spears and bows and arrows at this Hritis hand Ethiopians. Most of thè Burao assembly supported thè time - and collected donatìons of livestock and money to support Shcìkh's cali to arms, but thè Sultan of thè Habar Yunìs was not his campaign. ctuhusiastic .Sheikh Muhammad, however, such was thè popular In 1899, a small party of thè Administration's tribal constabulary mippor tfor his movement at this time, managed to persuade thè - known as Illalos (from thè Somali, Illaali to watch over) visited I Ubar Yunis to depose their clan-head appointing in his stead one thè sheikh and one of them surrendered his rifle for, it is said, four more favourable to thè cause. Some dramatic act was now called camels. On their return to Berbera, thè Illalos reported, perhaps for and this was supplied by a raid on two religious settlements of mendaciously, that Sheikh Muhammad had stolen a rifle and thè A «mal ibrandi of thè Ahmadiya Order whìch displayed little Consul sent a curt letter requesting its return. Sheikh Muhammad emhusiasm for Sheikh Muhammad's jihad. This caused some replied equally curtly, with what amounted to a declaration of consternation, and an onslaught upon Berbera itself was reported defiance , Shortly after this equivocai ìncident, thè Sheikh held to bc imminent. a large assembly amongst thè Dulbahante calling upon men from Adminìstrative reports claìmed that Sheikh Muhammad had every section of thè clan to join him in his crusade against thè now assumed thè title of Mandi** . But although widespread public infidels. With Httle vested ìnterest in Berbera's trade, and hardly «warcnes sof earlier events in thè Sudan, and sympathy for their any direct experience of thè British coast administration, thè co-religionists there, was certainly a contributory factor in thè rise Dulbahante had less qualms than thè rich Isaq merchants of thè of Sheikh Muhammad's campaign, there is no independent evid- coast and many flocked to join Sheikh Muhammad. These recruits ence that he ever in fact claimed this title. Indeed, according to ali to what was rapidly assuming thè character of a military crusade rcliable Somali sources, and thè evidence of his letters and poems, wcre issued with white turbans and a Muslìm rosary. he called himself 'Sayyìd* by which title, or more simply as Ina Rumours were now cìrculating that Sheikh Muhammad was ' Abdille Hassan (thè Somali equivalent of thè Arabie ìbn "Andille) collecting arms and men and preparing to lead an expedition into he is universally remembered throughout Somaliland today. His Ethiopia. A decade previously, English explorers and travellers followers ,in turn, soon became known everywhere in thè country traversing thè Ogaden had noted how thè increasìngly far-flung simply as 'The Dervishes', thè term 'dervisV being applied in

68 69 THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA tìon was so consìderable that thè Sayyid prudently withdrew to Somaliland generally to thè adherents of thè Salihiya Order. his own paternal kinsmen thè Ogaden, where he married a daughtei On i September, 1899, thè British Consul-General for thè coast of one of thè most prominent elders of thè clan. This device of received a letter from thè Sayyid accusing thè British of oppressing contracting politicai alliances by marriages was one which he was Isiam and denouncing those who obeyed or co-operated with thè to employ frequently hi thè course of his campaign. Administration as liars and slanderers. The letter also contaìned Although he was of Ogaden descent, however, his home had thè challenge: 'Now choose for yourselves. If you want war, we not previously been amongst them, and some members of thè clan accept it; but if you want peaee, pay thè fine.*" The Consul- decìded that they wished to have nothing to do with thè Sayyid General replied by proclaiming Sayyid Muhammad a rebel, and and plotted to kill him. But, as in subsequent attempts on his life, urged his government in London to prepare an expedition against thè news leaked out and Sayyid Muhammad confronted thè ring- thè Dervishes. Thus thè opening moves in thè long-drawn out Icaders and succeeded in rousing sudi public indignation against conflict were completed wìth thè officia idenùnciatlon as a 'rebel* them that he was able to have them summarily executed. On this of one who, belonging to thè Ogaden clan over which Éthiopia occasion these sterri measures, in thè current situation of Ethio- claimed but did not exercìse sovereignty, and whose maternal pian menace, served not to alienate thè Ogaden but to win hìm kinsmen (thè Dulbahante) amongst whom he lived had no treaty further support. Rifles and ammunition ìmported through thè with England, was surely most doubtfully cìassed as a British Frcnch port of Jibuti and thè ports of thè Majerteyn coast, were subject. now reachìng thè Dervishes in quantity and this greatly increased their morale and prestige. With these resources, trading caravans traversìng thè Ogaden country were systematically looted by thè Thè Holy War; thè first campaìgns Dervishes, and a hurriedly assembled Ethiopian expedition sent The scene was now set for thè twenty-years Dervish struggle out to dea! with thè situation failed to locate thè Dervishes and against thè British, Ethiopian, and Italian colonizers who had so dissipated ìts energies in looting camels and other livestock recently established themselves in Somali territory. After thè indiscriminately. This, of course, only further inflamed Ogaden Consul-General's proclamation, thè Sayyid and his followers fcclings against thè Ethiopians, and Sayyid Muhammad found moved from Burao to collect - according to .British reports by littlc difficult yin organizing a force some 6,000 strong which in threats and violence - more supporters from thè Habar Yunis clan. March 1900 stormed the^Ethiopian post at Jigj ìga and recovered ali Towards thè end of September, 1899 ,thè Dervishes returned to thè looted stock. This engagement thè Ethiopians claimed as a thè watering-place of Bohotle where some of thè Dulbahante vìctory; but in reality, although thè Dervishes suffered heavy deserted them. About this rime Garad'Ali Farah, hereditary leader casualties and withdrew, they had achieved their object and estab- of one of thè two main sections of thè Dulbahante sent a letter of lished beyond doubt that they were a force to be reckoned with. loyalty to thè Consul-General at Berbera asking for help against In contrast with thè traditional position of men of religion in thè Dervishes, A sìmilar message was also dispatched to Boqor interna iSomali affairs , Sayyìd Muhammad had now becomé a 'Isman, thè formìdable hereditary leader of thè powerful Majerteyn politicai leader, a position which he was cnabled to fulfi lwhile clan at Bender Qasim. This action, presumably, was taken in an stili retaining his religious ròle in thè tircumstances of thè wider effor tby thè Dulbahante leader to preserve his tradìtional autho- conflict between Muslim Somali and Christian colonìxers. He rity. Whatever thè reasons, thè Sayyid's response when thè news and his followers were now, moreover, in undisputed command leaked out was characteristically prompt, A party of Dervishes of thè Ogaden and to show their strength a force of about a was dispatched to assassinate thè Garad, an action which turned thousand Dervish cavalry raided one of thè Isaq ckns in June out to be a miscalculation for it immediately provoked a further carrying off 2,000 camels in loot. This daring attack, which took substantial withdrawal of Dulbahante support. Indeed, thè reac- A MOW-ÌRN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM : 1900-20 advantage of thè long-standing conflict over grazing between thè 3 That he should enjoy religious liberty; and, Isaq and Ogadcn clans, causcd consternation in tne British 4 That he should have freedom to trade. Protectorate, and thè protected clans withdrew from their summer grazing areas in and near thè Ogaden to their northern These conditions were acceptedandatreaty was signcdby thè Sayyid winter quarters which soon became perilously overcrowded. and Cav. G. Pestalozza, thè ItaUan Consul from Aden, at Illig on The Protectorate authorities realized that immediate actìon had 5 March, 1905. Sayyid Muhammad had agreed to remain at peace to be taken; for if thè situation vere allowed to continue, thè with Italy, Britain, and Ethìopia, and to accept Italian protectioh Isaq clans concerned would be forced to choose between coming - for what it was worth - being allocated a wedge of territory to terms with thè Dervishes and starvation for their livestock and between thè lands of thè northern Majerteyn Sultanate, and thè themselves. Sultanate of Obbia to thè south. Although thus banished from thè In thè circumstances, thè Ethìopian Emperor Menelik proposed British Somaliland Protectorate, by agreement between thè British joint action and Lt-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne who with his brother and Italian go vernments, thè Sayyid and his followers were granted (H. G. C. Swayne) had had considerale experience in thè Pro- grazing and watering rights for their livestock within thè Pro- tectorate was appointed to organize a British expeditionary force. tectorate up to thè wells at Halìn, Hudin, Togale, and Danod (thè The onset of thè rains delayed preparatìons, but on 22 May, 1901, last of which, incidentally, lay outside British territory in thè Swayne's force consistlng of a Somali levy 1,500 strong with Ogaden). twenty-one officer sof thè British and Indìan armies set out from This somewhat lame conclusion to thè third and fourth British Burao which at thìs time was stili unadminìstered/The operations expeditions which together had cost some five and a half million agaìnst Sayyid Muhammad, who was soon dubbed *The Mad pounds recognized that thè Dervishes had not been completely Mullah', had begun. Their course which, until thè outbreak of thè eliminated, but assumed that they no longer constituted any Great War in 1914, kept British war correspondents busy as well serìous threat. Or so at least it was convenient to thìnk. And in thè as providing aa excitìng field for adventurous British soldiers, meantime, Sayyid Muhammad and his surviving adherents had has been fully recorded elsewhere7 and need only be summarized been established as a kind of small theocratic state, sandwiched here. Between 1900 and 1904 - with from time to time active between thè powerful northern Majerteyn under Eoqor 'Isman, Ethiopian support and Italian co-operation - four major expedi- and thè southern Majerteyn and Hawiye who recognized thè tions were mounted. These though resisted bravely and brilliantly Sultan of Obbia, Yusuf "Ali Kenadid. Both these latter were under by thè daring guerilla tactics of thè Dervishes, who secured a Italian protection, directed from thè Italian Consulate at Aden, number of notable victories (such as that at Gumburu Hill on and subjec t to little dìrect control or interference except that 17 Aprii, 1903, when 9 British officers and 189 men were kìlled), provided by thè periodical visits of Italian gunboats along thè had by thè dose of 1904 so reduced thè Dervish strength and coast. To thè west, between Sayyid Muhammad and his followers morale that Sayyid Muhammad, who had evaded ali attempts at and thè British 'friendly* clans subject to effectiv econtrol from capture, agreed to a peace. Berbera, thè Dulbahante and Warsangeli provided a conveniSnt if He had now prudently wìthdrawn into thè Italian Majerteyn insecure buffer .At least thè British could congratulate themselves protectorate, where there was no resident Italian administrative on having transferred their stormy opponent to thè custody of officiai, and which was controlied stili from thè Italian Consulate at their allies thè Italiana, and both powers hastened to divest them- Aden. The Sayyid stipulated four main conditions: selves of any responsibìlity for thè Sayyìd's actions towards thè Ethiopians by a supplementary Anglo-Italian agreement of 19 1 That he should ha ve a fixed residence on Italian territory; March, 1907." 2 That he should govern his follo wers; While it is not difficul tto understand British satìsfaction, how-

73 A MO.DERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-2*0 ever guarded, at thè condusion of this arrangement, thè Italian fire, constituted so formidable a weapou. Haji 'Abdallah Sheheri of readiness to assume cven such Umited responsibilities as they had thè Habar Tol Ja'lo clan who had hitherto acted as thè Sayyid's done for thè Sayyid requires some explanation. It ìs possible that, agent at Aden, and had played an important part in thè negotìa-r even at this early date, thè Dervìshes were tegarded hopetully as a tions with thè Italian Consul Pestalozza leading to thè Illig treaty, potential aid to thè extension of Italian interests into thè Ethio- had gradually come to lose faith in thè Dervish mission. He was pian sphere. But, ptobably of more significance, is thè fact that thus readily persuaded by thè Italian authorìtìes to partìcipate in a Britain had in January 1905 enabled Italy to convert her lease of mission to Sayyid Muhammad Salih, thè founder and head of thè thè Benadir coast from thè Sultan of Zatrabar into an outright Salìhiya Order, which obtained from this religious dignìtary a purchase conferring fall rights of possession. In any event, thè letter referring to Muhammad *Abdille Hassan's reported viola- explanation given at thè time to thè Italian parlìament by Tommaso tions of Islamic law and threatening to repudiate him if he did not Tittoni, thè Minister tesponsible, was that thè Illig agreement mend his ways. The contents of this somewhat mìld denuncìation estabttshìngpeacefulrelationsbetweenltaly and Sayyid Muhammad were widely publicized by thè British and Italians and thè letter wouìd greatly facilitate thè extension of Italian authority in thè itself was delivered to thè Sayyid at his headquarters in March, Benadir. Events were soon to show how thoroughly mistaken 1909."*° this appreciation of thè situation was. It appears likely that thìs manceuvre was joìntly engineered by thè British and Italian authorìties, although there is little doubt alsothat Haji'Abdallah Sheheri, like many other former adherents, Prora Illig to Taleb an now regarded thè Dervishes as fanatics wjio paid scant attention The peace lasted until 1908,' Sayyid Muhammad ostensibly to thè ordinances of Isiam or thè rules of thè Salihiya Order. Yet icspecting thè terms of thè Illig agreement while using this period although this move undoubtedly had some efféct ,so great was thè of respite to recoup bis strength and influente. A widespread personal charìsmatic power of Sayyid Muhammad, and his reputa- network of spies and agents were operating in thè British Pro- tion as a quìte unique figure in Somali eyes so thoroughly estab- tectorate, seeking to undermine thè loyalty of thè clans and to lished, that thè damage to his position was by no means such as to attract them to thè Dervish cause. At thè same time, Sayyid seriously weaken his movement. The situation indeed called for Muhammad was pursuing a minoi and rather desultory wai more direct actìon. against Yusuf 'Ali, thè Sultan of Obbia who, though changeable But having already expended large sums of money totally out and equìvoca! in his attachments, was during this period generally of proportion to their limited interest in thè Somali coast, thè hostile to thè Dervishes, Not so thè Warsangeli clan within thè British government decided that before any further military British Protectorate on thè eastern coast, who, under theìr spirited operations were undertaken a new appraìsal of thè whole situation leader Garad Mahamud 'Ali Shirre {a. 1960), had now decided to was necessary. A fresh opinìon, it was felt, was called for; and to throw in their lot with thè Dervishes and in January 1908 fired on supply thìs General Sir Keginald Wingate, Governor-General of a British dhow as it was landing on their coast. This incident thè Sudan, was appointed to visit Somaliland to assess thè situa- provoked a hostile exchange of letters with thè Consul at Berbera tion and if possible to treat directly with Sayyid Muhammad. In and it was evìdent that thè Dervishes would soon be on thè march this latter respect thè "Wingate mission was singularly unsuccessful, again. and having considered its report, which was never published, thè Meanwhile, before thè next round of battles, thè British Ad- British government decided to cut its losscs and embark upon a ministration was presented with a convenient opportunity of new policy of coastal concentration. In 1910, accordingly, thè countering thè formidablebarrageof propaganda unleashed against Administration withdrew to thè coast evacuating thè interior - ìt by thè Sayyid, whose scathing poems, which spread like wild- little of which was in any case under stable civil rule - and arming

74 75 THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-2.0 . A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA The coastal Administration, deprived of effective military re- thè Isaq clans - thè 'friendlies* as they were called - thus leaving sources and greatly reduced in prestige, was totally incapable of them to protect themselves against thè Dervishes. Such mìsgiv- restoring order : and thè Dervishes were again on thè move, and ings as were felt by thè Administration were soothed by thè con- receiving a great access of new adherents, in circumstances whìch venient assumption that, if left undisturbed, thè situation would were peculiarly favourable to them. The new policy clearly was a throw up a leader capable of rallying support against thè Dervishes. That thè Dulbahante were left utterly unprotected was considered complete failure. By thè end of 1912, when it was officially reckoned that perhaps justified in view of thè fact that they had no treaty with thè British. a third of thè Protectorate's population had perished in thè *Time This, however, had not prevented Britain in thè past from regarding of eating filth', as it is known to Somali, British policy again thè Dulbahante as part of thè Somalìland Protectorate when it changed and thè Administration was authorized to raìse a locai was convenient to do. so. mounted carnei constabulary. This force which was to polke thè This vain hope was based on a quite mistaken appreciatìon of immediate hìnterland was organìzed under thè command of thè situation, for it assumed that Sayyid Muhammad was merely a Richard Corfield and soon proved highly successful, its mobility regular, if rather outstandìng, clan or trìbal leader whose politicai and tactics being well adapted to thè needs and conditions of thè róle lay in thè field of internai Somali clan politics. The truth of country. The people, besides, had for thè time being had sufficient course was, on thè contrary, that thè Sayyid occupìed a unique of unlimited violence and welcomed the^restoration of order. position as a national figure appealing to thè patriotic sentiments Hence, in quìte a short tìme thè new Carnei Constabulary was able of Somali as Muslìms irrespective of their clan or lineage allegi- to bring conditions back to something lìke normality in thè west ance. It is trae that internai clan rìvalries weakened thè Dervish and centre of thè Protectorate - thè Dervishes meanwhile movement, and that its compulsive appeal was also restricted by remaining in thè cast. Corfield received carefui and detailed in- thè divisions between opposing religious orders. But even thè structions that his duties were to police thè immediate hinterland, deeply alienated adherents of thè Qadiriya Order could hardly be and that he was on no account to attack thè Sayyid's forces. This, expected to rally in strength against thè Sayyid, for this would however, was not an easy task, since thè Dervishes periodically have required them openly to assume thè róle of thè Christian raided thè clans under his protection. colonizers, and would greatly have detracted from their religious It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that eventually a situation status. It was one thing to fight at British instìgatìon against co- arose where, after a fierce Dervish raid, Corfield and his constabu- religionists ; but to band together specifically for thè purpose of lary were in a position to give chase. Thus in August 1913, dis- destroying thè Dervishes was another matter. Moreover, such rcgardìng his instructions, Corfield courageously if impetuously unity against thè Sayyid and his followers as had existed under thè moved out from Burao in pursuit of a large Dervish force which British leadership had caused internai clan jealousies and antag- he engaged at Dulmadobe in thè cast of thè Protectorate. This rash onìsms to be temporarily bottled up ; and now that thè British action cost Corfield his lifc and both sides suffered very serious had gone, and free supplies of arms were available, thè urge to casualties. The result, which was announced on newspaper hoard- abandon this strained peace was overwhelming, ings in London as 'Horrible disaster to our troops in Somaliland*, Consequently, far from throwing up a leader to lead thè friend- has been immortalized in Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan's lies against thè Dervishes, thè clans now launched into a frenzied savagely brilliant poem *The Death of Richard Corfield'. 11 Despite pursuit of old scores and feuds, and thè interior of thè country this set-back, howcver, thè effectiveness of thè Carnei Constabu- lapsed into a state of unparalleled confusion and chaos. Soon indeed lary, which was now considerably enlarged, continued to increase situation was so desperate that a large of thè popu- thè proportion and served, with from time to time additional military support, lation was reduced to a state bordering on starvation, and food to keep thè Dervishes at bay until their final defeat in 1920. was so scarce that people had to eat rats and other unclean animala. 77 A MODHKN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-20 In thè meantime, several ncw factors of significance entered thè thè -world, wìth harlots, with wastrels, and with slaves, because situation during thè Great War. The ill-fated pro-Muslitn prince you are so weak. But ìf you were strong you would have stood by Uj Yasu became Emperor of Ethiopìa in December 1913, and yourself as we do, independent and free. It is a sign of your weak- moved his court from to Harar araongst his Muslim ness, this alliance of yours with Somali, menials, and Arabs, and subjects with whom his sympathies lay. With thè not-dìsinterested Sudanese, and Kaffirs ,and Perverts, and Yemenis, and Nubians, support of thè Turkish and German Consuls in Ethiopia, thè new and Indians, and Baluchis, and French, and Russians, and Ameri- Emperor conceived thè aim of creating a vast Muslim Empire in cans, and Italìans and Serbians, and Portuguese, and Japanese, N.E. Africa. To this end he entered into relations wìth Sayyid and Greeks and cannibais and Sìkhs and Banyans, and Moors, and Muhammad, probably supplying him with financial aid and arms, Afghans, and Egyptians. They are strong, and it is because of your and arranged for a German mechanic called Emil Kirsch to join weakness that you have to solicìt as does a prostitute.*1* thè Dervishes and work for them as an armourer at their new head- Throughout thè period 1914-18, on account of theìr military quarters at Taleh where a formidable ring of fortresses had been commitments elsewhere, thè British could do little more than built by Yemeni masons. Ecfore his pathetically unsuccessful bìd continue their defensive operations on a modest scale, However, for freedom from his exacting masters, Kirsch served thè Der- in February 1915, thè capture of thè Dervish fort at Shimberberis vishes well. And it is a measure of thè amazing resourcefulness and left a considerable gap in thè Sayyid's network of advanced posts eflectiveness of thè Dervish tactics that, with thè services of only and there were other minor successes. At thè same time, thè British one professional armourer for a restricted period, they could so blockade of thè coast had become thoroughly effettive, greatly successfully resìst thè long serìes of costly British operations. reducìng thè Dervish supply of arms and ammunìtion, so that, by Apait from Kirsch's services, thè extent of Turko-German sup- thè end of thè Great War, thè locai admìnistration judged that thè port received by thè Dervishes has not yet been fully elucidated moment was ripe to mount another expedition. This London althoughit seems tohave been rather nominai. However, in 1917, finally agreed to, and at thè beginning of 1920 a carefully planned thè Italian Administration of Somalia ìntercepted a document from combined aìr, sea, and land attack was launched which at last thè Turkish government which assured thè Sayyid of support and routed thè Dervishes. The formidable stronghold at Taleh was named him Emir of thè Somali nation. But thè Turks were in no bombed and Sayyid Muhammad forced to flee into thè Ogaden position to gìve effec tto this belated attempt to revive their old where, with characteristic fortitude, he proceeded to reorganize claims to thè Somali coast. his scattered followers and seek new recruits. As on several occa- Nevertheless, thè Sayyid himself, on thè basis that one's sions previously, thè Governor at Berbera now sent a message to enemies' enemìes are one's frìends, certainly greeted thè news of Sayyid Muhammad calling upon him to surrender and offering Turko-German successes with satisfactìon, although he firmly him a free pardon. The reply which was made in March was repudiated any suggestion that their help was essential to his ambiguous, neìther accepting nor rejecting thè British terms. campaign. The following extract from a letter received by thè It was then decided to dispatch a peace delegatìon of leading British Commissioner at Berbera in March, 1917, expressed his Isaq elders and religious dignitaries, including Sheikh Sìaddar's views in no uncertain fashion : son, Sheikh 'Abdìllahi, representing thè Qadiriya Order. AIso of 'And you know, and I know, what thè Turks bave done to you thè party was Sheikh Isma*il Sheikh Isaq of thè Dulbahante clan, and what thè Germans have done to you, you of thè British officia i representative of Sayyid Muhammad Salih in horthern Government. The suggestion is that I was weak and had to look Somaliland. Like many another, this religious leader had played, outside for friends ; and if,' indeed, this were true and I had to look apparently, a somewhat equivocai iòle in thè intricate politics of for assistance, it is only because of thè British, and thè trouble you thè period. He is said to have clandestinely supported thè Sayyid, have given me. It is you who have joined with ali thè peoples of but appears also to have been a party to thè Salihlya letter from 78 79 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM : 1900-20 Mecca denouncing thè Dervishes. With this distinguishcd compo- mission to falfil amongst his people whose ancient belief in Isiam sition thè party set off in some trepidation to treat wìth thè Sayyid. he saw as perìlously threatened by Christian colonization. It was They were authorized to persuade Sayyid Muhammad to surrender this realization which fired his patriotism and convinced him that oa die understandìng that he would be allowed to cstablìsh a thè first ideai would never be realized until his people were free. religious settlement in thè west of thè Protectorate and thete, under Thus thè national movement which he felt himself called upon to thè watchful eye of thè Administratìon, live in peace. . inspire was primarily a means to an end, To argue, as has been After a series of alarming audiehces in which they were treated customary in thè past, that Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdìlle Hassan with conterapt and submitted to many degradations, they returned used religion merely as a cloak to advance his own personal to report to thè Admìnistration that Sayyid Muhammad had aggrandizement ìs to make a cheap and shallow assessment which rejected thè offe r of sutrendet with .haughty disdain. Almost thè facts do not warrant. immediately afterwards, a Dervish force attacked Isaq clansmen Yet, although he never lost sight of his primary purpose as his grazing their livestock near thè Ethiopian border. Despite their many religious poems and unpublished theological works testify, very heavy losses, thè Dervishes were evidently not yet reduced to thè pressure of circumstances made it ìnevitable that he should defeat. However, this attack aroused fierce Isaq resentment, and become increasingly preoccupied with thè otganization and mili- thè outraged clans sought and gained thè sanction of thè Adminìs- tary needs of thè Dervishes. The theocratic rule which he estab- tration for a massive tribal onslaught on thè new Dervìsh head- lished, founded on a rigid interpretation of thè Shafi'ì school of quarters in thè Ogaden. The Dervishes suffere da very heavy Islamic law, despite thè fact that he allocated many civil and defeat, but as on so many previous occasions, thè Sayyid himself military responsibilities to thè ablest of his adherents, remained and a few companions eluded capture and made good their escape always personal in quality and never developed into a strongly to Imi on thè upper reaches of thè Shebelle River in Ethiopìa. hierarchical organkation. He did not establish, nor does he appear Arriving here in Òctober 1920, thè Sayyid and his followers built to have desired to establish a theocratic state which would survìve thirteen new forts and unsuccessfully sought officia iEthiopian him. He had no successor, many Salihiya followers did not support protection. This was their last gesture, however, for a few weeks him, and he did not claim to be Sayyid Muhammad Salih's sole later Sayyid Muhammad succumbed to an attack of influenza (or representative in Somaliland. Thus, although his organization malaria) and died on 21 December, 1920, at thè age of fifty-six. perished with his death, thè Salihiya brotherhood which had Thus, in thè words of one Somali chronicleof Sayyid Muhammad's existed outside his movement as well as within it, continued on campaign, 'ended thè life of thè man who had fought great odds*. afterwards and greatly expanded in scope. Nor, probabìy despite Of his many children from his numerous marriages only nine boys his great gifts of leadership, could he have founded a. stable and one daughter survived him. theocratic state. It was difficul tenough to create a highly fluid and loosely organized national movement. And what is remarkable is not that this collapsed with his death, but that he ever succeeded in Sayyid Mithatfffffad's movement and his aehievewents establìshing it at ali. Whatever his detractors have claimed, and notwithstanding thè For despite such favourable factors as thè ìrritant of Christian undoubtedly tyrannical character of his mie ultimately, there is no mission activity and thè hostile and zenophobic reaction of Somali question that Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan's burning passion was to multiple colonization, thè obstacles inherent in thè very fabric to quìcken his countrymen's devotion to Isiam and to secure of Somali society which he had to seek to surmount were fbrmìd- universal and absolute adherence to ali thè ordinances of their able. Since Ahmad Gran*s wars against Abyssinia in thè sixteenth faith. To him thè Salihiya brotherhood was thè *way ' through century there had been no tradition of politicai unity on anything which this was to be achieved. He had thus a deeply felt approaching a national basis such as thè Sayyid sought to inspire.

80 Si THE DERVISH FIGHT POR FREEDOMl 1900-20 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA it was tiot sutprisìngly from his paterna! dansmen of thè Darod Particularistic clan rivalries and jealousies rooted in family that hìs most enduring support carne, This was partly of thè eternai struggle for access to pasture and v fortuìtous, however, sìnce thè Isaq who ptoved generally less strongly entrenched to admit of thè possibiUty * ready to follow thè Sayyid lay much more firmly withia thè Britìsh co-o^ation. Indeed, even in Swayne's well-mforme d an,d usu sphere of effectìve contro!. Neverthcless, fot thìs betrayal of his shre'd judgement, in thè last decade of thè cause, as he regarded it, thè Sayyid never fotgave thè Isaq and ^^^ regularly berated them in his poetic polemics, saying of them in one famous poetn; "The fate of thè Isaq is to remain forevcr as stupid ^—!isr&; , , -. r^_ ^^^'rrrtf had not as donkeys.* While recourse to these tactics was necessary in building up his followìng, within thè Dervish ranks thè Sayyid sought to apply Sayyid Muhammad. Islamic law, enforcing thè law of talion and ignoring thè tradi- And there is no doubt whatsoever, that . eJJeace of favourable factors, these in ^emsekes woul d hav tional Somali practice of treating delicts according to theìr clan proved insufficien twithout thè leadership of such a perso natta context, Thus amongst his followers he sttove to replace tradì- Sayyid .It was more than anything else his magnete P«sonal»ty, tional clan loyalties by allegiance to his cause, and thè Dervish his ruthlessness and his complete ntter defian e of forces were organized into units large^ly on a non-clao basis. ^ ^ Another striking innovation was that women wcre sometirnes enemies, that appealed to thè Somali mmd and deeply ^ Ithè imaginakon of a people who with ali the,r «aditional democracy, traìned as -warriors, and a few were even mounted on horseback. Sre, above ali else, unswerving strength of Purpo e * adu n Ali thè daily prayers and calendrical ceremonies of Isiam were wavering determination. Tyrannkal he rmght be but tc^ many strictly observed, defaulters being liable to correctìon and in extreme cases to thè punishment of death and mutìlatìon. Women Somali, though not to ali, his ty»^ ™ ***"* *Sft±d noble end. These qualities thè kader of ^^possessed abund also were obliged to adhere strictly to theìr religious obligations, amlv and thè magnificent rhetoric and poetry with which he to wear thè veil, and relations between thè sexes were stringently to uTd Ws foes'o scathingly found a rea dy response arnong regulated according to thè letter of thè law. In his dealings with his foreign adversaries as with those of his his countrymen. The excitements of battio and raidmg, and ^ thè aaractions of thè spoils of war, also naturally exerted a strong compatriots who denied him immediate support, he employed a mixture of violent denunciation and vituperation, alternating with soft words of conciliation and encouragement, a conjunction of extremes which often bewildered and someùmes bemused those to whom these varied exhortations were addressed. That he was exerted by Sayyid Muhammad's personahty. movement able to engagé in interminable wordy exchanges, by letter, and by Yet aithough his task W as to create , i mdond »°?^rf word of mouth, and to compose innumerable poetic polemics transcending clan divisions, to accomphsh his he ob,^ Wof which have immeasuiably enriched thè Somali poetic heritage, necessity to adapt his tactics to thè realmes of Somah life. Hence as well as controlling thè politicai and mìUtary conduci of Dervish skill, employed ali thè STdumJ* he ™ affaìrs is a further testimony to thè Sayyid's truly extraordinary Somali politics; utilizing, when it seemed energy and resourcefulness. Hìs letters, and such of his poetry as has been collected reveal a shrewd appreciation of thè colonia! situation. Thus, he was well aware of thè Italian position in relation to thè British, saying of thè former in a poem addtessed clan, ateents, and his leading lìeutenants belonged to no 83 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT POR FKEEDOM: 1900-20 to thè British Commìssioner at.Berbera: 'The Italians are your course, thè Qadiriya were amongst his most bitter opponents, and followers thè foundlings whom you drive before you . . . it is not without cause, reviled thè Dervishes as heretics of whom it you who lead to pasture these weaker ìnfidels. Can I distinguish was claimed to be more meritorious to kill a single man than a between you (i.c. thè British) and your cattle?' hundred of thè Ìnfidels, This rivalry, which naturally weakened It is interesting too, that thè French with whom thè Dervìshes Sayyid Muhammad's cali to arms and limited its scope, was not had n& direct contact are apparently seldom referred to in Sayyid restricted to thè north of thè Somali Peninsula where thè main Muhammad's pocms. Their attitude throughout thè Dervish period course of thè twenty-years war unfolded. It reached also into thè seems to have bccn somewhat equivocai ; and sìrice they do not south of Somalia and thè Benadir coast, despite thè fact that, in appear to have cnergetically prevented arms imported through theìr resistance to Italian colonization, many of thè tribes and dans theìr coastiine from reaching thè Dervishès, it is not beyond thè there looked to Sayyid Muhammad for deliverance and support. bounds of possibìlity that they watched with interest thè outcome of a struggle which mìght permanently prejudicial to British prove The extensìon of Italian mie in thè south interests. Finally, before passing on to examine thè effects of Sayyid When Britain, not without reluctance, assumed Egypt's piace on Muhammad'sy//A///in Somalia where thè Italians were struggling to thè northern Somah" coast, there was no intention of extending her extcnd and consolidate their control, it is important to emphasize dominion into thè interior and hinterland. Britain's interest was that whatever Sayyid Muhammad Salih himself may have thought strictly limited to seeing that no hostile power held thè shore of his turbulent tlisciple, Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan remained, opposìte Aden and to ensuring that thè Aden garrison's meat after his fashion, true to his Order. Thusit was with thè words of a supplìes from thè Somali coast were unhampered. The long- hymn in praisc of thè Salihiya founder upon their lips that thè drawn out, costly, and unrewarding operations against thè Der- Dervishes attaclied in battle. And although thè true character of vishes, whìch were not by-products of any attempi to carry thè Sayyid Muhamni:ul 'Abdille's relations with thè headquarters of British flag inland, caused thè British government to assume his Order at Mecca has not yet been, and may never be fully greater responsibilities in Somaliland than had ever been foreseen elucidated, Sayyii lMuhammad Salih could surely have more de- and which were out of ali proportìon to Brìtaìn's very secondary cisively repudiateti his pupìl in Somaliland had he chosen to do so. interest in this area. Certainly Muhunmad 'AbdiJle Hassan himself conceived his The position in respect of Italian interests and hopes in Somalia missìon to be thnt of restoring to thè straight path of devotion thè was ver)' different .From thè beginning, Somalia was of primary Muslim faith of i he Somali. Yet, as must now be clear, to many of concern to Italy, and in taking over direct responsibility for thè hìs followers, to his adversaries, and sometimes even to himself, Benadir coast in 1905 thè Italian government did so with every thìs basic aim bccame overshadowed by his cali to national unity intention of developìng a true colony which could serve thè against his 'infuM* opponents. And with ali thè bloody campaigns mother-country both as a source of primary goods and'as a in which thè Dervishes fought, often against other Somali convenient receptacle for some of Italy's surplus population. Muslims, it is ìn this light, as a national hero and forerunner of From thè beginning, therefore, thè Italian policy was to extend modera Somali nationalism, that he is remembered by thè their effectiv e authority within thè widest possible territorial mass of his countrymen rather than as a sheikh or saint of great limìts, thè increasing penetration and opening up of thè hinterland blessing. being a direct object, not as in British Somaliland an unlooked for In this guise his patriotic achìevements are lauded today even consequence of thè Dervish rising. However, in thè early years by thè descendants of those who suffèred most in thè Dervìsh after thè disappointments in Eritrea, since public opinion in Italy period, and even by thè followers of thè Qadiriya. At thè time, of was strongly opposed to grandiose and costly colonial adventures,

84 85 THE FlGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-20 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA of administrative posts at seven other centres, mainly along thè by Italian standards thè graduai occupation of thè country and coast and at Barderà and Lughon thè JubalUver extension of Italian rule proceeded fairly cautiously. Nevertheless, In 1907 further trouble broke out with thè Bimal who had now thè impact of thè new colonizers was sufficien t to arouse fierce secured some support from thè Dervishes. And in Fcbruaty 1908 icsìstance amongst many of thè clans and tribes of Somalia to a force of Dervishes armed with nfles swept down thè Shebelle whom Sayyid Muhammad often appeaied as a symbol of Somali River causine contratte havoc. They were defeated ,however, resìstance to colonizatìon. Not, however, to ali thè Benadir peoples. and thè Italians look advantage of thè occasion to occupy thè The oppositìon to Sayyid Muhammad's movement on thè part of Bimal centre of Donane, thus finally paafymg that clan. The same thè southern branch of thè Qadiriya Order was as strong as it was year saw thè occupation of Afgoi, formerly one of thè main slave in thè north. Their leader, Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Brava markets and this action won for thè Italians thè co-opmtion of vigorously denounced thè Dervishes, branding them as murder- thè important Gelidi Sultan. The Administration Consolidated ous heretics destìned to eternai damnatìon in many of hìs noble this significant access of support by clearing an auxiliar yforce of teligious poems. His defiance of thè Sayyid's cause cost him his tribal poliee calkd thè 'Geledi Band* to aid their rollar forces life, for in 1909 he was assassinated by a party of Dervishes near (made up chiefly of Arabs and Eritreans under Italwu ofTicers)." Bioley, where his tomb has become one of thè most important By 1909 thè coasut area bounded by thè Juba and SUcbcll erivcrs centres of pilgiimage in southern Somalia. Likewise, Sheikh *Ali and thè sea had been effectively pacified and respcct for Italian Maye Durogba of thè Ahmadiya Order (d. 1917), today also authority had grown. Slavery was also now virtually under satis- venerated as a saint, i£ he did not so openly challenge thè Dervishes, factory control. Prioì to this date, Tommaso Caricai, Governar certainly offered them lìttle support and was favourably regarded of Somalia from 1907-10, reports that hostility towards thè new colonizers was such that a European could not ventur eoutsidc by thè Italians. As in thè north, there were thus in thè Benadir those who anv of thè coasul towns without an escort of anneri soklicrs acquiesced more or less teadìly in their new sìtuation, and those, with fixed bayoncts.16 especially but not exclusively with Salihiya connexions or sym- In 1909 thè ficst administrative post was openct l ut Obbia in pathies, who resisted thè colonizers with ali thè means at their thè Obbìa protcctorate, and six years later thè first Kcsidcnc ywas disposai, some receiving arms and other assistance from thè estabiished at Alula in thè northern part of thè Majcrtey npro- Dervishes. Resistance to Italian colonization was at thè same time tectorate Meanwhile, a year previously, a party of Dervishes stiffened by thè objection of some of thè southern clans to thè had estabiished a fort at Beletweyn on thè uppcr part of thè suppression of slavery. For as well as being employed in domestic Shebelle River and from thìs advanced post m 1916 ihcy attacked duties in thè Benadir ports, many slaves or serfs were also required Buio Burti, being only finally dislodged from thei rstronghold to cultivate thè fields of noble Somali land-holders who despised in 1920 Thus, throughout this period of thè extcnsin nof Italìan manual labour. Besides this, there was stili some traffic in slaves rule thè threàt of Dervish intervention was a Constan tthough to other countries, so that there were many with a vested interest nevèr fully reali/ed menace. And it was only with thc fma l defeat in thè continuation of these conditions which thè Italians were of thè Dervishes in 1920, by which tìme Italia» authority was obliged to seek to remedy.1* Thus partly on account of this griev- thoroughly estabiished, that this hazard was removcd. ance, in 1904 thè bellicose Bimal clan blockaded thè htnterland of after Merca, but a series of engagements peace was more or less Thefrontìer with Etbiopìa restored by 1905 when, having acquìred outrìght control of thè Benadir coast, thè new govemment of thè colony ìssued its first It was not only from thè Dervishes and sections of thè Benadir governmental decree. By this time, in addition to Mogadìshu, thè population that thè Italians encountered oppositori. In 1905, an efforts of thè two company regimes had resulted in thè opening A MODHKN I1ISTOHY OI- SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM! 1900-20 Kthioplan force descended down thè valley of thè Shebelle, position was further Consolidated by thè effect s of thè Anglo- raìding and pillaglng as far south as Balad near thè coast which Ethiopian agreement of 6 December, 1907, which fixed thè fron- was then not yet occupied by thè Italians. Two years later, after tier between Ethiopia and north-east Kenya (then stili thè British an Ethiopian military party had been forced by thè Dervishes East African Protectorate) at Dolo on thè Juba River, a point to retreat in thè Ogaden, a second and stronger expedition was well north of Lugh-Ferrandi. sent out, which, failing to engagé its elusive foes, turned south With this substantial encouragement and a payment to Menelik to descend on Lugh, raiding livestock and annihilating thè Italian of 3 million lire, Italy obtaìned by thè Italo-Ethiopian treaty of garrìson. Seriously alarmed at thè sìtuatìon, thè Italian govern- May 1908 a frontier running from Dolo on thè Juba northwards ment requested reparations, which were duly made, and then took to thè Shebelle where it joined thè line agreed to previously. A advantage of thè position to press thè Ethiopians for a definitìon perfunctory and rather nominai attempi was made to allocate of thè frontier. After thè Italian débàcle at Adowa, it will be differen tclans along thè boundary to eìther Ethiopian or Italian recalled that, in thè Italo-Ethiopian peace negotiations of 1897, control, with Mtde regard for thè grazing and waterìng needs of thè Italian sphere had been defined as an area i So miles in depth thè people concerned who, of course, were never consulted. The running from thè Juba River north of Barderà to thè confines Rahanweyn, for instance, were allocated to thè Italian sphere, of thè British Protectorate. This agreement had left outside thè while thè Digodia, Ogaden and others 'north ofthe frontier line* Italian sphere thè post at Lugh established by Ugo Ferrandi" in were to be dependent upon Ethiopia. With sudi scant definition 1895 where, however, Menelik had agreed to an Italian com- of thè new frontier, it is scarcely surprising that when in 1910 a merciai concession. In thè interval, thè Italian government had joint Italo-Ethiopian boundary commìssion sought to delimit thè been pressing hard through its representative at Addis Ababa boundary, agreement was reached only on a small sector running for thè recognition of Lugh as lying within Italian territory. The from Dolo on thè Juba to Yet, some 130 kilometres to thè north. Italian position had meanwhile been greatly strengthened by a Thereafter negotiations were abandoned, although thè Italian tri-partite Anglo-Italo-French Agreement of 13 December, 1906. survey party continued its work up to thè Shebelle. This treaty pledged thè three powers to 'co-operate in maintainìng Nevertheless, Italy had safely secured Lugh within her colony thè politicai and territorial status quo in Ethiopia' as determined of Somalia and a good stretch of territory besides, between thè by present conditions, and no less than rune separate agreements, Juba and Shebelle, and in this area she now proceeded to assert treatìes, and conventions - many of them mutually exclusive and hcr influente as well as along thè 'frontier' as understood in thè contradictory, and including thè Anglo-Italian protocols of 1891 Italian interpretation of thè 1897 and 1908 agreements. Ethiopia, and 1894, which had recognized thè Ogaden region as a sphere by contrast, was in no position to establìsh adminìstrative posts of Italian ìnterest." within thè sphere which she claimed, exce'pt on thè western srde The purpose of this document was to previde thè three powers towards Harar and Jigjiga. Thus, it was thè Italìans who derived with Instruments which would safeguard theìr various positions most profit from thè fluid position which resulted, and which and ambìtions in thè event of a collapse of thè Ethiopian govern- tendcd to reinforce thè Benadir's traditional róle as thè naturai ment - something that was considered as a distinct possibility outlct for much of thè trade of western Ethiopia and thè southern since thè Emperor Menelik was ailing. In thè officia iItalian inter- Ogaden. This róle thè Italians deliberately stimulated, adopting prctation, thè agreement - which naturally alarmed Ethiopia - a policy of economìe penetration which they advanccd by buìlding accorded to Italy a sphere of influente in southern Ethiopia, and roads from thè coast to thè border and granting customs exemp- thè right of armed interventìon in thè event of a politico-terri- tion on goods in transit between western Ethiopia and thè Ben- torìal change affecting thè integrity of a bordering state (e.g. adìr. At thè same time, thè clans straddling thè border on thè Somalia or Eritrea).'» This significan tenhancement of thè Italian Italia nside were encouraged to move imo thè Ethiopian sphere 89 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE DERVISH FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: 1900-20 freely , as their grazing and watering needs prompted, and were 1 this \untld havc happened eventually without British support provided with armed protection by parties of thè colony's frontier and promptìng, but its occurrence at this time, and in these cir- guards. By 1921, this policy of systematic infiltration had already cumstances, was one of thè paradoxical consequences of thè reached a poìnt where it was felt by thè Italians that thè division Dervish fight for freedom. Hence, although Sayyid Muhammad's of Somali clans and territory effected by thè 1908 treaty was no image was at thè time of his death, and stili remains, that of a longer consonant with prestige and majesty, as they put thè it, national hero and patriot, his holy war - despìte ali thè courage of Italian sovereignty.*0 But it was not ùntil thè celebrated Walwal and tenacity of his supporterà - not only failed in its purpose of incident of 1935 that matters carne finally to a head. driving thè *infidels 'into thè sea, but actually led to a further extension and entrenchment of alien rule. The generaiposition in i$20 In French Somaliland, by contrast, neither these secondary effect snor thè direct actions of thè Dervishes made any sensible By 1920 ,thus, thè Benadir coast and hinterland had been brought impact. And throughout this elsewhere turbulent period thè under Italian sovereìgnty, partly by treaty, partly by thè distrìbu- French devoted their energìes to thè imagìnative project of tion of largesse, and partly by force, although, by thè standards .securing Ethiopia's transit trade for their colony by thè construc- of thè period, this last device was used with relative moderation. tìon of a line of rail from Jibuti to thè Ethiopian hìnterJand. In thè north, thè two Italian protectorafes had both locai admin- Despite thè interruption of thè Great War in which a French istrative stadons, answerable now not to Aden but to Mogadishu, Somali battalion distìnguished itself, thè Franco-Ethiopian railway and thè ground was prepared for their fina! incorporation in thè reached thè Ethiopian capitai by 1917. The successfu lconclusion colony with thè abandonment of thè old policy of indirect rule of this great enterprise, thè only line of rail in thè whole area, a few years later. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdìlle Hassan's war, while guaranteed thè future prosperity of thè Cète and its capitai and it had sometimes delayed and impeded thè graduai extension of porr, Jibutì. Equally, it ensured thè graduai eclipse of Zeila as Italian rule, had not caused thè Italiana to alter their colonial thè traditional outlet for much of thè hinterland's external trade. plans or deflected them from thè purpose of creating an econom- Thus, from thè European point of view, France which had main- ically profitable possession whose agricultural potential might tained consistently excellent relations with Ethiopia, though be exploìted by settlers from country. Not that thè mother possessing thè smallest of thè Somali territories had so far gained economie considerations were thè only factors; Italian prestige most advantage from her colony, Brìtain» at thè other extreme, was already at stake and became an incrcasingly significant motìve had profited least. From thè Somali poìnt of view, thè events of as time passed. Nor had thè activities of thè Dervishes prevented thè period had merely further Consolidated thè partìtion of thè Italians from appreciating thè benefits of a policy of winning Somaliland ,but, despite this, Sayyid Muhammad's vaio struggle Somali goodwill as a means, not only of safeguardìng their had left in thè Somali national consciousness an ideai of patrìotism position in Somalia, but also of expanding their influence into which could never be efface dand which was to inspire later thè Ethiopian sphere. generations of his countrymen. By contrast, as has been seen, thè extension of British rule to cover a large area of thè hinterland of thè Somaliland Protectorate was thè result rather than thè cause of thè Dervish war. The Sayyid's campaigns had also cngendered a tradition of Anglo- Ethiopian collaboration against Somali and had drawn thè slender arm of Ethiopian rule farther into thè Ogaden, thus considerably strengthening Ethiopìa's position in relation to Somali. No doubt 90 SOMAL IUNIFICATION : THE ITALIAN EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE largely compulsory labour recruitment, mainly from thè seden- tary Bantu tribes of thè rivenne regions, continued throughout much of thè Italian colonial period, although thè conditions of CHAPTER V service of plantatìon workers gradually improved, in theory at any rate, if not always in practice. It was not, however, only labour problems which confronted SOMALI UNIFICATICI: THE ITALIAN thè first concessionaries. Since there were no sdentine studies of locai conditions to guide them, thè first Italian farmers had simply EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE to follow a procedure of trial and error, which, with their lack of adequate capitai or equipment, and in thè absence of any serious Government support until thè "end of thè Great War, in most cases proved disastrous. An agronomie tesearch station was in Economie and social devehpments in Somalia fact opened at Cenale, on thè Shebelle, near Merca, as early as THE LONG-DRAW ouNt campaìgns against thè Dervishes in 1912 by Dr Gnor where experiments were made with various Britìsh Somaliland, and thè graduai extension of Italian tuie in tropical crops including bananas and rice, and systematic investi- Somalia, left Httle urne or resources available for economie or gations undertaken of climatic and soii coaditions. But thè im- social improvement. In Somalia, however, from thè begìnning portance of this pioneering work was neglected at thè tìme by of thè period of direct control, thè aim was to attract settlers thè Italian government and did not bear fruit until thè initiation from thè mother country and to develop colonial plantarions of a more active colonial phase after thè war. In thè meantime, along thè Shebelle and Juba Rìvers. The scheme originally pro- most of thè early attempts at plantation farming had failed, and posed by Carletti (Governor, from 1906-10) envisaged thè settle- thè prospect of settling large numbers of Italian farmers in Som- ment of groups of Italian farmers in co-operative colonies on thè alia had dimmed. fertile land. With this in view, in 1908 Carletti instructed his However, thè arrivai in Somalia in 1919 of that pioneer of Resident Commissioner at Giumbo to reserve some 10,000 tropical agriculture, thè Duke of thè Abruzzi, and thè commence- hectares of arable land ìn thè Gosha region of thè Shebelle. This ment of thè fascisi governership of De Vecchi3 heralded new land had formerly been cultivated for thè Tuni clan by their developments which in time carne to change completely thè bondsmen and serfs. colony's economy. After intensive technical research supported With these resources at thè Government's disposai, steps were by adequate financial resources, thè Società Agricola Italo-Somala, taken to attract Italian settlers to open concessions and build founded by thè Duke in 1920 with locai headquarters at thè farms. But those who hopefully responded to thè lure of a bright station named after him on thè Shebelle (Villagio Duca degli future in Somalia soon found their efforts seriously impeded by Abruzzi), rapidly developed into a highly efRcien t agricultural thè difficultie sof recruiting locai labour, which, contrary to ali consortium producing cotton, sugar, bananas, oil and soap.i In expectations, proved far from easy to attract. This led thè Italian large measure thè success of this enterprise was due not only to Resident in thè Gosha Dìstrict to force people - mainly former, thè organizing genìus of its founder, and to thè rational sden- slaves and serfs - to work on thè plantations which. were beìng. tine preparation which preceded each phase of thè work, but also opened. Despite salaries which were not low, voluntary to thè strenuous effort swhich were made to overcome thè tradi- recruits were hard to come by, and those who were induced to tional difficultie sof labour recruitment. Unlike earlier attempts work for thè Italian farmers had to be supervised by guards at plantation farming in Somalia where thè settlers had obtaìned otherwise they simply stopped work or fled.1 Thìs tradition of their land from thè Admìnistration of thè colony, S.A.I.S.

92 93 SOMAL IUNtFICATION :THE ITALIAN EAST AFRICAN EMPIRF. A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA gcthcr in cultivating villages on thè consortium according to their acquired its land and much of its labour by a contract both direct cthnic and tribal origin. Elementary health and social services with locai tribesmen Bantu Shidle) amongst thè (thè whom thè were provided which, however modest and rudimentary, ex- consortium was established. By thè end of 1920, thè company ceeded those generally available at thè time elsewhere. had at its disposai an area of 30,000 hectares of rìch land granted The eventual success of thè S.A.LS. scheme encouraged De directly from thè collective tribal lands of sections of thè Shidle. Vccchì's government to create at Cenale - thè long neglected The tribesmen concerned retained possession of thè gardens site of Onor's pioneering research station - a vast irrigation which were actually under cultìvation, only conceding to thè project for pìantation cultivation. In regulating thè conditions Society land which they held in reserve. under which concessions were granced to Italian settlers and The Company thus broke new ground in thè manner by which companies, thè Administration produced a labour code modelled it acquired title to ìts lands from thè traditional tribal owners, on that pioneered by thè Duke of thè Abruzzi. The aim was to who contracted to supply much of thè labour necessary for thè attract whole families, as well as individuals, from thè southern work of irrìgation and bonificatìon which was to followy and cultivating tribes (particularly thè Bantu riverines), and to bind who also undertook to continue afterwards as paid employees thcm to thè land of thè consortium in which they found employ- of thè Society. Each famìly was to cultivate for thè Company ment by establishing them in labour colonies. As at Villagìo, an area not less than that worked for its own private use, and thè cach man or woman was allotted land for his own use and entitled produce was to be sold at rates fixed annually by joìnt agreement. to kcep a few poultry and cattle. The employer was obliged to However, while between 1920 and 1922 ,when thè rains were provide seed for thè worker's own use, and additional wages poor, and poverty and lack of work at home drove many people were paid during harvest and at planting time. During pregnancy, to seek employment wìth thè Company, after thè floods which women were to be given Hght work, and to be granted one followed in 1923 ,thè labour force melted away and a locai out- month's leave after hearing a child. Health and sankary services break of bubonic plague provided little inducement to return. were provided in thè colonial villages in which thè workers This marked reduction in thè supply of labour during thè criticai wcrc forced to Uve—fo rhaving gained labourers it was clearly work of bonification created a serious situation for thè Company in thè employer's interest to provide for their welfare. which was then driven to apply thè old methods of coercing The contract under which this bond was created between em- people ìnto joinìng its labour force. By arrangement wìth thè ployce and employer had to be fully explained to thè former, and Administration, Shidle and other tribesmen from Afgoi, Awdegle, signcd by both parties.* Yet, however generous these conditions and Buio Mererta were compelled to provide contingents of may have appeared to thè Italian settlers and companies, there labour. At thè same time, other voluntarily recruited workers was marked reluctance on thè part of many cultivating tribesmen were taken on at slightly higher salaries. to leave their lands and homes, negìecting their own subsìstence Nevertheless, thè Society stili experienced thè utmost difficulty farming , to work, virtually as prisoners, for foreign masters. in securing a stable labour force. By 1924, however, thè system of Conscquently in good seasons, especially, when there was plenty co-operative 'ccllaboration' by which labourers were established of work at home, thè Italian concessionarìes at Cenale continued in cultìvating settlements within thè Society's lands was extended to be confronted with thè problem of a reluctant and generally to ali employees and began to prove successful. Each worker inadcquate labour force which they overcame, with thè connivance was allocated one hectare of land, of which half was for his own of thè Administration, by forced recruirment. The consequent use, while thè remaìnder was to be worked by him for thè Com- forages which were undertaken, to collect workers from thè pany at rates which varied according to thè yield produced. On Baidoa and Bur Hacaba regions for this purpose, are stili bitterly this basis, a comprehensive labour code was elaborated under rcmcmbered today. Paradoxically, it was (and stili is) precisely which recruits from differen ttribes and areas were grouped to- 9J 94 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIAN EAS AFRICAT EMPIRN E those clansmen of thè nomadic areas who werc least disposed bonification and irrigation works were undertaken in indigenous to work on thè land, because of their tradìtional contempi areas on thè Shebelle. for cultivation, who were most anxious to obtain salaried In thè meantime a certain extensìon of social services had employment . By contrast, thè southern cultivating peoples, taken piace. A loose network of dispensaries, and, in thè main could, at thìs time certainly, satisfy most of their modest wants centres, of hospitals, had been established, thè Administration from thè produce of their own fields and livestock without devotìng perhaps more attention to this aspect of thè welfare of engaging in salaried employment except in time of scarcìty and thè locai population than to any other. A school for training famine.' Somali hospital orderlies was created in 1933. Despìte these difficultìes ,however, thè definitive establish- Other educational services, although state-aided, were provided ment of thè S.A.I.S. estates and their. erhulation by other com- chiefly by thè Catholic mìssions to whom, in thè less refractory panies at Cenale and other centres on thè Shebelle, and later on social dimate of thè south, there was less public hostility than ìn thè Juba, provided Somalia wìth a new pattern of trade. The thè north. Indeed, with theìr much more pervasive hold over thè export of bananas, attempted first experimentally by thè Duke of population, thè Italian government of Somalia was even able to thè Abruzzi, soon carne to be thè main object of production at erect an ìmposing cathedral in Mogadishu without arousing any Cenale and provided thè colony with a new export product which serious opposition. In such conditions, by 1929, thè missions rapidly carne to rivai in importance thè traditional rnainstay, were running elementary schools - at Merca, Brava, Gelib, Afgoì, hides and skìns. The only other significan tcommerciai venture Villagìo, Baìdoa, Kismayu, and even Ras Hafun. There was also a launched in this period was thè salt extraction plant at Ras Hafun, government school for teaching Italian to Somalis at Mogadishu on thè Majerteyn coast in thè extreme north. Work on this enter- whìch had been opened in 1907 ; and in thè same centre there was prise began in 1920, financed by a group of Lombardy industri- now a trade school. For thè Italian Administration regarded alists, and although interrupted by thè military campaigns in education for Somalis as, in thè main, preparation for such limited Majerteynia in 1925-27, thè plant was by 1933 producing 260,000 technical tasks as should conveniently be assigned to them. How- tons of high grade salt annually. The bulk of this was exported ever, in thè mission elementary schools, Somali and Italian child- to East Africa ,India, and thè Far East. reo were initially taught together ìn thè same classes. But in 1929 There were also corresponding developments in other fields, De Vecchi's successor Guido Corni, considering this practice particularly in Communications, thè Italians setting great store ìncompatible with thè proper relations between masters and by thè imperiai Roman dictum that roads are thè basis of success- 'subjects' - thè status assigned to Somali - laid down that thè two ful war and expansion and of peacefu lprosperity. Thus during races must be taught in separate classes. thè De Vecchi regime, thè extent of motor roads trebled to cover Nevertheless, thè educational facilìties open to Somalis con- some 6,400 kilometres. In 1928 a small diesel raìlway System tinued to expand and thè numbers of Somali and Arab pupils at was established linking thè plantations at Afgoi and Vìllagìo elementary schools rose from 1,390 in 1930 to 1,776 Ìn 1939; Duca degli Abruzzi with thè capitai and port of Mogadìshu. which, in thè circumstances, was a not inconsìderable achieve- In 1929 , thè first government geological survey was initiated ment comparing favourably with thè position at thè time in to provide a basis for a badly needed well-drilling scheme to aid British Somaliland and thè French Còte. This certainly \vould not thè nomadic sector of thè economy to which little attention had have been possible without a more favourable public attitudc previously been paìd. And between 1932 and 1933, one hundied towards Western education than that prevailing at thè time in and fifty wells were constructed. About thè same time, considera- thè British Protectorate. And in this connexion, in addition to thè tion was also given to thè hitherto neglected problem of improv- factors already mentioned, it is important to realize that, while thè ing thè traditional subsistence cultivation economv, and some Italian Administratio nallowcd considerable freedom to Catholic

97 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIA NEAST AFRICA EMPIRN E missionaries, at thè same tìme it also openly supported Isiam. Jubaland had been thè scene of much turbulence in thè past and Frequently funds were made available to aid in thè construction had experienced severa! heavy-handed British punitive expedi- tions,* thè transfer and thè demarcation of thè new frontier be- of mosques and shrines. The administrative System was, of course, after thè fashion of tween Somalia and Kenya passed virtually without incìdent. The Italian , bureaucratic and highly centralized, and directed dansmen concerned, of course, were not consulted, and little or by thè Governor and hìs immediate subordinates and secretaries no account was taken of clan distrìbution or grazing needs. at Mogadishu. In thè Dìstrlcts and Provinces, thè Residents If thè transfer of Jubaland went smoothly enough, thè case was (equivalent to thè English Distrìct Commìssioners) were assisted very dìfTeren twith thè extension of direct colonìal rule to thè two by government stipended 'chiefs' and elders. And although thè northern Italian protectorates. De Vecchi had urged this annexa- lattei operated vis-a-vis thè Administration in an advisory capacity tion from thè tane of his appointment; but authority was not given only, or more often merely as thè vehicle for directives and instruc- by Rome untìl July 1925 ,after a border incident in thè previous tions, to those of these 'Capos' who proved loyal and co-operative year when a party of police from thè British Protectorate had Italian colonia! decorations and financia! rewards were distributed crossed o ver thè frontier in pursuit of raiders from thè Majerteyn freely. Thus, for example, thè Bimal clan which had earlier proved Sultanato, The operations whìch were required to effec t this such a thorn in thè ftesh of thè Administration, in officia ipublica- change, though euphemistically described as a 'colonia! police tions of thè 19305 are praised for their loyal devotion to thè Italian action', entailed strenuous effort sand thè employment of more than 12,000 troops, including three battalìons from Eritrea, and a flag, and their notable leader Sultan ' Abd ar-Rahman 'Ali (Ise, who •was created a Cavaliere Ufficiale i,s hailed as a staurich supporter of di vision of Marines with naval support and reconnais sance planes. Italian interests. 6 Likewise, Sultan Ahmad Abu Bakr of thè Geledi, The first objective, thè submission of thè Obbia Sultanate, where renowned as a soothsayer and reputed to have been consulted by thè Sultan, Yusuf 'Ali Kenadid, was not a hereditary ruler but a Italians in 1940 as to thè outcome of thè war in East Africa, was brcakaway scion of thè Majerteyn clan, was accomplished easily made a Commander of thè Order of thè Colonial Star for thè part enough; and by thè end of October 1925, thè sultanate had been which, as nominai paramount of thè Digil clans, he had played in declared a province with Resìdences at Galkayu, El Bur, and IHig. thè organìzation of labour recruitment for thè Cenale consortiums, Yusuf 'Ali himself was deposed and pensioned offto Mogadishu. These and other Italian appoìnted *Capos' were supported in In thè subjection of thè northern protectorate, thè Majerteyn sul- their róle as agents of thè Italian Residents by an armed rural con- tanato proper, even with thè large military resources at their dis- stabulary force known as thè Gog/e, first recruited under De posai, thè Italians encountered serious resistance. Boqor 'Isman, Martino's governorship in 1914 and possessing by 1930 a strength though now an old man, was widely respected and his armed con- of some five hundred men. Thìs force was thè Somalia equivalent tingents had seen servìce during thè Dervish period in which, like of thè Brìtish Illalos in thè north. The Administration was also many of his countrymen, he had played a somewhat equivoca! supported by a strong polke force which, in thè same period, had rAlc .Faccd with thè demand to accept thè new status assigned to a strength of i ,47 5 na tìves led by 8 ; Italian officer sand subalterns. hlimelf and his people, he sought at first to temporize while I-ater, as thè colony's military contingents increased in number, mubllizing his followers. Hence, despite thè overwhelming mili- thè polke force was considerably reduced and became an officiai t«ry lupcriority of his opponents, he was able to hold out against branch of thè Colonial Carabinieri. * Ihcm for almost two years until thè end of 1927, when ali effettive In keeping with thè expansionist spirit of thè period, in 192; thè mlit&iicc was crushed and he gave himself up to receive thè same colony was considerably increased in sìze with thè cession by trMtmen tas that accorded to his kinsmen at Obbia. His son fied to Britain of Jubaland and thè port of Kìsmayu. This was part of Hthlopla ,but returned after severa! years to Mogadishu where he Italy's modest share of thè spoils of thè Great War, and though illm lof smallpox, 99 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIA NEAST AFRICA NEMPIRE Meanwhile, in thè newly subjected Sultanate of; Obbk a daring some return, reducing thè adversé balance of trade from a peak of rising had occurred at El Bur, led by a Majerteyn clansman called almost 131 million lire in 1927 to just under 29 million lire in 1934. "Ornar Samatar. After gaining control of thè police armoury and Nevertheless, after thirty years of direct rule, despite a great murdering thè Italìan Resident, thè leàding insurgents crossed thè expenditure of finance and effort ,thè colony was stili runnìng at a border ìnto Ethiopk, where, according to Italian reports, they marked deficit, and was very far from being thè economie asset to proceeded to campaign against Italkn infiltration in thè Ogaden their country which thè early Italian pioneers had forecast. And and to prepare attacks on Italian border posts. But apart from this, thè concomitant expectation that Somalia would also provide a in thè circumstances of thè power of reprisal wielded by thè Italian prosperous livelihood for large numbers of Italy's surplus authorities, thè rising left little tangible trace in thè colony irself. population was now so patently untenable that it had been The incorporation of Jubaland and thè two northern protec- quietly discarded. This unsatisfactory economie position, which torates led to a corresponding extension of direct adminisrration, it was becoming fashìonable to .disregard in view of thè reputed and thè colony was now divided into seven provinces or 'Regions* gain to national prestìgc which thè colony afforded, was soon to comprising thirty-three Districts presided over by Residents. The be further aggravated by thè far-reaching consequences of thè Civii Service as a whole now included no less than 3 jo espatriate unhappy'incìdent which occurred at Walwal in thè course of thè Italiana as well as 1,700 locally recruited Somali, Arabs, and Anglo-Ethiopian demarcation of thè British Protectorate's boun- others employed in a wide variety of subordinate posts such as dariesin 1934. those of medicai orderly, technical assistant, and forestry guard, etc. The most important appointment, certainly in Somali eyes, remained of course that of interprete!, a key positìon in any System Progrgss in thè Britìsh Pro fec forate of direct rule where expatriate officiate cannot speak thè locai The twenty-years Dervish war had been a period of stagnation language. With this formìdable adminìstrative machine, now when ali thè erTort sof thè Administration were directed towards strongly established, thè ranks of salaried chiefs and notables were ovcrcoming Sayyid Muhammad's movement and there was virtù- pruned to retain only those of proved loyalty and efficiency .Theìr «lly no time or money for anything more productive. Moreover, posìtion was also held in check by thè appointment of officiai unlike thè Sudan ,where thè British campaigns against thè Mah- Muslim judges (Kadis) wìth authority to administer Somali cus- dìats had indirectly promoted thè development of thè country tomary law as well as Islamic law, wider powers of jurisdiction ihrough thè establishment of rail, road, and telegraphic Communi- than those accorded to Kadis in thè British Protectorate. cations, and had also drawn attention in England to thè Sudan's This consolidation of rule and construction of thè basis neces- needs and led to such imaginative achievements as Gordon sary for economie exploitation proved exceedingly costly. From a College ,in thè Somaliland Protectorate thè results of the/f.W figure of a mere 900,000 lire in 1905, thè budget rose contìnuously, there were very different . Indeed, as. Dougks Jardine, Chief reaching 2,500,000 lire in 1908, and an average of 74 million lire Secretar yduring part of this period, has eloquently recorded, in thè early 19305 .Locai revenue, derived mainly from customs Smnaliland's twenty-years war left nothing more tangible than a and excise duties on imports and exports and licences - there was few ramshackl eFord cars and no decent roads or other means of no significan t direct taxation - also rose steadily but carne no- communJcation .*A stili greater misfortune' was 'that thè British where near meeting expenditure. Indeed, in thè same period, locai nuhlic had forgotten thè Somali war many ycars before it was revenue produced only 27 million lire, considerably less than half nfough tto a successfu lcondusìon.'» And having spentsomuch on thè colony's budget. However, by this time, thè export txade - mlllttry operations so completely out of proportion to their inter- principally of hides and skins, and cotton and bananas, thè latter •iti In Somaliland, thè British government was not now disposed taking precedence over thè former after 1932 begun show - had to to nmkc furthe rfunds available for development. To add to this 100 tor A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH:E ITALIA NEAS TAFRICA EMPIRN E sorry tale, thè conclusìon of thè operations against thè Dervishes, ptovìding thè export trade in sheep and goats and skins, con- far from ushering in a new era of co-operation between thè people tinued to prevaii. and thè Administration, left instead an atmosphere of sullen dìs- Whilc in agriculture thè initìatìve carne from Somali, thè posi- trust and covert hostility. tlon wìth education was very different .The efFec tof thè activities Notwithstanding this gloomy picture, however, an extremely of tlic Mission school at Berbera, and latcr at Daimole, in provid- signìficant development had in fac t occurred, almost unnoticed, lug onc of thè irritants which promoted thè growth of thè Dervish and without any assistance or aid from thè Protectorate authori- CBUS haCs already been noted. This school was in fact closed in ties. This was thè graduai adoption of sorghum cultivation in thè lyio ,whcn al! Mission proselytization was forbidden - thè ban western part of thè territory (in Borama and Hargeisa Districts), being strictly enforced» and never revoked in later years. During far from thè scene of thè Dervish operations in thè centre and cast. (lil icarly period, however, thè Government entered thè field on From shortly before thè turn of thè century, thè Gadabursi clan 1(1 ciwn account and by 190; had established small elementary and sections of thè Habar Awal (especially thè Jibril Abokor) ithooU at its three stations of Berbera, Bulhar, and Zeila, despite livìng in thè higher and better-watered land in thè west had begun Cuntlnued resistance and hostility. Unforrunately with thè rìse of to follow thè example of their kìnsmen in thè Jigjiga region of Jllmtl ,thè populations of Zeila and Bulhar dwindled, and thè clearing areas of bush and plantìng sorghum, thè ground being lehooln thcre were closed for lack of support. tilled by ox-drawn wooden ploughs. This comparatìvely advanced A more systematic approach had to waifVintil thè end of thè System of cultivation, strikingly differen t from thè hand hoc Dervi.th war whcn, in 1920, plans were prepared for thè institution technique employed in southern Somalia, seems to have been of ni xelementary schools and an intermediate school. Sìnce thè pioneered locally by a few religious settlements from which it himic government refused to provide funds, it was proposed to soon spread to thè surrounding clansmen. Far from hindering this mine thè necessary capitai by levying a direct tax on livestock. This economie revolution, thè efFec tof thè Dervish war appears on thè Itrlklng and, , to thè Somali public at thè tìme, most abhorrent pro- contrary to have stimulated it by creating a highly lucrative market |«ct, ruuscd fierce resentment and led to a riot at Burao in which for locai grain. For those nomads who turned to cultivation stili lite HÌNtric Commissionet r lost his life. Since thè Protectorate retained an interest in livestock and were nòt thus completely ftuthoritics were repeatedly instructed that any project which dependent for subsistence on their crops, To some extent at least, ml^li t spark off another 'Dervish war* was to be avoìded at ali they produced a cash crop which was traded locally with thè Co»!» ,thcsc plans were consequently dropped for thè time being. pastora! nomads in thè centre and cast of thè Protectorate. ' ° Nrvcrthclcss fro, m 1919 onwards, funds were made available to The importance of this development was recognized by thè •tml>l nc trìckle of boys, whose parents desired their education,, to Protectorate Admìnìstration in 1924, when an agriculture and he »cn tto thè Sudan and by 1933 there were five boys at Gordon veterinary office was opened, followed shortly afterwards by thè College .In thè interval, in 1929, a government grant was mùde to establishment of a small experimental station. In 1928 ,however, a «•lecux lprivate Islamic schools runby Somali sheikhson condition serious set-back occurred in thè form of a locust plague which des- thnt thcy taught Arabie reading and wrìting and arìthmetic. In troyed almost thè entire harvest and led to widespread famine, 19) J, new proposals were adopted for introducing a rational Nevertheless, by thè early 19305, stable cultivation combined wìth lyKcm of education and work started on thè construction of a new pastoralism was firmly established in a wide area of thè west of thè |iivcrnnient school at Berbera. In thè following year, thè Protec- Protectorate, and thè Admìnistration had completed thè demarca- turatc's first Director of Education was appointed; but again tion and mappìng of thè agricultural lands in Hargeisa District r*llKhu sfeeling strongly opposed thè scheme; and, after a riot at and in Borama District (definitively opened, after severa! false HiitA iOn which threc Somalis were killed and thè new Director of starts, in 1921). Elsewhere thè ali pervasive nomadic economy, IMuution was greeted with a shower of stones, thè proposals

102 103 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIAN EAS AFRICAT N EMPIRE lapsed and had to awaìt thè reoccupation of British Somaliland in were extremely modest, and restricted in fact to little more than 1941 after thè Italian defeat in East Africa. thè maintenance of effective law and order. In thè light of thè In other spheres, though pcrhaps less tempestuous, thè record intractable character of thè locai population who, despite thè few was on thè whole similarly bleak. Following 1926, however, there thousand cultìvators in thè west, were as a whole overwhelmingly was some road development, increasingly necessary with thè dedìcatèd to thè nomadic way of life, thè effective implementation opening of new Administrativc stations, and also an extension of of any radicai changes would have required a much more strongly medicai services. Apart from thè activities of thè veterinary office, established administrative machine. For thè homogeneous and thè only othcr mcasure of direct benefit to thè pastora! economy clearly delineated character of thè population in thè Protectorate was thè initiation of a small-scale well-drilling scheme in thè which facilitated thè maintenance of law and order on a limited 19303. These restricted and altogether mìnimal developments in a basis, also meant that, notwithstanding thè traditìonal rivalry of territory where, in contrast to Somalia, there were fewer naturai thè Isaq and Darod clans, such radicai innovations as western resources and neither thè spur of imperiai pride nor thè needs of a education could be resisted more effectìvel yand on a wìder front European settler community to consider, cost very little. The than in thè much more heterogeneous and divided conditìons of budget remained pìtifully snudi, amounting as late as 1937 to only Somalia.- -, £213,139. Wìth thè failure of thè attempt to introduce direct taxa- At thè same time, although there was no pervasive System of tion, which, had it been persevered with, would have been of indìgenous chiefs and consequently no basis for a true System of tremendous value for thè future, revenuewas derivedas in Somalia indirect rule, titular clan leaders and thè elders of lineages were in mainly from import and export duties and licences. The principal many cases officiall yrecognized by thè Administration and granted exports were stili, of course, hides and skins and livestock on thè small stipends. As in Somalia, these leaders, usuaìly known by thè hoof, valued in thè late 19305 at £279,940, when ìmports cost Arabie title *AkiT ,provided thè link between thè District Com- nùssioner and thè people of his district. And to aid thè mass of That it was possible to govern so cheaply this Qnderella of thè court work to which District Commìssioners found themselves Empire, as it was well epitomized, despite ìts considerable terri- unrewardingly committed by thè Somali love of litigation and thè torial extent of 68,000 square miles and its estimated populatìon of frequen t clan and lineage quarrels, these government Akils and 3 50,000, is explicable not only in terms of thè exiguous nature of 'chiefs1 (as they were somctimes misleadingly called) were granted government and of public services and development, but also in limited judicìal powers and thus furnished a rudimentary System relation to thè special characteristks of thè Somali social System. of subordinate courts. Their authority, however, was very small, Despite thè presence of only a tiny complement of expatriate and religìous issues and matters of personal status in^olving official saìded by Indìan and Arab clerks, and despite thè lack of Islamic law were left to thè care of Muslim magìstrates (Kadis). any effectiv eorganization of chiefly authority which could have Thus, despite some superficla lconcessions to thè principle of served as a basis for a System of indirect rule in thè orthodox sense, indirect rule, in practice thè Protectorate was governed as directly thè Somali clan genealogical System provided a pervasive frame- as Somalia, though with a much lighter hand and a more restricted work through which every individuai could be unerringly identi- purview. AH effectiv epower remained with thè District Commis- fied. This, with thè fact that in contrast to Somalia thè Protectorate's sioners who also acted as magistrates, thè territory being divided population was more compact and homogeneous, and divìded in into six separate Districts, ruled from thè secretariat and seat of fact amongst three clearly defined groups of clans - thè Dir, Isaq government at Berbera. With thè poor quality of Communications and Darod, made it possible for administration to be conducted and thè remoteness of many out-stations from thè capitai, District with a comparatively light hand. Commissioners naturally wielded very great authority and theìr Yet, it must again be emphasized that thè Administration's aims position was enhanced in this respect by thè Illalo tribal polìce 104 IOJ A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIA NEAST AFRICA EMPIRN E detachments assìgned to their conttol. A separate polke force was Enrico Cerulli. The work was completed by September 1930, and only created in 1926. But, while thìs aìded thè control of clan and thè results were ratified by an Anglo-Italian Agreement signed in lineage disputes, it did not serìously alter thè District Com- London in June of thè foÙowìng year. In thè spirit of thè originai missioner'sfar-reaching powers ; and ìn practice there tended often Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1894,'* thìs ratification seemed to to be a certain rivalry between police and administrative officers imply that thè frontier of Somalia -was recognized as extending and thè Illalos and regular police which, with their genius for along thè south-eastern part of thè Protectorate as far west as polìtica! intrigue, thè clansmen were only too ready to exploit. Do'mo in thè (Ethiopian) Ogaden, Ì.e. to thè 4yth meridian cast. This, with internai clan politica, and thè playing off of one Having successfully settled thè frontier with Italy, Britain now administrative officia iagainst another, a sphere of activity in which proceeded on thè demarcation of her Protectorate's boundaries government interpreters played a cruciai rólc, provided much of thè with Ethiopia, following thè terms of thè dubious agreement of excitement of locai tiibal life.11 1897. This was thè first clear indication which Britìsh-protected From thè end of thè Dervish period unti! after thè East Africa Somalis were vouchsafed of thè partial withdrawal of British campaìgn dutìng thè Second World War, this remained thè generai protection, and of thè abandonment of their terrìtory over which character of life in thè Protectorate, Yet, although thè rudìments Ethiopia was now anxious to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, of law and order were now effectively established, there was during it is scarcely to be wondered at that thè joint-Commission en- this period considerable turbulence in thè west, particularly countered oppositìon from thè clansmen in thè area, or, that in thè amongst thè Gadabursi and 'Ise clans. Thìs created serious admin- course of its work, one of thè commissioners lost his life. This, istrative difficultie swhìch were aggravated by thè effect s of however, was but a minor incident compared with thè reception thè arbitrary colonial partition which divided these clans between which was in store for thè Commission, led by Col Clifford and Britain and Ethiopia and, in thè case of thè 'Ise, France also. Rivai Dedjazmatch Tessema Bante, when it arrived at Walwal in thè claimants for thè leadership of thè Gadabursi clan and their adher- eastern Ogaden in November 1934. ents sought to play off to their own advantage thè Ethiopian The Commission's appearance here calls for some explana- authorities at Jigjiga and thè British at Borama. In 1930, this tion. What had happened was that, after completing its unpopular dangerous game led to an unfortunate incident when, guided by work of demarcation, thè Commission had crossed into thè thè pro-Ethiopian Gadabursi claimant, an Ethiopian force crossed Ogaden to survey thè wells and grazìng areas there to which into thè Protectorate and seìzed livestock. An encountcr with thè British-protected Somali were entitled access. This brought thè Borama authorities quickly followed in which shots were ex- Commissioners to Walwal on 23 November where, to their alarm, changed and four Ethiopians were killed. There were similar, they found their Ethiopian escort which had preceded them con- though less serious, difficulties on eastern border with also thè fronted by a well-armed Italian post. 11 Before following trje locai Somalia : but Ìn thè centre of thè country these complications did consequences of thè well-known and tragic dénouement whìch led not arise, for in thè absence of any Ethiopian administration in thè to thè Italian invasion and conquest of Ethiopia, we must return centrai Haud, thè Protectorate authorities could dispatch police brìefly to survey thè course of Italian and Ethiopian frontier parties into thè area with ìmpunity as need arose. activity in thè years immediately preceding 1935. Nevertheless, thè rime had clearly come to mark out on thè ground thè Protectorate's fronùers which had been defined so many years previously. In response to Italian pressure, attention The Wafoaì incident was given first to thè border with Somalia. This was demarcated It will be recalled that, following thè unsatisfactory 1908 treaty without incident by an Anglo-Italian Commìssion led by Col which perfunctorily and arbitrarily assigned certain clans to thè Stafford and thè Italian scholar and colonial Qvil Servant Dr Italian sphere and others to thè Ethiopian, thè Italians had 106 107 A MODERN HISTQRY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIA NEAS TAFRICA NEMPIRE consistently pursued a forward policy of economie and politicai after his daring attack on thè Italian post at El Bur in 1926, had infiltration in thè Ethiopìan Ogaden. Thus Guido Corni,1* Govcrnor of Somalia in successìon to thè redoubtable De Vecchi, crossed thè frontier and was now engaged in rebuffin gItalian boasts how successfu lthis policy proved during his term of office infiltration in thè Ogaden. (1928-31). Several prominent religious leaders across thè bordcr Thus thè Somali clansmen of thè Ogaden found themselves had now been won to thè Italian cause by generous gifts. Irregular caught between thè rivai attractions of thè two opposing camps, Somali groups, who could be disclaimed conveniently as bandits, both of whom were competing for their allegiance. And because were also recruited and provided with arms to stir up trouble in of thè exigencies of thè nomadic life and thè circumstances of thè Somali clan System in which any widespread politicai collaboration thè area.1» Thus in thè Mustahil region, Ololdin, thè forceful Ajuran sultan, was paid and afmed by thè Italians tò attack thè cannot long survive, they proved an easy prey to thè two powers Ethiopìan tribute-gathering expeditions whose arbitrary activities seeking their allegiance and territory. On thè whole, thè Itaiians constituted virtually ali that there was at this urne in thè way of were thè more successful bccause they were more free with gifts Ethiopìan administration. and blandishments and because it was easy for them to pose as These auxiliaries represented thè spearhead of thè officia iItalian thè champions of Isiam when thè Ethiopians made no attempt to border patrols which, from 1931, organized into a 'Banda* com- conceal their anti-Muslim sentiments. mand, and with a strength of one thousand armed soldiers under The Ethiopians, meanwhile, were not content merely to seek to Italian officer soperated from posts at Cardo, Goddere, and counteract Italian intrusion by actions which were limited to their Caladi, on thè Ogaden sìde of thè disputed frontier. In thè early sphere. Thus, for example, in September 1931, after evicting thè 19305 other small posts were opened as far into thè Ogaden as Italian post at Mustahil, an Ethiopìan force several thousand Walwal, which could scarcely be regarded as lying within thè strong swept down thè Shebelle to menace thè Italian district sphere assìgned to Italy. Yet thè Italian presence there went un- headquarters at Beletweyn, administering to thè Italians an un- challenged until thè tragic incident in 1934. pleasant dose of their own medicine. Italian reinforcements were By contrast, as has already been noted, at this tìme thè Ethio- hastily marshalled, but after hurried diplomatic exchanges an open pians had stili not established any administrative posts in thè east- clash was avoided and thè Ethiopians withdrew. Other incidents crn part of thè Ogaden into which these audacious Italian feelers followed from both sides, culminating in thè clash at Walwal in 1934, by which time preparations for thè invasion of Ethiopìa were now being thrust.16 The main centre of administration was in fact stili far west at Jigjiga ; although, as they had previously done from Eritrea and Somalia were well advanced, and Italy was be- in thè Somali territory lying round this centre and thè city of coming increasingly confident of her position vù-à-vis Ethiopia. Harar, strongly armed tribute-gathering parties were pressing And not wìthout cause. ever farthe rtowards thè cast to pavé thè way for thè eventual It will be remembered how, many years previously, Italy's imposìtion of Ethiopìan rule. At thè same rime, while thè Italiana generai position in thè Horn of Africa had been strengthened by played upon thè andent Somali antagonism towards thè Amhara, thè tripartite treaty of 1906." The effect sof this had been further thè Ethiopians sought to depìct thè Italiana in thè light of ruthless Consolidated by an Anglo-Italian agreement of 1915, by which alien usurpers and to turn internai Somali clan jealousie sto their Britain recognized and agreed to champìon Italy's claims to econo- account. Thus, not only by arbitrary military raids but also by mie interests in western Ethiopia. Italy, in return, agreed to sup- giving arms and other support to those Somali groups hostile to port Britain's aim of securing a concessìon to build a barrage on thè Italiana, thè Ethiopians sought to accomplish thè dual aim of Lake Tana. Thus, as before, Britain was in fact preparing ali pos- countering Italian aggression and winning Somali territory. sible safeguards for her interests in thè event of a collapse of thè Typical of those on thè Ethiopìan side was 'Ornar Samatar, who, Ethiopian monarchy. Three years later, to stili Ethopian fears and to advancc Italian interests more directly ,a treaty of perpetuai 108 109 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: EITALIA EASN TAFRICA EMPIRN E peace and alliance was signed between thè two states. Under thè Trade and commerce were now in any case strictly controlied terms of this, both countries bound themseìves to submit disputes by a rigid System of governmental monopolies and para-statal between them to a procedure of conciliation and arbìtration; a organìzations which left little room for endeavour or enterprise truly remarkable preparatìon for a war of colonial conquest. At and which, by fascisi legislation, explicìtly excluded thè participa- thè same time, in thè councils of Europe, Italy Had been lobbying tion of Somalis or other colonial 'subjects* in any sector of thè quite successfully for Anglo-French acquiescence ìn thè forth- economy where they might be in competition with Italians. In thè comìng act of aggressìon. government of thè colony itself, it is scarcely an exaggeratìon to Without going into ali thè sordid details, thè encpunter at say that fascist bureaucracy had run riot, leading to a proliferation Walwal, between thè Italian garrison and thè Ethiopìan escort of civìl and military functionaries which markedly reduced thè party, led on 5 December to a battle in which by thè employment efficiency of administration. Ali thè apparatus of fascist social life, of superior forces and weapons thè Italians forced their opponents their clubs and organizations - to at least one of which every to withdraw. The futile negotìations' * which followed through thè Italian citizen, child as well as adult, belonged - had been ìmported League of Natìons, Britaìn's tardy decìsion to abandon her sup- from thè mother country: and these permeated thè life of thè port of Italy's colonial adventures, thè equivocation of thè other Italian community to an extent which, particularly in thè locai powers, especially of France, and thè final crushing Italian con- context of Somalia, seems today ludicrous in thè extreme. quest little impeded by thè League's eventual decision to apply The non-Italian populatìon was subjected tc?a complex body of sanctions, have ali been too often described and judged to be again discrimìnatory laws designed to uphold thè racial status of thè retailed here. Up thè imperiai roads in Somalia and Eritrea which colonista; and, although mixed liaisons were common, officially had been built first to attract trade and then to serve as a basìs for they were frowned upon, and ìnter-racial marriage was totaìly for- expansion, with overwhelming numbers, arms, and aerial support, bidden. Fortunately, however, thè Italian legai machine, though thè Italian armies ruthlessly advanced until by 7 May, 1956, thè capable of issuing severe and arbitrary punìshments for trivial war was over, thè conquest complete. The ignominious Italian offences ,was at thè best of times extremely cumbersome, and more- defea t at Adowa, which had always rankled, had at last been over tended often to be mìtìgated in its effect sby thè inducements vindicated and Mussolini could boast that Italy had won her in kìnd or in money to which Somali found many Italian officiate empire at last. open. And after thè conquest of Ethìopia in which more than 40,000 Somali recruits had participated," thè Somali populatìon at large was rewarded by thè rather empty privìlege of being officially Somalia and thè Ogadsn withtn thè ìtalian Easf Afriean Empire designated as 'Somalis' or 'Natives* in piace of thè derogatory With thè conquest of Ethiopia, Somalia was enlarged by thè addi- terms 'subject* and ^indìgeno1 which had previously been thè officiai tion of thè Ogaden and thè regions occupied by Somali on thè usage. With this very lìmìted gesture Somali interests had t6 be upper parts of thè Shebelle and Juba rivers. This added three new content, for no other significant developments were pursued to administrative Provinces to thè territory and brought together extend thè range of those which had taken piace prior to thè Italo- Somali clansmen who had hitherto been arbitrarily separated by Ethìopian war. thè Somalia-Ethiopia 'boundary*. The preparations for thè cam- Yet despite thè harsh character of fascis t legislation and thè paign and thè war itself brought a brief period of unprecedented mass of regulations and propaganda designed to promote and prosperìty to thè colony. This, however, was quìckly followed by preserve thè dignity and 'majesty' of thè 'Aryan* conquerors, it thè economìe decline caused by Italy's participation in thè Second would be quìte wrong to imagine that thè Somali populatìon as a World War, a period during which in Somalia no new develop- whole was at this rime actively hostile to its rulers. Moreover, there ments of importance were undertaken by thè government. were naturally many Italian ofificial whos , while paying lip-service no A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMALI UNIFICATION : THE ITALIAN EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE to thè bombast of fascism, cartìed out their admihistrative duties mcnt had been inculcated which was to prove of great importance conscìentiously and well. And between not a few Somalis and in thè future. Italians there were frequently bonds of friendship and respect, at least as deep as those between Somalis and espatriate officials in thè other Somali territories. Equally, dcspite thè paucity of schooling, The first stirrings of modern Somali nttìonalism knowledge of Italian, often of course vcry rudimentary, was fairly In thè same period, another phenomenon of sìgnificance had be- widespread and certainly more extensive than acquaintance with gun to become evident in Somalia. This was thè rapid growth in Englìsh in thc Somaliland Protectorate. Partly, this is to be ex- urbanization whìch received a new impetus when, aftet thè Ethio- plained by thè case with which it is possible to pick up a tolerable pìan campaigns, large numbers of Somali soldiers were discharged speaking knowledge of Italian, as compared with thè difficulties and settlcd in thè Benadir towns, especially in Mogadishu. This of English, and partly also by thè fact that it was thè polìcy in ancìent port, whh its long cosmopolitan tradition, had, in thè Somalia to regard Somali as a barbarie tongue which must give decade between 1930 and 1940, more than doubled its population, piace to thè civilized language of thè rulers - an aspect of thè and now boasted some 60,000 inhabìtants. Equally, although no Italian image of themselves as colonists with a civiUzing mission trade unipn activity was permitted, thè employment of consider- worthy of thè Roman tradttion. 30 able numbers of workers by S.A.I.S. and other concerns helped to Politically, of course, there was no avenue open for Somali promote thè formatìon of new social and politicai attitudes, and activity except within thè framework of thè traditional clan System, these, further stimulated by western schooling, now began to be or in dealings with adminìsttatìve officiate. Nor was there any apparent in thè towns and principal centres of thè colony. direct partìcipation by Somali in thè government and administra- In these centres, where thè impact of western influence was tion of thè colony save at thè lowest levels, and then always in a experienced most keenly, and where thè traditional System of col- subservient capacity. Thus though Tommaso Galletti, thè first lective indemnification for wrongs was now less necessary than in regular governor of thè colony appointed in 1907, had compared thè nomadic world of thè interior, amongst merchants and traders Somali intelligence favourably with that of his own countrymen, especially there arose a new feeling of dissatìsfaction with thè par- and sensìbly proposed thè creation of Somali, munìcipal councils, ticularism of thè past. This, with thè traditional Somali national and eventually of an elected System of government/ 1 these liberai consciousness, which thè cxperience of Italian patriotic fervour ideas were far in advance of thè spìrìt of his generation, and presented in a new light, and thè long suppressed reaction to alien had to await thè new ideals of thè Italian trusteeship period of thè rule, ali combined to provide conditions favourable to thè emer- 19505. gence of new aspiratìons. Thus, in thè last few years of thè short- Yet to do thè Italians justice, whatever their motives, and not- lived Italian East Afrìcan Empite, thè first definite steps towards •withstanding thè impress of fascism, decidedly more of benefit to thè creation of a modern nationalist movement began to be taken Somalis had been created in Somalia than in thè British Protector- in Somalia. These took thè form of small clandestine meétings, ate, French Somaliland, or, above ali, in thè Northern Province of organized mainly, it appears, by some of thè new generation of Kenya which for long was destined to remain a stagnant back- Somalis who had been to school and were employed by thè Italian water. In publìc buildings and roads, and in thè plantation ìn- government. This activity did not pass unnoticcd, however, and dustry, thè foundations of a modern colony had been created, thè thè Administration took prompt steps to suppress what was benefit of which, despite thè many injustices committed against regarded as a potential threat to Italian rule. The employees con- them, Somalis were to reap in thè future. At thè same time, in thè cerned were separated and posted to remote areas where they were less intractable conditions of thcir colony, a wider respect for law thought to be out of harm's way." and order and a more modern attitude towards centralìzed govern- Meanwhile, in thè British Protectorate, similar developments 112 "5 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA SOMAL UNIFICATIONI TH: E ITALIA NEAS TAFRICA EMPIRN E were occurring. Here, although there was no urban growth of and Arab clerks instead of training locai Somali for these posts. consequence, there were very direct contacts with thè outside These néw currents of opinion, now for thè first time assuming world, through Aden and thè small overseas commuoities of organized form, were, after thè East African campaign and re- Somali seamen which were forming in thè world's main ports. Of occupation of thè Protectorate, soon to find issues capable of arous- greater consequence stili was thè ever-present rnemory and ing a much widcr public ìnterest and concern.** example of Sayyìd Muhammad's struggle for freedom. Again, thè Finally, mention must also be made of a separate but related first impetus seems to have come from thè few Somalis who, after development in Somalia which, though cultura! rather than politi- education in Aden or thè Sudan, had returned to find employment cai, was later to acquìre a highly emotive nationalistic appeal. This in thè clerical grades of thè civil service. One of thè earliest of these was thè invention, about 1920, by *Isman Yusuf Kenadid, of a to espouse thè new aspiratìons and to seek to promote thè generai highly sophisticated and accurate alphabet and script for thè social and politicai betterment of his countrymen was Haji Farah . Although thè Arabie script had long been in use 'Ornar, a former employee of thè Administration, who became in restrictcd cìrcles as a medium for writing Somali, thè differences active in thè 19205. After difficulties with thè Protectorate authori- between thè two languages made thìs a makeshìft expedient. And ties, he was exìled to Aden where, amongst thè growing Somali despite improvements introduced by Sheikh Uways and other communìty there, he participated in thè foundation of thè Somali early pioneers of writing Somali, Arabie stili remained an imper- Islamic Assocìation. Through articles in Aden newspapers and fect vehicle for Somali. 'Osmanìya, as thf cnew script was soon letters and petitions addressed to thè Britìsh government in named after its founder, overcame these disadvantages by com- London, Haji Farah and his associates contrived to bring Somali pletely abandoning thè attempi to rely on thè Arabie alphabet, interests to thè notice of people in Britaìn and thus helped to pre- adopting instead an entìrely new set of letters. This creation of pare thè ground for further developments. a truly indìgenous vehicle for thè national language naturally In thè Protectorate itself, under much thè same kind of inspira- appealed to thè Somali national consciousness, although, from thè tion as in Somalia, small groups of locai merchants and traders start, it found opponents amongst conservative religious leaders began to organice politicai associations and clubs in thè main who favoured Arabie. However, with its inventori position as a centres of Berbera, Burao, and Hargeisa about 1935 .From these member of thè princely famìly of thè Majerteyn clan, it soon gaìned tentative beginnings thè Somaliland National Society emerged a restricted currency in parts of thè Majerteyn region and amongst shortly afterwards. Its principal aìms were to encourage modern other members of thè clan living elsewhere. Later events were to education and progress in generai and to seek to overcome thè create circumstances in which this ingenious writing was to be traditional particularistk rivalries which divided Somali society, championed by thè leaders of modern Somali nationalìsm as a Later, these generai aims were elaborated into a more detailed symbol of Somali achìevement, associated with perhaps thè most programme which also included thè aim of thè unificarion of thè prized of ali things in thè Somali national heritage - thè -Somali Somali people and territorìes. While these aspirations, and par- language.4* ticularly those approving western education, represented a dis- tinct break with thè past, thè Society was in no sense anti-religious and indeed sought both inspiration and justification for many of its aìms in Isiam. In 1937 anothcr movement, more limited in its politicai significance but stili of considerable importance, carne into being. This was thè Somali Official sUnion, formed princi- pally to promote Somali interests in thè Civil Service, and inspired by discontent at thè Administration's policy of employing Indian 114 THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS: 1940-50 position under thè Italiana, thè Ogaden remaìned attached to CHAPTER VI Somalia and was administered with that territory from thè head- quarters at Mogadishu. British Somaliland, though part of thè sanie over-all adminìstration, had its own separate military gover- THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL nor. A further Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, signed in 1945,' re- FRONTIERS; 1940-50 turned thè Franco-Ethiopian railway to its pre-war status along with thè British military cantonments in Ethiopia, but enabled British military administration to continue in thè Ogaden and Somali unìficatiott, Haud without prejudice to Ethiopia's ultimate sovereignty over these areas. With these arrangements completed, thè Horn of ONE OF THEMAN side-cfFectY sof thè Second World War was to Africa was now to become thè scene of a new scramble for Somali stimolate a new conception of Somali nationalism, to foster thè territory; a conflict of interests in which for thè first time thè views natìonalist aim of unifying thè severa! Somali territories, and to of thè Somali themselves and their aspirations for thè future provide conditions under which this aim could largely have been received some belated consideration. realixed. In thè course of thè fighting in Africa, in August 1940, •» thè Italiana captured British Somaliland and added that territory to The Sri fise mìlitóry aà'ffiìmstratìon in Somalia and thè Ogaden thè Somali portion of their East African empire. This, however, was a short-lived success for seven months later thè Protectorate In Somalia thè Italians capitulated more easily and quickly than was recovered, and Somalia and thè Ogaden were occupied by thè had been anticipated, giving up a much largcr area of territory Allies during thè East Africa campaign and liberation of Ethiopia. 1 than thè British authorities were ready to administer. Conse- With thè sole exception of French Somaliland which in 194* quently, it was with thè scantiest of resources and preparation that declaredforDeGaulIe, ali thè Somali territories werenowdestined a ridìculously small band of Gvil AHairs Officerà, many of whom to remain for almost a decade under thè British flag. had no previous colonial experience,. arrived in Somalia to deal The occupied enemy territories administration, which had been with thè chaos left behind by thè fighting. • temporarily established in Ethiopia after thè Italian defeat, was Once thè elements of civil order had been restored, thè most terminated by an Anglo-Ethiopian agreement and military con- pressing problem facing thè new administration was thè serious vention of January 1942, To aid thè movement of Allied troops economie sìtuation created by thè collapsc of thè various Italian and to counter any danger from Jibutì, then stili under Vichy rule, para-statal monopolìes. The plantations on thè ShebeUe and^Juba however, this agreement provided for thè continuance of British were in a sad plight, many of thè Italian farmers having fled to thè Military Administration in thè Ogaden and in thè Haud as part of towns; thè Somali labour force had virtually disappeared, and a series of 'Reserved Areas' and cantonments which also included looting had caused widespread damage. Of thè major conccrns, thè vita! Franco-Ethiopian h'ne of rail from Dire Dawa to thè thè least affected was thè S.A.I.S, enterprise at Villagio which was French Somaliland border. The Haud was ruled from thè Ethio- stili in production and stili enjoyed a considerable complement of pian administrative centro of Jigjiga by a British Senior Qvil manpower, a trìbute to thè better conditions and labour relations Affairs Officer , and thè parallel existence of thè two authorities prevailing there. At Cenale, by contrast, thè British Administra- was a source of Constant embarrassment to each. Cominuing thè tion found that only six out of 136 holdings were stili under effec- tive production, and after severa! weeks of strenuous effor t ordy 116 joo of a required labour force of 8,000 had reported for work. 117 THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS: 1940-50 Somalia Gendarmerie under British officcrs . By 1943 this new A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA force had swollen to an establishment of 3,070 Somalis and African ranks (including some recruits from Tanganyika) with 120 British Latcr this situatìon was improved by an grant of un- cxtensivc officers . With these resources thè generai disarmament of thè occupicd land to thè locai Bimal ckn. Along thè Juba thè position population was satisfactorily achieved, and thè actìvitics of a was even more desperate. number of pro-Italian irregular guerilla groups effectively con- Howevcr, gradually, after thè employtnent conditions of thè trolled. To increase thè force's cfficiency and to provide fot thè former regime had been liberalized, an adequate labour force was future, a police school had been opened and was working extremely forthcoming were encouraged and thè plantations to concentrate well, training Somali N.C.O.s and Officerà , a few of whom by on thè production of sugar and grain to meet thè territory's locai 1949 had reached thè rank of Chief Inspector. At thè same time, needs. fuel Capital loans and tractor were made available to thè appallìng prison conditions of thè fas'cist regime were drastic- Italian farmers. Encouragement was also gìven to locai Somali ally altered. cultivators; and by 1943 Somalia was self-suppòrting in primary While thè centrai police force was thus completely remodelled, foodstuffs, further serious food occurred from although shortages thè gogk tribai rural constabulary-was taken over vktually in its time to time. Somalis and Arabs were also encouraged to panici- entìrety and without serious modification. On thè other hand, thè paté in trade and commerce more fuìly than had prevìously been Italian provincial administration which had collapsed during thè possible under discrìminatory legislation of pàst. Despite thè thè fighting, was completely replaced, ali Provinces and Districts be- these economie achievements, however, a considerable amount of ing placed in thè charge of British Civil Affair sOfficers . Other public assistance was required, particularly to meet thè needs of thè innovations were gradually introduced. The^old clan chiefs and Italian community which in 1941 numbered 8,000 and consisted leaders continued to receive government subsidies as in thè past, mainly of civilians and former servants and their dependants. civil but vacancies in theìr ranks were generally not filled. Instead, in - This problem was eased gradually by thè rcpatriatìon of women order to promote locai government, and as a preparatory step to- and children to Italy, to thè extent that by 1943 there were only wards autonomy and self-rule, tribai assemblies were encouraged some 4,500 Italians left in Somalia of whom a tenth were stili in to act as a liaison with thè Administration; elections for assembly receipt of assistance.1 leaders were held; and Distrkt and Provincial Advisory Councils Equally pressing was thè question of security and thè firm were created in 1946, These new Councils were encouraged to dis- establishment of thè new administration's authority throughout cuss such outstanding problems as water supplies, pastoral better- terrìtory. main thè Here there were two aspects to consider: thè ment generally, agricultural improvement, unemployment and maintenance of law and ordcr amongst thè populatìon as a whole ; food scarcities. and thè special problem of enemy Italian community. thè These Modest advances were also achieved in education. When thè two issues could not be completely separatcd since, with its very British Military Administration assumed contro! of Somalia, it inadequate resources in personnel, thè new administratìon had, of found in operation thirteen state-aided Italian mission schools necessìty, to rely upon thè services of many Italian officiala, providing some elementary education for Somalis and Italians, By particularly those with specialist technical skills. In thè event, whilc 1947 nineteen government elementary schools had been opened, many junior technical official scontinued to worfc under thè British notwithstanding thè difficultie sof recruiting qualified teaching Military Administration,, in more important key posts only those>' staf fin this period, There were also three private schools, and a were retained who showed no fascist and leanings whose conduct! teachers' training centre for Arabs and Somalis with an average indicated that no security risk was ìnvolved. Others were internedJ enrolment of fifty students. Thus, though education was stili piti- in prisoner-of-war camps. fully inadequate both in standards and extent, thè number of At thè same time, radicai and sweeping changes were necessaryv The Italian polke force was disbanded because of its 'bad discipline 119 and unreliability'* and completely replaced by a hastily recruitedj

118 A MODERN HISTORY OF SONfALIA children (stili almost entirely boys) attending school had doubled since before thè war. THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS : 1940-50 While with its concern for imperiai ambìtions and thè needs of its settler population thè Italian government had done lìttle to Administration, while it did not lead to thè promotion of Somali advance Somali interests, a large part of thè energies and activities civil servants to thè extent followed in Eritrea, led to thè training of thè new admmistratio nwas directed towards thìs end. To of a cadre of j unior Somali officials and a smaller number of more understand thè atmosphere in Somalia at this time, and thè nature senior police officers .This, as later events were to show, provided of thè relations between British official sand Somali, it has to be a sound if modest basis for more extensive Somali advancement in remembered that thè new rulers saw themselves as Hberators from thè civìl service in thè trusteeship period preceding independence. fascisi oppression and to a considerable extent were so received. Of even greater significance ,however, was thè Administration's Indeed, thè generally friendly reception accorded to them rein- attitude towards locai politics, Once it had found its feet, thè new forced thè Administration's tendency to regard thè Somali as allies government abolished thè restrictions of thè Italian regime on against thè Italians. And many British official smade no secret ofl locai politicai associations and clubs. Immediately, a proliferatlon their admiration for Somalis and contempt for thè defeatedj of Italian societies arose, expressing ali shadcs of metropolitan Italians. Hence there was from thè begìnning a considerable bone opinion from that of thè estreme right to thè extreme left. After of sympathy between thè new rulers and thè Somali public whichj thè fall of thè fascìsts, locai branches of thè Christìan Democrats in thè liberai currents of opinion of thè times, found expression ini gained thè largest affiliation amongst the^Italian communìty. Ali a strong and quìte explicit prò-Somali policy. Despìte its small| these Italian groups were naturally interested in thè question of thè numbers, moreover, thè new administration was not lackìng in ; future status of Somalia, an issue on which ali shades of Italian energy or initiatìve. And in some respects, thè lack of previous party opinion showed vìrtual unanimity, thè strength of patrìotism experience on thè part of many of its officiat eseems to have been being apparently greater than that of party doctrine. more of an advantage than a handicap ; for it brought fresh and This issue and thè upsurge of activity among thè Italian clubs unprejudiced minds to bear on thè country's problems and fiirther and associations attracted considerable Somali interest. In these emphasized thè break with thè past, giving to thè new government ( conditions, thè currents of progressive Somali opinion which had even more of thè character of a new broom, begun to seek expression in thè closing days of thè fascisi period, There was conscquently a generally favourable response, withj took concrete form with thè establishment of a number of Somali of course some exceptions, to thè benevolent, and on thè whol societies and clubs. The first and most important of these move- enlightened paternaUsm of thè new rulers. And, if thè Brida ments to achleve a formai existence was thè Somali Youth Club official swere sometimes more rigid in their officia i and private! opened at Mogadishu on 13 May, 1943, after several weeks of dis- capacìties than their Italian predecessors, there was little questic cussion with thè locai Politicai Office ron thè form of thè sotiety's of their progressive intentions, Moreover, British law, thouj constitution. The Club had thìrteen founder members representing strictly enforced with often unpopular but effectiv ecollectii ali thè maìn Somali clan groups. Much of thè inspiration carne from punishments to control clan and tribal warfare, soon earned Soi 'Abdulqadir Sekhawe Din, a prominent religious figure of Moga- respect and indeed has left a legacy which is stili valued for il dishu, and from Yasin Haji *Isman Shirmarke of thè Majerteyn impartiality. Above ali, thè defeat of their former masters who hi clan of northern Somalia. Another prominent religious leader who seemed invincible not only gave thè new British Admmistratk played an important part in thè Club's early days was Haji great prestige in Somali eyes, but also prompted an increasù Muhammad Husseyn, also of Mogadishu. Somali sophistication in thè evaluation of foreign nations. Thus, from its inception thè new society contained representa- In practical terms, thè libcralizing cffec tof thè British Militai tives of thè majority of thè traditional clan divisions within thè natìon, and of men of religion as well as laymen, united in thè desire to abolish thè wasteful clan rivalries of thè past and to establish a new conception of nationhood. These aims had always

121 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS: 1940-10 been present in Somali Isiam, and forty years cariici, at thè time of 'To unite ali Somalis generally, and thè youth espccially with Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan, this was thè only means by thè consequcnt repudiation of ali harmfu Jold prejudices (such, for which national patriotism could bejexpressed coherently. Now, example, as tribal and clan distlnctions) ; To educate thè youth in howevcr, these religìous aims were marrìed to a modera conscious- modern cìvilization by means of schools and by cultural propa- ness of natìonhood, and strengthened by a desire for progress in ganda circles; To take an ìnterest in and assist in eliminating by generai expressed through thè new vehicle of thè Somali Youth constitùtional and legai means any existing or future situations Club. which might be prejudicial to thè interests of thè Somali people; With these modernist and progressive aspirations to which thè And finally, to develop thè Somali language and to assist in puttmg British Military Administration was sympathetic, thè Somali into use among Somalis thè 'Osmaniya Somali script,' Youth Club rapidly gathered adherents, its members' conduct be- These were aims with which, as will be evident, no reasonable, ing officially described as 'exemplary*. Initially, It found most ready progressive administration could possibly find fault. Of particular support amongst thè younger educated officiala ,and soon'also in interest in this programme ìs its reàlistic attitude towards modern thè Somalia Gendarmerie. The Club's popularity in thè Gendar- educatìon, so differen tfrom thè traditional religìous oppositìon to merie was no doubt partly due to thè fact that at thè time some of western schooling. Nor was thè League's vìew on this matter thè most highly educated Somalis served in this force. Another merely verbal propaganda. Already, on its own initiatìve, and with sìgnificant factor was that by its very nature this organization thè approvai of thè Administration, thè S.Y.L. had opened a composed of Somalis from every clan division, mixed by deliber- nurober of schools and classes in English. Now too, thè ingenious ate policy in even thè smallest units, also sought to inculcate a Somali 'Osmaniya script, was no longer merely a cultural curio- code of loyalty transcending tribal and clan schisma. In these sity, but had acquired definite natìonalist sìgnificance. The difficul- circumstances, reinforced by thè graduai tendency of both organi- tìes attendìng its wholesale adoption, partly practical and partly zations to acquìre a majority of Darod clansmen in theìr ranks, as a resalt of competition with Arabie, have proved more intrac- there is little doubt that thè Gendarmerie must be regarded as table than some of thè other objectìves in this irJtial S.Y.L. state- having played a significant part in thè growth of modern Somali ment of policy. nationalism at this stage. And despite thè British predeliction for Although thè largest and best organized movement, thè League that princìple of government which discourages politicai activity was not thè only organization to emerge in this initìal period. in thè civil service, thè Somali Youth Club affiliation of many Apart from a number of ephemeral smaller groups, mainly with Gendarmerie and other officìals was condoned because thè new limited locai and particularistic interests, thè most important rivai movement was progressive, co-operated wìth thè government, and was originally formed under thè name of thè Patriotic Benefit was antì-Italian. In other circumstances, thè attitude of thè British Union, or 'Jumiya*, representing chiefly southern Rahanweyn and administering authority might well have been very different ;as in Digil tribesmen, thè partly Bantu rivenne peoples, and some of thè fact, as wìll presently be seen, was thè case in Kenya. locai Arab communìty. This organization, with thè welcome By 1946 thè British Military Administration officially estimated addition of Italian financìal support, favoured a more conservative thè Club to number no less than 25,000 affiliatesi and by thè end policy and sought particularly to protect thè interests of thè south- of 1947 it had changed its name to thè Somali Youth League and ern agricultural tribesmen from domination by thè northern was strongly organized as a politicai machine with branches nomads who overwhclmìngly supported thè League. Out of this throughout Somalia, in thè Ogaden, Haud, British Protectorate, body, which was markedly less anti-Italian than its rivai, developed and even in Kenya where its activities, in a different admìnistra- thè Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali, formed on 25 March, 1947, under tive milieu, were viewed with distìnctly less favour. The League thè presidency of Sheìkh 'Abdallah Sheikh Muhammad. had now a fbur point programme: Meanwhile, thè tempo of politicai activity and interest had

122 123 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS: 1940-50 soared aftcr thè war with increasing speculation on thè future status of thè , an issùe which could only be resolved very limited strategie interests in thè area. By thè end of 1946 thè in thè context of thè whole tangled problem of thè disposai of ali Four Powers had stili not reached agreement on thè whole turgid thè former Italian colonies. Already Ethiopia was pressing for thè question of Italy's former possessions and ìt was decided to send return of thè Ogaden and Reserved Areas, her sovereìgnty over out a commìssion to thè countries concerned (Somalia, Eritrea, which had been recognized in thè 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Libya, and Cyrenaica) to consult their own aspirations for thè Agreements. Ethiopian pretensions extended also even to Somalia, future. which of course Italy was now claiming strongly. To thè four The Commission arrìved at Mogadishu on 6 January, 1948. By Powers inìtially charged with thè disposai of thè Italian colonies, this time thè locai politicai scene had become complìcated by thè however, thè Brìtish Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sensibly strenuous efforts of thè Italians to secure a favourable pro-Italian proposed in thè spring of 1946 that thè interests of thè Somali front, and by thè premature annoùncement of thè Bevin proposals. people would be best served if thè existing union of Somali terri- Though stili uncompromìsingly opposed to any return of their tories were continued. A trusteeship, preferably under Britain, territory to Italy, and stili thè party with by far thè largest follow- although this was not an essential condition» was suggested. ing, thè S.Y.L. had experienced a split in its ranks in its former Unfortunately for Somali aspirations but scarcely surprisingly, stronghold of Majerteynia, where .thè infiltration of Italian this solution was strenuously opposed by Ethiopia. Nor was interests had secured thè promotion of a'rivaksplinter group called Ethiopia to be distracted from her determinatìon to regain thè thè 'Progressive Majerteyn League*. The Hizbia Digil Mirifle . Ogaden by thè promise of British support for her daims to was more seriously divided internally: and ali thè other Somali Eritrea, or more directly, by thè ofìer of thè port of Zeila and parts sodeties had joined together in a catholìc alliance called simply of thè north-west of thè Protectorate in exchange for thosc areas *The Conference* - in which pro-Italìan sentiments were fostered of thè Haud and Ogaden regularly frequented by British protected by Italian money. Nevertheless, despite thè presence of this intni- clansmen in their grazìng movements. sive Italian influence, this configuration of interests had a basis in This tardy British attempi to adjust thè sìtuation showed some Somali politicai realities at thè time. Notwithstanding thè attempt concern for Somali nomadic interests, and a recognition of thè to detach thè important Majerteyn element, thè S.Y.L. had now a real problems created by thè partition of a nomadic people. Even strong Darod following and anti-Darod traditional interests under thè unitary control of thè British Military Administration were often suspicìous of and hostile tò thè League. This was thè these had proved singularly troublesome and had been a Constant case with many, though not ali Somalìs of thè Hawiye clans, of source of friction. This argument, however, had no appeal for whom an important group centrìng on Mogadishu tended to Ethiopia. Nor did it carry mudi weight with thè other three powers regard thè Italians as potential allies against further Darod intru- concerned with thè problem of thè disposai of thè Italian terri- sion and pressure in their affairs .Similarly, many of thè Rahan- tories. For they tended to be generally sceptical of British inten- weyn and Digil tribesmen continued to .accept Itah'an support in tions, and their wider interests, in so far as they impinged at ali on an effor tto cnhance and safeguard their interests against those of thè Somali question, tended to run counter to thè Bevin proposals. thè predominantly nomadic clansmen of thè north. Thus from thè start it was dear that if thè British scheme for In addition to attempting to divide thè ranks of their strongest Somali unification was to have any prospect of success it would opponents in thè League and to sponsoring and encouraging thè need strong advocacy. As matters turned out, it soon became growth of rivai organisations, thè Italians were also engaged in a obvious that thè forces arrayed against thè pian were such that to direct and forthright propaganda campaign for thè return of have sought to overcome them would have required a degree of Somalia to Italy. Towards thè end of 1947 these manceuvres effor tand politicai sacrifice which was not warranted by Britain's assumed formidable proportions, and locai marufestations of Italian concern, backed by thè mctropotttan radio and press, had 124 125 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONI AL PRONTIERS :1940-^0 bccome incrcasingly vociferous and arrogant in tone. It was, more- Gendarmerie supported by contingents of thè King's African over, difficul tfor thè British Mìlitary Administratìon to deal fairly Rifies.8 After this unfortunatc incìdent, hysterìcal allegatìons were and also firmly with this upsurge of Italian natìonal prìde. For thè levelled at thè Administration which was accused of complicity on future of thè territory was stili in questìon and already Somali thè Somali side and of faìling adequately to protect Italian lives had unjustifiably by of hopes been encouraged discussion thè and property. Bevìn pian which, as was now becoming increasingly evident, It was in this atmosphere of smouldering animosity that thè could not be implemented. The locai Italian community was, Four Power Commission proceeded to cxamine, surprisingly non- warned òfficially of were likely to however, thè dangers which chalantly in thè cìrcumstances, thè cases of thè various parties and ensue if this exuberant campaign continued. But, apparently, thè groups, thè Italians hoping to profit from thè sympathy whìch Italians relied upon British Administration to their thè uphold their losses had attracted. The maìn spokesman for thè S.Y.L. was interests, even if this meant unjustly suppressìng Somali nationalist 'Abdillahi Ise (later to become the'first Premier of Somalia).' The fervour. Certainly there was Uttle ìf any modification in thè con- League's President, Hajì Mahammad Husseyn, also played a duct of thè Italian for a return of Somalia to Italy, and agitatìon prominent part in thè hearings; and thè very detailed and impres- events carne to a tragic head with thè arrivai of thè Four Power sive S.Y,L. programme for thè future development of thè country Commission of inquìry. was drafted with thè advìce of Mr Salole, an Aden Somali As soon as thè Commission had assembled at Mogadishu it was lawyer employed in thè legai department of^he Administration, greeted by a flurry of Italian fiags and slogans. The British Chief and of Michael Mariano, a former administrative employee from Adminìstrator warned thè Commìssioners of thè danger to public thè north.* As on previous occasions, thè party stressed its aim of order, and particularly to Italian lives and property, likely to follow bringing thè Somali territories together under a single govern- if similar demonstrations were allowed to continue. The Com- ment, of working steadily towards full independence, and advo- mission, however, replied that it wished to observe such public cated a ten years* period of trusteeshìp for Somalia under Four manifestations of support, and asked that permission be granted Power administration. On no account would thè League coun- for a large public rally to be held by thè S.Y.L. on 11 January. tenance a return of Italian mie. This was granted, and on thè appointed day thè Youth League The majority of thè other Somali groups, organìzed with assembled a large number of its supporters at Mogadishu. On Italian financial support into a consorùum under thè name of thè thè mornìng of thè same day, without prior notification or author- 'Somalia Conference', presented a less coherent programme in ization, members of thè Italian community and their supporters which they proposed a trusteeshìp period of thìrty years for and henchmen, many of whom had been hired for thè occasion, Somalia, under Italian rule, but subject to thè radicai reform of thè thronged in lorry loads into thè town. Many of thè Italian party country and its development in ali spheres. The H.D.M.S., while were armed with bows and arrows as well as other weapons and previously supporting this view, had now broken wìth thè jCon- proceeded to apply these in a determined effor tto break up thè ference and favoured Four Power trusteeship for thè same lengthy S.Y.L. demonstration. Tension rapidly mounted, and both sides period. The opinions of ali thè locai Italian societies and interest- were soon engaged in a filli-scale battle in thè course of whìch groups were conscìentiously heard, and treated indeed with greater Italians shot at S.Y.L. supporters and threw hand-grenades into respect and attention than their numbers might nave seemed to thè crowd. warrant. These, needless to say, unanimously favoured thè return This rash action cost thè Italian community dear; fifty-one of Somalia to Italy. Italians were killed and a similar number wounded. Somali Having studied thè vìews of a considerable cross-section of thè casualties were less severe. Widespread looting also occurred, and population, thè Commission» in due course submitted its find- further violence was only prevented by thè action of thè Somalia ings on Somalia to thè Council of Foreign Ministers, reporting,

126 127 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS: 1940-50 correctly, dcspitc frequent jibcs at S^Y.L. delegates during thè heat- In any case, Somali nationalism mainly expressed through thè ings, that thè League's programme commanded thè largest public S.Y.L., which immediately gathered a fresh access of support, was support in thè territory. Nevertheless, notwithstanding thè mani- now so firmly entrenched that, whatever happened, there could fest opposition to a return of Italian authority, Britain, Hke France be no return to thè stagnation and oppression of thè fascisi period. and America, had now definitely come round to supporting trusteeship under Italy, while Russia, although previously also advocating this, had now decided in favour of Four Power control. The disposai of thè HwdàndQgàdm With this fatture to reach agreement which involved also thè other Meanwhile, while in Somalia itself thè majority of thè population ex-Italìan colonies, thè whole turgid issue was passed for settle- had been fighting to achieve independence and freedom from ment to thè General Assembly of thè United Nations. And having Italian rule, in thè Ogaden a similar campaign was in progress now abandoned its earlier proposals for Somali unificatìon, thè against thè surrender of that territory to Ethiopia. And despìte its Brìtish government proceeded to defend its new position-by seek- isolatìon and backwardness, thè new aspìrations spread by thè ing to discredit thè S.Y.L. claim to speak for thè majority of League quickly found support. As early as 1942 there had been Somali. Statements in thè House of Commons to thìs effect ,drew disturbances in thè Harar-Jigjiga region connected with Ethio- a sharp reply from *Abd ar-Rashid 'Ali Shirmarke 10 who had now pian attempts to impose direct taxation. Two years later, leaders become Secretary of thè League and was later to lead an indepen- of thè Ogaden clans petìtìoned thè British Mìlitary Administra- dent Somali government. 'Abdillahi 'Ise was dispatched to lobby don, urging Britaìn not to relinquish their territory to Ethiopian thè United Nations delegates : and thè pro-Italian Conference now rule. enjoying little public support, and largely controlled by thè These attempts to preserve Somali independence were coun- Italian Liaison staff at Mogadìshu, sent rcpresentatives to promote tered by Ethiopian moves designed to win Somali favour. To thè thè Italian case. embarrassment of thè British authorities, thè Ethiopian Governor While thè U.N. Assembly discussed thè disposai of thè Italian at Jigjiga sought to solicìt Somali goodwill by offering hìgher colonies at its meeting at Lake Success in 1949, having before it salaries to Somali elders and clan leaders than those paid by thè thè Bevin-Sforza compromise pian proposing Italian trusteeship Administration. The response to these overtures varied consider- for Somalia" for an unspecified period, popular demonstrations ably. The officia i head of thè faction-ridden Gadabursi clan, in agaìnst thè Italìans continued at Mogadishu and elsewhere in thè receipt of a stipend from both sides, was gradually won over to thè territory. Somalia's fate was now clearly in thè balance, and Ethiopian cause, leading many Gadabursi to defect from thè Somali hopes seemed likely to founder, as so often in thè past, for S.Y.L. Others, however, and they were in thè majority, fiocked to quite extraneous reasons. This duly occurred, but, despite thè thè League which became so successful that thè Ethiopians spught strength of anti-Italian feeling, thè Assembly *s decision on 21 to ban it, but were prevented by thè British Administration. Hav- November, 1949, to entrust Somalia for ten years to Italian admìn- ing failed in thìs direct line of attack, a counter-movement istration under U.N. tutelage was received calmly and without financed by thè Ethiopian government was launched called thè incident. As will be apparent presemly, this unexpectedly peaceful Somali Mutual Relief Association. This, however, did not attract acceptance of thè decision was not merely a matter of resignatìon in much support. Full advantage was also taken of thè occasion of thè face of thè ìnevìtable. Due account has to be taken of thè very thè Duke of Harar's wedding in 1946 to which leading Ogaden firm provisions which thè Assembly laìd down ensuring that Italy clansmen were invited as officia iguests. would discharge her new responsibilities honourably, and, even These various blandishments were of questionale value, but more signìficant, of thè limitation of thè period of trusteeship to with uncertainty as to whether thè Bevin pian would be imple- ten years. mented mounting, towards thè end of 7946 a number of Ogaden

129 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONTA LFRONTIKRS :1940-50 Icadcrs took thè precaution of making contaci with thè Ethìopìan governar at Jigjiga. This situation, ìndeed, was one with which However, by agreement with Ethiopia, Britain retained a thè Ogaden clansmen were already only too famìliar from their temporary civil affair sadmìnìstration, directed from thè British prcvious experience of Italo-Ethiopian competition. And in thè Protectorate, within that part of thè Haud and Ogaden which thè present circumstances of contìnued doubt as to their future posi- 1935 Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission had established as tion, it was naturai that thè clansmen concerned should seek to being habitually frequented by British protected Somali clansmen provide for every possibility. Nevertheless, thè generai character in their further grazing movements. This, of course, did not in any of opposition to Éthiopian control was indisputable." In 1947, way question Ethiopia's sovereignty ìn these 'Reserved Areas*, this was amply demonstrated when, with thè exception only of although this rested ultimately upon thè ambiguous 1897 Anglo- thè 'Ise, ali thè clans of thè Ogaden and Reserved Areas presented Ethiopian treaty, which despite thè recent ìnterpretation gìven to thè British authorities with a petition agaìnst thè surrender of it had originally carefully refrained from acknowledging Éthio- their country to Ethiopia, requesting that their protesta should be pian sovereignty over thè areas in question.1* conveyed to thè General Assembly of thè United Nations. Thus Ethiopia had in fact done very well ìn these transactions, Britaìn, as has been seen, had earlìer sought to rctain thè and had turned thè Italian conquest of her territory to considerable Ogaden as part of thè Bevin scheme for Somali urnfication. But profit. She had gained thè Ogaden which she had never fully as this pian had come to nothing, thè British government decided administered and to which her only international title was pro- that thè time had now come to abandon thè Ogaden to Ethiopia in vided by thè 1897 and 1908 Italo-Ethiopian, agreements. And fulfilmen t of thè 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements. even if she was not at once to admìnìster it fully ,she had also now This course of action was adopted despite thè known strength of unambiguously acquired thè Haud, to which her originai legai, as Somali feeling on thè matter, and thè naturai repugnance of thè well as moral, claim was tenuous and debatable. As thè victìm òf British officials on thè spot to partecipate in what many regarded fascisi aggression, Ethiopia had naturally every right to thè most as a betrayal of Somali interests. And when thè decision was considerate and gcnerous treatment. But it was unfortunate that, announced at Jigjiga, a riot occurred in which twenty-five Somalis in thè process of satisfying her claims to reparation for thè events lost their lives. Nevertheless, apart from this gesture of defiance, of thè past, protesting Somalis should bc sacrificed and thè collec- thè population of thè Ogaden as a whole bowed to thè inevìtable; tive Somali desire for national self-determination be cast asìde and thè transfer from British to Éthiopian control took piace almost as soon as it had achieved an articulate existence. smoothly and without further incident on 23 Septcmber, 1948. This unexpectedly peaceful exchange, whether or not this was thè The rehabìlitation of thè Sri fiso Protettorate intended effect ,was no doubt facìlitated by thè disbursement amongst thè Ogaden clansmen of some £91,000 by thè departing Having abandoned thè Bevin pian for a Greater Somalia, and British in settlcment of ali outstanding blood-dues and claims having relinquished thè Ogaden to Ethiopia, thè next step^was incurred durìng thè period of British rule." In any event, Ethiopia obviously thè return of thè British Somaliland Protectorate to its had at last gained thè Ogaden which she had so long coveted, and, pre-war status. This took piace in November 1948 when Mr in contrast to thè position at thè time of thè Italo-Ethiopian con- Gerald Rccce (later Sìr Gerald), formerly Provincia! Commissioner in thè Northern Province of Kenya, was appointed Governor of flict in 193 5, was now in a position to establish her rule throughout thè Protectorate and also invested with thè office of Mìlitary this vast area. The tribute-gathering sorties which Ras Makonnen had sent out from Harar and Jigjiga at thè turn of thè century, Administrator of thè Haud and Reserved Areas. which had created a basis for Ethiopia's pretensions to sovercignty Since thè re-occupation of thè Protectorate in 1941 much had occurred, thè old care and maintenance policy of thè past having over thè Ogaden, had at last bornc fruit. been at last decisively abandoned in favour of more progressive 130 A MODliRN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS." 1940-50 policies. Por this complete changc of orientation much credit is for Somali nurses opened in 1945. The long-standing problem due to thè effort sof Sir Gerald Fisher, Military Governor from of secular education was also attacked. With three elementary 1943 to 1948. Despite thè more intractable character of economie schools opened at Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao in 1942, a con- and social conditions in thè Protectorate as compared with Som- certed campaign by radio and mobile cinema was mounted two alia, and thè absence of thè colonial basis which had been created years later to win support for further educational developments. there by thè Italians, thè upheavals of thè war had not been wìth- The response this received was favourable; and by 1945, seven out effec tupon thè locai Somali population. These circumstances elementary schools with an attendance of over four hundred favoured an extension of thè modernist trend which had begun boys were functioning. Assistance was also being given to nine- to appear before thè war; there was now appreciably less hostiiity teen private Koranic schools teaching Arabie and arithmetìc. to secular progress and social change. By 1950 there were two Intermediate schools and plans for On thè return of thè Britìsh in Aprii 1941, thè first problems starting secondary education. In the-same period thè scope of were again those of re-establishing norma! trade and commerce agrkultural services expanded considerably; experiments with and of restoring law and order, which, as in Somalia, entailed new crops and fertìli^ers were initiated, grazing control schemes thè recovery of thè large stores of weapons and ammunìtion were put into effect ,and a number of small experimental date discarded during thè fighting. Since Berbera, as well as a number plantation swere establlshed. of other stations, had been seriously damaged in thè operations, It might be thought that thè successful introcjuction of these it was decided to build a new government headquarters at Har- new measures, and pardcularly of secular education, implied that geisa, thè site of Sheikh Maddar's religious community, in thè ali conservative resistance to change had been overcome. This, centrai hinterland of thè Protectorate. This was a decision in however, was far from being thè case. There was stili an under- fall accord with thè new forward policy of extending administra- tow of antagonism which thè severe devastation caused by a tive and social servìces through thè Protectorate: thè old days of plague of locusts in 1944-45 brought to a head. Anti-Iocust thè coast adminìstration based on Berbera had gone for ever. The measures employing locust bait, whìch was regarded with sus- reception accorded to thè returning Brìtish was also propitious. picion, were interpreted by some elements in thè population as a On ìts own initìative thè Carnei Corps reported for duty armed deliberate attempi by thè government to kill Somali camels and with Italian weapons, and was at orice dispatched to disami thè stock; and in 1945 this issue provoked a serious riot at Burao clansmen of thè interior. By thè end of thè year, trade and com- and sìmilar troubles at Erigavo. Order was restored without much merce were back to normal and thè primary dìsarmament of thè dìfficulty , but thè situation pointed to thè need for a marked whole population had been achieved without serious incident. improvement in public relations and a tightening up in admin- By thè end of thè folìowing year thè policc force had been com- istrative contrql. In point of fact, at thè rime, thè administrative pletely reorganized and, with a strength of eight Britìsh officers establishment was quite inadequate, there being only five Dìstrict,. and inspectors and some 800 Somali other ranks, was in a secure Commissioners available to run six Distrìcts, and only one of position to maintain civil order. these official acould speak Somali. As will be evìdent, thè Pro- By 1945 ,with thè aid of thè new Colonial Development and tectorate was stili very lightly administered. Welfare scheme of grants, a co-ordinated programme for de- As in thè past, thè line of control ran through thè Dìstrict velopment was under way. A generai survey of thè resources Commissioners to government stìpended Akils, a few of whom and potentialities of thè country, including a study of grazìng were empowered to hold minor courts without any crimìnal and watering requirements, began in 1943 under thè direction jurisdiction. The Kadis Courts, regulating matters of personal of Mr J. A. Hunt, an experienced geologist and administrative status according to Islamic Law, continued to function under a officer .Public health services were extended, and a training school Chief Kadi presiding over a court of appeal at Hargeisa. In 1945,

132 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS : 1940-50 thè Akils Courts, more appropriate to-a more hìerarchical tradi- with thè needs and ìnterests of thè Isaq clans and particularly tional System than that characteristic of Somali society, and activc in promoting these in Kenya. In thè Protectorate, eithcr which had never worked very well, werc gradually abandoned through this organization, or ìndependently of it, most of thè in favour of a new System of Subordinate Courts. These courts Isaq supported thè S.N.L. consisted of a judgc and assessors expert in customary law, but The introduction of thè Somali Youth League to thè Protec- also with sufficien teducation to record proceedings in English torate, and its graduai growth in adherents in 1947, brought a or Arabie. Thìs more fiexible arrangement was more in keeping new element into thè situation, and one which was by no means with thè spirit of Somali customary procedure. In thè main welcomcd by thè locai Administration.1* For although thè S.Y.L. towns, new township committees were formed to provide for a was generally representative of ali thè Somali clans, to thè dom- graduai devolution of authotity, and a town planning board was inantly Isaq population of thè Protectorate it was tinged with a also set up. strongly Darod flavour, appealing rherefore more immediately The most notable experiment launched in this period, however, to thè eastern Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans than to thè was thè creation of a Protectorate Advisory Council, whìch in centrai Isaq. However, thè serious disturbances which marked thè presence of thè Governor, held its first meeting in July 1946. thè polidcal scene in Hargeisa in 1947, though,connected with a Delegates representing most sections of public interest, thè new proposed merger of thè S.N.L. and S.Y.L., were apparently not as well as thè old, attended from each District. The first meeting motivated by tradìtional Isaq-Darod antagonism. They were lasted a week, and thè Council's agenda included such topics as: produced, in fact, it seems, by a split within thè Isaq themselves, thè development of agricolture, thè problem of destitution and one party favouring thè new alliance, while thè other, being juvenile delinquency in towns (very pressing at thè lime), thè more conservative, supported thè Isaqiya association. One of thè extension of thè Subordinate Court scheme, thè operdng of further two factions concerned consisted mainly of Habar Yunis clans- rural dispensaries, grazing control, and thè more controversial men who had recendy lost their tradidonal position as thè main issue of grazing movements in thè Haud and Reserved Areas. source of employees in government servìce. The loss of this This last item concerned thè conflicting grazing movements of lucrative and influential monopoly, which dated from thè earlicst thè Isaq and Dulbahante clans from thè Protectorate and those days of British rule, had been hastened by thè new administrative of thè Ogaden, a problem to become increasingly difficul t of polìcy of seeking to relate thè employment of Somali personnel solution after thè surrender of thè Ogaden and Haud to Ethiopian to thè relative strengths of thè various clans. This policy, while administration. appealing to others, had little attraction for thè Habar Yunis, and These progressive moves were accompanied by a considerale caused considerable bitterness. awakening of modern politicai interest which was further stimu- This turbulent phase, however, quìckly passed, and after thè lated by growing concern over thè future status of thè Protec- abandonment of thè Ogaden to Ethiopia, thè announcement of torate and thè Somali terrìtorìes generally. In this situation, thè Somalia's future status, and thè resumption of civil administra- Somaliland National Society which had emerged immediately don in thè Protectorate ìtself, having no major and immediate bcforc thè var, joìned with another locai association to form thè issue to marshal public concern, interest in thè new politicai Somaliland National League. Although described in thè officiai assocìations temporariiy flagged. Such interest as remaincd records of thè time as more conservative than thè S.Y.L., this seemed for thè present in thè main content to co-operate with body shared thè League's aìm for Somali unification as well as thè Administration in thè graduai development of thè country. championìng thè extension of education and thè abolition of clan By 1950, indeed, it seemed that a new spirit of co-operation particularism. Also in existence in this period was thè more between thè public and its government had been achieved, and narrowly based Isaqiya association, concerned almost entirely thè Protectorate appeared to be set fair on a course of graduai

135 A MODER NHISTORY OF SOMALIA THE RESTORATION OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS : .1940-50 evolution and progress. And in keepìng with this state of aflairs cncouraged, in contrast to thè position in British Somaliland and thè first decisive steps in thè eventual Somalizatìon of thè civìl Somalia. service had been taken. Several police officer àhad reached thè Nevertheless, a territorial Representative Council wit hstatu- tank of Inspector, a Somali Inspector of Schools had been ap- tory powers was established in 1945. This body contained an pointed, and two Somali official ahad gone to England on Col- equal number of representatives of thè locai French community onìal scholarships. A modest beginning, but stili a begìnnìng. and of thè mixed Somali, *Afar ,and Arab population, its members being appointed partly by election and partly by nomination by thè CSte's Governor. And in addition to its locai functions, thè Tèe generai sìtuaììon at thè end of 1949 Council appointed one representati ve to thè Council of thè French Of ali thè Somali territories only French Somaliland, 16 with its Republic, and another to thè French Union Assembly . In thè National Assembly itself, thè Còte was directly represented by a rivai Somali and lAfar population, had experienced no major change of government and remained generally aloof from thè Deputy elected from thè combined native and French electoral momentous tide of events which characterize thè decade in thè colleges. area as a whole. This isolation and insulation coìncides in a way As in other French territories, this canalization of politicai with thè particularism of thè 'Ise Somali in thè Còte, and their activity towards thè metropolitan country, ppofoundly affected attachment, for thè most part certainly at this tìme, to Ethiopia, thè later development of politicai parties, serving to insulate a situation in conform ity with Franco-Ethiopian co-operation. politicai movements in French Somaliland from those in other Although with its port of Jibuti extensively developed between parts of Somaliland. The generai effec tof French policy was thus Còte 1926-39, anid its salt factory in maximum production in 1936, thè isolation of thè from thè tenor of Somali advancement thè Cote had become thè most profitable of ali thè Somali terri- elsewhere. And thè perpetuation of thè old tradition of Franco- British rivalry in thè Horn of Africa was very evìdent in thè tories, very Httl ein thc way of social progress had been attcmpted. The pastoralists' needs had, it is true, been improved by a vet- French mistrust of Britain's originai plans for Somali unification, little erinary service started in 1939 ,heatth services existed on a rudi- a deeply grounded suspicion of British motives which lost after officially mentary scale, and education by 1950 provided eight schools fot of its savour Mr Bevin's pian had been discarded. some 720 pupils . But apart from thè urbanized population of It was stili a common view, in French officia icìrcles, given Jibuti, which had swelled rapidly to a town of 20,000 inhabitants, currency also by Ethiopian sources, that, to thè detrìment of Ethiopia, Britain stili nurtured hopes of supporting thè estab- thè traditional pastoral life of thè interior remaincd virtually lishment of a Greater Somalia with a Somali government friendly unaffectcd. to England.17 Later events bave not entirely supported this The System of administradon, in which Commanders of Dis- jn- terpretation of British interest in N.B. Africa. tricts (cereles) were either military or civil officials ,was otherwise Thus, although by 1950 a measure or repre sentati ve govern- similar to that in thè British Protectorate and Somalia, although ment had been granted to thè Cote, and more in fact rhan was no attempi had yet been made to promote anything in thè way given at thè time to British Somaliland or Somalia, both these of modern locai government . Nor were there any Somalis in territories had experienced a more profound and far-reachin^ training for responsible positions in thè civil service which con- politicai awakening .In addition, both these poruons ot Somali- tinued to be stafled exclusively by expatriates. And although trade land, and particularly Somalia, were now unambiguously launched unions had come into existence amongst thè working population on a course of development and progress leading to independcnce. of Jibuti, there were as yet no locally based politicai parties not- Unfortunately for Somali national aspìrations, however, thè wìthstanding thè fac t that thè S.Y.L. and S.N.L. had seme sup- unique opportunity which had existed for welding these two port in thè territory. Nationalist politicai activity indeed was not

156 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA territorics together with thè Ogaden and Haud, and preparine this national entity for self-government under a single System of tuie, had been irrctrievably lost. For thè present, Somali nation- alist activity was accordingly forced to concentrate most of its energies upon locai issues in British SomalUand and Somalia, CHAPTER VII while elsewhere it was suppressed and condemned to a clan- destine existence. FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO From thè Somali point of view consequently, thè advantages which had in fact materialìzed during Britain's period òf military INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 rule were slight compared with thè expectatipns which had been aroused. And appreciation of thè progress achìeved during this time was mitigated by bitterness at thè failure of thè Bevìn pro- The introduction of representatìve govemment in Somalia posals. Those who did not know ali thè issues involved in thè ITALY' SNEW POSITIO iNn her former colony of Somalia was negotiations concemìng thè disposai of thè ex-Italian colonies, carefully and closely defined in thè United Nations Tru;:eeship and some of those who did, were left to upon this further agreement under which she assumed responsibilìty for :he ter- instance of thè fickleness of British policies. And far from gaining ritory. The Italian Trust Admìnistration (A.FvI.S.) was re-quired a ratìonal national basis for preparatìon for self-rule, divisive thè to 'foster thè development of free politicai institution sind to effect sof thè nineteenth-century partition of Somaliland, particu- promote thè development of thè inhabitants of thè tcrritory larly in respect of Ethiopia's portion, had now bccome more towards independence'. To achieve this end Somalis wcrs to be firmly entrenched than before. This inevìtably thè strengthened given increasing responsibility in thè politicai and admim;:ranve barriers opposing Somali nationalist endeavour and Consolidated control of their country under thè benevolent tutorship of thè thè colonia! legacy of fragmentatìon which could only lead to Trust Admìnistration .The Agreement, which was apprcTed by frustration and friction in thè future. thè U.N. Assembly on 2 December, 1950 ,also container :as an But despite this, thè centuries* old cultural nationalism of thè annex a declaration of constitutional principles guaraz:eeing Somali had at last found a powerful politicai expression. modern Somali rights and thè full implementation of thè Trust Admin- Somali nationalism in fact had gained an impetus and momentum ìstration's obligations. To malte assurance doubly sure fr:oi thè which was to carry it increasingly forward, notwithstanding this Somali point of view, a special U.N. Advisory Counci lwas reated continued partition and thè continuing force of internai clan to sit in Mogadishu to previde direct liaison with thè Italian rivalries and factionalism. This new politicai development, Adminìstratio nand its wards. This body, which consistei of a exercise moreover, opened a new field for thè of tradìtional smal lcommittee of representatives of U.N. member goverrjnèrits Somali polìtica! expertise. And certainly few emergent nations and a small secretariat staff ,was available to mafc erecorrjzenda- could boast a more vigorous and exacting politicai tradition than tions and reports on thè progress of developmen tinali spher:s and that of thè democratic pastoral social System where, perforce, to provide tangible evidence of United Nations responsibil:"7 and cvery man is a politician and must exercise ali his politicai talents concern. The effec tof this U.N. presence was also furthe r?=:eng- to thè uttermost if he is to survive and prosper in this demanding thened by thè provision of regular visiting mission swh:cr, like and hostile environment. thè Advisory Council, reported to thè Trusteeship Conrcil of thè United Nations.1 These measures which left Italy little room for mancr-nre or evasion, coupled with thè restriction of thè trusteeship penod to 138 139 A MOIH'.K NHISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 ten ycars, hclpcd to alJay Somali apprehensions. Nevertheless, able advance on thè situation in 1950 when lìtde more than two thè first fcw ycars of thè new regime were marked by animosity thousand students were rcceiving education. It also testified to and suspidon on both sides, With memories of thè 1948 distur- thè new and widespread public appetite amongst thè old and bances vcry mudi alive, and consaous that they were unlikely young alike, especially in thè towns, for Western education. to receive a very cordial welcome, thè returnìng Itallan authori- Serious attempts to provide fundamental education for adults ties judged it prudent to ensure that they were adecjuately pro- amongst thè less accessible nomadic sectìon of thè population tected against any violent espression of Somali resentment. To were also made, though wìth less successi Priority was also given Somalis, however, thè strong military forces which were dis- to higher and vocational education. Here thè Italian Administra- patched to support thè establishment of thè new administration, tion showed initiative and courage in opening a School of gave thè handover much of thè character of a military occupation. Politics and Administration at Mogadishu in 1950 as a training Nor was thè position much eased by thè heavy-handed manner centre for Somali officials and politicai leaders. This bracketing in which thè Italians tended, initìally at least, to reassert their together of thè two skills most ;needed in an emergent country authority. Some prominent S.Y.L. members who had achieved was also reflected in later legislation which, in marked contrast responsible positions in thè civil service under thè British were to thè British tradhion, encouraged members of thè civil service reduced in rank, dismìssed, and in a few cases imprisoned. Similar to stand'as candidates for election to thè legislature, secure in thè measures were also taken against leading S.Y.L. civilians, par- knowledge that if they faìled they could resumé their administra- ticularly those judged to be dangerously anti-Italian; and a tive careers whhout handicap. By 1957 tlje School of Politics defermined attempi was made to discredit thè strength and popu- had provided a cadre of officials with basic training in administra- larity of thè League. Aibitrary acts of this sort led to S.Y.L. tion, and thè emphasis then switched to thè concomitant need demonstrations and, on a number of occasions, to riots which for technically qualified staf f in other fields. The School was were strongly repressed by thè authorities. transformed into a Technical and Commerciai Institute. Mean- This unfortunate vendetta, however, dìd not involve ali thè while, in 1954, a Higher Institute of Law and Economics, later rank and file of thè S.Y,L. and did not prevent some members to become Somalia's University College, was opened to provide from unostentatiously co-operating with thè Italians in thè imple- a two-year Rome University diploma course. mentation of new progressive developments. Hence, although These locai measures were reinforced by generous bursary thè first two years of thè trusteeship were marked by a series of provisions for study overseas, mainly in Italy, although Egypt ìncidents between thè League and thè Administration which also made considerable numbers of scholarships available as part reduced thè immediate effectiveness of measures designed to of her aid programmo. ' These developments did much to dissi- promote Somali advancement, this equìvoca! period nevertheless pate what remained of Somali scepticism over Italian intentions, saw thè groundwork for progress firmly established. Nowhere and this effec twas greatly enhanced by thè progressive opening was this more strikìng than in thè field of education. An ambitious of senior posts in ali branches of thè civil service to _Somaìì and imagìnative scheme for generai education crystallized in a officiate . Here advancement proceeded with rapidity, to such an five-year development programme launched in 195 2 with extent indeed that by 1956 ali Districts and Provinces were in thè UNESCO collaboration. New state schools providing free educa- direct charge of Somali adminìstrative officerà .Although ìt would don replaced thè mission schools upon which thè Italians had be unrealistic to imagìne that in ali administratìve procedures these relied in thè past; and by 1957 some 31,000 children and adults new Somali official awere as competent as those they replaced - of both sexes were enrolled in primary schools, 246 in Junior and there were certainly shortcomings in such matters as record secondary schools, 3 3 6 in technical institutes, and a few hundred keeping and paper-work - in their day-to-day administration, par- more in higher educatìonal institutions, This represented a not- ticularly in thè Districts, they showed a hìgh standard of ability.

140 T4T A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA l'ROM T1UISTKKSII1 TOP INDEPENDENCE :19^0-60 Whìle in educatìon, thè Italian Trust Admìnìstration built irregular In succeeding ycars, cotton exports reached a pcak figure essentially upon thè efforts of theìr immediate British predeces- as early as 1952; and, with a more steady rate of progress, cercai sors, in economics thè groundwork went directly back to thè productlon by 1957 was sufficient to permit an export surplus, fascist period. Unfortunately, however, advancement here on a Over thè Ram eperiod almost £3 million were invested by Italian scale and at a pace equal to that achieved in other spheres proved conccrni in plantation agriculture and ìndustry, thè main Italian much more difficult .With an annual subsidy from Italy of ovcr compuny , S.A.I.S., producing by 1956 sufficien t cane sugar to £3 million between 1950 and 1955 ,much of public expenditure mect Snrnulu'G own needs and to provide a margin for export. was necessarìly devoted to reconstruction and repair and applied The prlnclpa! export asset, however, remained thè banana in- to improve roads, Communications, and other public Works dustry which , since it had been an Italian state monopoly, had concerned with education, government, and health. In 1954, languiteci during thè perìod of British military adminìstration. however, a comprehensive scheme for- developing Somalìa's This vai rcvivcd after thè Italian retutn on a simikr basis under economie resources was launched in thè form of a Severi Year thè tltlc of Azienda Monopalio Banane. By 1955, although stili Development Pian based upon studìes made by thè Trust Ad- hedgccl flbout with tarìff restrictìons and judged by some econo- ministratìon, thè United States I.C.A. mìssion, and U.N. agencies.* misti1 to bc operating uneconomically, banana exports had risen This scheme provlded for a total expenditure of some £4 million, to ovcr j 0,000 tons annually - almost five times thè figure achieved over half of which was allocated to agrìcultural and livestock in 1957 .This monopolìstic trade now occupied a crociai posìtion development. In cultivation thè emphasis was on thè extension not only in relation to its direct trade return, but also since it was and intensification of irrìgatìon farming along thè middle and indirectly a principal source of Italian grants-in-aid to Somalia. lower Shebelle River, thè construction of flood basins along thè The industry's control by thè Italian state not only ensured a mìddle Juba, and of catchment basins in thè dry-land farming steady and uncompetitive market in Italy - which on thè long regions between thè rivers. Provision was also made for thè term might retard its potential growth - but also provided in its clearance of additional land, for thè construction of public Storage profit sfrom thè sale of bananas at hìgh and uncompetitive prices silos for grain, thè opening of experimental farms, and for thè to Italian wholesalers a source of revenue applied to make grants introduction of modern farm implements. A more radicai innova- to Somalia. This was an arrangement which, though possibly tion was thè formation of an agricultural bank, thè Credito ultimately detrimental to thè development of Somalia's banana , designed to provide farmers with loans and credit facil- export industry, satisfied for thè time being many differen t in- ities for agricultural development. For thè nomads, thè Pian tercsts. proposed an estensive well-drillìng scheme and thè construction With these developments Somalia was thus greatly expanding of water catchment basins. Whereas in thè past Italian agricultural her productìon for both locai and foreign markets. As a whole, development had been limited to thè plantation areas farmed by however, thè country remained desperately poor and continued^ settlers, now thè whole emphasis was on thè realization of thè to run at a scrious deficit .While locai revenue, derìved as in thè potentialities of thè indigenous economy. Considerablc alloca- past principally from import and export dues with little help tions of funds were also made, however, to improve road com- from direct taxation, rose from just over £1 million in 1950 to municatìons which would be of some benefit to thè banana and doublé that figure in 1956, expenditure, although decreasìng fruit export trade. from £7 million in thè first year to £5 million five years later, Obviously thè full effec tof these improvements would not be continued to remaki far in excess of receipts. By 1956 there was felt for many years after thè terminatìon of thè trusteeship period; stili a considerale and persistent adverse balance of payments, but thè initial results were nevertheless encouraging. This was and thè generai economie picture was such as to lead thè World particularly so with theproductìon of cereals and cotton. Although Bank missìon which visìted thè territory in 1957 to conclude

142 M3 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHT PTO INDEPEN'DENCE :1950-60 that exccptionaJ financial assistance might be required for as thè British Military Administration. Although elected member- many as twenty ycars after independence. Although later fisca! ship in thè rural councils was introduced in 1955, thè District improvcmcnts suggcst that this assessment might be unduly Councils tended to be less effective than their urban counterparts pessimistic, thè outlook dearly left much to be desired. and remained essentially consultative bodìes providing a useful by 1957 it was stili carly to be of what could be If too certain adjunct to thè system of direct administration through District achieved with thè resources available in economie progress, in Officers. The municipal councils which were not so directly thè field of politics there was little doubt as to thè outcome. affected by thè exigencies of thè nomadic life developed very Unlike many Afrìcan thè position in other evolving terrìtories, successfully, their members showìng a marked desire and aptitude in Somalia politicai advancement proceeded in step with thè for increased responsibility. Thus by 1956, 48 of these councils replacement of espatriate by Somali officiala in thè civil service had been established with a fair degree of financial as well as and police. There was thus a smooth arid regular devolutìon of politicai autonomy- This rapid progress was assisted by thè authority in both thè administrative and politicai spheres at thè Administration^ policy of attaching as secretaries to thè councils same pace of advancement. This sensible rnatching of thè two officiala with a training in municipal administration. Initially Knes of towards autonomy was greatly facilitated progress tuli councìl members were nominated by thè Admìnìstratioa, but in by thè success of thè new cducational measures which, if they 1954 thè first municipal elections were held and no less than six- did not produce an. immediate cadre of university graduates, teen parties presented candidates. Seventy-fÌY. eper cent of thè at least ensured a wide spread of generai education. In politics, male electorate voted, suffrage being then confined to men, and thè first important step was thè creation of a national Territorial thè S.Y.L. won over half thè available 281 seats. Council in 1950 with consultative functions for which thè ground In 1956 when Somalis were repkcing Italians in ali senior had already been prepared under thè British Military Admin- administrative positions, these developments were crowned by istration. This was not merely a decorative or nominai body, but thè transformation of thè Territorial Council into a legislative an attive forum to which governmental decrees and draft ordì- assembly composed of 70 seats, ten of which were reserved for nances were passed for scrutiny and discussion by thè Trust ethnic minorities: thè Italian and Arabian communities being Administration. Between 1950 and 1955 little short of a hundred allocated four seats each, and thè Indian and Pakistani groups one ordinances, covering a wide range of subjects, were thus con- seat each. The new assembly was given full statutory powers in sidered by thè Council. Hence, although this body which con- domestic affairs ,although thè head of thè Italian Trust Administra- tained some thirty-five members representative of both traditional tion retained thè right of absolute veto, Initially Italian coun- and modern interests (including thè politicai parties) was in com- position sìmilar to thè British Protectorate's Advisory Council, sellors were to be attached to thè Somali Ministers in thè cabinet appointed after thè elections, and draft legislation had to be it was more truly an embryonic legislature than thè latter organì- approved by thè Italian authorities before passing to thè assembly. sation. A further step in this dircction was taken when, on thè Candidates for election were required to be literate in Arabie or advìce of thè U.N. Advisory Council, legislative committees and Italian, a quaKfication which indicates thè spread of education offices were created to preparc thè way for a fuller devolution of politicai authority. which had already been achieved by this time. As was to be ex- pected, thè new assembly was much more representative in com- At thè same rime, at a locai level, governmental responsibility position than thè old Territorial Council, and included a wider was progressively devolved through two types of locai govcrn- coverage of modernist opinion. ment body: District Councils in thè rural areas, and Municipal Voting which was stili confined to men, was conducted by Councils in thè towns and main centres. These organs were a direct development of what had already been established under differen tprocedures in thè urban and rural constituencies. In thè municipa li ties, voters had to be registered on thè municipal lists 144 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 and votes wcre cast by secret ballot. In thè interior where thè this major gfoup of ckns was exceedingly strong. The Hawìye, conditìons of nomadic life made thìs procedure difficult and un- however, were divided in their attitude towards thè party. certaìn, voting took piace thiough traditional clan and clan section Dìvision within thè leadership between Darod and Hawiye mem- assemblies. These meetings passed block Ust sof votes to thè bers, had led to thè formation prior to thè 1956 elections of an recorders, a procedure which lem ìtself to manìpulation. It was organization origìnally callìng Ìtself thè Hawiye Youth League therefore no surprise to find that thè total recorded vote was far which sought to detach Hawiye support. These difterences wìthin in excess of what might have been predìcted from. thè estimated thè S.Y.L., however, were resolved in time to present a unìted strength of thè population, although thè latter figures themselves front at thè elections (in which thè Hawiye Youth League won were by no means definitive. no seat). But thè extent of thè party's difficulties in patchìng up Whatever shortcomings may have marred thè conduct of thè this cleavage was cvìdent in thè composìtion of 'Abdillahi 'Ise's electìons in thè rural areas, thè exuberance with which thè generai government. In additìon to thè Premìershìp itself, two of popuktion seized this first opportunity to express its politicai thè remaining five ministries were assigned to politicians of will was remarkable. Of thè 60 seats available to thè Somali thè Hawiye clans, while thè Darod gained two ministries, and thè electorate, 43 were won by thè S.Y.L., 13 by thè H.D.M.S., three Dir one. This allocation of portfolios, which seemed to meet thè by a small group called thè Somali Democratic Party, and one needs of thè moment, later caused thè pen^ulum to swing in by a frankly clan organization called thè Union. 6 From thè opposite dìrection, thus favouring thè formation of Darod fifteen opponents at thè previous municipal elections, thè League's break-away groups. rivais had now dwìndled to five, largely as a result of amalgama- Certaìnly no other party could boast thè same national follow- tions amongst thè smallest and most narrowly based groups. ing. But, as later events were to show, thè more effectively thè With this impressìve consolidation of their position, thè party League widened its base, and thè greater its electoral success, was called upon to form a government under 'Abdillahi 'Ise as thè more profound became its internai divisons. In thè circum- Somalia's first Prime Mìnister. By this time, little trace remained stances of Somali politicai realìties, any party with strong national of thè earlier antagonism between thè Italian Admìnistration and support could not but be essentially a consortium of rivai clan thè League ; a good working basis of agreement had now been interests. The League's weakest following was stili amongst thè reached between thè two sides, which was strengthened with southern Digli and Rahanweyn who remained strongly attached thè appointment in 195 5of thè highly respected liberai Dr En- to their own particularistic party, thè H.D.M.S. This party did rico Anzilotti as Administrator. Henceforth, in so far as it was not campaìgn on a national basis; yet by winning 13 seats in its in a position to do so, thè Italian Administration confined its own electoral areas of Upper and Provinces, it found partìcipation in Somali politics to seeking to encourage those itself thè main block on thè opposition benches in thè Assenibly. elements within thè S.Y.L. which it considered most 'moderate* Relations between thè H.D.M.S. and thè League continued'to be and favourable to a continuation of thè Italian connexion. coloured by thè traditional hosrility between thè two factìons At thè 1956 elections thè League was estimated to have a mixed of thè nation which thè rivai parties tended to represent,-and by national membership distributcd amongst thè main clan groups their earlier difference sin their attitudes towards Italy. Thus thè as follows : Darod, 50 per cent; Hawiye, 30 per cent; Digil- H.D.M.S. accused thè S.Y.L. government of discriminating Mìrìne, io per cent; and others, io per cent. When thè British agaìnst its supporters in thè public service: and some conception withdrew from Somalia thè principal cleavages within its leader- of thè depth of feeling between thè two sides can be gathered ship (which thè Italians had sought to exploit) had been amongst from thè assassination, in obscure circumstances, of thè prom- its Darod adherents. Now although it stili did not command an inent H.D.M.S. deputy Ustad 'Isman Muhammad Husseyu in absolute monopoly of Darod support, thè party's following from 1956 .Later, H.D.M.S. members in thè Assembly succeeded in 146 H7 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDEN.CE: 1950-60 having their 'martyred* colleague commemorated by thè naming thè first government school for gìrls at Burao constituted a of a Street after him near thè principàl mosque in Mogadishu. notable innovation which, despite some continued resistance to But although in 1956 ,thè H.D.M.S. was stili a force to be reck- secular education in generai and to gìrls* education in particular, oned with, its lack of national appeal gave it little prospect of was generally welcomed, Indeed, favourable interest in thè school TÌctory in a politicai atmosphere increasingly charged with thè took thè very tangible forni of many pressing requests to thè nationalisric fervour of a people moving rapidly towatds inde- girls* parents for thè marriage of their daughters, and extremely pendence.' hìgh marriage payments were offered . The same year saw thè establishment of thè Protectorate's first secondary school for boys, which was a considerable advance for it enabled students The Britistt Protectorate and thè Haxd to take thè General Certificate of Education examination in their Whìle in Somalia thè Hmìtation of thè period of trusteeship to own country without having to go overseas. Increasìng public ten years imparted a strong sense of urgency, in British Somali- interest in and support for these new ventures led to thè estab- land, where no date had been set for independence, and where lishment in 1954 of a standing committee on education; and, in indeed thè mattcr had scarcely been raised, progress proceeded that year also, thè territory's first Somali Education Office rwas at a mudi more leisurely pace. This coincided with thè generai appointed, By this tìme in Somalia, thè Deputy-Director of vìew prevalent in British circles that development was likely to Education was an Italian traìned Somali, whose qualifications be ali thè more effective if conducted at a slow and steady pace. and experience, however, were by no means superior to those of This gradualist approach was, it may be argued, well adapted to thè single Somali education office rin thè British Protectorate. thè particularly intractable economie and social circumstances of In other spheres there was less to report. The territory's thè Protectorate. But as events turned out, thè last days of colordal exports of hides and skìns increased, but no new produci was tuie in British Somaliland ended in a hectic scramble which might found to strengthen thè economy. Agricultural and veterinary have been partly avoìded had thè pace been quickened earlier. services were expanded; and in this direction thè most striking And certainly it was unfortunate that there was not more officiai achievement was perhaps thè excavation of a series of much- contact and co-operation between thè British and Italian author- needed water-Storage basins along thè southern boundary of thè ities in thè two neighbouring territories prior to their indepen- Protectorate. 1 In 1953 a hydrological survey of seasonally flooded dence and unificatìon. This, it should be added, is not merely to waddics which might permit irrigation cropping commenced be wise after thè event. Already by 1956 and 1957 thè probable near Burao. Geological surveys were also intensified in thè search course of later developments had become faìrly dear, and oppor- for exploitable minerals. tunities which might have been taken for profitable collaboration In thè politicai field up to 195 5progress was restricted in thè were irretrievably lost. main to locai government. A Locai Authoriries ordinance enacted In thè period immediately after thè return of British Somaliland in 1950 empowered thè Governor to appoint selected Akils - thè to its former dvil status in 1948 perhaps thè most striking evidence salaried headmen who provided a link between District Commis- of progress was in thè field of education, although thè spread of sioners and their people - as Locai Authorities. This invested schoolìng was concentrated withìn a much smaller sectìon of thè these lìneage representatives with certain lìmited judicial powers, population than was thè case in Somalia. Building upon thè and in theory, strengthened their traditional authority beyond that successful experiments of thè war years, educatìonal opportun- customarily enjoyed by lineage elders. Consequently, there was ities were gradually extended. A trades-school was opened in at first widéspread public resistance to thè new scheme; but by thè 1952 at Hargeisa, and a vocational training centre in thè cultiva- mid-i95os, when it was dear that thè position could be accepted ting centre of Borama in thè west. A year later, thè opening of without applying its statutory powers, thè new arrangements 148 149 FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA British-protected Somalis of their rights to graze and water their had come to bc gcnerally acceptcd. In practke there was livestock in thè Haud, rights whìch were enshrined in thè originai hardly any appreciable change in thè patterà of authority, except Anglo-Ethiopìan treaty of 1897 and reiterated in thè new Agree- in thè titlcs which clan headmen now bore. Yct thè modest ment.. sakry of not more than £15 monthly which went with thè tìtle The graduai withdrawal of British authority had attracted attracted many rivai applicants, and thè position of Locai Author- little attention or criticism. But when thè terms of thè new Agree- ity soon carne to be regatded as synonymous with group indepen- ment and its implications became public knowledge there was dence.» In thè same period, with less ostensible opposition, town an immediate and widespread outcry. Massive demonstratìons and district councils were opened. By 1954 elected representatives occurred throughout thè Protectorate to express thè deep sense were serving on thè Protectorate's two town councils at Berbera of Somali outrage, and hastily organized protest delegations were and Hargeisa, and both thesc bodies had acquired a measure of dispatched to London and New York, where they wete received financial responsibility. At a national level, thè only vehicle for with gratifying publicìty and sympathy, but achieved little satis- thè expression of public opinion rcrnained thè Advisory Councìl. faction. With thè support of other prominent national leaders This usually met twice yearly to discuss a widening range of (notably Mr Adan Ahmad), Michael Mariano, who had earlier ìssues, including thè vexed question of thè abolition, or curtail- played an important ròle in thè hearings before thè Four-Power ment, of collective responsibility for blood-compensation. This Commissìon in Somalia.» succeeded in formìng a national conven- problem whìch goes to thè very roots of thè Somali clan System tion called thè National United Front, This body which drew was thrown into relief by thè bitter clan fighting between thè support from ali sections of organized public opinion, including Dulbahante and Habat Tol Ja'lo in thè years 1951-57, and was initially thè S.Y.L. and S.N.L,, launched a vigorous campaign. with of increasing conccrn to ali nationalistically minded Somali. thè twin objectives of recovering thè Haud and obtaining inde- In thè years immediately following thè return of thè Italians to pendence for thè Protectorate within thè British Commonwealth. Somalia, party politicai activity in thè Protectorate declined tem- These actìvities were regarded with-every sympathy by thè porarily. The S.N.L. and S.Y.L. conrinued their regular weckly locai British administrative officìal s many of whom deeply re- meetings at branches in difierent parts of thè territory but, with gretted thè transfer of thè Haud to Ethiopia and who soon found no burning cauije to command attention, public interest flagged. thè terms of thè new Agreement extremely difficul tto apply. At thè end of '1954, howevcr, an event occurred which changed With thè Ethiopian authorities seeking to claim sovereìgnty over thè wHole course of politicai life and led eventually to thè Protec- those British-protected clansmen who exercised their rights to torate*s advancement to full independence. This precipitant was pasture their herds in thè Haud, thè work of thè British Liaison thè final liquidation of British adrninistration in thè Haud and Office at Jigjiga became impossibly complicated. The Ethiopians, Reserved Areas and thè complete surrender of these vital graàing for their part, found thè continued British presence intolerable lands to Ethiopian control. In thè period since thè resumption and only thè utmost tact and patience prevented thè sìtuation of civil administration in thè Protectorate, British control in thè degenerating into bitter open conflìct. As it was, frequent inci- Haud had gradually been reduced until, by 1954, only two British dents in thè region and tepeated representations by both sides, Civil Affairs Officers remaìned there. Without prior notice or which found no satisfactory conclusion in a series of joint Anglo- consultation with her Somali subjects, on 29 Novcmber Britain Ethiopian conferences, reinforced thè N.U.F.'s campaign for thè signed a new agreement with Ethiopia which provided for thè return of thè Haud to British Administration. The surrender of complete withdrawal of British authority and replaced thè re- thè territory was based, of course, upon thè current British inter- maining officiate by a British Liaison stafF with headquarters pretation of thè vexed treaty of 1897, an interpretation which, at Jìgiig4- The duties of thè British Liaison Office r(Mr J. G. S. although at variance with Britain's originai desire to avoid Drysdale) and his assìstants were to facilitate thè cxercise by

150 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 recognizing Ethiopian so vereignty in thè Haud, had been reinf orced list of twenty-four candìdates proposed after a serics of fiercely by thè 1942 and 1944 Agreements during thè period of military debated politicai meetings in Hargeisa. These candidates represen- occupatìon. Defending hìs government's decìsion (which reflected ted not thè politicai parties, but thè maìn clan groups in thè coun- thè Foreign Office's continucd supportfor Ethiopia) in thè House try, as was to be expected in thè light of thè continuing vitalìty of Commons in 1955, thè Colonial Secretary explained that he of clan ties and thè failure of thè parties at thè time to represent regretted thè originai 1897 treaty but that it was 'impossìble to thè majority of clan interests. 11 Meanwhìle, having failed in its undo it'. However, as dìificulties with thè Ethiopian authoritìes primary aim of recovering thè Haud, thè N.U.F. had gradually muldplied and thè strength of Somali feeling became fully lost support, thè S.Y.L. and S.N.L. had drifted away, and what apparent, thè Britìsh government did make an abortive attempt had origìnally been a national conventìon was rapidly becoming to adjust thè situatici!. In Aprii 1956, thè Joint-Parliamentary a politicai party in its own right. Under-Secretary for Foreign Afiairs was sent on a fruitless mission Although thè Haud campaign had not succeeded, thè Protec- to Addis Ababa to intercede personally with thè Emperor and torate had at last taken its first decisive step towards independence, to offe rto buy back thè disputed territory. As in thè past, thè and thè politicai parties began actively to consìder thè possìbilities Ethiopian government stuck to its guns and no progress was of eventual union with Somalia. More immediately, tequests for made. Similarly, thè N.U.F. failed in its attempts, extremely em- elected Somali representation were made as soon as thè legislative barrassìng to Britain, to have thè issue debated at thè U.N. council began its sessions in 19571 an<^ following thè report of Assembly and brought for judgement to thè International Court a commission of inquiry (two of whose five members were at The Hague. Somali)," thè legislature was reconstituted to provide for this The ncw nationalist fervour which had been aroused, how- early in 1959. The new Council contained twelve elected members, ever, was not to be quenched and received further impetus from two nominated unofficials , and fifteen officia i members with thè thè Ethiopian Emperor's speech on 25 August at Qabradare in Governor, Sir Theodore Pike, as Presìdent. Elections were held in thè Ogaden when he claimed that thè Somali people were part March, by secret ballot in a small number of urban constituencìes of thè 'Great Ethiopian family *and asserted that, inevitably, thè and by acclamation in thè rural constituencies: suftrage was re- future advancement of Somalis lay with Ethiopia. 10 There was stricted to men, consequently a renewed upsurge of politicai activity, and thè Since their request for an immediate unofficia lmajority had not former mood of quiescent acceptance of Britìsh Adminìstration been accepted, thè S.N.L*, at this time representing thè most began to give piace to ìncreasingly urgent demands for fuller forward nationalist position in thè Protectorate, officially boy- autonomy. In response to this pressure thè British Government cotted thè electìons leaving thè field clear for thè S.Y.L. and announced in 1956 that thè pace of advancement would be accel- N.U.F. In thè event, however, no S.Y.L. candidate was returned; erated and representative government gradually introduced. and of thè twelve elected members of thè legislative council seven Britain, it was also indicated, would not oppose thè eventual supported thè N.U.F., four had no definite party allegiance, and union of thè Protectorate with Somalia if this was desired. Events one was a member of thè S.N.L. Ali thè parties shared thè same now snowballed, gradually at first, but with increasìng rapidity aìms of independence and unìfication with Somalia, and differed as thè date of Somalia's independence drew near. New schools only in their attitudes towards thè speed with which these goals were opened; at rates of pay equal to those of their espatriate should be accomplished. With thè exception of thè Habar Tol European equivalents, Somali officiat ewere more rapidly pro- Ja'Io clan who provided thè main leadership and much of thè tank moted to senior pcsìtions in thè police and administration, and and file support of thè N.U.F., thè majority of thè other Isaq clans in 1957, thè Protectoratc's first legislative council was established followed thè S.N.L. which now enjoyed thè strongest member- with six unofficia lmembers nominated by thè Governor from a ship. The Darod clans in thè cast, and thè Dir clans in thè west, 152 M5 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 jointly numcrically weaker than thè Isaq, had stili no binding Districts were in thè direct charge of Somali official a and thè party allegiance, although thè S.Y,L.~tended to find its greatest Assistant Commissioner of Police was a Somali. Over 100 Somali support, sucfa as it was, amongst these groups. With their head- students were now studying overseas, some of them at British quarters at Mogadishu and their naturai preoccupation with Universities, and thè Protectorate's second secondary school had events in Somalia, thè League had stili not succeeded in creating been established. a firm locai basis of interest in thè Protectorate. The Protectorate British Somaliland had come a long way towards realizing branches of thè party rernained thè poor relations of thè movement, Somali nationalìst aims, despìte thè tardy beginnings of thè early and as such failed to make any wide ìmpact. 1950$, and with officia iBritish approvai for eventual union with In response to thè S.Y.L. boycott and increasing public pressure Somalia already indicated in 1957 and reiterated more strongly in for fuller Somali representation, a new constitution meeting these 1959, thè territory seemed now set fair on a course of a few years' demands and providing ministerial responsibility was introduced final preparation for ìndependence. Few observers, certaìnly, at thè beginning of 1960. In thè elections for this new legislative antìcìpated that thè Protectorate was to be thrust ìnto Ìndepend- council held in February, thè S.N.L. gained twenty of thè available ence in a matter of months, thus in thè event forestalling Somalia. thirty-three seats; thè N.U.F. in alliance wkh thè S.Y.L. one; and This view which envisaged a cairn and graduai final phase of thè United Somali Party, a new organization which associatcd British tutelage, however, serìously underestimated thè great itself with thè S.N.L. and reprcsented thè Darod and Dir clans, surge of nationalist interest generated by Somali?'s forthcomìng twelve. This result marked thè eclipse of thè N.U.F. which had Ìndependence. Already in 1959 , delegates from ali thè parties previously been regarded generally by thè Administration as thè and politicai groups in thè Protectorate had participated in thè future government party. Nevertheless, although thè S.N.L. in formation at Mogadishu of thè National Pan-Somali Movement. alliance with thè U.S.P. now held thirty-two seats as opposed to In its charter this organization embraced thè twin aims of cam- thè single seat shared between thè N.U.F. and S.Y.L., thè number paigning by peaceful means for thè Ìndependence and unification of votes which they obtained was only a little more than twice of ali thè Somali territories, and of creating firm ties with other that of their opponents. But although those who supporti thè African and Asìan states. With these politicai manceuvres towards N.U.F. and S.Y.L. might justly claim that their voting strength unification gathering ìncreasing momentum it was evident, in thè was not matched by thè allocation of seats, there was no doubt wider context of Somali affairs ,that thè Protectorate's Ìndependence that thè S.N.L. and U.S.P. jointly represented thè majorìty of thè could not long be delayed. Protectorate's population. Two members of each party were accordingly appointed as Ministers, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal, leader of thè S.N.L., assuming thè title of Leader of Govern- The final pbase in Somalia ment Business in thè legislature. The government formed in Somalia by 'Abdillahi 'Ise in This sudden constitutional step forward was accompanied by a confronted by ali thè problems of a country moving rapidly corresponding acceleration in thè pace of Somali advancement towards autonomy. Interest naturally centred on those internai generally. An examìnation of thè whole question of thè replace~ issues of vital concern to thè future stability and prosperity of thè ment of expatriate by Somali official ain thè government service state. External affair sbeing outside his government's purview, thè had been initiated in August 1958.J> Some conception of thè only gesture towards thè fulfilmen tof thè abìding goal of Pan- rapidity with whìch this process had now proceeded may be Somali unity which thè Prime Mìnister permìtted himself was thè gathered from thè fact that, while in 1959 there were only two announcement, given first piace in his programme, that every effort Somali District Commissioners as well as a number of District would be made to settle thè dìsputed frontier with Ethiopia - a Officers and Assistant Superintendents of Police, by 1960 ali six subject on which more will be saìd presently. Of more immediate A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 1950-60 moment was thè stabilization of thè country's precarìous economy, government was also soon prcoccupied with thè important ques- thè attraction of forcìgn capitai and aid, and thè raising of increased tion of preparing a constitution for thè independent state. To this revenue by wider taxation. The peiennial and vexed question of end a decree passed in September 1957 set up two committees to dcciding upon an officia i language - Somali being stili in thè study thè problem, onc politicai, and thè other which included main unwritten - also received attention, but, as will be seen later, Italian advìsers, technical. The intention was to draw upon thè remained unresolved. In social affair s thè government pledgd experience of other African states which had akeady achìcved itself to examinc ways of extending voting rights to women, and to independence. 1* promote thè further Somalization of ali branches of government In thè light of thè prevailing Fan-Somali aìm shared by ali and administration, including thè judicial system. In this lattet nationalists, thè constitution had to previde for thè possibility of field satìsfactory progress was in thè main achieved, and a number thè eventual union of Somalia with other Somali territories. and of other progressive measures were successfully launched. provisìons fulfilling this requìrement were incorporated in thè The statutory authority of chìefs, in practice greater amongst final proposals. Here thè S.Y.LJ government and thè H.D.M.S. thè southern cultivators than thè northern nomads, was reduced; opposition held very different views. The League favoured, and thè procedure of applying collective punishments in thè con- indeed insìsted upon, a unitary state with a high degree of cen- trol of inter-clan feuds was modified ìn thè direction of placing a tralized authority. In thè light of its own partìcularistic interests, stronger burden of responsìbility upon thè individuai crimìnal. thè H.D.M.S. on thè contrary sought a federai relationship which This move was designed to weaken thè continuing vitality of col- would permit a high degree of regional aHtonomy. Already thè lective clan solidarity. At thè same tìme, in an effort to separate opposition had advocated thè creation in its own southern area of secular from religìous authority, thè consìderable eliminai powcrs a separate Digil-Mirifle state, and in conflict with thè government's wielded by Muslim magistrates (Kadis) under thè Italian System firm repudiation of them had expressed sympathy towards thè were reduced in order to restrict their jurisdiction more un- Ethìopian Emperor's overtures contaìned in his speech at ambiguously to matters of personal status. As far as thè Somaliza- Qabradare." Here as in other matters such as thè discrimination tion of thè judiciary was concerned, pending thè training of thè against Digil and Rahanweyn clansmen alleged to exìst in thè necessary Somali staff ,Somali District Commissioners were tem- public service, thè H.D.M.S. position proceeded directly from its porarily granted judìcial powers to be exercised subject to thè own particukristic interests and generai opposition to thè S.Y.L. overridìng authority of higher courts presided over by Italian But with only thirteen members in thè Assembly its voice was judges. naturally weak. On a differen tpiane, in a climate of opinion increasingly hostile The real threat to thè League's authority carne from within its to thè disruptive effect sof clanparticularism, legìslation waspassed own ranks, both through thè independent-mindedness of its making it Ulegal for politicai parties to bear tribal names. This deputies in thè Assembly, and through thè wider cleavage between measure, was, no doubt, partly directed against thè opposition Darod and Hawiye supporters. The ìssue which best senred as a Digil-Mirifle party which adroìtly changed its title to that of vehicle for thè expression of these internai difference swas thè ììi^bia Dastur Mtistaqìl Somali (Somali Independent Constitutional imputed moderation of 'Abdillahi 'Ise's government's policìes. Party) thus taking advantage of thè plurality of languages in Critics of thè government accused it of being too ready to co- Somalia to retain its originai initials. Legislation was also enacted operate with Italy, of not showing sufficien tSomali independence, forbidding thè use of thè traditional derogatory names applied to and above ali of doing nothing tangible to advance Pan-Somalism. thè sab specialìst occupational groups who, in any case, were now This discontent, concerned essentially with rivalries within thè rapidly acquiring a considerale degree of emancipation from their League, carne to a head on thè appoìntment in July 1957 of Haji fonner status as bondsmen. As well as such issues as these, thè Muhammad Husseyn - then absent in Cairo - as President of thè

T 56 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 19^0-60 party. On his return to Somalia, Haji Muhammad assumed leader- elections - in which for thè first lime women partìcipated equally ship of that faction within thè Lcaguc which took as its slogati a with men - provided an opportunity for assessing thè extent of thè more militant advocacy of Fan-Somali unity. This group within new movement's appeal. Of 663 seats thè S.Y.L. won 416; thè thè party now openly attacked thè government, and thè President H.D.M.S. 17) ; while Great carne in third piace winning only 36 of thè Assembly, Adan 'Abdulle 'Isman, who was dubbed seats but nevertheless beatìng thè only other national party which 'Shamun* after thè prò-Western Lebanese leader. Strong demands contested thè elections, thè Liberai Party, which gained 27 seats. were made for a more open pro-Arab and pro-Egyptian stand. Clearly thè G.S.L. did not as yet constitute a serious threat to thè This line of attack seemed favoured at thè lime by thè public League with its massive national following. But, takìng into sympathy provoked by thè recent assassination of thè Egyptian account its very recent formation, it could by no means be dis- member of thè U.N. Advisory Council at Mogadishu. Earlier, some missed altogether, particularly in view of thè forthcoming elec- Somalis had volunteered for service wìth Egypt during thè Suez tions for thè national assembly due thè following spring. The crisis; but since then there had been Somali protests at alleged S.Y.L. consequently intensified its effort sand sought particularly Egyptian interference in SomaUVs internai aflairs. Now, however, to gain a fresh access of support amongst thè Digli and Rahan- opìnion seemed again generally favourable to a more definite pro- weyn who had so impressively demonstrated their attachment to Egyptian altgnment and this was strongly advocated by Haji their own party in thè municipal elections. To apprecìate thè Muhammad and his assocìates. In keepìng with this position, thcy League's prospects in this direction it is necestary to recali that, also urged thè adoption of thè Arabie script as thè most appropri- although these tribes possess a strong sense of separate identity, ate national medium for written Somali, a question on which with in their ethnic compositìon they are a mixture of many dìfferent its earlier enthusiasm for *Osmanìya, and also on thè part of some clan elements, and include large numbers of people of Darod and members for a Roman orthography, thè League was stili pro- Hawiye origin. Whether this was thè intention or not, thè impli- foundly divided. 15 cations of this fact acquired new signìficance from legìslation The League's new President was a severe embarrassment to thè promulgated in 1959 to abolisti thè traditional status of client- government and its supporters, and his ìnfluencc was such that an tenant amongst thè Rahanweyn and Digil tribes. For thè effec tof open splìt in thè party seemed imminent. This, however, was this was to encourage thè more recent client elements - mainly of narrowly averted, for in Aprii 1958 those behind thè Prime northern Darod and Hawiye origin - living amongst thè Rahan- Minister and thè President of thè Assembly achieved thè expulsion weyn to assert their independence and thus weaken thè solidarity from thè party of their troublesome adversary after a series of of thè Dìgil and Rahanweyn as a whole. At thè same titne, many frantic meetings. Much of thè credit for this successful manceuvre, Rahanweyn politicians who aspired to high office were becoming which involved maintaining thè support of both thè Darod and convinced that their best chance of success lay with thè League Hawiye wings of thè League, appears to lie with Adan 'Abdulle, rather than thè Hi^bia. Finally, since thè H.D.M.S. had secured later to become Somalia's first President. Faced with this defeat, control of most of thè municipalities in thè Digil and Rahanweyn Haji Muhammad Husseyn, who enjoyed a formidable reputation area, thè need to present a united front against thè S.Y.L. in thè as an orator and who had in thè past played an important part in Assembly may have appeared less urgent. It was certainly an thè development of Somali nationalism, struck out on his own to arguable proposition that locai Rahanweyn interests might best be form a new militant party called thè Greater Somali League. To safeguarded from within thè all-powerful League. Although it is this new organization, known locally as 'Great*, Haji Muhammad impossible to determine thè rektive importance of these different sought to attract support from thè dissìdent flanks of thè League factors, it seems beyond doubt that their generai effec t was to and to exploit what remained of thè Darod-Hawiye breach, facilitate thè new S.Y.L. drive for Digli and Rahanweyn votes. after Adan 'Abdulle's intervention. The October 1958 municipal The Greater Somalia League, in its turn, played into thè hands

158 '59 FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA ln terms Of the Prevailin g:sectional interests witHn thè country of thè govcrnment by indulgìng in acts of vìolence whìch led to its partial supprcssion and gteatly rejiuced thè success of its electoral campaign. Both thè G.S.L. and thè H.D.M.S. lodged strong protests against thè conditions under which thè electoral campaign took piace and officially boycotted thè elections. 1' Further confusion was caused by thè action of thè Darod Minister of thè Interior who, allegedly in response to Egyptian representa- tions, revoked a cabinet order dosing thè headquarters of thè G.S.L. A cabinet crisis followed in which thè Minister offered his S.Y.L.rresmem» yi ^ ^ ^ iw ^efallen Great's leader Haji resignation and this, apparently to his surprise, was accepted, his ffis^^-z^^*™?*???™ portfolìo being assumed by thè Prime Minister. The remaining Darod Minister, as a gesture of clan solidarity, then also tendered his resignation. This, however, was not accepted, and he - to thè confusion of those who interpret Somali national politics purely in terms of clanship - remained with thè government. These events followed immediately after thè elecdons and indicate that 'Abdillahi *Ise* sgovernment felt itself to be in an exceedingly strong positìon. And not without cause : of thè 90 seats in thè newly expanded Assembly only 29 were contested and of these thè League won 22. Of thè remaining seven seats, two went to thè Uberai Party, and five to a break-away fragment of thè H.D.M.S. which had ignored thè officia i party boycott, Many former Inàpendence and unification H.D.M.S. deputies had in fact changed sìdes and entered thè new Assembly on thè S.Y.L. ticket. Despite this sweeping vìctory, or perhaps rather because of it, &OT (Mr 11- Lennox-Boyd) had stated that there were stili wide cleavages wìthin thè ranks of thè League. And 'Abdillahi 'Ise, chosen again as Prime Minister by thè party conference in May, was faced with a formidable problem in rewarding ali those very disparate elements which had contri- buted to hìs party's success. The new and enlarged government, formed in June after protracted negotiation, consisted of fifteen Sd te £$ ™™l single race, pracnse thè sa me r^on Ministers and Under-Secretaries evenly distributed amongst thè Darod, Hawiye and Digil and Rahanweyn groups of clans. The two most prominent figures in thè last category were Muhammad 'Abdi Nur, Minister of Industry, and 'Abdi Nur Muhammad Husseyn, Miiister of General Affair sand former Vice-President of thè H.D.M.S. The generous allocation of portfolios demon- strates better than anythìng else thè success of thè S.Y.L, cam- paign amongst thè Digil and Rahanweyn. 161 160 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE: 19^0-60 to tìmc between politicai Icadcrs in Somalia and thè Protectorate announced in thè House of Commons that his govcrnment was received dircction and stìmulus with thè formation of thè sympathetic to thè Somali request and that thè Colonial Secretary National Fan-Somali Movemcnt at Mogadishu when delegates of (now Mr lain Macleod) would hold a constitutional conference to ali thè Somali territories attended and pledged to strive for thè discuss Ìndependence early in May. Faced with this decìsìon, thè common goal. In December of thè same year, thè U.N. General Protectorate Administration, whìch had hoped to gaìn rime for Assembly adopted a resolution deterrò i ning that Somalia's further development and preparation, and which had conse- trusteeship should terminate on i July, 1960, severa! months quently encountered bitter hostility, was left to make thè necessary before thè end of thè stipulated period. This announcement had precipitate arrangements. immediate repercussions in British Somaliknd. With this behind them, delegates from thè Protectorate con- Already, following thè February electìons in thè Protectorate, ferred with government leaders in Mogadishu in thè mìddle of which introduccd ministerial government, thè pressure for Aprii. By this time thè preparation of Somalia's constitution for independence and union with Somalia had greatly increased. Ìndependence had been completed, and thè Protectorate delegates There, were however, differences of opinion within thè S.N.L.- agreed to its generai terms that thè Republic which they would U.S.P. coalìtion government as to thè timing of these evcnts. One join should be a unitary state, with an elected President as Head of view, héld amongst others by thè Leader of Government Business, State, and bc governed by a Prime Minister and Council of was that union should not be precipitate, but that time should be Ministers responsible to a sìngle legislative Assembly. In short, allowed for thè Protectorate to narrow thè gap in development there was to be one flag, one president, one parliament, and one and progress with Somalia. The very estensive differences in government; and untìl they could be fully intcgrated thè former almost ali aspects of government between thè two territories administratìve, judicial, and economìe systems of thè two terri- would also cleatly require many rearrangements and adjustments tories would continue to function separately. before union could be fully consummated. It fell to Michael This decided, thè Protectorate leaders assembled in London on Mariano as thè sole opposition member in thè legislative council 2 May for thè conference which was to sever their colonial to press thè opposite vìew, which was also shared by some mem- connexion. For once British and Somali interests seemed to bers of thè government, and particularly by leaders of thè U.S.P. coincide. The British government was now anxious to relinquish This assessment considered that if union was to take piace it was responsibilìty for what in relation to its she and significance had better that it should take piace as soon as possìble, difference sin undoubtedly been one of Britain's least rewarding possessions. thè adminìstrative traditions of thè two territories being left to Ali Britain sought for herself, apart from measures to protect thè sort themselves out afterwards. pension and compensation rights of British personnel, was thè Whatever thè respective merits of these two schools of thought, contìnuation of thè lease for thè BBC Middle Eastern Service and each clearly had much to commend it, thè strength of public relay station at Berbera. This caused no diflriculty ,and thè,-con- nationalist feeling was now such that thè latter view must prevaii. ference, which was conducted in a most cordial atmosphere, Consequently previous ideas about some form of Commonwealth was told on 4 May by thè Colonial Secretary that his government connexion were dropped, and on 6 Aprii, 1960, thè legislative had decided to arrange for thè Protectorate to becomeindependent council, with thè unanimous support of ali its elected members, by i July, 1960.»a Only one proviso, of a nominai rather than passed a resolution calling for immediate ìndependence and union substantive nature, was attached. This was that while thè British with Somalia. The motion requested that 'bold and definite action government did not consider it necessary to have a written agree- be taken, and that thè date of Ìndependence and unification with ment abrogating thè 18 84 and 1886 Anglo-Somali treaties, it desired Somalia must be i July, 1960, thè date when Somalia will attain that clan headmen and tradìtional leaders should publicly demon- its full freedom* . Pive days later, thè British Prime Minister strate their acceptance of thè decision to grant Ìndependence.

162 163 FROM TRUSTEESHIP TO INDEPENDENCE1 iy>u--u^ aside in favour of Dr 'Abd ar-Rashid assumed responsibility fot Foreign ArTairs .Thus, three weeks after Somalia's proclamation A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA of independence, thè new Somali Republic was provìded with a government which represented a reasonable balance of northetó This was readily agrced to by thè Somali delegation, and pro- and southern interests, closely paralleling thè ratio of northern vision was made fot a meeting on 24 May of Council of thè (3 3) and southern (90) seats in thè National Assembly, And after Elders.1» What is of particular interest here is that thè British thè enthusiastìc celebrations whìch marked independence and government should have felt it appropriate and nccessary to make unification had subsided, in an atmosphere stili heavily charged this stipulation: earlier British governments had shown little with nationalìst jubilation, thè new government settled down to scruple in acting unilaterally against thè intention and content of deal with thè many problems posed by thè new state's dual colonial these same treatics. heritage and its pressing need for financìal assistance. The constitutional conference was followed by a hectic scramble Although thè United Nations 'experìment* in Somalia, as it has in thè Protectorate to carry out its decisions, and in thè event often been called, had cettainly succeeded in providing thè new British Somaliland became fully independent on 26 June, 1960. state with an effectìve administrative and politicai framework, Pive days later, on i July, Somalia followed suit, and having neither thè southern nor thè northern regions were yet ecor.omically previously concluded separate agreements with thè British and viable. In recognition of their outstanding economie requirements ìtalian governments, thè two territories united on thè basis to both former colonial powers had agreed to continue to supply aìd whìch their leaders had agreed. The two legislatures mct in joint and assistance. Britain had promìsed million for thè first year formally form £i| sessìon at Mogadishu and amalgamated to thè after independence, and thereafter an annually negotiable amount. National Assembly of thè Republic, electing Adan 'Abdulle This financial aid was accompanied by a six months* programme of 'Isman (former President of thè Somalia Assembly) as provisionai technical assistance such that Brìtain would for six months President of thè Republic. The Republic's constitution was to be continue to pay thè salarìes of those former colonial official awho ratified by a national referendum to be held a year later: thè elected, at thè request of thè Somali government, to stay on after former British Somaliland was to be known as thè Northern independence. Italy promised a more substantial annual grant of Regions, and thè former Somalia, thè Southern Regions. Six days about £5 million, paid partly in thè form of salaries to a team of later, on 7 July, Jama* 'Abdillahi Qalib, a leading member of thè ìtalian 'experts" serving with thè Somali government. The com- northern S.N.L., was elected by thè Assembly as its new President merciai link between thè two countries, which brought thè south- in piace of Adan "Abdulle. ern regions into thè European Common Market, was to be This left thè more difficul tquestìon of thè composition and continued through thè banana monopoly and thè heavy depen- leadership of thè new government to be resolved. After a series of dence of Somalia uponltaly for imported goods. With this backing, delicate manceuvres lasting two weeks, this was successfully accom- and a growìng range of aid and loans from other countries, notably plished, and on zz July Dr 'Abd ar-Rashid 'Ali Shirmarke, who had America, Egypt, and thè Communist bloc, as well as generous etnerged as thè leader with thè most acceptable qualifications, help through thè various U.N. agencies, thè newly ìnstalled announced thè membership of his government. Of fourteen Somali Republic was in a position to face thè future with batter minìsterial positions, four were allocated to thè northern S.N.L. economie prospects than had ever been envisaged in thè past. and U.S.P. Amongst these, 'Abdi Hassan Boni of thè U.S.P. assumed thè important position of Deputy Premier; Muhammad Hajì Ibrahim Igal, thè northern premier, accepted thè portfolio fot Defence, and 'Ali Gerad Jama' of thè U.S.P., who had been one of those most strongly in favour of immediate uniflcation, became Ministerof Education. Of thè southern S.Y.L., *Abd ar-Rasaq Haji 165 Husseyn, thè Prime Minister's dose associate, was given thè Ministry of thè Interior, while 'Abdillahi 'Ise who had stepped 164 ' THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE National Assembly, or in thè cabìnet itself. No other bond of CHAPTER Vili mutuai interest had so many far-reaching ramifications in ali aspects of private and public life.1 Nationalists, party politicìans, and traditional religìous leaders THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE alike, had for long inveìghed against those aspects of kinshìp whìch perpetuated wasteful sectional rivalries, which weakened and sometimes vitiated necessary collaboration, and which Icd to The baiante of'p&rtìcularìstìc ìnieresfs in thè netv stafe thè preferment of individuai and of policies irrespective of their intrinsic rnerits. While acknowledging thè associated Valùes of HOWEVE PRECIPITATR anEd incomplete it may have appearcd generosity and assistance, and thè highly democratic traditional at thè tìme, thè union of thè former Biitlsh Somaliland and Somali: polìtica! process where policy-making is not thè monopoly of a had at oncc a profound efìect on Somali politics. Since thè focus o; small privileged class but thè naturai right of every adult man, thè ali politicai interests was now ultìmately a single national legisla- other divisive aspects of their politicai herltage \rete fiercely ture, thè marrìage of thè two territorìes entailed significant, and i; condemned. This 'problem of tribalism* as it carne to be known some cases quite drastic changes in thè politicai status of thè vari, had already been thè subject of much public controversy and ous clans and lineages within thè state. To appreciate thè fu! debate. Prior to ìndependence and union, both thè Ptotectorate import of this immediate consequence of union it is necessary tol and Somalialegislatures had frequently discussed thè question and, realize that, despite thè patriotic fervour which acclaimed thè over-optìmistically in thè light of thè realities of thè situation, had formation of thè Republic, thè most all-pervasive element in sought to find a means of extìrpating what nationalist leaders now politics remained thè loyalty of thè individuai to his kin and clan. regarded as thè supreme impediment to effective national unity.* There was not, of course, a politicai party to represcnt thè interests Here of course Somali nationalists were at one with nationalist of each clan; thè trend which had once existed in this direction leaders in every other territory in Africa : and thè divisive inftuence had long since passed and thè presence of sudi* powerful national of Somali 'tribalism* was felt as more, rather than less frustrating consortiums as thè S.Y.L. made it impòssible for narrowly based by thè fact of its persistence within an already achieved cultural clan partìes to achieve any effectiv eposition in national politics. unity. Nationalist leaders saw only too clearly how clan differences Nor was clan particularism by any means thè only politicai tie o; and jealousìes had in thè past facilitated thè partition of théir significance. With thè increasing spread of western education, people by foreign powers. Now these same factors, with little growth of modern towns, and thè graduai but quite unmistakablei diminished vitality, impeded not only thè full realization of thè formation of new social classes, clan loyalties now fell into piace Pan-Somali goal, but also seemed to imperii thè stability of thè as one component in a complex of diverse politicai attachments. Republic itself. Here Somali fears may seem exaggerated; for Yet within this cluster of allegiances, for thè majority of thè sectional interests and differences of one kind or another exist in population those bonds based on clanship - now extcnded much ali countries, Yet it has to be borne in mìnd that what is specific to more widely than in traditional Somali politics - remained thè thè Somali case is thè strength of thcse particularistic divìsions, most pervasive, thè most commanding, and above ali thè most their universa! appeal, their pervasiveness, and their organization insìdious. No other single line of communication and common along a single principle of grouping. And, despite thè effort sof interest connected so directly and incontravertibly thè pastoral some nationalists to deny their existence, there could be no doubt nomad in thè interior with his kìnsmen in thè civil service, in thè of their continuing importance in thè politicai lìfe of thè new state. The emotion which thè whole issue of clanship engendered was 166 itself evidence of thè compelling force which clan ties stili exerted. 167 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA as long as thè S.Y.L. represented a moderate position on thè Howevcr unwillingly, ali politicians and parties had, perforce, to question of Greater Somalia, those parties sudi as thè S.N.L., utilize these bonds of kinship in attaining their politicai aims. U.S.P., and G.S.L. which shared a more militant policy and Perhaps thè best illustration of thìs necessary ambivalence in which also represented a strongly pro-Arab nationalist position nationalist attitudcs is provìded by an ingenious sophistry which might-be expected to join together against thè League. Again, had grown up in Somalia prior to independence and whìch was thè possibility of sharp regional cleavages between north and now gaining wider currency. In thè past, and stili largely in turai south could not be ruled out. For despite thè underlying cultural areas, a person's generai placement in society and clan allegiance unity of thè Republic as a whole and thè all-pervasìve character was elicited by asking what clan he belonged to and what section of dan ties, thè long experience of two distinct colonial traditions within it, thus ttacing his range of genealogica! and politicai allegi- had left quite difFeren timprìnts in north and south, to a greater ance until a point was reached signìficant to thè inquìrer. Now, extent ìndeed than was immediately apparent. however, since it had become thè accepted etìquette amongst thè British exclusiveness and empiridsm, thè accent on quality élite to refuse to reveal clan identity and to profess no more rather than quantity in educatìona] and sodai advancement, definite allegiance that people increasingly than of'Somali', began attachment to British conceptions of justice and ideals of admin- to refer to their present loyalties as though they had only histoiical istrative conduci, and thè strict separation of politics from admin- significance. It thus became acceptable to discuss clan allegiance, istration, ali contrasted in northern eyes with thè apparently less and even to inquire into thè clan particulars of a stranger, in ternns rigorous standards of politicai and publioservice morality in thè of his 'ex-tribe'. Indeed, thè word 'ex* was adopted into Somali, south and with thè involute Italian bureaucratic tradition. Nor and now provided a perfectly acceptable means of establishing was this ali. The presence in thè past of a sizeable settler European those details of clan affiliation which are in a way similar to, but community in thè south, coupled with a wider degrée of economie so mudi more important than what is conveyed by a Londoner's development and education and a tradition of a more pervasive social System thè 'addiess*. In thè predominantly nomadic of system of rule, reinforced by traditional cultural distinctions Somali no other means exìsted, nor would it seem easy to find one, between thè two regions, had produced subtle but none thè less to so unequivocally identify thè individuai. significant dinerences in their social climates. As a result, on thè It is in this of if reluctantly situation contìnuing, acknowledged, whole, thè traditional attitudes of pastoral Somali sodety were particulatistic divisions that thè true politicai significance of thè more strongly entrenched in thè north, while thè south, by con- union of thè Protectorate clans with those in Somalia is revealed. trast, appeared in many respects more modernist in outiook. To Prior to this, politics in thè Northern Regìons had been dominated northerners these distinctions provided a set of standards well by thè numerically predominant Isaq supporting thè S.N.L., with adapted to express their traditional pride and aloofness. thè locai Dir and Darod dans combining in opposition as thè These several bases for potentìal re-alignment and division U.S.P. Union with Somalia, however, not only greatly reduced did not, of course, appear as distinct and separate alternatives, thè politicai status of thè Isaq, but also made it possible for thè nor did thcy ali converge in a sìngle line of cleavage. Rather they U.S.P. Darod to acquire new influence through joining thè all- presented a cluster of overlapping bonds of affinity whìch could powerful S.Y.L. For thè Dir wing of thè U.S.P., traditional be utilized in various ways as seemed most advantageous to thè associations suggested thè possibilities of alliance with thè leaders and rank and file of thè difFeren tparties. This gave a degrec Hawiye, either within outside thè alternatively, or League: or of of flexibility and room for manosuvre which thè politicai parties combination with thè Isaq. of thè new Republic were not slow to grasp. Since some of these These were by no means thè only potentìal regroupings which lines of aUgnnient were mutually contradictory they also con- presented themselves as new and advantageous lines of politicai tributed to thè stability of thè state. Thus, for example, clan collaboratìon. On a basis of common interest other than clanshìp, 169 168 THE PROBLEM SOF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA These and other divergencies contained in thè Republic's dual solidarity amongst thè Darod of thè ex-Protectorate and Somalia colonial experience presented a wide rahge of intricate problems was to some cxtent offse tby dìfferences between north and south which would have to be solved before thè new state could func- stemming from thè separate colonial traditìons of thè two regions, tìon with proper efficiency .These differences were further aggra- and vice versa. On thè other hand, this regional cleavage was vated by linguistic barriers which, as well as entailing an Italian reìnforced in thè case of thè Isaq by thè circumstances of their teachìng tradition in southern schools and an English one in thè distribution which was restricted to thè former Protectorate and north, affected ali spheres of activìty, private as well as public. did not extcnd into Somalia. Since agreement had stili not been reached on a national script for Somali,* and since only a small section of thè population was The mecbanics of integration fully literate in Arabie, thè two colonial languages continued to be used in thè transaction of business. Many southern politicians This in its most basic terms was thè background against. which and senior official shad acquired some knowledge of English thè union of thè two parts of thè Republic remaìned to be con- during thè period of British Military Administration, but few summated and something more binding than mere polìtica! knew thè language sufficientì ywell to use it regularly as a means integration achieved, Here it would be difficult to minìmize thè of written communication for officia ipurposes ; and in thè north problems posed by their dual colonial heritage which confronted virtually no one was proficient in Italian. Hence, while with other thè leaders of thè new Republic. In administration, although thè politicai considerations, this seemed to tip thè balancc in favour functions of British and Italian trained official s were similar, of English in thè long term, it did not resolve thè immediate whatever their relative standards, each staf f operated under problem of communication for thè government and civil service, different conditions of service and on rates of pay which differed many of whose members could not write to each other directly radically. This was trae of ali official sin every branch of govern- without thè aid of English-Italìan interpreters. And competent ment, induding thè national polke force and thè national army translators and interpreters were hard to find. At thè same time, (formed by thè amalgamation. of thè former Somalìland Scouts wìth thè Somalia military forces). Less personal, but no less com- even without this linguistic problem, physìcal Communications between thè two regions of thè Republic left much to be desired. plicated problems arose in relat^on to thè separate legai traditions of thè two regìons. The northern legai System was based primarily There was no direct telephone link between Hargeisa and Moga- dishu ; and although thè two centres were connected by irregular upon English Common and Stature Law and thè Indian Penai police flights, and by a regular twice weekly air-servìce, thè Code. In thè south thè System depended mainly upon Italian Colonial law.' In addìtion, while before union Somalia had her journey by road frequently took three days to accomplish. own appellate system, appeals from thè High Court of thè British Finally, thè various Italian and British expatriate officia s] who remained in thè country after independence as technical experts, Protectorate were heard by thè East African Court of Appeal. Hence., until a unified judiciary could be introduced, separate were naturally strongly attached to their separate systems of sections of thè Supreme Court of thè Republic had to be estab- administration and hence, no doubt unintentionally, tended some- times hinder rather than facilitate integration. con- lished to deal with litìgation in thè two regions. In fiscal and to to This accounting procedures thè position was equally complex for servative effec twas most noticeablc in thè south where there was a official sfeared wìde differences in procedure distinguished thè British System much krger expatriate community. These Italian in operation in thè north from that founded by thè Italians in and resented developments which seemed to threaten not only thè south. And to round out thè picture, considerale variations thè primacy of their mother-tongue, but also thè whole metro- politan connexion with its important trade and cultural links. in tariffs and customs dues and in patterns of trade divided thè With this very mixed legacy, and with thè added inducement north from thè south. 170 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE of thè strong clan cleavages whìch exìsted between north and 'Abd ar-Rashìd 'Ali Shlrmarke, who had again been ìnvited to forni south, it is hardly surprìsìng that difficulties should have arisen, a government, announced his new and expanded administration between thè two halves of thè Republic. Shortly after thè flush of sixteen Ministers drawn from thè S.Y.L. and S.N.L.-U.S.P. of patriotic enthusiasm which marked independence and union (these two parties had joined in formai coalition in September had abated, a certain disenchantment became apparent in thè 1960). The National Assembly, however, felt that thè govern- north. That thè north should take thè initiative in questioning ment was too large: and on 14 August, with great independence thè value of union requìrcs Httle explanatìon. The north had of mind, passed a bill Umiting thè number of mìnistries to twelve sacrificed more than thè south. The south, with thè capitai and before debating thè new government's statement of policy. Dr National Assembly at Mogadishu, was stili thè hub of afiairs; 'Abd ar-Rashid resigned. Yet he was stili thè favourite leader, and but from its former positìon as thè capitai of a'small state Har- having been prevailed upon to reconsider hìs decision, returned geisa had dedined to a mere provincia! headquarters remote to confront thè Assembly on 19 August with a cabinet pruned from thè centre of things. Even though many northern officìals to twelve members. His programme of internai development and now held key positions in thè government, northern pride found integration, and non-alignment in external affairs , backed by it hard to stomach this reduction in prestige. This dissatisfaction loans to thè valuc of £25 million (mainly from Egypt, West was also directly stimulated by thè marked increase in unem- Germariy, thè U.S.S.R., and Czechoslovakia) and direct aid ployment which accompanied thè withdrawal of expatriate (from Itaìy, Britain, and thè United States) was overwhelmingly official sand their families after independence. adopted by thè Assembly.fi ^ This growing mood of discontent and resentment was clearly With thìs success to its credit, and with work proceeding on thè expressed in thè national referendum which was held on 20 June, preparation of a unìfied legai code and other measures designed 1961, to approve thè provisionai constitution under which thè to integrate more fully thè two regions, thè government appar- two territories had joined together a year previously. The ently felt little need to gìve urgent consideration to thè situation referendum became in effec ta test of confidence in thè govern- in thè north. Attention was in any case soon sharply diverted by ment; and despite thè presence of some of their members in thè disastrous floods which swept thè south of thè Republic in thè government at Mogadishu, thè S.N.L. in thè north decìded thè autumn and which, following hard on thè heels of two ex- on a boycott. As a result, of a total recorded vote of just over ceedingly poor rain seasons, threatened wìdespread hunger and 100,000 in thè north, more than half opposed thè constitution.* disease.7 Such sympathy as this unkind stroke of fortune aroused In thè south by contrast, where thè main opposition carne from in thè north was scarcely strengthened when thè members of thè thè G.S.L, and H.D.M.S., consìderably more than a million and National Assembly chose this moment to pass legisktion doublìng a half votes in favour of thè constitution were recorded and little their salarìes to a figure (£100 monthly) considerably in excess of more than 100,000 against. that receìved by southern Provincial Commissioncrs and other The significance of this obvious danger signal was not fully senior officials . Despite thè participation of their elected repre- appreciated by thè government at Mogadishu, which, despite sentatives, to northerners thìs was but one of a long series of generous disbursements of largesse in thè Italian tradition, was irresponsible actìons taken by thè government in distant Moga- having a difficul t time in thè Assembly, and not merely from dishu. northern members. Disagreements within thè S.Y.L. were very Matters carne to a hcad with thè short-lived and abortive apparcnt in thè Assembly elections for thè President of thè milìtary coap of December 1961. The full cìrcumstances of this Republic, held on 6 July, These Adan 'Abdulle Isman, thè pro- northern gesture of defiance are stili far from clear. The revolt was visionai President, won by a narrow majority from his opponent led however, by a group of Sandhurst-trained lieutenants who, Shcikh 'Ali Jumaleh after three ballots. Three weeks later, Dr after independence, found themselves serving under Italian-

172 A MODERN RISTORI; OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE trained superior officer s who had been postcd to thè north. thè south and twìce as much as southern D.C.S.) Later in 1962 new Directly inspired, it seems, by a misture of personal ambition fiscal and accounting procedures on thè (British) northern pattern and northern patriotism, these British-trained junior officers were adopted throughout thè Republic. At thè same time, thè quietly arrested thcir southern superiors whom they regarded as former British practice of thè purchase of government equipment unjustly promoted over their hcads. They then gave out publidy through tender boards was also introduced, an innovation which that, following widespread tioting against thè government in seriously perturbed Italian companies in thè south and encouraged Mogadishu and elsewhere, General Da'ud, commandant of thè competition by Somali firms. national army, had assumed control of thè state. This news seems Of more direct benefit to.the north was thè government's to have been not unfavouiably received. But on thè following day drive to see that thè region received a greater share of development suspicìons began to be aroused by thè .conspicuous absence of projects and new industries. Already thè ambitious Tug Wajale superior officers ,and word soon leaked out that thè real object mechanized wheat and sorghum farming scheme, which had of thè revolt, no doubt strongly sympathìzed with, if not directly been launched in September 1960, was proving highly successful, aided and abetted, by elements within thè S.N.L., was to break and withtìs much publicity as possible further efforts were made wìth thè south and destroy thè Republic. For many people this to expand production. With British aid, Hargeisa airport was was too much; and led by private soldiers and non-commissioned to be modernìzed and improved; Russia and thè U.A.R. were to officerà thè rebellious lieutenants were ali arrested. By thè time provide funds for new locai industries ; and as a counter-part to government reinforcements and polke arrived in strength from thè £i\n U.S.-aided port development scheme at Kismayu Mogadishu thè whole affai rwas over. Ìn thè south, Russian engineers were to examine thè possibilities This incident, in which certain high-ranking officiat eand mem- of improving harbour facilities at Berbera. New hospitals were bers of thè government were suspected of complicity, and which, also under constructìon. incìdentally, pointed to thè need to improve Communications These provisìons, however, were not sufficien tto silence thè between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, at last spurred thè government continuìng discontent in thè north. Most profoundly perhaps to action. The ring-leaders were arrested (and brought to trial a this stemmed from a conjunction of northern pride and politicai year later),1 a number of officiat ewere dìsmìssed or reduced ìn isolation : thè basic difficulty being that thè Isaq, who made up rank, while those who had remained loyal were rewarded and thè majority of thè region's population, no longer supported new efforts were made to integrate thè two regions more fully. their elected members in thè government. Moreover, although Northern and southern personncl in ali branches of government there was talk of having thè National Assembly meet periodically service, including thè forccs and polke, were postcd much more at Hargeisa, nothing carne of this, and thè sense of vnorthern extensively on a national basìs than had been thè practice pre- remoteness continued much as before. In this sùuation it was viously. Further measures took more time. The new Gvil Service naturai that thè G.S.L. should seek allies in thè north, and indeed Law unifyìng salaries and conditions of service throughout thè in thè summer of 1962 a new party (thè Somali Democratìc Republic was not ratificò until March 1962. From thè point of Union), attempting to amalgamate thè G.S.L., S.N.L., and view of northern civil servants, although absolutely necessary, some of thè U.S.P. and H.D.M.S. (Ìn thè south), made its this was a mixed blessing ; for, while it raised thè salary scales for appearance under thè leadership of Haji Muhammad Husseyn. thè lower grades of employee, thè top sakries of senior officials However, thè S.N.L., or at least its now rather nominai leaders were decreased to a point roughly midway between thè two in thè Assembly, were hampered by their association with thè extremes of north and south.» (Priot to this, Distrìct Commis- coalition government; and thè time was rapidly approaching sioners in thè north on thè old Brìtish rates received salaries when those S.N.L. members in thè government who had main- considerably hìgher than those of Provincial Commìssioners in tained a dangerously ambiguous position would have to choose

174 175 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA thè new party received much public support in thè north. In thè between retaining thè support of theit elcctors and their placcs south thè position was less clearly defined, and it remained to bc in thè government. A formai split hètwecn thè S.N.L. and U.S.P seen whether thè S.N.C, or S.D.U. wouid emerge as thè dominant also seemed indicated. opposition party, or whether both wouid join forces against thè Both these things happened latet in thè summcr, Dissatisfaction League. Wouid either or both these parties amalgamate with thè in thè north had assumed such proportions that thè government H.D.M.S. and other minority organizations ? These were ques- was moved to dispatch a special team of three northern Ministers tions which, in thè extremely fluid and shifting politicai situation (two S.N.L. and one U.S.P.) to sort out thè situation which now current at thè end of 1963, only time and thè approaching muni- threatened to lead to thè breakdown of normal administratìon, cìpal and Assembly elections could settle. Certainly, if ali thè The President himself was also thrown into thè breach, and made opposition groups wcre to merge, thè S.Y.L. wouid be in a a prolonged and much publicized tour, thè generai succcss of difficul t position. But it was jmpossible to gauge whether, as in which must be partly attributed to his own high personal repu- thè past, thè League wouid recapture its resilience and succeed tation. The investigating team of Ministers was less fortunate. in defeating its rivals. Here much wouid depend not only upon Difficulties arose over thè interpretation of their terms of ref- thè balancc of clan interests in thè party, but also upon possible erence; and thè Minister of Agriculture (U.S.P.) did not agree changes in its leadership. with his colleagues as to thè measures -which should be taken Already thè League, very much thè backbone of thè stili (which included suspending a number of northern administrative nominai coalition government, had reacTed to this mounting tide officfcrs'0) to meet thè situation. As a result, at thè end of thè of opposition by seeking to dose its ranks and by assumìng a summer thè two S.N-L. members, one of whom was Muhammad more militant and vigilant ròle in thè management of thè state. Haji Ibrahim Igal, Minister of Education, resigned from thè At -its annual congress in July 1963, thè new young Secretary- government. This actìon restored to these two prominent S.N.L. General, replacing thè elderly traditional religious leader who figures much of theìr former popularity in thè north and en- had preceded him," made a fiery speech urging that thè party couraged other S.N.L. members in thè Assembly to come out must act more effectively as thè arm of thè government. This openly and concertedly against thè government. A more organ- was typical of a new tendency in S.Y.L. policy suggestive of thè ized and powerful paruarnentary opposìtion was now emerging, single-party state philosophy, tj and carne at a time when thè Politicai leaders began to discuss thè formation of a new party League felt its position to be seriously threatened. Other poìnters to include thè rump of thc S.N.L. under Muhammad Haji Ibrahim in this direction, at least in thè eyes of thè opposition parties, IgaL, and those (predominantly Hawiye) members of thè League were provided by thè controversial Public Order bill passed by who supported thè defeated presidential candidate Sheikh 'Ali thè Assembly after stormy scenes in July.^ If, however, it was stili Jumaleh. It was also hoped to include other minority groups. too early to assess this trend with any confidence, it was typical These moves culminated in May 196} in thè creation of thè of thè Somali politicai scene that it should develop at a-rime when Somali National Congress led by some twenty members of thè thè Republic was more amply provided with opposition partìes Assembly from both north and south. than ever before. And ìn this uncertain situation there was one The immediate pretipitant on this occasion, ironically enough Constant upon which ali thè parties could rely: that thè present from thè point of view of thè government, was thè introduction members of thè Assembly wouid do ali in their power to retain throughout thè Republic of a unitary System of tariffs and customs their hìghly paid positions. How thè electorate wouid behave was dues which, though intended to lower transport costs in thè another matter. north, had quìte thè opposìte cffect." Food prices in thè northern Thus by thè end of 1963 northern particularism appeared regions immediately soared causìng widesptead public ìndigna- more and more to be finding an outlet in thè Somali National tìon which led to a riot at Hatgcisa on i May. This assured that 176 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE Congress, and its objectives wcre less thè divisìon of thè Republic words. 'Our misfortune*, Dr 'Abd ar-Rashid wrote,1* *is that our than thè downfall of thè S.Y.L. government. It was this more neighbouring countries, with whom, like thè rest of Africa, we Hmited, and of course endrcly constitutional aim which explained seek to promote constructive and harmonious reladons, are not thè fatture of thè attempted coup in 1961 and thè readiness with our neìghbours. Our neìghbours are our Somali kinsmen whose which thè new northern politicai organizations sought to ally citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrange- with those who opposed thè S.Y.L. in thè south. Hhherto, indeed, ments". They have to move across artificial frontiers to their thè integrity of thè Republic had been mudi less seriously in pasturelands. They occupy thè sarne terrain and pursue thè same danger than foreìgn observers had sometimes supposed. More- pastoral economy as oursclves. We speak thè same language. over, by thè end of thè year, further progress had been achieved We share thè sarne creed, thè same culture, and thè same tradi- in thè fuller integration of thè two regìons. In May, by 52 to tions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners ? Of course 42 votes, thè Assembly had passed legislation extending thè we ali have a strong and very naturai desire to be united. The first exìsting southern pattern of universal suffrage to thè north, where step was taken in 1960 whèn thè Somaliland Protectorate was prevìously only men had enjoyed thè right to vote." In June, united with Somalia. This act was not an act of "colonialism" Artide 29 of thè Constitudon was revised to prohibit proselyt- or "expansionism" or "annexation". It was a positive contribu- ization except by Muslìms, thus standardizing thè previous tion to peace and unity in Africa.* British Protectorate pracdce throughout thè Republic. In August, The union of thè Protectorate with Somalia, however, was one legislation was passed unifying thè regulations governing munì- thing. The further extension of Somali unificadon to embrace cipal and rural district councils. And by thè end of thè year, French Somaliland, thè Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, and thè thè lengthy and intricate task of establishing a unìform legai Northern Frontier District of Kenya, although boldly enshrìned code was almost complete. in thè Republic's constitution,"' was an altogether different Thus, by thè end of 1963, in thè three and a half years which matter. Both thè Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and thè had elapsed since thè proclamation of thè Republic, much of thè Haud and Ogaden, were part of neighbouring states which had work of integration had been accomplished. The most significant shown no enthusiasm for thè Somali cause and could hardly be politicai forces in thè state were also workìng towards a more expected to agree readily to territorial changes which would satisractory pattern of grouping, To what extent their conflicting diminish their size and presdge. With French Somab'land thè interests would receive dìrect representatìon in thè forthcoming posìdon might be thought to be more hopeful, sìnce, theoretically Assembly elecdons, due in thè spring of 1964, remained to be at any rate, assuming that a majority of thè territory *s mìxed seen. It appeared likely, however, if current trends continued, population desired it, there would be no constitutional impedi- and in particular if thè Isaq could achieve a stable alliance with ment to an independent ex-French possession joining thè Re- southern clan interests, that thè divisìon between north and public in much thè same way as thè British Protectorate had south would lose much of its force. joined Somalia. In 1960, hòwever, French Somalilaad was far from being independent. In thè Gaullist referendum of 1958 thè Cote's population had voted against complete emancipation and The fan-Somali issue had chosen to remain an oversea territory of France. The creation of thè Republic stili left outside thè fold those This requìres some explanation. Since thè formation of thè Somali natìonals Hving in French Somaliland, in thè contiguous Cóte's Territorial Council in 1945 ,thè politicai life of thè territory eastern regions of Ethiopia, and in thè Northern Frontier District had received a new impetus wìth thè establishment under thè hi of Kenya. The situation thus confronting thè newly formed eadre in 1957 of an elected legislature with responsibility for Republic in 1960 is best described in thè Prime Ministeri own internai affairs .This represented a notable constitutional advance 178 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE but one which was not, however, matched by developments in to Mogadishu where, in 1959, he participatcd in thè formation other spheres comparable to those taking piace at thè lime in of thè National Pan-Somali Movement. His short but eventful Somalia or British Somaliland. The first elections for thè new politicai career ended in October of thè following year when he assembly were won by thè Union Republicaine, an electoral was killed in an air crash while on his way back to Mogadishu coalition representing sections of both thè Somali and 'Afar from a visit to China and Eastern Europe. communities and thè Arab population, and led by Mahamud In thè Cote itself, Hassan Guled had succeeded Mahamud Harbi Harbi. The principal rivai organization, with a similarly mixed as Vice-President in thè Council, but vacated this office to Ahmad composition, was led by Hassan Guled, who, like Mahamud Diinì, an 'Afar member, in Aprii 1959 when he was elected to Harbi,, belonged to thè 'Ise Somali. After thè elections, a Council thè French National Assembly. Later, jn June 1960, Ahmad of Ministers was formed under thè presidency of thè colonial Diini was replaced by another 'Afar tribesman, 'Ali *Ariif Burhan. Governor. In addition to its Vice-President, Mahamud Harbi, Thus, although Somali membcrs stili made up thè largest block thìs body included three other Somalìs; two 'Afar, one Arab; in thè Territorial Assembly (14 out of 32 seats: 'Afar, 13) and and one European. If it did not correspond exactly to thè relative also in thè Government Council, thè leadership had now fallen strengths of thè Somali and *Afar populations, this composition to thè Afar and thè most strongly nationalist Somali were in whìch reflected thè greater politicai involvement of Somalis, | opposition, or exilc. Meanwhile, on a brief visit to thè Cote in suggested that, despìte their traditional rivalty, thè two main July 1959, General de Gaulle had announced categorically, with elements in thè CSfe's population shared sufficien t common his usuai command of rhetoric, that Prance attached estreme interests to co-operate in thè management of internai affairs. importance to thè port of Jibuti (which now rivalled thè British As thè tide of Somali nationalist feeling mounted in thè British port of Aden) and had no intention of relinquishing control.™ Protectorate and Somalia, however, thè position began to change. Thus in 1960 when thè government of thè RepubHc began to The 1958 referendum in fact was interprcted as offering a choice takc stock of thè prospects facing Pan-Somalism, thè position between workìng for independence and union with Somalia, and in French Somaliland was far from promising. Although there remaining with France. Mahamud Harbi campaìgned on a Somali was stili no absolute division of opinion between thè Somali and nationalist platform, while Hassan Guled, with thè powerful 'Afar communities on thè question of eventual union wìth thè support of thè French declorate, canvassed for a vote in fàvour Republic, it was difficul tto gauge thè extent of Somali nationalist of continuing thè connexion with France. When, with Mahamud interest, and even more difficul tto assess its appeal to thè 'Aiar. Harbi stili in office ,it was announced that this latter aim had French policy, moreover, was evidently dctermined for thè prevailed, an extremely confused situation developed. This was present at least to make no further concessions of sovereignty, resolved by thè intervention of thè French authorities who dis- and clear indicatìons had been given that thè French Govern- solved thè assembly and arranged for new elections to he held on ment regarded thè Pan-Somali movement as a threat to be resisted 23 November, 1958.l8 In thè confusion, Mahamud Harbì's party as firmly as possible. In addition, new French measufes in thè largely disintegrated, while Hassan GuledV group changed its CSte, undertakcn with thè object of advancing thè previously composition. Pive electoral groupings eventually emerged; two neglected 'Afar community, had thè effec t- which in Somali eyes of them frankly 'Afar organizations, and two others Somali- they seemed designed to promote - of drivìng a wedge between *Afar alliances led by thè two principal contenders, Hassan Guled thè two peoples. Finally, and perhaps most significantly of ali, and Mahamud Harbi. Under a new System of allocating seats on in their hostility to thè Pan-Somali aim, French politica were a proportìonal basis," Hassan Guled, commanding thè majority closely allied with those of Ethiopia, and sustained by thè mutuai of 'Afar support, defeated Mahamud Harbi's Union democratìque interest of both countries in thè prosperous port of Jibutì and Somalie. Mahamud Harbi subsequently fled to Cairo, and later thè line of rail connecting it to thè Ethiopian hinterland. 180 181 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA The main issue was that, while Ethiopia insisted that thè fron- In thè Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, thè prospects of any tier should be determìned on thè basis of a strictly legalistic furthcr extension of Somali unification seemed even more remote. interpretation of thè 1908 Italo-Ethiopian Convention, Italy Here, following thè Empcror's speech on Somali aflairs at maintained that other international agreements should also be Qabradare in 1956, a few modest developments in schooling and taken into account as well as ethnic factors relating to thè distri- medicai scrvices had becn introduced, but nothing on thè scale bution of different Somali clans in thè disputed area. The Italian promised. And thè appcal of such innovations was greatly weak- posìtion thus favoured a more liberai interpretatìon in thè direc- ened by thè Ethiopian government's insistence that Somalis who tion of Somali natìonal aspirations. Prior to independence no wished to advance themselves should do so through thè medium of further progress was made; although, in December 1959, both Amharic. No party politicai activity was permitted and any overt Ethiopia and Somalia agreed that thè British provisionai line expression of Somali natìonalist sentiment was firmly dealt wìth. should remala in force until a fina! settlement was reached." Thus, despìte thè fact that by 1960 therc wcre six Somali deputies After independence, thè union of Somalia with thè British and one Senator in thè Ethiopian parliament, and also a number Protectorate added a'new complication. In theìr negotiations of locally recruited administrative and polke ofScials in thè with thè British government thè Protectorate leaders formally Ogaden, there was no avenue open for thè expression of Somali refused to endorse thè provisions of thè Anglo-Ethiopian treaty nationalist aspirations. The extent of nationalist support conse- of 1897 whìch they were considered to fall heir to in succession to quently could only be estimated from thè growing incìdence of Britain. However questionable in internatìpnal law, their attitude rebellious incidents and from thè news brought to Mogadishu was that they could hardly be expected to assume responsibility by politicai refugees and clandestine delegations. Thìs uneasy for a treaty which, without Somali consent and in defìance of situation was exacerbated by thè failure of thè two countries to prior Anglo-Somali agreements, eventually led to Ethiopia's reach agreement on theìr mutuai frontier which, in practice, acquisition of thè Haud." With these two frontier disputes out- remained thè provisionai administrative line left by thè British standing, both of which related directly to thè wider Fan-Somali in Somalia in 1950. issue, Ìt was cleaf that thè Republic could expect no support from During thè Italian trusteeship period, at thè instigation of thè Ethiopia for her campaign of Somali unification. It was also United Nations, repeated negotiations had taken piace to define evìdent that relations between thè two neighbouring states would a frontier acceptable to both sides. The Italians daimcd that thè frontier lay to thè west of thè provisionai line, while thè Ethio- remain difficul tin thè estreme. pians maintained that ìt ran to thè cast, nearer thè coast. After thè Italian government had refused to accept an Ethiopian com- Tèe. Kenya dispute promise on thè provisionai boundary, an arbìtratìon tribunal This left thè situation in thè Northern Frontier District of Kenya of three jurists was appointed in 1958 .Dìfficulties arose, howevcr, to assess. This ethnically and administratively distinct tegion of over thè tribunal's terms of reference, and thè United Nations Kenya contained a population (according to thè 1962 Gsnsus) of Assembly sought to overcome these by calling upon thè King of just under 400,000, considerably more than half of whom were Norway to nominate some outstandìng international personalìty Somali. The 'District* in fact comprised six separate administra- to act as an adviser to thè tribunal. This delicate ròle was assigned tive Districts with headquarters at Manderà, Wajir, Garissa, to Mr Trygve Lie, thè former U.N. Secretary-General, who was Isiolo, Marsabit, and Moyale. Widely dispersed and thinly con- asked to propose terms acceptable to thè two parties. A draft com- centrated on thè ground, thè Somali pastoral nomads occupied promise was accepted by both Italy and Ethiopia in 1959 as a basis almost thè whole of thè eastern part of thè region (Garissa, for discussion; but amendments subsequently made by both sides Wajk, and Manderà Districts), being cordoned off from their were mutually unacceptable and thè matter remained in dispute. 183 182 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEpENDENCE neighhours and ethnic kinsmen thè Orma and Boran Galla by she refuse to do less for her Somali subjects in Kenya? thè 'Somali line', which ran southwards from -cast of Moyale to This may seem a sìmple view of thè matter. But in thè minds of thè Tana River. The Pokomo cultivators, numbering some 6,joo thè tribesmen conccrned, Britain had commìtted herself to a line and straddled along thè banks of thè Tana, provided another ethnic of action to which, in similar circumstances, it was only logicai element in thè composition of thè District. And thè fairly clear- to expect she would adhere. The position of thè British govern- cut division between Galla and Somali, although complicated ment, however, was far from clear. With vivid memories of Mr by thè fac tthat many Oromo had adopted Isiam and were in process Bevin's attempts, however unsuccessful, to promote Somali of assimilation to Somali, was offset by thè presence in Marsabit unification, Britain's willingness to facilitate thè union of her District, in thè extreme west, of thè part-Somali Rendille tribe Protectorate with Somalia had, predictably, seriously disturbed who formed a distinct wedge between pagan and lyluslim Galla Ethìopìa. Since Britain's first guarded indication in 1956 of her and numbered some 10,000 pcrsons. Thus although thè eastern intentìons in respect of British Somaliland and Somalia, thè part of thè District clearly belonged to thè Somali, thè position Ethiopìan government had launched a spirited campaign agaìnst in thè western areas was less well-defined. Pan-Somalism. The strategy adopted was to accuse thè British As a whole in 1960 thè N.F.D. stili remained thè most isolated, government of seeking to establish a pto-British Greater Somalia and thè most backward portion of Kenya, and indeed, with thè and to press for an elucidation of Britain's policy. The Emperor's exception only of thè Ogaden, thè least advanced of ali thè visit to Moscow in 1959 and his acceptance of a $100 million Somali territories. Since thè proscription in 1948 of thè S.Y.L. Russian loan indicated thè possible repercussions of disregarding in this 'closed District*, as it was defined in Kenya's legìslation, 1* Ethiopian interests. In these circumstances, and faced with thè nationalist activity had to remain dormant until 1960 when some Protectorate's request for independence and union with SomaUa belated recognition was given to thè politicai rights of its tax- by i July, 1960, Mr Macmillan judged it neoessary to ofife rsome payers. Immediately prior to that, although there had been no clarìfication. Thus, in Aprii 1960, havìng accepted thè Protec- direct partìcìpation by thè people of thè District in thè 1957 torate's request for independence, thè Prime Minìster made thè Kenya elections, in 1959 a Somalì-nominated member had been following statement to thè House of Commons. *Her Majesty's appointed to 'look after* their interests on thè legislative council. government* he said, 'did not and will not encourage or support The lifting of thè ban on polìtica! organisations in 1960, although any claim affecting thè territorìal integrity of French Somaliland, not at once accompanied by a rekxatìon of thè other special Kenya, or Ethìopia. This is a matter which could only be coh- resttictions in thè District,, and thè prompt mobilization of Somali sìdered if that were thè wish of thè governments and peoples nationalist support behind thè Northern Province Peoples* concerned.' Evidently this declaration was primarily intended to Party, heralded a new era. Or so at least it seemed at thè time. The mollify thè fears of Ethiopìa and France and to reassure thè Somali tribesmen of thè District had already announced their Kenyan African leaders. At thè same time, however, when this intention of seeking self-determìnation independcntly of thè message was relayed by thè Governor of Kenya to chiefs and test of Kenya in order that they could unite with theìr kinsmen elders in thè N.F.D. two months later, it seemed to open thè in thè Republic. With thè long adminìstrative tradition of treating door to thè attainment of Somali aspirations. For thè statement thè area and ìts people differently from thè rest of thè colony, and acknowledged that theìr wishes would be considered, and they with Bruisti approvai for thè union of SomaUa and British Som- believed that apart from Somalis thè only government which aliland, Somali nationalists felt that they had good reason to hope was 'concerned* was that of Britain. This was also thè officiai that their aspirations might be realized. For, if in response to view in thè newly formed Somali Republic. thè wishes of thè people of thè Somalìland Protectorate Britain With thè rapidly evolving politicai situation in Kenya, it was was prepared to facilitate their union with Somalia, how could therefore this segment of thè Somali nation in thè N.F.D. which 184 185 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE appeared to afford thè best hope fot an early extension of Somali This request was naturally firmly opposed by thè K.A.N.U. unincation. Thus, while in thè two yeàrs foUowing independence and K.A.D.U. delegations, who, notwithstanding their kck of thè govemment of thè Republic kept a watchful eye on events in unanìmity on other issues, were adamant in refusing to concede French Somaliland and thè Ogaden and sought to publicize any tight of separate self-determination to thè Somali and asso- Somali cfforts there to gaìn independence, its main preoccupation cìated peoples of thè N.F.D, Such a concession, they claimed, was with thè Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Here there would jcopardtee thè territotial integrity of Kenya and would was certainly much to occupy Somali nationalists ; for thè sìtuation encourage tribal separatist movements throughout thè colony. developcd very rapidly. In thè 1961 Kenya elections thè pre- In assuming this position, thè K.A.N.U. leaders were fortified dominantly Somali Districts of Garìssa, Wajir, Manderà, and by thè knowledge that they enjoyed thè support of Ethiopìa and Movale, fotmed a sìngle constituency (Northern Province East). that African governments in other territories had little sympathy But only 1,622 people regìstered as voters: Somalis had generally for thè Somali case. The N.F.D. delegation on thè other hand decided to boycott thè elections on thè grounds that to participate asked why they should not be accorded thè same rights as their in them would imply that they accepted Kenyan cìtizenship. The kinsrnen in thè former British Somaliland Protectorate whose sole candidate, Mr 'Ali Adan Lord (later killed in a motor atódent independence and union with Somalia had taken piace under and replaced by Mr A. R. Khalif ), was returned unopposed. British auspìces. If thè princìple of self-determination meant Aftcr thè 1961 elections thè tempo of politicai activity rapidly anything, they urged, it certainly could not mean thè enforced mounted and thè Somali campaìgn for self-determination inde- suppressìon of theìr national and legitima?e integrity.** pendently of thè test of Kenya gathered momentum. Frequent In reply, thè K.A.N.U. delegation asked why those non-Somali delegatìons of Somali party leaders and tribal elders visited Moga- tribesmen of thè N.F.D, who might not wish to leave Kenya dishu to seek support. In November, thè National Assembly res- should be sacrificed to thè Somali demand for secessìon. The ponded to these rcquests for help by passing a motion welcoming solutìon to thìs problem, they claimed, was simple. Let those thè union of thè Northern Frontier District with thè Republic Somalis who desired it, leave Kenya and join thè Somali Republic: and urging thè government to press for this by ali possìble means. no one would stop -them. The fact that thè Somalis found their This encouraged thè Mogadishu government to mount a pub- livelihood in thè District was not important, for they were licity campaign in support of its kinsmen in Kenya; and although nomads: and in any case in thè K.A.N.U. view they possessed it could not be reprcsented itself, to give strong moral backing only a slender claim to thè territory. to thè N.F.D. delegation at thè Kenya constitutional conference Faced with this conflict which involved differen tconceptions held at Lancaster House in February 1962. By this time, as well of nationhood and nationality, thè Colonia! Secretary (Mr R. as a number of organizations which opposed thè Somali aim, Maudling) told thè conference that he had decided that an inde- there were three principal nationalìst parties in thè District. pendent commission 'with appropriate terms of reference* should These, although divided in their bases of affiliation along tribal be appoìnted to 'ascertain public opinion in thè area régarding lines, were united in seeking independence separately from Kenya its future'. It might, he added, be necessary to hold a pleblscite in order to join thè Somali Republic. The N.F.D. delegation or even a referendum in part of thè N.F.D. On thè understanding was led by Mr A. R. Khalif. He asked that : 'before any further that thè commission's findings would be implemented before constitutional changes affecting Kenya were mode, autonomy Kenya bccame internally self-governing, this solution was accep- should be granted to thè area which they represented as a territory ted by thè N.F.D. delegation. And with this, as it appeared sub- wholly independent of Kenya, in order that it might join in an stantial achievement, thè delegation returned to Kenya to prepare Act of Union with thè Somali Republic when Kenya becamc for thè invcstigation of opinion which, they had been led to fully independent', 1* believe, was to determine theit future status, Knowing well thè

186 187 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA vising thè Republic that it would have to waìt for thè results of strength of Somali feeling ìa thè N.F.D. on thè matter, they vere thè commission. This evasive action concealed a most significam shift of em- in lìttle doubt as to thè outcome.J MeanwHlc, thè Somali government in Mogadishu, having phasìs in British policy. At thè Lancaster House conference, thè guardedly welcomed this news, anxiously watched thè course of Colonia! Secretary had shown that he had an open mind on thè events through a specially appointed ministerial committee. dispute and was prepared to see ìt settled by secession according Public opinion, particularìy in thè notth where, with thè common to thè evidence collected by thè N.F.D. commission. Statements British connexion and similar. citcumstances priot to unìon, made then by thè K.A.N.U. delegation too suggested that it ìnterest was most strongly marked, dernanded that thè govern- would not have been impossible to have gained their acceptance, ment should pursue thè matter energetìcally. Widespread public however reluctant, for this solution to thè probiem. Since thè demonstrations ìn dìfferen tparts of thè Republic expressed mora! conference, however, thè British government had apparently solidarìty with thè N.F.D. delegates as they presented thè Somali had second thoughts, partly at thè instigation of thè Foreign case at thè Kenya Conference. In keeping with this mòod, thè Office with its perennial concern for Anglo-Ethiopian relations, Prime Mìnister made a fiercely anti-imperialist speech in March and partly in response to pressure from thè Uganda and attacking Ethiopia and France, and warning Britain that she Tanganyika governments as well as from Kenya ìtself. Thus would be held tesponsible if thè 'mistakes of thè past* were re- with thè many other pressing problems confronting Kenya, peated and thè peoples of thè Northern Frontier District denied to say nothing of other areas of British activity, thè actual thè tight to *freely decide their own destiny'. 36 Words, however, appointment of thè N.F.D, commission was allowed to drag on no longer sufficed .The public clamour for action was loud and while Kenya's African leaders acquired further authority and increasingly strident in tone. The prevailing feeling was reflected began to display increasingly militant attitudes towards thè ìn a motion of no-confidence in thè government tabled by thirty- Somali secessionìsts. one members of thè Assembly (from both north and south) at These and other circumstances made it more and more attrac- thè end of March. Their primary criticism was thè government's tive for thè British government to pass over thè Colonia! Secre- *lack of courage* in pursuing thè Fan-Somali ìssue. tary's assurance and to incline towards thè poshion of thè Kenyan Nevertheless, despite these exhortations, Dr 'Abd ar-Rashid's nationalists. Hence Britain*s Une was now to stress that part of cabinet decìded to follow thè principles laid .down in thè Re- her stated policy on Somali unification which held that in thè publìc's constitution and to limit action for thè present at least case of thè present dispute nothing could be decided without thè to peaceful diplomacy. In thè unexpectedly protracted period consent of thè government of Kenya. Accordingly, while offici- before thè appointment of thè N.F.D. commission towards thè ally maintaining thè 'correct' attitude of refusing lo treat directly end of thè year, thè Mogadishu authoritìes sought accordìngly with thè Republic, unofficially members of thè British embassy to rnaintaìn what pressure they could upon thè British Foreign at Mogadishu put forward thè convenìent if somewhat disin- Office . They made it clear that they intended to abide by thè genuous argument that ultimately thè Somali government would findings of thè commission, or of any other impartial record of have to settle thè probiem itself with Kenya. Only thus, it was public opinìon in thè disputed territory. Once this had been urged, could a lasting solution be achieved. established, however, it was up to Britain to take thè necessary Doubtful of thè resuh, but wìlling to see what could be gaìned action, for thè issue was primarily one between Britain and thè by this approach, thè Somali government took advantage of thè Somali people. However, U was by no means easy to deal with 1962 July Independence Day celebrations to invite leading mem- Britain on this matter. For thè British government found this bers of thè rwo Kenya African nationalist patties to Mogadishu direct approach from Mogadishu extremely embarrassing, and for informai talks. Jomo Kenyatta and his party arrived first, dìd ali it could to avoid making any direct responso beyond ad- 189 188 A MODERN HISTORY OF .SOMALIA THK PROBLEM SOF INDEPENDENCE their visit bcing followcd shortly afterwards bjr that of Ronald adamant and showed no inclination to modify theìr positions. Ngak and other leading K.A.D.U. figures. Socially thè visits In these circumstances thè government at Mogadishu, confident were a great successi thè distitìguished guests were féted, thè that its kinsmen in thè N.F.D. would opt for independence and utmost cordiality prcvailed, and most itonically in thè circum- union with thè Republic, continued to press Britain to expeditc stances, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ngala were each awarded thè Star thè appointment of thè commission and to give effec tto its an- of Somali Solidarìty. ticipated findings. In thè interval, anxious that thè N.F.D. should In a number of discussions and publìc speeches, Jomo Kenyatta be shielded from any other changes which mìght prejudice thè stated emphatically that he regarded thè N.F.D. as an inalienable issue, thè Republic judged it necessary on several occasions to part of Kenya and thè whole issuc as a domestìc matter. Mr remind thè British government of its Lancaster Housc under- Ngala's positìon was similar, if less resolutely stated. Spokesmen taking that, in thè meantime, 'there would be no change in thè for thè Somali side challenged thè argument that thè disputed status of thè Northern Frontìer District or in thè arrangements area was 'part and parcel of Kenya*, and emphaslzed how through- for its administration'. out Kenya's adminlstratìve history thè territory had been treated The long-awaìted commission, consisting of a Nigetian judge as a separate entity. Relterating that thè Somali government in- and a Canadian General, at last arrived in Kenya in October • and tended to tespect thè wìshes of thè N.F.D. tribesmen, they insisted having completed its work of hearing evidence with commen- upon thè latterà rìght, as they saw it, to separate self-determin- dable alacrity, and - what was perhaps^ more surprising - without ation. And with both sides thus in disagreement, but vying with incident, published its report some six weeks later. The Com- each other in their expressions of enthusiasm for thè projected mìssioners found*8 that thè Somali who they estimated mad• e East African federation, which was ultimately to include both up 62 per cent of thè N.F.D.'s popuktìon 'almost unanimously' Ethiopia and thè Republic, thè President judged it necessary to favoured secession from Kenya with thè object of 'ultimately' intrude a note of cautìon. The basic obstacle impeding effective joining thè Somali Republic. This desire was shared also by thè African .unity, he sadly concluded in an assessment of Pan- majority of thè other smaller Muslim communities in thè District Africanism as poignant as it was eloquent, was thè 'unwillingness (princìpally Muslim Galla). The contrary wish to remain with of African rulers to curb their powers and to lift their artificial Kenya and to particìpate in its constitutional development was colonia! boundaries*.17 recorded amongst some of thè Oromo in Marsabr tDistrict ,among Thus these direct talks produced no progress, and preliminary non-Muslim Boran in Moyale District, and with thè Pokomo discussions on thè Republic's participation in thè East African cultivators along thè banks of thè Tana River in Garissa District. federation had already run into difficulties . Here thè problem, There were also several smaller areas of mixed opinion. The no doubt theoretical in thè light of thè many other obstacles generai division, however, coìncided with thè division between whìch would have to be overcome before even thè nudeus of Muslims (Somali and assocìated peoples) and Aon-Muslims federation was achieved, was one of timing. Both sides agreed (principally Galla). A significant indication of thè force of thè that if thè Republic joined thè projected federation, thè Somali Somali desire for union with thè Republic was that although thè territories should form a single territorial unit within it. But thè maìn strength of thè Oromo people lay in Ethiopia, there was 'no Kenyan leaders considered that this locai Somali unification suggestion* in thè verbally recorded evidence, that Ethiopia had should take piace affer thè Republic had cntered thè federation, *any concern* with thè issue of thè territory's future status. while thè Somali leaders, influenced by their difficulties with The Commission's findings were largely as had been antici- Ethiopia, insisted that thè order of events should be reversed, pated, but thè report contained one phrase whìch was particu- This may seem a trivial dispute, but as thè East African federation larly dìsquieting to Somali nationalists. Thìs was that evidence remained an unrealized aìm, for thè present both parties were had been collected *on thè premise that there can be no question 190 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA some room for manceuvre it was not made whether this of secession before Kenya gets independence*. This assumption clear repre- sented thè British government's fina! decision on thè issue, it was derived, apparently, from thè Commissioners* confidential instructions. It was not included in thè previous Colonial Secre- difficul t to see how Brìtaìn could hope later to concede seces- tarvi announcement of thè decisìon to set up thè Commìssìon sion without seriously endangering her relations with Kenya and made at thè Kenya conference, and it appeared to be in confile! Ethiopia. with thè undertaiciag given then that a decision would be taken Whether, at thè time, thè British government considered thè befote Kenya became independent. Whatever might be thought matter finally closed or not, thè announcement of thè new arrange- of thè British government's concluct of thè whole issue, this ments merely further antagonked Somali opinion and led to thè direction to thè Commission seemed to imply a definite hardening resignation of ali stipended chiefs and locai authorities. The of opinion against thè Somali desire for secession. This was also tribesmen concerned also made it clear that they would not par- ticipate ìn electìons for a regional assembly under these conditions. suggested by thè way in whìch thè British Foreign Office was handling thè matter through its embassy at Mogadishu. At thè With equal ìnevìtability, relations between thè Somali Republic Britain which been subject serious over same time, although championed by a number of British news- and had to strain thè papers, thè Somali case had acquired no new appeal for thè previous months, now rapidly deteriorated, Public opinion was demands nationalist leaders in Kenya or as far as could be judged for those vociferous in its that thè Republic should break off relations with Britain, and in thè face of of other Afrìcan states. The generai atmosphere was scarcely diplomatic mounting promising. opposìtion Dr *Abd ar-Rashid's government had little alternative- Nevertheless, stili hopeful that thè British government would if it was to remain in office .However, at thè eleventh hour in a honour thè undertakings gìven at thè Kenya Conference, and round of unusually active diplomatic exchanges, thè British encouraged by thè N.F.D. Commissioni findings, thè Somali Ambassador told thè Somali Prime Minister that he had been advised that new proposals were on thè way. The British govern- government intensified its efforts to press Britain for her prom- ised decision. To this end, despite British reluctance, thè Somali ment, apparently, had decided to alter its position. What thè Prime Minister visited London at thè end of thè year for brief new proposals were must remain a matter of academic interest talks with Mr Macmillan and thè Foreign Secretary, These did only, for this hopeful message to thè Prime Minister was later with announcement by thè Ambassador little to ciarify thè situation. countermanded thè that, after At last, in March 1963, it fell to Mr Duncan Sandys, thè new ali, his government had nothing more to say. With remark- British Colonial Secretary, to announce his government's decision. able restraint and a pardonable ignorance of British diplomatic history, Dr ar-Rashid permitted himself thè observation that To thè satisfaction of thè Nairobi and Addìs Ababa governments, 'Abd but to thè chagrin of Somalis, this was that thè N.F.D. was to he doubted if any other British Ambassador had ever been sim- be brought into Kenya's ragionai constitution. A new, pre- ilarly treated.»0 Relations between thè Republic and Britain were dominantly Somali, North-Eastern Region was to be created in formally severed on 12 March, 1963. The rupture loss of for both countrìes. which Somalis would enjoy thè same degree of locai autonomy involved privileges as had already been accorded elsewhere in Kenya's other six The Republic relinquished her small but useful annua! subsidy of j£i£ million from Britain, while Britain lost over-flying rights Regions. This decision, which gave effec tto thè recommendations and was forced to dose down her powerful BBC Middle Eastern of thè Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission 1 » rather than to thè findings of thè special N.F.D. Commission, not only ignored service relay transmitter at Berbera. Britain had evidently decided thè Somali secessionist demand but also cut off from thè new that, whatever interests she might have in maìntaining friendshìp Region several Muslim tribal groups which shared thè Somali with thè Republic, and whatever responsibilities she might be aim. Moreover, although no doubt with thè intention of leaving held to owe to her Somali subjects in Kenya, or to her former

192 '93 A MODF.RN HISTORY OF SOMALIA TUE PROBLKM SOl- INnKPHXDMX'CF. subjects in thè Northern Rcgìons of thè Republic, these vere not Lastly, Ìt is not without interest to speculate how differenti/ such as to justify endangering thè long-standing entente with this dìspute might have turned out had thè Somali Republic Ethiopia or alienating thè new Commonwealth territory of Kenya. entered thè Commonwealth on thè basìs of thè Somaliland Pro- This decision no doubt assumed that thè disputed Northern tectorate's long connexion with Britain, Such circumstances Frontìer District of Kenya would probably not erupt into vìolence, would no doubt have made thè British government's position or that if it did thè tesulting situation could be satisfactorily con- even more dìfficul t; but they would perhaps also have provided tained without danger to British interests. How accurate these a setting in which thè aspirations of thè Kenya Somalis would assumptions would prove in thè long terni could not be predicted bave received more sympatheti attentionc . with certainty. What could be said, however, with some degree of confidence was that thè breach between Britain and thè Republic need not Pati-Africanista andwìder issues have occurred. This, of course, is not to make thè facile and un- The Somali Republic's concentration of interest on thè N.F.D. comprehendìng judgement that thè Somali Republic acted too issue durìng thè three years sìnce independence had proved precipitately: but rather to suggest that thè British government singularly unrewarding. Not only had thè specific objective of acted too indecìsively and too slowly. Por severa! years prior to union with her kinsmen in Kenya eluded her grasp, but also, in thè 1962 Kenya conference, thè Provincial Administration of thè thè process, thè Republic had been manceuvred into a position of N.F.D. had consistently reported on thè direction and strength unenviable isolatìon in thè Pan-African world. of Somali feeling. Had these reports received serious attention This development was not without irony. In thè particular it would clearly have been possible for thè British government setting of their nationalist movement in thè past, Somalis had to have prepared thè ground for thè eventual secession of thè shown, on thè whole, little interest in African nationalism else- N.F.D. without, at that stage, incurring serious opposìtion from where. But since thè formation of thè first Somali government Afrìcan opinion in Kenya. This, however, was not done and thè in 1956 ,and particularly since thè establishment of thè Republic problem was left until it became insoluble except at thè cost of in 1960, thè position had changed. These events had greatly alienating one side or thè other. widened thè range of Somali interests and experience and had At a much later stage in thè development of thè affaìr ,it is also forced Somali nationalists to seek to come to terms with, and to questionable whether thè middle course of, in effect , passive play their part in, thè rising tide of Pan-Africanism which was resistance adopted by thè N.F.D. Somalis with thè concordancc sweepìng thè continent. This new trend was already foreshadowed of Mogadishu was thè best strategy to pursue in thè circumstances. in thè Republic's constitutìon which enshrined thè twin aims of Jt is, of course, easy to be wise after thè event. But ìt might well promoting Pan-African and Pan-Somali unìty, as well as thè have been more profitable for thè N.F.D. Somalis to have adopted obligatìon to maintain friendly relations with thè world of Isiam. more violently intransigent tactics, or alternatively, to have par- Between Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism there see/ned no ticìpated wholeheartedly in thè new constitutional arrangements incompatìbility ; for Somali nationalists regarded these goals as with thè aim of usìng thè new Regioni Territorial Assembly as complementary and saw Somali unificatìon as a legitìmate re- a mouthpiece from which to press their secessionist aims in a gional application of thè generai and wider prindple of Pan- manner which thè British government might have found Ìt pos- African unity. On this basis, thè union of thè ex-Protectorate with sible to accede to more readily. To have been acceptable, how- Somalia was hailed by Somali as a Pan-African, as much as a ever, this latter course would have required a degree of mutuai Pan-Somali achievement, and indeed, despite thè problems of confidence and understanding which thè British government's integration, as one of thè few successful examples of African conduct of thè dìspute rendered difficult. unìfication. Outside thè Republic this view at first received some

194 '9J A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE favourablc attention, but did not attract as much notice or in- was part of what, as nationalists, they had struggled to win from terest as it might have seemed to merit. thè British colonizers. Ethiopia's posìtion was rather different; The Somali view of thè necessary preconditions for effective although again, thè Somali aim questioned thè frontiers over African unification owed much to thè special tircumstances of which she had long struggled with Italy. And it was in this light, theìr cultura! heritage. The assumption that viable politicai union ignoring Ethiopia's ròle in thè partitìon of Somaliland, that thè required to be under-pinned by a commonality of cultura! iden- leaders of other African states seemed disposed to view thè prob- tity was fondamenta! to their thìnkìng. Thus, as thè President lem. Moreover, thè Somali case was put forward by men who hìmself put it in a speech during Jomo Kenyatta's visit to Moga- had not played any striking part in thè Continental movement of dishu in July 1962: African natìonalism, but whose opponents, Jomo Kenyatta, 'We have learned of a cardinal principle underlyirig thè effective- Tom Mboya, and thè Emperor of Ethiopia, had in their various ness or otherwise of a politicai union between two Independent ways most emphatically done so. Another significant factor States, It is this: thè ordinary person must be able to identify weighing against thè Somali was thè hostility aroused by their himself and his interests with thè new order, on economie, eth- traditional attìtudes of ethnic superiority. nic, and cultura! grounds.* These were some of thè wider considerations involved in thè Moreover to Sornalis there seemed a connexìon between Pan-African assessment of thè Somali dispute and those with cultura! homogeneity and democracy. Thus in thè same speech, which Somali representatives had to contend as they canvassed President Adan added: for support at successive meetings of Afrifan states. Ovcr thè *It is this lesson that is perhaps thè hardest to learn but if we period between thè attaìnment of independence and thè rupture Africans are proud to take our piace in thè comity of Nations, of diplomatic relations with Britain thè results were far from en-1 we must do more than pay lip-service to thè feelings of thè couragìng. Although prior to indcpendence, thè All-Afrìcan ordinary man and woman in our society.'" People's Conference at its Tunis meeting in January 1960 had This view of African unity which expresses thè long tradition passed a favourable resolution on Pan-Somalism, it was this of Somali cultura! unity, and thè desire to move from nationhood organizatìon's next. meeting at Cairo, in March of thè following to statehood which is thè crux of thè Fan-Somali aim, runs counter year, where thè Somali delegates encountered stifF opposìtion, to thè process of nationa! unification in other African states. which set thè tone for other all-African occasions. Thus at Mon- For thè generai ptoblem elsewhere in Africa is thè construction rovia two months later, al! that was achieved was a motion urgihg of nations from thè polyglot and polytribal territorially defined thè Republic and Ethiopk to settle theìr boundary disputes; and states, with their arbitrary frontiers, which are thè legacy of at Belgrado in September, thè Somali case again attracted no colonialism. This difference between Somali natìonalism and tangible support. In thè following month, however, President African nationalìsm elsewhere, however, while of academlc Adan *Abdulìe*s state visit to Ghana produced a gUmmer of hope interest, would in itself hardly have been important enough to from this ìnfluential quartet. A joint communiqué issued .by thè isolate thè Somali people at thè bar of Pan-African opìnion. The two Presidents advocated African federalism as thè generai solu- rea! difficulty lay in thè conflict between thè Somali aim to unite tion to border problems but also stressed 'thè imperative necd to with their kinsmen across thè frontiers of Kenya and Ethiopia, restore thè ethnic, cultural, and economie links arbìtrarily des- and thè passionate attachment of thè new African leaders to troyed by colonization*. Here Dr Nkrumah was apparently such colonially defined boundaries. To Kenya and Ethiopia, and influenced by his own interest in thè Ewe problem on thè by analogy elsewhere, thè Fan-Somali movcment threatened Ghana-Togo frontier.'* Such comfort as might be drawn African territorial sovereìgnty. Kenyan leaders could hardly be from this statement, however, soon disappeared as it became expectcd to surrender teadily something whìch, in their eyes, evident that no African state was prepared to see Ethiopia*s

196 A MOpERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE róle in Somali partìtion as that of a colonizer. Even more resistance to Ethiopian mie in thè Ogaden, How far such a trend cmphatically, no one was prepared to view thè Kenyan could be sustained was difficul tto forecast. African nationalists* claìm to thè N.F.D. as in any sensc Before leaving this record of thè Republic's growing isolation colonialist. at thè bar of African opinion, brief mention must be made of thè Subsequent African meetings were equally disappointing, róle of Egypt. As thè leading Arab state and thè African coun- although more practical suggestions for settling thè issue were try most heavily ìnvolved in Somali affairs, ,Egypt was obviously soon forthcoming. The Lagos confcrence in January 196* urged pkced ìn a difficul tposition, This was ìllustrated by thè clumsy that thè Somali dispute should be placed before thè arbitrating attempts made by Radio Cairo to profess support for both thè body whìch was to be established to deal with conflicts between Somali and Kenyan leaders through Arabie and Somali broad- African states. The February meeting of thè Pan-African Move- casts on thè one hand, and Swahili on thè other. When it soon ment for East and Central Africa, endorsing Nkrumah's federal- became evident that each side was aware of what was being said ism, offered thè more radicai, if idealistic solution of uniting thè to thè other this tactic was dropped, and by thè rime of thè Addis Somali territories ia an extension of thè projected East African Ababa conference Egypt's position was one of uneasy neutrality. federation to include thè Republic and Ethiopia. This proposai No state which aspired to play a leading róle in Pan-African led to thè later technical difficulty , mentioned previously, as to affair scould afford to commit itself on thè Somali side. whether Somali unity should be restored before or after thè Republic had joined thè federation. While negotiations along these lines were proceedìng with lìttle success, thè anomalous Isolation Afro-Asìan solidarity conference held in Tanganyika in February Although thè value of positive statements in favour of thè Somali 1963, despìte bitter disagreement provoked by thè presentation case may be questioned, there is little doubt that thè concerted of thè Somali case, surprisingly passed a modon in support of opposìtion whìch Somalis had encountered in thè three years thè N.F.D. secessìon movement. The conference's refusai to since independence was heavily damaging. Britaìn's hand had cndorse Somali references to Ethiopian imperklism was much been conveniently strengthened by her accurate assessment of more in character with thè generai tenor of other African Pan-African opinion, thè indirect effec tof which was further meetings. Ìllustrated at thè futile meeting between Kenyan and Somali Finally, such slender comfort as thìs ambìguous result seemed representatives held at Rome in August 1963 under British to offe rwas completely destroyed at thè ìmportant Addis Ababa auspices. At these talks, which Britain convened under some summit conference in May. With thè long legacy of border in- criticism at home for her management of thè issue and, apparendy, cidents and recriminations between Ethiopia and thè Republic in thè hope of lessening tension in thè N.F.D, itself and between and tension stili continuìng, thè Somalìs at first refused to attend Kenya and thè Republic, thè leader of thè British delegation ex- thè conference, but later decided to compromise. But there was plained that his government judged their decision not to grant no concealing thè position of isoladon into which they had been secession to be ìn accordance with thè concensus of African manoeuvred or thè icy reception accorded to those passages in opinion expressed in Addis Ababa. Consequently, proposals by thè Somali Presidenti speech which, with more courage than thè Somali government that, pending a final solution, thè disputed tact, referred to Ethiopia's part in thè divìsion of Somaliland.» area should be placed either under joint Somali-Kenyan, or United Ethiopia had scored a notable tactical victory; and with her Nadons administration, received scant attendon and thè talks recent discomfiture on thè N.F.D. issue and thè concerted re- broke down. buttai of her Pan-Somali aspirations, thè Republic began to seek Thus thè end of 1963 saw thè Somali Republic cast in thè róle a rapprochement with her powerful neighbour despite growing of thè odd-man-out in African affairs ,and Kenya launched into 198 199 A MODERN HISTORY OF.SOMALIA THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE independence with, from thè Somali poìnt of view, thè N.F.D. support. The Prime Mirùster had already visited China, and also issue umesolved, or as some British officiate secmed to assume, India, in thè middle of thè year, no doubt with these matters settled by default. Yet, despitc this, hitherto thè Republic had very much in mind, and trade and aid agreements had been signed followed thè generai Afro-Asian patterà of non-alignment at with both countries. Thus it seemed likely that these negotiations thè United Nations and in her dealìngs with thè two world would be followed up by some new and strikìng manifestation power blocs. Moreover, within thè Pan-Africanist camp, she of Chinese help which, in thè context of East-West relations, had generally found herself alìgned wìth that group of African might restore thè Mogadishu government's flagging prestige. states which induded Ethiopia notwithstanding thè serious locai Most unexpectedly, however, it was not from this quarter but difficulties of thè two neìghbouring states. Qearly vita! though from Russia, that Dr 'Abd ar-Rashid found thè means by which he thè Pan-Somali issue was to Somali national sentiments, it could hoped to recapture popular support. In November 1963 it was not be allowed to override thè Republk's other interests. Since officiajl yannounced that thè Republic had refused an offe rof independence tìiese had prospered with generous grants of aid Western military assistance valued at almost £6j million ìn favour .and capitai loans from both East and West. Indeed, foreign aid of Russian military aìd to thè tune of nearly £11 million. has assumed such proportions by thè middle of 1963 that it was To what extent this move represented a definite change of possible to launch an ambìtious Pive Year Development Pian direction in Russian policy in thè Somali dispute remaìned to be (1963-67) costìng £70 million, of which almost half thè capitai seen. Its locai effects ,however, were more immediately discernible. was already available. In thè November municipal elections thè government party won This success in attracting such substantial aid might be thought 665 of thè available 904 seats (74 per cent), while its principal riva! to have vìndicated thè government's pclicy of not allowing thè thè Somali National Congress gained 105 seats. In thè elections Pan-Somali dispute to affec tthè Republic's generai positìon as an for thè national assembly which followed on 30 March, 1964 - by uncommitted state closely assocìated with Ethiopia within thè which tìme thè long train of border incidents with Ethiopia had Afro-Asian camp. Opponents of thè S.Y.L. government, how- erupted ìnto open war and thè Ogaden was in resurgence - thè evct, did not see thè matter in this light: and, some at least, werc S.Y.L. position was again strongly maintained, though with a prepared to sacrifice their other interests to a much more definite slightly reducedmajority (S.Y.L.,69 seats; S.N.C., 22; S.D.U., 15 ; course of action on thè N.F.D. issue. The rupture of diplomane H.D.M.S., 9; others, 8). These results speak for themselves and relations wìth Britain, conducted in a most civilized manner, had show how effectivdy thè League had recovered much of its wìde by no means assuaged thè deep wound to Somali pride caused popular support in circumstances which were bound to strengthen by Britain's action. And popular indignation against Britain and thè government's position. At thè same time, thè manner.in her allies in thè West found much to feed upon and brood over which thè elections were conducted, and thè extent to which in thè long history of Britain's past conduci of Somali affairs. oppositìon parties participated in them, reaffirme dthè Republic's Accused of not providing sufficiently strong leadership on thè continuing commitment to thè principles of parliamentary democ- N.F.D. issue, and increasìngly unpopular for its management of racy. Thus in thè conduci of its internai polìtica! life as much as in home afìairs, thè S.Y.L. government searched anxiously for some its external nationalist interests, thè Somali Republic remained dramatic action which might restore its popularity and enhance isolated from many of its neighbours. its position before thè coming elections. In these condìtions of Somali anger and despair it seemed at The final pbase ofcìvilian government first most likely that thè Chincse Peoples' Republic, which had already shown considerable interest in Somali affairs and which The composition of thè new government formed after thè elec- had no conflictìng comroitments in Ethiopia, would prorTer tions led to prolonged and bitter conflic t within thè Darold

zoo 201 THE PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA thè findings of thè 1962 Commissìon, was making little headway leadership of thè S.Y.L. and this, inevitably, had wide repercus- at great cost to thè loca! civilian Somali population.54 In Jibuti sions. ar-Razaq Husseyn, a politician of considerable per- 'Abd macter swere even worse. In thè referendum , held two months sonal charisma and courage, replaced 'Abd ar-Rashid as Prime before thè Mogadishu presidential electron and carefully orchestrated sought number Minister and energetically to institutc a of ad- by thè Ftench auchorities ,thè ìnhabìtants of thè Cote (or at least ministrative reforms. In thè National Assembly thè government those permitted to voce there) had again endorsed thè contìnuance •was severely harassed at every possìble by thè ousted opportunity of French contrai, rejecting outrighc bdependence. The 'Afars had premier and hìs faction. covert sabotage was-facilitated by This now indeed seized thè politicai initiatìve so long enjoyed by thè Assembly practice qf normally votìng by secret baìlot, thus thè Somalis and had turned thè knife in che wound by changing thè making it extremely difficul tfor *Abd ar-Razaq to contro! his ill- name of thè Cote to thè 'French Territory of thè 'Afars and 'Ises'. 35 discipHned party which, followìng dcfections from other patties, Nothing could more directly reflec tthè new politicai complexion now held 105 seats. in Jibuti, At thè cost of severa! cabinet reshuffles ,'Abd ar-Razaq and his With so little to show for thè bold pursuit of thè Somali cause supporters were able to survive until thè Presidential elections of favoured by his predecessors, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal June 1967. President Adan AbduIIe 'Isman, who was eligible for decìded to see what rnight be achieved by^more conciliatory re-election, was supported by Premier *Abd ar-Ra2aq to whom he diplomacy. Followìng encouraging exchanges with thè Ethiopian was related by marriage. The main riva! candidate was thè ex- delegation at thè O.A.U. heads of state meeting at Kinshasa in Premier, 'Abd ar-Rashid, who had formed an alliance wìth thè September, Premier Igal met President Kenyatta at Arusha in Isaq politician and former leader of thè S.N.C, Muhammad Haji Tanzania in October and both sìdcs agreed to thè immediate Ibrahim Igaì (now officially a member of thè S.Y.L.). In thè event, normalization of their relations, to thè establishment of peace in *Abd ar-Rashid secured thè Presìdency and in July summoned his thè N.F.D. and to further negotiations thiough thè good offices ally Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal to form a government. A of President Kaunda in thè search for a final settlement to thè British-trained northerner had thus assumed thè reins of govern- problem. In keeping with these developments, diplomatic rela- ment, and allocated portfolios to minìsters representing thè main tions with Britain (which had given milìtary support to thè lìneage blocs in thè normal way. With thè continued division of Kenyans in thè 'shtfta war') were restored and steps taken to thè Darod hegemony in thè League, thè fragile coalition of Dir, promote a less anti-Western image to balance thè impression Isaq and Hawìye lost its point and thè S.N.C, became virtually inevitably conveyed by thè Somali Republìc's increasìng military redundant as an anti-Darod party. Division along thè north-south axis was also difficul tto sustain under thè joint mie of a southern dependence on thè U.S.S.R. Although Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal claìmed that hisvnew President northern Premier. There generai and was thus a tend- diplomacy did not make any concessions to Ethiopia or Kenya ency to revert to locai lineage rivalry, thè encompassìng major and indeed represented a new understanding of thè Somali point lineage blocs dissolving, for thè time into component frac- being, of view, in Addis Ababa and Nairobi it was tempting to interpret This re-emergence of small group factìonalism coincided tions. thè new Somali policy as a capìtulation, This view naturally com- with thè growing disillusionment and frustration felt by many of mended itself to thè Somali Premier's opponents in Mogadishu, urban elite at thè ineffectiveness of thè Fan-Somali thè struggle. where demonstrators accused him of a 'sell-out*. With thè finan- Taking stock of thè generai situatìon on thè wider Pan-Somali dal resources at its disposai, thè government was, however, able issue, thè new Premier found Httle cause for comfort. The clan- to survive these criticisms, securing a cautious balance of support destinely supported Somali guerrilla campaign in "Northern Kenya sufficien tto carry it into thè campaign for thè generai election held (known to thè Kenyans as thè sbifta ~ Ì.e. bandìts - war), which had developed in thè region after Britain's faìlure to ùnplement in March 1969. 203 ZOZ A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA New declorai regulations were introduced to discoutage ono- man Hneage paitics and to encourage national parties. Each con- stituency was assigned an 'declorai quotient', determined by divìding thè number of votes cast by thè number of seats avaìlable. CHAPTER IX Only parties polli ng more votes than this target quotient could gain seats. There was trcmendous national interest in thè impend- ing contest and politicai activity on a greater scale than ever THE SOMALI REVOLUTION: 1969-76 before. Many promìnent civil servante resigned -their posts to stand 'as candìdates. Large sums of money were spent in cam- paigning; figures of £i 5,000 being quoted in a number of cases (thè national budget at this time was £15 million). The govern- The milìtary coxp ment rallicd ali its resources and thè much respected police com- THE ELECTION WHICS H had brought thè S.Y.L. to power with mander, General Muhammad Abshir, resigned from bis post, such overwhelrning authority had left a bitter legacy of discontent. refusing to agree that police transport should be employed to Although, at constituency ìevel, rivai lineage segmenta had carry S.Y.L. voters to thè polting stations. There was a great dea! hedged their bets by supportìng several candidates under diflerent of confusion and in some districts riots occurred, resulting in thè party banners, many had not succeeded in returning a trusted reported loss of some forty lives. Despite thè new declorai pro- representative to Mogadishu. Many of thè unsuccessful candidates visions, a record number of 1,002 candidates, representing 62 who had invested so heavily in thè campaign were powerful, parties, contested thè 123 seats, The S.Y.L. won 73 seats, thè ambìtious people and thè conduci of thè elections encouraged emasculatcd S.N.C. 11 and thè H.D.M.S. a mere three. The latter them to bring forward a large number of electoral petitions and result indicated how thè Digit and Rahanweyn tribesmen now complaints to thè courts. The government's answer was provided evìdently felt that their interests were better served through thè by thè Supreme Court which, contrary to prevìous decìsions, now wide national parties than by their own parochìal party. As usuai, ruled that it was not empowered to judge such issues. This as soon as thè National Assembly opened, a large number of naturally increased thè frustration felt by many of those who had members crossed thè floor of thè house to join thè government, not gaìned a seat in thè Assembly, At thè same time, although thè hoping to share in thè spoils of office .The unedirying stampede S.Y.L. monopolized thè Assembly, their very numbers greatly of deputies left 'Abd ar-Razaq Haji Husseyn sitting alone as thè exacerbated thè norma! problems of party discipline. This en- sole opposition member of thè Assembly ! In company with thè couraged Igal's government to rely even more heavily than its majority of ìts peers, thè Somali Republic had at last become a predecessors on thè funds at its disposai 1. Qpponents and critica one-party state. outside thè Assembly were consequently able to complaìn'even more bitterly of thè corruption and nepotism which they con- sidered now prevailed at ali levels of government. This sense of discontent and frustration was by no means limited only to members of thè westernized elite. The democratic parliamentary process which had seemed to blend so well with traditional Somali politicai institutions and had begun with such verve and promise, had turned dìstinctly sour. The National Assembly was no longer thè symboi of free speech and fair play for ali citìfcens .It was now widely regarded cynically as a sordid

204 205 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMALI REVOLUTION : 1969-76 market-place where, with little concern for thè interests of those ensurìng his election as President and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim who had voted for them, deputies traded their votes for personal Igal's re-appointment as Premier, those army officers who had gain. Deputks were ferried about in sumptuous limousines, hear- been closely watching developments decided to act. ing thè magìe registration letters A.N. (Assemblea Nazionale) In thè early hours of 21 October thè army occupied kcy poìnts which thè inveterate poor of thè capitai translated with grim throughout thè capitai, members of thè government and other humour as anna nolahay: 'I*m ali right, Jack*. A story popular in leading polhicians and personalities were placed in detention (or, Mogadishu epitomizing thè gulf between rulers and ruled referred as in thè case of General Muhammad Abshir, under house arrest). to an incìdent in which one man riding on another's back and The Constitution was suspended, thè Supreme Court abolished, making thè motìons of driving a vehide was stopped by a puzzled thè National Assembly dosed, politicai parties dedared illegai, guard at thè entrance to Government Headquarters (Governò). and rule by a Supreme Revolutlonary Coundl established. The 'What do you think you are doing?' challenged thè guard. 'Oh', new regìme's aims stressed thè elimìnation of corruption and replied thè man riding his human mount, 'I noticed that in order tribal nepotism and thè re-establishment of a just and honourable to get in here you had to be conducted by a chauffeur.* In thè sodety in which proper attention would be given to real economie opìnion of thè more disillusìoned critica, democracy had lapsed and social betterment for ali. In esternai affairs ,existing treaties into commercialized anarchy and strong mie of a new type was would be honoured and thè Somali unificano^ struggle continued, urgently required ìf thè country was to be rescued from thè morass while further support would be given to liberation movements of poverty, insecurity and ineflkiency into which ìt had sunk. 2 generally and to thè fight against colonialism. In earnest of these' Premier Igal and President 'Abd ar-Rashìd seemed supremely intentions and hopes thè state was renamed thè 'Somali Demo- unconcerned by these danger signals and their only acknowledge- cratic Republic'. The membership of thè Supreme Revolutionary ment of them was to adopt a dangerously high-handed and Coundl (S.R.C.) was announced on i November. As had been authoritarian style pf mie whìch added to their unpopularity. anticipated, its President turned out to be General Muhammad Rumours of mìlitary intervention were rife and, amongst thè Siyad Barre (who had succeeded thè late General Da'ud as army alienated young elite partìcularly, there was much discussion of commander in 1965) assisted by twenty-four other officers from potential candidates to provide thè leadership which would be thè rank of major-general to captain. Of thè two originai Vice- necessary to save thè country from its present difficulties, One Presidents, one was General Jama' *A1 ÌKorshell, who had suc- name canvassed, despite his known reluctance to act unconstitu- ceeded General Muhammad Abshir as police commander and tionally, was that of thè former polke commander, General whose presence signalìzed thè acquiescence rather than active par- Muhammad Abshir. ticipatlon of thè police force in thè coup as afaif accompli. (General In thè event, thè immediate precipitami of thè coup were Korshell was discredited and arrested in Aprii 1970.) v entirely unexpected. During thè absence on a visit overseas of The presence of a number of maleable captains and thè notable Prime Minister IgaI, on i j October, 1969, while visìtìng drought omissìon from thè S.R.C, of several younger army colonels who stricken regions in Las Anod District in die north of thè Republìc, had earlier agitated for a military foap, was widely interpreted as President 'Abd ar-Rashìd *Ali Shirmarke was shot dead by one of indìcating General Siyad's determination to remain firmly in his polke guards. At this news, thè Premier hastened back to command of thè new government, a view which later develop- Mogadishu to organize thè election of a new President upon whom ments - as we shall see - were amply to confimi. Two weeks after he could rely for support. The Premier's candidate was an old- seizing power, thè S.R.C, announced thè formation of thè four- campaigner and dose associate, Haji Muse Boqor. When, at a late- teen-member committee of 'Secretaries' with executive rather than night meeting on 20 October, thè party caucus reached agreement ministerial powers, who would be responsible for day-to-day to present this nomìnee as their officia i candidate, thus virtually administratìon. Except for thè police Vice-President, General 206 207 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMAL REVOLUTIONI 1969-7: 6

Jama* 'Ali Korshell, who was charged with tesponsibility for Scientific Socialista in Somalia Internai Affairs ,thè other mcmbcrs otthe Council of Secretaries This vigorous effor tto correct thè errors of thè past and piace thè •were young civilian civil servants - technocrats chosen for thcìr country's fortunes on a finn footing assumed a more specific ability rather than with an eye to achieving an evcn representation ideologica! orientation on thè first anniversary of thè coup (Octobet of thè country's traditional clan and lineage dìvisions. Assisted by 1970), when General Siyad proclaimed that Somalia would hence- its civilian Secretaries, thè S.R.C, at once embarked on an cnergetic forth be dedicated to Scientific Socialism. This choice of direction, revitalization of thè country's government, economy and social already foreshadowed in thè retrospective transformation of thè enjoyìng services. The aim, wide popularity, was to clean out thè coup into a Revolution (Ka'an in Somali) reflected thè army's grow- Augean stables and to restore Somali virtues with a realistic and ing dependence on Russian equipment and advìsers in contrast to concerted onslaught on thè people's real enemies : poverty, dìsease thè complcmentary connexion of thè police force with America and ignorance. and thè West. It was also naturai that thè idealistìc young intellec- To this end thè civilian district and provincia! governors were tuals associated with thè new regime should look to thè Soviet replaced by energetic young army and police officers; vigilant bloc for inspiration, since thè prevìous civilian governments had military personnel were posted to ministries to go through thè on thè whole inclined towards thè West (despìte, or perhaps accounts and scrutinÌ2e current transactions ; embassy staf fwere bccause of, thè Russian military aid agreement of 1963). Scientific recalled for retraining and, where this was judged necessary, re- Socialism (in Somali literally, 'wealth-sharing based on wisdom* - placed by military personncl. Politìcians and official ssuspected of banti-ivadaàgga tilmikudhisan\ was now thè cornerstone of officiai irregularities were arrested and investigated, pending court pro- policy and closely lìnked with thè idcals of unity or 'togetherness' ceedings. The new regional and district governors were appointed (wadaa/ir), 'self-reliance* (ù ku kalsoonaan) and (self-help' (iskaa wab as 'chairmen* of locai Revolutionary Councils which sought to u qabso}.* The announcement of thè advent of Scientific Socialism galvanize activity. emphasis produttive This pervasive on direct- was coupled with a vehement denunciation of tribalism, which %s ing public resources purposefully towards thè xWdevelopment so thè officia i slogan succinctly stated "divides [where] Socialism urgently needed in Somalia was reflected in an expansion of thè unites*. The former government-stipended locai lineage headmen propaganda activities of thè Ministry of Information, which was (akìls) were replaced by elders with thè appealing title of 'peace- now also responsible for 'Public Guidance*. Immediate practical seekers* (ndbad-doQn}^ or at any rate this new designation was measures taken included harnessing thè energies of some of thè officiall yadopted. The abolìtion of payment of blood money was large population of unemployed, poverty-stricken urban tribal Ukewise confirmcd, and those prone to engagé in this or other 'drop-outs', by giving them food and dothing to work in farms tribalistìc actions connected with thè traditional lineage and clan and on road construction and other public projects. Members of organization warncd that they risked swingeìng fines and prison thè public were ìnvited to lodge complaints about thè past rnis- sentences. As a positive measure against urban tribalismo thè management of thè country and to make suggestions about future government undertook to provide funera lexpenses for those who improvements. At thè same time, to discouragc thè intcrmìnable died in towns without relatives available to help them perform blood feuds between lineages which had done so much to under- mine national solidarity in thè past, thè death sentence was intro- these services. The national campaign (olol) or 'crash programme' (parnaamaaf) duced to replace thè blood compensation (dija) paìd traditìonally against tribalism culminated in demonstrations later in thè year between groups. andearly in 1971 when effigie srepresenting 'tribalism, corruptìon, nepotism and misrule' were symbolically burnt or buried in thè Republic's main centres. The circumlocutary use of thè term 'ex* 209 208 THE SOMALI REVOLUTION : 1969-76 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA given to thè Head of State's sayìngs in thè daily programmes of (ex-clan) tolerated by previous civilian regimes (see above p. 168) Radio Somali. In thè same vein, thè GenetaFs public appearances was completely outlawed, and thè word comrade (Jaalle: friend, were scenes of carefully orchestrated jubilation where he was chum) launched into generai currency wìth officiai blessing to greeted with applause and adulatìon, feted and saluted by his replace thè traditional, polite term of address 'cousin' («wW«r), devoted subjects, who often danced before hìm to Korean which was now considered undesirable because of its tribalistic, choreography. This leadership cult, so alien to thè egalìtarianism kìnship connotations. Earlier Somali natìonalists, both relìgious of traditional Somali nomadic culture, contrasted sharply with thè and secular, to brotherhood of had appealed thè transcendent disarmìng hùmility and man-to-man directness which thè Head of Somalis, uniting those of different clan and lineage. The new State was. careful to display in his face-to-face encounters with his stress on frìeadsbip appealed for co-operation and unity on thè comrades and foreign vìsitors. basis of an undifferentiated, nationalistic Somali identity, in which The pomp and ceremony surrounding thè Head of State's traditional divisìons were totally annulled. public appearances also served to hìghlight his own modest The development of this officiai ìdeology and of other reinforc- private lifestyle and his much publicized edìfyìng concern for thè ing divisions became increasingly important to General Siyad's poor and underprivìleged. Thus, despite his exaltation as *Bene- regime as thè public enthusiasm which had greeted thè coup ficent Leader* (buono condottone, thè legend on an officia iposter), initially gradually diminished. A national cult, owing something General Siyad managed to retain his popular image as a man of thè to Chinese, North Korean and Nasserite as well as Soviet in- fluences, was gradually created round thè Head of State. The new people. -H officiai hagiography presented General Siyad as thè 'Victorious Leader' (Guulwaaddè), dauntlessly leading thè nation in ìts unremit- State contro! ing struggle against Ìts foes. Posters, poems, songs of praise and The employrnent of this Maoìst cult to focus thè vital energies of panegyric speeches soon monotonously proclaimed throughout thè masses was supplemented by a growing plethora of other thè country thè sublime calling of thè herok Tather' of thè nation, agencìes of thought control. The Politicai Office of thè President whose 'Mother' was thè Revolution. Inspired by Scientific was expanded into a national organization of apparatcics staffing Socialism, this mystical union was depicted as thè sourcc of "orientation centres 1 (baniwnirì) which were set up in ali permanent prosperìty and success in thè nation's struggle forward. Amongst settlements of any size throughout thè country. Members of thè its more precious progeny were thè 'Flowers of thè Revolution' public were expected to assemble in these centres on public holi- (as they are officially designated - destitute children, often orphans, days to study thè aims and methods of thè Revolution within who had been gathered from thè streets of Mogadishu and other walls decorated with pictures of thè new holy trinity: faalle towns ìnto Revolutionary Youth Centres, where they received Markis (Marx),/^//? Lenin andyW/e Siyad. In their efforts to instili food, clothes, education and training in thè tasks of nation- and maìntain revolutionary fervour at thè locai level, presidency building). These new recruits to thè nation symbolized thè ideai officiala were aided by members of thè people's vigilantes (thè new citizen whose dedication to his country was pure and un- guulwaaddayaar), or 'Victory Pioneers', an organization established tarnished by atavistic kinship allegiances. in thè summer of 1972 and recruited largely amongst thè unem- Such pìthy exhortations as *less talk and more (haddalyar work' ployed. With their brìght green unisex uniforms and Orwellian- iyo hawlweyn), culled from thè General's numerous public har- eye, symbolizing vigilance, these civilian guards were expected to figured prominently in national daUy paper (Qctober angues, thè play a leading role in organìzing locai support (in kind or cash) Star) and were collected together in a little blue-and-white (thè for development and 'crash programmes*. Women's btanches national colours) pocket manual, which was wìdely distributed were entrusted with community and family welfare work. and proudly displayed by zealous officiate. Similar prominence was 211 zio THE SOMALI REVOLUTION: 1^69-76 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA «ble to do so fled thè country, seeking employment overseas - In thè capitai, Mogadishu, a na donai top-level orientation notably in Arabia, thè Gulf States and in Kenya. There was thus a ccntre for thè higher public service cadrcs was established in thè marked 'brain drain' which substantially depleted Somalia s man- former military academy, which was renamcd 'Halane' after a ™ wer resources, particularly in those fields where there was most young Somali lìcutenant who had died whìle attempting to savc need of talent. While some of those who remamed faithfully his country's colours in thè brief outbreak of fighting with Ethio- behind pursued successful carcers in government service or m pia in 1964. Intensive in-service training courses there wcre run business, others were frequendy imprisoned and harassed by in collaboration with staff from thè Somali Institute for Develop- aeentsof thè security service. ment Administration. These positive organs for shaping and The N S S. had become thè mam agency supplymg defendants sustaining patriotism at thè appropriate pitch were rèinforced by for trial in thè National Security Courts which were presided over other agencies which checked deviations from officia i policy. by military officers , often with Uttle or no legai training. These Prominent amongst these were thè National Security Service courts handed out rough justice, thè accused enjoymg few of thè (N.S.S.) and thè National Security Courts which joindy dealt with richts normally accorded in properly constituted courts of law a wide range of 'politicai* offences induding nepotism and tribal- Sentences tended to be strict and appeals for clemency to thè Head ism, as already indlcated, as well as with such charges as 'lack of of State were apt to receive a cool reception revolutionary zeaT and treason. Members of thè National Security While ordinary criminals found guilty of murder were regu- Service, under a Sandhurst and K.G.B.-trained commander, en- larly «ecuted by firing squad, there were àlso several puHic joyed arbitrary powers of arresi, sometimes following thè denun- Lcutìons of persons accused of plotting against thè state. The ci a ti o n of a suspect by his personal enemies. Members of thè. most widely publiched occurred in July i 91 z when two generals publìc services were kept under survcillance and N.S.S. reports Le a Vice-President) were executed-on thè charge of attempting played an important in promotion and part demotion. io overthrow General Siyad's regime. This response to internai In monitoring and seeking to control public opinion, consider- disagreement within thè S.R.C made it indisputably clear *at able use was also made of sgenti provocateurs. Rìghts of assembly General Siyad's word was law and brooked no defiance or dis- were lìmJted, and persons wishìng to visit thè homes of foreign aereement. If this uncompromising sentence admimstered a sharp nationals or attend foreìgn embassy parties required to possess ìolt to national feeling, thè public execution of ten locai religious officia ipermits. Otherwise, unless thcy were sufficiently powerful 'sheikhs in January I975 had wider and more serious repercussions to enjoy immunity from these petty controis, those who frater- Buchine a deeper nerve. With twenty-three others who received nized with foreigners were liable to be held for questioning by thè on^prison sentences, thè ten executed religious figures were N.S.S. These restrictìons were justified by reference to thè per- ^Lld with preaching in thè mosques against a Uberai new law vading atmosphere of gossip and intrigue which in thè uninhibited which, contrary to traditional Isiam, gave women thè sanie in- days of civilìan government, so it was argued, facilitated thè sub- Teritance rights as men. By this action, taken m Internala! versive activities of foreign governments hostile to Somalia. Women's Year, thè government demonstrated its secular reform- Rumour-mongers (Afminsbar) were indeed probably thè most ist intcntions - but at thè cost of raising in an acute form tìje whole frequendy denounced of ali anti-government influences, and aue^tion of thè Islamic identity of thè Somali people. This is an spreading malicious gossip against thè regime was a charge Lue to which we shall return shortly in a more consideri discus- incurring serious penalties. Although few politicai prisoners were sion of thè compatability of Isiam and Scientific Socialism. brutally tortured or died in -custody, this oppressive climatc was While thè President regularly exhorted his locai representatives particularly distasteful to thè westernized elite and to many of to act as charmels of communication faithfully relaymg thè ideas those who had played a prominent part in politicai life during thè and aspirations of his subjects to nim, this pervasive apparatus ol previous civilian regìmes. Many of thè more outspoken who were

112 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMAL REVOLUTIONI 1969-7: 6 state contro! was hardly conducive to an effective dialogue be- private enterprise, selling surplus livestock to Somali and Arab- tween rulers and ruled. Thesc txansactions were thus, inevitably, owned exportìng firms, buying for thè Arab and Persian Gulf somewhat one-sided. Policy dìd change from time to time (and market. Not ali thè off-take from thè pastoral economy was dis- indeed in 1977 dramatically), partly in response to publìc opinìon, tributed through private enterprise. A sìgnificant proportion but its course was sufficiently erratic to make it difficult for found its way to thè Russian built state-owned meat canning fac- members of thè public to be cettain at a particulat time of thè tory at Kismayu (where there ìs an American-built port). The precise boundaries of acceptable opinion, Retkence was clearly marketing and export of skins was controlied nationally through a thè safest policy, and people naturally told those in authority what government agency. The other maìnstay of thè export economy, they thought they wanted to hear. thè banana crop, was produced largely on ptivately-owned Ali this contributed to thè seemingly arbitrary'nature of thè plantations, some belonging to Arabs and Italians, in thè rivenne authority exercised by thè Supreme Revolutionary Council. regions of southern Somalia but exported exclusively through a Despite ìts elaborate and heavy-handed character, however, this natìonal marketing agency which allocat.es producers 1 'quotas*. essentially autocratic pattern of government stili touched thè Ali graìn produced, again mainly in thè better-watered south, nomadic majority of thè populatìon relatively lightly. The nomads, from privately-owned and usually very small farms was likewise indeed, remained as a refractory challenge despite energetic purchased by thè Agrìcultural Development Corporation and sold measures designed to bring them mote securely into thè fold. In at eontrolled prices through retailers, or distributed through 1974, thè eight provinces into which thè state had previously been orientation centres. Each farmer was allowed to retain a propor- divided were reconstituted as fifteen new regìons, comprisìng tion of his crop for dom'estic consumption. Regìonal Storage seventy-eight districts, where necessary renamed to exclude tribal facilities were p'rovided by thè government which, through this (or clan) names. Emphasis was placed on thè settlement (digmó) as System of state-controlled marketing, endeavoured to cut out self- thè basic unit of association and identification in a further effort seekìng middlemen. Partly in order to attract government to extirpate lingering Hneage loyalties. And even among thè finance, some farming enterprises formed themselves into agri- nomads efforts were made to encourage people .to regard thè cultural co-operatìves or collectives - of which one of thè most orientation centre at a regùlarly frequented water point as thè hub successful was thè traditìonally-based religious commune of El of social and politicai activities. Marriages, which had traditionally Bìrdales in thè north-west of thè Republic. As has been indicated, involve'd rivai (and often potentially hostile) Hneages, were now there were of course also state farms, some employing prison to be conducted at a locai orientation centre, with its resident ìabour, and thè state-owned sugar production complex at Jowhar community replacing thè kin of bride and groom. It would be on thè Shebelle River. Prior to thè unforeseen demands made on unreaìistic to expect these measures to bave made mudi immedi- resources by thè catastrophic 1975 drought, thè 1974-8 Pive Year ate impact amongst thè nomads. There was thus, inevitably, a Development Pian allocated 30 per cent (£200 mìllion) of thè total considerable gap between theory and practice in thè politicai life budget to further agricultural development. Special consicjeration of thè nomadic majority of thè population-. was to be given to resuscitate moribund state farms and thè formation of further co-operative and crash programme farm settlements to absorb unemployed townsmen and surplus popula- Management of thè econoray tion from thè nomadic sector of thè economy (a matter of criticai The same might be said with equal force of thè application of urgency following thè 1975 drought). Scientific Socialismi in thè management of thè state's economy. While a number of small private companies existed in towns, The nomads with their privately-owned herds of camels, cattle some in thè forra of *co-operatives', thè few large industriai and flocks of sheep and goats remained obdurate exponents of concerns (usually thè products of foreign aid) were state run (e.g. 214 li S THE SOMALI REVOLUTION : 1969-76 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA language, hygìene, .modern animai husbandry methods, basic thè Chinese-built match factory). And in 1975 October thè import civics and thè aims of Scìentific Socialism. Equipped with blan- and distributkm of most foreign manufacturcd goods was national- a folding blackboard, and water-bottle, and drawìng a daìly izcd, resuldng in pcriodic shortagcs. There were stili, however, a iets, allowance of two Somali shillings (approximately 15 English new number of successful entrepreneurs operatìng large-scale and pence), these privileged urban students were to share thè fruite of highly profitable businesscs. Taken as a whole, thè economy thus thè Revolution with their neglected nomadic comrades, staying remained in practice mixed, although thè element of state control as guests with nomadic family groups and teachìng their hoste to had certainly incrcascd appreciably since thè introduction of read and write. The guiding slogan, supplied by thè President, Scientific Socìalism. was thè same as that for thè earlier urban mass literacy campaign: *If you know teach; if you don't learn*. As General Siyad ex- Socialism and development plained in a speech on Women's International Day on 8 March, 1974; 'The Key is to give everybody thè opporrunity to learn It was, however, on ite cxtended national 'crash programmes* that ... readìng writing. imperative that give people thè S.R.C, relied for thè most direct implementation of its and . .. It is we our modern revolutionary cducatìon . . . to restructure their social revolutìonary ideals. Amongst thè most imprcssive and ambitious exìstence. . . . It will be thè weapon to eradicate social balkaniza- of these were thè urban and rural mass literacy campaigns of 1973 tìon and fragmentation into tribes and sects. will bring about and 1975. In 1972 General Siyad's government took thè bold and it an absolute unity and there will be no room for any negative sensible decision of adopting thè roman alphabet as thè officiai foreign cultura! influences.' The closely linked goals of moderniza- script for thè national language, Somali. The question of whether to choose thìs script, with its secular implicatìons, or thè less tion, nationalism and independence are here ali combìned; a modern, intcgrated natìon consisting of those who not only 'speak suitable Arabie alphabet, favoured by many pro-Arab Somalis, had always proved 'too delicate for previous governments to thè same language*7 but who also read and write ìt. However carefully planned, this cxtraordìnarily ambitious resolve effectively .Once thè decision had been taken it proved project was bound to encounter problems ìn its execution. The popular, and there is little doubt that thè urban literacy campaign unptedictability of nomadic movements and thè exigencies of thè of 1973 was highly successful.6 Official s were sent on crash nomadìc life did not make for easily accessìble, unencumbered courses with thè inducement that, ìf they failed their literacy students, even when watering fees were waived at government exams, they might lose their jobs. Adult literacy classes, which lacked thìs sancdon, drew large and enthusiastic attendances from wells to attrae! potential pupils. On thè other hand some of thè young teachers, whose urban upbringing had precluded experì- thè most educationally deprived sections of thè urban popula- ence of thè nomadic life, found thè rigours of thè bush far from tion. appealing. In this 'outward-bound* project, therefore, if those Following this *Cultural Revolution* as it was somewhat participated showed grandiloquently if characteristically hailed by thè Minister of In- nomads who in lessons that they could formation and National Guidance, Generai Isma'il 'Ali Abokor, quickly master thè new script, their teachers often learnt as much as they taught. How thè project would have ended if it had been thè aim in 1974 was to extend 'instant literacy* to thè nomads. In allowed to reach completion as planned remains a matter for con- July 1974, at'an estimated cost of £10 milìion, a huge taskforce of jecture. event, thè Prosperity some 30,000 secondary school students and teachers was dìs- In thè 'Rural Campaign' had to be patched imo thè interior in triumphant truckloads. In parties of hurriedly renamed thè *Rutal Development Campaign* when it eight, with a teacher as leader and with thè participation of was discovered that it had coincided with one of thè worst veterinary and medicai personnel, these young pioneers of thè droughte in Somali hìstory. 8 Unlike thè government in Addis new Somalia set forth to teach thè nomads to write their own Ababa during thè earlier Ethiopìan famine, thè Somali govern- 216 117 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMALI REVOLUTION : 1969-76 ment, much to its credit, did not attempt to conceal thè extent of retnain in their new locations once good raìns restored their thè disaster and mobilìzed ali its resources to save thè lives of as traditional grazìng areas and enabled them to rebuild their many as possìble of thè drought-stricken nomads. A state of depleted herds and flocks. emergency was dedared, a *holy-war* prodaimed against thè This national catastrophe, which was thus quite effectivel ycon- famine, and vigorous appeals made to thè internadonal com- tained and even taken advantage of, prompted a major reorganiza- munity fot famine relief supplies and medicai aid. In thè worst tion of thè government in December 1974. This in turn helped to affccted northern and north-eastern regìons, thè students werc prepare for thè eventual introductìon in July 1976 of thè much quickly marshalled into organizing famine relief camps to accom- heralded politicai party, thè Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party, modate as many as 200,000 destitute nomads at thè height of thè and thè officia ireplacement of military by civilian rule, a develop- drought. ment for which thè Russians had long been pressing, If thè drought thus transformed thè rural development cam- paign into a massive famine relief operation, ìts originai aims were recovered by converting thè famine relief camps into orientation Socialism and traditional constraìnts: Isiam and tribalism centres- This, of course, was necessarily only a temporary expedi- We must now attempt a deeper assessment of thè true extent of ent. Many of thè nomads in thè camps had lost ali or most of their thè transformation achìeved by Sdentile ^ocialism of thè most lìvestock, and their future Hvelihood posed an acutely challenging pervasìve traditional forces ; Isiam and thè clan (or lineage) System, problem. Here again, however, advantage could be taken of Although there were said to be a few atheists amongst thè young adversity. The government was quick to seize thè opportunity of Somali Marxist elite, General Siyad repeatedly insisted that his furthering two of its long-term policies : thè sedentarization of government's commitment to Scìentific Socialism was fully com- nomads and detribalìzation. While a restocking scheme was also patìble wìth Isiam and indeed, as he pointed out with some justice, inaugurated, most of those in thè relief camps werc re-established expressed thè essentìal communal spirit of Isiam. As he declared either in newly expanded collectives and state farms along thè in a speech a few months after seizing power : 'Our Islamìc faith Shebelld and Juba Rìvers in thè south, or in coastal fishing com- teaches us that Ìts inherent values are perennial and continually munities to supply thè Russian-aided fish-canning industry. evolving as people progress. These basic tenets of our religion Although thè Somali government had hoped thè costs of this cannot bc ìnterpreted in a static sensé, but rather as a dynamic vast re-settlement would be met from Arab funds, in thè event it source of ìnspiration for continuous advancement. . . . To help was organized by thè Russians who provided air and road our brethren and our fellows, we must go beyond thè concept of transport on a massive scale. This sudden re-location of Somali charity and reacri thè higher and more altruìstic concept of co- population, involving up-rooting people from their traditional operation on a national scale, We must strive with enthusiasm and grazing areas and re-settling them amongst unrelated clans and patriotism to attain thè highest possìble rate of generai welrare for lineages, where they were to change from nomadic herdsmen to ali/ Moreover, as General Siyad explained in a speech in 1972, sedentary cultivators or fishermen (both occupations traditionally evidently aimed at young secular radicals, *The founders of despised by thè nomads), was a bold and hazardous undertaking. Scientific Socialism were not against religion in partìcular but they While thè mixed cuMvating population between thè Shebelle exposed and disproved thè reactionary elements of religion that and Juba Rivers contained many people of northern nomadic dominate [thè] sound reasoning of mankind and hence hinder origin," such a large and rapid transformation, as General Siyad's [thè] progress of society.' speeches at thè time acknowledged, rìsked refuelling traditional There was no question, therefore, of thè death of God here - clan and tribal rivalries. And, if no major incident occurred, it was whatever conservative Islamic critics inside Somalia or outside it difficul t to forecast how many of thè re-settled nomads would claìmed. As President Siyad declared in another speech in 1972: 218 219 A MODHRN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMALI REVOLUTION: 1969-76 'As far as socìalism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message Hke majority of Somalìs. As thè followìng table shows, thè S.R.C was Isiam but a mere System for regulating thè relations between man in its mixed lineage composìtion in thè same traditìon as its and his utìlization of thè means of production in this world. If we predecessor civilian cabinets. decide to regalate our national wealth, it is not against thè essence of Isiam. God has creatcd man and has given him thè faculty of Composìtion of Somali governments* mind to choosc between good and bad, between virtue and vice. by major lineage blocs, 1960-75 We have chosen social iustice instead of exploìtation òf man by man can and this is how we practically help thè individuai Muslim 1960» 1966* 1967" 1969* 1975* and dìrect him to [a] virtuous life. Howevcf, the'reactionaries Darod 6 6 6 6 io wanted to create a rift between socialism and Isiam because Hawiye 4 5 4 socialism is not to their interest.' In this eclectic fashion thè Siyad 4,3 Dìgil and Rahanweyn z 5 3 2 ° regime staunchly defended its blend of socialism av

220 221 A MODRRN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMALI REVOLUTION: 1969-76 *M.O.D.' given to thè regime. M stood for thè patrilineage of thè embrace a wider range of groups and, if necessary, to register President, OTor that of his mother, and D for that of his principal changes in their relative power and rankìng. The formation of thè son-in-law, head of thè National Security Service. The Presidenti Somali Socialist Revolutìonary Party in June 1976, with its large own lineage live along thè upper reaches of thè Juba River near Supreme Council, composed of seventy-three members, provided thè Ethiopian and Kenyan frontiers. His mother's clan, thè • widcly representative setting for thè M.O.D. power celi. Ogaden, occupy thè ncighbouririg and critically sensitive region The Central Committee, presìded over by President Siyad as of that name (Ogaden) in Ethiopia. The Presidenti son-in-law's Sccrctary General of thè Party and as Chairman of thè Council of clan are also of key importance, for they traditionally herd theìr Ministers, included ali thè members of thè former S.R.C, with thè stock on both sides of thè boundary separating thè former Britìsh addition of nineteen others - mainly, but not exclusively, military and Italian Sornalilands and so constìtute thè bridge linking these pcrsonnel. Each new member was responsible for a particular two terrìtoriàl segments of thè Somali state. Just as thè President area of government. At thè "same urne separate government sought to modulate thè level of Somali nationalism in thè Ogadcn minìstcrs were also appointed to act ìn co-ordination with thè through his vital maternal links there, and thus contro! his Politicai Bureau. Finally thè vìtal Politicai Bureau consisted, as external relations with Ethiopia, so through this son-in-law's clan might have been expected, of thè President (no longer stylcd he sought to contaìn friction between thè northern and southern 'General') and thè three Vice-Presìdents, Generals Husseyn parts of thè Republic and their respective Anglophone and Kultniye, Muhammad 'Ali Samatar (army commander), Isma'il Italophone colonial tradìtions. The M.OJD. constéllation was thus 'AH Abokor (Assìstant Secretary General of thè Party); and thè an apt formula for ruling Somalia, providing thè President with a N.S.S, head, General Ahmad Sulayman 'Abdulle. If this extra- power base which offered external as well as internai security. Its ordinarily. comrjlex apparatus, far more elaborate than any previ- limitations, as we shall see, were intrinsic to thè reciprocai charac- ous civilian admìnistration, included any members capabie of ter of these relationshìps which, if they assured thè President of seriously challenging thè authority of thè President it was cer- faithful support, did so at thè price of making him particularly tainly by accident, and they were well advised to maintain a low sensitive to thè partìsan interests of those ìnvolved. This added profile. Although thè number of people and range of interest a direct personal flavour to thè Presidenti repeated vitrìolic groups implicitly represented in officia i policy-making was attacks on 'tribalism' as an intolerable abomination. As he greatly enlarged, it was clear that thè President had every intention declared in a menacing address to regional judges: *TrìbalÌsm and of retaìning as complete control as ever. nationalism cannot go hand in hand.... It is unfortunate that our There was no question of his seeking to abandon or seriously natìon is rather too dannish; -if ali Somalis are to go to Hell, modify his own special version of benign, despotic paternalism, tribalism will be their vehicle to reach there*. 'Speak for yourselP, What thè new strutture sought to do was to endow thè Presi- some of his listeners must have muttercd under their breaths. denti authority with greater legitimacy. Two years a/ter its Although no-one could utter thè secret symbol of General foundation, thè officia i Party could boast no more than 20,000 Siyad's power openly, thè M.O.D. basis of his rule was public membcrs, a figure which hardly suggested massive popular sup- knowledge and discussed and criticized in private. With their port Ìn thè country at large. usuai verbal facìlity, ingenìous Somali sophists developed an alternative circumlocution, substituting datcs, starting from that Sodalism and Siyadism of thè Glorious Revolution, to represent thè major power- holding groups. In this idìom 21 October was used as a synonym It would be over-simplistic to characterize this period of Siyad's for M, 22 October for O and 23 October for D. This new code rule as a phase in which a superstructure of Marxist rhetoric had thè additional advantage of being sufficiently elastic to concealed an infrastructure built upon enduring clan and lineage

222 223 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA THE SOMALI REVOLUTI ON : 1969-76 loyaltics. The factions vyìng for influence were not solely based on former some Somalis suppose to have been a patrilineal ancestor kinship ties. Doctrinal and ideological diflerences, Marxist and of thè Head of State. Islamic, werc also significant , as well as competition between This is thè formidable endorsement whìch President Siyad exponents of thè two rivai colonìal traditìons - thè Italian and sought to capture and exploit as he presented hìmself as thè British. The Head of State treated criticism on these fronts as perennial crusader in thè endless battle against thè nation's foes. seriously as on any other, stoutly maintaining that Scientìfic The lay and thè religious were thus conjoined in a fertile unìon as Socialism was a System of universa! appHcability, pragmatically thè President proclaimed himself thè divinely guided saviour of adaptable to ali conditìons - Islamic as well as non-lslamic. As he his people. No wonder some Somalis were heard to mutter, under contemptuously observed in a speech at thè Halane National their breaths, that Somali socialism was a religion. Orientation Centre in 1972, narrow-minded orthodox Marxists Life in Somalia in thè period under revìew was indeed a battle missed thè poìnt when they said 'that Comrade V. I. Lenin con- and one in which every victory was haìled as thè achievement of fiscated such and such property after thè Great October Revolu- thè Great Leader. This atmosphere of perpetuai strife was con- tion, or in [thè] 19405 Comrade Mao Tse-Tung did this and that firmed by such naturai calamities as thè 1975 famine and by in his country against thè reactionary forces. These people are repeated government discoveries of internai 'traitors' and sub- totally ignoring thè historical conteit of thè teachings of thè great verters of thè Revolution. As thè Presidenti speeches incessantly socialist thinkers. They lecite quotations from thè founders of warned, and as thè arbitrary arrests and unpredictable rehabilita- scientific socialista out of their proper context'. In a different tions of politicai prisoners confirmed, thè state was constantly setting thè same poìnt was made in much thè same spirit by a menaced by internai as well as external adversaries dedicated to young Somali Marxist ìntellectual who concluded a heated private thè overthrow of Scientific Socialism. Socialism, as thè President debate with a well-known French Marxist anthropologist with dedared in one of many harangues to thè nation, ' ' cannot exìst thè dismissive declaration: *I don't need Marx; Marx needs mei* without opposition which must be overcome by a ceaseless struggle Nevertheless, if thè ideology of class struggle was scarcely very towards victory. In this dialettica! conflict it was President Siyad appropriate to locai conditìons, 'class' could easily be replaced by who identified thè enemy and kept thè battle tally. Although 'tribe' and thè Marxist dialectic blended readily with mìlitary jingo- Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung and thè peripatetic Kim II Sung (to say ism. Waging ceaseless wars against his country's encmies - pov- nothing of Mussolini) ali had some influence on thè homespun erty, disease, ignorance - and launching national campaign aftet philosophy of development and power constructed by thè Siyad campaign, Sìyad was presented as thè omnipotent leader in thè regime," locai politicai realities suggest that 'Scientific Siyadism* relentless struggle forward to progress and victory. In such an might be an appropriate description of thè Somali experience at atmosphere of Sturm una Drang there are traditional precedent s for this time. Certaìnly socialism was here a means rather than a'n end. Siyad's style of leadership. In thè past, however, personal auth- ority of thìs kind and scale had usually only been successfully wielded by national religìous heroes, wagìng thè holy war (jièaJ) against thè infide!. The two outstanding examples of this proud tradition in thè Somali national consciousness were thè famous Islamic champion, Ahmad Gran (1506-43) who conquered and briefly ruled thè Christian Ethiopian heartland in thè sixteenth century, and thè fiery twentieth-century Dervish hero, Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan (1864-1920)."» While thè latter was related to President Siyad both maternally and by marriage, thè

224 225 NATIONALISM , ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION there were naturally those who criticized such extravagant hospitalìty as a ridiculous waste of scarce resources,. many ordinary people were proud of their country's newly found importance, As one CHAPTER X young officia i pointed out, Gross National Pride was sometìmes more sìgnificant than Gross National Produce! NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY In seeking a more prominent and forceful role in African affairs, thè regime stressed how well placed geographically Somalia was AND REVOLUTION IN to act as a naturai mediator between thè Islamìc world and sub- THE HORN OF AFRICA Saharan Africa. Since thè Sudan had previously presented itself in this Ughi, Somalia's bìd for thè same position brought a new component of rìvalry to thè hìtherto generally dose relatìonshìp between thè cwo states. Collaboratìng with Cuba in thè training Sniiialia's new prominence in mternatìonal affairs of guerrilla forces for thè African Liberation movements, and as O.A.U. Chairman, General Sìyad was particularly well placed eo THE FIRST PHASE of General Siyad's military mie (roughly up to partìcipate in thè delicate pre-independence negoriations between 1974) may be characterized as a period of concentrarlon on internai thè Portuguese government and thè liberation organìzations in problems, namely, locai development and thè consolidation of thè Angola and Mozambique. This was in line with thè Somali rt'gimes authority. The dramaric progress which had been achieved governments generai stance of actively supportìng independence on these froncs encouraged in thè second phase of Siyad's government movements in thè sttuggle against colonialism and imperialism. ,t more extrovert polìcy with a greater involvement in external The all-pervasive African rhetoric on these issues, to which previous iilrìiir s- both locally and in cerna tionally. Tentacive steps had already cìvilian governments had paid little attention, and even rather been made in this directìon on a number of occasions, as for despised, was now given wide locai currency on thè radio and in insrance in 1972 when Somalia successfully mediated in thè thè government press, as well as in racher crudely designed posters confrontation becween Uganda and Tanzania. Bur this forward and slogans. It was also imported into locai folkloric theatrìcal esternai policy assumed much greater prominence in 1974 when, productions where thè anti-ìmperialist struggle became an officially h.iving joined thè Arab League as thè only non--speaking favoured, if unsubtly executed, theme. Ali this was another index member state, Somalia also acred as hosc for thè Organìzatlon of of Somalia's growtng involvement in, and commitment to, African African Unìty. Alchough thè elaborate arrangement involved in issues. As thè regime saw it, thè roasses were at last coming to provkling thè necessary facilities (includìng security) for thè officiai realize thè burning importance of thè struggle against thè stnister ik'legiirion s and numerous guests and news reporters posed a forces of colonialism and neo-colonìalìsm. scrious challenge ro locai resources in Mogadishu, thè country rose It was in this wider African context that General Siyad's regime io thè occasion which proved to be a consìderable success. No now turned again to consider thè perennìal issue of Pan^Somali t-xpense was spared to take this opportunicy of promoting thè nationalism. Since their assumption of power in 1969, thè military inuge of Somalia in African, Arab and ìnternational eyes as a had, of course, frequently acknowledged their abiding commitment proudly independent progressive socialist state, with an impressive to thè liberation of those parts of thè Somali nation which stili nvord of achievements to boast. The O.A.U. meeting was held languished under foreign mie - thè Prendi Territory of thè 'Afars in June in thè sumptuous new Peoples Palace in Mogadishu, and Issas (Jibuti); thè Ogaden (Ethiopia); and thè northeastern oimstructed at great cost, and a fleet of Mercedes Benz limousines region of Kenya. But they had hkherto shown a moderation ali wiis acqutred for thè use of thè visiting Heads of State. AJthough thè more remarkable in a military government in pursuing this 226 227 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONALISM .ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION

aim. The opportunity which thè O.A.U. chairmanship provided, thè 'Afar - essentially a loose congeries of groups - were now and thè constraìnts it imposed, suggested that if this nationalist themselves rìven by powerful divisions. 'Ali 'Ariìf was losing support issue were now to be vigorously revìved, thè anachronìstk persistence in his own community, and thè 'Afar as a whole had been thrown of French rule in Jibuti should be the-nrst target. The uncertaìnty into turmoil by thè bitter conflict which had recently flared up and confusion that began to spread chroiigh Ethiopia in 1974 as between thè 'Afar leader Sultan 'AH Mirreh at Asaita in Ethiopia thè ageing Emperor increasìngly lost contro! and was finally and thè new military regime in Addis Ababa. To understand thè overthtown on 12 September by thè armed forces, inevitably significance of this development Ìt needs to be appreciated that, greacly encouraged Somali hopes of achieving autonomy for thè for many years, thè 'Afar had had in effec t two heads: their Ogaden. Exciting though this prospect was, fot thè time beìng modern politicai party leaders in Jibuti; and their more traditional ìt was considered prudent to watch and waìt to see what would spokesman, Sultan 'Ali Mtrreh, who, under Haile Sellasie's System happen in Ethìopia while concentrating primarily on Jibuti. This of indirect rule, controlied thè strategically and economically polìcy, as we shall see, did not exclude making a more encouraging, important Awash Valley. 'Ali Mirreh's flight to Jibuti, following ìf stili guarded, response to a variety of dissident refugees from a bloody engagement with Ethiopian forces, which stormed Asaìta Ethiopia, includìng Ogaden Somalis. and inflicted savage cìvilian casualties, created a powerfal new anti-Ethiopian 'Afar movement which might find a Somali alliance The end of prence rule in Jibuti expedient. This anti-Ethiopian facrion, whidi mooted thè possibility In Jibuti ìtself, thè elections held in November 1974 proclatmed of an autonomous 'Afar state, soon established thè 'Afar Liberation thè strength of 'Afar domìnance in thè locai chamber of deputìes Front, a guerrilla movement which threatened thè security of thè where, under thè defiant slogan Union et Progrès dans L'Ensemble vital rai! link between Addis Ababa and Jibuti. fran^aìs, 'Ali 'Ariif's 'Afar party won ali thè seats. The Somali Meanwhile, within thè Territory itself, in February 1976 several opposition was represented officially by thè Ligue populaire Africaìne F.L.C.S. terrorists hijacked a school bus contaìning thè children of pour l'independence (L.P.A.I.) while thè more mìlitant, outlawed French military personnel and drove it to che Somalia border. Front de la Cote des Somalis (F.L.C.S.), with headquarters in The hijackers, who were demanding uncondìtional independence, Mogadishu, remained underground. This organization made its were overcorne with some loss of life when French forces stormed presence fel t by kidnapping thè Prendi Ambassador to Somalia thè bus. Shots were apparently exchanged with Somalia forces in May 1975. His safe release, achieved with thè aid of thè across thè frontier , provoking angry accusations and denunciations Mogadishu government, led to some brief ìmprovement in Franco- by both parties and leading to a sharp deterioration in relations Somali relations. Certainly Jibuti was receiving an increased amount between Somalia and France. In thè ensuing politicai upheava! in of attention and publidty. In December, following a meeting Jibuti thè extent of public support (not exclusìvely Somali) for between 'Ali 'Ariif and President Giscard d'Estaìng, it was announced thè banned L.P.A.I., became evident. Premier 'Ali 'Ariif was that thè territory would be granted independence, with France deserted by most of his colleagues in thè Assembìy. In thè face retaining a locai milìtary base. Predictably this arrangement was of mounting pressure as thè pendulum swung back again in favour denounced by thè pro-Ìndependence L.P.A.I. and did little to of thè Somalis, he had little option but to resign and was replaced satisfy those (not ali now only Somalis) who were pressing for in July by his former Secretary-General 'Abdallah Muhammad independence. Kamil, an 'Afar married to a Somali. This able, young admìnìstrator The politicai situation in thè Territory was rapidly becoming had been chosen by thè French authorities as ideally suìted to bewilderingly complex. Although a number of violent clashes head a new interini coalition government, induding representatives between 'Afar and 'Ise tribesmen had occurred earlier in thè year, of ali thè main parties, and to steer thè territory to independence,

228 229 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONALI5M, ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION which, ir was announced in November, would be achieved in thè sections of thè Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway, paralysing thè line of following summer. Communications and trade which was equally important to Ethiopia In March 1977, talks on thè preparations for independence and to Jibuti. With its already high rate of unemploymenc, Jibutì were held in Paris. The leaders of ali thè 'Afar and Somali parties thus achieved formai politicai sovereignty with its entire hvehhood had been invited, but only those who favoured thè coalitìon in jeopardy . Ali thè ìndications were, moreover, that thè mountmg government responded. They agreed that a new referendum on tension between Ethiopia and Somalia would add further pressures thè issue of independence would be held in May, as well as threatening thè territory's fragile identity and thè delicate 'Afar- elections for an enlarged Chamber of Deputìes. The Somali Somali alliance on which its future secunty depended. The main dominated L.P.AJ. and F.L.C.S. and some of 'Ali 'Arìif's formec hope for future viability lay in thè mucual incompatability of supportare agreed to forni thè coalition Rassemblement papa/aire Ethiopian and Somali ambitions, in external French and Arab pour ilndependence (R.P.I.), presenting a single list of candìdates supporr, and in thè complexities of thè factional as well as tnbal which consìsted of 33 'Ise, 30 'Afar and 2 Arabs. Although thè divisìons in thè locai population. 'Afar parties boycotted thè combined election and referendum, there was a 77 per cent poli with 99 per cene of thè voters favouring independence and thè composite list of officia icandidar.es: Uè Ogaden War (1977-8): only 10 per cent of those who voted obeyed thè 'Afar parties' Western Somalia or Basterà Ethiopia? •* cali co protest by casting blank votes. On 16 May Hassan Guled, If thè immediate precipitants of thè 1977 Ogaden War can be chairman of thè L.P.A.I. and former deputy in thè French National traced to thè upsurge of competing regional nationalisms unleashed Assembly, was elected President of thè Council, heading a gov- by thè Ethiopian Revolution and thè brutal repression practised ernment of ten ministers, sìx of whom belonged to his own party by Colonel Mengistu's regime, its ultimate origins take us back and none to F.L.C.S. Half of thè new ministers were 'Afar . Finally, to thè beginning of Ethiopian imperialism in thè region - Menelik's at midnight on 27 June, under thè neutra! title 'Republic of conquest of Harar in 1886 and subsequent military expeditions Jibutì', thè territory became independent with thè veteran Somali (equipped with arms supplied from France, Italy and Tsarist Russia) politician, Hassan Guled as its first President and 'Abdallah against thè surrounding Somali, 'Afa r and Cromo tnbesmen. This Muhammad Kamil as Prime Minister. The new infant state became extension of Ethiopian dominion, cotnciding with thè partmon of thè 49th member of thè O.A.U. and thè 22nd member of thè thè Somali coast between France, Britain and Itaty provoked thè Arab League. Armed wìth French guarantees of aid and defence fierce Dervish struggle which, under thè leadership of thè fiery and promises of Arab supporr, Hassan Guled gave no commitment, Ogaden Sheikh, Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan , sought between one way or thè other, on thè question of possible union in thè 1900 and 1920 to regain Somali independence from ahen rule. future wìch Somalia and, presumably with Ethiopia in mind, The first major Dervish attack in March 1900 was, i'ignificantly, indicated that Jibutì would not become thè 'agent' of any East on thè Ethiopian military post at Jigjiga. The full impact of African state and would respond in kind to acts of external Ethiopian jurisdiction in this peripheral area only began to be felt aggression. This bold declaration of independence towards each after thè British withdrawal in 1947 and 1954 (see Chapter 7) of Jìburi s pówerful neighbours (Somalia and Ethiopia) could not, prompting a revival of active Ogaden nationalism. As we have however , conceal thè extent to which thè future of this tiny, seen, friction between Ethiopia and thè newly formed Somali precariously poised enclave depended on its relations with both Republic, exacerbated by armed clashes between thè locai Ethiopian these states. The intimate character of this dependence had already authorities and Ogaden tribesmen, flared up into a brief outbreak been poignantly underlined when, a few weeks prior to indepen- of war in 1964. When peace was restored, thè Ogaden msurgents dence. Somali (and perhaps also 'Afar) guerrillas had blown up lost momentum and went underground, thè focus of thè Pan-

230 231 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONAUSM, ETHNIC1TY AND REVOLUTION

Somali struggle veering to che Somali population in Northern Colonel Mengìstu into accepting a loose socialist federation, under Kenya. Soviet patronage, which would allow thè Ogaden Somalis an Meanwhile , in thè adjacen t Ethìopian provìnce of Baie, and unspecified measure of locai autonomy. This effor t to apply thè similarly stimulated by opposition to Amhara rule, a parallel Soviet formula for accommodating locai nationalism did not go reslstance movement developed amongst thè Cushicìc-speaking sufficiently far to satisfy Somali aspirations while vastly exceeding Arussì and Oromo peoples who were closely relaced to thè Somalìs. Mengistu's concept of acceptable Ethiopian devolution, A leadìng figure here was a locai Oromo warlord called Wako By thè spring of 1977 Oromo guerrilla forces had succeeded Guco. Fighting started in 1963 and continued sporadically until in recovering control of most of thè countryside in Baie. In thè 1970, when a massive Ethiopian milìtary operation succeeded in north thè war in Eritrea had reached a criticai phase, wìth thè re-establishing Amhara control. Characteristically, thè defeated locai nationalise force s conerolling almost thè whole area and Wako Guto made peace with Haile Selassìe and received thè tìtle pressing hard on thè beleaguered and demoralized Ethiopian of Dajazmach.1 In thè course of this protracted struggle, many garrisons in Asmara and Massawa. By this time relations between refugees - many but not ali Muslim Arussi — sought refuge from thè new rulers of Ethiopìa and President Carter's new admìnistration their Ethiopian oppressore by escaping across thè border into in Washington had also gravely deteriorated. Ethiopia's traditional Somalia where, particularly during thè effort s of Prime Minister superpower protector was withholding military supplies and urging Igal and later President Sìyad to maintain good relations with a negotiated settlement with thè Eritreftns . In Aprii Mengistu's Ethìopia and Kenya, they were something of an embarrassment. regime retorted by closing U.S. installations (including thè Kagnew Indeed, some of thè more milìtant Oromo leaders were actually Communication sstation in Asmara - no doubt less significane to imprisoned by thè Somali authoriries. Simìlar sanaions were from U.S. stracegy since thè acquisition of Diego Garda), expelling U.S. cime to time applìed to militant Ogaden Somalis in prominent personnel, and angrily denouncing thè hypocrisy of human rights positions in che Somali government and armed forces when they criticisms, which it was claimcd had never been voiced against inopportunely sought to press General Siyad into armed intervention che Emperor. This move signalled thè commencement of a seismic in thè Ogaden. By 1975, as dìsorder spread throughout Echiopia, shif t in superpower alignmencs in thè Horn of Africa with wide- and thè capacity of thè new milirary rulers to hold thè country ranging consequences, thè ful lrepercussions of which were difficult together was increasìngly in question, thè attitude of those in to foresee, far less measure. power in Somalia was shifting to a more sympathetic response The immediate effec t was Mengistu's visit co Moscow in May to Ogaden aspirations. Wako Guto was in Mogadishu seekìng which produced a 'solemn declaration' of mutuai collaboration supporc and thè Western Somali Liberation Front, whìch included and thè denunciation of 'imperialìst' and 'reactionary' forces which Muslìm Oromo, Arussi and Ogaden leaders, could no longer be were accused of aggravating tension in north-east Africa .This was cold-shouldered by President Siyad if serious domestic upheavals clearly not merely rhetoric since, on thè ève of Jibuti's incjependence were to be avoided. In 1976 Wako Guto apparently returned to on 26 June, thè new Cuban-trained and Russlan-armed peasant Baie to lead a new and highly successfu l campaìgn against thè army, numbering at least 70,000, was proudly paraded in Addis Ethiopian government, chis time under thè banner of thè W.S.L.F.2 Ababa. If thè Ogaden Somalis were to recover their independence About thè same time General Siyad sene emissaries to Addis there was clearly not much time left. Having disrupted com- Ababa to attempi to negotiate with thè new military leaders on munications between Jigjiga and Harar and Harar and Diredawa, thè question of autonomy for thè Ogaden. Despite thè common thè W.S.L.F. consequently began to muster its forces for concerted commitment of thè Ethiopian and Somali regìmes to revolutionary atcacks on thè Ethiopian garrisons in thè Ogaden, By thè end of socialism ,these overtures proved as unsuccessful as thè later attempt July when thè W.S.L.F. claimed to nave liberated thè strategie in March 1977 by Fidel Castro to manoeuvre General Siyad and centre of Gode, Ethiopìa was accusing thè Somali Democratic

232 233 NATIONALISM. ETHNUCITY AND REVOLtmON A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA require defeat of thè regrouped Ethiopian forces in Harar and Republìc of mounting a full-scale wàr of aggression and appealing Dice Dawa. As thè cheatre of conflict grew larger, ìnvolvìng for external heìp. At thè beginning of August a mediatory mkìatìve associated ethnic groups, officia i W.S.L.F. scatemencs as well as by thè Organisation of African Unìty faìled when che Ethiopians those from thè Mogadìshu governmenc emphasized thè dose affinity refused to allow thè issue of Somali self-determinatìon co be of thè Somalìs and Arassi and other Oromo in Baie and che discussed or to permit W.S.L.F. representation. The shift of Russian Harar area. The cerms 'Abo-Somali' and 'Wariya-Somalì' (from patronage to Ethìopia and thè lack of sympathy for Ogaden abo in Oromo and wàrìya in Somali, used to atcract a person's aspirations broughc General Siyad co Moscow at thè end of che atcentìon) were coined co emphasise thè dose affinity between che month on what seemingly curned out to be a disappointing and Somali members of che W.S.L.F. and their Oromo allies; and on fruitles s visit. Breznev, thè Party Chairman, had litele time to these Hnes ,thè Somali Abo Liberation Front (S.A.L.F.) was formed spare for thè Somali President who, drawing hìs own conclusions, sec off in September on a series of urgenc visits to Arab states; as an offshoo t of che W.S.L.F. ic was later reported thac Saudi Arabia had promised Somalia £230 million for armaments, on thè underscanding rhac Somalia The break with Russia severed Russian links. thè its On 7 Sepcember, as fighting in thè Meanwhile, a dramacic discraction occurred in thè Somali Republìc Ogaden became increasingly fierce, Ethiopia broke off diplomatic when, on 18 October, wìch full Somali collaboration, a West relacion swith Somalia and on thè following day a joint Ethiopio- German anci-terrorist squad successfully rescued a hijacked Luf- Kenyan statemene was issued, condemning Somalìa's 'brazen and thansa jet at Mogadishu airport. This nacurally greacly encouraged naked aggression'. Alchough formally Echiopia and Kenya were Somali hopes of Western sympathy and support for thè struggle bound by a defence pace aimed at concaining Somali irridentism, in thè Ogaden. Somali—Sovie t relations were strained to breaking Kenyan aid in thè ensuing conflict was limited co officia idenun- point. The only major impediments to a formai rupture were ciacions of Somali 'aggression and co allowing Ethiopia to import Sìyad's concern to avoid thè potential destabilìzation of his regime munitions through Mombasa while denying over-flying rìghts co which an abrupt breach mighc encourage, and a nacural reluccance air consìgnments of weapons for Somalia. to tetminace his maìn source of arms supplies before reliable Later in Sepcember as thè massive Russìan airlif cof M.I.G.s, alternative arrangemencs had been secured. There was also perhaps tanks and heavy weapons to Addis Ababa was reporced co have che hope that Russia might, under appropriate pressures or gathered momencum, thè W.S.L.F. achìeved theìr greacest triumph: blandishments, scili somehow wring from Mengistu thè necessary che lìberation of Jigjìga, che main Echiopian milicary headquacters concessions to Somali nationalìsm in thè Ogaden. No progress in in thè Ogaden. Their opponents — whose morale had been weakened chis directìon was achieved, however, and on 13 November thè by successive bloody internai army purges — had offered lìttle predictable breach with Russia was announced in Mogadishu. Ali resiscance , thè Ethiopian thitd dìvision retreating, accordìng to naval, air and ground miUtary facilities - includìng thè importane some sources mucinously , from their key defensìve posicion on che Communications and submarine mìssile handling station at Berbera Marda Pass which commanded thè road to Harar. Excensive - were wichdrawn, thè Somali-Soviet treacy of friendship (whose quantities of largely American equipment were abandoned co che terms Russia had violated by supplying anns to Ethiopia) was jubilan tSomalis as they recovered milhary control of their country. renounced, and 6,000 milìtary and civilian personnel and cheìr Controlling Jigjiga, W.S.L.F. forces swept on towacds Harar in families given a week co leave thè country. Diplomatic relacions pursuit of their ultimace objeccive of freeing che entire Somali with Russia were retained; whìle with Cuba there was an abrupc area up to che Awash Valley of Ethiopian domination. This would and complete severance. This long-anticipated, but stili delicate entail thè expulsion of thè Ethiopians from areas round Harar breach with Russia and her satellites received a tumultuous public with mixed Somali, Oromo (Galla) and 'Afar populations and 235 234 NATIONALISM, ETHNIC1TY AND REVOLUTION

1 MODERA N H'ISTOKY OF SOMALIA out of aaìon, was thè sole port of entry for Russian supplies. welcome. In contrast to thè Chinese, thè Russìans had never been However, despìte these encouraging developments, thè massive popular in Somalia. The long suppressed public antagonism and influx of Russian and Cuban equìpment and advisers was evidencly resentment felt towards Somalia s erstwhile officia i 'friends' (as- begìnning to have some effec t for, although they claimed to have sociated in most people's minds with thè more oppressive aspects entered Harar on mote than one occasion, thè W.S.L.F. were not of Siyad's regime) fanned into hatred by thè frenetic climate of able to capture thè town. The anticipated victory turned into a thè Ogaden War were at lasc given free rein, bringing a further scalemate, with reported long-range artìllery exchanges between wave of popularìty for thè Mogadishu government. thè opposìng forces. Late in December while General Siyad was Natìonalist sentiments in thè Republic, stimulated to an un- in Iran seeking support, Ethiopian war-planes made a limited foreseen degree by Somali literacy, had reached a climax. The series of air-strikes on cargets in Somalia was nghting in thè Ogaden, in which many were directly and ali Northern Somalia. now desperately seeking a substitute for her former Russian mìlicary indirectly involved, had become a national obsession. Ali interest patronage and trying to convince thè United Staces and Western focussed on thè progress of thè \var and thè unofficia l contribution governments that it was in their ìntetest to exert pressure to halc to thè war effort had unquestioned priorìty over ali other activities. che menacing Russo-Cuban build-up in Ethiopia. Alchough prior Ali aspects of life in thè Republic were affected. In every government to breach with Russia, che American government had implied department and miniscry there were conspicuous absentees away thè chat it was to supply Somalia with arms, ic now 'on leave', while in thè armed forces chose from thè Ogaden had prepared appeared that no direcc milìtary aid would be forthcoming from this or similarly gone to join their brothers and clansmen in thè fight other Western sources unless Somalia was prepared co cease againsc thè Ethiopian usurper. Mother and child care centres were supportìng thè Ogaden natìonalists and to renounce her Fan- hastily converted into cottage factories for making uniforms. Radio Somali commicments. Somali appeals for support brought angry reports of thè progress of thè war were followed throughout che reactìons from Kenya and were consequently treated with great state with rapt attention; such was che demand for iiews rhat it became impossible co find transìstor radios and batteries in thè caution by thè N.A.T.O. governments. Another importane faaoc which reinforced this very circumspect and unenthusiastic response shops. Thìs consuming-preoccupar:on with thè Ogaden left little to Somali requests was thè delicacy of thè Anglo-American time or need for thè officia icult or" thè Glorious Leader, President Rhodesian negotiatìons. The Brìtish and American governments Siyad, which was quietly allo\ve\ co subside - at least fot thè were particularly concerned to avoid any step which would alienàce time being. O.A.U. opinion and consequently stressed thè ìmporcance of finding a sectlement to thè Ethiopia-Somali dispute in thè African context. The Ethiopian reconquest While they were prepared to denounce Russian and Cuban incerferenc ein African problems with increasìng outspokenness as We must now return to our chrorùcle of che war. By che end of thè prospect of Cuban intervention in Rhodesia became a serious November thè fighting round Hir^r had become particularly fierce, possibility, they firmly declared their adherence to che and reports that Cuban personnel r_ì< ìbeen evacuated lent substance O.A.U. to WS.L.F. claims that they were poised to seize contro! of this doctrine of thè inviolability of existing frontiers - which thè British ancient Muslim city - or whar was lefc of it afcer so many Foreign Secretary referred to as 'thè map of Africa. It was a bicter irony to che Somalìs thac chese Western policy devastating attacks. The prospecr >M 3" W.S.L.F. breakthrough into stacemencs were construed by thè Ethiopians, in officia i pro- Harar seemed ali che nearer when thè news carne that thè 'Afar nouncemencs, as support for Somalia! In fact, furthest Western Liberation Front, who wich thè Oromo Liberation Front were also thè now waging a guerrilla war atr^ìnsr thè Ethiopians, had cut che governments appeared prepared co go was to offé r thè emlnently sensible advice that it would be in Somali interests to negotiate virai road from che port of Assab ^-hich, with Massawa and Jibuti 237 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONALISM, ETHNIC1TY ANp REVOLUTION from a position of strength, while thè W.S.L.F. were stili in control forces were being withdrawn frorn thè Ogaden and that Russia of thè Ogaden, What those who made these suggestions did noe and Cuban forces should follow suit, thus in effec t concedìng perhaps appreciate was che delicacy of relations between thè Siyad victory to che Ethiopians. There was in fact considerale anxiety government and thè various clan elements in thè W.S.L.F. There in Somalia that thè Ethiopian advance would not stop at thè was a naturai but mistaken tendency to see thè W.S.L.F. as simply border but would press on into thè Republic. Quantitìes of arms a 'front ' for Mogadishu when thè reality was that che Ogadenis were thus nervously issued to thè civilian population in thè north. were equally tryìng to manìpulate Siyad's government in Mogadishu. In thè event, as thè Russians had promìsed, thè Ethiopian advance Somalia was thus by ali sides cast in thè role of-aggressor and halced ac thè frontier, limitìng itself to gradually reimposìng little or no attention paid to thè claims to self-determination of Ethiopian rule in thè Ogaden. If thè fact that thè former head che Ogaden Somalìs. The clandestine rather than open partìcìpatìon of thè Russian milìtary mission -to Somalia, General Grigory of army units from thè Somali Republic tended to confirm thè Batislov, had dìrected this successful operation against them added view that thè Somalis were thè aggressore, 'invading Ethiopian a bitter piquancy to their defeat, stories were also current amongst territory'. Even Iran, which was prepared to break off diplomane thè fleeing Somali survivors of thè moderatìng influence exercised relations with Kenya on thè issue of Somali interests, stated by che Russians in thè treatment of prisoners. There was, however, categorically that her support was designed to protect Somalia's no immediate ìndication that thè Russo-Cuban presence was to borders and not to recast African frontiers . With this only limited be withdrawn from thè Ogaden, far less Trom Ethiopia - a support from a handful of Arab states, with no battle-hardened proposition which was angrily rejected by Mengistu's government. foreign auxiliaries to set against thè Yemenis and Cubans, and It soon became clear also that W.S.L.F. guemlla activity in thè with Russian equipment smaller in quantity and inferior in quality Ogaden would continue; indeed only a few weeks after thè officiai to that now so abundantly available to Ethiopia, thè Somali Somali withdrawal, and foìlowing a presidential visit to China, position was increasingly precarious. In an atmosphere of mounting thè Mogadishu government announced that it would not cease apprehensìon in Febnaary 1978 Somalia officiall yentered thè war supporting thè Ogaden lìberation movement. This inevitably led and announced a generai mobilization. The long-awaited Russian to provocative exchanges wich Ethiopia and assertions that if and Cuban counter-offensiv e was now properly underway and Ethiopia's boundaries were not respected chete was no reason why alrcady claiming some successes. The final putsch occurred at thè Somalia's should be. Time would teli whethet this defiant Somali bcginning of March when, after subjecting thè 8,000 strong Somali policy was an effòr t to save face after thè terrible Ogaden debacle, force between Jigjiga and Harar to heavy aerial bombardment, or an Ìndication that Somalia had at last found powerful Arab thè lOth Ethiopian division supported by an entire Cuban armoured backing (e.g. Iran and Saudi Arabia) prepared to come to thè brigade of sixty to seventy tanks bypassed thè Marda Pass and Rcpublic's defence ìn thè event of an Ethiopian attack. v atcacked Jigjiga from thè unexpected direction of thè north. Cuban- crewed tanks were also air-lifted behind thè Somali lìnes and The wìder ìmplications of thè Ogaden conflict Cuban-piloted M.I.G.s supported thè attack in which a number of sophisticated new Russian weapons seem to have been deployed. The Ogaden conflict, as we have seen, prompced an extraordìnary Having evacuated thè loca! civilian population to Somalia, thè volte-face in superpower alignments in che Horn of Africa . The Somali defence abandoned Jigjiga to thè invadere. A relief brigade Russians who had, as it were, come in to Somalia with thè thrown into thè battle from Somalia, straffed by M.I.G.s, was Ogaden (see above), went out with it, an about-turn which testified unable co stem thè Ethiopian advance. to thè abiding force of locai natìonalism in thè area - a point After a flurry of intetnacional exchanges, on 9 March President co which we shall return shortly. The opportunist Russian thrust Siyad announced that, in response to American requests, Somali into che power vacuum created in Ethiopia by thè withdrawal of

238 239 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NAT1ONALISM , ETHN1CITY AND REVOLUT1ON American support from Colonel Mengistu's reìgn of terror, may Mengistu to reimpose Ethiopian tuie in thè Ogaden. Israel's initially have seemed advantageous to Western interests. America willingness to supply napalm and military technicians was readily was longer no ìnvolved in sustaining a precariously poised regime intelligible in terms of ber intetest in sustaining a powerful Christian which, soì-disant socìalist as k was, was clearly determined to presence in thè Red Sea as a counterpoise to Arab influence. What remain in power by liquìdating ali opposition in thè most savage thè Libyan paymasters would gaìn from participating in suppressing 'manner. Russia had taken on a perilous and ultimately arguably thè Eritrean separatista, partìcularly thè left-wing Muslims whose thankiess task, sìnce it was far from clear whether Ethiopia could status in some Middle Eastern eyes approached that of thè Palestinian be held together, except at a cost in manpower, arms and liberatìon movements, was less self-evìdent. involvement at which even thè U.S.S.R. mìght baulk. What had Of coutse it was in thè interests of thè Ethiopian regime, and not perhaps been foreseen were thè lengths to which thè Russians in thè Ethiopian tradition of foreìgn policy, to have composite and their Cuban allies were in fact prepared to go in shouldering external support. However, their externat connexions were now thè unenviable burdens of shoring up Mengistu's uncertain authority. so clearly dominated by thè Russians that nothing could disguise By thè summer of 1978, after thè reconquest of thè Ogaden, thè fact that Ethiopia had become a Soviet client state. The long- thè Russo-Cuban directed Ethiopìan war-machine had, prediccably, cherished Tsarist ambition of making Ethiopia^a Russian protec- transferred its attentions to Eritrea. Here thè situation for thè torate, prominent at thè end of thè nìneteenth century when Russians and Cubans was much more delicate and potentìally Russian arms and advisers had facilitated Meneliks conquests, and damaging than that in thè Ogaden. The Eritrean freedom-fighters romanticized in che Ethiopian origins ascribed to thè national poet had previously enjoyed direct Cuban support in their struggle to Pushkìn, had at last borne fruit.3 This happy outcome which in recover independence for thè former Italian colony of Eritrea, thè nineteenth century was to have been achieved withìn thè federated to Ethiopia ìn 1952. They had, moreover, a much longer bosom of thè Christian Church was now realized under thè successor tradition of highly organized resìstance to thè Ethiopians and had ideology of communism in circumstances strongly reminiscent of succeeded in recovering control of virtually che whole country thè Soviet Union's own revolutionary experience. For thè Cubans, except fot thè beleaguered Ethiopian garrisons in Asmara and thè too, thè turmoil and bloodshed in Ethiopia had ali thè hallmarks porr of Massawa. The mountainous Eritrean terrain was also, of an authentic 'on-going' revolutbn, gìving thè strongman Men- unlike thè Ogaden, ideally suited to successful guerrilla operations gìstu a: its head a naturai appeal for Fidel Castro in contrast to - as previous campaìgns had illustrated. A protracted and inevitably thè patetnalistic Somali leader Siyad Barre. The latter was ali too exceedingly bloody war, with a high casualty rate on both sides, reminiscent of Latin American benevolent dictators in an older seemed bound to cause embarrassment to thè Cuban image in tradition; and whatever its achievements, thè placid Somali Rtev- Africa and might also adversely affec t Russian interests in thè olutìon could certainly not match thè Ethiopian in turmoil, death continent. It would certainly complicate both countries' telations with left-wing and right-wing parties in thè Arab world on whose and terror. But if, with this Russian-controlled aid, Mengistu finally suc- support thè Eritreans depended. Any ptolonged mìlitary actlon ceeded in quelling thè Eritteans and restoring and consolidating against thè Eritreans which excluded thè possibility of a negotiated his authority in thè other dissident provinces as well as in thè politicai settlement to their demands for autonomy would also urban centres of Ethiopia, it would atso be in thè Ethiopian strain che strange marriage of convenìence (or 'unholy alliance' as tradition for him to try to dispense with his foreign patrons once thè Somalis denounced it) which had developed in support of they had served his purpose. Whether and when this would Ethiopia in thè Ogaden War. Perhaps 'marriage' is too strong a happen were speculations which only thè future could resolve. term for thè curious mélange of Russian (and other East European), Certainly it ìs in thè tradition of thè region to repulse foreign Cuban, South Yemeni, Israeli and Libyan support which enabied interventìon as insistentiy and urgently as it is requested. 240 241 NAT1ONAUSM, ETHNIC1TY AND R.EVOLUT1ON A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA of thè Somalì-Ethiopìan dispute. More prominence could thus The position in thè summer of 1978 was unbalanced and have been given to thè fact that Somalia became ìndependent shifting . Ethiopia had moved from thè American to thè Russian with a inherited boundary dispute with Ethiopia which much camp. Somalia had lost thè patronage of one superpower without, previous Italian and Unìted Natìons* effor t had failed to solve. in thè post-Vietnam era, gaìning that of thè other. The extent The 'map of Africa ' in this region was thus far from settled at and significance of Arab suppott was stili an uncertain quantity. thè time of Somalia's independence. Communist China, whìch had consistently champìoned both thè If, moreover, during thè heyday of Somali-Soviet friendship, Somalis and thè Eritreans, continued to issue powerful condem- thè regime had prudently continued to cultivate a few friends in nations of Russian imperialìsm. The degree to which China was thè Western bloc it might have been easier to swìtch sides when able and willìng to supplement her well-conceived and popular thè time carne. It would also, clearly, have been extremely cìvilìan aid projects in Somalia with military support at thè level advantageous to have taken every possìble step to have tried co needed had yet to be seen. In thè wake of thè rif t with Russia, allay thè naturai (and not unjustined) anxieties of thè Kenyans. thè E.E.C, counttìes had concentrated their effort s on supplying There was also thè issue of thè questionable wisdom of pretendìng an emergency aid progtamme to continue ptojects abandoned by not to support thè W.S.L.F. and so, in a way, confirming thè thè Russians, and no doubt China would develop her own distinctive Ethiopìan (and generai) impression of the^Somalis as aggressive eontribution (which need not exctude supplying arms to thè invaders. It was cettainly a cardinal error not to have accornpanìed W.S.L.F. guerrillas). Improbable though it might seem, thè pos- or prefaced thè W.S.L.F. offensive in thè Ogaden with a concerted sibility of some new Somali accommodation with thè Russians diplomatic offensive presenting thè Sornali case in thè strongest was noe to be totally excluded as President Siyad took stock of possìble terms. Little efFor twas made even to clarify thè objectìves his bewilderingly complex foreign relations. and limits of thè W.S.L.F. campaign. The importance of ali these neglected factors was strìkingly illustrated in thè reports in thè Western press and on thè radio Locai firoblems by commentators sympathetic to thè Somali case which, during The plethora of external uncertaìnties competed fot. attention with thè initial Somali successes, described thè W.S.L.F. forces as thè pressing locai problema posed by thè humiliating defeat in 'capturing', 'taking' and 'seizing' etc. various 'Ethiopìan' centres thè Ogaden. There were naturally bitter recriminations both on in thè Ogaden. These subcle and quìte undeliberate polkically- thè conduci of thè military operations, directed at thè end by thè loaded semantics strengthened thè impression that thè Somalis President himself, and on Somali foreign policy. The numerous were thè aggressors brazenly invading Ethiopìan territory, when in foreign missìons undertaken by thè President and his representatives reality it was Somali settlements whose independence was being had gaìned no unqualified public support from a powerfu l source restored - with help from thè armed forces of thè Somali fiepublic. for this new phase in thè Fan-Somali struggle which had begun In thè euphoria of victory thè W.S.L.F. used exactly thè same with sudi verve and promise and closed so disastrously. terms in announcing their successes when it would have been There were ampie grounds for criticism in this grim post- more prudent to have spoken of thè recovery of Somali sovereignty. mortem. If thè government had spent a minute fraction of its The Ministry of Information and National Guidance might have military budgec on a professiona l public relations campaign it been expected to produce more effettive propaganda. But like so might have been easier to convince outsiders of thè justice of thè many of thè other departments of state in Somalia whose per- Somali case for self-government in thè Ogaden. Sustained publicity formance was critically tested during thè conflict, it was dìrected over thè years would have kept thè issue alive in thè public mind by people whose appoìntment seemed to owe more to their loyalty and made it more difficul tfor foreign governments (such as those to thè Head of State than to their technical skìlls. The effectìveness of Brìtain and Italy) to forget their past involvement in thè origìns 243 242 NATIONALISM, ETHNIC1TY AND REVOLUTION A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA and Cuban-supported enemy tactics had been grossly underestimated of che presentatìon of thè Somali case was also handicapped in by thè over conndent and ill-experìenced Somali command. It unexpected ways. So, for inscance, thè government's commitment was , apparently, a combinatìon of these faccors that led to thè co thè eradication of cribalism, as well as thè complexìties of ìts tragic mìstake of commming a reserve force of Somali regulars relarìonship wich che various clan elemencs in thè W.S.L.F. forces, to a defeat in which their lack of air cover guaranteed they would made ìt impossibil eto publish documents demonstrating thè locai suffe rheavy losses. dìstribution of Somali clans in thè Ogaden at che cime of Menelik's There was naturally considerable confusion when those who invasion in che nineceench century. had escaped from che blitzkrieg of Jigjiga amved at che northern The underiyìng realities here were indeed dauncìng. The rela- froncie r of thè Somali Republic. A number of summary military tionship between thè 'Ise Somali round Dire Dawa and thè Ogaden executions were reported to have occurred• . According to some was an uneasy one, and there was also a long hiscory of compecition accounts, those shot were officer s who had refused to obey orders over grazing between che Ogaden and Isaq clans to their norch. during thè final confiìct round Jìgjiga. Other reports suggested There were even dìvisìons within thè Ogaden confederation of that some of those executed were soldìers who, when ordered to clans itself, noe least between chose leading thè Ogaden guerrillas discard their uniforms and return immedìately to thè Ogaden as and clansmen in promìnent posicions in thè Somali Republic. W.S.L.F, guerrillas, had threatened mutìny. There was also mistrust and rivalry between che Muslim Oromo The regime also, apparently, considered it pruderie to order thè supporters of thè W.S.L.F. and other Otomo (some Muslìm), majority of those units which had been withdrawn from che equally hoscile co Mengìscu's regime, some of whom supported Ogaden to stacion themselves along this northern frontier where che Oromo Liberation Front. Other Oromo again (and probably they provided a defence against a possible Ethiopìan invasion and thè majority of this large nacion) were not direccly allied with could not easily spread dìscontenc in che south. These precautions eirher of these organizacions. The 'Afar , as we have seen, were seemed justified since on 9 Aprii an attempted coup was made equally dìvided inco prò- and anti-Echiopian faccions . These by forces garrisoned in thè south. Pive hundred rebel soldiers were numerous divisions greatly reduced che efFeccivenes sof thè Western reported to have died in thè ensuing battle with forces loyal to Somali struggle and made relations with che Somali Republic President Siyad, who hìmself survived unscathed. Several of thè infiniceì ycomplicaced. And nocwìthscanding che force of Somali rebel leaders - colonels of thè Majerteyn clan - escaped to Kenya. nucionalism , chere were ìndividuals and groups who found it How much of thè arms distributed among thè civilìan population convenient to be able to move readily across internatìonal fronciers in thè north had now been successfully recovered remained obscure. and from one state's jurisdiction co another's, racher than unreservedly Certainly armed dìssìdence seemed a serious potential hazard. identifyin gwith thè Somali government in Mogadishu. This long Thus, whìle soldiers and civìlians accused of complidty in thè legacy of opportunist manìpulation of idenrity and citizenship, abortive Aprii coup were being trìed in Mogadishu in August reinforcing internai clan divisions, inevicably added to che straìns 1978, thete were widespread reports that che Majerteyn clan was within thè W.S.L.F. movement. holding hostages belonging to che Marehan clan of che Presìdent. In retrospect, with ali these problems it was particularly galling The Head of State, whose most recent appointments and promotions co recali how wise it would have been to negotiate from a position .suggested an increasìngly defensìve dependence on his own clansmen, of strengch - co have, for example, offere d Echiopia secure access was also said co be negotiating clandestìnely with Majerteyn clan co thè porc of Jibutì in return for ìndependence in che Ogaden. leaders in an effbr t to avert a situation which, some locai Sornali Finally , thè conduce of thè military operations provided abundant commentators claimed, threatened to lead to widespread tribal ammunicion for cricicìsm and recriminarion . There were many war. Perhaps this was an exaggerated view. Certainly, there was occasions on which, with hindsighc, it seemed thac grave tactical much more openly voiced critìcism of Sìyad's government in errors had been commìcted. The sophìstication of thè Russìan- 245 244 NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA appeals were launched for ìnternational aid, which with thè help Mogadishu in thè summer of 1978 chan there had been four of sympathetic voluntary organìsatìons and other pressure groups yeurs previously, before thè 1975 drought and 1977 Ogaden War. in Europe and America achìeved wide publicity and, eventually, This seemed less indicative of a deliberate relaxation of previous a gratìfying response in short-term emergency relief. The camps, security measures, although there may have been an element of which in some cases over refugees, were organised this, than of an increasing lack of firm centrai contrai. Talk of housed 40,000 by thè NRC in with Minìstry of thè thè need for a change of government was, if anything, more rather collaboratìon thè Interior than less insistem followìng thè unsuccessful Majerteyn attempt and, as time went on, developed their own internai organisation to overthrow thè regime. There was irritation ih some quarters under camp commanders who might be teachers or other officials. that thè attempted coup had been so badly mìsmanaged. And, Within camps, locai resìdential areas were frequently named after although thè impatience of thè numerous Majerteyn clan which place-names in thè Ogaden, thus conserving ties with piace of had been so powerful in thè days of parliamentary rule was origìn. A special Refugee Health Unìt was also set up to supplement understandable, theìr narrow, parochial ìnìtiative alienated members and extend thè work of short-term foreign medicai aid teams. of other groups who shared their feelings of discontent. Food was distrìbuted in thè camps on thè basis of ration cards In view of these trends it was not surprising chat thè Presidenti issued to individuai families. bizarre decision to consign che director-generals of ali ministnes While helped by voluntary organizations, thè Somali Government and government agencies to a five months' stìnt in thè national had to meet much of thè initial cost of thè refugee relief ptogramme; orientation centre in Mogadishu should be seen by some as a longer-term nnancìal responsibility was assumed by thè United defensive reaction in thè wake of thè Aprii uprising. If this action Nations High Commission for Refugees and ìts (mainly Western) brought ali thè councry's top civil servants under dose mihtary donor governments. The actual number of refugees qualifyìng for contrai, and also promised 'objective' means of promoting some this support (costing over $100 million annually) thus soon became and demoting others, it exacerbated thè grave difficultie s which a lively issue. Following disagreements between thè Somali National were already being experienced in absorbing thè massive quancities Refugee Commission and representatives of thè major donor of foreign aid (mainly from Islamic and Western sources) which, countrìes a head-count of camp residents was attempted in in licu of military supporr, were now pouring into thè country November 1981, but reports of irregularities in thè counting following thè Ogaden War. It was thus dear that thè divisive procedures led to further controversy and both sides agreed, forces unleashed by thè defeat would have a pervasive and corrosive reluctantly, on a compromise 'planning figure' of 700,000. The influenc ewithin Somalia which would tax to thè full ali Siyad's Somali authorities strenuously resisted ali further attempts to rcmarkable powers of endurance. With so many internai as well elucidate thè number and demographic charaaer of thè camp- as external sources of unceruùnty and instability, President Siyad's based refugee population, insisting that there were rn/any more predìcament was not enviable. camp refugees than thè planning figure, to say nothing of thè unregìscered 'invtstble refugees' Hving in thè homes of relatives The refugee mvanon and absorbed into thè generai population. This led to thè absurd situation in which thè arbitrary 1981 planning figure remained In che che wake of Ethiopian teconquest of thè Ogaden, hundreds as a frozen statistic despìte thè dynamic demographic pìcture in of thousands of Somali and related tribesmen flooded into thè thè camps, with bìrths and deaths and new arrivals as well as Somali Republic in scardi of refuge. The government responded departures. Under Ìts Extraordinary Commissioner (himself an promptly to this human dìsasrer, setting up a National Refugee Ogadeni), thè NRC built up an tmpressive empire which viewed Commission (NRC) and hastily establishing a string of refugee camps in thè north, centre and south of thè country. Urgent demographic enquiry with grave suspidon. 247 246 NATIONALISM ,ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA

Thus thè initia l strain on thè Republic's economy created by Americans were reluctant to provìde Somalia with more than basic sucri an enormous refugee population (representing as much as a defensive equipment valued at $8.7 million (rather than thè $47 20 percent increase in national population) later carne to be offset million requested) in 1987. There was also some evidence of or micigated by thè benefits, at least for some, of what amounted Western influence in internai politicai developments . Thus thè to a refugee relief economy. None of thè refugee camps was regìme's power base and public mandate were formatly extended economically self-sufficien t — few had water or arable resources by elections in December 1979 for thè new 'people's parliament', which would make this feasible — and theìr populations tended ali of whose 171 members belonged to thè officia iSomali Rev- olutionary Socialist Party. Afte rthè elections, thè President reshuffled to consist initially of elderly men and women and children.4 However, such adult males as were presene tended to become his cabinet and abolished thè titles, if not thè roles, of his three integrated in thè wider Somali economy, some working locally, Vìce-Presidents . In October 1980, however, at thè height of thè others joining thè stream of migrants seeking jobs in thè Gulf refugee crisis which was by then aggravated by fuel shortages, states or returning to manage their lìvestock in Ethìopìa, where thè head of state declared a state of emergency and resurrected they mìght also join guerrilla groups. As time went on, thè new thè Supreme Revolutionary Council, whìch remained in piace, ìn camp generation of young males provided a convenìent captive parallel (if that is thè right expression) with thè overlapping reserve for press-gang recruitment into che Somali armed forces, politburo and Central Party Committee, which, in turn, overlapped provoking frequen t incidenti between recruiting officer sand locai with thè Council of Ministers. It is dqubtful whether many UNHCR officials. populations of comparable sìze to Somalia's can have had mote As might be expected, thè presence of such large immigrant top-heavy or grandiose forms of government. It was certainly 'a refugee communìties, while initiall ywarmly received, was bound labyrinthine structure which promoted confusìon amongst thè to have locai politicai repercussions, especially where relations with governed and dìscouraged decision-making outsìde thè President's thè host community were traditionally unfriendly .Thus, although immediate circle. thè refugee population in thè north included a sizeable proportion The Supreme Revolutionary Counci l was disbanded (again) in of non-Somali Oromo (a related Cushìtic-speakìng people), ìt was March 1982 when President Siyad paid his first officia ivisit to probably che presence of refugees belongìiig to thè Somali Ogaden thè United States. In preparation for this, under American pressure, clan itsel f which created thè most friction for thè locally based thè Somali President had released thè two prisoners of conscìence, and traditionall yrivalrous Isaq clans. This seemed to contributo former Prime Minister Muhammad Haji Ibrahìm Igal and thè to thè sense of northern alienation which became so marked in much respected former police commander, Muhammad Abshir, thè early 1980s. We shall return to this issue shortiy. both of whom had been held without charge or trial virtually continuously since October 1969. The release of these prominent figures from thè past was, however, followed in June of thè same Frinii one-party to one-man slate year by thè arresi of seven leading members of thè regime who The refugee crisis which followed thè Ogaden War locked Somalia were accused of beìng ìnvolved in a sinister plot against thè into receìving a generous channel of humanitarian aid from thè government. This new group of detainees included Vice President Western governments which had replaced Siyad s former superpower Isma'il 'Ali Abokor and thè forme rForeign Minister, 'Ornar Arteh partner , thè Soviet Union. The priorities and ìnterests of these - both prominent northerners and architects of thè personality Western governments, especially their concern to discourage Somali cult of thè head of state. Also included were two major figures 'irridentism 'and to improve Somali/Kenyan relations, were reflected belonging to thè clan of thè Presìdent, who could thus hardly be in thìs emphasis on civilian rather than military aid. Thus, while accused of clan bias in this instance - or of collegìal loyalty. One thè United States obtatned some military facilities in Somalia thè of these, Dr. Muhammad Adan Sheikh, former Minister of

248 249 NATIONALISM, ETHNIC1TY AND REVOI.UTION i A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA reports of any references made to his person in thè media or Education and a leading Marehan intellectual, had been on a other publications. downward spirai from high ministerial offic evia thè headship of With thè tight control of ìnformation in a country without thè Somali Academy of Sciences and Culture. any effectiv eindependent media and where state censorship was Promìnent Somali politicai figures had by now, of course, become concinuously at work, orai sources of news assumed great ìmportance. resigned to this pattern of uncertain promotion and demotion as Thus thè external services of foreign radio stations broadcasting members of a rotating elite whose trajectory extended from prison in Somali (as well as those in Arabie and English) were widely through ambassadorships to ministerial office .The two extremes listened to, particularly thè BBC Somali service from London. in this rotatìon were not very far apart, sìnce some mìnisters were The importance of this as a source of internai as well as external not allowed to leave thè country (even for medicai treatment) news may be judged by thè frèquency with which thè Siyad and were virtually held hostage fot their clans or clan segments. regime complained to thè Britìsh government about alleged BBC President Siyad, who had thè skìlls of a practìcal Machiavelli and bìas. Equally, when thè British government contemplated closing thè mind of a politicai computer, was particularly adept at selecting down thè service to save money, a delegation of prominent Somali token figures from obscure, minority segments of major clan groups leaders made representatìons directly to thè British ambassador ìn who were flattered to serve him and present themselves as clan Mogadishu. They quite accepted, they saùi, that Britain had representatives. The tangled web of kinship connexions so adroìtly economie dìrEculties and needed to reduce spending. In this case, manìpulated by thè head of state was indeed extremely intricate5 they suggested, mudi as they appreciated thè ambassador personally, - and, in ics idiosyncratic fashion , representative of thè national clan it would be better to dose thè British embassy rather than terminate macrostructure whose many divisions President Siyad exploited thè BBC broadcasts! Another popular reaaion to thè Siyad regime's brilliantly/ ' If, in earlier years, 'Scientifi c Socialism' had been an attempt to stìffle public debate and critìcism was to be seen in 'industry for controlting power', without this justificatory ideology, thè development of a flourishing gente of protest poetry drawing and with new strains imposed on thè earlier MOD coalition of on thè traditional riches of Somali orai culture. Opponents of thè clans around thè President, Sìyad was now pulling out ali thè regime, in and outside Somalia, composed stìngìng attacks on its stops in thè 'traditional' politicai System to se cure his daily survival. leaders - often in thè form of opaque love songs. These were Unquestionably, Siyad outstripped ali his cìvilian predecessors in countered in compositions by thè Presidenti own 'court' poets che art of politicai survival. Of course he had thè advantages of and led to prolonged poetic exchanges. Recorded on cassettes, thè mìlitary power, thè constantly ramifying securiry services (civilian resulting poetic 'chains' (as Somalis called them) were widely and milìtary) ,thè absencc of genuine democratìc institutions, and diffused throughout Somalia and among thè Somali diaspora •ampie material resources to coopt and reward pliant supporters. overseas, thè transìstor revolution having given an expansive new These devices which facilitated thè Presidenti personal survival vitality to thè traditionally powerfu l orai culture.7 In Somalia it were not, of course, particularly conducive to effectiv egovernment became a serious offenc e to be caught by thè customs officiate und development: The chronically underpaid cìvil servke became importing - or exporting — such seditious material. ìncreasingl ydemoralised, and official swho wished to survive without incurring politicai difficultie sassiduously kept their heads down and avoided promotion to positions where they might attract Organiseti opposition and resistance unwelcome interest. This officia imalaise extended outside Somalia These many diffuse currents of discontent assumed a more organised to che Republic's embassies abroad, whose maìn task becarne that form through two main politicai movements based prìmarily on of monitoring thè conduct of Somali nationals overseas and, even, thè clans in thè centrai and northern (ex-British) regìons of thè of reporting on thè activities oflocal nationals with Somali interests. Republic. Those mainly Mudugh-based Majerteyn clansmen as- The head of state was particularly concerned to receìve prompt 251 250 KA-HONAUSM, ETHN.aTY AND REVOLUT.ON A MODERN H1STORY OF SOMALIA WilllVJ.,. sociated with thè unsuccessful accempted coup of 1978 had by doctors, teachers and businessmen who had joined forces not to overthrow regime sìmply improve quality late 1981 formed thè Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), thè but to thè of thè a guerrilla organisation which transferred its operarional head- locai public setvices. In such circumstances, thè SNM could expect considerable public support and launched a number of successful quarrers to Ethiopia in thè following year and set up a powerful radio transmitter ('Radio Kulmìs' - later called 'Radio Halgan). military operations, including a spectacular release of detainees from Manderà prison in January and in In lune of rhac year, with military support, SSDF forces pushed 1983, Decembet 1986 northern regìons National Security Service Chief. across che Echiopian border and seized contro! of a small area assassinati thè In January thè Military Governor of northern regions inside Somalia, claiming in their broadcasts that a national uprising 1987, thè proposed a campaign of harsh military and economie measures, was under way against che Siyad regime. A state of emergency was declared and a series of draconian measures instituted to similar to those earlìer applied in Mudug against SSDF sympathisers. regain contro! of Mudugh and thè adjoining areas - although che The intriguing fact that this 'top secret' pian, addressed to thè invaders remained in possession of thè border terricory they had Head of State, subsequently found its way into thè public domaìn outside Somalia suggested that it might have been deliberately taken. leaked to fuel friction between its author's (Majerteyn) clan By this time, thè other main opposition group, thè Somali National Movemenc (SNM), drawing supporr primarily from thè supporting thè SSDF and thè SNM Isaq who were che target of thè proposed military reprisals. This woul^l be consisterle with thè Isaq clans of Togdher region, had been launched in London and divide-and-rule tactìcs on which che President was increasingly Ethiopia and had announced that it would coordinate its efforts with thè SSDF. If thè lattar movemen: reflected in some measure relyìngAs mìgh. t be expected, che regime attacked both these opposition thè hubris of thè Majertyn clansmen whose politicai ascendance movements, seeking to dìscredit them as clan-based 'tribalist' had been eclipsed by Siyads Marehan power, thè SNM articulaced Isaq erievances ranging from inadequate politicai representation, organisations and, based on their Ethiopian connexions, also as unpatriotic features which cercainly reduced their national appeal neglect in development, and thè frustration of locai businessmen - and contributed to their faìlure to coalesce into a credible national and exporters chafing at economie controis that adversely affected front. From thè Ethiopian point of vìew, these two opposition thè parallel market which, boosted by hard currency from livestock movements formed a convenient counter poise to thè Mogadishu- and labour exporrs to che Gulf states, flourished so profusely in backed Western Somali Liberation Front in thè Ogaden which, thè north. The livestock trade, in which Isaqi merchants played however, temained less active in thè period reviewed here. le was a leadinc role, received a further severe shock in 1983 when thè thus noe surprisìng, following concerced pressure and blandishments Saudi governinone imposed a rinderpest ban on Somali imported (in thè shape of economie aid) from thè West, that thè Somali stock. In che same year thè Somali governmenc prohibited thè regime should not only have sought to mend its fences with Kenya sale and culcivacio nof thè stimulant narcotic plant, qat (Catha (in thè Western ìnterest) but also to have moved toward riegotìations ect//fis), which Imi become a flourishing cash crop in thè north with Ethiopia about thè Ogaden. The Somali and Ethiopian heads western regions." However progressive and well intentioned, this of state duly met in thè conveniencly neuctal territory of Jìbuti move was interpreted in thè north as a further atcack on Isaq in January 1986. The fragile peace which followed this reportedly encerpris e and commerciai acrivity . These individuai sources of positive meeting, was, however, soon threatened by new border frustration were exacerbated at a more profound level by thè large clashes early in thè following year. It is a measure of thè depth refugee prcsence in thè north and thè increasing trend toward of politicai cynicism in Somalia at this tìme that this engagement direct military naie from Mogadishu. Tension was compounded was interpreted in some Somali circles as an orchestrated ploy by by such misunderstandings as thè arrese on charges of subversion, thè Siyad regime to elicit further military support from che West. ut thè end of 1981, of over forty prominent locai civil servants, 253 252 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NAT10NALISM, ETHNIC1TV AND REVOLUT1ON

Whatever thè ultimate fate of these delicate peace imtiatives, ìc Maslah, Siyad s cousin and matemal brother, 'Abdarahman Jama was already abundantly dear that ""a slong as thè SSDF and SNM Barre (Foreign Minister), 'Abdillah iWarsamme Indolleh (Minister were based in Ethiopia, thè Ethìopians had a powerful weapon for Co-operatìves) and 'Abd al-Qadir Haji Muhammad (Deputy to counter such pressure as Mogadìshu might attempt to exert Secretary General of thè Party). This family faction of Marehan through thè Western Somali Liberation Prone in thè Ogaden - close kin (also known as thè clan faction - qabiili - in Somali), which in che late 1980s became ìncreasingly viewed by Ogadenì as we shall see, did not enjoy che unqualified supporr of thè clansmen as a puppet organìsation created by President Siyad. Marehan clan as a whole, nor were its ranks so close that they excluded interna! rivalries between, for instance, General Maslah and Foreign Minister 'Abdarahman Jama'. A family or clan dynasty? When, under pressure from his agitated clansmen, President In thè meantime thè unthinkable had nearly happened in Somalia. Siyad returned precìpìtately to Somalia in June 1986, General President Siyad was injured in an almost fata i car crash in May Samatar promptly relinquished his caretaker role, receiving little 1986. That he survived owed little to his securiry guards, who thanks for his loyalty. Siyad was clearly offering no encouragement hijacked a Somali hospital doccor ar gunpoint, forcing him to thè to thè 'consticutional' faaìon. Within his own family, there was scene of che accident without explaining wha t had happened and competition between his children by differen t wives as well as thus not allowìng him to bring appropriate medicai equipment. other prominent close kinsmen bidding for pctwer. Although General In thè event, through thè prompt action taken by Vice President Samatar had not taken advancage of thè Presidents absence to Samatar and friendly governmencs, President Siyad was flown in undermìne Siyad's position and there had been no coup attempt," a hospital piane to Saudi Arabia. He made a remarkable, if Siyad's authority had naturally suffered a serious blow. For thè incomplete, recovery, recurning to Somalia to resumé his dutìes first time since he assumed power in Somalia, chere was a widespread in June - though, naturally , hardly wìth hìs former vìgour. public discussion of who would succeed him and, as we have During his absence and while thè publìc was stili stunned by seen, intense actìvicy on thè part of his Marehan clansmen (who thè news of thè accident, in conformity .with thè constkution, had most to lose) to safeguard their position once their great Senior Vice President General Muhammad AH Samatat cook over leader was no longer there. Despite hìs advanced years and thè as acting head of state and declared a state of emergency. This lingering effect sof his accident, Siyad struggled to regain contro!, appears to have prevented precipitate military acrion by members doìng ali he could co foster thè impression that his legendary of Siyad s family and close clansmen who were evidently deeply vitality remained undiminished. Thus in September 1986 thè unxiou sabout their posìtion in thè absence of thè 'Old Man' - Central Committee of thè Party duly proposed thè 'Old Man' as with whom they were in close touch whìle he was in thè hospital President for a furche r seven years and, as expected, this was in Saudi Arabia. General Samatar's prompt intervention in mounting endorsed unopposed at thè Party Congress in November.v In thè a holding operation seemed also to be generally supported by thè ensuing national elections on 23 December Siyad was formally military as well as by other members of thè politburo: Vice reelected with 99.9 percent supporr from thè electorate. Pressure Presidents Husseyn Kulmiye (Minister of Planning) and Ahmad by thè Foreign Minister and other prominent Marehan candidates Suleyman (Minister of Interior and former head of che National to gain appointment to thè politburo, presided over by Siyad, Security Service) and Comrade Ahmad Mahmud Farrah. This was opposed by thè existing 'constitutional' faction members, and group of leading figures from a range of clans became known as thè matter was dropped for thè time beìng. The President responded thè LconstÌtutìonal' faction (Dastouri in Somali) in contrast to thè ro thè Marehan clamour by consolidatìng their position in thè faction , drawn from Siyad's own family , known as che 'Gang of armed forces with a crop of accelerateti promotions to thè position Pive': che Presidenti powerfu l first wife , her eldesc son, General of General and other senior ranks and reshuffled his cabinet in

254 255 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONAL1SM, ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION a manner which strengrhened Marehan control of thè Ministry of Ogaden were split berween thè two factìons, as was evìdent from Defence. Following a meeting of thè Party Central Commìttee, thè existence now of two Ogaden movements: thè Siyad-controlled it was announccd at thè beginning of February 1987 that General Western Somali Liberation Front, and thè anti-Siyad, Ogaden Samatar had been appointed 'First Minister' in a new govemment National Liberation Front. The proliferating power of thè Marehan which Consolidate dMarehan power in thè Ministry of Defence, gave new significance and impetus to its own internai divisions relieving General Samatar of responsibility here. Indeed, General and to thè jockeying for power within thè Presìdent's famjly and Samatar's offic e and officia iresidence were taken over rather among his close kb. Whìle before his car accident, President Siyad unceremoniousl yby thè recently promoted Minìster of Defence, had seemed to be encouraging thè Foreign Minister to prepare to Sìnce such crucia i ministries as Defence and Foreign Affairs succeed him, after his accident thè Hmeligh t switched to his son reported directly to thè head of state rather than to che 'First General Maslah. These effort sto establish a family dynasty prompted Minister', there now appeared to in effect , two governments be, Maslah's Marehan rivals to seek support oucside their own clan - one ofiicìall yconstituted around General Samatar and thè other ranks, even amongst members - of thè opposed 'constitutional' ìn practice conducted around thè residuai seat of final auchority, faction led by First Minister Samatar. How Samatar himsclf would President Siyad. The relative power of these two overlapping react to these dynastic inìtiatives remained to be seen. Some locai politicai circles was suggested by General Samatar's reluctance to observers considered that Samatar had mìssed his chance of securing take President Siyad s seat when thè latter was unable to attend power when he acted as caretaker while Siyad was in thè hospital meetings of thè Councii of Ministers. To further complicate matters, afce rhis car crash, Samatar's loyal behavìour at that criticai time che reduced personal energy meant that many issues Presidenti might also be seen as confirmation of Siyad's sound judgement with which he had previously dealc personaily now passecì into in selecting as his long-serving Minister of Defence and First Vice thè hands of such clansmen as thè Foreign Minister, thè redoubtabie President (as Samatar then was) a figure from a traditionally General Gani, formally a Vice Minister of Defence, and 'Abd disadvantaged mìnority group with elicne links only with one of al'Qadir Haj i Masaleh, thè recently appoìnted deputy Secretary- thè dominane Somali clans (thè Majerteyn). General of thè Party. On many issues, decisions were also taken by thè influentia lcircle formed around che Presidenti formidable first wif e and her son General Maslah. This entrenchment and An unenviable inberitance expansion of Marehan power was particularly striking Ìn che army, Before we conclude our discussion of this uncertain politicai Iegacy where by che middle of 1987 it was estimated that as much as we must briefly consider thè generai economie picture toward thè half thè senior office rcorps belonged to thè Presìdent's clan or close of President Siyad's long reign. During thè Ogaden War, related clans, thè proportion being even higher in che artillery Somalia had receìved substantial military aid from Arab sources. and tank brigades based Ìn thè capitai in che new southern OPEC states continued to be vital sources of oil and generai command unic headed by Siyad's son General Maslah. Marehan civilìan aid after thè war and thè associated Russian withdrawal official sin most miniscrie sand government departments likewise and were joined by thè United States and EEC countriés. The constituted an informa i monitoring service, influencing if not uneasy relationshìp with thè American government which failed determining admìmstrative decisions. to deliver anything like thè volume of military assistance requested To thè members of other clans »these developmencs seemed to was complicated by thè American food aid arrangement permittìng indicate that thè Marehan were buìlding a defensive clan laager thè Somali government to sell this graìn to generate locai funds which was a far cry from che earlier MOD tripartite alliance of for development projects whose control both parties contested. Marehan , Ogaden and Dulbahante. One of thè most prominent Nevertheless, thè perilous state of thè economy in thè aftermath Dulbahante figures was in thè 'Constìtutional' faction, and thè of thè Ogaden War and thè financial burden of thè refugee aisis 256 257 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND REVÓLUTION made it difficul tfot che Somali government not co accept an IMF package of economie 'liberalisatioh' measures. These involved which it had opportunistically joined in 1974. Here again there devaluing thè Somali currency; reducing state control in production, was no element of state intervention, and locai merchants acquired marketing and price-setting; and encouraging small businesses as hard currency at thè parallel exchange rate by providing thè well as seeking to develop exports. The banana industry, formerly families of mìgrants with goods or equivalent Somali currency. a major item in exports, had declìned disastrously in thè era of Obviously a recession in thè Gulf would bave dire consequences Scientifi cSocialism, with state-controlied sugar production similarly for this source of hard currency, with proliférating effects on thè dimìnishing and failing even to satisfy thè loca! market. Likewise, Somali economy. peasant farm grain production, especialiy in thè arabìe south, had In an effbr t to counter soaring inflation (90 percent in 1984) fallen far short of market demand due to farmets rejecting thè and to bring more hard currency into thè national banking system, low, government-controlled prìces ofFered and turnìng instead to thè government sought to encourage traders to open locai foreign cultivatìon of water melons as a highly profitable cash crop exchange accounts. The franco valuta export System was abolished untrammeled by government controls. and then reìntroduced in a modified form in 1984, and World On thè other hand, thè iìvestock export industry, whìch had Bank dollar auctions were instituted in September 1986 in thè not been nationalised or controlied, flourished with rising world hope of curtailing thè informai money market and narrowìng thè prìces and sready demand. This trade peaked in 1982 at a value gap between thè officia iand unofficial exchange rates. At thè same of US $132 million, representing 80 percent of Somalias total time and with some Umked success, thè government sought to foreign exchange earnings. Under thè so-called franco valuta increase its tax revenue by more effective collectìon and to reduce arrangements, thè governmenc set a minimum prìce for such exports its expenditure on thè sprawling civìl servìce, in which every hìgh which each licensed exporter had to pay at thè officia irate through school and unìversity graduate had previously had a tight to thè nattonal bankìng System. Typically, however, thè price specified automatic employment. Salary ìncreases were combined with staff and reported to thè Bank by thè Somali exporter and Saudi, or cuts and offers of land for agricultural development for prematurely other hard currency importer, was much less than that actually retired civil servants. There was, however, no sign that thè paid. This hard currency profit earned by thè Somali exporter government was in a position to introduce sufficiendy radicai pay was either used to import scarce consumer goods for sale in and effidency reforms to enable government employees to abandon Somalia or sold to Somali imporcers at thè parallel market exchange their numerous supplementary unofficial sources of income, without rate which soared to over twenty times thè officia irate. Substantial which they could not possibìy survive — a months wages would gains, often augmented by customs evasions, were thus made by not pay a week's rent. While thè uneasily accepted IMF intervention licensed exporters who were estimated to number about four and EEC balance of payments supporr 10 with other Arab and hundred in 1982, 9 A year later this vital trade received a rude Western development aid enabled thè state economy to stagger shock when thè main importing country, Saudi Arabia, declared on in thè late 1980s, thè generai economie outlook sèemed as a rinderpest ban on Somali livestock. Thìs unanticìpated problem parlous as thè politicai. No wonder so much hope was attached underlined thè exrent of Somalias dependence for trade as well to thè grandiose multimillion Barderà hydroelectric project - for as for aid on thè Saudi kingdom, whose cultural pressure was which, however, firm financial support had in 1987 stili to be evident in government campaìgns to promote Arabie teaching for committed by thè United States and other Western donors. ndults as wel! as children. The other main source of private-sector With some positive initiatives in thè banana industry and thè foreign exchange was provided by thè remìttances from migrant resumption of livestock exports, thè economy in thè late 1980s workers in thè Gulf states in Somalias 'muscle-drain', which again was perhaps not beyond redemption, but it was certainly in a reflected thè country's growing dependence on thè Arab League mess, and economie policy was erratic and displayed thè same emphasis on daily survival that marked thè politicai scene. Following 258 259 A MODERN HISTORV OF SOMALIA NAT1ONALISM, ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION thè Ogaden War, as we have seen, Somalia's primary arms continued to exploit other clan connexions and antagonisms. He dependency on thè Soviet Unìon had been replaced by more thus distributed money as well as arms to mobilise 'friendly' generalised aid dependency on thè United EEC and States, thè groups. But sìnce thè configuration of inter-clan alh'ances kept OPEC countries .This new dependency - which included thè need changing, this dangerous policy led to a generai proliferatìon of for provision of basic foods - was heightened and entrenched by small arms which readily found their way into thè hands of thè thè continuing , Palestinian-type refugee presence, for which no President's adversarìes. permanent solution had been found and which ìf resolved by a However, thè frightenìng spectre of potentìal civil war also, massive refugee retum to Ethiopìa would dramatically reduce one paradoxically, benefitted thè veteran i survivor as this gave pause of thè staple elements in Somalia's foreign aid portfolio. The to some of his bitterest enemies. Sìmilarly, thè fact that no coup consequences of thìs would certainly ramify widely far outside thè was mounted ìmmediately following President Siyad's accident was refugee camps (of which there were over 40 by 1987), Foreign an indication of thè apathy, politicai paralysis and inter-clan aid organisations had generally identified thè nomads and turai suspicìon which his survivalist style of ruJe had done so mudi to farmers , partly because of their vulnerability to drought, as thè promote. It thus seemed possible that out of ali thè bombastic poorest elements in thè population. But more recent studies posturing and essentially empty rhetoric which marked thè earlier suggested that, despite thè presence of thriving small as well as years of his reign, Siyad's one potentially posisìve legacy to succeeding big urban entrepreneurs, with their mushrooming thè populations politicai leaders might be a state of clan paralysis, discouraging towns were likely to display more acute real poverty. This would " civil war. Following thè President's demise, this would be likely certainly be aggravated if economie recession in thè Arab states to promote thè hegemony of his family and clansmen. But, with forced large numbers of out-of-work migrants to return to Somalia. che increasìngly acute power struggle which could be anticipated With spiralling food and fue l prices as well as shortages, thè within thè clan after Siyad, potential Marehan leaders would ominous implications of these urban trends were suggested by thè inevitably seek wider alliances which might end in a stalemate, spontaneous riots which occurred in mid-August 1987 in thè or enable thè 'constitutional' factìon to gain power in an atmosphere capitai . Some concessions were by thè government, which nude of national reconciliation. Any successor regime seeking stability also arrested a number of alleged 'agitators'. Simila r disturbances through nation-wide representation would, of course, have to in simila r circumstances preceded thè Ethiopian revolution which include satisfactory participation by thè disaffeaed clansmen sup- terminace dHaile Selassie's long reign in 1974. porting thè SNM and SSDF, thus giving Ethiopia thè opportunity At thè dose of thè period we review bere, thè politicai situation to exercise considerale influenc ein thè formation of future Somali had changed dramatically from that a decade earlìer at thè time governmencs and thè terms of future relations between thè two of thè Ogaden War. Then Somalia nationalism had been buoyant states. In thè decade following thè Ogaden War, Siyad's sufvivalìst and confident , and General Siyad had been able to mobilìse strategies had helped to reinforce thè inherently segmentary character sentiments of national solidarity which, with thè exception only of thè Somali politicai System, undermining nationalist solidarity of one northwestern clan (based in Jibuti), effectivel yembraced (always a fickle and temporary phenomenon) to thè consequent ali thè nation's major clans. In such an expansive context thè advantage of Ethiopia. President's MOD power base represented a security net. Now, ten years later, with thè collapse of national solidarity and an unparalleled growth of inter-clan strife , thè MOD framework had been aban- Retrospect and prospect: doned as General Siyad fel l back defensivel yon thè support of nationalism and ideology in thè Rom thè most loyal segments of his own Marehan clan. At thè same Nevertheless, with a decade's hindsight we can see how thè 1977- time, of course, with thè ampie means ar his disposai Siyad 8 Ogaden War dramatically underlined thè persistent national 260 261 NATIONALISM ,ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION A MODERN HÌSTORY OF SOMALIA

instability which ìs entrenched in thè Hom of Africa by thè centuries of thè Semitic-speaking Christian Amhara who have juxtaposition of two mutually opposed ìrridentìst scares: Ethiopia provided both a sturdy highland peasantry and an equestrian and Somalia. Partly for reasons which we shall shortly examine, aristocracy. The preeminence of thè Amharas replacing that earlier Somali irridentism tended to conceal che equally powerful force enjoyed by thè Tigreans of Tigre and Eritrea has coincided with of Ethiopian expansionism. The former, of course, was more patent thè graduai southwards movement of thè capitai in an ever- and striking. In I960 Britain and Italy in particular, and thè expanding empire, When, in thè nineteenth century, Menelik international community in generai, had particìpated in thè es- succeeded in establishing thè far-flung frontìers of modern Ethiopia tablishment of a Somali state which excluded threé parts of thè thè new capitai of Addìs Ababa in Shoa Provìnce became thè Somali nation and was consequently incomplete. The new state's hub of thè empire. It was left to his successor, Halle Selassie, to conscitution and flag committed it to striving to attain independence establish his authoricy by consolidating and building on Menelik's and statehood for thè remaining Somali communìtìes under alien foundations, This Haile Selassie did in a masterly fashion, adjusting rule. Given thè hìstory of foreìgn involvement in thè dismemberment thè old formula of divìde and rule, implemented by a subtle of thè Somali nation, including such attempts as thè Bevin pian combination of direct and indirect rule, to thè exìgencies of thè to rectify it, this was noe an unreasonable aspiration, particularly modern world ìnto which Ethiopia was gradually but inevìtably in thè African world of I960. Ethiopia's position was very different. drawn.13 As with his predecessors, under his aegis, Amhara After thè Second World War, following thè Italian fascisi conquest, hegemony was tempered by an implidt melting pot philosophy which Britain and her Atlìes had done little to avert, Ethiopia which offered upward mobìlìty and assimilation to Amhara identity was most generously treated. The gallant little Emperor who had to ambitious members of thè other ethnic groups, including thè so appealed to Western sympathies was not only restored on thè numerically dominant Cushìtic-speaking Oromo (or Galla) as long throne of a lìberated Ethiopia but was also given thè Ogaden as they adopted thè Amharic language and Christian faith. The and Eritrea. In this case thè short-lived Italian colony of Ethiopia elasticìty of Amhara ethnìcity was enhanced by thè freedom with was not merely restored to independence but fortined by thè which Amharas married non-Amhara women and by thè bilateral addition of another, historically distinct ex-Italian possessìon, Eritrea, Amhara kinship System, Amhara rule was thus buttressed by a with thè Ogaden (thè Ethiopian claìms to which we have examined) powerful plinth of Amharized Oromo, while other Oromo remote thrown in for good measure. By any standards this was over- from power in thè distant southern provìnces (Arusi, Bali, Sìdamo) compensation! It was also, of course, ìn thè Ethiopian politicai were treated on their own lands as colonized subjects, open to ali tradition ìn thè sense that Ethiopia was thè last and largest of thè exactions of insatiable Amhara landlords. More remote stili Africa's traditionai conquest kingdoms, a fact obscured by thè were thè ethnic cousins of thè Oromo, thè 'Afar and Ogaden and preoccupation of European Ethiopian specialists with Ethiopia's other Somalis in Harar Province on thè very peripheryv of thè Semitic languages and Christian religion. This preoccupation rein- empire. The Amhara presence in these regions was, as we have forced thè Ethiopian rulers' own predeliction, assocìated with their seen, primarily limited to milìtary garrisons, thè veritable 'beau- confiden t sense of superiority in comparison with other Africans, geste' outposts of empire. stressing their links with Europe and ignoring those with Africa. The claim to rule this sprawlìng mosaic of peoples was tra- To appreciate Ethiopia's inherent expansionist dynamic we need ditionally valìdated by demonstrations of force and by new conquests. Since, as was inevitable, in a conquest state of this to look at ics internai politicai anatomy. 12 The contrast with Somalia is striking. Despite ìts many clan divisions, thè Somali kind, thè power of thè cenere over thè periphery waxed and waned state is based on ethnic nationalism; Ethiopia is an unwieldy over thè centuries, in some periods thè claim to rule was legitimated congeries of differen t peoples and language-groups, even races, less by fresh conquests than by internai consolidation. But, however weldetl looseiy together by thè domination over thè last five thè balance lay in any period, Ethiopia incorporated an expansive

262 263 1

A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND REVOLUTION ; dynamic which was integrai to ijs polìtica! history. Thus, in thè of thè Organisation of African Unity to thè ìnvìolability of thè conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia it was critìcally important colonial frontiers and thè pronounced frontìer fetishism of con- for thè Amharized Ethiopian leader Mengistu to demonstrate his temporary African states. Here we may interpolate that, if there aurhority by conquering thè Ogaden Somalìs, and this was ali is substance in Elie Kedourie's 15 argument that African nationalism thè more cruciai in view of his rejection of thè ancient Solomonic is a product of European nationalism, thè special circumstances myth of kingshìp employed so skilfully by Haile Selassìe and of colonial Africa favoured a pluralìst revision of thè European earlier rulers to sacralize their power. The subjection of Eritrea, nation-state concepì of thè type associated with modernity and iis well as thè suppression of internai currents of ethnic nationalism, nationalism by Ernest Gellner. 16 has thè same significane?. With such powerful structural vested ìnterests involved, Ìt was scarcely surprìsìng that in 19-77, as in an earlier decade, there was litele African enthusiasm for thè Somali cause which threatened Sfate and nation in Africa to undermìne thè prevailing Ethiopian pattem of African state. Stripped of thè trappìngs of modern government and ideology at If thè principles of self-determination had to be denìed to part a more basic level, Ethiopia and Somalia represent two opposìng of thè Somali people this, many argued, was a small price to pay types of traditional African state. In pre-colonial Africa, thè politicai for keeping firmly shut thè pandora's box of problems which, if unìts were either multinational states of thè Ethiopian type, or unleashed, would jeopardìze thè stability of a whole continent - homogeneous ethnic units like thè Somalis, Both types were and certainly unseat many African leaders. probably equally common, The European partition and its aftermath Sensitivìty on thè part of African leaders on this issue perhaps radìcally changcd this pattern. As is well known, European colonies reflected their increasìng awareness of thè mounting strength of and protectorates were almost universally haphazard assemblages rivai ethnic forces in thè continent and of thè conspicuous absence of tribes and language groups thrown together by thè vagaries of of any generai formula (other than tyranny) with which to conflicting imperiai desìgns. The word 'tribe', ìt should be noted, accommodate them. In its modern and largely, though not ex- had acquired a pejorative and etymologìcally misleading meanìng. clusìvely, urban form, rampant tribalism or ethnicity was as many Unlike thè divisions in thè urban Roman state to which it originally anthropologists had emphasized 17 partly a response to increased referred , it had been applied in Africa to designate speech group interaction and competitìon for scarce resources, rather than communities which were ethnocentrically regarded as backward, a lingering primordial 18 anachronism. This interactionist or strategie barbarie, generaily uncivilized. This curious development contrasted perspective, treatlng ethnicity as an infinitely elastic vehicle for strikingly with thè situation in parts of thè Caribbean and Latin shared economie and/or politicai intetests tended, howevet, to America where thè word nation was correctly applied to those neglect its subjective appeal as a focus of identity - a point well unics of population which m Africa were derogatively designated made recently by A. L. Epstein 19 among others. Morefbver , while 'tribes 1 by Europeans. 14 In any event, what distinguished these in Africa, as elsewhere, ethnicity could be manufactured and colonial artefacts from each other was thè identity of thè colonizing manipulated as in thè case of Idi Amin's synthetic Nubi identity power and thè frontiers defining its jurisdiction. This emphasis in Uganda, it also had ro be recognized that, once formed, national on territoriatly defined, polyglot and ethnically heterogenous states cultures were readily politicìzed into active nationalism. This, tipped thè bilance in favour of thè pre-colonial Ethiopian model, indeed, is thè case with Somalia nationalism. As we nave seen, itself reminiscent of thè multi-national Habsburg empire. Inde- this began as a primarily cultural force, no doubt shaped by pendence and che post-colonial era saw, inevitably, a further stress eenturies of interaction with surrounding populations, and with placed on fronders which, as President Nyerere once expostulated, growing contaci first with Isiam, which it assìmilated, and then were so ridiculous they must be sacred. Hence thè commìtment with Christianity, which Ìt rejected, acquired an increasingly sharp

264 265 A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA politicai edge. This book has attempted to chart che course of that politidzation .The weakness of this traditìonal endowment, The Hom of Africa wryly recognized by modern Somali nationalist s and devastatbgly illustrated in thè decade since has been ìts segmentary 1978, Somali ethnic limite character. Although through backing thè Somali National Front and thè International frontiers Somali Salvation Democratic Front thè Ethiopian government had Approximate boundaries of Somali clan groups in thè short term undermined support from Somalia fo r Somali natìonalism in thè Ogaden (itself designated an 'autonomous region' under thè new Ethiopian constìtution of September 1987), this situation could not be expected to last ìndefinitely .A future Somali government whìch succeeded in recapturing thè loyalty of these dissident Somali groups could, without necessarily seekìng to do so, rekindle wider Somali nationalis t sentìments whose most likely UBLIC OF JIBUTI Jibut«M*** i focus would be eastern Ethiopìa. The intensity of Ethiopian involvemen tin Somali affair sin thè late 1980s surely reflected a shrewd evaluation of thè perennìal character of this locai nationalist issue, whìch, naturally, had its counterpatts elsewhere in Africa and for which no generai solution had yet been discovered. E T H I O P i A

Scale in kilometres 200 400 600 800

266 267 The Horn of Africa The new (1974) regions and main towns Somali ethnic limite of Somalia Main areas of Somali culttvation Frontiera of former British ------— -— International boundary Somatiland Protectorate Regiona! boundary and Somalia

Cape Guardafui

JfBUTI v >5

"Tj; «Erigevo 'T*j- 8 Haf-USNUUtSlIIskushuban- * J. SANAG ' .yB"urTOX SANAG JEASTERN E T H i O P I A T H I O P I A '^•-*.Aynabo*\ "*"^-^ i NUGAL^'-.

Gailadi / Hararghe Region . N * f •Galkayu/l / «Gallcavo .*---j MUDÙG No.» X " >N - ^•/C> VjDbbiay \BaMRe fl ,onv A V ^ X . -.VÉeteiì / V-'^ V «Weyn , Duca Degli Abruzzi ,, / BAY Baidoa1 tala ' "-"-—' ft-MOGADISHU fe^af . inw«:B Merca'* rf M ^ adshu TaMKl|Ìi N Y A ' Lm^A ER \R «ySSW^^HI^ i^f^ ! J U0 A V^HiPFI I P Afmadu* ^. >< 5 " ABEI : LE I KismayuJ^S I

Scale in kilometres 200 400 600 800 i I i i

268 269 NOTES

Enrico Gemili (Ccrulli, Somalia: Scrìtti vari editi ed inediti, I, Rome, 1957, pp. 231-357). NOTES 2. The main Cromo ìnvasìon of Abyssinia from thè south-east is documented by contemporary sources, ouistanding amongst which is The History of thè Galla, written by thè Abyssinian monk Bahrey, about 1593- On rhe Galla see t G.W.B. Huntingford, The Galla of Etbiopia, London, 1955. H. S. Lewis, A Galla Monarcby, Madison, 1965; A. Legesse, Cada: three approaches to thè study of African society, New York, 1973- As joinc CHAPTER I members of thè Eastern Cushitic language family thè ancestors of thè 1. The resulta of thè referendum held in thè Republic in June 1961, however, Somalis and Oromo are believed to have originally inhabited thè highlands cpiy a population of thè order of over four million there alone. No adjacent to thè lake region of 'Ethiopia. Research in modem historical smurate assessment of thè tota! Somali population wìU be possible until linguistics indicates that from this cradle land, thè proto-Somali thrust rjìiìble census information is available. to thè northeast, occupying part of thè Hom by about 1000 AD or earlier 2. This is thè eastern part of thè former Northern Frontier District of Kenya (see, e.g., H. S. Lewis, "The Origins of thè Galla and Somali', Journal b which thè bulk of thè area's Somali population is concentrated. of African History, 7, I, 1966; B. Heine, 'The Sam Languages. A History 3. This is thè Arabie name by which thè 'Afar are usually known to outsiders. of Rendiile, Boni and Somali', Afroasìatic Linguistics, 6, 2, 1978; U. TJ Somali, however, they are generally known as 'Awdali. In thè Repubìic Braukamper, 'Oromo Country of Origin: A Reconsideration of Hypotheses' e-: Tibur ithey number some 150,000. in G. Goldberg and B. Podolsky (eds.), Ethìopian Studies, Rotterdam, 4. Tue best recent discussion of thè position of Somali in relation to thè 1981, pp- 25-40). Thus thè north-south migrations of indivìdua! Somali Kiniitic and Semitic groups of languages is B. W. Andrzejewski's 'The dans discussed nere appear to represent a secondary sequence of population ixsition of Galla in thè Cushitic Language Group', Journal of Semitic movement following thè inrroduction of Isiam. £xfiw, 1964, pp. 135-8. 3. The interpretation of Ibn Sa'id's evidence is critically assessed by Cerulli 5. T-c dramatic incroduction in 1972 of mass literacy in thè Roman script in Somalia I, pp. 93-95. bv che military regime in Somalia is discussed in Chapter IX. Prior to 4. In addition to Cerulli, op. cit,, for ìndependent numismatic evidence on iis a number of scripts had been devised by Somalis. The most popular this dynasty, see G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, 'Coins from Mogadishu e. cr these, called 'Osmanìya after its inventor , enjoyed limited currency, 1300 to e. 1700', Numismatic Chronìcle, 1963, pp. 179-201 and M. H. c^mpeting in certain areas wìth Arabie as a medium fo r writing Somali. Yusuf, Numismatic ìnscriptions National Museum, Mogadishu, On Oc chese early scripts see; I. M. Lewis, 'The Gadabursi Somali Script', 1970. thè Ajuran, see also L. V. CassaneHi, The Shap'tng of Somali Society, salititi of thè Sfhaol of Qrìental and African Studies, 1958, pp. 134-56. Philadelphia, 1982. Ss also below, p. 115- 6. F:c a representative selection of Somali poetry see, B. W. Andrzejewski 5. According to one legend popular in Ethiopia, Ahmad Gran was thè issue ira I. M. Lewis, Somali Poetry, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964. of a Coptic priest and a Muslìm harlot. A recent writer has more seriously 7. F:c fulle r details on traditional Somali marriage and family life see, I. suggested that thè Imam may have belonged to a section of thè Beja M. Lewis ,Marriage and thè Family in Northern Somaliland, East African tribes. kstìnite of Social Research, Kampala, and London (Kegan Paul), 1962. 6. See Shihab ad-Din, ed. and trs., R. Basset, Futuh al-habasha, Paris, 8. Se; K.L.G. Goldsmith and I. M, Lewis 'A Preliminary Investigation of 1897-1909. ihe Blood Groups of thè "Sab" Bondsmen of Northern Somaliland', Man, 7. These cities are today ali in ruins and although a preliminary survey of Voi. LVIII , 1958, pp. 188-90. thè majority of them was made by Major Curie in 1940, they have not 9. F^c a detailed discussion of this and other aspects of Somali sociology, yet been systematically excavated. A thorough excavatìon should throw >« I. M. Lewis, A Pastora! Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politici considerable light upon this period. For an excellent recent survey see N. snoxg tèe Nortkern Somali of thè Hom o/ Africa, London, 1961. Chittìck, 'An Archaeological Reconnaissance in thè Horn: The British- 10. I. M. Lewis, 'Conformity and Contrasr in SomaJi Isiam', in Lewis (ed.), Somali Expedition, 1975 , Azania, 1976, pp. 117-33. The best generai in Tropical Africa, London, 1966. history of thè wars between Abyssinian Chrisnans and thè Muslims is J. S. Trimìngham's Isiam in Ethìopia, London, 1952. 8. In 1624, Father de Valesco, a Jesuit missionary, visited Paté and Malindi CHAPTER II and heard thè news of Mogadishu's conquest. There are also other records 1. One version of this important source was discovered at Kismayu in 1923, ind has recently been published with a translation by thè Italian scholar in Somaliland which refer to this event.

271 270 NOTES NOTES

9. This distribution of peoples is corroborateci by a Portuguese document Egyptian perìod is G. Douin, Htstoire du Règtte du Khedive Ismaìl, Cairo, of 1625 which deicribes thè caravan.route from Mogadishu into Abyssinia. 1941, Voi. III. 10. Much light on these furthe r movements has been shed by thè studìes 2. Between 1884 and June 1885, however, Italy pressed Britain to agree to mode by Sir Richard Turnbull while serving in 'thè Northern Province an Italian occupation of Zeila and Harar. In June 1885, Lord Granville of Kenya. Por refcrences to these and thè generai sequence of movements indicated that notwithstanding thè de jure sovereìgnty of Turkey over ìnto Kenya, see, I. M. Lewìs, 'The Problem of thè Northern Frontier these, Britain would not oppose an Italian bìd. By this time, however, District of Kenya', Race, 1963, pp. 48-60. On thè expansion of thè thè Italian parliament would not accept an Italian occupation. For an Somali as a whole see also, I. M. Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of thè excellent and fully documented analysis of Italian diplomatic manoeuvres Horn of Affici Journet!, of African History, I960, pp. 213-30. See also up lo this date see C. Giglio, L'Italia m Africa: Etiopia-Mar Rosso, 1857- E. R. Turton, 'Banru, Galla and Somali Migrations in thè Hom of Africa: 1885, Rome, 1958. A Reassessment of thè Juba/Tana Area', Journal gf'African History, 16, 3. The 'Haber Garhajìs' are an alliance of two separate northern Somali 4, 1974; G. Schlce, 'Ciana in Northern Kenya', Africa, 55* 1, 1985, pp. clans, thè Habar Yunis and 'Idagalle. Eastem clans with whom Britain 17-38. concluded a protectorate treaty were thè Haber Tol Ja'lo; thè "Warsangeli; 11. After his boat foundered, von der Decken was murdered by hostile and thè Majerteyn. The Majerteyn eventually fell within thè Italian sphere. membcrs of thè teligious community at Barderà, but some of his companìons The Dulbahante clan to thè cast of what became thè British Somalìlland escaped and managed to reach thè coast safely with thè expedition's Protectorate was not included in thè protectorate treaties. scientific records. 4. These treaties are convenìently reproduced in Tèe Somali Penìnsula: A 12. The name Galla, whìch is of obscure origin, is first recorded in thè Netf Light on Imperiai Motives, London, 1962. This important officiai sixteench century: it is used without always a specific ethnic connotation publication by thè government of thè Somali Republic contains thè fullest in Ethiopia to designate traditionally 'subject' peoples. The Galla cali study which has yet been made of Anglo-Somali relations in this period. themselves Oromo. 5. L. P. Walsh, Under thè Flag and Somali Coast Stories, London, n.d., p. 13. Richard Burton, First Footstepi in East Africa, Everyman edition, 1943, 311. pp. 288-9. 6. Yusuf 'Ali estabiished himself as Sultan of Obbia, thè hinterland of which 14. That is, thè coastal strip from thè mouth of thè Juba in thè south to is occupied by clansmen of both thè Hawiye and Majerteyn, about 1870 Itala in thè north, and induding thè ports of Brava, Merca, and Mogadishu. after a dispute with thè heredìtary Majeneyn Sultan 'Isman. Earlier, in 15. Guilkin estimated that there were about 1,000 weavers in 1847, and 1839, a British commerciai treaty had been signed with thè Majerteyn that thè annual production of cloth amounted to some 37,000 pieces, clan. each three yards long. This was consumed locally and also exported to thè Swahili coast and northern Somaliland. Some of it travelied as far as 7. Menelik had by now officiall y denounced thè Ucciali treaty with Italy thè ports of Arabia, thè Persìan Gulf, thè Red Sea, and Egypt. Cloth and repaid thè Italian loan whìch he had received. Britain, however, in was also produced on a smaller scale at Brava and Merca. See C. Gutllain, contras! to France, refused to accept Menelik's position, and continued Documenti sur l'histoire, la geographie, et U commerce de l'Afrique Orientale, to treat with Italy although it was abundandy dear that thè Italians had 3 vols., Paris, 1856. See also E. A. Alpers, 'Muqdisho in thè Nineteenth little control over Abyssinian policy towards thè Somali. Century: A Regìonal Perspective', Journal of Afrìcan History, 24, 1983, 8. There were at this time, of course, no Italian administrators in thè Ogaden, pp. 441-59- and apart from thè unofficia lagreements signed between Ogaden clansmen 16. Loot from coastal shipwrecks had by this tìme become an important and Italian explorets, Italy's claims derived from her 'protectorate' over element in thè Majerteyn trading economy, contributing to thè development Abyssinia, and thus uitimately depended upon thè forays made by of a more centralised politicai organisation. See W. K. Durrill, "Atrocious Abyssinian forces into this territory. misery: thè African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, 1839-1884', 9. For a thorough account of Russian penetration and interests in Ethiopia American Historical Review, 91, 2, 1986, pp. 287-306. at this time see C. Jesman's excellent study, The Rusiians in Ethiopia: a» essay in fut'tlity, London, 1958. 10. R. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories, 1894-1901, 1923, p. 173- CHAPTER III 11. The post at Biyo Kaboba consisted 'of a fragile block-house bulli of loosc 1. Although thè Khedive claimed that thè firmans of 1865 and 1866 which stones and thatched with straw, . . . it is garrisoned by seven men conveyed to Egypt thè Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa also included ... a nondescript and ragged riff-raf fof Somali and Sudanese - no Zeila and thè Somali Coast, this was not thè case and thè latter cession Abyssinians atnongst them . . . those poor devils, who receive no pay was provided for in a third firman of 1875. The best account of thè . . . only live on passing caravans. . . .' (Count Gleichen, thè Intelligence

272 273 NOTES

Maxamad Abdullt Xassan, Mogadishu, 1974. Another comprehensive account of thè Sayyid and his poetry is to be found in Y. I. Keenadiid, NOTES Ina 'Abdilk Xasan e fa sua attività letteraria, Istituto Universario Orientale, Naples, 1984. For broader discussion of thè Sayyid's use of politicai Office r with Rodd's party, Wtth thè Mùsiott to Menelik, 1897, London, oratory and poetry in thè development of Somali nationalism see S. S. 1898, p. 27.) Aiolà, another piace where a temporary Abyssinian post Samatar, Orai Poetry and Somali National'wn, Cambridge 1982. had been opened within British territory, was found to be deserted in 4. Catha edulis which grows in Ethiopia. The succulent green leaves when 1897. Thus che Abyssinian encroachments were mere tokens, but thè fresh have stimulant properties similar to those of thè benzedrine family cffecc of this rather nominai Abyssinian pressure was to make Britain of drugs. They are often chewed by Sheikhs of thè Qadiriya Order to realize that hcr Somali terrirory was more extensive than was really necessary keep themselves awake during night services. for her purposes. 12. This important point is also reflected in Rodd's dispatches to London, 5. See Swayne, op. cit., pp. 6, 7, 128, etc. 6. Quoted from D. Jardine, Thè Mad Mullah of Somaliland, London, 1923, see The Somali Ptnìnsula, pp. 55-58. • 13- Rodd, Social and Diplomane Memoirs, 1894-1901, p. 187. p. 43. 14. A discussion of thè interest of Russia in thè triangolar contest berween 7. The fullest and most detailed account by an officiai who was Chief France, Italy, and Britaìn, in thè Red Sea coast and hinterland would be Secretary to thè Somaliland government during part of thè period, is out of piace here. But it is significant to record thar Russia was involved Jardine's book referred to above. For thè initial phase see also thè British as an intermediary in thè peace negotiations between Italy and Ethiopia government's officia i record, Correspondence relating to thè rising of thè after thè battle of Adowa. Mullah Mohammad Abdulla in Somaliland and consequent military operations, 1899-1902, London, 1903. For particular periods and aspects of thè Bricish operations, and on thè part played by Ethiojjia, thè following are CHAPTER IV also worth consulting: M. McNeiil, la Pursuit of thè Mad Mullah, London, 1. For further informacion on Isiam in Somaliland see, I. M, Lewis, A 1902; ]. W. Jennings, Wtth thè Aèyssittians in SomalUand, London, 1905; Pastora/ Drmocracy, London, 1961, pp. 213-28; E. Gemili, Somalia, scritti and for thè contributìon made by thè Kìng's African Rifles regiment, H. vari editi ed inediti, Rome, 1957; B. G. Martin, Musiim Brotherhoods in Moyse-Bartlett, The History of thè King's African Rifles, London, 1956. 19tb century Africa, Cambridge, 1976. The standard Italian record of thè jihad, with particular reference to its 2. In thè 1890s thè settlement at Hargeisa consisted of a few hundred huts effects in Somalia, is, F. S. Caroselli, Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia, Rome, surrounded by a high fence endosing roughly a square mile of sorghum 1931- gardens. In this centre thè poor and destìtute, and cripples, used to collect 8. For thè terms of this and thè Illig treary see, The Somali Peninsula, cit., to receive succour and support. Sheikh Maddar's reputation extended far pp. 118-22. (These, and ali other treaties up to 1908, relating to thè into thè Ogaden and he had contacts with thè leaders of most of thè Horn of Africa, are of course to be found in E. Hertslet, Map of Africa surrounding Somali clans. In 1893, thè Sheikh helped to savc Lord by Treaty, 3 vols,, London, 1909 - 3rd edition.) Delamere's life after he had been mauled by a lion in thè course of a 9. For an unusual account of conditions in thè British Protectorate at this hunring expedition in thè interior. In rerurn, Delamere gave Sheikh time see, F. Swayne, A V^oaiatt's Pleasure Trip to Somaliland, London. Maddar an imposing stone house which he had had constructed near thè 1907. settlement. Sheikh Maddar's tomb in Hargeisa is regularly vìsiced by 10. A translation of this letter is given by Jardine, of. cit., pp. 184-5. those in scardi of blessing and is thè scene of an annua! ceremony of 11. For thè full text and translation of this and other poems by Sayyid remembrance. The fullest desaiptìons of thè settlement in Sheikh Maddars Muhammad see, B. W. Andrzejewski and I. M. Lewìs, Soma/i Poetty, lifetime are those given by H.G.C. Swayne, Seventeen Trips through Oxford, 1964. Of Corfield and thè carnei constabulary which he raised, Somaliland and a Visti to Abyssinia, London, 1903- a sympathetic account is given by H. F. Prevost Battersby, Richard Corfield 3. This date, and much of die materia! relating to thè Sayyid's personal life of Somaliland, London, 1914. and thè family Dervish movement, are based upon records in thè possessìon 12. Quoted from Jardine, op. cit., p. 249. The Sayyid's correspondencc with of his son, Sheikh 'Abd ar-Rahman Sheikh Muhammad, and his brother, thè British Commissioner was conducted in Arabie. His poetic messages, Sheikh exiensive Hassan Sheikh 'Abdille. I have also made use of however, were generally in Somali. Information collected from a number of surviving members of thè Sayyid's 13. H.G.C Swayne, op. cit., p. 117. dose associates, and from accounts of thè period by thè present head of 14. The continuation of slavery under thè Company's mie of thè Benadir thè Saiihiya Order in Somaliland, Sheikh 'Isman Sheikh 'Umar, and thè caused a scandal and led to an Italian commission of inquiry directed Dulbahante historian Haji Nur 'Ise. The first authoritatìvc study of thè Dervishes by a Somali historian is Aw Jama 'Umar 'Ise's Taariìkhdii 275 DaraawUshta, Mogadishu, 1976. This work complemenis thè same scholar's briiliant compilation of thè Sayyid's poems, D'tiwaanka Gabayada Sayid

274 NOTES

by Gustavo Chieie and Ernesto Travetti. The Commission's revealins findingi wcrc publishcd in 1904, as, Le Questioni del Benadìr (Mìlan), NOTES and full yuipport thè chargcs which were made against thè Company •ccuiing it of Nor was che Italian govemment blameless. For negligerle. 1937 , Voi. ii, pp. 412-18; ind to P. Barile , Colonizzazione fascista nella un acceuible though decidedly anti-Italian account of thè posìtion see E Somalia Meridionali, Rome, 1935, pp. 179-81. S, Pankhunt, Ex-ltaltan Somaliland, London, 1951, pp. 38-83. 5. A useful discusiion of thè problem of labour scarcity, on which there is 15. At this time vcry fcw Somali were recruited into thè Italian forces engaeed an estensive literarure in Italian, is given by M. Karp, The Economici of in thè work of 'pacification '- for obvious reasons. There were, howcver Trusteesbip in Somalia, Boiton, I960, pp. 104-10, and 117 ff. a few Somali aslcaris mainly from thè north, Later thè Italians drew 6. Typical commenta are to be found in Barile, op, cit., pp. 149 ff. heavily upon their Somali subjects to staff their police and miiitary units, 7. For full details of thè itruccure and growth of rhe police and miiitary thè qualities of thè northern nomadic Somali, in particular, being frequently forces in Somalia during thè period, see Corni, op. cit., pp. 185-236. eulogized in ItaJian reports during thè fascisi period as thè outstandìng 8. Rivalry between thè Marehan and Awlihan clans in this region assumed representatives of this 'race of warriors'. serious dimensions about 1910 when a Brilish post was opened at Serenleh. 16. T. Carletti, / Problemi del Benad'tr, Viterbo, 1912, p. 270. From this base attempts were made in 1912 to bring thè Marehan under 17. For a brilliantly vivid record of Ferrandi's years at Lugh see bis, Lttgh. effecnve administrative conirol. Further friction , however, led to thè Emporio commerciale sul Giuba, Rome, 1903, one of thè few classici which mounting of an expedition of thè King's African Rifles between 1913 bave been written on Somalia. and 1914. Tension between thè two clans appears to have been fanned 18. For thè filli terms of thè treaty see The Somali Peniasula, cìt., pp. 107- by thè activities of 'Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, a prominent headman of 10. Apart from polirical objeaives, thè treaty laid down thè commerciai thè Awlihan employed as an agent by thè British authoritìes. He seems and economie aìms and spheres of interest of thè three powers in this to have been a rather unhappy choice, for in 1915 after making an officia! area of Africa . These induded: for France an extension of thè Jibuti visit to Nairobi, he returned to thè area to broadcast thè news that thè railway from Dire Dawa to Addìs Ababa (under a French company with country between Wajir and Serenle had been placed under his authority. British, Italian, and Ethiopian representatives); for Britain (and Egypt) This encouraged thè Awliban to provoke their enemies thè Marehan and control of thè Tana and Blue Nile waters; and for Italy thè possibility in thè resulting tension to rebuff ali attempts at mediation on thè part of a link across Ethiopia between her two colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. of thè Administration. In 1916, after a savage Awlihan attack on thè 19. The Italian Foreign Minister at that time, Tommaso Tittoni, explained Marehan, matters carne to a head and 'Abd ar-Rahman Mursal was to thè Italian parliament that thè treacy reserved for Italy 'thè share which warned that unless camels looted in thè raìd were returned he would be is due io us and ìs necessary to assure thè future of thè two colonies' dismissed from govemment service and imprisoned. He was not, however, (Eritrea and Somalia). For thè officia iedition of thè Ministeri speeches to be intimidated and contrived a daring attack on Serenle post in which see , Baron Quaranta, Italy's Foreign and Colonia! Polìcy: Speeches of Senator thè locai British officia iwas killed along with thè majority of his guard. Tommaso Tittoni, London, 1914. With thè arms and ammunìtion which had been seized, Serenle remaìned 20. As officiaily teported by C. Riveri, Govemor of Somalia from 1910-20, in thè hands of thè Awlihan until thè Italian Resident at Barderà, on quoted in G. Corni, Somalia Italiana, Voi. ii, Milan, 1937, pp. 21-22. thè opposite side of thè Juba, crossed thè river with his askaris and drove thè Awlihan out. Thereafter, although no British punitive expedition could be dispatched CHAPTER V unti! 1917, 'Abd ar-Rahman's following began to dwindle so that when 1. For further details see Carletti's record of bis govemorship, / Problemi thè expedition did arrive they were able to break thè Awlihan resìstance del Benadìr, Viterbo, 1912, pp. 187 (F. without difficulty .The majority of thè dan's firearms were capeOred and 2. For de Val Gsmon's own account of his period thè stupendously heavy fine of 25,000 camels imposed. As well as this, of administration see his Orizzonti d'Impero: Cinque Anni in Somalia, most of thè dan's leading elders were arrcsted and imprisoned. - Milan, 1935. Thus although thè disarmamene of thè dansmen of this turbulent 3. An admirably comprehensive study of thè S.A.I.S. enterprise and of thè region was by no means complete, some respect for thè administering Duke of thè Abruzzi's part therein is given by C. Maino, in her La authority had been ìnstilled by 1924, when thè treaty of London was Somalia e L'Opera della Duca degli Abruzzi, Rome, 1959. signed providing for che transfer of Jubaland to Italy. In thè interval between thè announcement of this new fate, and its actual execution, thè 4. For fulle r Information on thè detailed tcrms of these regulations and clans, who were given no opportunity of expressing their views, split up contracrs thè reader is referred to G. Corni (ed.), Somalia Italiana, Milan, into anti-Italian and anti-British factions. Delicate handling of thè situatìon was required to prevent an outbreak of violence. This short record may 276 serve to give some impression of thè generai conditions in Jubaland ai thè time.

277 NOTES NOTES

9. D. Jardine, Th$ Mad Mullah of Somali/and, London, 1923, pp. 316-18. 23. On che rise of Somali nationalist parties generali/ see, I. M*. Lewis, A 10. For fuller information on cultivation in thìs pari of thè Protectorate, see Posterai Dimocracy, London, 1961, pp. 266-96; and 'Modern Politicai I. M. Lewis, A Pastora! Democracy, London, 1961, pp. 90-127. Movcmenti in Somalilund', Africa, 1958, pp. 244-61; 344-63. 11. For details of thc record of events over this period see thè officiai annuals, 24. These matten are diicussed more fully in, I. M. Lewis, "The Gadabursì Colorititi Resorts: Somaliland. An impressionisele and lively account of thè Somali Script', Butlttin of thè School of Orientai and African Studies, 1958, work of a District Commissioner ac thè tìme is provided by H. Rayne's xxi, pp. 134-56. See also below, p. 216. Sua, Sand and Somala: Ltaves from thè Notebook of a District Commissioner in Britisè Somaliland, London, 1921. For another interesting record of CHARTER VI thè conditions and atmosphere of thè period see, M. Perham, Major 1. For thè officiai British account of thè Italian collapse in Somalia and thè Dane'i Garden, London, 1926. For discussion of thè Protectorate's needs Allied occupation see George Steer, The Aèyssiaian Campaìgns. The Officiai and porentìalities by a Governor of thè time see, H. B. Kittermaster, Story of thè Conquest of ìtalietn East A/ria, London, 1942, For an Italian "The Development of thè Somali', Journal of thè African Society, 31, 1932, version of thè circumstances of thè Italian defeat see, R. di Lauro, Come pp. 234-44. Pattick Kakwenzire suggesre that after thè long period of Abbiamo Diffeto L'Impero, Rome, 1949. stagnation following thè Dervish war thè Italo-Ethiopian conflìct stimulated 2. For details of this treaty see, The Somali Peninsula, cit,, pp. 122-5. prosperity in thè British Protectorate, encouraging modest developments 3. Conditions in Somalia at this time and shortly afrer thè Italian collapse in medicai care, veterinary and agricoltura! servìces etc.p which, of course, are graphically described in The First to èe Freed, a pamphlet prepared were aborted by thè outbreak of thè second world war (P. Kakwenzire, by thè Ministry of Information and published by H.M. Stationery Office, 'Resistance, Revenue and Development in Northern Somalia, 1905-1939', London, 1944. For a more detailed stucfy of events under thè British International Journal of African Historical Studies, voi. 19, 1986, pp. 659- Military Adminiscration up to 1947, see Lord Rennell of Rodd, British 77.) Military Administration ofOccupìed Terrìtories in Africa, 1941-47, Lòndon, 12. See above, Chapter III, pp. 55-6. 1948. Also of consìderable interest in conveying thè atmosphere in thè 13- See H. M. Clifford, 'British Somaliland-Ethiopian Boundary', Geographical Btitish Protectorate immedìately after its recapture is Gordon Waterfietd's Journal, 97, 1936, pp. 289-307. And for thè Italian version of thè events Mornìttg Will Come, London, 1945. For a vivid, impressionistic, and semi- of Walwal thè account by thè Banda commander Major Roberto Cimmaruta, autobiographic record of thè British Military Administration and thè life Val-Val, Milan, 1936. and activities of its polìce and administrative officials see, Douglas Collins, 14. Corni, ep. cit., pp. 34—37. A Tear for Somalia, London, 1961. A more sophisticated glimpse of thè 15. Corni again provides some of thè details, others are drawn from locai period is contained in Gerald Hanley's novel, The Consul at Sunset, London, Somali sources. See also S. Pankhurst, Ex-ltalian Somaliland, London, 1951. 1951, pp. 99-103, for an account from thè Ethìopian vìewpoint. 4. Rennell of Rodd, cit., p. 153. 16. Cf. also M. Perham's excellent generai work, The Government of Ethiopia, 5. This and other information nere is based chiefiy upon materia! drawn London, 1948, pp. 336-8. from thè officia i reports of thè British Military Administration. 17. See Chapter IV, p. 88. 6. See thè officia i communiqué issued by thè Administration, summarized 18. For a discussion of these from thè Ethiopian side see again, Pankhurst, in E. S. Pankhurst, cit., pp. 224-5. op. cit., pp. 99-111, and A. de la Pradelle (who represented Ethiopia in 7. 'Abdìllahi 'Ise (of Mudugh Province, born in 1922) had in 1938 been thè attempi at arbitration with Italy), Le Conflict Italo-Etbiopten, Paris, employed as a eterica! officia i in thè Italian Administration. In 1941 he 1936. For an English assessment of Britain's pan, see C. Hollis, Italy in resigned his post to set up in business. Joining thè S.Y.L. in 1945 he Africa, London, 1941, pp. 141-203. See also E. M. Robertson, Mussolini was elected to thè League's centrai committec in 1947, and after acting ai Empire-Builder, Europe and Africa, 1932-36, London, 1977, as thè principal S.Y.L. spokesman to thè Four Power Commission in 19- The part played by antì-Ethiopian Ogaden dansmen is enthusiastìcally 1948, served as a representative at thè United Nations from 1949-52. described by H. de Monfried, Les Guerrieri de L'Ogadea, Paris, 1936. 8. Both these men are Catholics, and in Mr Mariano's case his adherencc 20. See, for example, R. R. de Marco, 'The Italianisation of African Nacives', to Christianity has not prevented his playing an importane role in Somali in Government Native Education in thè Colonie!, 1890-1937, New York, politics. 1943. See also R. L. Hess, Italian Colonialìsm in Somalia, Chicago, 1966. 9. See Four Power Commission of investigatioti for thè former Italian Colonie», 21. T. Carletti, / Problemi del Benadir, Viterbo, 1912, p. 274. Rtport on Somaliland, Voi. ii, London, 1948. This report has not been 22. See M. Pirone's very useful outline history of Somalia, Appunti di Storia fully released to thè public in this country but can be consulted ac thè dell'Africa, H, Somalia, Rome, 1961, pp. 140-1. library of thè Foreign Office. As well as containing its record of thè

278 279 NOTES NOTES

submissioni madc in Somalia by thè various parties and interest-groups, Protecrorate authorities as dangerously leftish, if not Communìst-inspired. che report il uieful in including material on thè changes cffècted in ali This mistaken characterizacion took severa! years to live down. Hencc, spheres during Brìtish military mie. Large para of thè report are published although not iubject to a tota! proscription, thè League was cerrainly noe In E. S. Pankhurst's Ex-ìtalian Somaliland, pp. 222 ff. See also thè arride encouraged in ìts early efforts to artract adherents in Britìsh Somaliland- by thè British member of thè Commission, È E. SrafFord, 'The ex-Italian 16. See H. Deschamps, et al., Cote des Somali*, Reunìan-ìnde, Paris, 1948, Colonies', International Affairs, Voi. xxv, January, 1949, pp. 47-55. and Notes et Etudes docttmentaires, Le Còte frantati des Somalis, 29th Aprii, 10. 'Abd ar-Rashid 'Ali Shirmarke (of Majerteyn Province, born 1917) served 1961. as a detical officia i in both thè Italian and British Administrations, was 17. For an interesting expression of French views on these Somali questioni Secretary of thè S.Y.L. from 1948-51, and a member of its centrai see, R. Lamy, 'Le destin des Somalis', in Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asìr. committee. Mer Rouge-Afrique Orientale, Paris, 1959, pp. 163-212. 11. For an account of thè UN. debates see Pankhurst, op. cit., pp. 260-9, 298-354. See also B. Rivlin, The United Nations and thè Italian Colonies, New York, 1950; and G. H. Becker, The Disposinoti of thè Italian Colonies, CHAPTER VII Annemasse, 1952. The future of Somalia was complicated by thè generai 1. No extensive study of thè importane róle of thè U.N. in Somalia hi* issue of thè other ex-Italian territories, but especially by that of Eritrea yet been published. For some valuable comments, however, see A. A. to which Ethiopia advanced strong claims (see Pankhurst, cit., and thè Castagno, 'Somalia, International Conciliatjpn, New York, March, 1959. same authors Eritrea on thè Ève, London, 1952; and for a ìess parusan pp. 395-400. point of vìew, G.K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: a colony in traasition, 194l~ 2. After 1954 thè Administration jointly with UNESCO opened three cemres 52, London, I960). Briefly , thè Bevin-Sforza compromise had proposed for fundamental education in thè south of Somalia. Two, at Dinsor anJ rhat Libya should be placed under U.N. trusteeship for ten years; Cyrenaica Villabruzzi, were amongst part-culttvating dans, while thè thìrd, at Afmadu, should be administered by Britain; Tripolirania by Italy; that Eritrea was concemed only with fully nomadic groups. It proved thè least successful divided between Erhiopia and thè Brirish Sudan; and rhat Somalia should and was discontinued after two years of operation. remain indefinitely under Italian trusteeship. This pian, however, foundered 3. On thè development of education generally, in Somalia particularly, ami on severa! counts, and it was only at thè Fourth Session of thè United also in see A. A. Somali Republic'. Nations Assembly that a further compromise proposal was accepted placing British Somaliland, Castagno, 'The ìn H. Kitchen (ed.), The Educated African, London and New York, 1962. Somalia under Italian administration and U.N. trusteeship for a period of ren years. Significare provìsos were attached to ensure that thè U.N. 4. See, A.F.I.S., Plans de Développemertt Economique de la Somalie, Aanéu should exercise a large measure of overriding contrai. 19^4-1960, Rome, 1954; and G. F. Makgodi, Linee Programmatiche pr 12. The claims made to thè contrary by thè Ethiopian government and by lo sviluppo economico e sociale della Somalia, Rome, 1953- The Seven Year such distinguished supporters of Ethiopia as Miss Sylvia Pankhurst are Development Pian is crirically discussed in M. Karp, The Economia cf generally unfounded, as of course is also thè pretension that thè Ogaden Trusteeship in Somalia, Boston, 1960. formerly formed pari of thè 'ancient Ethiopian empire'. As has been seen, 5. See Karp, op. cit., pp. 87-104. Ethiopia's claims to thè region were origjnally established by infiltraticn 6. On these two parties, thè first of which eventually became incorporateti and conquest in thè late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and in thè Liberai Party, see, I. M. Lewis, A Fosfora/ Democrqcy, London. only acquired some status in international law in che 1897 and 1908 1961, pp. 283-90. Italo-Echiopian agreements. There were, of course, pro-Echiopian Somali 7. Progress throughout thè trusteeship period in Somalia is excellendy elemenrs in thè Ogaden, Somali attachments and attitudes rowards esternai documented in thè Administration's annual reports, Rapport du gouvernemens influence s being always partly influenced by internai factional divìsions italien a l'Assemblèe generale des Nations Umes sur L'Administration & and thè exigencies of thè locai Somali politicai scene. A somewhat parallel tutelle de la Somalie, Rome, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For further details situation existed in SomaHa in thè final phase of British rule, when thè on che positìon up to 1958, see also I. M. Lewis, Modera Politicai division in attitudes towards a return of Italian control between thè S.Y.L. Movements ìn Somaliland, International African Institute Memorandum and H.D.M.S. was partly a producr of internai diffèrences between thè XXX, London, 1958, and Castagno, cit., 1959. Fot an extremely detaiied supporters of thè two gorups. report of thè procedura! aspects of thè 1956 elections see, A.F.I.S., Lt 13- D. Collins, A Tear for Somalia, 1961, pp. 170, 177. Prime Elezioni Polìtiche in Somalia, Mogadìshu, 1957. 14. See above, pp. 59—61. 8. For an originai and very personal view of conditions in che Protectorate 15. Inffuence dby securiry assessments in thè Northern Frontier Province of at this time by che wife of thè engineer ìn charge of this scheme see. Kenya rather than in Somalia, thè S.Y.L. was initially regarded by thè M. Laurence, The Prophet's Carnei Beli, London, 1963.

280 281 NOTES NOTES was consequently begun, but at thè cime of had not resulted 9. Por fuller dìscuision of thè social implications of thè new Locai Authorities independence in any conclusive action being taken. Similarly, thè S.Y.L. government KC, I. M. Lewii, fi/., 196l, pp. 200^3. 10. The Empcror'i address is recorded in a brochure in. Amharic, Arabie, and formed in Somalia after thè March 1959 elections, set up a tribuna! to English, pubtiihed by thè Ethiopian Press and Information Department, study thè problem of trìballism and to consider how traditional tribal 1956. ties could best be adapted to thè needs of a modem state. 11. For further informacion see, Lewìs, ctt., 1958, pp. 346-9. 3- See S. Santiapichi, Appunti di Diritto penale della Somalia, Istitut. 12. See, Report of thè Commiato» of Enquiry imo Unoffifial Representatìon on Universario della Somalia, Rome, 1961; P. Contini, The Somali Republic, thè Legislativi Coartai, Government of thè Somaliland Protectorate, Har- an expertment in Legai Integration, London, 1969; M. R. Ganzgìass, The geisa, 1958. Penai Code of thè Somali Democrazie Republic, New Brunswick, 1971. 13. A Commissioner for Somalization was appointed and in Aprii 1959 his 4. In October I960 a committee under thè chairmanship of Mr Muse H. report was being studied by thè government. In July of that year an I. Galal, thè distinguished authority on Somali poetry, was set up to Advisory Public Service Board was created co select candidates for overseas recommend thè most suttable script for thè mother-tongue. The Committee's scholarships; to recommend thè sclection of civil servants for promotion; recommendations favoured ihe use of a Roman orthography, but no to advise on entry conditions to thè public service and to deal with other decision was taken by thè government of thè Republic at thè cime. related matters. The Board, which was chaired by thè Attorney-General, 5- The fact that only some 100,000 persons voted out of thè north's estimated consisted of two other officia i members and rwo independent Somali popuktion of 650,000, suggests that at least half thè electorate boycotted members. thè referendum. Ali aduli men and women were entitled to vote, women 14. See G. A. Costanzo, Problemi costituzionali della Somalia nella preparazione voting for thè first time in thè north's history. ali' indipendenza, Mtlan, 1962. 6. The Prime Ministeri statement of policy is fuUy reported in The Somali 15. See above, p. 152. News, 25 August 1961. 16. In March 1957, thè government had brought out a Somali news-sheet 7. For further information on this disaster and thè measures taken to combat ('The Somali Messenger', Wargeyska Somaliyed) written in Somali tran- its effects , see Rehaèilitatton programmi drawn up by thè Committee jet up scribed in a simple but accurate Roman script. But popular reaaìon was by His Excellency thè Prime Miaister to recommend measures essential to so unfavourable that after two editions this was withdrawn. repair damages caused by thè flood, Somali Republic Ministry of Information, 17. See Report of thè United Nat'tons Advisory Council for thè Trust Terrìtory Mogadishu, 1962. of SomalUand under Italian Administration (1 Aprii, 1958, to 31 March, 8. For a report of thè judkial proceedings, see The Somali News, February 1959), document T.1444, 1959, pp. 24-31. 1963. The lieutenants fought bravely against thè Ethiopians in thè spring 18. See Report of thè SomalUand Constitutional Conference held m London in of 1964. May 1960. Cmnd. 1044, London, I960. 9. A national civil service establishment commissìon was set up at thè end 19. This body, stili essentially advisoty, had replaced thè former Protectorate of 1962 to regukte appointments and promotions, on thè former British Advisory Council and constìtuted a sort of Upper House, Protectorate pattem. 20. For thè British agreements see, Agreement and Exfèanges ofLetters between 10, Late in thè summer a generai re-posting of ali District and Provincial thè Government of thè United Kingdom and thè Government of SomalUand Commissioners took piace. in connexìon with thè Attainment of Independence by Somaliland, Cmnd. 11, The tax on petrol in thè north was raised to thè rate currently applied 1101, London, 1960; and for thè Italian, L'Amministrazione fiduciaria in thè south, causing petrol prices in thè north to doublé. At* thè same della Somalia e i Rapporti dell'Italia con la Repubblica Somala, Rome, time thè tax on diesel fuel was reduced and also imporr duties on alcohol Ministry of Foreign Affairs ,1961, pp. 127-206. This report also contains and cigarettes to brtng thè northem prices imo line with those in thè a summary account of thè entire trusreeshìp period. south. These ktter measures were expected to offset thè increases in petrol prices. Unfortunately, however, for reasons which are difficult to understand, CHARTER Vili thè government failed to realize that alinosi ali motor vehides in thè north use petrol and not diesel Northemers found Utile comfort in 1. See Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, cit,, pp. 266-96; and 'Problema in thè oli. development of modem leadership and loyalties in thè British Somaliland thè reductions in alcohol and cigarette prices which they regarded in thè Protectorate and U.N. Trusteeship Temtory of Somalia', Civilisations, I960, circumstances as derisory. pp. 49-62. 12, Sheikh Mahamud Muhammad Farah (Ogaden) who had occupied this 2. Thus in thè Protectorate in 1957 thè legislative councii asked thè govemment offic e as a compromise candidate for thè two previeni years. Sheikh to insticute an inquiry ìnto thè abolition of thè tribal system. An inquiry Mahamud was Mìnister of Justice in thè 1959 S.Y.L. government.

282 283 NOTES NOTES

13. A number of artici» on this iheme urging thè need for scrong govemment Dispute', Inttrnatìona! *tid Comparative Law Quarterly, 1956, pp. 245- •ppeared in thè governmcnt newspaper. See The Somali News, 21 and 65; and 'Recent Developments in thè Ethiopia-Somaliland Dispute 1, ikìd, 28 Dccember 1962. 1961, pp. 167-78. 14. The Bill received thè supporr of 72 members of thè Assembly, ten 23. Movement into and out of thè Distria: was restricted under thè Oudying memben opposed it, and one member abstained: other members had Districts Ordinince, 1902, and thè Special Districts (Administration) apparently left thè Assembly in protest. The new law which consisted of Ordinance, 1934. A form of control over movement between towns in 78 arrides provided, ittter alta, for tìghter control of publìc meetings thè Distria, noe far short of thè South African 'pass System', was also and associations and empowered thè Supreme Court to suspend ot dissolve applìed. politicai parties which vìolated thè provisions of thè Repub'lic's constitution. 24. See Report of thi Ktnya Conslitutional Con/eretice, 1962, Cmnd. 1700. To what extcnt thè opposition's cricicisms were justified can only be judged London, 1962, p. 11. from thè way in which this legislation was applìed. Certaìnly, in thè past 25. See A People in Itolation: a cali by politicai parliti of thè Northern Frontier some opposition groups had abused thè democratìc privileges of thè Distrìct of Kenya for Union wìth thi Somali Republic, London, 1962. This Repubiìc to an extent dangerous to public security. pamphlet sets out thè Somali cose for thè three prìncipal secessionist 15- As noted above, however, women in thè north had participared in thè parties - The Northern Province Peoples' Progressive Party, thè Northern nationat referendum on thè Republic's constitution. Frontier Democratic Party, and The Northern Province Peoples' National 16. The Somali Peninsula: a new tight on imperiai motives, London, 1962, p. Union. vi. 26. For a fui! report see The Somali Ntws, 23 March, 1962. 17. Artide VI, section 4, of thè Constitution read: "The Somali Republic 27. This speech was delivered at a state banquet held in honour of Jomo shall promote, by legai and peaceful means, thè union of Somali territories Kenyatta on 28 July, 1962. For further informaiion on these visits see and encoutage solidarity among thè peoples of thè world, and in partkular The Somali Reputili? and African Uaìty, an illustrated commemorative brochure published by thè Somali Republic, Mogadishu, 1962. among African and Islamic peoples. 1 28. Kenya: Report of thè Northern Frontier Distrìct Commission, Cmnd. 1900, 18. See A Pastoral Democracy, cit. pp. 303-4. London, 1962. 19. For details see, The Somali News, 8 December, 1958. 29. Kenya: Report of thè Regionat Boundaries Commifsiott, Cmnd. 20. For further information on events in thè Cote, see S. Touval, Somali 1899, 1962. 30. See thè exceilent and foli description of thè negotiations between thè Nationalism, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963, pp. 123-31; and Notes et Republic and Britain contained in J. Drysdale's valuable study The Somali Etudes Documentami; La Cote Fran^aìse dei Somalis, Li Documentatici! Dìspute, London and New York, 1964. For rurther information on thè francaise, Paris, 1961, No. 2,774. issue see also I. M. Lewis, 'The Problem of thè Northern Frontier Distria 21. For a short summary of these fruitless negotiations and references to thè of Kenya', Race, 1963, pp. 48-60. relevant U.N. documems, see A. A. Castagno, 'Somalia', laiernational 31. Speech of 28 July, 1962. The President made these points more explicit CoKci/iation, York, No. 522, New 1959, pp. 386-91; and for a statement in a further speech on 16 August, during Ronald Ngala's visit to Mogadishu. of thè Ethiopian point of view, The Ethio-Somalia Frontier Problem, Ministry Referring to democratìc practice in thè Republic on that occasion, President of Information, Imperiai Ethiopian Government, Addis Ababa, 1961. See Adan said he regretted that many other African States, 'because of thè also, A. A. Castagno, 'Somali Republic' in J. S. Coleman and G. C. intolerances rhat are inevitable among a heterogeneous populace' had had Rosberg (eds.), Politicai Parties and National Integration ;» Tropical Africa, to resort, for thè sake of cohesion to a single-party System of government. Berkeley, 1964, pp. 512-59. 'Others forbid politics altogether', he added. See The Somali Republic and 22. The Ethiopian government on its part at first announted that after thè African Unity, cit.; and I. M. Lewis, 'Pan-Africanìsm and Pan-Somalìsm', Protectorate had become independent, thè northern clans ' grazing nghts The Journal of Modera African Studies, 1963, pp. 147-61. in thè Haud would be cancelled. Later, however, a few days pnor to 32. See Dennis Austin, 'The Ghana-Togo Frontier', The Journal of Modern independence, a further Ethiopian statement assured thè Somali government African Studies, 1963, pp. 139-45. of thè Protectorate that thè grazing rights would contìnue as long as thè 33. The filli text of this speech is given in The Somali News, 31 May, 1963. 1897 boundary was recognized by Somalis. Since thè tbrmation of thè For a convenient summary of thè main events in thè Republic up to Republic both sides have in practice respected thè exisnng frontier, December 1963 see; Somali Governmcnt Government Activities from although this uneasy situation has led to a train of incidents. See The Independence untìl Today (Ist Jttly I960-31st Dectmbtr 1963), Mogadishu, Dami Incidenti, a pamphlet published by thè Ministry of thè Interior, 1964. Somali Republic, Mogadishu, 1961. For a discussion of some of thè legai 34. See J. Markakis, National and Clasi Gonfiici in thè Horn of Africa, aspects, see D. J. Latham Brown, "The Ethiopia-Soroiliiand Frontier Cambridge, 1987, pp. 187-91.

284 285 NOTES NOTES 35. See I. M. Lewis, 'Dcvelopments in thè Somali Dispute,' Africa» Affaìrs, 1967, pp. 104-12; V. Thompson and R. Adloff , Djtiouti and thè Horn 11. These and other ipecches are reproduced in My Country and My People: ef Africa, CaJifomia , 1968; P. Oberìc, 'Afars et Somala: lei dossieri de Selecttd sfttcbts ofjaalli Major-GeneralMohammad SiyadBarn, Mogadishu, Djtboutì, Paria , 1971. 1974. 12, For fulle r discuuion of these issues see A. Wolczyk, 'II "socialismo" CHAPTER IX Somala; un industria per il potere'. Concretezza, Rome, January, 1972, pp. 23-6; L. Pestalozza, Somalia, Cronaca della Rivoluzione, Bari, 1973; 1. An officia istatemem made after che miUtary coup of 1969 alleged that B. Davidson 'Somalia: Towards Socialism', Race and Class, 1975, pp. Premier JgaJ had cxpended £500,000 in public funds in paymems io 19-38; I. M. Lewis, 'Kim II Sung in Somalia; The end of tribalism?', membcrs of thè Asscmbly between January and October, 1969- in P. Cohen and W. Snack (eds.), The Politics of Office, Oxford, 1979. 2. For a vivid evocation of thè corrosive atmosphere in thè capitai, Mogadìshu, see Nuruddin Farah's nove), The Naked Need/e, 1974. 3. This term was originally devised long before 1969 by members of thè CHAPTER X BBC Somali programme co refer to socialism and communism in Europe and thè Middle East. 1. P. Gilkes, The Dying Lion, London, 1975. 2. In 1977 thè Ethiopian military government claimed to bave dìscovered 4. This expression was in circulation in thè mid-1950s ìn thè then British documentary proof of a concerted Somali campaign designed to sprcad Somaliland Protectorate, where thè expatriate adminìstrators strongly ctvil insurrection throughout south-eastern Ethiopia. The alleged Somali encouraged self-help schemes for school construction, farming and other development projects. plot was referred to by thè title 'War Clouds in thè Hom of Africa', by a strange coincidence thè title of T. J. Carnegie monograph, War 5. For a sympathetic Russian account of this enterprise written during thè Farei's Clouds in thè Horn of Africa: a crìs'u for Detente, New York, 1976. This heyday of thè Somali-Soviet enteate, see P. Kuprijanov, 'Somalian Village: inceresting study examined thè implications for thè superpowers of conflict Social and Economie Transformations', ìrd International Congress of Af- ricanùts, Addis Ababa, 1973. between Ethiopia and Somalia over thè Ogaden on thè assumption that 6. For a detailed account see B. W. Andrzejewski, 'The Jncroduction of a Ethiopia was stili supported by thè U.S.A. and Somalia by thè U.S.S.R. Narional Orthography for Somali', African Language Stitdìes, 1974, pp. For a partisan Ethiopian view of thè problem, couched in thè new 199-203; and 'Pive Years of Wriccen Somali: A Report on Progress and Marxist-Leninist language, see M. Wolde Mariam, Somalia: thè problem Projects', Bulletta of Afrìcan Studia: Notes and New (supplement to child of Africa, Addis Ababa, 1977. See also C. Legum and B. Lee, Africa'), 1977. See also O. O. Mohamed, from Written Somali to a Ritrai Conflict ìn thè Hom of Africa, London, 1977. For further information on Developmeni Campaign, Mogadishu, 1975. For an interesting analysis of thè activitìes of thè WSLF and its relations with paratie! Oromo movements thè politicai implications of adopting written Somali see D. Laitin, Pol'ttics, sucri as SALF, see I. M. Lewis, "The Western Somali Liberation Front Language and Thought: Thè Somali Experience, Chìcago, 1977. and thè Legacy of Sheikh Husseìn of Baie' in J. Tubiana (ed.)f Modera 7. This is one of thè few concise definitions of nationalism generally preferred Ethiopia, from thè accession of Meni/eà II to thè present, Rotterdam, 1980, by politicai scientists, see e.g. K. Minogue, Nationalism, London, 1967, pp. 409-16. J. Markakis, National and Class Conflict in thè Hom of p. 154. Africa, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 223-32, contains detailed information on 8. See I. M, Lewis (ed.) Abaar. thè Somali Drought, London, 1975 and thè rektions between thè movements as well as with thè government of Somalia, Directorate of Planning and Co-ordination, Revised Programme thè Somali Republic before and during thè Ogaden War. of Assistala Required to thè Drought Strickea Areas of Somalia, Mogadishu, 3. See C. Jesman, The Rttssians in Ethiofìa: an Essay Ìn Futility, London, 1975- For an excellent accounr of thè fishìng cooperative* established for 1958. drought-afflicce dnomads, see J. M. Haakonsen, Sdentile Socialism and 4. Fot a valuable survey of these generai conditions see H. Christensen, Self-Reliance, Bergen Studies in Social Anthropology, Bergen, 1984. 'Survival Strategies for and by Camp Refugees in Somalia', Hom of Africa, 9- See I. M. Lewis, 'From Nomadism to Cultivation: thè Expansìon of voi. 5, no. 4, 1983. Politicai Solidariry in southern Somalia1 in M. Douglas and P. Kaberry 5. For detailed documentation on these kinshìp connexions in thè late 1970s, (eds.), Man in Africa, London, 1969: 'The Dynamics of Nomadism; see M. Hassan, 'Status of Human Rights in Somalia', Horn of Africa, Prospects for Sedentarjzation and Social Change' in T. Monod (ed.), voi. 3, no. 2, 1980, pp. 3-11, and subsequent lettere and artides on Pastoralism in Tropical Africa, London, 1975. See also L, V. Cassanelli, Sìyad's 'nepotism'. The Shaping of Somali Society, Philadelphia, 1982. 6. For an admirably well-informed assessment of thè character of President 10. See Chapter IV, pp. 63-91. Siyad, see D. D. Laitin and S. S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, Boulder, 1987, pp. 158ff. 286 287 NOTES INDEX 7. See I. M. Lewis, 'Literacy and Cultura! Identity in thè Horn of Africa: The Somali Caie* in G. Baumann (ed.), Tèe Wrìtten Word; Literacy in Traminoti, Oxford, 1986, pp. 133-49. 8. Cf. A. I. Samatar, 'The Predatory State and thè Peasantry: Reflections on Rural Development Policy in Somalia' in A. I. Samatar (ed.), Africa Today: Somalia Crius of State and Society, 32, 1985, pp. 41-56. Somali and Arabie propcr natric i «re 62; trcaties and boundary 9. A. Hoben ec al., Somalia: A Social and Instittttional Profili, Boston Africa indexed as they appetì In thè t«t, eg, agreements with Italy, 62, 88, 89; Studies Center working paper SP-1, 1983, p- 68. See also D. R. Aronson, 'Abdì Hassan Boni appuri unde r A. 'Kinsmen and Comrades: Towards a Class Analysis of che Somali Pastora! campaigns against Dervishes, 70- thè name commonly prafuced Sector', Nmadic Peoptes, no. 7, 1980, pp. 14-33. On thè earlier period When is 90; pencc with Dervishes, 72-4; of this trade see C. Geshekter, 'Anti-Colonialìsm and Oass Formation - with an honorific , it is ìndexed dccord- reUtioni with Italy , poiitton in thè Eastcrn Horn of Africa before 1950', International Journal of African ingly, eg. Sheikh Isma'il Sheìkh Itnq Somaliluid, 87-90; relationi with Htstorical Studies, 18, no. 1, 1985, pp. 1-32. appears under S. Othcr namei ire in- France, 91 10. In July 1987 it was announced that Western govemments and miiltilateral dexed according to surname Initia llet- Adal, (Ifat) Muslim Emirate , 25-7 organisarions had agreed to reschedule Somalia's outstanding foreign dcbt tere. Adale, (Itala), 52 payments (estimated at t!72 million in 1986) over a twenty-year period. Adan 'Abdulle 'Iiman, 11. See, e.g., V. Jamal, 'Nomads and Farmers: Incomes and Poverty in Rural 158; Somalia in D. Ghal and S. Radwan (eds.) Agrarian Polìcìes and Rural 'Abdallah Muhammad, Harar ruler, proviiional President of Republic, Poverty in Africa, Geneva, 1983, pp. 281-311. 50 164; President, 172, 176; loses 12. Cf. J. Markakis, Ethìopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, Oxford, 1975. 'Abdarahman Jama Barre, Somali Presidential eleaion, 202, 221 ' 13- Por an unusually well-informed analysis of this period see, C. Clapham, Foreign Minister, 255 Aden, 1, 39-tt), 114 tìaile-Selassie's Government, London, 1969. J. Markakis and N. Ayele, Abdi Hassan Boni, Deputy Premier, Administration, Europeans in, 7; Clats and Revolittion in Etbiopia, 1978, a criticai Noctingham, supplies 164 Italian System of, 98, 111, 112; in analysis of Mengistu's regime. Abdi Nur Muhammad, Minister of British Protectorate, 106; in French 14. So for instance in syncretic religion of Voodoo and in Umbanda thè Haitian General Affairs ,160 in Brazil, che gods or spirits were divided into differen t 'nations' including Somaliland, 136; Somalization of, Abdillahi 'Ise, first Premier of those of such African nationality as 'Yoruba', 'Ibo'. 141, 144, 154-5; Integration, 170, 15. See E. Kedourie (ed. and introd.), Nat'tonal'tsm in Asia and Africa, London, Somalia, 127, 128, 146, 156, 157, 174 158, 164, 279 1971. Adowa, battle of, 53, 56, 110 'Abd al-Qadir Sekhawc Din, Somali 16. E. Gellner, 'Scale and Nation', Pbìlosophy of thè Social Sciences, 3, 1973, Afar (Danakil), people, 4, 47, 49, religious leader, 121 pp. 1-17. 136, 180, 181, 228, 263 17. See e.g. F. Barth (ed.), Ethnìc Groups and Beundaries, Boston, 1969; A. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke, Afgoì , slave market, 87, 94; mission Cohen (ed. and introd.) Ur&an Ethmcìty, London, 1974, and Ttvc- Secretary of SYL, 128, 280; school at, 97 Dimensìonal Man, London, 1974. criticìses SYL leadership, 16!; head Agricultural Development Corporation, 18. See e.g. C. Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Glencoe, 1963; L. of Republican Government 164, Mair, New Nattons, London, 1963- 215 173, 179, 188, 193; President, 19. A. L. Epstein , Etkos and Identity, London, 1978. 202; assassinateci, 206, 221 Agricolture, generai, 2, 3; nomadic, 'Abd ar-Razaq Haji Husseyn, 161; 7-9; cultivation and crops, 12-15; Minister of Interior, 164; Premier, Italian methods of, 92-6; in 202, 204, 221 British Protectorate, 102; services 'Abdullah Muhammed Kamil, first expanded, 133; Agricultural Bank, Premier of Jibuti, 230 142; Tug Wajale Scheme', 175 Abruzzi, Duke of thè, 93, 95 Ahmad Diini, Vice-Presìdent French Abyssinia (see also under Ethiopia), Somaliland Council, 181 war with (13th and 14th Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Gran), 25- cencuries), 25-7; arms trade with, 7, 81, 224 288 50-1; relations with Italiana, 50- Ahmad Sulayman 'Abdulle, General, 62; negociation swith British, 56- 223, 254

289 INDEX INDEX govemment, 149, 150; final hand- Castro, Fidel, 232-3, 241 Ahmadìya, Muilim brotherhood, 64, Benadir Company, 53 over of Haud and Reserved Areas Chinese Peoples' Republic, 200, 210, Berbera, 2, 21, 27, 35, 35-6, 42-5, 65 to Ethiopia, new agreement with 216, 224, 225. 242, 249 J48, 132, 150, 163, 193, 175 Ajuran , clan , 24, 28, 33, 108 Ethiopia, 150; mission to Addis Christianity (Chrìstians), 25-7, 67, Bevin, Emest, Bricish Foteign Akil, headman, 43, 105. 149 Ababa, 152; new Legislative 69, 81, 97, 178, 241, 263 Secretary, 124, 128, 137. 247 'Ali Adan Lord, Kenyan Somali Council (elected members), 153; Colonia! Development and Wetrare Bimal, clan, 86, 98, 118 leader, 186 new constitutìon, 161; ìndependence gtants, 132 Borama, district, 102, 106 'Ali 'Ariif ,Jibuti 'Afa r leader, 228, negotiations with Somali leaders, Corni, Guido, Itaiian Govemor, 97, Boran Galla, tribe, 4, 31, 191 229 162,. 163; independence announced, 108 Brava, 6, 22, 38, 39, 51, 97 'Ali Gerad Jama', Minister of 164; influence of British tradition Cotton, weaving, 38; export of, 100 British (Britain, British Government), Education, 164 on new Republic, 169; attitude to Council of Secretaries, 207, 208 arrivai of, 30; blockade Somali Amhara, domìnani Ethìopian ethnìc pan-Somalism in Kenya, 185; Cuba, 227, 233, 236. 237-9, 240, coast, 33, 36; Protectorate of graup, 263, 264 discuss future of Kenyan Northern 241 t 245 Mombasa, 37; treaty with Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (1942), Frontier Districts at Kenya Majerreyn Sultanate, 38; on Somali Constitional Conference, 186; 116 coast, 40-2; actìon after Egyptian Dakkar, capitai of Kings of Adal, 25 Anglo-Ethìopian Boundary Commission of Enquiry on NFD withdrawal, 45; Anglo-Somali Danakil ('Afar), people, 4, 27, 47, Commission, 61, 106 problems, 187, 191-2; announce treaties, 46, 60; Agents on Somali 49, 136 Anglo-Italìan Agreement (1925), 109 NFD to remain with Kenya, 192; coast, 47; protesi, 55; mission co Darod? clan-family, 6, 12, 22, 23, Anglo-Italìan Boundary Commission strained relations with Somali Abyssinia, 56; negotiatìons with 26, 29, 30, 122, 146, 147. 157. and agreement (1930-1), 106, 107 Republic, ambassador withdrawn, Abyssinia, 57-62; dìspute with Ras 158, 159-61, 168, 170 Anglo-Italìan Protocols, 55, 88; 193; diplomatìc relations restored, Makonnen, 57, 59, 61; 'most Da'ud, General, Commandant of agreement (1907), 73, 89 203; refuses military aid, 237 favoured nation' agreement with National Army, 174, 207 Anglo-Italo-Ftench Agreement (1906), BBC, Middle Eastern Service relay Abyssinia, 59; war with Dervishes Dcrvishes, 69, 70-81, 87 station. Berbera, 163, 193, 251 88, 109 and Sayyid Muhamrnad, 70-84; Digil, tribe, 5, 7, 12, 13, 123, 125, British Military Administration, Anglo-Somali treaties, 46, 47, 60 Anglo-Italian agreement (1907), 73; 146, 156, 160, 204 establishment in Somalia and Amonelli, Itaiian Coutil, 54 review situation in Somaliland, Dir, 'Samale' clan famìly ,6, 12, 23, Anzilotti, Dr Enrico, Itaiian Ogaden, 116, 117; labour problems, start new policy, 75, 76; raise 24 153, 158 118; repatrìatìon of Italiani, 118; administrator , 146 Carnei Constabulaty, 77; peate Diya system, 11, 208, 209 reorganizatton of polke force, Arabie, 5, 115, 158 delegando to Dervishes, 79, 80; Dulbahame, clan, 6, 70, 71, 76, 150, Somalia Gendarmerìe, 118, 119; Arab League, 220, 226, 230, 257, cede Jubaland and Kismayu to 256 education under, 119, 120; attitude 259 Italians, 98; progress in of Somalis to, 120 121; Itaiian Atabs, 5, 20-1, 87, 100, 137, 145, Protectorate, 101-7; redefinition ot propaganda against, 125, 126; Four Education, 97, 102, 115, 133, 136, 180 Protectorate boundaries with Power Commission arrives, rioting 140. 148, 149, 218-9V Asian, communiry in Somaliland, 7, Somalis, 107; Second World War in Mogadishu, 126; Somalia Egypt (see also United Arab 21, 145 campaigns, agreement with becomes Itaiian trusteeship temtory, Republic), 41-3, 45, 46, 141, 165, Assab, port of, 41, 44 Ethiopia, 116, 117; military 128; Ogaden transferred to 173, 199 administrarion of Somalia and Ethiopean rute, 130; administration Erigavo, distria. 21, 23, 133 Ogaden, 117-31 (see also under Bananas , export of, 4, 96, 143, 165, ends, 131 Eritrea, 233, 240, 247-9 British Military Administration); 259 Bulhar, port, ocoipied by Egyptians, Ethiopia (see also under Abytiinii), proposals fot union of Somali Bantu, 5; Somalized, 7; dispiacimene 43, 103 boundaries of defined , 62; peoples, 124; proposals abandoned, of by Somalis, 19; labour fbr Burao, town, 77, 103, 114, 133, 149 boundaiies wìth Britiih 128; Brìtish Somaliland Protectorate Italians, 95, 123 Burton, Sir Richard, 33, 34, 36 Protectorate, 107; frìctìon with Barderà, town, 3, 29, 88. 9?, 259 reformed, 131; development Italiani in Ogaden, 'Wàlwal ptogramme in Proteaorate 132, Barislov , Grigory, 239 Carnei Constabulary, 77, 132 Incìdent', 108-10; war and treaty 133; establish Protectorate Advìsory Beja, tribe, 4, 27 Carletti, Tommaso, Itaiian Govemor with Italians, 109, HO; liberated Council, 134, 150; expand Beletweyn , district , 87, 109 of Somalia, 87, 92, 112 from Italians, 116; asks for return Benadir , province ,6, 51-3, 74, 90 education, 149; develop locai 291 INDEX INDEX

of Ogaden tnd Roicrved Arem, Habar Yunis (Isaq) clan, 35, 46, 49, 'Isman Yusuf Kenadid, 115 Juba, river, 3, 3; Italian colonici, 92 Ogaden triniferrcd from Britijh 135 braci, 241 Jubaland, 19, 51, 98 adminiitration, 129-31; auumes Halle Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, Italo-Ethiopian peace treary, 62 full contro! in Haud and Rcscrved J 152, 182, 185, 228, 229, 232, Italy (Italians, Italian Government), Kadìs, muslim magistrates, 100, 105, Area., 130, 151; United Nations 247-9, 263 inierests in SomalUand. 41, 44, 45, 133, 156 boundary commiiiion, 182, 183; Haji 'Abdallah Sheheri, 75 50, 51, 53-62; «ruggte with Kenya, Somali population of, 1, 183, opposition to pan-SomalUm 182-3; Haji Farah 'Ornar, 114 Dervishes, 70-91; Anglo-Italian 184; border with Somali Republic, agreement (1907), 73; assume relationi with Somali Republic, Haji Muhammad Husseyn, 121, 127, 5; frontier wìth Abysiinìa, 89; limited responsibility for Sayyid 181, 183, 201, 203, 227-8, 231- 159. 175 Somali Youth League active in, Muhammad, 74; purchase Benadir 41; coup and revolution, 228, 231, Haji Muse Boqor, 206 122; SYL banned, 184; Northern coast from Sultan of Zanizibar, 74; 232; «peli Americana, 233; Hamitic peoples, 4; early history of, Provinces Peoples' Party formed, Russian supporr, 234, 237-44; 18-21 colonia! polìcy, 85; operations moves for Somali unificatìon , 186; against Dervishes, create auiciliary nature of state, 262-3 Haq ad-Din, Sultan of Ifat, 25 Kenya Constitutìonal Conferencc, force, 86; pacify coastal areas, European Economìe Community Harar, province of Abyssinia, 1, 2, 186; British Commission to cxtend administration, 87; relations (EEQ, 257, 259, 260 23, 44, 45, 48, 49, 65, 129, 130, Northern Frontier Distrias, 187, with Ethiopia, definitici! of 236-7, 263 191, 192; Kenyan leader* vUtt influente in Somaliland, 87-90; Filonardi, Vincenzo, Italian consul and Hargeisa, town, 2, 59, 102, 132, Somali Republic, 189, 190; Britiih policy and progress of colonization, commerciai venturer, 51-3 135, 150, 175 Government announces deciiion on 92-101; redefinitìon of boundaries Finance (and economie*), 100, 101, Hassan Guled, first Presìdent of NFP, 192, 199; Somali unification with British Protectorate, 107; 104, 142, 143, 144, 165, 173, ' Republic of Jibuti, 180, 230 issue, 203, 207; as refuge, 213, 176, 200, 201 forward policy in Ogaden, 108, Haud, thè, regìon of SomaìUand and 245; attìtude to Ogaden War'234, 109; 'Walwal Incident', 109, HO; Five Year Devclopment Pian (1974- Abyssinia, 2, 3, 6, 56, 59, 129, 237, 248, 253 8), 215 war with Ethiopia, 109, HO; 131, 150, 151 Kenyatta, Jomo, 189, 190, 196, 197, conditions in Somalia after Four Power Commission, 125 126 Hawiye, clan family, 6, 12, 24, 125, 203 127, 128 Ethiopian war, 110-2; Second 147, 158 Kìng's African Riffes , 127 World War campaigns, 116; France, 54, 91, 181, 228, ->"> 2309 - Health Services, 95, 97, 132, 136 Kirsch, Emil, 78 1 position of Italians under British Her, form of politicai centraci, 10 Kisymayu, 3, 97, 98, 175 French SomalUand (see also under Military Administration, 117, 118; Hiran, province, 6 Jibuti), 1-3, 23, 49, 91, 116, attempi to create a pro-Italian front Hunter, Nfajor , Br. Consul, 45, 46 Language, 5, 6, 171, 216 136-8, 179, 203, 227-30 in Somalia, 125; dash with SYL, 180-1, Husseyn Kulmiye, General, 223, 254 Law, 100, 105, 133, 134, 156, 170", 126, 127; UN trusteeship 212-3 Gadabursi, clan, agreement, 139; dispute with SYL, 23, 43, 54, 56, 106 League of Nations, 110 Ibn Sa'id, early Atab geographer, 24 140; sevcn-ycar developmcnt pian, Galawdewos, Abyssinian Emperor, 27 Lennox-Boyd, Mr Alan, 161 Galkayu. town, 28. 99 Ifat, early Muslim state, 25 142; Somali independence, 164; Libya, 220, 241 Galla, see under Oromo Illalos, tribal constabulary, 68, 98, posi independence relations, 171, LÌJ Yasu, Emperor of Abyssinia, 78 Garissa, town, 5; Kenyan Somali 173 105 Livestock exports, 252, 258, 259 district, 183, 186, 191 Iran, 237, 238, 240 Lugh, town of, 57, 87, 88, 89 , 93, 117 Isaq, clan, 23, 24, 83, 106, 129, Jama' 'Abdullahi Qalib, 164 Genealogy, use òf among Somalb, 10 135, PO, 178, 244, 248, 252 Jama' 'Ali Korshcll, General, 207, 104, 168 'Ise (Dir) clan, 46, 49, 54, 55, 56, 208 Madeod, Mr laìn, 163 Germany, 78, 173. 236 130, 156, 244 Jibuti, capita! of French SomalUand, Macmillan, Mr Harold, 183, 192 Gogie, Italian rural constabukrv 98 Isiam, 5, 16, 27, 20-3. 25-7, 63, 2, 49, 59, 71. 116. 136. 181; Mahamud 'Ali Shirre, 74 119 64, 83. 100, 105, 133, 156, 213. Republic, 230-1, 253 Mahamud Harbi, 180, 181 219-20, 224 Jigjiga, 71, 89, 102, 106, 108, 116, Mahdi, 48, 50 Majerteyn, province, 6, 38> 87, 96, Habar Awal, clan, 35, 46, 54 Urna 1!! 'Ali Abokor, General, 216, 129-30, 231, 234, 238-9, 245 John of Tigre, Abyssinian King, 46, 99, 121, 125, 161, 245-6, 252, Habar Tol Ja 'lo tlsaq) din. 46 69 223, 249 150, 153 Isma'ìl Jabarti, Sheikh, 22 50 253, 257 295 292 INDEX INIMiX Manderà, Kenyan Somali diitrict, 138; prorests agamst transfer of Politicai Partici (uc ilio Stimali Rahanweyn, tribe, 5, 7, 12, 13, 123, 183, 186 Haud to Ethiopìa, formatìon of Youth Club, Sorridi Yiuidi 125, 147, 159 Marehan, clan, 222, 243, 230, 2)2, National United Front, campaign Chriitinn Demtxrnt» (Italìnn) ,121; Railways, 59, 91, 96, 229, 231 253, 256, 261, 277 ^ for rerum of Haud, 151-8; in Greatcr Scindili LCBJIUP formcd, , Ras Makonnen, 50, 56-9 Minino, Michul. 127, 131. 162 Somalia, 140-8, 155-60; and 138; conici» elcttion, 139; Hawiye Refugees, 246, 247, 248, 249, 260 Maudling , Mr Reginnld, 187 tribalism, 166-9, 221-2, and Youth Leflgue , 147; Hizbia Dastitr Rendille, tribe, 184 Menelik, Abyjsinian King, 46, 50, Scienrific Socialism, 209-13, 219- Mmtaqil Somali, 156; Hizbia Reserved Areas, 124, 131 54, 55, 38, 72, 202, 231, 244, 20, 224-5; literacy campaign, 216; Digil-Mirifle Somali (originally Ribi (Wa-Ribi), 19 248 Somali unificano!!, 157-8, 161-2, Patriotic Benefi t Union), 123; Robecchi-Bricchetti, Italian explorer, Mengistu, Coloncl, Ethiopian Head of 178-83, 202-3, 227, 233, 236, evidence to Four Power 52 State, 231, 233, 235, 239^*1, 242, 247 Commission, 127; stati in Rodd, Rennell, 56-61 244, 249, 253, 264 National Security Courts, 212, 213 Legislative Assembly, 146; Member Merca, district. 6, 22, 24, 51, 52, 86 National Security Service, 212, 213 assassinated, 147, 148; Isaqiya ' Mogadishu, capitai of Somalia, 4, 22, Nkrumah, Dr., 197, 198 Sab (Digil and Rahanweyn), 6, 14, Association, 134; Liberai Party, 24, 28, 37, 31, 52, 86, 97, 126, Nomads, 3, 7-12, 102, 214 216-7, 15 159; Marehan Union, 146; 172, 174, 188 217-9 Sab, hunters and meta! workers, 60, Moyale, Kenyan Somali distria, 186, National Pan-Somali Movement, 156 191 155; National United Front, Sa'd ad-Din, Sultan of Ifat, 25 Obbia, Sultanate of 73, 87, 99 Mudugh, provìnce, 6 campaign for retum of Haud to Saho, tribe, 4 Ogaden, plain of, 3; region of, Muhammad 'Abdi Nur, 160 British Administration, 151-3; Salihiya, Muslim Order, 66 Somali dans move imo, 24; Muhammad Abshir, General, 204 Progressive Majerteyn League, Salisbury, Lord, 42, 61 claimed by Abyssinia, 51; Italian 206, 207, 249 splinter from S.Y.L., 125; 'Somalia Salole, Aden Somali family, 127 sphere of influence , 56; Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali Samatar, General, Conference', 127; Somali Sandys, Duncan, 192 Muhammad returns to, 71, 80; 223, 254, 255, 256, 257 Democratic Party, 146; Somali Sapere, Guìseppe, 41 Iralian policy in, 108, 109; Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal, 154, Democratic Union, attempts Saudi Arabia. 213, 234, 239, 243, returned to Ethiopian contro!, 130, 164, 176, 202, 203, 206-7, 221, amalgamation of G.S.I., S.N.L., 254 131; and Somali unificatìon, 179, 249 U.S.P. and H.D.M.S., 175; Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan, 196, 197, 198, 201, 227, 228; Muhammad Siyad Barre, President of Somaliland National League, 134, 52, 53, 65-8, 70, 71, 72-4, 75, Ogaden War, 1977, 213-41; Somalia, 207, 209, 210-1, 213, 150-5, 162, 164; Somali National 78, 79, 80-4, 224, 231 position of Ogaden clan in 216-8, 219-20, 221-2, 223-4, Congress, 176; United Somali Party, Sayyid Muhammad al-Barr, 33 Ethiopìa, 248-9; in Somalia, 256, 224-5, 226-8, 232-4, 235-6, 154, 162, 164; S.N.C, decline, 261 Sayyid Muhammad Salih, Muslim 239, 242, 245-6, 249, 250, 252, 202; parties abolished, 207; Somali Oman, 37, 38 teacher at Mecca, 66, 75, 84 254, 255, 256, 257, 261 Socialist Revolucìonary Party, 219; Sdentine Socialism, 209, 210, 213, 'Ornar Samatar, 100, 108, 109 Mustahil, 108, 109 in French Somaliland: Ligtie 214-6, 219-20. 223-5, 250. 257 Organisation of African Unity, 203, Muzaffa rdynasty, 24, 28 pop ut aire Africaine poitr Scnusi, Muslim Order, 48 226-8, 234, 237, 250, 265 ì'indtpendtnce, Frani de la Orma, Galla clan, 184 228-9; Shebelle, valiey and river, 3, 6; National Assembly of thè Republic, Cote dei Somali;, 228-30; Oromo, people, 4, 12, 19-24 27-30, Italian colonies aJong, 92, 93 164, 165, 172, 173, 176, 177, 31-2, 184 191, 232, 233, 235, Raìitmblement populain pouf Sheikhs, as holy men, 15 201, 202, 204, 205-6, 207 l'ìndipendenct, 230 237, 244, 248, 263 Sheikh 'Abdalkh Sheikh Muhimm«d, Nacionalism, Somali, influence of Osmaniya script, 115, 123, 216 Population, of SomalUand, 1-4, 6, 7 123 Isiam on, 16; modera Somali start Portuguese, 21, 26, 227 Sheikh 'Abd ar-Rthmwi SeyU 'I, 64 of, 113, 114; effec t of Second Protectorate Advisory Council, 134 Sheikh 'Ali Jumaleh, 172, 176 World War, 116; dubs and Pan-Africanism, 195-9 Sheikh 'Ali Maye Dungbt, 86 societies after Second World War, Persiani, 7; arrivai of, 21, 22 Qabradare, 152, 181 Sheikh Isma'il Sheikh luq, 79, 80 121; use of 'Osmaniya' script, 123; Plague, bubonic, 94; of locusts, 102, Qadiriya, Muslim Order, 64, 65, 79, Sheikh Maddar, 63, 66. 132 Somaliland National League 133 84, 85 Sheikh Uways Muhammad, of Bnvi, founded, 134; feeling in 1949, Pokomo, tribe, 184, 191 Quran, 15, 65, 220 86 294 295 INDEX INDEX

Shìdle. irìbc, 7, 94 12, 15-6; first migrations of 22-4; Wako Gutu, Cromo resiscance leader, Wingate, General Sir Reginald, Governor-General of Sudan, 73 Shihnb ftd-Din, 26 _ _efiects of expansion of, 32; position 232 Shirmarkc 'Ali Salili, Somali Haji, 33. of under Italiani, 110-2 Walashma', Muslim dynasty, 25 Women, 8, 158, 178 34. 35. 36 Sorghum, 2-4 12, 102 Walsh, L. Prendergast, British Vice- World Bank Miwion, 114, 143 Slaves, former, 7, 19; objeccions to Sorrentino, Giorgio, 53 Consul, 47, 48 abolirion, 86 Speke, Lieutenant, 36 Walwal, 62, 90, 101. 107-10 Yasin Haji 'Isman Shirmarke, 121 Warsangeli, 'Darod' clan family, 6, Società Agrìcola Italo-Somala, 93. 94, Suf i and Su6sm, 63 Yemen, Sourh, 238. 241 117 , 143 Sultans, 9, 10 73. 74, 135 Yeshaq, Abyssinian Negus, 25 Somali Abo Liberation Front, 235 Sultan 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Ali 'Ise, 98 Warsheikh, porr of, 51 Somali National Movement, 252, Sultan Ahmad Abu Bakr, 98 Water, 9, 96, 104, 149, 172 Welfare scheme, 132 Zanj, people, 19-22. 24, 29 253 , 254, 26!, 266 Sultan 'Ali Mirreh, Ethìopian 'Afar Western Somali Liberation Front, Zanzibar, 19, 37-9. 51, 52, 74 Somali NacionaJ Society, 114 leader. 229, 230 232-7, 242-3, 244, 253, 254, Zeila, port, of 21, 25, 33, 34, 42, Somali Officiai *Union, 114 Sultan Yusuf 'Ali Kenadid, of Obbia, 257 49, 91, 103, 124, 133 Somali-Orma (Galla) agreement, 3! 51, 73, 99 Somali Republic, internai politici: Supreme Revolucionary Council, 207, formed, 164; constitutiona! 213-4, 216, 220-2, 223. 249 referendum , 172; military coup fails, 173; dìscontent in north, 175; Tajura, 45 ministerial investigation, 176; Tana, river, 5, 31, 184; lake, 109 municipal and national elections Tittonì, Tommaso, Italian Mìnister, 74 (1964), 201; presidencial eleaions Tot system, 10 (1967), 202; nacional election Trade Unions, 114 (1969), 204; military coup, 206; Tribalism', 166-9, 221-2 Supreme Revolutionary Council Turks, 26, 27, 78 established, 207; Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party established, 219; extemal relacions: with Ucciall, Treaty of 45, 56 Britain, 183-95, 203, 237; with United Arab Republic (see also Chinese People's Republic, 200, Egypt), 142, 160, 165, 173, 199 242, 249; with Cuba, 227, 236; United Nations, 128, 129, 130, 139, with Ethiopia, 183, Ì85, 201, 203, 140 , 144, 162, !Ó5, 167, 182 227-8, 231-41; with Kenya, 227, USA , 128, 142, 175, 234, 237, 240, 234, 237, 243; with other African 242 , 249, 257, 259, 260 coumries, 196, 226-7, 237, 250-2; USSR, 128, 142, 171, 175, 201, . with USSR, 142, 171, 175, 201, 203, 209, 218, 219, 233-7, 240, 203, 233-6; wiih Arab world, 248, 260 234, 238, 239, 242; with thè Usted 'Isman Muhammad Husseyn, West, 200, 237, 243; isolation of 147, 148 199, 243, 250-2 Somali SaJvation Democratic Front, Vecchi, De, Italian Governor, 95, 96, 252 , 253, 254, 261, 266 99 Somali Youth Club - Somali Youth Victory Pioneers, 211 League, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, Vìllagio duca degli Abruzzi (Jowhar), 127, 129-31, 134, 135, 140, 146, 93, 95, 96, 97, 117 147, 150-4, 159. 160, 161, 177, 201 . 204-5, 279 Somalia , I; penerai, 4-7; relìgion, Wajtr, Kenyan Somali Dìstrìct, 30, ailtur eand «xi;il insritimtìns 7, - 183 , 186