SPECIAL SERIES CRISIS COLLECTION Volume 1 UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY
Attack onon a a SigintSigint Collector,Collector, the U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty (S-CCO)-fS-€OOr
'fntS f)6et:Jr.IEN'f e6N'fA:INS e6f)EW6Kf) r.1A:'fEKIA:L
NATIONAL SECURITY Classifiedby byNSA/CSSM NSA/CSSM 123-2 AGENCY Review in in April April 2011
CENTRAL Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-08-2006 pursuant to E.O. SECURITY 12958, as amended. MDR 51712. SERVICE Contents of this publicationpublication should not be be reproduced,reproduced, oror furtherfurther disseminateddisseminated outside the U.S.U. S. IntelligenceIntelligence CommunityCommunity without thethe permissionpermission of the Director,Director, NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction andand dissemination shouldshould bebe directed to the OfficeOffice of Cryptologic ArchivesArchives andand History, T54. i 'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA I
UNITED STATESSTATES CRYCRYPTOLOGIC PTOLOGIC HISTORYHISTORY
Special SeriesSeries Crisis CollectionCollection
VVolume olu►ne 11
Attack onon a SigintSigint Collector,Collector,
the U.S.S.V.S.S. LilJerty-(S=€€6TLiberty •
William D. GerhardGerhard Henry W. MillingtonMillington
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRALAGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICESERVICE 1981
NO'f ItEtEASABLE 'fO fOItEIGN Nlt'fIONltLS
'fOP SECRET UMBRA
------~------...... ,...~ UNCLASSIFIED
Contents Page ForewordForeword______ vii Authors' Note______Note ix Chapter I POLITICAL-MILITARY BACKGROUNDBACKGROUND (U) _ 1 Chapter II CONSIDERATIONS LEADINGLEADINGTO TO THETHE SHIP'S DEPLOYMENT (U) _ 5 The Requirements forfor IntelligenceIntelligence (U) _ 5 Technical Collection Factors (U) _ 6 I Its ee8) ... 6 ~o 1. 4 . (c) Fo 1. 4 . (d) U.S. InterceptIntercept of VHF/UHF CommunicationsCommunications {l,JL------(U) --- _ 10 1 I(e eeSJ ------10 Airborne CollectorsCollectors (U) - _ 11 The Decision to Deploy the Liberty (U) _ 12 Chapter III DEPLOYMENT TOTO THE MEDITERRANEAN (U) 15 U.S.S. Liberty's Modus Operandi (U) 15 Abidjanto toRota, Rota, 24-3124-31 May 1967 (U) 17 Liberty at Rota, 31 MayMay to 22 JuneJune 19671967 (U)(U)______ 17 Air Force SecuritySecurity Service'sService's TechnicalTechnical Processing Center (U)(U)______ 18 Enroute toto Operational AreaArea ThreeThree (U) 19 Directions toto Withdraw the Liberty (U) 21 OperationalArea AreaThree, Three, 88 June (U) 23 Liberty's Processing Mission (U)(U)______ 23 Chapter IV THE ATTACK (U)(U)______ 25 Reconnaissance ofof the Liberty (U) 25 General QuartersQuarters DrillDrill (U) 25 Attack Begins (U) 26 Air Attack Begins (U) 26 Torpedo-Boat AttackAttack (U) 28 Post-Attack Reconnaissance (U)(U)______ 30 Sixth Fleet Reacts (U) 31 WishingtonWashington Informed (U) 32 Israel Reports Error (U)______(U) 32 Johnson InformsInforms KosyginKosygin (U) 32 Liberly Recovers (U) 32 Liberty Recovers (U) 32 U.S. NavalNaval Attache Helicopters to the Liberty (U) 34 Israeli Helicopter Conversations (U) 34 Liberty Licks Its Wounds (U) 35 Chapter V THE ISRAELI EXPLANATION (U)______(U) 37 Chronology of ofIsraeli Israeli ActionsActions (U) 37 Israeli Prosecutor's ChargesCharges ofof NegligenceNegligence (U) 38 Explanation ReexaminedReexamined (U)______(U) 40 Chapter VI RECOVERY ANDAND INITIALINITIAL ASSESSMENTASSESSMENT (U) 43 Medical AssistanceAssistance (U)(U)------______ 43 Commander,Sixth Sixth FleetFleet Arrives (U) 43 Replacement Inquiries (U) 43
UNCLASSIFIED iii UNCLASSIFIED
Page Recovery ofof SensitiveSensitive Materials (U)(U) _ 44 Assistance to NSA NSA PersonnelPersonnel (e eeO) _ 45 Cleanup Continues (U) - _ Cleanup Continues (U) 45 Command Investigations InitiatedInitiated (U) ------_ 47 Preparations at MaltaMalta (U)(U) _ 47 Blalock Returns HomeHome (U) (U) _ 48 Liberty's Arrival at Malta (U)(U) -_ 48 Evacuation of Wilson Wilson (U) (U) _ 51 Clearing Damaged Areas (U) _ 51 Damage SurveySurvey atat Malta (U)(U) -- _ 52 JCS Factfact FindingFinding Team'sTeam's InterviewsInterviews (U)(U) _ 52 Accounting forfor Classified MaterialMaterial (U)(U) _ 54 Joint SurveySurvey at NorfolkNorfolk (U)(U) _ 55 Chapter VVIIII THE INCIDENTINCIDENT UNDERUNDER REVIEWREVIEW (U)(U) _ 57 The NSANSA Review Review and Reaction (U)(U) _ 57 The JCSJCS ReviewReview (U) (U) _ 58 Congressional Review (U) _ 59
Chapter VVIIIIII A FINAL LOOK (U) _ 61 Safety EstimatesEstimates forfor CollectionCollection MissionsMissions of Mobile Platforms (U)(U) _ 61 Availability of Linguists (U)(U) _ 62 Communications Problems (U)(U) _ 62 File Reduction for ExposedExposed CollectorsCollectors (U) _ 62 Unanswered Questions (U) _ Unanswered Questions (U) 63E°63EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) Denouement (U) ~~~::- EO 1.4.(d)1. 4. (d) Denouement (U) 64 E° Bibliography (U) -"';;::::...------67 Illustrations (U)
Maps [C3 CCO) 6 I~...."..",.,...... ,...~~-:-:--~=-:":~=__'="""j ...... Photographs EOEO 1.4.1. 4. (c) U.S.S.U.S. S. LibertyLiberty (U) ..._...... -- ... __ - ...... """'''';.:::::::...... ::::...... -- _ 2 Manual-worseManual-morse PositionalPositionsI 1(Cl iv UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Page Liberty Arriving inin Malta (U)(V)______ 40 V.S.S.U.S.S. Davis (U)(V)______ 42 Helicopter Evacuating Liberty's Wounded (V)(U) 44 Vice Admiral Martin Visits Liberty (U)(V) 45 Dish AntennaAntenna on Liberty (U)(V) 46 Donald L. Blalock (U)(V) 48 Liberty in Malta (U)(V) 49 Inspection of Torpedo-Damaged Hull (V)(U) 50 Navy Divers Recover Classified Debris (U)(V) 51 Manual-worseManual-morse Positions Destroyed ((e —ee6) C ) 53 Sigint EquipmentEquipment Ruined by Torpedo Blast (C€O CCO)008) 54 Commander WilliamWilliam L. McGonagle (U)(V) 55 UNCLASSIFIED vV ------~-~~~- SEeRET Foreword (8 GGO) The IsraeliIsraeli attack on thethe U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty some 14 years agoago was, indeed,indeed, a wrenching experienceexperiencefor forU.S. U.S. SigintSigint agencies.agencies.The The loss,loss, particularlyparticularly inin the case ofof thosethose SigintSigint specialists who gave theirtheir lives or were wounded, waswas difficultdifficultto to accept.accept. The knowledge that that the tragedy resulted notnot only only from from IsraeliIsraeli miscalculationmiscalculation but alsoalso fromfrom faultyfaulty U.S.U. S. communicationscommunications practices was even more difficult to accept. (C(8 CCO)060) The passage of timetime has made it possible for thethe authors to reexamine the Liberty incident objectively andand answer aa number of persistentpersistent questions.questions. TheThe authorsauthors accordinglyaccordingly set forth the technicaltechnical rationalerationale for the Liberty mission, thethe particulars ofof the IsraeliIsraeli miscalculation,miscalculation, the detailsdetails ofof thethe AmericanAmerican communicationsfailures, failures,a anarrative narrativeof ofthe the attackattack and of attempts to minimizeminimize the compromisecompromise ofof cryptologiccryptologicmaterials, materials,and andthe the lessonslessons toto bebe learned from the event. (C(6 CCO)660) Finally, this isis alsoalso anan accountaccount ofof thethe wayway thethe U.S.U.S. SigintSigint agenciesagencies organizedorganized their responseresponse to requirementsrequirements brought on byby aa crisis situation.situation. As such, it hashas muchmuch toto offer offer the student ofof U.S.U.S. cryptologiccryptologic operations.operations. (C-CCO)(G 000) A word aboutabout thethe authors, who workedworkedon onthis thisproject projectpart part timetime after they had retired. AnAn experiencedexperienced operations officer and and researchresearch specialist,specialist, Mr.Mr. Gerhard headed the NSA-NSA SCA TaskTask Force thatthat producedproduced the SoutheastSoutheast AsiaAsia HistoryHistory Series,Series, asas well well as the SpecialSpecial ResearchResearch Element that producedproduced studiesstudies ofof SigintSigint crisiscrisis situations. Mr.Mr. Millington,Millington, whowho spent mostmost of his career in researchresearch andand documentationdocumentation activities, waswas for years in chargecharge of the NSANSA Library.Library. Vincent J. Wilson,Wilson, Jr. Chief, Cryptologic HistoryHistory andand Publications Staff -REERETSEURET vii UNCLASSIFIED Authors' NoteNote Many people contributedcontributed to the completioncompletion of this history.history. TheThe authorsauthors gratefullygratefully acknowledgeacknowledge the effortsefforts ofof membersmembers ofof thethe NSANSA HistoryHistory andand PublicationsPublications StaffStaff whowho offeredoffered substantivesubstantive suggestions andand laboredlabored overoverpublication publicationformat format andand preparationpreparation -— VincentVincent J.J. Wilson, Jr.,Jr., Chief; Henry Schorreck, Historian;Historian;Priscilla PriscillaA. A.Pitts, Pitts, Editor;Editor; and Joan M. Hall, Secretary.Secretary. RobertRobert D.D. Farley, of thethe HistoryHistory Staff,Staff, spentspent manymany hourshours arrangingarranging forfor andand conductingconducting interviewsinterviews ofof personnel intimatelyintimately associated withwith the Liberty incident. InIn turn,turn, II foLo 86-36 painstakingly transcribedtranscribed the interviewinterview tapes. To RussellRussell G. Fisher,Fisher, CryptologicCryptologic Records Declassification Staff, Staff,we weare are indebtedindebted for his his security classificationclassification review.review. Both Bob Rush, Electronic Security Command, and James Gilbert, IntelligenceIntelligence and SecuritySecurity Command History Staff generously providedprovided usefuluseful sourcesource materialsmaterials from their collections.collections. !' ii William D. Gerhard f; Henry W. MillingtonMillington !~ 8 DecemberDecember 19801980 ! ~ f,n I t ~ I UNCLASSIFIED ix SECRET Chapter I Political-Military BackgroundBackground (U) (U)(V) A brief looklook at thethe MiddleMiddle EasternEastern (U) The UnitedUnited StatesStates supportedsupported thethe situation during early 19671967 is necessary forfor an appre-appre United Nations' efforts toto maintain peace inin the area ciation of thethe mounting political and military tensionstensions and, whilewhile championing thethe rightright of thethe State ofof Israel that ultimatelyultimately led to to thethe U.S.U.S. decisiondecision toto positionposition to exist, urgedurged restraint andand respectrespect forfor thethe rightsrights ofof the U.S.S.V.S.S. Liberty in the easterneastern Mediterranean.Mediterranean. all nations.nations. (U) Within the ArabArab world,world, PresidentPresident (U) Since the mid-1950s,mid-1950s, the majormajor worldworld Gamal Abdel Nasser of thethe UnitedUnited ArabArab RepublicRepublic powershad had beenbeen keenlykeenly awareaware ofof andand sensitivesensitive toto the (U.A.R.) soughtsought toto overcomeovercome opposition toto his leader-leader buildupof of tensionstensionsin in thethe Middle East.East. BothBoth thethe ship by the monarchiesmonarchies of Saudi Arabia andand Jordan."Jordan.' Soviet Union andand Communist China were quick toto take In latelate JanuaryJanuary 1967,1967, whenwhen U.A.R.U.A.R. aircraftaircraft bombedbombed advantage ofof unsettledunsettled conditions therethere to extend their Najran in SaudiSaudi Arabia,Arabia, relationsrelations betweenbetween the twotwo own influence overover governments wherever possible — countries were furtherfurther strained. InIn Yemen,Yemen, the U.A.R.U.A.R. often competing withwith oneone anotheranother in this effort.effort. supported the insurgents against the Royalists. Jordan, (U) By the endend ofof thethe 1950s19508 thethe ChineseChinese trying toto keepkeep fromfrom becomingbecoming embroiledembroiled in Israeli-Israeli Communists hadhad begun toto assert themselves, especiallyespecially Arab frictions, orderedorderedin in MarchMarcha a halt toto ArabArab in Iraq and Syria. InIn MayMay 1966,1966, Syria's new president, infiltration intointo Israel through Jordanian territory as Nureddin el-Attassi, scoffedscoffed at wagingwaging a conventionalconventional well as a a cessationcessation ofof PalestinePalestine LiberationLiberation internalinternal war againstagainst Israel and urged what he called a "people's agitation against thethe JordanianJordanian Government.Government. 1 war of liberation,"liberation," Chinese-CommunistChinese-Communist style.style.' TheThe (U)(V) Between JanuaryJanuary and April 1967,1967, the head of the PalestinePalestine LiberationLiberation OrganizationOrganization (PLO),(PLO), Syrian-Israelifrontier frontierwas wasthe the scene ofof a seriesseries ofof Ahmed Shukairy,Shukairy, also admitted toto receivingreceiving ChineseChinese escalating clashes rangingranging fromfrom potshotspotshotsat at tractorstractors to aid. PLO PLO representatives had been sent toto VietnamVietnam exchanges ofof firefirebetween betweentanks, tanks,artillery, artillery, andand aircraft.aircraft. and communist China to observeobserve communistcommunist guerrillaguerrilla Both sides refused, atat different times,times, to permit the techniques, and PLOPLO troopstroops werewere receivingreceiving arms fromfrom United NationsNations MixedMixed ArmisticeArmistice CommissionCommission to mark 2 Communist China.China.' the armisticearmistice line at disputeddisputed pointspoints andand insistedinsisted onon (U) As forfor thethe Soviets, theythey hadhad particular farming and patrolling disputeddisputed areas.areas.'S cause for not wishingwishing to seesee thethe SyrianSyrian GovernmentGovernment (6(8 CCO)GGO) On 7 April 1967, a Syrian-IsraeliSyrian-Israeli clashclash humiliated, defeated, and, perhaps,perhaps, overthrown.overthrown. The escalated from an exchangeexchange of fire between tankstanks to increasingly radicalradical Syrian GovernmentsGovernments which had attacks by both SyrianSyrian and IsraeliIsraeli aircraft. ByBy the assumed power sincesince thethe beginning of 1966 1966 had comecome end of the day,day, IsraeliIsraeli planesplanes had appearedappeared overover the to rely more and more on Soviet military andand economiceconomic outskirts of Damascus and six Syrian planes had beenbeen aid, toto permitpermit increasingincreasing numbersnumbers ofof SovietSoviet advisersadvisers shot down.down. This eventevent triggeredtriggered aa SigintSigint ReadinessReadiness to be stationed in the country,country, and allall in in all all toto offeroffer "Alfa" called by NSA for Middle EastEast targets. TheThe the mostmost promisingpromising field for SovietSoviet penetration andand Alfa waswas terminatedterminated threethree daysdays later."later.' influence inin thethe MiddleMiddle East.East. TheThe SovietsSoviets genuinelygenuinely ((B-CCO) - C ) As the tempotempo of thethe civilcivil war war withinwithin feared massive Israeli retaliation that mightmight toppletopple Yemen increased, U.A.R.V.A.R. aircraft dropped poison-gaspoison-gas the SyrianSyrian Government;Government; they therefore spurred thethe bombs onon Yemeni RoyalistsRoyalistson on 2222 April.April. LaterLater that Egyptians on to vigorous counteraction,counteraction, thethe full reper-reper month when the YemeniYemeni GovernmentGovernment imprisonedimprisoned twotwo cussions ofof whichwhich theythey could notnot foresee.'foresee." Americans from the AgencyAgency for International Devel-Devel- ifAt+DhEillit-eefaNT-effiti'il*FrEfi-eibitE*IIANBtH ¥fA COftfHN~ CIIANNHI:iS ONI:iY -67BORETSHCRHq:' 1 UHIAISSVIDNI1 t4 (U) TheU.S.S. U The (U) 151 enlistedmenalongwith anadditional6officersand128enlistedmenfrom theNavalSecurityGroup. 1964). Shehadanoverall lengthof455feet,amaximumspeed18knots withanallowablepersonnelcomplementof9officers and 94.She 1964). 151 enlisted U.S.S. had men an Liberty Liberty along overall was commissionedinMay 1945asavictoryshipandlaterconvertedinto technicalresearchship(December was ihan with length commissioned additional f455 of feet. (Photograph courtesy oftheDepartment oftheNavy.) (Photograph officers 6 nMy14 sa as 1945 May in a maximum and courtesy (Figure isUNCLASSIFIED) (Figure 128 speed enlisted victory of is UNCLASSIFIED) f18 of the ship Department e from men knots and ihan with later the of the converted Naval allowable Navy.) Security into personnel a Group. technical complement research f9officers 9 of ship (December and U1MISSVIDNI1 -fteRET-SECRET opment (AID),I(AID)] Israel had complete mastery of the skysky having virtually I Ir------destroyed four Arab air forces.forces."13 (S-CCO)(~-ee~) From 11-14 May,May, UA.R.U.A.R. aircraftaircraft at- (8m(J09)ummummF'orty-fiveulninutesmaftel' CCO) Forty-five minutes after the launchingla.unchiIlg tacked towns inin Saudi Arabia'Arabial r I I of the Israeli air offensive,offensive, IsraeliIsraeli troopstroops startedstarted their 1.4. (c) crushing groundground attackattack against U.A.R. forces in the I (S-CCO)(8-888) When on 14 May May thethe U.A.R.D.A.R. placedplaced Sinai. In thethe GazaGaza Strip,Strip, IsraeliIsraeli groundground forcesforces tooktook its airair defensedefense units onon full full alertalert andand deployeddeployed itsits Rafah andand KhanKhan Yunus.Yunus. MeanwhileMeanwhile tanktank columnscolumns tactical naval units, NSANSA expandedexpanded itsits AlfaAlfa to embrace raced thirty milesmiles west intointo the SinaiSinai toto capturecapture AlAl 9 all Middle EastEast targets.targets.' `Arish.'Arish. With this rapidrapid spreadspread ofof hostilities,hostilities, NSANSA (U) On 17 17 May,May, thethe U.A.R.D.A.R. requestedrequested ) instituted aa SiSigintint Readiness ReadinessAlfa Alfa to watchto watchSoviet Soviets' I that thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations EmergencyEmergency ForceForce (UNEF)(DNEF) '-- imoves...1 moves. '4 /: withdraw fromfrom thethe Gaza Strip. TheThe U.N.UN. complied,complied, (U)(D) On Tuesday, 6 June, U.A.R.UA.R. President j and NasserNasser immediatelyimmediately began moving troopstroops intointo the Nasser, charging that that U.S.D.S. andand BritishBritish planesplanes hadhad Sinai. ThisThis decisiondecision byby thethe U.A.R.D.A.R. governmentgovernment — intervened inin the war on the sideside ofof Israel,Israel, closedclosed the [: presumably encouragedencouragedby by thethe Soviets and SyriansSyrians Suez Canal to allall shippingshipping andand severedsevered diplomaticdiplomatic -— to move itsits armed forces upup toto the SinaiSinai armisticearmistice relationswith withthe the US.U.S. InIn turn,turn, thethe U.S.US. brokebroke line thusthus reestablishedreestablished thethe directdirect Egyptian-IsraeliEgyptian-Israeli diplomatic ties with Cairo.Cairo. military confrontation which whichhad had been the majormajor (U) On the battlefield,battlefield, IsraeliIsraeli tanktank col-col I immediate causecause ofofthe the 19561956war. war.'10 umns advanced toward thethe Suez Canal on three majormajor (C(8 CCO)GGO) Five days later on 23 23 MayMay 1967,1967, the I fronts: throughthrough Al 'Arish`Arish towardtoward AlAl QantarahQantarah in the U.A.R.D.A.R. blockaded thethe Strait ofof Tiran,Tiran, therebythereby closingclosing north; throughthrough Abu'UwayjilahAbuUwayjilah along thethe central routeroute the GulfGulf of AqabaAqaba to IsraeliIsraeli shippingshipping and prohibitingprohibiting I toward Ismailia; and toto Al Al QusaymahQusaymah on the southernsouthern unescortedunescorted tankerstankers ofof any flag flag fromfrom reachingreaching thethe I route. Farther south,south, otherother columnscolumns advancedadvanced to Al Al Israeli port of Elat.Elat. ThisThis actionaction reproducedreproduced anotheranother Kuntillah in the Sinai.Sinai. element that hadhad broughtbrought onon thethe 19561956 war. war. BecauseBecause (U)(D) Operating against the JordanianJordanian I Israel had repeatedlyrepeatedly asserted that sheshe would would go to forces, IsraeliIsraeli troopstroops capturedcaptured thethe cites ofof Janin,Janin, war if the U.A.R.UA.R. blockedblocked the Gulf,Gulf, NSANSA raised its Qalqilyah, and Ram Allah and tooktook thethe highhigh groundground Alfa to a a SigintSigint ReadinessReadiness "Bravo"Bravo Crayon"Crayon" for all all north of Jerusalem on 6 June. Middle East communications."communications. II (U)(D) The U.A.R.D.A.R. blockadeblockade precipitatedprecipitated (U) On 7 June, IsraeliIsraeli unitsunits sweptswept acrossacross quiet but full-scalefull-scale mobilizationmobilization by Israel. ArabArab forcesforces the SinaiSinai toto advanceadvance withinwithin eighteeneighteen milesmiles of the SuezSuez were repositioned, andand onon 3030 May Egypt and JordanJordan Canal in the north and reachedreached toward the Mitla Pass signed a five-yearfive-year military alliance,alliance, completingcompleting ArabArab in the south.south. OtherOther IsraeliIsraeli forcesforces capturedcaptured AshAsh Shar-Shar encirclement ofof Israel.Israel. Shortly thereafter,thereafter, SovietSoviet naval mah at thethe entranceentrance toto thethe GulfGulf ofof Aqaba,Aqaba, breakingbreaking vessels enteredentered the MediterraneanMediterranean throughthrough thethe the blockadeblockade atat the Strait ofof Tiran.Tiran. AlsoAlso on the 7th, Dardenelles. 12I2 Israel gained control of the Gaza Strip plusplus the WestWest (U)(D) On 1 June,June, asas pressurepressure toto open open thethe Bank of the JordanJordan River.River. TheThe JordanianJordanian armyarmy andand Strait ofof TiranTiran builtbuilt withinwithin Israel,Israel, MosheMoshe DayanDayan waswas accompanying IraqiIraqi unitsunits were defeated. appointed Israeli Minister of Defense. TheThe next day,day, (U)(D) The United NationsNations calledcalled for a cease-cease Friday, 2 June, the UnitedUnited StatesStates andand thethe UnitedUnited fire. IsraelIsrael acceptedaccepted providedprovided the otherother belligerentsbelligerents Kingdom issuedissued aa joint statement declaringdeclaring the GulfGulf complied. OnOn 77 June,June, Jordan agreedagreed to thethe cease-fire,cease-fire, of Aqaba anan international waterwaywaterway to which allall statesstates but the U.A.R.UA.R. rejectedrejected it.it. TheThe followingfollowing day (8 June), were entitled freefree passage.passage. however,both both thethe U.A.R.D.A.R. and SyriaSyria acceptedaccepted thethe (U)(D) The weekendweekend ofof 33 and 4 JuneJune passedpassed cease-fire. AtAt approximatelyapproximately 1400 hourshours this samesame uneventfully, butbut then lightninglightning struck. OnOn Monday,Monday, date the U.S.S.US.S. Liberty was attacked. 5 June at approximatelyapproximately 0845 Middle EastEast time, Israel (U)(D) On 9 June, followingfollowing an Israeli charge launched simultaneous airair strikes againstagainst allall forwardforward that SyriaSyria hadhad violatedviolated thethe cease-fire,cease-fire, IsraeliIsraeli troopstroops U.A.R.D.A.R. airfields onon thethe Sinai and in thethe SuezSuez CanalCanal and armored forces smashed deepdeep intointo Syria. By the Zone. While thethe bulk of the 400-plane40o-plane Israeli air forceforce time both sidessides agreed, on 10 June, toto observeobserve the concentrated on U.A.R. targets, thethe remainingremaining IsraeliIsraeli U.N.UN. cease-fire,cease-fire, the entireentire southwesternsouthwestern cornercorner ofof jets mademade coordinatedcoordinated attacks againstagainst airfieldsairfields inin Syria was inin IsraeliIsraeli hands, including the Golan Heights Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. IsraeliIsraeli raidsraids againstagainst Arab air which dominateddominated IsraeliIsraeli territoryterritory in the JordanJordan ValleyValley bases continued throughoutthroughout 55 JuneJune and byby nightfallnightfall and around the SeaSea ofof Galilee.Galilee. IIANBfJE \"lA Cer-HN'f' CIIANNEfJS el\TfJ\' SEellSBCRfi'f r— 3 SBURBT -SECRET EO 1.1.4.(c)4 . (c) (8 eeO) On this samesame day,day, whenwhen thethe SovietSoviet '(U)l(U) CharlesCharle,.W;¥Ollt, W. Yost, "The Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli War;War; How How it Began,"Began," Foreign.Atiairs,Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan(Jan 1968),1968), p. p. 310. 310. representative toto the U.N.U.N. threatenedthreatened directdirect SovietSoviet 'lUi4(U) The UnitedUnited ArabArab RepublicRepublic waswas formed in 1958 1958 intervention ifif the SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil diddid not halthalt the with the union of Egypt and Syria andand thenthen dissolveddissolved in September fighting, NSA extendedextended Bravo "Crayon""Crayon" to Soviet'Soviet 1961. Even though the unionunion was was dissolved, Egypt was still referred to as as thethe U.A.R.V.A.R. untiluntil 22 SeptemberSeptember 19711971 when when thethe namename waswas L.._~ ....Jtargets. targets.' AA cease-fire,cease-fire, negoti-negoti- changed toto the Arab Republic ofof Egypt. In this historyhistory U.A.R.V.A.R. is ated byby thethe U.N.,U. N., finallyfinally wentwent intointo effecteffect and allall used throughout to mean Egypt. hostilities ceased atat 18301830 hourshours Mid-EastMid-East time onon '(U) Ibid, p. 306. 306. Saturday, 1010 JuneJune 1967.1967. °(C'(e eee)CO) NSA (P2), "Sigint"Sigint ReadinessReadiness BravoBravo CrayonCrayon Critique," Serial: P2/00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8. '(U)'(V) Ibid. '(V)5(U) Ibid. Notes 99(V)(U) Ibid. lo Source documentsdocuments areare inin thethe "Crisis Collection" of of thethe NSA HistoryHistory IO(V)(U) Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli War;War; How How Collection. It Began,"Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968),1968), p. 319. 319. ''(C1'(8 CCSSe) ) NSA (P2), "Sigint"Sigint ReadinessReadiness BravoBravo Crayon Crayon Critique," Serial: P2/00670,P2I00670, 10 July 1968, p. 8. '(U)'(V) Theodore Draper. Israel and World World Politics.Politics. "(U)"(V) Ibid. Viking Press, New York, 1968, p,p. 35. "(U)Il(V) Ibid, p. 9. 9. '(V)2(U) Hal Kosut, editor. Israel and the Arabs:Arabs: The '"(V)4(U) Ibid. June 19671967 War. Facts on File, File, New New York, York, 1968, 1968, p. 32. 15(U)Is(U) Ibid. 4 SBURBT II~BLB VIA OOMIN'f OH....NNBLS ONI.¥ 'fOP BECKE'f Chapter II Considerations LeadingLeading toto the Ship's Ship's Deployment Deployment (U)(U) (S CCO)GGQ) Looking backback upon the Liberty inci-inci EIOEO 1.4.(c)1.4. (c) dent today,today, AmericansAmericans mightmight wellwell questionquestion why the U.S. introduced an intelligence shipship intointo aa warwar theatertheater in which Americans werewere notnot directdirect participants and exposethat that shipship toto thethe risk it did. did. TheThe decisiondecision to (8 CeO) I 80ElO 1.4.(c)1.4. (c) deploy, itit should bebe noted, came before the SixSix Day Day E0EO 1.4.(d)1. 4. (d) War erupted. It camecame afterafter carefulcareful NSANSA considerationconsideration of customercustomer requirements for intelligenceintelligence from this troubled region, of technicaltechnical factorsfactors whichwhich would would govern thethe collection of Middle East communications,communications, and of the needneed to to develop develop technical Sigint data inin the eventevent futurefuture U.S.U.S. involvementinvolvement in MiddleMiddle EastEast hostilities shouldshould bringbring aa requirement to support U.S. forces. TheThe NSA decision toto request the Liberty's deploymenton on 23 23 May,May,the the dayday itit raised its SigintSigint readiness condition to Bravo-Crayon,Bravo-Crayon, was,was, moreover,moreover, (TS(CPS CCO)GGO) In latelate May-earlyMay-early JuneJune 1967,1967, while while only oneone of manymany actionsactions takentaken toto improveimprove SigintSigint still focusingfocusing forfor thethe most partpart on the U.A.R.U.A.R. thethe collection,processing, processing,and andreporting reportingin in thethe criticalcritical intelligence requirements took on a sense sense of of urgency. urgency. weeksbefore beforethe the SixSix DayDay WarWar as thethe NSANSA actionaction office, G6,G6, beganbegan aa round-the-clock SigintSigint operationoperation at Fort Meade)Meade. I The Requirements for Intelligence (U) (8 Ceo) The long-standinglong-standing Middle East tension had produced a growing requirementrequirement fromfrom U.S.U.S. intel-intel ligence usersusers forfor informationinformation onon aa number of military E0 1.4.(c)1. 4. (c) ~(SC) IntelligencehltelligElnceusers users define, of course, thethe categories ofof information theythey need from Sigint,Sigint, and it isis upup to to thethe SigintSigint specialistsspecialists toto translatetranslate theirtheir requirements intointo meaningful,meaningful, responsiveresponsive collectioncollection and processingprocessing actions.actions. In so doing, doing, thesethese specialistsspecialists had toto taketake intointo theirtheir calculationscalculations somesome II IIA-NBt.e ViA C6M1N'f CIIA-NNet.S 6Nt.\" 'FOP SBSRH'F 5 TOP SECRET EO.~. 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) tO~. 1.4.(d)1. 4 . (d) (S CCO) "E·OEJ 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) ~8 (J(JO)I-----"7Fi;;;;:;~e;;;;:::eE;e:;:_------~ Adq.i.(d)BDl. 4. (d) (Figure is is SECRETBlfJefilfJ'I' CCO)eeBj Technical Collection Factors (U) (G-CCO)(B eeo) U.S.'u.s~ IcoIlec-IcOllec tion ofof Middle Middle EastEast communicationscommumcahons hadhad developed developed over the years in response response to intelligenceintelligence requirementsrequirements arising out of one one crisis crisis situationsituation afterafter another.another. InIn place atat the timetime ofof thethe SixSix Day Day War War and~d/the the (T3-CCO)('t'B eOO) For collection of VHF and UHF com- com- deployment ofof thethe Liberty were groundground-rsites sites andand munications, the U.S. dependeddepended airborne collectors forfor the MiddleMiddle EastEast communica-communica Ionon USN and USAF USAF mobile, mobile, airborneairborne collectors.collectors. tions which werewere likelylikely toto yield.atIeastyield at least a part of the information specified in thetl:le/requirements. requirements. (TS-CCO('1'8-006)) AtAtU;Sr U.S Iground (SaeeO) site~ ~rttercept Ll ,S-CCO sites' intercept positions, accordingaccording toto a post- Liberty NsANSA review,'review/ werewere on on handhand primarilyprimarily forfor Middle East communications. Almost oneone halfhalf of this -E-T-S-G643)-tqJS 660) coverage waswas on communicationscommunications of of the U.A.R.U.A.R. I=---_~_- EO 1.4.(c)1.4. (c) 6 TOP-SEC-RET-TOP SEORH'F IIkNBfltl ViA COMIN" CIIA-NNtlflS ONt.." EO 1.4.(d)1.4. (d) OP SECRET UPtIBRA- ! - - : I I"EO h.4.(c).4. Ie) EO L.4.(d).4. Id) I ~(TSC) J I ~ -.J I- I L --.J , i !,E0'EO 1.4.(c).4 . Ie) Ii/ +128-6€0-14F) (Figure .i.is TOP'P8P 8Be~liJrpSECRET• COOeeB X17NI') N8F81tN TOP SECRET UMBR2\ 7 -TOP-StetterSHCRHT EO 1.4.(c)1. 4. (c) ls ,~~ --- 1 E9 1.4.(c) ;i:::·.E0\1.4.(d). 4. (d):~: .... I (TO(~8 CCO)eeO) Intercept assignmentsassignmentsas as ofof 8 JuneJune 1967 at the U.S.U.S. stationsstations illustrateillustrate thethe variedvaried naturenature of thethe collectioncollection missions. missions. (C CCO) Intelligence andand SecuritySecurity. CommandCommand (INSCOM) manual-morsemanual-morse positionspositions II I I I (Photograph courtesy of INSCOM.) 4.(c) (Figure is t'OistriforlfriMe"'1":l"2lli~WT'1l'1:l:-ee"" .~ ~~~ I 17 W ~ I , 1. 4. (c) 8 TOP SHCRHT IIkNBItB ViA e9M1N'F UIIANNIL8 ONL¥ TOP SECRET UMBftA O 1.4.(c)1. 4. (c) ...... 19 ...... FRS6 I I ...... ········································ 18 (8 ceo) r analY8t~ EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) (C(0 CCO)(00) u.s.U.S. ArmyArmy Sigint analysts'(Photograp::t'h-:::c~ou::;rt=etI:::-y )~ (Photograph courtesy ': 'fOP SB€RB'f UMBRA 9 if3Q.J-. 4. (c) 'fOP SECRE'f Ur.IBRA U.S~lnterceptof.S. Intercept of VHF/UHFVHFjUHF CommunicationsCommunicatibns (U) ..... ...I successful collection of VHF/UHFVHF/UHF com-com- municationsdepended dependedon onintercept interceptbyl by 0 Isitessites located near the transmitterstransmitters andand byby airborneairborne collec-collec tors which could fly orbits in theirtheir. vicinity.vicinity. Close-in Close-in intercept facilitiesfacilities locatedlocated preferablypreferably withinwithin ground-ground wave distance of transmitters werewere alsoalso a prerequisiteprerequisite to effectiveeffective interceptintercept ofof low-poweredlow-powered HFHF communications. ~(SC) I iSet-(SC) Sigint collectorscollectors hadhad graduallygradually in-in creased their knowledgeknowledge ofof Middle Middle EastEast VHF/UHFVHF/UHF communications. HF communicationscommunications occasionally re-re ferred to otherother communicationscommunications inin thethe VHF/UHFVHF/UHF modes.modes.I I I (C(S CCO)000) I I 'TheIThe U.S.U.S. also also had had USN USN and and USAF USAF airborneairborne "---"":":""----' collectors who were experiencedexperienced inin flying orbits off the coast of the U.A.R.U.A.R. and and Israel.Israel. ivs.eeei- I 10 'fOP SECRET Ur.IBRA NOF6RN EO 1. 4 . (c) - ._.--_._.__._------'-- !EOko 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) l'OP'fOP-SteltirrSECItE'f UMBRrUMBItA 1"---- _ -€69-~ Electrical communicationscommunications betweenbetween INSCOM detachmentsdetachments andand theirtheir parentparent INSCOMINSCOM organization, the U.S.U.S. Army Army CommunicationsCommunications SupportSupport Unit, asas well well as as theirtheir communicationscommunications with NSA, were were via U.S. U.S. Army Army StrategicStrategic CommunicationsCommunications CommandCommand facilities, off-line,off-line, and and encryptedencrypted onon KL-7A KL-7A equipmentequipment using the AdonisAdonis system (KAK-199).(KAK-199). (T3(~S -COO-NF) 000 nF) (TS(~S CCO)000) Mobile airborne collectors in orbits off the coast ~~~ of thethe U.A.R.U.A.R. and and IsraelIsrael hadhad somewhatsomewhat greatergreater flexibility. S212 Airborne Collectors (U) (TSC(~SO ~,F)NF) I (TS('I'S CCO)000) The major part ofof the U.S. VHF/UHFVHF/UHF collection came from Navy EC-121 and Air Air Force Force C- C 130 flights out of AthensAthens onon interceptintercept missionsmissions largely largely specified byby NSA. Prior to 23 23 May, May, U.S. U.S. Airborne Airborne Collection Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) C-130s C-130s flew somesome eighteight sortiessorties aa month in the easterneastern Medi-Medi- terranean,terraQean,1 I I 'TheThe EC-EC- 121 aircraftaircraft were also flying about eight sorties a month in the easterneastern MediterraneanMediterranean forfor bothboth ComintComint and Elint intercept andand anotheranother eight sorties a monthmonth I I (S-CCO(S-OOO') After 23 May, May, when when NSA NSA declareddeclared a Sigint ReadinessReadiness BravoBravo condition,condition, C-1308C-130s flew flew daily daily flights with with NSA-specified NSA-specified intercept missions.missions. The The IIThe The U.A.R.U.A.R. had used used requirement forfor dailydaily flights resulted in a reductionreduction of U.S.S.R. militarymilitary radioradio equipmentequipment from 1960, 1960, much much sorties... 1 P.ndpd thethe reassignment of one of which came with aircraft, tanks, andand radarsradars the C-130 I EC-121sEC-121s also also began began daily, daily, U.U.S.S.R. S. S. R.provided providedthe the U.A:R.IU.A.R. and after the outbreakoutbreak of war war twice-daily, flights into the easterneastern MediterraneanMediterranean inin direct support of thethe U.S. iSixth Sixth Fleet.Fleet. AtAt NSA's suggestion,suggestion, thethe U.S. Navy rescheduled itsits flights so thatthat theythey wouldwould complementcomplement thetheC-130 C-130 flights,flights, thethe C-130sC-130s flying flying duringduring the morningmorning hours commencing atat 0300Z and the EC-121EC-121 aircraftaircraft departing at 0800Z.08;;..;;.O;..;O;.;;;Z;.;.' ----, (TS(~S CCO000 NF)~W) (tpS 000) (TS-CCO-NP)ffS OOO-fo(F' , NOHOW- -TOP-SteRE'141111BRA'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA 1111 I I EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) L tFOP SB€RBtF Ul\IBRA 3131°° 32° 33°330 34° 35°350 LEBANON)I LEBANON",,; /",",-,) 1(\ 3333°-t---~;::------+-r=...... ,~c.=,;,~--f------~'------+-~----~° USAF C-130s , ) ISRAEL(ISRAEL :5'y USN EC-121s -:.. \..f1 32°32°+----~-___jr_------_+_--____i._--_1--~~..!!..!.~=___+_++_----___1 TEL AVIV (s1 2") 0' /JJ 0 R..DR,.D A/NA-/N L../7,./) .. , ISRAEL ) 'f I S RAE L ') SUEZ CANAL 460-•-t UNITEDUNITED ARAB REPUBLICREPUBLIC \ _ (C~e CCO)eeo) AfterAfter NSANSA declareddeclared aa Sigint Readiness condition for the the eastern eastern Mediterranean, Mediterranean, collection collection ffightsflights ofof thethe EC-121 and C-130 aircraft werewere increasedincreased toto onceonce dailydaily insteadinstead of the usual usual eight eight ffights flights a month. (Figure is CONFIDENTIALeBN-FfBBN'PMfJ CCO)eeB~ £01.4. (c) producingproducingComint Comint responsive to to requirements,requirements, partie-partic- ularlyularIy thosethre relatingre I ating' to to the t h e U.A.R.UAR. and and to to merchant mere h an t shipping. I ...... 133 r14 ...... The Decision to Deploy Deploy the Liberty (U)(U) r ffset(TSC) During May andand early June 1967, the U.U.Sc=JSi.gintorgllIlization SiI Sigint organization performedperformed moderatelymoderately well with its existingexisting groundgroundancl and airair collectioncollection inin EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) 12 -T-0P-EkffeRET-UMBR-AtFOP SBCRBtF Ul\IBRA EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . (d) EOO 1.4.(c)1.4. (e) -TeP-soettgri-umatt*TOP SECRET UMBRA Arab countries would break diplomatic relations withwith the U.S. and that,)that,' EO 1.4.(c)1.4. (e) ('fse·?w) E0EO 1.4.(d)1.4. (d) 16 (TG~~B CCO)000) For consistent, close-in intercept, Sig-Sig int specialistsspecialists decided that thethe assignmentassignment ofof a a collec- collec tion shipship to to workwork..offshore offshore fromfrom thethe U.A.R.U.A.R. waswas in in order. It waswas/natural natural thatthat theythey wouldwould decidedecide uponupon shipborneshipbomecollection. collection. A technicaltechnical research ship (TRS)(TRS) was, according to to oneoneestimate estimateat at thethe time, thethe equivalent of 13 airborne collectors and,and, besides that,that, L.. ...JThis kind of a response was, they I This kind of a response was, they was more economicalto to operateoperate thanthan the airborneairborne knew, unlikelyunlikely withwith the thenthen availableavailable collectiopcollectiop collectors.'collectors.'? In additionaddition to taskstasks suchsuch as as sustainedsustained organization. collection asas inin the casecase of U.S.N.S.U.S.N.S. MullerMuller' (TS('f8 CCO)000) NSA considered the categories of Mid- Mid off thethe shore of Cuba dle East communications for which the existingexisting collec-collec tion organization was either inadequate or for which L- ----' the special ships were tion organization was either inadequate or for which I the special ships were it offered offered smallsmall promisepromise forfor sustainedsustained intercept.intercept.' prepared byby design design for quick quick reactionreaction toto exigenciesexigencies of of one kind oror another."another." (3-CCO)(8 000) Choice ofof aa shipship forfor thethe Mediterranean narrowed betweenbetween thethe U.S.N.S.U.S.N.S. Valdez I I then nearnear Gibraltar,Gibraltar, and thethe Liberty in portport atat Abidjan, Ivory C08:st~Coast. NSA chose the Liberty because she hadhad superiorsuperior speed (18(18 knots vs. 8 knotsknots forfor Valdez), because her VHF/UHFVHF/UHF multichannelmultichannel collec-collec tion capability was better, andand becausebecause sheshe was, was, unlike unlike Valdez, at thethe beginningbeginning ofof a a deployment."deployment;'? NSANSA SigintSigint accordingly requestedrequestedthe the Joint ChiefsChiefsofStaffiJoint of Staff/Joint collectionmanagers managersconcluded concludedthat that thethe then existingexisting Reconnaissance CenterCenter (JCS/JRC) on 23 May 1967 to collectionorganization organizationwould would be beable, able,at at best,best, only to divert the Liberty to thethe Mediterranean.Mediterranean. make aa moderate response to many of the intelligenceintelligence requirements in in viewview ofof technicaltechnical limitationslimitations inin the E0EO 1.4.(c)1. 4. (e) collection ofof VHF/UHFVHF/UHF communications. Notes (C(8 CCO)000) In thethe casecase of of thethe airborneairborne collectors,collectors, the Sigint planners feltfelt thatthat thethe averageaverage orbit timetime ofof Source documents areare inin the "Crisis ColleCtion"Collection"of of thethe NSANSA History the C-130s andand EC-121s -— aboutabout five hourshours on stationstation Collection. after allowing forfor timetime toto and from orbit areas —- was was too shortshort for the sustainedsustained collectioncollection desired. 1leu)(U) NSA Staff, "Fact"Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," undated. (U) Expansion of airborneairborne collectioncollection waswas 2'(S(C COO)Ssel NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint"Critique-Sigint ReadinessReadiness Bravo Bravo a possibility, butbut additional aircraft inin sufficientsufficient num-num Crayon," 10 July 1968, 1968, pp.pp, 31-47,31-47, hereafterhereafter citedcited "Critique-SRB"Critique-SRB bers would bebe difficultdifficultto toobtain, obtain, andand there was the Crayon" and NSA Staff, "Report to the the Director,Director, NSA:NSA: U.S.S. U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5),CAGTR-5), 2323 May-8May-8 JuneJune 1967," 12 June 1967, 1967, pp. 1-4, 1-4, consideration ofof downtimedowntime forfor maintenance whichwhich/for for hereafter cited "Report to the Director,Director, NSA."NSA." aircraft was greatergreater thanthan for othyother Platforms.iSplatforms." 3'cU)(U) "Report to the Director,Director, NSA," p. 1. 1. (TS(~S GGOCCO~lF) NF) InIn thethe case of the'the sites, SigintSigint '(9'es CCO)eee) Informal information from NSA NSA StaffStaff Officer,Officer, Clarence Toomer Toomerl rSigintreIations{Jurie1980):Sigint relations (June 1980). planners consideredconsideredtheir their fixed locationslocations andand thethe EOEQ 1.4.(c)1.4. (e) 5'CUI(U) NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca. resulting confinementconfinementof oftheir their VHF/UHFVHF/UHF interceptintercept to EO 1.4.(d)1.4. (d) 16 Jun 1967. 1967. line-of-sightdistances distances fromfrom thosethose locations. They also 6'CU)(U) NSA (G62), "Briefing on 1967 1967 Middle East correctlyanticipated anticipated that,that, in the eventevent ofof war, certain Crisis," undated document; "Report"Report toto the Director, NSA," Tab C. -NOFORN—NOFORN TOP-SELeRET-IiMBRikTOP SECRET UMBRA 1313 ------~~~ '(U)'(UJ John R.R. Rasmuson,Rasmuson, A HistoryHistory ofof Kagnew Kagnew "(U)13(UJ NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the Middle Station and AmericanAmerican ForcesForces in Eritrea, 25 May 1973.1973. East," undated;undated; NSANSA Staff, Staff, "Operations"Operations Staff Summary," ca. 1616 88(U)(U) Kagnew Station, OfficeOffice of Operations, Annual Jun 1967;1967; "Report to thethe Director,Director, NSA,"NSA," p.p, 2;2; "Critique-SRB"Critique-SRB Historical Report,Report, FY 1967,1967, vol.vol, II IT ; ; "Critique-SRB"CritiQue-SRB Crayon,"Crayon," pp.pp, Crayon," pp. 17-18.17-18. 11-12, 20. "(U)I4(UJ NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 99(UJ(U) NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16 Jun 1967.1967. 16 Jun 1967;1967; "Critique-SRB Crayon," pp. 20, 37. 37. 18I5(UJ(U) NSA Staff, "Fact SheetSheet forfor DIRNSA,"DffiNSA," un-un- ''(U)lO(UJ Electronic Security Command, History of the dated; "Report to the the Director,Director, NSA,"NSA," TabTab A;A; "Critique-SRB"Critique-SRB 6931st Security Group, 1 Jan-30 Jun 1967,1967, pp. 8-9, 16, 16, 60-62,eo-sa, 78, Crayon," pp. 16-17.16-17. Interview with Gene Sheck, 11 11 Aug 1980, p. 2. 86, 92; "Critique-SRB"Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 21. 21. ik.l~r+ U.S. Army Army CommunicationsCommunications Support Unit,Unit, "(U)Il(UJ Julie Alger,Alger, "A Review of the TechnicalTechnical Re- Annual HistoricalReport. Report, FYFY 1967,1967, vol. I;I; (U)(UJ "Critique-SRB"Critique-SRB search ShipShip Program,Program, 1961-1969,"1961-1969," 1 1 MayMay 1970;1970; InterviewInterview with Gene Crayon," pp. 12-14.12-14. Sheck, 11 11 Aug 1980, p. 5. "(U)lJ(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact SheetSheet forfor DIRNSA,"DffiNSA," 1l"fet-4€1- U.S. Army Army CommunicationsCommunications Support Unit,Unit, undated. Annual Historical Report, Report,FY FY 1967,1967,vol. vol. I,I, 11 Oct 1967;1967; (U)(UJ 'I8(UJ8(U) Julie Alger, Alger, "A ReviewReview of the TechnicalTechnical Re- "Critique-SRB"CritiQue-SRB Crayon,"Crayon," pp.pp. 12-14; (UJ(U) "Report"Report toto the Director,Director, search Ship Program, 1961-1969,"1961-1969," 11 MayMay 1970.1970. NSA," Tabs A and B. "I9(UJ9(U) "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 18.18. 14 CONPIBHN'fIAL SH€RET SPOKE Chapter III Deployment to the the Mediterranean Mediterranean (U) (U) i'S€t-(3C) With Sigint unitunit USN-855USN-855 on board,board, "through thethe navalnaval componentcomponent commandercommander toto a a specificspecific the U.S.S. Liberty had been in operation forfor two two years fleet or force force commander." InIn May 1967, the U.S.S.US.S. and four months when NSANSA sentsent its messagemessage toto the Liberty, an auxiliaryauxiliary generalgeneral technicaltechnical researchresearch shipship JCS asking for deploymentdeployment ofof the Liberty to thethe (AGTR) was operatingoperating underunder thethe controlcontrol of thethe Com-Com Mediterranean. DuringDuringthis this timetime it hadhad undertakenundertaken mander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The TRSTRS commandingcommanding of-of five separate missions off the west coast of Africa to ficer waswas CommanderCommander William L. McGonagle.McGonagle. ,,".,ate mi"ion, off the ~,t ,oo,t 0; ::~'~J "11:0 1. 4 • (c) I'" (8-CeO) The JCSJCS alsoalso specifiedspecified that technicaltechnical control of Sigint activities was\Vasto to be exercisedexercised by the Director, NationalNationafBecurity Security AgencyAgency via directdirect com-com I The ship munication toto thethe ships or through the Director, NavalNaval had executed a numbernumber ofof difficultdifficult tasks — locatinglocating Security Group. A collectioncollection assignment, thethe JCSJCS new communications, IDew ,0mmunioatioD,j I stated furtherfurther inin itsits 19651965 message,message, wouldwould take intointo account technical factors as determined byby NSA NSA andand safety factors asas determineddetermined byby militarymilitary operationaloperational commanders. (C-CCO) Other US.U.S. Sigint ships atat this timetime included thethe U.S.S. Oxford and Jamestown in South-South (C-CCO) Liberty's Sigint detachment, USN-855,USN-855, east Asia, the U.S.S.US.S. Georgetown and Belmont in therefore, came under the technicaltechnical controlcontrol of thethe South America, thethe U.S.N.S.US.N.S. Muller off Cuba, andand Director, NSA and underunder thethe managementmanagement controlcontrol ofof the U.S.N.S.U.S.N.S. Valdez enrouteenroute toto the U.S.US. fromfrom thethe the Director,Director, NavalNaval SecuritySecurity Group. On board thethe Mediterranean.'Mediterranean. I Liberty, the SigintSigint detachmentdetachment waswas known known asas thethe "Research Department." ItsIts spacespace belowbelow decksdecks waswas U.S.S.u.s.s. Liberty'sLjhert.r~ Modus OperandiOperandi (U) compartmented withwith accessaccess permittedpermitted only to staffstaff having the properproper clearances.clearances. CommandingCommanding officerofficer of of the ResearchResearch Department waswas LieutenantLieutenant CommanderCommander (U) U.S.us. reconnaissancereconnaissance operationsoperations camecame David E. Lewis.Lewis. TheThe ship'sship's Captain,Captain, CommanderCommander under thethe purview ofof thethe J-3,J-3, Joint ChiefsChiefs of Staff. AA Deputy DirectorDirector forfor Reconnaissanceassisted assisted thethe J-3 McGonagle,had had thethe clearances needed for access to in the exerciseexercise ofof operationaloperational controlcontrol overover reconnais-reconnais the ResearchResearch Department,Department, visitedvisited thethe departmentdepartment sance activities of the unifiedunified andand specifiedspecified commands.commands. daily, receivedreceived briefings, and reviewedreviewed the "special"special The Joint ReconnaissanceReconnaissance Center (JRC)(JRC) workedworked forfor traffic" available there. the DeputyDeputy DirectorDirector forfor ReconnaissanceReconnaissance and hadhad (C-CCO) Paddy E. Rhodes,Rhodes, during an interview,interview, authority over U.S. reconnaissancereconnaissance operations.operations. NSANSA described thethe area of the Liberty which housed USN-USN had a a representativerepresentative toto thethe JointJoint ReconnaissanceReconnaissance 855: "The researchresearch spacesspaces had reallyreally three decks.decks. OnOn Center, Mr. JohnJohn Connell.Connell. the lowestlowest deckdeck wewe hadhad aa training room andand a fanfan (U) In 19651965 thethe JCSJCS hadhad givengiven generalgeneral room. The next deckdeck waswas thethe RR BranchBranch (collection)(collection) guidance onon thethe conductconduct of technicaltechnical researchresearch shipship spaces, the 00 BranchBranch (communications)(communications) spaces,spaces, andand (TRS) operations. Operational control of the shipsships waswas processingand and reporting.reporting.The The oneone aboveabove itit was T to be be effectedeffected byby unifiedunified andand specifiedspecified commanderscommanders Branch (other than morsemorse signals)."signals)." -REeRET-SPOKE-SECRET SPOKE 1515 - _~_o=---_··- CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED (U) A small portion ofof the antenna configuration ofof thethe U.S.S. Liberty included: (11) Long-wire VLF/LF antenna (34) Discone antenna (12) ECM antenna (35) Monocone antenna (27) 10' 10' whip whip antenna (36) ECM antenna (32) ECM antenna (41) VHF-receive antenna (33) ECM antenna (42) 35' whip antenna (Figure isis UNCLASSIFIED) 1€t' Typical ofof communicationscommunications arrange-arrange- (C-CCO)(0 000) Sigint collectioncollection positions includedincluded oneone ments of the AGTRAGTR class, the Liberty had circuits forfor for directiondirection finding,finding, 1717 for for radiotelephone,radiotelephone, 2020 for for the ship'sship's commandcommand in one location andand those for its manual morse, 7 for automatic morse,morse, 77 for for electronicelectronic Sigint detachment in a a separateseparate location.location. Liberty's countermeasures,and and 3333 for nonmorse non morse search andand naval communications station,station, which served the com-com development, thethe latter forfor frequenciesfrequencies bothboth aboveabove mand, had aa "receive""receive" terminalterminal forfor fleet fleet broadcasts,broadcasts, and belowbelow 30 Mhz. three circuitscircuits forfor on-lineon-line ship/shore radiotelephoneradiotelephone and voice communications, andand one additionaladditional orderwireorderwire (U) Perhaps the mostmost visiblevisible technicaltechnical full-duplex circuit.circuit. InIn aa separateseparate location,location, USN-855USN-855 feature of the shipship waswas its antennas,antennas, somesome 45 in all. all. had anan on-line,on-line, full-duplexfull-duplex radiotelephoneradiotelephone circuit,circuit, a secure one-channelone-channel moon-relay systemsystem —- technicaltechnical research shipship specialspecial communicationscommunications systemsystem . (U) Not so visible was, however, thethe ship's (TRSSCOMM) -— andand a "receive-only""receive-only" terminal forfor armament, whichwhich was minimalminimal —- fourfour .50-caliber.50-caliber fleet broadcasts. In casecase ofof needneed severalseveral off-lineoff-line en- en machine guns,guns, 22 forward and 22 aft,aft, oneone BrowningBrowning cryption devices were also available. automatic rifle, and a numbernumber of small arms.?arms.' 16 -eONFIDENTIA47CONFIBBNHl..J. HAHln.J~ V:IA CO~HHT CIIAHHBJ;.S OHJ;.Y SHCRHT SPOKH Abidjan toto Rota, 24-3124-31 MayMay 19671967 (U) provisionsprovisrons andand fuel, acquiringacquiring the militarymilitary documen-documen tation necessarynecessary for itsits assignmentassignment toto Commander-in-Commander-in Chief, U.S. Navy Navy EuropeEurope andand laterlater toto thethe U.S. Sixth (0 000) The TRS waswas atat Abidjan,Abidjan, IvoryIvory Coast,Coast, Fleet, andand repairingrepairing its TRSSCOMMTRSSCOMM which had a at the endend of of May May on itsits fifthfifth AfricanAfrican cruisecruise when, in faulty hydraulic system. response toto NSA'sNSA's message onon 23 May, the JCS/JRC,JCS/JRC, ~(3C) Six ArabicArabicl hinguistslinguists with approval ofof the DeputyDeputy SecretarySecretary of Defense,Defense, joined USN-855 for the expectedexpected work on V.A.&U.A.R. andand directed movementmovementof ofthe the shipship to the easterneastern Medi-Medi I IcolIlmunications.communications.Three Three ofof the ArabArab lin-lin terranean viavia Rota, Spain, andand requestedrequested thethe Com-Com guists, NSA civilianscivilians.Allen Allen M. Blue, DonaldDonald L.BlaL. Bla- mander-in-Chief, AtlanticAtlantic to changechange operationaloperational con-con lock, and Robert L. Wilson,Wilson;weJ,'e were among thethe specialists trol of thethe shipship toto thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope who came on board at Rota,Rota, thetheremllining remaining linguistslinguiste upon itsits arrival at at Rota.:'Rota.' AtAt the time, thethe Liberty being NavalNaval SecuritySecurity GroupGroup specialist&specialists. ThtaNSAThe NSA was under the operational control of thethe Commander,Commander, linguists brought withwith themthem selected technicaltechnical mate-mate Service Squadron 8,8, a componentcomponent of thethe Commander-Commander rial, I I AssignmentAssigriri:l "EO.E° 1.4:1. (c) in-Chief, Atlantic, and onon 24 24 May May thethe Commander,Commander, ent of civilian linguists to work work on boardboard aa U.S.Na.VyU.S. Navy ship Service Squadron 88 issued sailing orders toto the Liberty, was notnot unusual.unusual. OnOn TRSTRS deploymentsdeployments alongalong thethe with information copiescopies to Commander,Commander, Sixth FleetFleet African !coastlines,coastlines, civilian lin-lin and others, directingdirectingthe the shipship toto move atat onceonce to I guists had workedworked alongside thethe military linguists, whowho Rota.'Rota. 4 The LibertyLiberty departeddeparted Abidjan atat 0530Z, 24 24 at timestimes werewere notnot availableavailable inin sufficientsufficient numbernumber forfor May, with estimated time of arrival inin Rota,Rota, 31 May.' May.s the missionsmissions at hand.hand. LihertyatLiberty at Rota,Rota, (C~C CCO)CCG) NSA actionaction officersofficers establishedestablished aa teltel- 31 May to 2 JuneJune 19671967 (U) econ with USN-855USN-855 (Lieutenant(Lieutenant CommanderCommander D.D. E. E. Lewis and his assistant, LieutenantLieutenant MauryMaury H. Ben-Ben (U)(V) When the Liberty arrived at Rota on nett) onon 1 1 JuneJune inin orderorder toto confirm confirm the arrivalarrival of the 31 May, it camecame underunder thethe operationaloperational control of the personnel, special equipment, and technical materialsmaterials V.S.U.S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope (Gen.(Gen. L.L. Lem-Lem needed in thethe easterneastern Mediterranean.'Mediterraneen." In orderorder to nitzer) who turned over control to thethe Commander-in-Commander-in assist USN-855'sVSN-855's reportingreporting andand transcribingtranscribing functions, Chief, U.S. Navy Navy Europe.'Europe." WhileWhile delegatingdelegating his con- con NSA hadhad previouslypreviously arrangedarranl(ed with I trol, GeneralGeneral Lemnitzer still wantedwanted operationaloperational infor-infor mation on the ship'sship's progressprogress and asked on 1 1 JuneJune that situationsituation reportsreports (Sitreps)(Sitreps) andand plannedplanned intendedintended movement (Pim)(Pim) reports from the Liberty arrive at his headquartersheadquarters daily daily andand thatthat anyany incidentsincidents bebe reported asas soon as possiblepossible in accordanceaccordance with the (8-CCO)(S-CCO) To facilitatefacilitate thethe planningplanning forfor USN-USN existing reconnaissancereconnaissance reporting instructions.instructions.'7 855's collection mission, Sigint managersmanagers had desig-desig (C-CCO)to-CCO) After taking control, Admiral John S. nated fivefive operational areas numbered westwest toto east in McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Navy Europe,Europe, the easterneastern MediterraneanMediterranean nearnear thethe coastline of thethe directed the Liberty to sendsend toto his his headquartersheadquarters daily U.A.R.,D.A.R., Israel,Israel, Lebanon,Lebanon, andand Syria,Syria, eacheach measuringmeasuring Sitreps and position reports andand inin those reportsreports to about 5Q-by-5050-by-50 miles. hiIn proposingproposing the fivefive operationaloperational include thethe PimPim for the nextnext 2424 hourshours andand anyany areas to the JCS,JCS, thethe Director,Director, NSANSA hadhad indicatedindicated commentson onstatus status ofof the ship. HeHe directeddirected thethe his preference,preference, basedbased onon wave wave propagationpropagation analysis of Liberty to depart forfor thethe easterneastern MediterraneanMediterranean whenwhen U.D.A.R. A.R. communications, forfor operational area threethree ready, provided guidelinesguidelines forfor itsits staying within inter-inter (32:00-33:00N toto 34:00E) if operationaloperational and safetysafety national waters, and asked for adherenceadherence to estab-estab factors did not dictate otherwise.'otherwise. 10° With the territorialterritorial lished communications procedures forfor thethe region. NSA limits establishedestablished by MiddleMiddle East countriescountries in mind,mind, also received the situationsituation reportsreports beingbeing requiredrequired byby JCS subsequentlysubsequently directeddirected thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, Europe andand Commander-in-Commander-in Europe to deploy the Liberty to operational area three Chief, U.S.V.S. NavyNavy EuropeEurope andand used these, alongalong withwith with closest point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya, I ship positionspositions given in Liberty's daily informal tech-tech and the U.A.R.U.A.R. ofof 13 13 nauticalnautical milesmiles duringduring transit.transit. nical summaries, to plot on a routineroutine basisbasis thethe coursecourse On arrival in operational areaarea three,three, CPA was to be ! 8 of the Liberty.Liberty! 12.5 nm to the U.A.R.U.A.R. andand 6.5 nm nm to to Israel."Israel. II ActingActing (U) At Rota, the Liberty prepared for its upon the JCSJCS messagemessage for for Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Eu-Eu deployment toto the easterneastern Mediterranean,Mediterranean, taking on_on., rope and after hearinghearing from the Liberty that it hadhad -SEeRET-SPOKESHCRHT SPOKB- 17 SECRH'I' (U) The The Liberty docked inin Rota,Rota, Spain,Spain, to be be readiedreadied forfor deploymentdeployment to thethe easterneastern Mediterranean. InIn Rota, the operationaloperational control of the Liberty was turned over toto the U.S.U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe,Europe,who who inin turnturn delegateddelegated thethe control to Admiral Admiral John S. McCain,McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Navy Europe.Europe. (Photograph courtesy of Robert L.L. Wilson.)Wilson.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) completed repairs to thethe TRSSCOMMTRSSCOMM hydraulichydraulic sys-sys the interceptintercept acquiredacquired directlydirectly fromfrom thethe airborneairborne tem, AdmiralAdmiral McCainMcCain directed the Liberty to follow follow collectors uponon their theirreturn return toto base. At thethe time,time, the scheduleschedule prescribedprescribedby byJCS. JCS.'12 TheThe Liberty then departed Rota on 2 June at 1230Z1230Z through thethe Strait L- ..1I waswas processingprocessingthe the interceptintercept of theths- of Gibraltar onon a a coursecourse paralleling the NorthNorth AfricanAfrican airborne collectorscollectors with NSANSA performingperforming the backuj:backup coastline. processing onon ArabicArabic languagelanguage materialsmaterials and retainingretainins: Air Force Security Service's TechnicalTechnical full responsibility for processingprocessing of interceptedDintercepted communications. Courier time for delivery of/tapesof tapes tctr Processing CenterCenter (U)(D) NSA I !waswas 72 hours. (s(8 CCO)GGO) While the Liberty was enroute to Rota (3 CCO) from Abidjan, NSA was arranging with the AirAir ForceForce Security Service (AFSS), now thethe Electronic SecuritySecurity Command, for moremore expeditiousexpeditious processingprocessing of Navy'sNavy's VQ-2 EC-121 andand Air Force's C-130 intercept, whichwhich had increasedincreased considerablyconsiderably from the nownow dailydaily flightsflights off thethe Israeli and U.A.R.U.A.R. coastline.coastline. TheThe objectiveobjective waswas to establishestablish aa technicaltechnical processingprocessing center (TPC)(TPC) forfor 18 -Reettef-SHCRH'f IIkNBLB ViA eOr.HN'f elIANNBLS ONL\' 1. 4. (c) SECRET and 3333 otherother addresseesaddressees includingincluding thethe Commander,Commander, Sixth Fleet thatthat asas of of 0001Z,000lZ, 7 June,June, thethe Liberty would bebe guardingguarding thethe fleet broadcast from the NavalNaval CommunicationsStation Station atat Asmara,Asmara, Ethiopia,Ethiopia, whichwhich served the eastern Mediterranean.Mediterranean. InIn accordanceaccordance withwith customary communications procedures, the Liberty would guardguard thethe fleetfleetlJroadcast broadcast of thethe NavalNaval Com-Com I munications Station,Station, Morocco, until until itit reachedreached the (S-CCO)is GOO) I eastern Mediterranean.Mediterranean. (U) The Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.U.S.S. NavyNavy Europe apprised Commander, SixthSixth Fleet, ViceVice Ad- Ad miral William 1. I. Martin,Martin, onon 33 June,June, thatthat the Liberty'sLiberty's mission waswas to conductconduct anan "extended"extended independentindependent surveillance operationoperation inin thethe eastern Mediterranean"Mediterraneair' I and that SixthSixth FleetFleet mightmight bebe calledcalled uponupon to to provideprovide (C-CCO)te-eeej When the TPCTPC becamebecame operationaloperational onon logistic andand otherother support.support.'17 ·EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) 1 June,June, thethe linguists,linguists, divideddivided intointo fourfour operationaloperational (U) With the outbreakoutbreak of the warwar on 5 shifts, processed thethe tapes as theythey werewere broughtbrought into June, thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. NavyNavy EuropeEurope in the TPC compoundfrom fromthe the aircraft,aircraft, andand the ana-ana a messagemessage toto the Commander,Commander, Sixth Fleet and others lysts/reporters issued theirtheir contentscontents withwith aa minimumminimum took note of thethe movementmovement ofof somesome 2020 SovietSoviet warshipswarships of delay as Critics,Critics, Spots,Spots, electrigrams,electrigrams, or.or in thethe with supporting vessels andand an estimated 88 or 99 SovietSoviet technical supplements to post-mission flightflight reports.reports.'13 submarines intointo the easterneastern MediterraneanMediterranean andand Ae-Ae Enroute to Operational Operational Area Three (U) gean and, alongalong with otherother guidance,guidance,instructed instructed ViceVice Admiral Martin to keep his shipsships aridand aircraftaircraft at leastleast 100 nm away away from the coastscoasts ofof Lebanon,Lebanon, Syria,Syria, (C,(8 CCO)GGO) On 29 May in a a messagemessage toto USN-855,USN-855, Israel, and thethe U.A.R.U.A.R. andand at leastleast 2525 nm nm away away from from the Director, NSA had outlined the missionmission for the Cyprus."Cyprus. 1M The Commander,Commander, Sixth Fleet directeddirected hishis Liberty during its voyagevoyage toto the easterneastern Mediterra-Mediterra units to complycomply later/thatlater that day."day.19 NeitherNeither thethe Com-Com nean, the changingchanging geographical and hearability con-con mander-in-Chief,U.S. U.S. NavyNavy Europe nor the Com-Com siderations to governgovern specific collection activityactivity during mander, Sixth .FleetFleet directivesdirectives includedincluded specificspecific in-in the trip.trip. TheThe Director,Director, NSANSA designateddesignated USN-855USN-855 structions to.the U.S.S. Liberty. positions forfor searchsearch and development of Moroccan HF, structions to the U.S.S. Liberty. VHF, UHF, andand radioprinterradioprinter communicationscommunications andand (0 GOO) Liberty was to the southsouth ofof ItalyItaly whenwhen Algerian HF,HF, VHF, andand possiblepossible VHFVHF multichannelmultichannel the SixSix DayDay War broke out. With thethe war'swar's inception, inception, communications. USN-855 was toto forward by electrical the Liberty assumed a readiness condition, and USN-USN transmission technical summaries of MoroccanMoroccan andand 855 began to keepkeep abreast ofof eventsevents fromfrom NSANSA andand Algerian communications to to NSA, withwith informationinformation field sitesite Sigint ReadinessReadiness Crayon andand other reportsreports copies going tol I on the MiddleMiddle East situation and,and, ofof course,course, from its and couriercourier delivery ofof tapes and traffictraffic toto NSA'sNSA's own intercept.intercept.',0 MembersMembers ofof thethe USN-855USN-855 feltfelt somesome 14 Middle East Office,Office, G6.' G6. 4 apprehension as they approachedapproached whatwhat theythey nownow knew knew (8-000) Liberty's move intointo thethe MediterraneanMediterranean to be a a war war zone; zone; they appreciated perhaps more than proceededaccording accordingto toplan. plan.It It reportedreported thatthat it before thethe need for general quartersquarters drills, but theythey overtookand and passedpassed threethree Soviet ships during its took comfort fromfrom theirtheir noncombatant statusstatus and, ofof passage throughthrough thethe Strait ofof Gibraltar.'Gibraltar;'? FollowingFollowing course, the visibilityvisibility ofof thethe flag.flag. One One USN-855USN-855 survivorsurvivor the NorthNorth AfricanAfrican coastline,coastline, itsits collectioncollection positionspositions recalls beingbeing toldtold that"that "...if...if anythinganything werewere to to happenhappen were on the prescribedprescribed AlgerianAlgerian andand MoroccanMoroccan com-com we were withinwithin tenten minutes ofof air strike andand help.help. munications. OrientationOrientation andand trainingtraining for the mainmain None of usus werewere veryveryworried worried...."'...."21 objective, U.A.R. communications,communications, detracted some-some what from performance on the secondarysecondary AlgerianAlgerian and (0-000) While it was was neitherneither NSA'sNSA's responsi-responsi Moroccanassignments, assignments,but butthis this waswas toto bebe expected.expected.'16 bility nor intention to adjudgeadjudge the safetysafety factorsfactors ofof (U) At 1330Z, 1330Z, 2 JuneJune thethe Liberty in-in the Liberty's mission, inin view ofof the outbreakoutbreak ofof formed the NavyNavy MovementMovement ReportReport OfficeOffice in in LondonLondon hostilities, NSA's Gene Sheck and DickDick HarveyHarvey diddid -REeRETSECRET 1919 'fOP SECRECf UMBRA ask the NSANSA liaison officerofficer to tothe the JCS/JRC,JCS/JRC, Mr.Mr. J. intelligence interest,interest, or engageengage in harassment."harassment." Ad-Ad Connell, onon 55 June ifif anyany considerationconsideration waswas beingbeing miral Martin also instructed the Liberty to copy copy the given therethere toto a changechange in the Liberty's operational fleet broadcast andand toto use his fast carriercarrier tasktask forceforce area. TheyThey remindedreminded Connell thatthat duringduring thethe 19621962 (TF-60) tactical circuits ifif necessary.necessary."25 LibertyLiberty did not Cuban missile crisiscrisis five yearsyears earlier the U.S.S.V.S.S. receive, forfor oneone reasonreasonor oranother, another, thisthis message.message.'26 Oxford had been pulled back from the Havana area. (U)(V) On 7 June atat 0800Z0800Z the Liberty was The NSANSA concernconcern was for for thethe technicaltechnical collectioncollection off the coastcoast ofof thethe U.A.R.V.A.R. andand approachingapproaching opera-opera arrangements which wouldwouldhave haveto to bebe adjustedadjusted if the tional areas twotwo andand three.three. DespiteDespite thethe ImmediateImmediate Liberty was to be withdrawn.withdrawn. TheThe NSANSA liaisonliaison officerofficer Precedence assignedassigned toto the Liberty's Sitrep/Posit re-re discussed the matter withwith JRC'sJRC's ship-movementship-movement officerofficer port at 0908Z,0908Z, 7 June,June, givinggiving its positionposition at 0800Z0800Z at and thenthen advisedadvised Sheck and HarveyHarvey that nono actionaction 33-06N 28-54E, itit took, according toto a JCSJCS postmor-postmor was then under consideration."consideration. 22 tem report,report, somesome fifteenfifteen and one-halfone-half hours for the (U)(V) On 6 June, asas it it was was passingpassing betweenbetween Liberty's position reportreport to reachreach thethe Commander,Commander, Libya and Crete, the Liberty reported to Sixth FleetFleet Sixth Fleet, the action addressee.raddressee.'' Liberty was now now that itsits TRSSCOMM,TRSSCOMM, whichwhich had had had malfunctionsmalfunctions inin guarding thethe fleet broadcastbroadcast ofof thethe NavalNaval Communi-Communi its powerpower supply andand hydraulic systemssystems onon thethe trip cations Station, Asmara. OnOn this day aa numbernumber ofof from Rota, was again operating satisfactorily and, inin actions were under way to minimize the appearance ofof reply to a a Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Navy EuropeEurope U.S. involvementinvolvement inin thethe MiddleMiddle East hostilitieshostilities andand query concerningconcerning Pims not beingbeing received,received, providedprovided to changechange the Libert'sLiberty's operational0 erational area. the date-timedate-time groupgroup ofof PimsPims previouslypreviously sent. (~SC) ~(3C) USN-855'sVSN-855's communications onon thethe 6th to NSA NSA were were normal -— itsits 24-hour24-hour summarysummary for 5 June, itsits informalinformal technicaltechnical summary no.no. 3,3, a SpotSpot Ireport, itsits follow-upfollow-up to to al~ ~ I and otherother reportsreports allall beingbeing receivedreceived withoutwithout commu-commu nication difficulties. ItIt waswas also also in in satisfactorysatisfactory com-com- munication with(wit~ lin thisthis period."period. 23 (U)(V) On this samesame day, 6 June,June, thethe Com-Com mander-in-Chief,U.S. U.S. Navy Europe toldtold the Com-Com-l mander, SixthSixth FleetFleet thatthat thethe Liberty was to comecome under his operationaloperational control at 00012,OOOl.Z, 7 JuneJune 19671967 in order "to facilitatefacilitate area command and control and any possiblepossible requirement for protectionprotection during the ~ In a message toto the Commander, Sixth Middle EastEast hostilities" andand pointedpointed\.out out thatthat thethe Fleet, the JCSJCS tooktook notenote ofof new new U.A.R.V.A.R. allegations,allegations, Liberty's schedule might be revisedrevised for safety reasonsreasons possibly derivedderived inin JCS'sJCS's opinion fromfrom thethe U.A.R.'sV.A.R.'s "as dictateddictated by the locallocalsituation. situation."',,24 LibertLibertyy acknowl-acknowl I Ito the effecteffect that U.S.U. S. personnelpersonnel edged the instructionsinstructions concerningconcerning its operationaloperational con-con. were in communicationcommunication with Israel andand werewere possiblypossibly trol atat 2036Z2036Z on thethe 6th.6th. Liberty's commanding providing militarymilitary assistance. EquallyEqually concernedconcerned about officer, Commander McGonagle,McGonagle,also also told\\told the ComCom the earlierearlier U.A.R.U. A.R. allegations thatthat U.U.S. S. aircraft hadhad mander, Sixth Fleet that thethe shipship waswas in in a a "Readiness"Readiness participated inin the IsraeliIsraeli air strikesstrikes againstagainst thethe Condition Three-Modified" and reminded his superiorsuperior U.A.R., the JCSJCS askedasked forfor assuranceassurance fromfrom Vice Vice Ad- Ad that thethe ship'sship's "self-defense"self-defense capability"capability" waswas limitedlimited miral Martin that hishis aircraftaircraft werewere notnot withinwithin 200200 to fourfour .50-caliber.50-caliber machine guns and small arms. miles ofof thethe U.U.A.R., A.R., Syria,Syria, oror IsraelIsrael andand thatthat therethere (U)(V) Three hourshours laterlater thethe Commander,Commander, were no Sixth Fleet communicationscommunications oror other contacts Sixth FleetFleet cautionedcautioned itsits new new chargecharge byby messagemessage to with Israel.Israel.2919 TheThe Commander,Commander, SixthSixth FleetFleet repliedreplied "maintain aa high high statestate ofof vigilancevigilance against attack oror negatively, observing onlyonlythat that radio voice circuits had threat ofof attack"attack" inin view view of of thethe "unpredictability"unpredictability ofof been established with the AmericanAmerican Embassy in Tel U.A.R.V.A.R. actions." He directed the Liberty to reportreport byby Aviv andand thatthat transmissionstransmissions so far hadhad onlyonly beenbeen forfor Flash precedenceprecedence anyany threatening actions orror "anyany testing purposes."purposes. 30 diversion from schedule necessitated by externalext~rnaf (8 eeO) Studying the successfulsuccessful Israeli drivedrive threat" andand toto submitsubmit "reports"reports ofof contactcontact withwith ships,ship$, into U.A.R.V.A.R. territory, thethe Director,Director, NSANSA decided thatthat aircraft, andand submarinessubmarines whichwhich areare unidentified,unidentified, qfdf the Liberty's opportunity for effectiveeffective collectioncollection ofof 20 40P-REGRE-T-441BRA-'FOP SECRB'F UM:BRA EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) CONPIDENTIAL U.A.R. communications might mightbest best taketake place inin 20 nm CPA, JRC's MajorMajor Breedlove,Breedlove, skippingskipping normalnormal operationalarea area twotwo toto the westwest of of thethe originallyoriginally Commander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope channels, onon Vocom Yocom specifiedarea areathree. three. TheThe Director, NSA asked at called Commander-in-Chief, U.S. NavyNavy Europe's com-com 2104Zthat that thethe JCS/JRCJCS/JRC change the Liberty's schedule mand center to conveyconvey thethe JCS/JRC decisiondecision and to "to satisfy technical requirements." Since this request direct that the Liberty be moved moved back to a CPA CPA of of reached thethe JCS/JRCJCS/JRC as the latterlatter waswas havinghaving secondsecond 100 nmnm toto the coasts of Israel, U.U.A.R., A.R., and Syria and thoughts aboutabout the Liberty, no action would be taken a CPA ofof 2525 nmnm toto Cyprus.Cyprus. HeHe indicatedindicated to Lieutenant on the NSA request. E. L. Galavotti, thethe operationsoperations duty officer there,there, thatthat a confirmingconfirming JCSJCS messagemessage wouldwould follow. follow. BreedloveBreedlove Directions to Withdraw Withdraw the LihertyLiberty (U) explained thethe urgency ofof thethe matter "because"because timetime (C(0 CCO)000) In view ofof thethe sensitivity regarding the [was] gettinggetting shortshort toto where sheshe will be in in thosethose U.A.R. chargescharges ofof U.S. complicitycomplicity with Israel andand limits." GalavottiGalavotti saidsaid hehe would would go toto Sixth Fleet right following a aquestion questionfrom fromthe the US.U.S. Chief ofof NavalNaval away and hadhad anan appropriateappropriate messagemessage readyready byby Operations aboutabout the wisdomwisdom ofof Liberty's assignment 080001Zfor for releaserelease byby hishis superiors toto Sixth Fleet.Fleet. in thethe warwar zone;"zone,' thethe JCS/JRCJCS/JRC mademade aa new new assessmentassessment Some fourteen minutesminutes afterafter callingcalling Commander-in-Commander-in of the danger inherent in thethe Liberty's operations. Chief, U.S.U. S. NavyNavy Europe,Europe, BreedloveBreedlove called the Com-Com JRC considered thethe distancedistance of the Liberty from the mander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope JRCJRC watchwatch officer,officer, informinginforming Sixth Fleet, some 300300 toto 400 miles. After it learnedlearned him of the verbal requestrequest toto NAVEURNAVEUR and telling him from NSANSA thethe degree toto whichwhich thethe collectioncollection missionmission that NAVEURNAVEUR hadhad promisedpromisedto totake takeaction. action.'35 wouldsuffer sufferif if thethe ship'sship's CPACPA was was changed,changed;"32 JRCJRC (U) Within the Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. decided toto accept the missionmission degradation. At the Navy Europe command center,center, an unfortunateunfortunate delaydelay time ofof thesethese deliberations -— 2300Z, 77 JuneJune —- the took place, however, inin relayingrelaying thisthis JCS/JRCJCS/JRC instrucinstruc- Liberty arrived on station in operational area three. tion to thethe SixthSixth FleetFleet forfor action.action. MindfulMindful thatthat thisthis (U) In a a messagemessage conveyingconveying thethe sensesense ofof directive had skippedskipped channelschannels andand waswas only only verbal,verbal, urgencythen then developingdevelopingin in thethe Pentagon staff, JCS Galavotti's superior,superior, CaptainCaptain M.M. J.J. Hanley, Jr., Dep-Dep expressedconcern concernin in aa message at 2230Z2230Z to to Com- Com uty Chief of Staff, U.S. NavyNavy Europe, directed that mander-in-Chief,Europe Europeover overthe the MiddleMiddle EastEast situasitua- the messagemessage toto Sixth Fleet not be releasedreleased until the tion andand statedstated that thethe JCS-directedJCS-directed operationaloperational area date-time groupgroup ofof thethe JCSJCS confirmingconfirming messagemessage was at for the Liberty was "for guidanceguidance only" and couldcould be hand. NAVEURNAVEUR policy allowed forfor acceptance of oral "varied as locallocal conditionsconditions dictate."dictate." JCS alsoalso in-in instructions from higher headquarters toto move move shipsships structed thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Europe to changechange and aircraftaircraft onlyonly if if given given by by flag flag or or generalgeneral officersofficers or CPA toto thethe U.A.R. toto 20 nm, to IsraelIsrael 1515 nm."nm. 33 if firm firm evidenceevidence of a a messagemessage directivedirective werewere providedprovided Althougha a copycopy ofof thethe message was toto have gone to -— for example,example, the date-timedate-time groupgroup ofof a a confirmingconfirming the Liberty, it would would notnot reach thethe ship prior to the message. InsteadInstead of releasingreleasing the message,message, CaptainCaptain attack. TheThe DepartmentDepartment ofof ArmyArmy CommunicationsCommunications Hanley told thethe NAVEURNAVEUR commandcommand center dutyduty Center inin error sent itit to to thethe NavalNaval CommunicationsCommunications officer, CommanderCommander C.C. G.G. Jorgensen, to appriseapprise Com-Com Station in the Pacific.Pacific.34 mander-in-Chief,Europe Europeof ofthe thematter matter andand ask that (U) Further deliberationdeliberation within the JCS/JCS/ headquarters toto obtain the date-timedate-time groupgroup of thethe JRC following discussions discussionswith withthe the Chief of NavalNaval confirmingJCS JCS message. JorgensenJorgensen thenthen called the Operations, who waswas pressing for a 100-mile100-mile CPA for U.S.US. EuropeanEuropean Command'sCommand's (EUCOM)(EUCOM) commandcommand duty the Liberty, now resultedresulted in a JCSJCS decisiondecision toto move move officer atat 080030Z, who indicatedindicated he would would check and the Liberty well offoff thethe hostile shoreline. Contributing call back. TheThe JCSJCS confirmingconfirming message,message, JCSJCS 080110Z08011 OZ to the decision,decision, as JRC'sJRC's CaptainCaptain MerriwellMerriwell VineyardVineyard was, of course, notnot yetyet releasedreleasedat at the time of the (USN) toldtold NSA's JRC representative, JohnJohn Connell,Connell, call. ItsIts transmissiontransmission by thethe DepartmentDepartment ofof ArmyArmy late on the 7th,7th, waswas thethe desiredesire ofof GeneralGeneral Wheeler,Wheeler, CommunicationsCenter Centerin in thethe PentagonPentagon toto Com- Com Chairman,JCS, JCS, toto support inin any wayway the U.S.US. mander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope waswasat at 080211Z.080211Z.'36 position takentaken atat the U.N.UN. inin answeranswer to U.A.R. chargescharges (U) Not hearinghearing from the higherhigher head-head of complicity. U.S.U.S. Ambassador ArthurArthur J. GoldbergGoldberg quarters, CommanderCommander Jorgensen repeatedrepeated hishis call at had stated on the 6th6th toto thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil that 0325Z onon 88 JuneJune toto check againagain onon thethe statusstatus of the "All Sixth Fleet aircraft areare andand havehave beenbeen severalseveral action and again asked EUCOM toto obtainobtain a date-time hundred miles fromfrom thethe area ofof conflict."conflict." group, this time speakingspeaking with a dutyduty officerofficer in the (U) At 2350Z, oneone hourhour afterafter the JCS had JRC sectionsection of EUCOM,EUCOM, Lieutenant ColonelColonel C.C. K. given itsits instructions restricting the Liberty to thethe 15-15- Russell. European Command's delaydelay ofof threethree hours in HAN"BLE VIA C01fHN'f CHANNELS ONLY -eeiffif3ENTIA-COKPIDENTIAL 2121 UNCLASSIFIED responding toto NANAVEURVEUR hadhad resulted from itsits assump-assump preparations onon boardboard thethe D.S.S.U.S.S. America for a presspress tion, basedbased onon Breedlove'sBreedlove's call fromfrom thethe JCS/JRC,JCS/JRC, conferencerelating relatingto to thethe U.A.R. chargescharges of U.S.V.S. that NAVEURNAVEUR waswas alreadyalready takingtaking action.action.37 ShortlyShortly complicity withwith IsraelIsrael inin the prosecutionprosecution of the warwar thereafter, Russell waswas able toto give give JorgensenJorgensen thethe and to SixthSixth Fleet'sFleet's needneed toto transmittransmit otherother traffictraffic of required JCSJCS date-time group, the messagemessage havinghaving equal or higher precedence.r"precedence.' MeanwhileMeanwhile Liberty was, just arrived in thethe EUCOMEVCOM JRCJRC dutyduty officer'sofficer's hands, of course, already in its operationaloperational area. ItsIts positionposition but thisthis waswas aboutabout thethe samesame timetime asas NAVEUR'sNAVEUR's at 080800Z080800Z was within 3030 nm of 31-45N31-45N 33-30E33-30E inin information copycopy ofof JCSJCS 080110Z,080110Z, thethe confirmingconfirming area three. message, arrived in thethe NAVEURNAVEUR commandcommand centercenter (U)(V) When itit rains,rains, itit pours,pours, andand therethere would bebe eveneven further delaysdelays inin thethe attempts to get get itself —- thethe time,time, 0325Z,0325Z, 88 June.June. AA preciousprecious fourfour the wordword to the Liberty. hours had gone by since MajorMajor Breedlove'sBreedlove's call. (U)(V) JCS's investigating team,team, the U.S.U.S. (U)(V) Commander Jorgensen thenthen asked for Navy CourtCourt of Inquiry, and later aa congressionalcongressional staff a telecontelecon with Sixth Fleet'sFleet's staffstaff dutyduty officerofficer and at gave close attentionattention to the Sixth FleetFleet messagemessage to the 080355Z was experiencing difficulties in establishingestablishing Liberty, following the thestatus status ofof the messagemessage in thethe contact because of atmosphericatmospheric conditions. He thenthen critical hours before itit came under attack.attack. Essentially, had his radioradio operatoroperator contact Sixth FleetFleet laylAy singlesingle the findingsfindings were these: sideband radioradio andand requestrequest thethe telecon as soon soon as as possible. The two-waytwo-way telecon with Sixth Fleet beganbegan Time Status at 080410Z.080410Z. 0630Z, 8 JuneJune Sixth FleetFleet StaffStaff DutyDuty OfficerOfficer hadhad message ready for release by Assistant (U)(D) When the Sixth FleetFleet staffstaff dutyduty officerofficer Chief of Staff (Operations).(Operations). told JorgensenJorgensen his command did not have JCS 080110Z080110Z 0917Z Message released withwith ImmediateImmediate as yetyet (the(the ArmyArmy CommunicationsCommunications Center,Center, Pentagon,Pentagon, Precedence. having misrouted this message to Hawaii),Hawaii), JorgensenJorgensen 1035Z Message transmittedtransmitted toto the NavalNaval passed it to to himhim threethree timestimes beforebefore gaininggaining an ac- ac Communications Station, Morocco,Morocco, knowledgement atat 080440Z fromfrom thethe SixthSixth Fleet's duty for relay to thethe Liberty, the delaysdelays officer, who was having difficulty in hearing NAVEUR. owing toto the transmission of equal oror Jorgensen thenthen sentsent aa confirmingconfirming message:message: "From"From higher precedence messages. Unaware CINCNAVEURCINCNAVEDR CommandCommandDuty Duty Officer to COM-COM that thethe Liberty, pursuant toto its in-in SIXTHFLT Duty Officer.Officer. Be advised that JCSJCS 080110Z0801lOZ structions, waswas now now guarding the fleetfleet FORAC. Official msg follows." broadcast of thethe NavalNaval Communica-Communica tions Station, Asmara,Asmara, thethe SixthSixth (U)(V) Ironically, thethe Sixth Fleet'sFleet's dutyduty offi-offi Fleet routingrouting clerk erred inin sendingsending cer then indicatedindicated to JorgensenJorgensen thatthat Sixth Fleet diddid this messagemessage toto Morocco.Morocco. not hold referencereference (a) on the criticalcritical JCSJCS messagemessage andand 1050Z Message receivedreceived atat the NavalNaval Com-Com asked for a copy. copy. SinceSince NAVEURNAVEUR alsoalso waswas without a munications Station, Morocco,Morocco, andand copy of the referenced message, despite both NAVEUR passed over DefenseDefense CommunicationsCommunications and SixthSixth Fleet'sFleet's havinghaving beenbeen designateddesignated forfor infor-infor System to DCSDCS station,station, Asmara.Asmara. mation copies (JCS(JCS 7337/072230Z),7337/072230Z), JorgensenJorgensen wouldwould Through error, the AsmaraAsmara DCS stasta- obtain it fromfrom Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Europe and later, tion sent thethe messagemessage to thethe NavalNaval on obtaining aa copy, outline toto the Sixth Fleet'sFleet's dutyduty CommunicationsStation, Station, Greece, at officer itsits contents whichwhich had,had, byby that time,time, beenbeen 1238Z. TheThe latterlatter sent it back to the Asmara DCS station. overtaken by events. 1510Z Asmara DCS station delivereddelivered the (U)(D) From 080440Z June 67 it became the it became the message toto thethe NavalNaval Communica-Communica Commander, SixthSixth Fleet's responsibility toto direct the tions Station. Liberty to a a safersafer areaarea ofof operationsoperations than the one in 1525Z Naval CommunicationsCommunications Station, As-As which she was thenthen steering.steering. ViceVice AdmiralAdmiral Martin'sMartin's mara, putput thethe messagemessage on itsits fleetfleet message to the Liberty, directing it notnot toto approachapproach broadcast. the coastcoast ofof thethe U.A.R.,D.A.R., Syria,Syria, oror IsraelIsrael closercloser thanthan 100 nm, wentwent outout somesome fourfour andand one-halfone-half hourshours later, The Liberty would not receivereceive the criticalcritical messagemessage inin at 080917Z,080917Z, the delay in this casecase beingbeing attributed to time. 22 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED SECRET SPOKE (U) The actionaction messagesmessages directingdirecting with-with LihertysLiberty's Processing Mission (U)(U) drawal of the Liberty to aa CPA CPA of of 100 100 nm were three in number: JCS 080110Z,OBOllOZ, Sixth Fleet 080917ZOB0917Z referredreferred to in the foregoing, andand Commander-in-Chief, Europe's (3-CCO)(8 eeO) On station inin operationaloperational area three, 080625Z toto NAVEURNAVEUR confirming informal exchangesexchanges USN-855's processingprocessingand and reporting constituted a giving actionaction onon thethe JCS messagemessage to NAVEUR.NAVEUR. Infor-Infor complex undertaking.undertaking. It waswas to provideprovide daily technical mation copies ofof thethe JCS and thethe CINCEURCINCEUR actionaction summaries forfor use by by otherother collectorscollectors andand NSA,NSA, messageswere were to to havehave gonegone toto the U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty, enabling themthem toto remainremain upup toto date on the Liberty's and it is, is, of of course,course, entirelyentirely possiblepossible thatthat timelytimely operation. Upon completion of its deployment,deployment, USN-USN- receipt of these mightmight havehave triggeredtriggered aa withdrawalwithdrawal ~W855 was.. to provide;:~Vide traffict,allie and unprocessedunpwe"..d tap"tapes totO EQEO 1.1.4.(c)4 . (c) action onon thethe part of the Liberty's Commander Mc-Me NSA EQEO 1.1.4.(d)4 . (d) 142 I Gonagle. ButBut thethe same unkind fatefate guarding the action messages waswas alsoalso lookinglookingafter after thethe information copies.copies. (0-CCO)(e eeO) The war had changed thethe status of the These too ran intointo communicationscommunications problemsproblems of one one U.A.R.'sU. A.R. 's ArmedArmed ForcesForces and hadhad diminisheddiminished signifi-signifi kind or another, and thethe Liberty would not receivereceive cantly the Liberty's opportunity toto collectcollect thethe specifiedspecified them."them. 39 communications. MuchMuch ofof thethe U.A.R.'sU.A.R. 's Air Air ForceForce no longer existed,existed, itsits ArmyArmy was in disarray,disarray, andand com-com Operational AreaArea Three,Three, 88 June (U) munications had declineddeclined accordingly.accordingly. (C(8 CCO)eeO) Once onon stationstation off PortPort Said in oper-oper Notes ational area three,three, USN-855USN-855 employedemployed itsits collectioncollection SourceSounedowmentsare'nthe"CrisisCollection"oftheNSAHistt;l,.y documents are in the "Crisis Collection" of the RSA History nositionspositionsorimarilv primaril toto levelopdevelon U.A.R.IU.A.R.I Collection.Cullett/ofL "EOE0 1.4. (c) Icommunicationscommunications II '(U)I (V) Julie Alger,Alger, "A Review Review of the TechnicalTechnical Re-Re- search ShipShip Program,Program, 1961-1969,"1961-1969," 11 MayMay 1970.1970. '(C-CCO)'(8-886) Source documents used for informationinformation onon Liberty's mode of operation include: NSA Station FacilitiesFacilities BookBook - V.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855);(VSN-855); (V)(U) NSA OPINS No. 2855,2855, Manual of U.S. SigintSigint Operations,Operations, 12 Mar 1965;1965; (U)(V) JCSJCS messagemessage cite no.no. 5838, 052235Z NovNov 65;65; and (U) NSA NSA oral oral historyhistory interviewinterview withwith Terry L. McFarlandMcFarland onon 2323 JunJun 1980.1980. '(V)3(U) JCS msgmsg citecite no.no. 6499,6499, 291602Z291602Z MayMay 1967.1967. 4(V)4(U) COMSERVRON 8 msg, 240020Z240020Z May 1967.1967. '(V)5(U) Liberty msg, 241732Z May 1967.1967. '(U)6(V) USCINCEUR msg, 300932Z May 1967.1967. 'RD'(U) USCINCEURVSCINCEUR msg 010035Z Jun 1967.1967. '(U)'(V) NSA Staff, "Informal Paper onon Liberty's Com- munications," 22 Jun 1967;1967; NSANSA oral historyhistory interviewinterview withwith Gene Gene Sheck on 1111 AugAug 1980.1980. '(C2(8 CCO)886) Source documents relating to Liberty's prepa- rations at RotaRota include:include: DIRNSADIRNSA msgmsg to to NSAEURNSAEUR Office,Office, Germany, i'Sf3t-(CC) The Liberty had nono specificspecific assign-assign 26 May 1967;1967; DIRNSADIRNSA msg to USN-855,VSN-855, 252317Z252317Z May 1967;1967; and DIRNSA msg, 232133Z May 1967. ment to intercept IsraeliIsraeli communicationscommunications while it was was DIRNSA msg, 232133Z May 1967. 10(V)l°(U) DIRNSA msg to JCS/JRC, 292013Z292013Z May 1967.1967. in operational areaarea three. OmissionOmission of this taskingtasking "(U)"(V) JCS msg msg cite no.no. 6724,6724, 011545Z011545Z Jun 1967.1967. was, inin part, owingowing to thethe lacklack ofof HebrewHebrew linguists.linguists. 1212(V)(U) Liberty msg to CINCNAVEUR,CINCNAVEUR, 021132Z021132Z Jun But on the morning of 8 June its VHFVHF search positionspositions 1967; CINCNAVEUR msg, 020717Z JunJun 1967.1967. did produce threethree tapestapes of Israeli air traffic.traffic. TheThe "(U)"(V) Source documents used in discussion of the Air contents were,were, asas determineddetermined later,later, routine operational Force's TPC include: ESC, History of the 6931st6931st SecuritySecurity Group,Group, messages. AsAs aa by-product of searchingsearching for U.A.R.U.A.R. 1 Jan-30Jan-3D JunJun 1967;1967; NSA Staff, "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16 Jun 1967;1967; NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection inin thethe Middle East,"East," communicationsin in thethe Sinai, USN-855USN-855 alsoalso identifiedidentified undated; NSA Staff (G62),(062), "Briefing onon the 19671967 MiddleMiddle EastEast some 2222 frequenciesfrequenciesas as Israeli,Israeli, butbut again there waswas Crisis," undated. nothing relatablerelatable inin any wayway to to thethe forthcomingforthcoming 'I4(V)4(U) DIRNSA msg to USN-855,VSN-855, 292201Z292201Z May 1967.1967. attack.attack."41 1515(V)(U) Liberty msg, 022108Z Jun 1967.1967. -REeRETSECRET-SPOKE- 2323 CONFIDENTIAL 16'"(U)(U) NSA oral historyhistory interview,interview, Terry L. Mc- Mc- "(U)2s(U) NSA Staff (G62), "Briefing on the 1967 1967 Middle Farland, 2323 Jun 1980. 1980. East Crisis," undated. 17"(U)(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg 031016Z Jun 1967. 1967. 29'"(U)(U) JCS msg msg cite no.no. 7239, 7239, 070259Z 070259Z Jun 1967. 1967. "(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msgs, 051352 and 051850Z 051850Z 30'o(U)(U) COMSIXTHFLT msgsmsgs toto JCS, 070626Z070626Z and Jun 1967.1967. 071503Z JunJun 1967.1967. ''"(U)9(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg, 052015 Jun 1967.1967. 31"(U)(U) Russ Report, p. 19. 19. "(U) NSA Staff,Staff, "Report"Report to the Director,"Director," 1212 Jun 20,o(U)(U) NSA oral history interview, Robert L.L. Wilson, Wilson, 6 May May 1980; 1980; DIRNSADIRNSA msgmsg to USN-855,USN-855, 252317Z252317Z May May 1967. 1967. 1967, chronology section. "(U) JCS msg cite no. 7337 to CINC- "(U)ti(u) NSA 'oral history interviews withwith Robert L. "(U) JCS msg cite no. 7337 to CINC- Wilson onon 66 May 1980 andand with Paddy E. Rhodes on 13 June 1980.1980. EUR with information copy to Liberty, 072230Z Jun 1967.1967. 34"(U)(U) Russ Report, pp. 35, 36. "(U)22(U) NSA Staff, "Report"Report to the Director,"Director," 1212 Jun 35"(U)(U) Russ Report, p.p. 23; 23; NAVEUR NAVEUR ContingencyContingency 1967; House Appropriations Committee Surveys and InvestigationsInvestigations Watch Team,Team, "Memorandum-U.S.S."Memorandum-U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 12 JunJun Staff, A Report to the Committee on Appropriations - U.S. HouseHouse 1967; NSA Staff,Staff, "U.S.S. Liberty-Chronology,Liberty-Chronology, 2323 May-8May-8 Jun."Jun." of RepresentativesRepresentatives on the EffectivenessEffectiveness ofof thethe WorldwideWorldwide Commu-Commu "(U)'"(U) Russ Report, p. 23 and Tab 22 to to Annex Annex D. nications SystemsSystems andand Networks ofof the DepartmentDepartment of Defense,Defense, "(U)37(U) Ibid, p. 24. 24. vol. I, p. iv, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," December 1967. vol. I, p. iv, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," December 1967. "(U)'"(U) Ibid, pp.pp. 26-27. 26-27. 232'(U)(U) NSA Staff, "Informal"Informal Paper onon Liberty's 3939(U)(U) Detailed information on thethe communicationscommunications Communications," 22 Jun 1967. 1967. delays is in the RussRuss ReportReport andand also also in in thethe HouseHouse AppropriationsAppropriations 2424(U)(U) CINCNAVEURmsg msg toto SixthSixth Fleet, Liberty, Committee report cited in footnotefootnote 22.22. and others,others, 061357Z061357Z Jun 1967.1967. 4040(U)(U) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 1967. 1967. "(U)25(U) COMSIXTHFLT magmsg to Liberty and others,others, 414I(S(C CCO)SSQ) NSA Staff, "Note forfor thethe Director,Director, SigintSigint 062349Z JunJun 1967.1967. Reflection of Liberty Incident," 27 JunJun 1967;1967; (U) (U) NSA NSA Staff,Staff, 26 '"(U)(U) MG J. R. Russ, USA, "Report of the JCS Fact "Questions by Gen. Gen. Carroll,Carroll, Director,Director, DIADIA - -Answers Answers ProvidedProvided byby Finding Team-U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 Jun 1967,"1967," p. 17. 17. Here-Here G Group/PO4,"Group/PM," 27 Jun 1967.1967. after citedcited asas thethe RussRuss Report.Report. 424l(S4C CCO)SSQ) DIRNSA msg to USN-855, 022333Z Jun 1967;1967; "(U)27(U) Russ Report, p. 18. 18. NSA Staff, "Critique-SRB Crayon," 10 Jul 1968.1968. 24 eONFIDBNCfIAL II/..NB"bB ';1/.. GOMIN'I' GlIl.rNNB"bS ON"bY CONPfDENTIAL Chapter IVIV The Attack Attack (U) (U) (U) Thursday morning,morning, 8 June 1967,1967, found found (U) Later in thethe morning,morning, atat 10561056 hours,hours, the Liberty cruising slowly inin internationalinternational waters onon an aircraftaircraft similarsimilar toto an an AmericanAmerican flyingflying boxcarboxcar station as directed. AtAt approximatelyapproximately 08300830 hourshours (local(local crossed asternastern of the Liberty at a distance of aboutabout time), thethe Liberty notified the Commander,Commander, SixthSixth three toto five five miles. miles. The planeplane circledcircled the shipship aroundaround Fleet thatthat her positionposition for the nextnext 2424 hourshours wouldwould be the starboardstarboard side,side, proceededproceeded forwardforward of the shipship andand within 3030 nautical milesmiles of of coordinatescoordinates 31-45N31-45N andand headed back toward the SinaiSinai peninsula.peninsula. ThisThis recon-recon 33-30E.'33-30E.I The sea was calmcalm andand thethe clear sky permittedpermitted naissance was repeated atat approximatelyapproximately 30-minute30-minute visibility of of tenten miles; a lightlight breezebreeze ruffledruffled thethe intervals. It was was impossibleimpossible to see see any any identifyingidentifying Liberty's ensign.'ensign. 2 markings onon thethe aircraft. TheThe planeplane nevernever approachedapproached (U) Liberty's projected course forfor thatthat day the Liberty in a a provocativeprovocative manner and mademade nono was toto proceedproceedto to aa point 13 nautical miles from the attempt to signalsignal thethe ship. NorNor did did thethe Liberty U.A.R. coast at 31-27.2N,31-27.2N, 34-00E34-00E (Point(Point Alpha),Alpha), attempt toto signalsignal it.'it. 7SubsequentSubsequent investigationsinvestigations of the thence toto 31-22.3N, 33-42E (Point(Point Bravo), thencethence to attack onon thethe Liberty identifiedthe the aircraftaircraft asas a 31-31N, 33-00E33-00E(Point (Point Charlie)Charlie) retracingretracing thisthis track French-built Noratlas NORDNORD 2501, piloted by IsraeliIsraeli until new ordersorders were received.received. Normal steaming speed Air Force. was toto be five knotsknots and typical steamingsteaming colorscolors (which (which --tet"tet Though this planeplane waswas unidentified,unidentified, indicated conditions werewere normal) were flown.' flown.3 AA the thoughtsthoughts ofof RobertRobert L.L. WilsonWilson (one (one of threethree NSANSA "condition ofof readinessreadiness three,three, modified" waswas set;set; i.e., civilians aboard the Liberty) must havehave been been sharedshared a normalnormal steaming watch,watch, exceptexcept thatthat oneone manman waswas by his shipmates.shipmates. WilsonWilson rememberedremembered thinkingthinking whenwhen stationed atat eacheach ofof thethe forwardforward twotwo .50-caliber.50-caliber he saw the plane, that "it"it mustmust bebe IsraeliIsraeli becausebecause machine guns,guns, numbersnumbers 5151 and 52. Lookouts Lookouts on the what else is flying outout herehere atat this point in the warwar bridge werewere designateddesignated toto man machine guns 53 and and also also it's comingcoming from the directiondirection of Israel andand 54 justjust aft of the bridge,bridge, in the eventevent of a surprise air it's goinggoing back to Israel, so it was was obvious obvious thatthat itit was was or surface attack."attack.4 Israeli. I didn't thinkthink muchmuch ofof it. it. TheyThey werewere just outout (U) At aboutabout 09300930 hours,hours, itit waswas possible possible there checkingchecking us out. That'sThat's whatwhat I Iwould would do do too.tOO.,,8 s8 to visuallyvisually sightsight thethe minaret at AlAl `Arish'Arish on thethe (U)(V) Being sensitive toto itsits exposedexposed andand U.A.R. coast. This was used as a navigational aid and unprotected position, the Liberty reported toto thethe the ship'sship's positionposition was verified asas being being within itsits Naval Security Station Command,Command, atat approximatelyapproximately operating limits. ThereThere werewere no no otherother conspicuousconspicuous oror 1100 hours, that sheshe hadhad destroyeddestroyed allall supersededsuperseded outstanding navigationalnavigationalfeatures featuresin in thethe area."area.' May publications (e.g. crypto documents) and intended to destroydestroy allall irregularlyirregularly supersededsuperseded materialmaterial dailydaily Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U)(U) because of thethe "current situationsituation andand shallowshallow water in operating area.""area."' (U) Shortly before 0900 hours (Iocal(local time),time), two delta-wing,delta-wing, single-enginesingle-enginejet jetaircraft aircraft orbited the General Quarters Drill (U) Liberty three timestimes atat 31-27N,31-27N, 34-00E.34-00E. TheThe planes'planes' altitude was estimatedestimated atat 5,000 feet,feet, at aa distancedistance ofof (U)(V) After the lunchlunch hour, atat 13101310 hours,hours, approximately two miles. miles. Liberty notified the Com-Com the Liberty's crew was exercised atat general quarters mander, Sixth Fleet and others ofof this reconnaissance,reconnaissance, for drilldrill purposespurposes forfor a amandatorymandatory noncompetitivenoncompetitive stating that identificationidentification was unknown and and thatthat nono exercise toto train thethe crewcrew in in chemical-attackchemical-attack proce-proce amplifying reportreport would bebe submitted.6 dures. This was a routine activity, part of the ship'sship's -GONFIDEibillift€ONFIDfiN'fIAL 2525 -~ ------ SECRE'f (U) The The DassaultDassault MirageMirage jetjet bomberbomber of thethe typetype which which attacked the Liberty on 8 June.June. (Photograph courtesycourtesy of Jane's All the World'sWorld's Aircraft.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) training programprogram established by the Commander,Commander, Ser-Ser approachingairplanes airplanesthat that had beenbeen picked picked up on on vice Force, AtlanticAtlantic Fleet,Fleet, and was notnot related to her radar byby thethe lookouts.lookouts. It waswas 1400 1400 hours.hours. FromFrom the mission inin the eastern Mediterranean.Mediterranean. The drilldrill waswas starboard wingwing of of thethe bridge,bridge, CommanderCommander McGonagleMcGonagle performed satisfactorilysatisfactorilyand and thethe shipship returned to her observed aa singlesinglejet jet aircraftaircraft that appearedappeared similar, ifif "modified condition three"three" at 1345.1345.10LO not identical, to those that hadhad beenbeen sightedsighted earlierearlier (U) Followingthe the generalgeneral quartersquarters drill,drill, in the dayday and and aboutabout whichwhich a sightingsighting report had beenbeen the Liberty's Commanding Officer, Commander Wil-Wil submitted. The relativerelative bearing of thisthis planeplane waswas 0 0-500 liam L. McGonagle,McGonagle, fixedfixed herher position byby radarradar asas about 135°,135 , its positionposition angle was about 45°-50°,45 , its being 25.5 nautical milesmiles fromfrom thethe minaret at AlAl elevation approximately 7,0007,000 feet,feet, and it it was was approx-approx `Arish,'Arish, which waswas toto thethe southeastsoutheast (bearing 142°1420 true.)true.) imately five toto sixsix milesmiles fromfromthe the ship.ship. ItIt appeared to McGonaglethat that thethe planeplane waswas travelingtraveling parallel to, Air Attack Begins (U) and in thethe samesame directiondirection as the Liberty. With hishis binoculars trainedtrained onon the aircraft,aircraft, thethe CommanderCommander (3-CCO)(8 000) Amidships below deck,deck, the Liberty's was unaware of a second second planeplane swoopingswooping inin from the Research Department (the(the SigintSigint collection,collection, process-process port side to to launchlaunch aa rocketrocket directeddirected towardtoward thethe ing, and and reportingreporting area)area) resumedresumed normalnormal operations.operations. bridge. When thethe rocketrocket explodedexploded twotwo levels levels below below the Robert L. WilsonWilson was in thethe analysis/reportinganalysis/reporting area bridge, McGonagleordered orderedthe the generalgeneral alarmalarm to be be together with the otherother civilians,civilians, AllenAllen M. Blue Blue and and sounded. Donald L. Blalock, plus the MarineMarine linguists.linguists. ThingsThings had beenbeen slow slow and WilsonWilson consideredconsidered goinggoing up on deck to do do some some sunbathingsunbathing but changedchanged hishis mind. mind. Com- Com (U) CT3 PaddyPaddy E.E. (Dusty)(Dusty) RhodesRhodes waswas munications TechnicianTechnician (CT)(CT) TerryTerry L. McFarland,McFarland, headed below decksdecks fromfrom his GQ GQ station,station, damagedamage seated atat hishis manual-morsemanual-morse positionosition controldetail. detail.At At thethe end of the GQGQ drill,drill, thethe L..- ---I[ThatThat farfar belowbelow deck deck it it was was diffi- diffi- Commander hadhad ordered the whaleboatwhaleboat engine tested cult forfor anyone anyone to hearhear muchmuch of of whatwhat waswas happeninghappening and, whenwhen DustyDusty heardheard aa muffled muffled explosion,explosion, hehe topside. thought, "Those damned deck apes blew thatthat boat up (U) During the generalgeneral quartersquarters (GQ)(GQ) and I've got to go go backback upup and and fight fight thethe fire."fire." drill, LieutenantLieutenant JamesJames G.G. O'ConnorO'Connor (Assistant(Assistant Tech-Tech Simultaneously,Dusty Dustyheard heard thethe generalgeneral quartersquarters nical OperationsOperations Officer ofof thethe Research Department) alarm. ScamperingScampering back up the ladder,ladder, hehe could could smell smell had beenbeen officer ofof thethe deck onon thethe bridge. At the burning powder and startedstarted "dogging"dogging down"down" doors doors conclusion of ofthe thedrill, drill, hehe went upup to thethe 0404 level level when aa rocket tore through a bulkheadbulkhead to his rightright (above thethe bridge) toto see if he he could could locatelocate thethe ripping steelsteel all about. 26 SECRETSHURHr:P IIANBI:JB ViA COMIN" CIIANNBI:JS ONI:J\" E0EO 1.1.4.(c)4 . (c) CONFIDENTIAL (U) Down inin thethe ResearchResearch Department,Department, L. Wilson wentwent upup toto thethe secondsecond deck deck from from thethe Terry McFarland, wearing his headphones,headphones, was va- va processing andand reporting (P&R) spaces to empty safes guely awareaware ofof flickers ofof light comingcoming through the on that upperupper level.level. bulkhead. HeHe didn'tdidn't realize that thesethese werewere armor-armor (C(0 CCO)eeS) Hearing the generalgeneral quartersquarters alarm,alarm, piercing tracertracer bullets slicing through the Liberty's CT3 Clyde W.W. Way ranran from the messmess deck to his his skin. The "flickers""flickers" werewere accompanied byby a strangestrange station inin thethe T-BranchT-Branch spacesspaces oneone deck deck above the R noise thatthat soundedsounded to TerryTerry likelike chainschains beingbeing pulledpulled Branch. Way plugged inin his radio receivers and heard across thethe bottom ofof the ship. Next,Next, hehe saw saw SeamanSeaman nothing; he called thethe R2 areaarea only toto learnlearn thatthat their "Red" AddingtonAddington racerace down the ladderladder fromfrom above above reception had alsoalso gone gone dead. with blood runningrunning down hishis right leg from a wound wound in (U) Topside, one level above the mainmain the knee. "Somebody's up up therethere shootin'shootin' atat us," saidsaid deck, the explodingexploding rocketrocket hadhad started aa blazingblazing firefire Red. Nobody spoke,spoke,but but TerryTerry couldcould seesee thethe fear in in two two 55-gallon 55-gallon gasoline gasoline drums stowedstowed below below the the faces faces about him. Someone Someone orderedordered thethe men to bridge on thethe portport side.side. McGonagleMcGonagle quicklyquickly orderedordered perform emergencyemergencydestruction, destruction,and andthey they turnedturned to his ExecutiveExecutive Officer,Officer, Lieutenant CommanderCommander PhilipPhilip dumping classifiedclassifiedmaterial material inin the weighted,weighted, whitewhite M. Armstrong, toto go down and releaserelease thethe gasolinegasoline canvas bagsbags speciallyspecially mademade forfor this purpose.purpose. Robert,Robert, cans. Lieutenant O'Connor joinedjoinedthe the Exec.Exec. JustJust as (U) Starboard sideside of the Liberty, scorched by fire from explodingexploding rocketsrockets thatthat were launched by the Israeli attack aircraft•aircraft. (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) I12tNBtJE ViA COMlN'f CII2tNNELS ONLY CONfIDENTIAL 1:1 ------_._--~------_...... _...... _------ UNCLASSIFIED both reached the toptop of of thethe ladderladder toto proceedproceed down,down, (U)(V) In the firstfirst minutesminutes of the air attackattack a bombbomb hit nearnear thethe whaleboatwhaleboat on the starboard side,side, the Liberty suffered a completecomplete loss of external com-com immediately aft ofof the bridge.bridge. ArmstrongArmstrong and O'ConnorO'Connor munications because of badlybadly damageddamaged radio trans-trans were thrown back onto thethe bridge and other personnelpersonnel mitting equipments andand antenna systems. In spitespite ofof in thethe pilot-housepilot-house were blown fromfrom theirtheir feet. Mc-Mc this, emergencyemergency restorationrestoration ofof hicomhicom voicevoice capabilitycapability Gonagle grabbedgrabbed thethe engineengine order annunciatorannunciator andand was completed withinwithin minutes. All U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty rang up all head flankflank speedspeed —- an orderorder forfor maximummaximum communicationsimmediately immediatelythereafter thereafter were via the speed. At thethe samesame time,time, hehe orderedordered LieutenantLieutenant hicom voice network."network.' 3 Maurice H.H. Bennett to report to thethe ChiefChief ofof NavalNaval (V) The coordinatedcoordinated strafing, rocket, and Operations (CNO) via the high-commandhigh-command radio circuit incendiary air attacks createdcreated threethree majormajor firesfires topsidetopside (hicom) thatthat the Liberty was under attack byby uniden-uniden that coveredcovered large areas of the Liberty with flamesflames tified jet aircraftaircraft andand requiredrequired immediateimmediate assistance.assistance. and heavyheavy smoke. Eight men were were killed or died died of of This Flash message, giving the Liberty's position as injuries received duringduring thethe air attack:attack: twotwo killed killed or or 33-25E, 31-23N, waswas receivedreceivedby bythe the aircraftaircraft carriercarrier mortally wounded onon thethe bridge, two killed at machine U.S.S.V.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) andand relayedrelayed toto Commander, gun 51, one killed at machinemachine gungun 52, one one dieddied fromfrom U.S.V.S. NavalNaval ForcesForces Europe; Commander, Sixth Fleet; wounds receivedreceivedon onthe the mainmain deckdeck starboardstarboard side, and and Commander,Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60).ll60)." Liberty's two died of wounds receivedreceived onon thethe 0101 level level portside.portside. transmission was not mademade withoutwithout difficulty.difficulty. DuringDuring Throughoutthe the topsidetopside area,area, 75 men men hadhad beenbeen the attackattack andand intermittentlyintermittently thereafter,thereafter, thethe hicomhicom wounded by shrapnel and shockshock ofof explodingexploding rockets.rockets. voice circuitcircuit was subjected to loud jamming regardless (U)(V) During thisthis period, the Liberty grad-grad of frequency.frequency. This electronicelectronic interferenceinterference was de- de ually built up speedspeed fromfrom five five knots; her exactexact speedspeed scribed as a steadysteady carriercarrier withoutwithout modulation."modulation.'? was not known butbut itit is doubtful that sheshe exceededexceeded 1111 (U)(V) After being blown backback ontoonto the bridge or 12 12 knots while underunder attack. floor, Lieutentant O'ConnorO'Connor realized he had nono feelingfeeling in his his body body from the waistwaist down. ToTo get out of the Torpedo-Boat Attack (U) way, he dragged himself into the combatcombat informationinformation center (CIC)(CIC) behind the bridge,bridge, wherewhere severalseveral others (U)(V) At about 14241424 hours, look-outslook-outs sighted had alsoalso soughtsought safety.safety. LyingLying face face down, down, O'ConnorO'Connor three high-speedhigh-speed boats approachingapproaching the Liberty from soon noticed thatthat therethere waswas a a lot lot of of blood blood on on thethe floorfloor the northeastnortheast onon a a relativerelative bearingbearing ofof approximatelyapproximately and then realizedrealized it was was his. AboutAbout this time,time, EnsignEnsign 135°1350 atat aa distancedistance ofof aboutabout 1515 miles. miles. TheThe boatsboats O'Malleystepped steppedinto into thethe CICCIC andand helpedhelped stopstop appeared to be be in in a awedge-typewedge-type formation,formation, spacedspaced O'Connor's bleeding by stuffingstuffinga a T-shirtT-shirt into the holesholes about 150150 to 200 yardsyards apart, andand closingclosing in a torpedo-torpedo in his back.back. launch attitudeattitude at anan estimatedestimated speedspeed of 27 to 30 30 (U)(V) A few moments afterafter the bombbomb blast knots. CommanderCommander McGonagle orderedordered a sailor fromfrom on the starboardstarboard side,side, CommanderCommander McGonagleMcGonagle was hit the bridgebridge to manman thethe starboardstarboard gun and taketake thethe by flying shrapnelshrapnel and knocked offoff hishisfeet, feet, but,but, though boats under fire. Using the hicom circuit,circuit, the Liberty's shaken up,up, he remainedremained on the bridge,bridge, totallytotally inin radioman reported the approach of the torpedotorpedo boats. command. This waswas received and relayed by thethe U.S.S.V. S. S. Saratoga (U)(V) For the nextnext fivefive or six minutes, air-air to Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, V.S.U.S. Navy Europe andand toto the craft mademade criss-crosscriss-cross attacks on the Liberty at aboutabout Commander, SixthSixth Fleet.Fleet."14 one-minute intervals,intervals, hittinghitting her withwith rocketsrockets andand (U)(V) It was was then thatthat thethe CommanderCommander no-no machine-gun fire.fire. AA finalfinal countcount enteredentered into the CourtCourt ticed thatthat thethe Liberty's American flag hadhad been shot of Inquiry's record, showed 821821 separateseparate hitshits on the down. He immediately orderedordered a signalman to hoisthoist ship's hull and superstructure. The attacking aircraft the "holiday"holiday ensign" -— the largestlargest flagflag aboardaboard (ap-(ap were later identifiedidentified as French-builtFrench-built DassaultDassault MirageMirage proximately7 7 xx 13 feet)feet) -— from the yardarm,yardarm, the jet fightersfighters whosewhose armament consistedconsisted ofof two two 30mm30mm normal flag halyard having been destroyed. There waswas cannon, two 1,000-pound1,000-pound bombs, and four rocketrocket podspods smoke fromfrom thethe burningburning whaleboat and other topsidetopside (18 rocketsrockets each). fires inin the vicinityvicinity of the bridge.bridge. (U)(V) During the firstfirst or or second strafing run, (U)(V) Commander McGonagle passedpassed the the ship'sship's public-addresspublic-address system,system, thethe electricallyelectrically pow-pow word, "Stand"Stand by for torpedo attack."attack." He heldheld hishis ered intercomintercom system,system, andand mostmost sound-poweredsound-powered phonephone course, since turning away from the boatsboats wouldwould bring circuits werewere severed or destroyed.destroyed. the shipship closercloser to land, andand turningturning towardtoward themthem wouldwould 28 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ------CONFIDENTIAL swing thethe ship broadside towardtoward thethe attackers, givinggiving ammunitionbox, box,causing causingthe thegun gun to to firefire in thethe them a larger target. direction of the attacking boats. (U) When Robert L. WilsonWilson heard thethe (U) At this time, thethe motormotor torpedotorpedo boatsboats torpedo attackattack warning, he rememberedremembered oneone of thethe opened fire withwith theirtheir gun mounts, killing the Liberty's seamen tellingtelling himhim toto sitsit on the floorfloor and bracebrace hishis helmsman. In a mattermatter ofof secondsseconds oneone torpedotorpedo crossedcrossed feet against the wall.wall. astern of the shipship atat aboutabout 2525 yards.yards. TheThe timetime waswas (U) In thethe processingprocessing and reporting area, then 14341434 hours. A minuteminute later,later, aa secondsecond torpedotorpedo CT Terry McFarland waswas toldtold toto "tuck"tuck pant legslegs into struck the shipship onon thethe starboardstarboard side,side, justjust forwardforward ofof your socks,socks, buttonbutton top collar, get rid of of loose material, the bridgebridge andand aa few few feetfeet belowbelow the waterwater line.line. Again, Again, and lie flat on on floor floor and hold your head in your hands using thethe hicom net,net, the Liberty broadcast thatthat the to protect your face." ship had beenbeen torpedoedtorpedoed and was was listing badly.badly. TheThe (U)(0) When the motormotor torpedotorpedo boatsboats werewere Saratoga picked upup the transmission and relayed itit to approximately aa mile away, thethe center boatboat waswas seen seen the Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, V.S. U.S. NavyNavy EuropeEurope andand to flashing aa signal. light.light. Because of smoke and flamesflames the Commander,Commander, Sixth SixthFleet. Fleet.'15 in the directiondirection fromfrom which which the boatsboats werewere approach-approach (U) To Lieutenant O'Connor,O'Connor, lyinglying on the ing, Commander McGonagle couldcouldnot not readread thethe signals, floor ofof thethe combat information center, the torpedo'storpedo's but he saw saw what he believedbelieved to be an an IsraeliIsraeli flag.flag. As As deafening explosionexplosionseemed seemedto tolift lift thethe ship right outout the air attackattack hadhad knockedknocked out the Liberty's starboard of the water, and whenwhen it settled backback he thought it signal light,light, he attempted toto signalsignal with aa hand-heldhand-held was going toto roll over. Aldis lamp.lamp. This maymay notnot havehave beenbeen powerfulpowerful enoughenough (U)(V) In thethe ResearchResearch DepartmentDepartment wherewhere to penetrate thethe smokesmoke pouring fromfrom thethe fires started the torpedotorpedo struck,struck, everythingeverything went black; oil and and by the attackers. Believingthat that thethe air attack mightmight debris were everywhere. WaterWater rushedrushed in and and equip-equip have been in in error,error, CommanderCommander McGonagleMcGonagle quicklyquickly ment fell over Terry McFarland, but hehe managedmanaged to shouted to the starboardstarboard forwardforward gungun to to withholdwithhold fire.fire. keep clear andand make his way inin the darkness to the The gunner firedfired aa shortshort burst at thethe motormotor torpedotorpedo ladder toto go go topside. When he got out therethere waswas about boats before hehe understood thethe CO's order.order. At the a foot foot and a halfhalf ofof airair spacespace left. same time,time, though unattended,unattended, thethe after gun on the (U) CT Clyde Clyde W. Way Way was was in in T-BranchT-Branch starboard side opened fire: flames from the burningburning spaces above thethe processing andand reportingreporting area.area. WithWith whaleboathad had ignitedignitedbullets bulletsin in thethe gungun andand in the the explosionexplosion below, allall equipmentequipment fell to the floorfloor and smoke pouredpoured fromfrom thethe P&R hatch. WayWay startedstarted pulling menmen outout asas they came up the ladder.ladder. ThereThere was no panic. A Marine went down thethe ladder to help help locate men possibly trappedtrapped inin thethe water. As the water rose in the Research Department, LieutenantLieutenant MauriceMaurice Bennett realized that that hehe had to close close the hatch to contain the flooding.flooding. AttemptsAttempts toto contact the MarineMarine who had gone back failed, andand LieutenantLieutenant BennettBennett reluctantly andand sorrowfullysorrowfully orderedordered thethe hatchhatch closed.closed. McFarland andand Way then wentwent topsidetopside to help help fight fight fires and attend thethe wounded.wounded. (U) The torpedotorpedo explosion hadhad torn a hole hole in the sideside of of thethe shipship thatthat extendedextended fromfrom a a few few feet feet above thethe water line to below thethe turnturn of the bilge.bilge. It was shaped likelike aa tear-drop, and was was 39 feet across at its widestwidest point. ItsIts immediateimmediate effecteffect was was to to flood flood all compartments onon two two decks below thethe water line, from from frame 53 to frameframe 66. TheseThese framesframes supportedsupported water-water (U) During thethe attack,attack, severesevere damagedamage waswas tight bulkheads,bulkheads, andand marked thethe locationlocation of thethe done to one one of of thethe twotwo forward forward areaarea 50-caliber50-caliber Liberty's Research Department and storestore rooms.rooms. gun mounts. Twenty-fivemen mendied died inin these spaces some from the ((rre eee) Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson, Wilson, NSA.) NSA.l blast, othersothers drowned.drowned. (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) (U) The torpedo hithit did not start aa majormajor fire, probably because of the immediateimmediate floodingflooding of thethe HANDLE ViA e6M1N'f etlANNELS 6NLY CONFIDENTIAL 29 UNCLASSIFIED 31° 32° 33° 34° 35° LEBANON)! LEBANON",.; ,,----.) \ 33° , ) 'ISRAEL!ISRAEL ys" /i (',,---J"( \.\-•S 32°32°"+------+------+------1L--~~!l.!.!~_+_tt_----___1 TEL AVIV (1 .... -\ POINT C POINT A POINT B ").c" " AIJ 0 VDR,.O A,./NVil POINT OF ATTACK (f---../i.. .:l ISRAEL ) SUEZ CANAL 400....., L'ARISN UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC \ (U) TheThe projected projected track of the UhertyLiberty on the day day of attack. attack. (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) affected area, but the Liberty immediately listed nine were 62-ton62-ton craft,craft, capablecapable of 42 42 knots, withwith aa crew crew of of degrees to starboard. PowerPower and and steeringsteering controlcontrol werewere 15 andand armamentarmament consistingconsisting ofof one one 40mm 40mm cannon,cannon, lost temporarily and the ship came dead in the water.water. four 20mm cannon, and twotwo torpedos.torpedos. The timetime waswas 1440 1440 hours. (U)(D) The threethree torpedotorpedo boatsboats alsoalso stoppedstopped Post-Attack Reconnaissance (U) and thenthen milledmilled around astern of the Liberty at aa (U)(D) At aboutabout 15151515 hours,hours, twotwo helicoptershelicopters range of approximately 500500 toto 800 yards.yards. One of the approached the Liberty and circled around thethe ship at boats signaled by flashing light, in English,English, "Do"Do youyou a distancedistance of aboutabout 100100 yards.yards. The StarStar ofof DavidDavid I require assistance?" Not being able to signalsignal by light, insignia was clearly visible. One of thethe helicoptershelicopters waswas Commander McGonagle ordered ordered aa signalman to hoisthoist numbered 0404 oror 04,D4, the other 08 or D8.08. TheThe helicop-helicop '1 the internationalinternational flagflag signalsignal for "not under command,"command," ters departed, returned,returned, andand departeddeparted again.again. ! meaning that thethe shipship waswas maneuveringmaneuvering withwith difficultydifficulty (U)(D) Commander McGonagle designateddesignated the and thatthat theythey shouldshould keepkeep clear.clear. OneOne of of thethe torpedotorpedo mess decks as a casualtycasualty collectioncollection station, and the boats was identified by a hullhull numbernumber ofof 204-17. 204-17. All All wounded werewere takentaken there by repairrepair partyparty personnelpersonnel boats retired towardtoward shore at 15051505 hours. The attackattack- and other crew members ableable toto assist. ing torpedo boats were laterlater identifiedidentified as French-builtFrench-built (U)(D) Reports received from damagedamage controlcontrol motor torpedeo boatsboats of the Israeli AyahAyah class. TheseThese central indicated that thethe floodingflooding was was underunder control.control. 30 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED ----~~- ~- UNCLASSIFIED Power waswasrestored restoredto tothe the bridgebridge atat 15201520 hours, but Sixth Fleet Reacts Reacts (U)(U) steering controlcontrol couldcould notnot bebe regainedregained fromfrom thethe bridge, making itit necessary toto give rudderrudder orders by telephone (U)(D) Aboard his flagship, the guided-missileguided-missile to men inin thethe "after steering"steering" compartment,compartment, andand forfor light cruisercruiser U.S.S.U.S. S. Little RockRock (CLG-4), the Com-Com some timetime theythey operatedoperated thethe ship's heavy rudder byby mander, Sixth FleetFleet receivedreceived (from the Saratoga) the hand. Liberty's messagesabout about thethe air andand torpedotorpedo boatboat (U)(D) At 1536 1536 hours,hours, thethe IsraeliIsraeli torpedotorpedo attacks. AtAt 1450 1450 hours, fifty minutesminutes afterafter the attack boats again approached the Liberty from the star-star began, hehe orderedordered thethe aircraft carrier U.S.S.U.S. S. America board, atat a rangerange ofof five five miles. During thethe next hourhour (CVA-66) toto launchlaunch four armed A-4 Skyhawks andand the and a quarter, the boatsboats returnedreturned towardtoward the shipship carrier U.S.S.U.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) toto launchlaunch fourfour several timestimes before disappearing over the horizonhorizon armed A-1 attackattack planes to defenddefend the Liberty. The without furtherfurther signal or action. America was also directed to provideprovide fighterfighter covercover and (U)(D) Communicationswere were restoredrestored at tanker aircraft to refuelrefuel thethe fighters,fighters, if necessary.'necessary. 16 about 1600 hours, andand CommanderCommander McGonagleMcGonagle dic-dic At this time,time, thethe SixthSixth FleetFleet waswas locatedlocated southsouth ofof tated aa messagemessage toto LieutenantLieutenant BennettBennett providingproviding Crete, approximatelyapproximately 450450 miles west of the Liberty. additional informationinformation concerningconcerningthe the attackattack by un- un (U)(D) At 1516 1516 hours,hours, Commander,Commander, TaskTask identifiedaircraft aircraft andand thethe factfact thatthat thethe torpedotorpedo boatsboats Force 60, implementedimplemented Sixth Fleet's directivedirective andand had been identifiedidentified asas Israeli.Israeli. A preliminary estimate instructed his carrier pilots to "destroy or drive off of thethe number ofof deaddead and casualties, as well as the instructed his carrier pilots to "destroy or drive off condition ofof thethe ship,ship, was also provided. Transmission any attackers whowho are clearlyclearly making attacksattacks on the of this message was delayeddelayed because shipboard emer-emer Liberty. Remain over internationalinternational waters.waters. DefendDefend gency measuresmeasures demandeddemanded immediateimmediate attentionattention to yourself ifif attacked."1717 preservethe the safetysafety andand stabilitystability ofof the shipship andand (U) On the heelsheels of this action,action, atat 15201520 minimize newnew casualties.casualties. hours, the Commander,Commander, Sixth Fleet,Fleet, informedinformed U.S.U. S. (U)(D) Fifteen minutes later twotwo unidentifiedunidentified Commander-in-Chief,Europe Europe (CINCEUR)(CINCEUR)of ofthe the atat- jet aircraft approached the Liberty from thethe starboard tack and aircraftaircraft beingbeing deployeddeployed to defend thethe Liberty. side andand reconnoitered fromfrom aa distance beforebefore disap-disap It waswas estimatedestimated that thethe firstfirst aircraftaircraft wouldwould be be on on pearing fromfrom thethe scene. the scenescene at 17151715 hours." (U) U.S.S. Little Rock,Rock, a guided guided missilemissile lightlight cruiser cruiser and and the the flagship flagship of of the the Commander, Commander. Sixth Sixth Fleet. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.)Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) UNCLASSIFIED 3131 UNCLASSIFIED (U) Followingthis, this, atat 15491549 hours, thethe (DST).CDST). Walt RostowRostow informed thethe PresidentPresident andand Commander, Sixth Fleet relayed to the ChiefChief ofof NavalNaval immediatelydrafted drafteda a "hot"hot line"line" messagemessage toto thethe Operations (CNO) and the Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Kremlin. PresidentPresident JohnsonJohnson approvedapproved thethe followingfollowing Navy Europe,Europe, (CINCUSNAVEUR)(CINCUSNAVEUR) hishis messagemessage ofof text whichwhich was sent toto ChairmanChairman KosyginKosygin at 11171117 instruction to thethe carrierscarriers concerningconcerning the useuse of of force force hours (DST): and observanceobservance ofof Israeli andand EgyptianEgyptian territorialterritorial We have justjust learned that U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty, an auxiliaryauxiliary ship,ship, limits.'limits. 199 has apparently beenbeen torpedoedtorpedoed byby Israel forcesforces in errorerror offoff Port (U) Commander, Task Force 63, reactingreacting Said. We We have instructedinstructed our carrier,carrier, Saratoga now in the Mediterranean to dispatch aircraft to the the scene scene to to investigate.investigate. to thethe Liberty's plight, sent aa messagemessage to Sixth FleetFleet We wish youyou toto know thatthat investigationinvestigation is the solesole purposepurpose ofof at 16101610 hourshours recommendingrecommending thatthat fleetfleet oceanocean tugtug this flightflight of aircraft, andand hope hope thatthat youyou will will taketake appropriateappropriate U.S.S. Papago (ATF-160)of of thethe AbnakiAbnaki class be be steps to see see that properproper partiesparties areare informed.informed. WeWe have have passed passed diverted to proceedproceed at maximummaximum speed toto assist the this messagemessage to ChernyakovChernyakov but feelfeel thatthat youyou should should know know of of Liberty. this development urgently.urgently.'24 The messagemessage was receivedreceived in Moscow Moscow at 11241124 hourshours Washington Informed (U) (DST)."CDST).25 AtAt 1210 1210 hourshours KosyginKosygin replied by "hot"hot line" that hehe hadhad passedpassed thethe messagemessage toto PresidentPresident NasserNasser (U) An hour and eleven minutesminutes afterafter the of Egypt.Egypt.'26 ThereafterThereafter instructionsinstructions werewere issuedissued byby JCS Liberty was attacked, thethe NationalNational MilitaryMilitary CommandCommand and Commander, Sixth Fleet to withdraw thethe aircraft Center (NMCC) inin thethe PentagonPentagon waswas phonedphoned byby launched toto defend the Liberty. By 1849 hours Sixth CINCEUR andand told of the situation asas known. known. At At 0915 0915 Fleet reported all planesplanes recalledrecalled andand accountedaccounted for. 27 hours (DST), 8 June,June, NMCCNMCC phonedphoned the NSANSA SigintSigint (U) Deputy Secretary ofof DefenseDefense VanceVance CommandCenter Centerto tonotify notifyNSA NSA of ofthe theattack. attack.'20 notified the Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Navy Europe,Europe, (U) At thethe WhiteWhite House,House, PresidentPresident Lyn-Lyn by phone at 17001700 hours that allall news news releasesreleases on the don B. Johnson was busy telephoning cabinet members Liberty affair would bebe made at thethe WashingtonWashington levellevel and congressionalcongressional leadersleaders whenwhen hehe waswas interruptedinterrupted at -— no releasesreleases were toto be mademade aboardaboard ships.ships. ThisThis 0949 hours (DST) by Walt Rostow,Rostow, his SpecialSpecial Assist-Assist information waswas relayedrelayed toto thethe Commander,Commander, SixthSixth ant forfor NationalNational SecuritySecurity Affairs, andand toldtold thatthat "the Fleet. 28 Liberty, has beenbeen torpedoedtorpedoed in thethe Mediterranean.Mediterranean. The shipship isis locatedlocated 60-10060-100 milesmiles northnorth ofof Egypt.Egypt. Libert}'Liberty Recovers (U) Reconnaissanceaircraft aircraftare are outout fromfrom thethe 6th fleet.fleet . ...no...no knowledge knowledge ofof the submarinesubmarine oror surfacesurface vesselvessel (U)CU) Unaware ofof what waswas happeninghappening at which committedcommitted thisthis actact....shall....shall keep youyouinformed.Y" informed."' fleet headquarters or in in WashingtonWashington and Tel Aviv,Aviv, the (U) Rostow phonedphoned againagain atat 1014 hours to Liberty was struggling to regain fullfull engineengine powerpower and advise thethe President thatthat thethe Liberty was "listing to reachreach deeperdeeper water.water. TheThe gyrogyro compasscompass was out but badly to starboard. The Saratoga has launched 4-A4's4-A4's the pilot-housepilot-house magnetic compass appearedappeared toto be be 1122 and 4-A1'8.-4-A1's.... ,>22 working. (U) The ship remained at general quarters Israel Reports Reports ErrorError (U) while the crewcrew effectedeffected post-attackpost-attack emergencyemergency meas-meas ures. Sixth FleetFleet waswas notified thatthat the Liberty had (U)CU) In TelTel Aviv,Aviv, Israel, the U.S.U.S. NavalNaval Attache, CommanderCommander E.E. C. Castle, was called to the carried out thethe emergencyemergency destruction of all all cryptocrypto Foreign Liaison Office, IsraelIsrael Defence ForceForce atat approx-approx publications andand key cards. HerHer onlyonly meansmeans ofof com- com imately 1600 hourshours (local(localtime) time) andand toldtold thatthat IsraeliIsraeli munication remained the hicomhicom circuits.29 air andand seasea forces forces had attacked the Liberty in error.error. (U) Liberty's medical officer, LieutenantLieutenant Immediately thethe U.S.U. S. DefenseDefense AttacheAttache officeoffice sentsent a Richard F. Kiepfer,Kiepfer, MedicalMedical Corps,Corps, USN,USN, performed performed Flash message toto advise thethe White House, Department one major operation and gave emergency treatment treatment to of State, andand othersothers ofof thisthis development."development. 23 wounded menmen asas bestbest he could. He manned the mainmain battle dressingdressing station, togethertogether withwith oneone hospitalhospital Johnson Informs Kosygin (U) corpsman, whilewhile thethe other corpsmancorpsman operated a sec- sec ondary stationstation inin the forward partpart of the ship.ship. BothBoth (U)CU) The messagemessage was received by thethe stations werewere flooded flooded with seriously injuredinjured men andand White House, NMCC, and other members of the U.S. for a time therethere waswas little opportunityopportunity toto do do more than military and intelligenceintelligence communitycommunity at 10451045 hourshours give first aid. BleedingBleeding waswas stopped,stopped, menmen were were given given 32 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED II ON (U)(V) The U.S.S.V.S.S. America was ordered by the Commander, Commander, SixthSixth Fleet to launch launch four four Skyhawks Skyhawks to defend the Liberty. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.) Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) GaIdISSVI GaIdISSWIONfl SH€RH'f SPOKE morphine forfor painpain and treated forfor shock, shock, and and thosethose naled a wave-off wave-off to to thethe transfertransfer attempt. Simultane-Simultane with lung wounds wereweretreated treated to ease breathing. ously, thethe helicopter pilot said he could not make the (U) At 1750 hours,hours, Sixth Fleet advised the transfer becausebecause of the Liberty's speed. A A few minutes Liberty that destroyersdestroyers werewere on thethe wayway at maximummaximum later anan impromptuimpromptu packagepackage weightedweighted with anan orangeorange speed andand thatthat the Liberty was to proceed on a course course was dropped fromfrom the helicopterhelicopter onto the forecastle.forecastle. of 340340°0 magnetic until 100 miles from present position, Inside the packagepackage was a messagemessage written on a callingcalling then turnturn 270°2700 magnetic.magnetic. card ofof "Commander"Commander Ernest CarlCarl Castle,Castle, UnitedUnited States Navy,Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Air, EmbassyEmbassy of the U.S.u.s. NavalNaval AttachéAttache HelicoptersHelicopters to United States ofof America,America, Tel Aviv." Aviv." On the backback ofof the Lihert)'Liberty (U)(U) the cardcard waswas written, "Have"Have youyou casualties?"casualties?" UsingUsing an Aldis lamp, the Liberty attempted for tenten toto fifteen fifteen (U) Back in Tel Tel Aviv, Aviv, thethe IsraeliIsraeli ForeignForeign minutes, to reply reply to to thisthis messagemessage withwith "affirmative"affirmative Liaison Office waswasarranging arrangingfor for aa helicopter to fly fly casualties." ItIt was not clear toto those on thethe ship that Commander Castle,Castle, U.S.U.S. NavalNaval Attache,Attache, to the LibLib- the replyreply was was understood.understood. Castle, however,however, had re- re erty so that hehe mightmight communicatecommunicate withwith itsits command-command ceived thethe message butbut was uncertain as to to whetherwhether ing officer. officer. The helicopterhelicopter left DovDov Hoss Hoss (now (now Sde- Sde the numbernumber flashedflashed was four or forty. forty. TheThe bodiesbodies of of Dov) airfieldairfield onon thethe northern side of Tel Aviv Aviv at 18101810 three crewcrew members had notnot yet yet been been removedremoved fromfrom hours and proceeded directlydirectly toto the Liberty. By 1835 1835 the forecastleforecastle andand mustmust havehave been been observedobserved byby thosethose hours, thethe IsraeliIsraeli SikorskySikorsky helicopter,helicopter, carryingcarrying Com-Com in the helicopter.helicopter. WithWith thethe waningwaning lightlight andand approachapproach mander Castle, waswas over the shipship hoveringhovering at approx-approx of dusk the helicopterhelicopter departed the shipship atat approxi-approxi imately 30 feet from from bridgebridge level.level. Lettering on thethe mately 19001900 hours.hours."31 tail ofof thethe helicopterhelicopter waswas SA32KSA32K and on on thethe fuselagefuselage (U) Shortly thereafter, atat 19151915 hours, the were the numeralsnumerals 06 or D6. D6. TheThe helicopterhelicopter hadhad Liberty transmitted toto CNO CNO a a post-attackpost-attack situationsituation neither an electric megaphone nor hand-held signal neither an electric megaphone nor hand-held signal report. 32 light with whichwhich to communicatecommunicate with the Liberty.3oLiberty.3° (U) Wearing civilian clothes, CommanderCommander Israeli HelicopterHelicopter ConversationsConversations (U) Castle could notnot convey hishis identityidentity toto the bridge of fS€T(3C) Back at NSA,NSA, withinwithin an hourhour ofof Liberty but byby visualvisual means indicated that hehe wished wished learning thatthat thethe Liberty had beenbeen torpedoed, the to be be lowered lowered aboard the ship.ship. At At first, first, CommanderCommander Director, NSA sent aa messagemessage toto allalII I I interinter- McGonagleprepared preparedto to receivereceivethe the attacheattache but, con-con cept sites requestingrequesting aa specialspecial searchsearch ofof all all communi-communi sidering thethe obstructions inin the forecastleforecastle area, sig-sig- cations thatthat mightmight reflect thethe attack or reaction."reaction.V NoNo EO1. 1.4.(c)4 . (c) (U) The The America also was ordered to dispatch F4 Phantom fighters, likelike this one, to to provide provide cover cover for for the Skyhawks.Skyhawks. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.)Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) 34 -SEC-RE-T—SPOKBSH€RH'f SPOKH SECRET SrOKE "'-1r .~ ,. ~------...... (U)(V) U.S.S.V.S.S. Papago,PapaJ{o, ocean tug of the Sixth Fleet, was sent to aid the LibertyandLiberty and was used toto recoverrecover classified material adrift fromfrom thethe torpedo holehole in the Liberty's hull. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.)Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) communicationsof ofthe the attackingattacking aircraftaircraft or torpedotorpedo suffering fromfrom thethe lossloss of of blood blood andand experiencingexperiencing a boats were available. However, oneone ofof the airborneairborne great dealdeal ofof painpain fromfrom his his wounds. wounds. By By remainingremaining onon platforms operatingoperating from Athens, hadhad collectedcollected voicevoice the bridge,bridge, McGonagleMcGonagle believed his presencepresence therethere conversations betweenbetween twotwoIsraeli Israeli helicopterhelicopter pilots and would give reassurance toto the crew.crew. TheThe Liberty's the control tower at HazorHazor AirfieldAirfield (near(near TelTel Aviv).Aviv). doctor, LieutenantLieutenant Kiepfer,Kiepfer, hadhad seenseen McGonagleMcGonagle onon Controltold told helicopterhelicopter815 815at at 14311431hours hoursthat" that "therethere the bridgebridge but mademade nono effort effort to get get him him below below to a is aa warshipwarship therethere which wewe attacked.attacked. The men jumpedjumped battle dressingdressing station. InIn LieutenantLieutenant Kiepher'sKiepher's words,words, into thethe water from it.it. You You will trytry to rescuerescue them." The CommandingCommanding Officer Officerat atthat that time was like a a rock rock upon upon Althoughthere there werewere otherother referencesreferences toto a search forfor which the rest ofof thethe menmen supportedsupported themselves.themselves. ToTo know know that he was was on the the bridgebridge grievouslygrievously wounded, yet having the connconn the men inin the water,water, nono personnelpersonnel from the Liberty and helm and ...... callingcalling everyevery changechange of course, was the thing had jumped overboard. AtAt 1434 hours, the controlcontrol that toldtold thethe menmen "we're"we're goinggoing to live."live." When I went to thethe tower toldtold helicopterhelicopter 815815that that the shipship waswas EgyptianEgyptian bridge and saw this, I should say that II knew knew that II could could only only and thatthat hehe could could return home.home. At At 1510 1510 hours, the insult this manman by by suggestingsuggesting thatthat hehe be be takentaken belowbelow for for treatment ofof his wounds. II didn'tdidn't evenevensuggest suggestit. it.'15 controller askedasked 815815 toto identifyidentify thethe nationality of any (U) The attackattack hadhad demandeddemanded thethe veryvery survivors. Subsequently,Subsequently, thethe helicopter pilot reportedreported best from the Liberty's crew and they hadhad respondedresponded seeing anan AmericanAmerican flagflag on onthe theship. ship. InIn anotheranother portion exceptionally well. Damage control competence mini-mini ofofthe the conversation,conversation, thethe pilot of helicopter 815 reported mized Liberty's structural woundswounds and kept her afloat.afloat. that number GTR 5 was written on the ship'sship's sideside The engineeringengineering crew under Lieutenant GeorgeGeorge Golden Golden and thatthat behindbehind thethe shipship werewere severalseveral uninflateduninflated lifelife maintained power toto thethe engines soso thatthat the Liberty boats. At 1521 hours the helicoptershelicopters werewere instructed could move awayaway fromfrom dangerousdangerousshoals shoalsin inthe the attack to returnreturn home.home.'34 area and headhead towardtoward the SixthSixth Fleet.Fleet. TheThe medicalmedical LihertyLiberty Licks Its WoundsWounds (U) officer andand his two corpsmen neededneeded helphelp and they gotgot it. InIn Kiepfer'sKiepfer's words,words, (U) As darkness settled over the Liberty, Any time we needed one volunteer, we'dwe'd getget ten. If anythinganything CommanderMcGonagle McGonagleremained remainedon onthe the bridge,bridge, still had to to be be done done ...... therethere werewere handshands everywhere.everywhere. WhenWhen we we &BERET—SPOKE-SHeRE,£, SPOKE 35 CONfiDENTIAL asked for two two pints ofof blood blood for transfusion,transfusion, wewe hadhad peoplepeople on on 13"(U)(U) U.S. NavalNaval CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816~7; Liberty the adjoiningadjoining tablestables whowho were saying, "If youyou need some, I have Incident, 88 JunJun 1967;1967; RecordRecord ofof Proceedings.Proceedings. this type."type." TheseThese werewere people people alreadyalready wounded."wounded. 36 13(U)u(U) MG J.R.J.R. Russ, USA, JCS. "Report of the Fact NSA civilian, Robert L.L. Wilson, Wilson, remembered,remembered, too,too, Finding Team, U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 88 Jun 1967",1967", p. 39. 39. that surprisinglysurprisingly there waswas no panic. WhenWhen the menmen (Hereafter cited as the RussRuss Report.)Report.) "(U)l4(U) U.S.S. Saratoga msg 081237ZOB1237Z Jun 1967.1967. were ordered toto do something, they did it. it. EveryoneEveryone 1515(U)(U) U.S.S. Saratoga megmsg OBl254Z081254Z Jun 1967.1967. was kept busy.busy. ThoughThough somesome were were obviously scaredscared to 1616(U)(u) COMSIXTHFLT msg 081250ZOBl25OZ Jun 1967.1967. death, therethere waswas simply simply no panic; nobody ranran rampant 13"(U)(U) CTF 60 msg msg 081316ZOB1316Z Jun 1967.1967. through thethe ship. No No one one sleptslept muchmuch that night.night. '"(U)8(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg 081320ZOB132OZ Jun 1967.1967. '"(U)9(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg 081349ZOB1349Z Jun 1967.1967. Helping the woundedwounded became everyone'severyone's job — - even even 20'o(U)(u) National Military CommandCommand Center, "Memo-"Memo- those with no medical training.training. Men learned to dressdress randum forfor the Record,Record, 15301530 EDT, 8 JunJun 19671967 and and NSA NSA SeniorSenior wounds oror dodo stitches.stitches. InIn some casescases toto quietquiet a man,man, Operations Officer Log, 0730-1530, 88 Jun 1967.1967. he was given aa bottle of rum to drown his pain. WithWith 31"(U)(U) The WhiteWhite HouseHouse Daily Diary, 8 Jun Jun 1967, 1967, the lengtheninglengthening hours of of darkness,darkness, deepeningdeepening depres-depres 9:49 a.m. telephonetelephone call from Walt Rostow, p.p. 2, and the WhiteWhite House Memorandum to to the PresidentPresident fromfrom W.W. W.W. Rostow, Rostow, 9:50 9:50 sion and shock shock caused some men to breakbreak downdown and a.m., 88 JunJun 1967.1967. succumb toto thethe fears they had been able to restrainrestrain 22"(U)(u) The WhiteWhite HouseHouse Daily Diary, 8 JunJun 1967,1967, during thethe attack and immediatelythereafter. thereafter.'37 10:14 a.m,a.m. telephone call from Walt Rostow. p. 3, and MemorandumMemorandum (U) Alone, battered,battered, and scarred but un-un to thethe PresidentPresident fromfrom W.W. W.W. Rostow, Rostow, 10:15 a.m.,a.m., 8 Jun Jun 1967. 1967. "(U)23(U) Other addresseesaddressees for U.S. U.S. Defense Defense AttacheAttache vanquished, the Liberty steamed steadilysteadily on through-through Office, TelTel Aviv, msg OS1414Z081414Z JunJun 1967, were: OSD, CNO, CNO, JCS, out thethe nightnight towardtoward aa rendezvousrendezvous with SixthSixth FleetFleet Sixth Fleet,Fleet, andand NAVEUR. NAVEUR. USDAO, USDAO, TelTel AvivAviv msg msg 151615Z 151615Z Jun destroyers. Three musters were takentaken to identify the 1967. dead, thethe seriouslyseriously injured,injured, andand those those who who were were 24'4(U)(U) Yurij NikolaevichNikolaevich ChernyakovChernyakov was Minister-Minister- missing. Casualty messagesmessages were completed as quickly quickly Counselor atat the Soviet Soviet EmbassyEmbassy in Washington,Washington, D.C., fromfrom 1965 1965 to 1969. 1969. He often substituted forfor thethe Ambassador.Ambassador. as possible possible and necessarynecessary messagemessage notifications sent. "(U) The White House Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, 1967, p. 3 and and "hot line"line" msgmsg to to ChairmanChairman KosyginKosygin fomfom PresidentPresident Johnson,Johnson, Notes 8 Jun 1967,1967,11:17 11:17 a.m. 26"(U)(U) The White HouseHouse Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, 1967, p. Source documents areare inin thethe "Crisis Collection" of of thethe NSA HistoryHistory 6. Collection. "(U) JCS megmsg 081529Z081529Z Jun 1967,1967, andand COM- COM- '(U)I(U) U.S.S. LibertyLiberty msg OB0634Z080634Z JunJun 1967.1967. SIXTHFLT megmsg 081649ZOB1649Z Jun 1967.1967. 28 2'(U)(U) U.S.S. Liberty,Liberty, "Ship"Ship WeatherWeather ObservationObservation "(U)(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msg OB1517Z081517Z Jun 1967.1967. Sheet," 88 JunJun 1967.1967. "(U)19(U) COMSIXTHFLT megmsg 081514ZOS1514Z Jun 1967. 1967. 30'o(U) USDAO, Tel Aviv Aviv meg msg 151615Z Jun 1967.1967. 3'(U)(U) CINCUSNAVEUR msgmeg 151003Z JunJun 1967.1967. (U) 31"(U)(U) U.S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816~7; Liberty 44(U)(U) U.S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816~7; Liberty Incident, 88 JunJun 1967;1967; Record Record of of Proceedings.Proceedings. Incident, 88 Jun Jun 1967; 1967; RecordRecord ofof Proceedings.Proceedings. "(U) U.S.S. Liberty msg 081715ZOS1715Z Jun 1967. 1967. 5StU)(U) Ibid. B(U)n(U) DIRNSADffiNSA msg 081356ZOB1356Z Jun 1967.1967. 6'(U)(U) U.S.S. Liberty megmsg OB0742Z080742Z JunJun 1967.1967. 3434(S(C COO)SSe) SigintSrin} pro~uctroduct reports:reports: 212r:r::::JR23.67-1-1R23_,_-67 7816~7; . '(U) U.S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67; Liberty 082015ZOB2015Z Jun 1967; 1967; 2 2 ... 24-67,24~7, O9OB31Z!Jun090831Z Jun 1967; 1967;20 21_1 Incident, 88 Jun Jun 1967; 1967; Record Record of of Proceedings.Proceedings. 1:t27-67,Q27~7, 091422Z091422Z Jun Jun 1967. 1967. 8'(U)(U) Robert L. Wilson, Wilson, oral interview transcript,transcript, 6 '(U)(U) U,S. NavyNavy CourtCourt ofof-Inquiry Inquiry 7816-67;7816~7; LibertyLiberty May 1980. 1980. Incident, 88 JunJun 1967;1967; RecordRecord ofof Proceedings. 9'(U)(U) U.S.S. Liberty msg OB0B56Z080856Z Jun 1967.1967. "(U) Ibid. 9U)IO(U) U.S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816~7; Liberty 37"CU)(u) .. Oral interviewinterview. transcripts:transcripts; Robert L.L. Wilson, Wilson, Incident, 88 JunJun 1967;1967; Record Record of of Proceedings.Proceedings. 6 May May 1980; 1980; CTC ClydeW.Clyde W. Way, 6.Jun6 Jun 1980;1980; and eTCCTC Terry L.L. "(U) U.S.S. Saratoga magmsg OB1235Z081235Z Jun 1967.1967. McFarland, 23 June 1980. EO 1.4.(c)1.4. (c) P.L. 86-36 36 CONPIDENTIAL IIANBhB ViA eOl\HN'f eIIANNB~S OH~Y CONFIDENTIAL Chapter V V The IsraeliIsraeli ExplanationExplanation (U) (U) The classification ofof paragraphs inin this chapterchapter whichwhich derive derive Naval Operations orderedordered thethe target erased from the fromfrom thethe statementstatement ofof the Israeli DefenceDefence Forces CourtCourt ofof Inquiry results fromfrom aa government ofof Israel request to the DepartmentDepartment ofof combat information centercenter plot table becausebecause he had State that the informationinformation "be treated on a a restrictedrestricted andand confi- confi no current information as to itsits location.location. ThusThus fromfrom dential basis." this momentmoment onon (approximately(approximately 11001100 hours) the LibLib- erty no longer appeared on thethe combatcombat informationinformation center plot table atat IsraeliIsraeli NavyNavy Headquarters.Headquarters. •fSt-Fre4- The IsraeliIsraeli DefenceDefence ForcesForces CourtCourt ofof Inquiry intointo thethe U.S.S. Liberty incident presented its {6+-f€t Between 1100 and 1200 1200 hours, NavyNavy findingsto to thethe MilitaryMilitary AdvocateAdvocate GeneralGeneral whowho rec- rec Headquarters receivedreceived reportsreports thatthat AlAl `Arish'Arish (occupied(occupied ommendedthat that a preliminary judicial inquiry be held by Israeli groundground troops) was being shelled from the to determine if there waswas any individualindividual or individualsindividuals sea. TheseThese reportsreports camecame from from two two separateseparate sources,sources, against whomwhom anyany chargescharges shouldshould bebe brought. TheThe the Air-Ground-SupportAir-Ground-Support Officer andand thethe Israeli South-South examining judgejudge was LieutenantLieutenant ColonelColonel YishayaYishaya ern Command.Command. At 1205 hours,hours, the Head of the NavalNaval Yerushalmi. He He gavegave hishis decisiondecisionunder under datedate of 21 21 Department orderedordered threethree torpedotorpedo boatsboats ofof thethe divisiondivision July 1967.1967. FromFrom thethe reportreport of that decisiondecision comescomes the at Ashdod Ashdod to proceedproceed toward Al 'Arish`Arish toto locate the followingIsraeli Israeliaccount accountand andexplanation explanationof ofthe the attackattack target. AirAir Force Force HeadquartersHeadquarters was advisedadvised of this on the Liberty' navy action andand it was was agreed that, whenwhen the torpedotorpedo boats located the target, aircraftaircraft wouldwould be be dispatched. Chronology ofof Israeli Actions (U) Accordingly,the the commandercommanderof of thethe torpedotorpedo boatboat division waswas orderedordered toto establish radio contactcontact withwith -~6")- At 0600 0600 hours (local time)time) on 8 June the aircraftaircraft asas soon soon as theythey appearedappeared over the target. 1967, anan Israeli aircraft, withwith a a navalnaval observerobserver onon (U) The torpedo boats locatedlocated an uniden-uniden board, locatedlocated aa ship 70 miles miles west of Tel Tel Aviv. Aviv. On On tified target atat 13411341 hourshours 2020 miles miles northnorth ofof Al AI `Arish'Arish the basis of this information,information, IsraeliIsraeli NavyNavy Headquar-Headquar and reported that itit was was moving moving toward PortPort Said at ters marked thethe object in red (meaning(meaning an unidentified a speed speed of 30 knots. A few minutesminutes later,later, the torpedotorpedo target) onon thethe combat information center plot table. boat divisiondivision commander reported reportedthat that thethe target,target, ~} At aboutabout 09000900 hours,hours, anotheranother IsraeliIsraeli then 1717 miles miles from from him,him, waswas moving moving at 2828 knots,knots, and plane reportedreported sightingsightinga a shipship 20 miles north ofof Al AI since he could could not overtakeovertake it,it, hehe requestedrequested thethe 'Arish.'Arish, The pilot reported that thethe shipship was was "coloured"coloured dispatch of aircraft towards it.it. ThisThis waswas done; done; the gray, veryvery bulky,bulky, andand thethe bridge amidships." The ship aircraft executedexecuted a run over over the shipship (Liberty) in an an was thenthen identified byby the Israelis asas a a supplysupply vesselvessel attempt to identifyidentify itit butbut sawsaw no no flag flag or or otherother of thethe American Navy;Navy; thereupon,thereupon, thethe marking on the identificationmark. mark. TheyThey did, however,however, report toto combat informationinformation centercenter plotplot table waswas changed to headquarters that thethe shipship was was paintedpainted graygray andand twotwo green (a(a neutralneutral ship). guns were situatedsituated in thethe bow.bow. On On thethe assumptionassumption 1€1-tei- Later that morningmorning at 10551055 hours, the Naval LiaisonLiaison OfficerOfficerat at IsraeliIsraeli AirAir ForceForce HeadquartersHeadquarters that thethe shipship was was an an enemy enemy target,target, AirAir Force Force Head-Head reported toto the ActingActing Chief of Naval OperationsOperations at quarters gave thethe aircraft an order to attack. Navy HeadquartersHeadquartersthat that the shipship sightedsighted earlierearlier waswas +64-~ During thethe first stage of the attackattack "an electromagneticelectromagnetic audio-surveillanceship ship ofof the the aircraftaircraft strafedstrafed thethe shipship withwith cannoncannon andand machinemachine U.S. Navy, named Liberty, whose markingmarking was G.G.T.T.R. R. - guns and duringduring thethe secondsecond stagestage droppeddropped bombsbombs onon 5." Upon Upon receivingthis this data,data, thethe ActingActing ChiefChief ofof it which which caused fires and smoke aboardaboard thethe ship. As As -CONFIDENTIACONFIDENTIAL-t 3737 CONFIDENTIAL (U) IsraeliIsraeli motor motor torpedo boatboat ofof the class which which attacked the Liberty:.Liberty. (Photograph courtesycourtesy of of Jane's Fighting Ships.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) the torpedotorpedo boats drew near, thethe aircraftaircraft werewere orderedordered i€ttet Throughout thethe contact, nono IsraeliIsraeli to leaveleave the target.target. DuringDuring thethe lastlast run,run, a alow-flying low-flying plane or torpedo boat saw an AmericanAmerican or any otherother aircraft reported toto headquartersthat that itit sawsaw thethe flag onon thethe ship. It waswas only an Israeli helicopter, sent marking "CPR-5""CPR-5" on the ship's hull. after thethe attackattack toto renderrender assistanceassistance —- if if necessarynecessary -€64-~ Upon receipt of this information about -— that noticednoticed aa smallsmall AmericanAmerican flagflag flying flying over the the ship'sship's marking,marking, thethe NavalNaval OperationsOperations Branch, at ship. At this time, the vessel was finally identifiedidentified "as"as approximately 1420 hours,hours, orderedordered thethe torpedo boat an audio-surveillanceaudio-surveillance shipship ofof thethe U.S. Navy." division commandercommandernot notto to attackattack inasmuch asas the aircraft maymay have have possiblypossibly identified thethe target incor-incor Israeli Prosecutor'sProsecutor's ChargesCharges of rectly. TheThe divisiondivision commandercommander waswas orderedordered toto ap- ap proach the ship inin orderorder toto establishestablish visualvisual contactcontact Negligence (U)(D) and to identify it. He He reported that thethe shipship appearedappeared to be be a a merchantmerchant oror supplysupply vesselvessel and that whenwhen he he i€t" Based on thethe foregoingforegoing account, the signalled thethe ship and requestedrequested its identificationidentification the Israeli Chief Military Prosecutor submitted a numbernumber ship repliedreplied withwith aa signalsignal meaningmeaning "identify"identify yourselfyourself of charges of negligence toto thethe examining judge of the first." AtAt thethe samesame time,time, thethe divisiondivision commandercommander waswas Preliminary Inquiry. The examiningexamining judge was thenthen to consulting a book on thethe identification of Arab NaviesNavies decide whether or not therethere waswas sufficientsufficient prima facie and makingmaking comparisons withwith thethe target beforebefore him.him. evidence toto justify bringing thethe accused toto trial forfor He concluded thatthat the targettarget waswas an an EgyptianEgyptian supplysupply negligence. ship named El-Kasir,El-Kasir. Simultaneously, the commandercommander tetfflT Given below areare the chargescharges broughtbrought of another ofof the torpedotorpedo boatsboats informedinformed thethe divisiondivision by thethe ChiefChief MilitaryMilitary ProsecutorProsecutor together with the commander thatthat he, too, thought the shipship waswas the EIEl- judge's findings.findings. Kasir. Therefore, at 14361436 hours,hours, thethe divisiondivision com-com {e}t€t 1. Charge: The first charge related to mander authorized the torpedo attack toto begin. begin. Only Only the failurefailure ofof thethe ActingActing ChiefChief of Naval Operations to after aa torpedotorpedo struck thethe shipship andand one one of of the torpedotorpedo report to the Head of the Naval Department thatthat the boats approachedit it from the otherother sideside were were thethe American ship, Liberty, was seen inin the morning hours markingsmarkings" "CTR-5"CTR-5" noticed onon thethe hull. Then the order of the day of the incidentincident sailing in the vicinityvicinity of the was given toto ceasecease thethe attack. Israeli coast.coast. 38 -e0NPIDENTIA-lheONPIDHNTIAL -C-ONFIDEMIA±eONFIDENTIAL Finding: Though thethe Head of the Finding: Though the torpedotorpedo boatboat Naval DepartmentDepartment testifiedtestified thatthat he did did notnot knowknow of of division commander claimedclaimed hehe never receivedreceived the the Liberty's presence inin thethe area on the day of the message notnot toto attack, thethe deputydeputy commandercommander of the incident, the OfficerOfficer ofof thethe Watch at NavyNavy Headquar-Headquar boat testified that hehe hadhad receivedreceived thethe messagemessage andand ters testified thatthat thethe HeadHead of the Naval Department passed it on to the division commander. The examining was on thethe NavyNavy CommandCommand BridgeBridge whenwhen the Com-Com judge believedbelievedthat, that,in in thethe heatheat of battle, itit was was manding Officer ofof thethe Navy ordered the markingmarking (on(on possible thatthat thethe messagemessage escapedescaped thethe awarenessawareness ofof the combatcombat informationinformation centercenter plotplot table)table) of thethe the divisiondivision commander and,and, inin any event, therethere waswas American supplysupply shipship changed toto green (indicating a insufficient evidenceevidence toto commitcommit anyany accused person to neutral vessel).vessel). Since the ActingActing ChiefChief ofof NavalNaval trial. Operations waswas anan eyewitness to to thethe event, hehe con- con ~ 5. Charge: That itit waswas negligencenegligence to cluded thatthat the HeadHead ofof thethe NavalNaval DepartmentDepartment did give the order toto attackattack aa warshipwarship withoutwithout previouslypreviously know aboutabout the presencepresence of an AmericanAmerican supplysupply ship establishing, beyond doubt,doubt, itsits national identity andand in the area.area. InIn viewview of of this,this, thethe examiningexamining judgejudge foundfound without taking into accountaccount the presencepresence ofof the Amer-Amer no negligence on onthe the partpart of the accused.accused. ican ship,ship, Liberty, in thethe vicinityvicinity of thethe coastcoast ofof -fro+~ 2. Charge: That thethe ActingActing ChiefChief ofof Israel. Naval Operations failedfailedto to reportreport toto the Head of the Finding: To thethe examiningexamining judge,judge, Naval Department that thethe hullhull markingsmarkings on the shipship there was no doubtdoubt thatthat thethe dominantdominant factors in the .observed byby oneone ofof thethe attacking aircraft werewere similarsimilar initial attackattack decisiondecision were the speedspeed andand course course of of to thosethose on the Liberty. the target.target. ThoseThose inin commandcommand werewere entitled toto assumeassume Finding: Witnesses testifiedtestified that that thethe reportedreported speedspeed (28(28 knots)knots) ofof thethe shipship waswas when thethe NavalNaval LiaisonLiaison Officerat at the AirAir Force Force correct, within the usualusual limitslimits ofof reasonablereasonable errorerror ofof Headquarters telephonedtelephoned the NavalNaval CommandCommand BridgeBridge 10-15 percent, relying upon the existingexisting meansmeans ofof about the hullhull markingsmarkings and their similaritysimilarity to thosethose determining thethe speed ofof thethe target.target. It was,was, therefore, of the Liberty, the officerofficer to whom he spoke repeated concludedthat that this waswas a militarymilitary vessel,vessel, and and sincesince the messagemessage in a loud loud voice sosothat that it was was heard by all the Liberty was classed asas a cargo ship, there waswas no present on thethe CommandCommand BridgeBridge includingincluding the HeadHead reason forfor surmising,surmising, inin viewview of ofthe the speed,speed, thatthat the of the Naval Department. TheThe examiningexamining judge stated,stated, target couldcould possibly bebe thethe ship, Liberty. If one adds therefore, thatthat therethere waswas thus nono reasonreason to repeat to to this otherother factorsfactors suchsuch as thethe reportreport ofof thethe shellingshelling the HeadHead of thethe Naval Department aa factfact that hadhad of the AlAl `Arish'Arish coast for hours on end, thethe ship'sship's been audibly announced toto those present. The chargecharge course towardtowardPort PortSaid, Said,the the aircraftaircraft reportreport thatthat the was dismissed. target waswas a warshipwarship and carriedcarried nono navalnaval oror otherother +e+1'67- 3. Charge: That thethe NavalNaval LiaisonLiaison identification marks,marks, andand the ship'sship's locationlocation closeclose to Officer atat the AirAir Force Force HeadquartersHeadquarters waswas negligentnegligent shore in a a battlebattle zone,zone, thethe cumulativecumulative effecteffect negatesnegates by not reportingreporting toto thethe AirAir Force Force thethe informationinformation any presumptionpresumption whatsoeverwhatsoever of a a connectionconnection betweenbetween about the presencepresence of the Liberty in the area.area. the AmericanAmerican supply shipship and thethe targettarget discovereddiscovered Finding: The examiningexamining judge con-con by thethe torpedotorpedo boats.boats. Thus,Thus, thethe examiningexamining judgejudge sidered this chargecharge unfounded.unfounded. TheThe responsibilityresponsibility forfor concluded thatthat the assumptionassumption it was was an an enemyenemy shipship the defensedefense of Israel against enemyenemy naval actions rests was reasonablereasonable andand thatthat the order given toto thethe aircraft solely withwith the Navy.Navy. EvenEven thoughthough AirAir Force Force Head-Head to attackattack waswas justified.justified. quarters ordered thethe aircraft to attack,attack, itit was was really really -~Ee+ 6. Charge: That itit waswas negligentnegligent to an orderorder issuedissued by thethe Navy,Navy, passedpassed onon throughthrough AirAir order the torpedo boatboat toto attack thethe shipship uponupon an an Force Headquarters. The NavalNaval LiaisonLiaison Officer atat the unfounded presumptionpresumptionthat that it waswas an an EgyptianEgyptian war-war Air Force Headquarters waswas entitledentitled toto assume that ship, andand thisthis asas a aconsequenceconsequence ofof not not takingtaking reason-reason the decisiondecision to attack waswas made after consideringconsidering this able steps toto makemake properproper identification.identification. report about the Liberty. There waswas no reason to feed feed Finding: The examining judgejudge con-con the AirAir Force Force withwith informationinformation andand considerationsconsiderations sidered it noteworthynoteworthy thatthat thethe identificationidentification of the that diddid notnot concernconcern it. target as the El- Kasir was made both byby thethe divisiondivision +G+~ 4. Charge: That thethe NavalNaval Depart-Depart commander andand the commandercommander of a a second second torpedotorpedo ment's order not to attack the ship (the Liberty), "for boat. UponUpon examining photos of the two ships, he was was fear of error and out of uncertainty with regard to the satisfied thatthat aa likenesslikeness existedexisted betweenbetween them, andand true identityidentity of thethe ship,"ship," waswas not not delivereddelivered to thethe that anan errorerror ofof identificationidentification waswas possible,possible, especiallyespecially torpedo boat division.division. when the identification was made while the ship waswas -elaiNTIORISITI-AbeONFIDENCfIAL 39 CONFIDENTIAL \ (U) U.S.S. LibertyLibert)' was mistaken by the IsraelisIsraelis forfor thisthis EgyptianEgyptian ship,ship, EI-Kasir.EI-112sir. (Photograph courtesycourtesy ofof Jane's Fighting Ships.}Ships.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) clouded in smoke. smoke. TheThe ChiefChief MilitaryMilitary ProsecutorProsecutor (U) In summation,summation, thethe judgejudge concludedconcluded argued that thisthis identificationidentification waswas unreasonableunreasonable be-be that inin all all thethe circumstancescircumstances ofof thethe casecase thethe conductconduct cause it was was inconceivableto tothink think thatthat this auxiliaryauxiliary of the navalnaval officersofficers concerned inin the Liberty incident ship El-El-KasirKasir could shellshell thethe Al 'Arish`Arish coastcoast oror that could not be be consideredconsidered unreasonable toto an extentextent she could move atat a speed of 28 knots. In reply, the which would justifyjustify committalcommittal forfor trial. examining judge saidsaid thatthat itit seemedseemed reasonablereasonable to him that thethe El- Kasir might have been part ofof thethe vesselsvessels Explanation Reexamined (U) that shelledshelled thethe coastcoast andand failedfailed toto get get away away from from the (U) Reexamination of Israel's explanationexplanation area or thatthat thethe shipship hadhad comecome to assistassist in thethe of why itsits air andand navalnaval forcesforces attacked the Liberty evacuation of EgyptianEgyptian soldierssoldiers strugglingstruggling awayaway from from reveals egregious errorserrors in both commandcommand judgmentsjudgments areas occupiedoccupied byby Israeli forces. Further, the judgejudge and operationaloperational procedures.procedures. said that therethere waswas no doubt thatthat the Liberty's refusal -~(64- The incidentincident isis doublydoubly tragic whenwhen it to identifyidentify herselfherself toto thethe torpedotorpedo boatsboats contributedcontributed is realized thatthat threethree hourshours beforebefore the attack occurred,occurred, largely toto the errorerror ofof identification.identification. Israeli Navy Headquarters waswas made aware of thethe (U) U.S.S. LibertyLibert,y arriving inin Malta afterafter the attack. (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) 40 -e0NRDE-W4A-12-CONFIDH~q:'IAL CONfIDENTIAL Liberty's presence, including exactexact name, ship type;type', mander becausebecause hehe believedbelieved itit quite possible thatthat the and hull number. The firstfirst error in responsible military message "escaped thethe awareness ofof the divisiondivision com- com operations came when the Liberty's identity was totally mander inin thethe heatheat of battle." erased at 1100 1100 hourshours fromfrom thethe combatcombat informationinformation +6+tet The finalfinal errorerror was thethe identificationidentification center plot table atat NavalNaval HeadquartersHeadquarters becausebecause nono of the Liberty as the EgyptianEgyptian supplysupply ship El-El-Kasir.Kasir, exact locationlocation forfor herher waswas known known after 09000900 hourshours onon The fact thatthat twotwo separateseparate torpedotorpedo boatboat commanderscommanders 8 June.June. made the samesame falsefalse identificationidentification only raisesraises thethe tel-ter The nextnext sinsin of of omission omission was was thethe question of the veracity of bothboth commanders.commanders. The ElEl- Israeli Navy's failure toto share with the AirAir Force Force full full Kasir was approximately one-quarter ofof the Liberty's details about the Liberty's presence off the AlAl `Arish •Arish tonnage, aboutabout one-halfone-half itsits length,length, andand offeredoffered a coast. ThisThis combatcombat parochialismparochialism waswas almost certainlycertainly radically differentdifferent silhouette.silhouette. To claim thatthat the Liberty a factorfactor contributing toto the attack on the Liberty — closely resembled the El-Kasir was most illogical. illogical. the examiningexamining judge'sjudge's opinion toto the contrary.contrary. EvenEven (U) The DepartmentDepartment of StateState expressedexpressed the IsraeliIsraeli examiningexamining judgejudge alluded to suchsuch possibility its view view of of thethe torpedotorpedo attackattack inin thesethese words:words: when he said: The subsequent attack byby Israeli torpedo boats, substantially Indeed, whoever perusesperuses thethe ample evidence presentedpresented to me, after thethe vesselvessel was was or or should should have beenbeen identifiedidentified by Israeli may conceivably drawdraw some lesson regarding the relationsrelations military forces, manifests the samesame recklessreckless disregarddisregard forfor between thethe two arms ofof thethe IsraelIsrael DefenceDefence Forces,Forces, whichwhich human life. The silhouettesilhouette andand conductconduct ofof U.S.S.V.S.S. LibertyLiberty were involved inin thethe incident, and the operationaloperational proceduresprocedures readily distinguished it from any vessel that couldcould have have been been in time of war.... war.... considered hostilehostile....It....It couldcould and and should should have been scrutinized visually atat close close rangerange beforebefore torpedostorpedos werewere fired....The fired....The -~(-64- In spite of the fact thatthat thethe IsraeliIsraeli AirAtr UnitedVnited States GovernmentGovernment expects the GovernmentGovernment of Israel Force diddid not have have all all thethe informationinformation aboutabout thethe also to taketake thethe disciplinarydisciplinary measuresmeasures whichwhich internationalinternational Liberty that waswas available toto the Navy, thethe pilotspilots ofof law requires in the eventevent ofof wrongful wrongful conductconduct byby thethe military the attackingattacking planesplanes were at faultfault forfor failingfailing toto make make personnel ofof aa StateState...[and)... [and] toto issue issue instructionsinstructions necessarynecessary to positive identification of the Liberty before attacking ensure that UnitedUnited StatesStates personnelpersonnel andand propertyproperty willwill not not the ship.ship. ThoughThough the pilotspilots testifiedtestified toto thethe contrary,contrary, again be be endangeredendangered by the the wrongful wrongful actionsactions ofof IsraeliIsraeli military personnel.'personnel. J every official official interviewinterview ofof numerousnumerous Liberty crewmen (U) When NSA's Deputy Director read the gave consistent evidence that indeed the Liberty waswas decision of thethe IsraeliIsraeli DefenceDefence Forces Forces PreliminaryPreliminary flying an American flagflag -— and, further, thethe weatherweather Inquiry, hehe summed upup his personalpersonal feelings on the conditions were ideal to assure its easy easy observanceobservance andand subject by calling it "a nicenice whitewash.'"whitewash.:" identification. These circumstancescircumstances —- priorprior identifi-identifi cation of the Liberty and easy visibility of the Amer-Amer Notes ican flag flag — - promptedprompted thethe Departmentof of State to inform the IsraeliIsraeli GovernmentGovernment that Source documents areare inin the "Crisis Collection" ofof thethe NSA History Collection. the laterlater militarymilitary attackattack byby IsraeliIsraeli aircraftaircraft on thethe U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty is quitequite literallyliterally incomprehensible.incomprehensible. AsAB a minimum,minimum, '(V)l(U) Israel Defence Forces, Preliminary InquiryInquiry File the attackattack mustmust be be condemnedcondemned as an act act of of militarymilitary reck-reck 1/67, 21 21 JulyJuly 1967.1967. ForwardedForwarded to Director,Director, NSANSA underunder covercover of of 2 lessness reflecting wantonwanton disregarddisregard forfor humanhuman life.life.' Department of State (INR)(lNR) Memo,Memo, 2222 AugustAugust 1967.1967. ~)- In the chainchain of mistakes, the nextnext oneone 22(U)(U) Department of State TelegramTelegram No.No. 210139,210139, to occurred whenwhen thethe division commander ofof thethe attacking the U.S.V.S. Embassy,Embassy, TelTel Aviv, Aviv, 1111 JuneJune 1967.1967. torpedo boatsboats failedfailed toto hear his deputy telltell him that '(V)3(U) Ibid. '(V)4(U) A pennedpenned long-handlong-hand comment by Louis Louis W. W. Naval HeadquartersHeadquarters had had orderedorderedthe the boatsboats notnot to Tordella, Deputy Director, NSA, 26 August 1967,1967, attachedattached to the attack for fear of havinghaving mistaken the ship's identity. copy of the IsraelIsrael DefenceDefence Forces Forces PreliminaryPreliminary Inquiry (cited inin The IsraeliIsraeli examiningexamining judgejudge exoneratedexonerated thethe corn-com- footnote 1).1). CONFIDHNCfIAL 41 (U)(V) UV.S.S. .S.S. Davis,Dayis, one of of thethe twotwo destroyersdestroyers toto reach reach the the Liherty,Liberty, runs a line line to to thethe strickenstricken ship.ship. The The DayisDavis assumed all communications functions for the Liherty.Liberty. ((C«e eel'll -- Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson,Wilson, NSA.) (Figure isis UNCLASSIFIED) ~------CONfIDEN'fIAL Chapter VIVI Recovery andand InitialInitial Assessment (U)(U) (U)(V) Sixteen and one-half hours afterafter the America reached the Liberty and beganbegan evacuatingevacuating Liberty was attacked, U.S.V.S. assistanceassistance finallyfinally reachedreached the seriouslyseriously woundedback backto to thethe carrier. OneOne hourhour her. At At 0625 0625 hourshours (local time)time) onon 88 June,June, thethe later, thethe America rendezvoused withwith the Liberty. destroyers U.S.S.V.S.S. Davis (DD-937) andand V.S.S.U.S.S. Massey Thereafter, thethe groupgroup of of shipsships setset aa coursecourse forfor SoudhaSoudha (DD-778) rendezvousedrendezvousedwith withthe the shipship at 33-OIN,33-0IN, 31-31 Bay, Crete,Crete, somesome 300 300 miles miles away. away. 59E, aa positionposition 420420 miles miles east-southeasteast-southeast ofof SoudhaSoudha Bay, Crete. The carrier, U.S.S.V.S.S. America, was still 138138 Commander, SixthSixth Fleet ArrivesArrives (U) miles from the Liberty, closing atat 30 knots.' (U)(V) Later thatthat afternoon,afternoon, ViceVice AdmiralAdmiral Medical Assistance (U) William 1.I. Martin, Commander,Commander, Sixth Fleet,Fleet, boardedboarded (U)(V) The CommanderCommander of DestroyerDestroyer Squad-Squad the Liberty for one hour toto visit its captaincaptain andand crew crew ron Twelve, CaptainCaptain H.H.G. G. Leahy, and otherother personnelpersonnel and to to personallypersonally survey the damagesdamages sustained. Fol-Fol from the Davis and Massey immediately boarded the lowing hishis visit,visit, Vice AdmiralAdmiral Martin recommendedrecommended to Liberty to assist inin controllingcontrolling damage andand inin treatingtreating the Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, V.S.U.S. NavyNavy Europe,Europe, AdmiralAdmiral the injured.injured. OnlyOnly afterafter thisthis transfertransfer diddid CommanderCommander John S. McCain,Jr., Jr., that the Liberty proceed direct McGonagle relinquishrelinquish hishis watchwatch on thethe bridge. HeHe was was to MaltaMalta forfor dry dry dockingdocking ratherrather thanthan toto SoudhaSoudha BayBay exhausted andand in in dangerdanger ofof havinghaving hishis wounds wounds become become first because ofof the primaryprimary necessity toto protect the infected. TemporaryTemporary command ofof thethe Liberty was cryptomaterial and equipment.equipment. AdmiralAdmiral McCainMcCain gavegave assumed by the OperationsOperations OfficerOfficer of Destroyer Squad-Squad his approval.'approval. 4 ron Twelve. Upon completion ofof aa medical assessment, (U)(V) Also visiting the Liberty during the the Commander,Commander, SixthSixth FleetFleet was advised thatthat thethe late afternoonafternoon of the 9th9th waswas CaptainCaptain RussellRussell Arthur, Liberty was ready toto transfertransfer 1515 seriouslyseriously woundedwounded Sixth FleetFleet MaintenanceMaintenance Officer,Officer, who reportedreported toto the and 9 deaddead to thethe America when its helicoptershelicopters V.U.S.S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Europe thethe followingfollowing cor- cor arrived. The possibilitypossibility of anyone being alive inin the rective actions: "established"established water-tight boundariesboundaries at flooded spacesspaces was deemed unlikely.unlikely. BulkheadsBulkheads werewere frames 52 and 78 andand atat second-decksecond-deck levellevel and mademade firm and the floodingflooding contained,contained, soso thatthat the Liberty repairs toto gyro, gyro, engine-orderengine-order telegraph,telegraph, rudder-anglerudder-angle was completely mobilemobile toto 10 knots.knots. The Davis assumed indicator, fathometer,fathometer, sound-poweredsound-powered phones andand all communications functions for the Liberty. Further, bridge-steering control." The Liberty's crew was aug- aug Sixth Fleet was advised that,that, uponupon arrival ofof the fleetfleet mented as necessary,necessary, and accompaniedaccompanied byby thethe tugtug ocean tug, U.S.S.V.S.S. Papago, the destroyerdestroyer Massey could Papago;Papago, and thethe destroyer,destroyer, Davis, she proceededproceeded 5 return toto fleet fleet duties.duties.2 toward MaltaMalta at 1010 knots.'knots. (U)(V) While Liberty's on-board needsneeds werewere being tended to, two two boatsboats fromfrom thethe destroyersdestroyers Replacement Inquiries (U) searched thethe area aroundaround the Liberty for two two hourshours looking forfor classifiedclassified paperspapers thatthat might bebe washingwashing out (C(6 CCO)660) A possible replacementreplacement for the Liberty from thethe pear-shaped,pear-shaped, gapinggaping hole in in thethe floodedflooded was already being considered. At approximatelyapproximately 13001300 Research Department spaces;spaces; nono classifiedclassified itemsitems werewere hours, the Director,Director, NavalNaval SecuritySecurity GroupGroup EuropeEurope recovered.'recovered. 3 ··EO 1. 4. (c) sent aa message message tot0L] I u .uuu ItheItlIeAmeficaarid America and (U)(V) At approximately 0915 hours, all ships I 'thethe Little RockRock requesting the got under way andand headed toward thethe carrier America status ofof ArabicArabic linguists (civilian and military) aboard at 10 knots. ByBy 1030 1030 hours, twotwo helicopters from the the Liberty for possible transfertransfer toto the U.S.S.V.S.S. Bel- IIANBf:;H VIA COMlNJ' CIiANNHf:;S ONf:;Y -CONFIDENTIACONfIDEN'fIAL-fr 4343 eONflf)EN'fIAL (U) HelicopterHelicopter from the U.S.S.U.S.S. America lowers aa litter to receive receive thethe Liberty's wounded. TheThe helicopter took the woundedwounded backhack to America, which was several miles away.away. He ee8) - Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson,Wilson, NSA.) NSA.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) 'EOEO1.4. 1.4.(c)(c) moat,mont, another technical research ship just.arrivedjnjust arrived in ruptured ResearchResearch Department'sDepartment's operationsoperations spacespace Norfolk, Viriginia, for repairs.re?airs,6Threehours6 Three hours later,later, at prompted NAVEURtodirectNAVEUR to direct SixthSixth Fleet on 9 June to 1555, I Irepliedreplied toto thisthis inquiry.inquiry. TheThe onlyonly do whatever is feasible feaeible to keep any Soviet ships out of of Liberty's remaining ArabicArabic linguistlinguist aboard the Liberty was wake....wake.... maintainmaintain observation of Liberty's wake and if if possiblepossible findfind-out out whatwhat sortsort of documentsdocuments areare beingbeing lostlost inin thethe wakewake....take....take Robert L. Wilson Wilson (NSA (NSA civilian);civilian); all othersothers werewere whatever steps maymay be reasonable andand appropriate toto reduce reduce wounded (and(and evacuated), killed, oror missing.missing. II possibility of compromise, notingnoting thatthat aa compromisecompromise could have also forwarded LieutenantLieutenantBennett's Bennett's requestrequest thatthat a both political and technical aspects.' team fromfrom the NavalNaval SecuritySecurity GroupGroup Europe meet the (U) Liberty's escorts reacted quicklyquickly andand Liberty when sheshe dockeddockedat at Malta to assistassist inin evalu-evalu most effectively toto minimize the uncontrollableuncontrollable lossloss of of ation ofof compromisecompromise of cryptomaterials and prepara-prepara sensitive materials. ThoughThough aa SovietSoviet guided-missileguided-missile tion of reports.reports.'7 destroyer (DDG 626/4) of the KildinKildin classclass remainedremained in thethe vicinityvicinity of the Liberty between 1320 and 16001600 Recovery ofof Sensitive MaterialsMaterials (U) hours on the 9th, sheshe was was keptkept underunder constantconstant sur-sur veillance andand diddid not stopstop oror recoverrecover anything.anything. The (U)CU) Mounting concern over the possiblepossible Davis, Massey, or Papago trailed inin Liberty's wake-wake loss ofof sensitivesensitive documentsdocuments driftingdrifting out of the Liberty's constantly toto recover paperspapers adrift.adrift. The first night,night, 44 -CONFIDENTEkfrCONFIDENTIAL I1AN9I:.E ,q,\ COMIN'f ClUNNEI:.8 ONI:.¥ CONFIDHN'IAL there was,was. quitequite naturally,naturally, aa clamorclamor forfor specific specific information aboutabout casualtiescasualties -— their namesnames andand extent of injuries.injuries. TheThe Liberty forwarded thethe bestbest information obtainable,obtainable, but data aboutabout thosethose missingmissing was elusive. DuringDuring thethe IsraeliIsraeli attackattack and immediatelyimmediately thereafter,thereafter. thethe Liberty conducted nono search for per-per sonnel because nonenone hadhad been reported overboardoverboard and she was trying to clear the area as soon soon as as possible.possible. On 10 10 June,June. thethe U.S.U.S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope notified JCSJCS thatthat the Liberty's flooded compartment could not be openedopened to accountaccount forfor missingmissing personnelpersonnel until thethe shipship waswas drydocked.drydocked. ToTo do do otherwiseotherwise wouldwould risk further floodingflooding andand perilperil the shipship and the liveslives of the survivorssurvivors who werewere takingtaking the crippledcrippled vessel to port.''port.!' Assistance toto NSA NSA PersonnelPer~onnel -(C(C CCO)CeO) (C(0 CCO)GGO) At NSA,NSA. when it was learned (through Navy personnel channels) that itsits employeesemployees DonaldDonald L. BlalockBlalock and Allen Allen M. M. BlueBlue werewere listedlisted amongamong Liberty's casualties,casualties. steps were taken to obtainobtain moremore definite information and to notify next of kin. Late onon the nightnight ofof 8-9 8-9 June,June, thethe ChiefChief andand DeputyDeputy Chief,Chief, NSA Civilian Personnel (Messrs. William M. HolleranHolleran (U)(D) VADM William I.I. MartinMartin (right),(right). Com-Com and AlbertAlbert W.W. Ulino) Ulino) drove to thethe SilverSilver SpringSpring homehome mander ofof Sixth Fleet.Fleet, visited the LihertyLiberty on of Allen Blue's wife,wife, Patsy,Patsy, toto notify her that AllenAllen the afternoonafternoon of 9 June.June. was missing in action.action.'? 2 (.(C((g CCO)ggQ) PhotographPhotograph courtesycourtesy ofof RobertRobert L.L. Wilson,Wilson. NSA.)NSA.) (C CCO)On 10 June, thethe Director,Director, NSANSA sentsent (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) a messagemessage toto NSA Europe directingdirecting thatthat a represent-represent ative be sent to meetmeet the Liberty at MaltaMalta toto provideprovide the Papago picked up one classifiedclassified itemitem ten milesmiles maximum assistance and guidance in respect to NSA NSA behind Libert-y,'Liberty.9 personnel, local liaison,liaison, and informational reporting to (C(0 CCO) Enroute to Malta, the Papago contin-contin NSA. The Director,Director. NSANSA directeddirected NSANSA EuropeEurope to ued to take exceptionalexceptional measuresmeasures to recover materials. arrange for RobertRobert L.L. Wilson'sWilson's transportationtransportation homehome Always in Liberty's wake, she used boatboat hookshooks and and by quickest means and toto relayrelay messagesmessages forfor his his wife. wife. crab netsnets toto pick pick up up floatingfloating material.material. LightsLights werewere All appropriate assistance was to be be given given to to DonaldDonald rigged on on Papago's bridge wing soso thatthat visibilityvisibility at L. BlalockBlalock inin arranging for for hishis returnreturn to the U.S.U. S. night was even better thanthan duringduring thethe day.day. When When Information copies of the message were sent to SeniorSenior material couldcould not be be recovered,recovered, Papago ran overover it U.S.U. S. LiaisonLiaison Officer,Officer, LondonLondonand and toto thethe Director,Director, with her propellerpropeller and then backedbacked down overover itit to Naval Security Group Europe.Europe."13 shred thethe paperpaper intointo smallsmall pieces.pieces. AlthoughAlthough somesome paper with typing onon it did did not not disintegratedisintegrate inin ninenine hours when placed in water byby Papago'ePapago's CO, it was was Cleanup Continues (U) believed that ocean-waveocean-wave action would have caused the fanfold paper (which(which waswas in in multimessagemultimessage blankblank (U) As the Liberty steamed westwardwestward onon lengths) toto ball upup and sink or at leastleast notnot be be easilyeasily 10 June,June, CommanderCommander McGonagleMcGonagle hadhad the shrapnelshrapnel visible. Total materialsmaterials recoveredrecovered byby thethe Papago removed fromfrom hishis leg andand waswas restingresting comfortably.comfortably. weighed eighteight pounds; highest classification was secret With adequate provisions ofof food,food, fuel,fuel, and water onon codeword I to board ship to reachreach Malta,Malta, therethere waswas concernconcern aboutabout (U) In Washington,Washington. afterafter the generalgeneral de-de- crew moralemorale andand Sixth Fleet was requested to have a tails of the attack onon the Liberty had beenbeen absorbed,absorbed, helicopter pick up the Liberty's outgoing mail as soon soon IIANBbB ViA eO'P.HN'f eIIANNBbS ON:b¥ -e0P+RDENT4A-freONFIDBNCfIAL 45 EO1. 1.4.(c)4 . (c) COf\PIDEf\TIAL (U) Liberty'sLiberty's forward dishdish antennaantenna afterafter thethe strafing attackattack byby IsraeliIsraeli jets.jets. HEl ElElS) Photograph- Photograph courtesycourtesy ofof RobertRobert L.L. Wilson,Wilson, NSA.)NSA.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) 46 -eeNPIDENTI-A±CONPIDENTIAL -}heiBtE-viA-eoNwil-etweitts-ONL-I'IIANBLH YIA CO:r.IIN'f CIIANNHLS ONL\' 1 SHCRH't' as possible andand atat the same time deliver mail addressed Preparations atat Malta (U) to the ship'sship's company."company. 14 The Liberty continued clean-clean up operations aboard ship as well well as the grislygrisly task ofof (U) To provideprovide forfor the handlinghandling of thethe accounting for personnel that werewere missing. On 11 11 Liberty when sheshe arrived at Malta,Malta, AdmiralAdmiral McCain,McCain, June, the Papago recovered one body floating six miles activated Task ForceForce (TF) 100,100, effectiveeffective 1212 June,June, astern of the Liberty; another personperson previouslypreviously re-re under the commandcommand of Rear AdmiralAdmiral HenryHenry A.A. Ren- Ren ported missing was now confirmedconfirmed deaddead afterafter recoveryrecovery ken, Commander,Commander, Service ForceForce AtlanticAtlantic Fleet sta-sta aboard ship.ship.'15 tioned inin Norfolk,Norfolk, Virginia.Virginia. CTFCTF 100100 was was chargedcharged with: Command InvestigationsInvestigations Initiated (U) 1. Supervising the drydocking, removal, and ship-ship ment of remainsremains of personnel killed in action; (U) While the Liberty limped steadily to-to 2. Preventing disclosure of classifiedclassified informationinformation ward Malta under the watchfulwatchful protection of the Davis and materialmaterial toto unauthorizedunauthorized personnel;personnel; and and Papago, U.S. military commands in the PentagonPentagon 3. Readying the Liberty for repairrepair byby Com- Com and inin EuropeEurope werewere feverishlyfeverishly arrangingarranging for thethe mander, ServiceService Force Sixth Fleet. drydocking of the ship plusplus full-scalefull-scale investigationsinvestigations ofof These functions were expected to be be completedcompleted withinwithin the eventsevents andand circumstancescircumstances surrounding thethe attack two days after Liberty's expected arrival in Malta onon itself. The JointJoint ChiefsChiefs of StaffStaff appointedappointed a fact-fact 13 June.June. SubordinateSubordinate tasktask groupgroup commanderscommanders werewere findingteam team onon 99 JuneJune and initiated plans for thethe instructed to be be prepared to reportreport inin personperson toto RearRear team toto visit,visit, inin turn,turn, thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S.U. S. Admiral RenkenRenkenat at thethe U.S.U. S. EmbassyEmbassy in MaltaMalta byby Navy Europe;Europe; U.S.U. S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Europe;Europe; noon, 12 June.June."'19 Commander, SixthSixth Fleet;Fleet; and the U.S.S. Liberty,"Libert y. I6 (U) Of the eighteight subordinatesubordinate tasktask groupsgroups (U) On the 10th,10th, afterafter conferringconferring with the that comprisedcomprised Task Force 100, the Director,Director, NavalNaval Commander-in-Chief,U.S. U.S. NavyNavy Europe,Europe, thethe U.S.U.S. Security Group Europe was directed toto provideprovide person-person Commander-in-Chief,Europe Europe recommendedrecommendedto to JCS nel for TG 100.4,10004, (Security); thisthis groupgroup waswas to assumeassume that aa NavyNavy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry bebe established.established. In his his responsibility forfor allall materials requiringrequiring specialspecial han-han message toto JCS, CINCEUR gavegave hishis rationalerationale for this dling, including their removal from the Liberty, trans-trans action asas follows: follows: fer to to securesecure storage,storage, andand continuouscontinuous security atat allall Have reviewed availableavailabledata data with respect to Liberty with times. 2020 CINCUSNAVEUR inin generalgeneral frame of chronologychronology before acci-acci (C(G CCO) GGO) Captain Carl M. Smith, Director,Director, Na-Na dental attack, during attack andand subsequentsubsequent thereto. WeWe bothboth val Security Group Atlantic, was designated Com have many very pertinent andand as as yet yet unansweredunanswered questionsquestions as val Security Group Atlantic, was designated Com- we appreciate Washington has. has. AtAt thethe same time, [it] must be mander, TG 100.4;100.4; otherother TGTG 100.4 100.4 personnelpersonnel werewere recognized [that][that] crewcrew members ofof Liberty from whom whom answers Commander E.E. H. H. Platzek;Platzek; LieutenantLieutenant CommanderCommander must be gottengotten areare at at pointpoint ofof exhaustion,exhaustion, sufferingsuffering fromfrom Benjamin M. Bishop; Lieutenant Philip G.G. Firestone,Firestone, wounds andand shock, deaddead or missing. It simplysimply does not makemake USNR; LieutenantLieutenantR. R. H.H. Lee; Lee; LieutenantLieutenant M. H. H. sense, legally or otherwise, toto initiate barragebarrage ofof uncorrelateduncorrelated Bennett (from(from the SigintSigint componentcomponent aboard the LibLib- questioning viavia long-haul communicationscommunicationsat atthis this time. Ob-Ob viously factsfacts must be developeddeveloped involving actionsactions and judgments erty); and CTCCTC AlfredAlfred J.J. Pawlinkowski.Pawlinkowski. Additionally,Additionally, of crew, crew, Liberty command andand chain of command,command, and also also NSA Europe named LieutenantLieutenant ColonelColonel Robert T. legal base mustmust bebe establishedestablished forfor possiblepossible claimsclaims againstagainst Green, USAFUSAF and Clarence R. Klumfoot (NSA security government ofof Israel. Therefore, I stronglystrongly endorseendorse establish-establish officer) to to assistassist TGTG 100.4 asas necessary.necessary.'II OfOf thisthis ment of CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry byby Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Navy Europe, as properproper procedure...althoughprocedure...although it may may be be somewhatsomewhat group, Bishop, Firestone, andand PawlinkowskiPawlinkowski were fur-fur time-consuming andand create impatienceimpatience amongamong thosethose whowho desire ther designateddesignated toto assist Lieutenant Bennett, as he he more rapid answers.answers. had requested,requested, withwith thethe evaluationevaluation ofof securitysecurity com-com JCS gave immediate concurrence andand onon 11 June,June, the promise andand preparation of required reports. 22 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. NavyNavy Europe convened the (S(8 CCO)GGO) To assist TGTG 100.6100.6 (Communications)(Communications) court inin London London with with directionsdirections toto proceedproceed promptlypromptly with its services,services, the Director,Director NavalNaval SecuritySecurit GroupGrou to the MediterraneanMediterranean and board the Liberty at seasea as Europe also arrangedarranged EO1. 1.4.(c)4. (c) soon asas possible.possible.'17 EO 1.1.4.(d)4 . (d) (U) In Israel,Israel, too,too, high-levelhigh-level investigationsinvestigations for TF 100100 inasmuch as the communicationscommunications guardship were being considered. On 13 June,June, the IsraeliIsraeli DefenceDefence provided byby SixthSixth FleetFleet to the TaskTask ForceForce lackedlacked the Force Chief of Staff, GeneralGeneral Rabin,Rabin, appointedappointed anan capability. 23 official CourtCourt ofof Inquiry to examineexamine thethe Liberty (U) After Rear AdmiralAdmiral Renken left Nor-Nor incident."incident. 18 folk, guidance for his TG TG 100.3 100.3 (Public(Public Affairs)Affairs) was was IIANBI::E ViA COflfHN'f CIIANNEI::S ONI::Y -S-ReftETSHCRH't' 4747 ------ eONPIDHNCfIAL classified mattermatter safeguarded.safeguarded. IfIf newsmennewsmen asked about these restrictions, theythey were toto bebe toldtold thatthat the actionsactions were being taken primarilyprimarily outout ofof considerationconsideration ofof families of missing personnel,personnel, sincesince remains may be in the exposedexposed compartmentcompartment and visiblevisible toto photogra-photogra phers; andand becausebecause communicationscommunications spacesspaces normallynormally contain classified equipmentequipmentand and areare closed toto thethe public, since it mustmust bebe assumedassumed thatthat somesome classifiedclassified equipment is exposed.exposed. Additionally,Additionally, nono interviewsinterviews ofof the officersofficers or crew of the Liberty were to be granted until authorizedauthorized byby Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S. NavyNavy Europe, after completioncompletion ofof thethe CourtCourt ofof Inquiry.Inquiry. IfIf queried by the press aboutabout thethe reasonreason forfor suchsuch policy,policy, the securitysecurity officer (TG(TG 100.4)100.4) waswas toto saysay thatthat thesethese men are potential witnesseswitnesses before the CourtCourt ofof Inquiry and it is is thethe desiredesire ofof thethe conveningconvening authority and the President of the CourtCourt thatthat recollectionsrecollections ofof witnesseswitnesses remain as freshfresh asas possiblepossible and notnot bebe influencedinfluenced inin any wayway by by outsideoutside discussions.discussions. The doctrinedoctrine ofof security at thethe sourcesource waswas to to be be followed followed atat all timestimes and therethere waswas to to be be no no censorshipcensorship ofof newsmen'snewsmen's 25 material. 25 (U) Upon arrivingarriving atat Malta, RearRear AdmiralAdmiral cO 000) NSA civilian, Donald L. Blalock,Blalock, waswas Renken met withwith hishis tasktask groupgroup commanderscommanders andand a membermember of thethe SigintSigint unitunit aboardaboard thethe American embassyembassy officialsofficials on onTuesday, Tuesday, 1313 June,June, to Liberty. Slightly wounded, he was was evacuatedevacuated complete plans forfor dockingdocking operations,operations, whichwhich wouldwould commence onon Liberty's arrival —- then estimatedestimated at to thethe America with the rest of thethe Liberty's 26 wounded. about 2300 hours thatthat night.night.26 (te"'e'etT) —- Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson,Wilson, NSA.)NSA.) (Figure isis (('jlh'r(INFIDZNTlDZt. rhZ ((('j)U) Blalock Returns Home (U) compiled andand radioed for delivery to him as he he passedpassed (C(e CCO)eeO) That samesame afternoon,afternoon, NSANSA civilian,civilian, through Rota, Spain, enrouteenroute to Malta.Malta. TGTG 100.3's100.3's Donald L. Blalock (earlier(earlier evacuated from the Liberty mission waswas toto satisfysatisfy thethe legitimatelegitimate interestsinterests ofof to thethe U.S.S.U. S. S. America with minorminor shrapnelshrapnel wounds)wounds) newsmen without compromise of classified information,information, was released fromfrom America's medical department and unwarranted interference withwith operations,operations, oror invasioninvasion flown toto Athens. There he was was metmet byby NSA NSA EuropeEurope of individual rights of privacy. Further,Further, it was was directed representative, CharlesCharles Cowardin,Cowardin, who arranged forfor that allall publicpublic affairsaffairs activitiesactivities bebe conductedconducted with the Blalock's traveltravel toto the United States.States. BlalockBlalock arrivedarrived aim ofof maintainingmaintaining thethe credibilitycredibility ofof thethe officialofficial at WashingtonWashington National Airport the following day. day.'27 announcements regarding thethe missionmission of U.S.S.U.S. S. LibLib- erty; i.e., sheshe was was a a communicationscommunications researchresearch shipship Liberty'sLiberty 's ArrivalArrival atat Malta (U)(U) that waswas diverteddiverted fromfrom herher researchresearch assignmentassignment to provide improved communication-relay linkslinks withwith the (C(0 CCO)000) Liberty's arrival inin MaltaMalta waswas delayeddelayed several U.U.S.S. embassies aroundaround thethe entire Mediterra-Mediterra until 06300630 hours, 14 June. PrecautionaryPrecautionary safety meas-meas nean during thethe currentcurrent troubles.troubles.'24 ures hadhad requiredrequired additionaladditional shoringshoring ofof damageddamaged (U) Specific groundground rulesrules werewere setset forthforth bulkheads and her speedspeed waswas reduced. Divers from the for presspress coveragecoverage ofof Liberty's arrival in Malta.Malta. Papago immediately began an underwaterunderwater inspectioninspection Newsmenwere werenot notto to bebe permittedpermitted in the immediateimmediate of the ship's hullhull toto determinedetermine whetherwhether oror notnot changeschanges vicinity of the dockyarddockyard while the Liberty entered the in the keelkeel blocksblocks would be necessary before drydocking dock, unless CTF 100 was satisfiedsatisfied thatthat the torpedotorpedo could begin.begin. TheThe keel waswas foundfound toto be straight andand hole was adequatelyadequately covered;covered; while the drydockdrydock waswas undamaged. At 1400 1400 hours the Liberty entered the pumped out, regardless of covering; andand after the dockdock drydock; byby 1530 hourshoursa a canvascanvas netnet had beenbeen tiedtied was pumped out,out, until allall remainsremains werewere removedremoved andand across the damaged side of the ship andand screensscreens hadhad 48 -eONTHiE-AfTIA-beONPIDHNCfIAL IIANBfJH VIA GOMIN'f GIIANNHfJ8 ONfJ¥ L3I 1 SID SWIDNI Ga GaLlIS SSVIDNI1 (U) The (U) The with holesfromtherocketfire. with holesfromtherocketfire. with U The (U) holes Uberty Liberty Liberty from the arrived inMaltaon14June.Thetorpedoholeis visible justabovethewaterline,andshipisriddled arrived arrived inMaltaon14June.Thetorpedoholeis visible justabovethewaterline,andshipisriddled rocket in fire. Malta n14 on June. (Photograph courtesyoftheDepartmentNavy.) (Photograph courtesyoftheDepartmentNavy.) (Photograph The (Figure isUNCLASSIFIED) (Figure isUNCLASSIFIED) (Figure courtesy torpedo is of UNCLASSIFIED) oeis hole the Department visible of the just Navy.) above the water line. and the ship is riddled anusaataissvioNa aaL3ISSVIDNI1 comparison tothehugepieces oftwistedmetal,theworkmenappearverysmall. oprsnt h huge the to comparison (U) AtthedrydockinMalta, workmeninspectthetorpedo-damagedhull ofthe (U) ttedyoki at,workmen Malta, in drydock the At pieces (Photograph courtesy oftheDepartmentNavy.) (Photograph of twisted (Figure isUNCLASSIFIED) (Figure courtesy metal, inspect is of UNCLASSIFIED) the h oke pervery appear workmen the Department the torpedo-damaged of the Navy.) ulof hull small. the Liberty. Liberty. In In UaLlISSVIDN9 feNfiDENTf2thCONPIDENTIAL been installed across all drydockdrydock drains. DuringDuring the Lieutenant Colonel GreenGreen (from the NSANSA EuropeEurope pump down, navynavy swimmersswimmersand and menmen inin aa rubberrubber raft staff), he returnedreturned home.home. LaterLater WilsonWilson learned that picked upup oil-covered paper paperas as itit floated outout of the his wife had beenbeen continuallycontinually informedinformed by NSA NSA per-per ship. WhenWhen thethe drydockdrydock waswas completelycompletely drained, a sonnel of what was going onon fromfrom thethe time thethe wholewhole thorough searchsearch ofof thethe entire drydockdrydock and each drain incident began;began; theythey hadhad eveneven offered offered to to have have someone someone screen was conducted by indoctrinatedindoctrinated Naval Security stay with her.29 Group personnel. NSANSA Europe personnel, sentsent to Malta, witnessedwitnessed all drainagedrainage operations.operations.28 Clearing Damaged Areas (U)(D) (U) In MaltaMalta thethe searchsearch forfor and and removalremoval Evacuation of Wilson (U)(D) of bodies bodies began atat 18301830 hours onon the 14th14th andand continued until approximatelyapproximately midnight, byby which which (C CCO)000) Earlier, asas soon soon as the Liberty entered time thethe remainsremains ofof 20 20 men,men, includingincluding AllenAllen Blue, had Malta, NSANSA EuropeEurope personnel boarded the ship to see see been recovered. Bodies of the remainingremaining fivefive missingmissing NSA civilian Robert L. Wilson. Wilson. When When Wilson Wilson said he men were were presumedpresumed lost at seasea enrouteenroute toto Malta.Malta. did not wishwish to staystay aboardaboard anyany longer,longer, hehe was was quickly quickly Liberty's death toll stood at 34.34. ushered to the U.S.U.S. ConsulateConsulate in Valletta for a shortshort (C(G CCO)eOO) Clearance of the damaged area contin-contin debriefing. Immediately thereafter, accompaniedaccompanied byby ued. Prior toto openingopening the hatchhatch leadingleading downdown to the (U) Navy Navy diversdivers GilbertGilbert Damelio,Damelio, JohnJohn P.P. Highffil, Highfill, andand DanielDaniel McDuffleMcDuffie recoverrecover classifiedclassified debrisdebris adrift as thethe pump-downpump-down operations continuecontinue on the Liberty in Malta.Malta. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.)Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) ttANtlLE VIA e6~HN'f eIIANNfitJS ONtJ\' -CONFIDENTIACONFIDENTIAL-fr 5151 eONFIDENTIAI. Research Department space,space, a guard waswas posted and removed fromfrom thethe spacesspaces atat Malta becausebecause ofof extensiveextensive all personnelpersonnel were required to log log in when when authorizedauthorized damage. In the ResearchResearch DepartmentDepartment andand non-morsenon-morse access. Crews ofof indoctrinatedindoctrinated personnelpersonnel began remov-remov search and developmentdevelopment areasareas on thethe secondsecond deck,deck, ing all classified equipmentequipment andand documents toto a securesecure very little outwardoutward damagedamage waswas noticeable.noticeable. However,However, space one deck aboveabove thethe damaged area. This recoveryrecovery the shiftingshifting ofof thethe racksracks and breaksbreaks inin the airair process proved toto be very very slow slow because the classifiedclassified conditioning ductsducts indicated considerableconsiderable shockshock dam-dam equipment andand material was mixed with the massmass ofof age; eacheach andand everyevery piecepiece of of geargear wouldwould requirerequire twisted wreckage. OfOf course,course,no no repairrepair toto the ship'sship's complete checks. Additionally, internal wiringwiring andand side could beginbegin untiluntil the damageddamaged area waswas freedfreed ofof patching facilities betweenbetween allall researchresearch spacesspaces wouldwould all classifiedclassified paperspapers andand equipment. ByBy 19 June, allall have to be checked. From thethe initial inspection, it was was classified mattermatter (including(including 168168 large canvas bags) had obvious thatthat considerableconsiderable replacementreplacement of internalinternal been stowed underunder guardguard inin a secure space aboard the wiring wouldwould bebe required.required. Preliminary, informal esti-esti Liberty.3DLiberty.3° mates made by thethe engineersengineers inspectinginspecting the Liberty (U)(V) On thethe afternoonafternoon ofof Thursday,Thursday, 1515 indicated thatthat thethe costcost to to reconfigurereconfigure thethe platformplatform June, newsmennewsmen and photographersphotographers werewere given given a rigidlyrigidly would rangerange betweenbetween fourfour andand six million dollars.dollars."33 controlled tour ofof Liberty's topside area plusplus severalseveral compartments onon thethe lower decks,decks, nearnear the pointpoint ofof JCS Fact Finding Team's Team's impact, fromfrom which which all all classifiedclassified equipment had beenbeen Interviews (U) removed. LaterLater that afternoon,afternoon, TaskTask ForceForce 100100 was was officially dissolved.dissolved. SomeSome tasktask forceforce personnelpersonnel remained (U)(V) While the Liberty was being cleansed with the Liberty, however, toto help wind up adminis-adminis and surveyed inin the MaltaMalta shipyard,shipyard, the NavyNavy andand trative, publicpublic affairs, and supply matters. The SixthSixth JCS investigativeinvestigative bodiesbodies werewere busilybusily interviewinginterviewing ap-ap Fleet MaintenanceMaintenance OfficerOfficer also remained to supervisesupervise propriate personnel aboard the Liberty and at variousvarious LibertLiberty'sy' s repairs.repairs."3' European command headquarters. (C(G CCO) GGO) Headed by MajorMajor GeneralGeneral JosephJoseph R. (U) Damage Survey at Malta (U) Russ, VSA,USA, thethe JCS FactFact FindingFinding TeamTeam arrivedarrived inin London onon TuesdayTuesday morning,morning, 13 JuneJune and spent mostmost (CeC CCO)CC6) In Washington,Washington, thethe NavalNaval ShipsShips En-En of the dayday atat Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, U.S.V.S. NavyNavy EuropeEurope gineering Center was coordinating aa visitvisit to the Liberty Headquarters interviewing AdmiralAdmiral JohnJohn S. McCain,McCain, to surveysurvey damage inin order toto expedite repairsrepairs to the Jr., andand membersmembers of his his staff.staff. LateLate thatthat afternoon,afternoon, ship's electronicelectronic system; it was was recommended thatthat the the teamteam flewflew toto Stuttgart toto talktalk withwith U.S.V.S. EuropeanEuropean inspection team includeinclude contractor personnelpersonnel plusplus NSA NSA Command personnel involved inin the Liberty incident. and NSGNSG people. people. 32 Thus,Thus, EugeneEugene Sheck,Sheck, ComintComint The followingfollowing day'sday's interviews also included one with Collection (Mobile)(Mobile) Management,Management, K12,K12, and Lieuten-Lieuten Brigadier General William Keller, Chief,Chief, NSANSA Europe. ant AllanAllan Deprey,Deprey, USN,VSN, SigintSigint EngineeringEngineering (Mobile(Mobile Points covered inin the talk withwith KellerKeller were:were: and Space),Space), K32,K32, inin companycompany withwith representativesrepresentatives ofof 1. Explanation of thethe mechanicsmechanics involvedinvolved for for the NavalNaval SecuritySecurity Group,Group, NavalNaval ShipsShips EngineeringEngineering tasking in satisfaction ofof both national and theatertheater Center, andand contractorcontractor respresentativesrespresentatives ofof Ling-Temco-Ling-Temco consumer intelligence requirements; Vought (LTV) and the FTMFTM SystemsSystems CompanyCompany visited the Liberty on 19-21 19-21 June. TheirTheir findingsfindings confirmedconfirmed 2. Technical reports issued by the Liberty (the the massivemassive damagedamage to thethe SigintSigint electronicelectronic JCS Team waswas providedprovided a copy copy of of Liberty's reports configuration. from 2 through 8 June); andand (Ceo CCO)CC6) With the exceptionexception ofof thethe TRSSCOMTRSSCOM 3. Adequacy ofof Criticomm service to EUCOMEVCOM in system antenna, allall antennasantennas werewere eithereither destroyed,destroyed, handling of the Mid-EastMid-East crisis.crisis. NoNo unusualunusual delaysdelays damaged, or burnedburned toto some some degree;degree; almostalmost completecomplete were experienced andand pertinent SigintSigint productproduct waswas replacement of the antennaantenna systemsystem wouldwould be required.required. received by J-2 EUCOMEVCOM on a timely basis.basis. In ResearchResearch RoomRoom no. 1, 1, equipmentequipment notnot completelycompletely Both the JCSJCS teamteam andand J-3 J-3 EUCOMEVCOM appearedappeared satis-satis destroyed by the torpedotorpedo explosionexplosion had been totallytotally fied withwith GeneralGeneral Keller'sKeller's explanations.explanations.'34 submerged inin heavyheavy oiloil andand salt water forfor six six days,days, (U)(V) On 15 June,June, the teamteam spentspent twotwo hourshours rendering it beyondbeyond salvage.salvage. The processingprocessing and re-re visiting Vice AdmiralAdmiral WilliamWilliam 1.I. Martin, Commander-Commander porting spaces,spaces, transcribingtranscribing positions,positions, maintenancemaintenance in-Chief, SixthSixth Fleet, andand staffstaff aboardaboard hishis flagship,flagship, shop and and cryptographiccryptographic roomroom were were severelyseverely damaged;damaged; the U.S.S.U. S. S. Little Rock.Rock. The team arrived in Malta at all equipmentequipment was either destroyeddestroyed byby thethe explosionexplosion or 1815 hourshours onon thethe 15th and departeddeparted forfor London London at 52 -CLONTH3ENTIA-frCONFIDENTIAL ItAN8LH ViA COfltllNtf eIIANNB~8 ON~Y 1 CONFIDIH\'fIAL (0 000, In thethe SigintSigint spaces,spaces, severalseveral manual-morsemanual-morse positionspositions werewere destroyeddestroyed byby thethe torpedotorpedo blast, asas reportedreported by the inspectioninspection team sentsent toto Malta.Malta. ThisThis teamteam waswas composedcomposed ofof personnelpersonnel from NSA, NSG, NSG, andand contractorscontractors fromfrom Ling-Temco-VoughtLing-Temco-Vought and FTM Systems Company.Company. (Photograph courtesy of the NSA/NSGNSNNSG inspection team.) (Figure is eaNfi'Il'EIi'fi AL=eeaj ) IIAN8LE VIA eOMIN'f ellANNHLS ONL\T -C-ONFIEPENThttCONFIDHN'fIAL 53 CONFIDENTIAL 0'7000700 hours hoursthe the nextnext morning.morning. AtAt Malta,Malta, Major General detailed lists of all technicaltechnical support materials that Russ and his team visitedvisited the Liberty and alsoalso spoke spoke had been forwarded to the Liberty.35Liberty.35 with Rear Admiral I.I. C. Kidd, PresidentPresident of the NavalNaval (U) In Malta, Liberty personnel attemptedattempted Court of Inquiry. TheThe JCS team returned toto Washing-Washing to makemake anan inventoryinventory ofof registeredregistered publicationspublications but ton inin thethe earlyearly eveningevening of 18 18 June. found itit to be be fragmentaryfragmentary at best.best. TheThe registeredregistered publications vault andand cryptospacescryptospaces werewere completelycompletely Accounting for Classified Material (U) destroyed byby thethe torpedotorpedo attack.attack. InIn spite of the factfact that, justjust beforebefore thethe attack,attack, mostmost registeredregistered publica-publica (C CCO) Though activities aboard the Liberty tions had beenbeen putput inin weightedweighted canvascanvas bags, itit was was immediatelyupon uponarrival arrival atat Malta had centeredcentered onon discoveredthat that thesethese bagsbags wereweretorn torn apartapart by thethe readying the the shipship for repair,repair, thethe requirementrequirement toto blast ofof thethe torpedotorpedo explosion;explosion; nono bagsbags remainedremained account for all on-boardon-board classified materialmaterial had notnot intact. Further,Further, thosethose publicationspublications thatthat werewere recoveredrecovered been overlooked. NotNot only had manymany classifiedclassified docu-docu were unusable: theythey were eithereither soaked in oil and salt ments been lost, butbut thethe recordsrecords andand inventoriesinventories ofof water or damaged by the blast.blast. NoneNone couldcould be be page page sensitive materials andand registeredregistered publicationspublications carried checked forfor completeness. AllAll paperpaper and metal residueresidue aboard ship had alsoalso beenbeen destroyed.destroyed. ToTo reconstructreconstruct from the damageddamaged area werewere placedplaced inin canvascanvas bagsbags Liberty's list of holdings, the Director, NSANSA requestedrequested and secured in locked spaces aboardaboard ship under twenty-twenty appropriate fieldfield station andand NSANSA elementselements toto compilecompile four-hour guard.36 EOr0 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) cC CeO) The NSA/NSG inspection team reported thatthat thethe equipment inin this Sigint space had been totally ruined by the torpedotorpedo blast. (Photograph courtesy of the NSA/NSGNSA/NSG inspection team.) (Figure is eBUFIBBN'fiAf: eeB) 54 -CON-FIDENTIALCONFIDHN'fIAL I1ANBLH VIA e6MINT eIlANNHLS ONI:JY CONFIDENTIAL (U) The The CaptainCaptain of the Liberty, CDR William L.L. McGonagle, surveyssurveys thethe damage done below the bridge from the rockets firedfired by the IsraeliIsraeli aircraft.aircraft. (Photograph courtesy ofof thethe Department of the Navy.)Navy.) (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED) (U) After Liberty personnel had completed to determine whetherwhether aa sortingsorting operationoperation waswas possible,possible, this action,action, CaptainCaptain CarlCarl M.M. SmithSmith (who(who hadhad beenbeen and toto makemake recommendationsrecommendations forfor further actionsactions oror TG 100.4100.4 commander)commander) informed thethe Director, NavalNaval disposition of material. The surveysurvey teamteam membershipmembership Security Group thatthat would bebe drawndrawn fromfrom thethe Naval Security Group, Naval despite [the] fact that allall classifiedclassified material cannotcannot bebe accuratelyaccurately IntelligenceCenter, Center, andand NSA.NSA.'38 accounted for and lossloss at scenescene [is][is] unknown,unknown, [am] confident thatthat (C(e - CeO) NSA representativesto to this teamteam possibility of compromisecompromise is reasonablyreasonably unlikelyunlikely whilewhile Liberty were: Billy Billy Durham,Durham, Operations,Operations, ComsecComsec Status,Status, [was] enen route [to][to] Malta and zero thereafter.thereafter. ItIt was was a time-time consuming tasktask under difficult conditions but thoroughnessthoroughness of all (S13);(S 13); Benjamin G. Cwalina,Cwalina, Security, ResearchResearch Divi-Divi has resulted inin maintenance ofof highesthighest degree of security integrity. sion, (M55); and Lieutenant John T.T. McTighe,McTighe, USN,USN, All can take justifiablejustifiable pride in dedication, willingness,willingness, and high high OperationsStaff, Staff, (G04).(G04). OnOn 3131 July, thesethese threethree morale of those participatingparticipating in the salvage operation.'operation. 37 traveled to Norfolk, Virginia, and hoardedboarded the Liberty, just returnedreturned fromfrom Malta.Malta. ThereThere theythey werewere joinedjoined byby Joint Survey at Norfolk Norfolk (U) other membersmembers of the surveysurvey team,team, principallyprincipally NSGNSG personnel. Following a abrief brieftour tourof ofthe the ship,ship, thethe team (U) Recognizingthat that the Liberty had had was taken belowbelow decks to thethe ResearchResearch OperationsOperations extensive reserve, on-boardon-board cryptographiccryptographic keyingkeying ma- ma spaces, where the canvascanvas bagsbags of of residueresidue werewere piled.piled. terials thatthat mightmight requirerequire replacementreplacement Navy-wideNavy-wide and Sailors from the Liberty's Sigint complement, dressed DoD-wide, thethe Chief ofof NavalNaval OperationsOperations proposedproposed in rubberrubber overallsoveralls andand gloves,gloves, selected about six or or that aa jointjoint surveysurvey teamteam meetmeet thethe Liberty when she seven bags at randomrandom fromfrom thethe grimy,grimy, oilyoily 160-plus160-plus returned toto NorfolkNorfolk and take aa samplingsampling of the residueresidue total and,and, oneone by by one, one, openedopened each and dumpeddumped its KANDt! ViA e6I\HN'f eUANNHtS 6NM' -e0NPf0Biliff*ECONFIDENTIAL 5555 CONPIDENTIAL contents on the floor inin front of the surveysurvey team. It those of scores more. The investigationsinvestigations then underunder was not a prettypretty sightsight andand hadhad malodorousmalodorous qualitiesqualities way would affect even more people. people. resulting from the combinationcombination of oil, brackishbrackish seasea water, burned metal, paper,paper, andand piecespieces ofof humanhuman Notes flesh. The team immediatelyimmediately agreed thatthat itit would would be be Source documents are in the the "Crisis"Crisis Collection"Collection" of the NSANSA impossible toto make a page-by-pagepage-by-page checkcheck ofof thethe bags'bags' History Collection.Collection. contents. From looking atat this sampling,sampling, thethe surveysurvey team concludedconcluded that:that: 1I(V)(U) COMSIXTHFLT msg 090513Z Jun 1967.1967. '(U)'(V) Commander, TaskTask Group (CTG) 60.5 60.5 megmsg' 1. Eighty percent of the materialmaterial waswas unidenti-unidenti 090758Z JunJun 1967.1967. fiable; '(U)'(V) Commander, Task GroupGroup 60.5 60.5 megmsg 092119Z092119Z Jun 1967.1967. 2. Some ofof thethe material was definitely discernible, 4(V)4(U) CINCUSNAVEURCINCVSNAVEUR msgmeg 100025Z Jun 1967. 1967. readable, andand classified;classified; and `(U)'(U) COMSIXTHFLT megmsg 0923-7Z Jun 1967.1967. 3. Some of the classifiedclassified material waswas identifia-identifia 4:i~:(U) IDmNAY1~;gG~~:5~~~~~~~8ZJunuI9li7'EOECGRUEUR, meg 091058Z Jun 1967. '(U) ralEillimag 091355Z Jun 1967. EO 1.1.4. 4 . ( ble, in part,part, byby shortshort titlestitles andand covercover markingsmarkings oror '(U)8(V) CINCUSNAVEURCINCVSNAVEUR msgmeg 091459Z Jun 1967. 1967. name-plate designations; e.g.,e.g.; largelarge boundbound volumesvolumes or or '(V)4(U) CTG 60.5 meg mag 092119Z Jun 1967. 1967. books. 10(V)NU) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR megmsg 191358Z Jun 1967. 1967. "(U)II(V) USCINCEURVSCINCEUR megmsg 101105Z Jun 1967. 1967. "(U)12(V) DIRNSA megmsg 091345Z JunJun 1967.1967. The team recommendedrecommended that:that: "(U)13(V) DIRNSA megmsg 101718Z Jun 1967.1967. 1. No attempt bebe mademade toto conductconduct a detailed bag-bag 1414(V)(U) CTG 60.5 meg msg 101750Z 101750Z Jun 1967. 1967. by-bag search for thethe solesole purposepurpose ofof identifyingidentifying AU)I'(V) V.S.U.S. NavyNavy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816-67; Liberty classified material; Incident, 88 Jun Jun 1967; 1967; Record Record of of Proceedings.Proceedings. 16(V)NU) Joint ChiefsChiefs of of StaffStaffmsg msg citecite no. no. 7642, 7642, 102140Z 102140Z 2. The CommandingCommanding Officer ofof the Liberty be Jun 1967.1967. authorized toto destroy the baggedbagged materialmaterial heldheld onon "(U)17(V) USCINCEURVSCINCEUR msgmeg 101045Z101045ZJun Jun 1967, and and board; and CINCUSNAVEURCINCVSNAVEUR msg 111311Z JunJun 1967.1967. "(U)18(V) V.S.U.S. DefenseDefense AttacheAttache' Office,Office, Tel Tel Aviv Aviv meg meg 3. Prior to thethe processprocess ofof burning,burning, anan effort effort be be 131335Z Jun 1967. 1967. made to empty each bagbag atat the incineratorincinerator to deter-deter 14I'(V)(U) CINCUSNAVEURCINCVSNAVEUR msgmeg 111031Z JunJun 1967.1967. mine the possiblepossible existenceexistence ofof identifiableidentifiable registeredregistered 2°20(V)(U) Ibid. publications and that eacheach suchsuch completecomplete publicationpublication "(U)2I(V) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR megmsg 111931Z Jun 1967. 2222(V)(u) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 091814Z Jun 1967. be accounted for prior to its destruction.destruction.39 "(V)24(U) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 111442Z Jun 1967. 2424(V)(u) CINCUSNAVEURCINCVSNAVEUR meg 120950Z Jun 1967. 1967. (U) CNO concurred withwith the survey team's 14"(V)(U) Ibid. 2626(V)(u) Commander, Task Force (CTF) 100 meg recommendationsand and authorizedauthorized destructiondestruction asas re- re Commander, Task Force (CTF) 100 msg 130934Z JunJun 1967.1967. quested. At the Director,Director, NSA'sNSA's request, allall remainingremaining 2727(V)(U) DIRNAVSECGRUDIRNAVSECGRV megmsg 131706Z JunJun 1967 and Comsec materialmaterial (excluding that that in canvascanvas bags)bags) NSAEURNSAEVR megmsg 140829Z Jun 1967.1967. aboard the Liberty at thethe timetime ofof attackattack waswas segre-segre "(V)2s(U) CTF 100 100 meg 150200Z JunJun 1967 and NSAEURNSAEVR gated and forwardedforwarded to NSA for inspection;"inspection." msg 161530Z Jun 1967.1967. "(V)29(u) Robert L. Wilson, Wilson, oral interview transcript, 6 (C(0 CCO)000' With thisthis commandcommand approval,approval, LibLib- May 1980. 1980. erty's CO arranged for appropriately clearedcleared personnelpersonnel 30lO(V)(U) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR meg 191326Z JunJun 1967. to fillfill a trailer withwith bagged residueresidue andand burnburn itit atat the "(U)ll(V) CTF 100 100 msg msg 150200Z 150200Z Jun1967. Norfolk incinerator. A list ofof documentsdocuments identifiedidentified in "(V)42(U) NAVSHIPENGCTR msg 141551Z Jun 1967.1967. "(U)33(V) NSA; K12, K32 Trip Report (by(by EugeneEugene Sheck the burningburning processprocess was forwarded toto CNO. At At NSA, NSA, and Lt. Deprey),Deprey), 2727 JunJun 1967.1967. M55 determined that therethere waswas only only minimalminimal security "(V)44(U) NSA; D1 msg for Gen. CarterCarter throughthrough NSANSA damage and nono compromisecompromise had occurred.occurred. Rep NORAD, circa 21 Jun 1967.1967. "(V)45(U) NSA;NSAj Status of OperationsOperations Actions Relative to (C(0 - 000) Though incineratorincinerator flamesflames consumedconsumed Sigint Readiness Bravo/Crayon, ReportReport no.no. 13, 9-10 Jun 1967.1967. the lastlast bitsbits andand piecespieces ofof oil-soakedoil-soaked residueresidue from the "(U)36(V) U.S.S.V.S.S. LibertyLiberty msgmsg 200735Z 200735Z Jun 1967.1967. assault on the Liberty these ashes did not mark thethe "(U)37(V) DIRNAVSECGRUEURDIRNAVSECGRVEUR msgmeg 191326Z Jun 1967.1967. end of the traintrain ofof eventsevents setset inin motionmotion onon 8 8 JuneJune "(U)"(V) CNO meg msg 142227Z Jun 1967.1967. "(U)"(V) U.S.S.V.S.S. Liberty megmsg 021630Z Aug 1967 and and 1967. TheThe Israeli attack had alreadyalready taken thethe liveslives Benjamin G. Cwalina, oral interview transcript, 9 May May 1980. 1980. of 34 Americans - - 25 25 from from thethe SiginitSiginit unit,unit, includingincluding 40(V)40(U) DIRNSA megmsg 081648Z Aug 1967 and CNO meg Allen Blue, and 9 of the Liberty's crew -- andand touchedtouched 102136Z Aug 1967. 1967. 56 -e0NFIDESA4A-frCONPIDENTIAL IIA:NBI:JH ViA: €Or.HN'f €II:ANNHf SECRE'f Chapter VIIVII The IncidentIncident underunder Review Review (U) (U) (U) Followingthe the attackattack on the Liberty, prepared to recommendrecommend all necessary action to insureinsure both thethe ExecutiveExecutive andand thethe LegislativeLegislative BranchesBranches set the securitysecurity of the technicaltechnical material andand equipment,equipment, about ascertainingascertaining thethe basicbasic factsfacts surroundingsurrounding the should thethe ship go under but, inin discussionsdiscussions with the incident. Other than thethe U.S.U.S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry JRC, ruled out thethe deliberatedeliberate scuttlingscuttling of the shipship and thethe cursorycursory IsraeliIsraeli BoardBoard ofof InquiryInquiry immediatelyimmediately since its presencepresence inin shallow shallow waterwater mademade compromisecompromise after thethe event,event, reviewsreviews went went forward forward under thethe of materials and equipmentequipment a distinctdistinct possibility.possibility. auspices of the HouseHouse Appropriations Committee, the (0 000) Other concernsconcerns were for the reassign-reassign JCS, andand NSA.NSA. In In addition,addition, aa SpecialSpecial CommitteeCommittee ofof ment of thethe Liberty's intercept mission to otherother the NationalNational SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil elicitedelicited informationinformation to collectors,'collectors,1 Ilin in thethe answer the Administration's questions on the incident. face of thethe inevitableinevitable attentionattention thethe presspress would,would. give give to thisthis incident,incident, andand forfor developingdeveloping a core core of of infor-infor The NSA Review and Reaction (U) mation for thethe expectedexpected questionsquestions thethe AgencyAgency would would (U) The eighth of June proved toto be a receive from DoD and otherother officials.officials. busy day for for NSA's NSA's directorate.directorate. HavingHaving receivedreceived a (8-000) As the eightheighth ofof JuneJune worewore on, thethe Critic message on the Liberty's dilemma,dilemma, Brigadier NSA staffstaff considered waways s to reassignreassi Liberty's mis-mis General John MorrisonMorrison of NSA'sNSA's ProductionProduction Organi-Organi sion.'sion. jE0'EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) zation, notified thethe directorate ofof thethe event at aboutabout 0900 hours, Washington time.time. Some 45 minutesminutes later, the directoratedirectorate learnedlearned thatthat the attackattack hadhad beenbeen byby the Israelis.Israelis. '-- ...... I Should.theShould the (C(6 CCO)660) Immediate concern waswas forfor thethe safetysafety U.S. actively enter the hostilities asas a a belligerent,belligerent, of the personnelpersonnel and the securitysecurity of the materialsmaterials onon they were willing to consider assignmentment of .certaincertain board. During the dayday urgenturgent requestsrequests wentwent out out from from Sigint tasks' NSA to thethe NationalNational MilitaryMilitary CommandCommand CenterCenter (NMCC), otherother officesoffices in in thethe Pentagon,Pentagon, and thethe Bureau of Naval Personnel toto ascertainascertain if the namesnames of any of the threethree NSANSA civilianscivilians onon boardboard appearedappeared ..... ---' Finally,Finally, /theythey consideredconsidered on the casualtycasualty list. BothBoth GeneralGeneral Marshall S. Carter redeployment ofof thethe U.S.S.U.S.S. Belmont, scheduled forfor and Dr.Dr. Louis Louis W. W. TordellaTordella became awareaware thatthat the refitting atat Norfolk atat aboutabout that-time.that time. OnlyOnly the last ship waswas in shallow shallow water, 35-4035-40 fathoms. And they mentioned seemed promising inin consideration ofof the knew, ofof course,course, thatthat the ship held technical materials Liberty's VHF/UHF mission,mission, butbut fullfull approvalapproval forfor which would reveal revealthe the missionmission of ofthe the shipship andand that assignment of the Belmont wouldwould not be forthcoming.forthcoming. it hadhad electronicelectronic equipmentequipment whichwhich would would compromisecompromise They also confirmed thatthat. the U.S.U.S. airborneairborne collectioncollection U.S.U. S. success success in demultiplexingdemultiplexing VHF and UHF multi-multi flights out ofof AthensAthens wouldwould continuecontinue withoutwithout channel communications.communications. Accordingly, Dr.Dr. TordellaTordella interruption. asked JRC's Captain MerriwellMerriwell W. Vineyard, USN, to (C(0 CCO)00r-0....;..) TheTh--,e .NSANSA directoratedirectorate examinedexamined Lib- have all documentsdocuments on board the Liberty burned and erty'derty'~ IlfIIf there shouldshould bebe questionsquestions aboutabout all equipmentequipment saved, if possible. possible. General Carter waswas the civilianscivilians on board, what shouldshould be said?said? Dr.Dr. -HAP193LIIANBtJH-E-Viik-e0MINT-effViA €OMlN'f €IIANNBI:aS ONI:aYiL-11 SECRETR•ET 5757 -StAeRBTSHCRH'I' - 'EOEO 1.4. (c) Tordella discussed this this matter withwith RearRear AdmiralAdmiral qualityquality-of" of thethe report. NSANSA was thenthen in a positionposition to Ralph E. Cook, Cook. the Director,Director NavalNaval SecuritySecuritv Group.Group. give copies ofof thisthis comprehensivereport report toto the JCSJCS Fact FindingFinding Team and to to thethe SpecialSpecial CommitteeCommittee ofof the NationalNational SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil (NSC).(NSC). (C(0 CCO).660) Directed as it it was was to to develop develop a a core core of of information on thethe event, thethe NSANSA group group did not not seek seek to identifyidentify remediesremedies forfor faulty procedures or,or, forfor thatthat matter, toto make make any any recommendationsrecommendations atat all.all. MajorMajor responsibilityfor forthat that fellfell toto thethe JCS and others. The I ThisThis stated that thethe group did have to field field searching questions beingbeing asked L:-:-:--"""":""---~~-~~ Liberty's presence offoff PortPort Said was "to assureassure com-com- the AgencyAgency by others. municationsfor for thethe U.S. GovernmentGovernment postsposts inin the (C(6 CCO)660) The JCS FactFact FindingFinding TeamTeam waswas ask- Middle EastEast and toto assistassist inin relayingrelaying informationinformation ing specific questionsquestions suchsuch asas these: concerningthe the evacuation ofof U.S. dependentsdependents andand • Does NSANSA receivereceive andand plotplot situationsituation reports? DoesDoes other citizenscitizens from the Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli war area." AsAs was was it keep keep the track?track? its custom,custom, NSA'sNSA's staffstaff workedworked closely withwith thethe Pen-Pen • Why was an Opscomm Opscomm circuit notnot establishedestablished tagon's Public InformationInformation Office andand referredreferred allall between NSA andand the Liberty? public queries NSA received to that PentagonPentagon Office.Office. •Were there anyany communicationscommunications problemsproblems during (C(0 CCO)000) There was,was, finally, finally, on that longlong day day of of • transit inin thethe Mediterranean?Mediterranean? 8 June,June, thethe needneed to to establishestablish quicklyquickly a core core of of •Did NSA fail to receivereceive any technical summaries,summaries, information onon thethe incident toto prepare for thethe manymany • questions beingbeing askedasked andand decisions toto be be made.made. product, or otherother communicationscommunications from the Liberty, Already thethe Secretary of Defense,Defense, Robert S. Mc- Mc nonreceipt of which would have been indicativeindicative ofof Namara, hadhad calledcalled GeneralGeneral CarterCarter askingasking forfor "precise communications difficulties?difficulties? information" on the ship'sship's complement,complement, the numbernumber • Was there anyany departuredeparture fromfrom normalnormal commandcommand of civilians, the meaningmeaning ofof "AGTR""AGTR" whichwhich appearedappeared relationships inin the handling of the Liberty's cruise? on the ship'sship's hull,hull, andand otherother mattersmatters whichwhich he felt felt (C(0 CCO)600) And Patrick CoyneCoyne of thethe NationalNational would be needed for a publicpublic release.release. DiscussionsDiscussions also Security Council'sCouncil's Special CommitteeCommittee askedasked broadbroad took place with WhiteWhite HouseHouse staffstaff membersmembers Patrick questions such as these: Coyne andand Bromley Smith,Smith, who elicitedelicited detailsdetails on the incident. • What informationinformation was received from the Liberty (C(0 CCO)000) To take carecare ofof thisthis needneed for for infor-infor from thethe time it arrivedarrived on station until thethe incident?incident? mation, GeneralGeneral Carter establishedestablished inin his his outerouter officeoffice • Were there anyany SigintSigint reflectionsreflections of the IsraeliIsraeli a TemporaryTemporary Mid-EastMid-East InformationInformation GroupGroup consistingconsisting attack? ofQLtllree~rSA.in~ivi~uals~ three NSA individuals — Mr. WalterWalter DeeleyDeeley of the • Would we receivereceive allall ofof ourour SigintSigint holdings relatingrelating P.P.L.L. to thethe incident?incident? 86-36 Production Organization andandl landand Lieu- Lieu tenant CommanderCommander Edward Koczak,Koczak, USN,USN, ofof thethe (U) Although questions remainedremained whichwhich Director's staff. The mainmain functionfunction ofof thisthis groupgroup was was would requirerequire answers, the workwork of the NSANSA group group was was to gathergather informationinformation on thethe event and to anticipateanticipate essentially complete byby thethe middle of June 1967.1967.1I the numerousnumerous questions toto be directeddirected toto NSA NSA over over The JeS Review (U) the comingcoming weeks. weeks. The JCS Review (U) (C(8 CCO)000) With timelytimely helphelp from from agency agency compo- compo (U) On 9 9 June,June, immediatelyimmediately after thethe nents, the groupgroup assembledassembled basicbasic datadata on the shipship Liberty incident thethe JCSJCS fieldedfielded a a five-man five-man team fromfrom itself, onon U.S. U.S. I I 'coverage Icoverage ofof Middle East its organization,organization, all with thethe necessarynecessary clearances, to communications,communications; onon operationaloperational and technical respon-respon examine communications and and controlcontrol aspectsaspects ofof the sibilities, andand on thethe technicaltechnical rationalerationale for thethe event. Senior member ofof thethe JCS teamteam waswas MajorMajor mission; it also also compiledcompiled /aa chronology chronology ofof eventsevents andand a General Joseph R.R. Russ, USA. Other teamteam membersmembers compendium of key documents and messages.messages. Assem- Assem were Rear AdmiralAdmiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick,Fitzpatrick, USN;USN; bling the informationinformation in a large large red red notebooknotebook entitled Colonel WilliamWilliam A.A. Garrett,Garrett, USAF;USAF; CaptainCaptain WilliamWilliam "Report toto thethe DirectorDirectorNSA NSA - U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-(AGTR D. Owen, Owen, USN; and Major Harlan E. Priddle,Priddle, USAF.USAF. 5), 23 23 May-8 May-8 June 1967,"1967," thethe groupgroup presentedpresented the (U) In spellingspelling out the termsterms ofof referencereference completed reportreport toto the Director on 12 JuneJune -— rather for thethe team, Lieutenant GeneralGeneral B. E. Spivy, Spivy, Director respectable staffstaff work inin view ofof the timelinesstimeliness andand of the JointJoint Staff,Staff, askedasked the teamteam toto examineexamine thethe 58 -SEC-RE-7SHCRH'I' IIA:NBI.B ¥fA: eOMIN'I' eIIANNBI.S ONI.¥ EO 1.4.(c)1.4. (c) ==~~~~_EO EO 1.4.1.4.(d)(d) eONFIDIU"qJIAL means employed in issuingissuing operationaloperational directivesdirectives ofof recommendations dealingdealing withwith emphasis on dedicated the JCSJCS to thethe U.S.S.V.S.S. Liberty and the specificspecific orders command-and-controlcircuitry circuitryrather rather than onon to the Liberty between 11 JuneJune and 8 June 1967,1967, and and common-user circuitry,circuitry, with measures toto improve improve fleet fleet to identifyidentify andand developdevelop informationinformation onon conflictingconflicting control communications via communicationscommunications satellite directives, delays in message message traffic, and nonreceiptnonreceipt ofof technology, andand withwith thethe amalgamationamalgamation ofof NATO NATO and orders. The teamteam waswas to reportreport itsits findings, findings, along along with V.S.U.S. militarymilitary communications.communications. recommendations, toto thethe JCS. (C(0 CCO) OOQ) Other than thethe threethree recommendationsrecommendations (C-CCO)(0-006) The JCSJCS teamteam visitedvisited NSA,NSA, otherother on which it participatedparticipated asas an an actionaction agency,agency, NSA NSA Washington-area principals,principals, and concernedconcerned militarymilitary was concerned aboutabout somesome ofof thethe other findings in the staffs and commandscommands inin Europe and the Mediterra-Mediterra report. OneOne recommendationrecommendation was,was, forfor example, thatthat nean. OnOn 10 10 June, asas thethe teamteam beganbegan itsits fact-findingfact-finding "procedures governing thethe control of surveillance platplat- mission, General CarterCarter called GeneralGeneral Russ andand forms be made more definitive withwith respect to tech-tech offered thethe totaltotal cooperationcooperation ofof NSA NSA andand followedfollowed nical research shipsships toto insure thatthat "artificial barriersbarriers through on this offeroffer by by makingmaking asas muchmuch informationinformation between operational elements of staffs and NSA/NavalNSNNaval available to him as as required,required, althoughalthough GeneralGeneral RussRuss Security Group" owing to securitysecurity considerationsconsiderations be had alreadyalready decideddecided not toto concentrateconcentrate onon sensitivesensitive eliminated "in"in order to improveimprove the valuevalue and timelytimely (that is,is, specialspecial intelligence)intelligence) matters. utilization of the Sigint products at allall majormajor commandcommand (U)(V) As the workwork of the fact-findingfact-finding team echelons." InsofarInsofar asas NSA was concerned, this rec-rec was drawing toto a close, close, GeneralGeneral Russ providedprovided on 18 18 ommendation waswas offoff thethe mark since SigintSigint productproduct June a preliminarypreliminary report to the ChairmanChairman of thethe already went directly to all commands and not through Joint ChiefsChiefs of of Staff,Staff, GeneralGeneral EarleEarle Wheeler,Wheeler, USA.VSA. NSA/NavalNSNNaval Security Group staffs. staffs. NSA NSA commentedcommented He apprised the ChairmanChairman ofof thethe fourfour messages messages from from formallyon on thisthis pointpoint inin a letterletter toto MajorMajor GeneralGeneral higher headquarters on 7/8 June toto subordinatesubordinate com-com G.B. Pickett,Pickett, ViceVice DirectorDirector for OperationsOperations (J-3); inin mands designed to change the Liberty's CPA, receipt its commentarycommentary onon thethe RussRuss reportreport forfor thethe JCS, thethe of which by Liberty "would undoubtedly have resulted J-3 discounteddiscounted this recommendation.recommendation. in thethe ship'sship's beingbeing aa greatergreater distancedistance fromfrom thethe scenescene (U)(V) When copies ofof thethe JCS Fact FindingFinding of actionaction...."...." DespiteDespite the Liberty's having been either Team's reportreport reachedreachedNSA NSAat at thethe endend of of June,June, an actionaction oror an an informationinformation addresseeaddressee on each of these General Carter instructed the chiefchief ofof his his telecom-telecom messages, General Russ's team found no evidence thatthat munications organization, ColonelColonel Leslie J.J. Bolstridge, the shipship receivedreceived anyoneany one ofof them.them. Nor did his team USAF,VSAF, toto review the the reportreport in minute detail with a find, for thatthat matter,matter, anyany evidenceevidence ofof conflictingconflicting view to "correcting ourour proceduresprocedures whereverwherever wewe can can directives governinggoverning the Liberty's operation. GeneralGeneral profit from this debacledebacle ofof militarymilitary communications."communications." Russ also made note of the irregularirregular procedureprocedure JCS Since the Russ report primarilyprimarily dealtdealt withwith command-command itself hadhad adoptedadopted inin bypassingbypassing Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, and-control communications, the RussRuss recommenda-recommenda Europe when it passedpassed verbalverbal instructionsinstructions toto Com-Com tions hadhad onlyonly marginalmarginal pertinencepertinence toto NSA's NSA's own own 2 mander-in-Chief, V.S.U.S. NavyNavy Europe, and he recounted communications. 2 the reasonsreasons forfor delays delays at NAVEURNAVEUR andand Sixth Fleet inin translating thethe JCSJCS directivedirective intointo action.action. Congressional Review (U) (U)(V) By 20 20 JuneJune thethe JCSJCS FactFact FindingFinding Team had completed its work, hadhad preparedprepared itsits report, (U)(V) Following aa hearing focusing onon the and hadhad mademade itsits recommendationsrecommendations toto thethe JCS.JCS. OfOf JCS messagesmessages whichwhich failedfailed toto reach the Liberty, the the 1717 recommendationsrecommendations made, 9 concernedconcerned the mis-mis House Appropriations Committee on 14 14 AugustAugust 19671967 sions, functions,functions, operationaloperational responsibilities,responsibilities, and op-op directed itsits SurveysSurveys and Investigations staff to examine erational control/technicalcontrol/technical tasking and guidance mat-mat the effectivenesseffectiveness of the DoDDoD worldwide communications ters; thethe otherother 88 relatedrelated toto communications,communications, traffictraffic system. The staffstaff studiedstudied thethe delaysdelays andand nondeliverynondelivery management, methods, facilities, and availabilityavailability ofof of messages originatedoriginatedon on 77 andand 88 June directing the trained personnel.personnel. InIn reviewing reviewing andand commentingcommenting onon withdrawal ofof the Liberty asas a springboardspringboard toto its the report'sreport's recommendationsrecommendations forfor thethe JCS,JCS, thethe J3 and and broader reviewreview of of DoD's DoD's worldwide worldwide communications.communications. J6/JCS reservedreserved follow-onfollow-on action for the firstfirst categorycategory The staff produced a two-volume report report forfor thethe chairchair- of recommendationsrecommendations to to thethe Joint StaffStaff butbut assignedassigned man of of thethe congressionalcongressional committee. Volume II re- re responsibilities to various other agencies for study and viewed thethe communicationscommunications problemsproblems inin the Liberty implementationactions actions inin the secondsecond categorycategory ofof incident, volumevolume II II thethe worldwideworldwide communicationscommunications recommendations. NSANSA drewdrew assignments onon three systems and networksnetworks of the DoD.DoD. -}heilaL-E-ii+A-eeMENT-eff*NNEL-S-Wa-1IIANBI:JH l.t"lA C6~HN'f CIIANNEI:JS 6NI:JY7- fLONFfDEINIFf*ECONFIDENTIAL 59 UNCLASSIFIED (U) In itsits work,work, thethe SurveysSurveys andand Investi-Investi changes inin reportingreporting formats, U.S.U. S. militarymilitary salessales gations staff interviewedinterviewed JCS, NSA,NSA, NavalNaval Commu-Commu policies, and reorganization of Army Reserve units.units. In nications Command, Department ofof Army Army Communi-Communi contrast, actualactual instructionsinstructions calledcalled forfor assignmentassignment ofof cations Center, andand JCSJCS MessageMessage CenterCenter personnelpersonnel in Immediate precedence toto "situations"situations whichwhich gravely gravely the WashingtonWashington areaarea and most of thethe militarymilitary com-com affect the security of national/allied forcesforces or or populace,populace, mands and communications centerscenters in the PacificPacific and and which require immediate delivery toto the addres-addres European regions which had beenbeen involved involved with with LibLib- sees" —- for for example,example, amplifyingamplifying reports of initialinitial erty's communications inin one way or another. enemy contact, reportsreports ofof unusualunusual majormajor movementsmovements (U) Essentially the staffstaff coveredcovered the samesame of military forcesforces of of foreign foreign powers powers during peacetimepeacetime ground that GeneralGeneral Russ'sRuss's teamteam plowedplowed earlier. They or during strainedstrained relations, attack orders, andand urgenturgent worked theirtheir wayway throughthrough allall thethe communicationscommunications intelligence messages.messages. errors made during the attemptsattempts toto withdrawwithdraw thethe (U) While the congressionalcongressional staff directed Liberty on 7/8 June.June. TheThe staffstaff waswas somewhatsomewhat moremore most of its its attentionattention toto DoD000 commandcommand communica-communica critical than thethe JCSJCS FactFact FindingFinding TeamTeam of the failure tions, itit also also took took notenote ofof CriticommCriticomm which, theythey foundfound to deliver to the Liberty the informationinformation copiescopies of the functioned throughoutthroughoutthe the crisis relativelyrelatively free of of JCS andand CINCEURCINCEUR messagesmessages directingdirecting withdrawalwithdrawal problems. TheThe staff was aware of steps NSA took to (JCS 080110Z080110Z June 67 andand CINCEURCINCEUR 080625Z080625Z June keep CriticommCriticomm free of of thethe overburdeningoverburdening traffictraffic 67). Specifically,Specifically, theythey wantedwanted toto know ifif a typicaltypical common inin crisiscrisis situations,situations, particularly anan 8 JuneJune commander would taketake action on an informationinformation copycopy action in which which NSA NSA directeddirected thethe curtailmentcurtailment ofof of this kindkind from from a a higherhigher commandcommand beforebefore receivingreceiving electrical forwardingforwardingof of allall routineroutine reportsreports soso that the implementingimplementing messagemessage of his immediateimmediate superior.superior. crisis-related traffictraffic could could flow flow expeditiously.expeditiously.'3 They tested the mattermatter withwith unnamedunnamed U.S.U.S. Navy Navy officials whowho hadhad commanded bothboth large and smallsmall naval vessels andand learned, according toto the report,report, that therethere wouldwould have been no question that that if thethe Notes Liberty had receivedreceived thethe informationinformation copies,copies, "the Captain of thethe Liberty would have moved moved withinwithin Source documents areare inin the "Crisis Collection" of of thethe NSA History minutes without waiting for an implementingimplementing order." Collection. (U) In its its volume volume II, II, thethe congressionalcongressional staff tooktook full note ofof thethe breakdownbreakdown of the precedenceprecedence '(U)leu) ((C)c ) - LTG Marshall S. Carter,Carter, MemorandumMemorandum forfor system inin communicationscommunications and drewdrew upon upon DoD-000 the Record, Record, 8 8 JuneJune 1967;1967; Dr. Dr. Louis Louis W. W. Tordella,Tordella, Memorandum,Memorandum, provided informationinformationfor for thethe Middle East crisis.crisis. Of Of "Directorate's Temporary Mid-East Information Group," 8 JuneJune some 452 452 high-precedence,high-precedence, (Flash andand Immediate)Immediate) 1967; Walter G. Deeley, Deeley, MemorandumMemorandum forfor the D/DIR,D/Dffi, "U.S.S."U.S.S. Liberty," 14 June 1967; NSA Staff,Staff, "Report"Report toto the Director, NSA," crisis-related 000DoD messages, onlyonly 2222 percentpercent of the 12 June 1967;1967; and DffiNSADIRNSAletter letter toto MG J.J. R. Russ, (JCS Fact Flash and 3030 percentpercent ofof thethe ImmediateImmediate messagesmessages Finding Team), 1212 June 1967.1967. actually met establishedestablished precedenceprecedence criteria. 1'(U)(U) The Russ Report; NSANSA Director, handwrittenhandwritten (U) Part ofof the'the' delaydelay in transmitting the notes, 8 and 10 10 June 1967;1967; JCS/J-3, "Note by the SecretariesSecretaries to the JCS on U.S.S. Liberty Incident," JCS no. 2308/378, 24 June Immediate-precedence Sixth Fleet withdrawal message the JCS on U.S.S. Liberty Incident," JCS no. 2308/378, 24 June Immediate-precedence Sixth Fleet withdrawal message 1967; Joint CommandCommand and Control Requirements Group, Memoran-Memoran to thethe Liberty, it will will be be recalled,recalled, waswas owing owing toto the dum for the JointJoint ChiefsChiefs of Staff, "Fact FindingFinding Team," 1818 JuneJune urgency ofof equalequal oror higherhigher precedenceprecedence (that(that is, Flash) 1967; Walter G. Deeley, letter toto Vice Vice DirectorDirector for OperationsOperations (J-(J messages. DuringDuring thethe crisis,crisis, originatorsoriginators assignedassigned Im-Im 3), 29 29 June June 1967. 1967. mediate precedence to messages messages on subjects such as 3J(U)(U) House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff, A Report to the Committee on Appropriations these: enlistedenlisted menmen reassignments,reassignments, hospital-patienthospital-patient Investigations Staff, A Report to the Committee on Appropriations - U.S.U.S. HouseHouse of of RepresentativesRepresentatives onon the the EffectivenessEffectiveness of thethe reports unrelated toto thethe crisis,crisis, friendlyfriendly shipship locationslocations Worldwide CommunicationsCommunicationsSystems Systemsand andNetworks Networksof of the DoD, DoD, and movements,movements, setting upup of of presspress conferences,conferences, U.S.S. LibertyLiberty Incident,Incident, vol.vol. I I pp. 48-50. 48-50. vol. II, pp. pp. 75-76. 75-76. 60 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED eONFIDHN'FIAL Chapter VIIIVIII A Final LookLook (U)(U) (C(0 CCO)000) Perhaps thethe Liberty has undergoneundergone the platformsplatforms operatedoperated andand were,were, JCS/JRCJCS/JRC believed,believed, scrutiny long enough. FirstFirst the Israeli CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry in the bestbest positionposition to evaluateevaluate safety factors.'factors. I examined thethe event,event, exculpationexculpation of IsraeliIsraeli nationalsnationals (C CCO)CCQ) , ,.InIn thethe Liberty incident, thethe Com-Com apparently not beingbeing hindmost in the court'scourt's calcula-calcula mander, Sixth Fleet,Fleet, waswas responsibleresponsible for the safetysafety ofof tions. Then thethe U.S.U. S. Navy Navy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry studiedstudied the ship.ship. ButBut ViceVice AdmiralAdmiral Martin waswas notnot in a the incident.incident. TheThe JCSJCS reviewreview activelyactively soughtsought toto position to evaluate the expectedexpected intelligenceintelligence gaingain or or identify faulty proceduresprocedures and practices forfor correctivecorrective assign degrees ofof importanceimportance toto the expectedexpected intelli-intelli action. TheThe NSANSA review review was was essentially fact-finding in gence gaingain inin termsterms of changing riskrisk factors.factors. Judgment nature. AndAnd thethe HouseHouse AppropriationsAppropriations CommitteeCommittee on the valuevalue ofof thethe intelligenceintelligence toto be be gainedgained couldcould review, mademade asas it was was withoutwithout allall thethe informationinformation come only from DoD-level intelligenceintelligence agencies -— and, available to the JCSJCS team,team, nonethelessnonetheless reconstructedreconstructed in the casecase of the Liberty, particularly fromfrom NSA. NSA. many of the basic findings ofofthat that team and sought to use them asas a a mirrormirror inin which which to to observeobserve problemproblem (0 000) In the aftermath ofof the incident,incident, there areas inin DoD's DoD's worldwide worldwide communications.communications. DespiteDespite the was indeed some soul searching onon this pointpoint withinwithin official scrutiny,scrutiny, it is still necessarynecessary to commentcomment brieflybriefly NSA. The head ofof NSA'sNSA's TemporaryTemporary Mid-East Infor-Infor on a few subjects of interest andand concernconcern toto cryptologiccryptologic mation Group toldtold Dr.Dr. Tordella inin mid-June thatthat hehe organizations. believed NSANSA could notnot really absolveabsolve itself totallytotally from the safetysafety considerations.considerations. He believed thatthat NSANSA Safety EstimatesEstimates forfor Collection Collection Missions may have toto demonstratedemonstrate "that "that the needneed is not not established frivolously" and questioned whether or not of Mobile Mobile Platforms (U) \ the intelligenceintelligence requirementsrequirements againstagainst whichwhich NSANSA worked atat the timetime werewere reallyreally ofof suchsuch aa compellingcompelling •t€7EC— One principal area ofof concernconcern was the nature asas to to justifyjustify usingusing thethe specialspecial operationaloperational areas manner in which which safety factorsfactors werewere adjudged.adjudged. PriorPrior 2 in the MiddleMiddle EastEast whichwhich NSA NSA designated.'designated. to thethe Liberty incident, commanderscommanders did not essen-essen tially regardregard mobilemobile collectorscollectors asas integralintegral componentscomponents (C(0 CCO)000) One has toto pose pose thisthis question.question. HadHad of their commands.commands. After all, JCS/JRCJCS/JRC assignedassigned the NSA sentsent a message toto thethe JCS/JRC onon 55 June, the schedules andand routes, the platformsplatforms existed to satisfysatisfy day war broke out,out, and stated simplysimply that thethe agencyagency "national intelligence"and and -— asas theythey maymay havehave which initiated thethe missionmission in the firstfirst place, NSA, thought —- not not theirtheir ownown intelligenceintelligence requirements,requirements, now believedbelievedthe the risk to its cryptologiccryptologic materials and and NSANSA was on the sidelinessidelines as a majormajor interestedinterested personnel outweighedoutweighedits its estimateestimate of technicaltechnical andand party. AsAs GeneralGeneral RussRuss learned,learned, commanderscommanders accord-accord intelligence benefitsbenefits toto be derived, wouldwould there havehave ingly feltfelt some uncertainty as to to theirtheir specificspecific respon-respon been more expeditious action action byby JCS/JRCJCS/JRC toto cutcut the sibilities in supportingsupporting these platforms.platforms. TheThe GeneralGeneral mission short?short? NSA may have drawn a mild mild rebukerebuke reasoned therefrom,therefrom,and and sosostated stated inin hishis report,report, that for presumingpresuming toto evaluate safetysafety factors.factors. But thethe commanders must have adequateadequate knowledgeknowledge of a ship's hypothetical NSA messagemessagemight might havehave addedadded toto the mission if theythey are to control and support itit effectively.effectively. position thethe CNOCNO waswastaking takingat at aboutabout thisthis time to (U) JCS/JRCJCS/JRC looked toto the unifiedunified andand increase thethe ship's CPA, and it mightmight have stimulated specified commandscommandsto to provideprovidefor for thethe safetysafety of the JCS/JRC actionaction earlierearlier thanthan 080110Z.080110Z. mobile collectors. The regionalregional commandscommands werewere in close close (C(0 CCO)000) On 8 JuneJune NSANSA was, was, however,however, of a touch with politicalpolitical andand militarymilitary conditionsconditions inin which which totally different mind.mind. SinceSince itit did not wantwant toto lose lose IIANBbH ".tIA COflfHN'f CIIANNHbS ONbl' -60*REFEN-71-ALeONFIDHN'fIAL 6161 'fOP SECRE'f ,/E0EO 1.4.1. 4 . (c)(c I the coveragecoverage itit had planned forfor thethe Middle East,East, it technical processing centercenter at I INSANSA had sent sent aa messagemessage toto thethe JCS/JRCJCS/JRC proposingproposing assignmentassignment to thethe fieldfield all all butbut oneone of of itsits HebrewHebrew linguists.linguists. PriorPrior of the U.S.S.U.S.S. Belmont to thethe easterneastern Atlantic/Medi-Atlantic/Medi to thethe Liberty's arrival at Rota,Rota, Spain,Spain, thethe NavalNaval terranean asas soon soon as possible afterafter thatthat ship'sship's expectedexpected Security Group had inventoried its availableavailable linguistslinguists arrival at NorfolkNorfolk on the nextnext day.day."3 TheThe Director,Director, in orderorder toto selectselect ArabArab linguistslinguists forfor assignmentassignment to NSA laterlater withdrewthis this requestrequest inin the faceface of of USN-855. OneOne ofofthe the selectees,selectees, itit turned out, carriedcarried reluctance on the partpart ofof thethe Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, the classificationclassification "Special"Special Arabic"Arabic" -— in reality,reality, Atlantic'Atlantic" andand reevaluationreevaluation of the CPACPA constraintsconstraints onon Hebrew—Hebrew- andand assignment ofof thatthat individualindividual waswas by by mission effectiveness. accident rather thanthan byby design.design. USN-855USN-855 did not useuse (C-CCO)(6 660) In reflectingreflecting on thethe Liberty/Liberty/PuebloPueblo him as a a HebrewHebrew linguist.linguist. incidents in an an oraloral historyhistory interview,interview, GeneralGeneral Mar-Mar (U) As in other situationssituations —- the lacklack ofof shall S. CarterCarter saidsaid Vietnamese linguistslinguists duringduring thethe Vietnam period,period, forfor as a a resultresult ofof bothboth ofof thosethose traumatictraumatic experiences,experiences, wewe have have example -— this lack ofof HebrewHebrew linguists showed thatthat reviewed ourour proceduresproceduresand and foundfound therethere was littlelittle changechange the linguistlinguist talenttalent poolpool availableavailable toto U.S. U. S. cryptologiccryptologic needed in NSA-JCS relationships, but therethere werewere some some changeschanges agencies for employment in crisis conditionsconditions was not not needed in the chainchain ofof commandcommand supervisionsupervision and monitoring...monitoring... 6 of just wherewhere thethe ship is, and what it is is doing, doing, 'andand waswas it always adequate.6 necessary. (C-CCO)(6 660) As it turned out, the Liberty incident Communications Problems (U)(D) -— and some six months laterlater the Pueblo seizure — (U) Errors made in thethe handlinghandling ofof com- com brought about somesome modificationmodification inin the JCS/JRCJCS/JRC municationsaccounted, accounted,in in somesome measure, forfor thethe procedures for weighing risk vs. intelligence-gainintelligence-gain fac-fac Liberty tragedy. Studied inin great detail by the JCSJCS tors. InsteadInstead ofof relyingrelying entirelyentirely onon militarymilitary assess-assess Fact FindingFinding Team and reviewedreviewed byby thethe staff of the ments, thethe newnew proceduresprocedures tooktook intointo accountaccount House Appropriations Committee, the communicationscommunications intelligence-agencyinformation informationrelating relating toto potentialpotential problems posedposed aa challenge forfor thethe JCS andand forfor DoD DoD risk.'risk. 5 Just priorprior to thethe Pueblo's capture, NSANSA hadhad agencies inin the immediateimmediate post-Liberty period. apprised the JCSJCS ofof SigintSigint fromfrom NorthNorth KoreanKorean com-com (U) NSA was not the DoDDoD actionaction officeoffice for munications portending difficulties for the Pueblo. correcting faulty communications procedures,procedures, butbut it (U) NSA should not yieldyield or or shouldshould yieldyield was indeed aa very interestedinterested party to correctivecorrective actions grudginglyto to others, thisthis reviewreview would would suggest,suggest, inin stimulated byby thethe RussRuss Report.Report. DoingDoing whatwhat hehe could,could, safety evaluationsevaluations ofof missionsmissions involvinginvolving large holdingsholdings General Carter calledcalled ArmyArmy Chief of Staff,Staff, GeneralGeneral of Sigint materials, equipment,equipment, andand personnel.personnel. Harold K.K Johnson, about thethe considerableconsiderable numbernumber ofof mishandled messagesmessagesin in thethe DepartmentDepartment ofof Army'sArmy's Availability ofof LinguistsLinguists (U)(C-CCOI(U) -cco)- communicationscenter center inin the Pentagon,Pentagon, particularlyparticularly (C(6 CCO)660) Looking backback on the Liberty incident, those comingcoming toto NSA, and onon 3 JulyJuly providedprovided GeneralGeneral one perhaps shouldshould faultfault thethe cryptologiccryptologic organizationorganization Johnson's staff withwith examplesexamples ofof messagemessage mishandlingmishandling for notnot assuringassuring thethe presencepresence onon boardboard ofof qualifiedqualified during the Liberty incident. DepartmentDepartment ofof Army'sArmy's Hebrew linguists for on-station examination of Israeli response waswas positive,positive, andand soon thereafterthereafter itsits Com-Com voice communicationscommunications uncovereduncoveredin in thethe intercept fromfrom munications Staff added page monitors on its circuits the nonmorsenon morse search andand developmentdevelopment missionmission and forfor to NSA NSA to checkcheck assignment of address groups. Errors not eveneven havinghaving aa tokentoken missionmission onon IsraeliIsraeli voicevoice diminished from some 4040 toto 7 a day out of an averageaverage communications.It It turned out thatthat HebrewHebrew languagelanguage daily total ofof 1,0001,000 transmissions. General Carter alsoalso tapes producedproduced by USN-855USN-855 fromfrom thethe searchsearch andand insisted, as noted earlier, that hishis staffstaff examineexamine thethe development mission onon thethe morning ofof 88 June did not Russ Report recommendationsrecommendations relating to DoDDoD com- com contain information on the forthcoming IsraeliIsraeli attack,attack, munications forfor any possiblepossible applicationapplication to NSA'sNSA's but NSANSA did not learn this untiluntil itit hadhad receivedreceived these Criticomm network.network.'7 tapes andand hadhad processedprocessed them several daysdays afterafter the event. For all NSA NSA and USN-855USN-855 knewknewat at the time,time, File ReductionReduction forfor Exposed Exposed CollectorsCollectors (U)(U) information onon Israeli intentionsintentions towards the shipship (TC('f'S CCO660 nF) NI') TheThe SixSix Day War and thethe Liberty might well have been on those tapes. incident createdcreated conditionsconditions inin whichwhich SigintSigint personnelpersonnel (C(6 CCO)660) Hebrew linguistslinguists were,were, toto bebe sure, inin had toto taketake fastfast actionaction toto preventprevent lossloss of of theirtheir short supply.supply. In sendingsending threethree HebrewHebrew linguistslinguists to fillfill documentation and ee ui ui • ment.ment. out the staffstaff ofof thethe U.S.U. S. Air Air Force Force SecuritySecurity Service'sService's L.- ..... while dealing successfully with 62 -TOP'fOP-SteRFF-SECRE'f IIhNHLB ¥I.... 60l\HN'I' UIIMlNB1.8 ONl.Y NOFORN EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c I TOP SB€RBT the problem,problem, diddid encounterencounter difficultiesdifficulties because of the not specific toto USN-855's easterneastern Mediterranean mis-mis time requiredrequired to destroydestroy recordsrecords and neutralizeneutralize equip-equip sion, recordsrecords which could have remained behind at ment. InIn its its reportreport onon emergencyemergency destruction ofof SigintSigint Rota. ThisThis samesame judgmentjudgment wouldwould probably not apply,apply, documentation and equipment'equipmentII on thethe otherother hand,hand, toto on-boardon-board SigintSigint equipment,equipment, recommended reductionreduction toto the absoluteabsolute minimumminimum ofof virtually all of which which was essential to the mission.mission. detachment filesfiles asas one measure toto facilitatefacilitate thethe +C±f€t- The Liberty's experience, together with destruction. The report stated: the Pueblo capture, led to to some some emphasisemphasis onon file file Technical documents, operationaloperational aids,aids, etc., should be limited reduction and on measures to facilitate destructiondestruction ofof to those those requiredrequired to carrycarry outout thethe mission;mission; files files held held and and cryptologic materialsmaterials andand equipment. The incidentsincidents containing information thatthat maymayor or may not be neededneeded at some some future date shouldshould be be eliminated.eliminated. The librarylibrary ofof trainingtraining pointed up, as no others had donedone before,before.the the needneed forfor manuals ought to be limitedlimited toto those those covering covering itemsitems ofof equip- equip scaling the distribution ofof technicaltechnical documentationdocumentation to ment in use use at at thethe detachment;detachment; anyoneanyone who who cannot read a specific and minimal levelslevels necessarynecessary forfor executionexecution ofof TEXTA card can be taught without the use of a TEXTA TEXTA card can be taught without the use of a TEXTA tasks, andand followingfollowing the incidentsincidents somesome moderationmoderationin in- ,° E0EO 1.4.1. 4 . (c)(c I Manual; a Traffic Traffic Analyst'sAnalyst's HandbookHandbook is not not needed needed where where the supplysupply ofof documentationdocumentation\Vasi:n,evide~ce. was in evidence. there areare no no traffic traffic analysts,analysts, nornor is is a acryptographiccryptographic textbooktextbook where there is no no cryptanalysiscryPtanalysis,:.a;:c.::;;co;;.:m:;Jp;;.:l,::is.::h.::;;ed:;,._' accomplished.' ..., (U) ...... AsadirectAs a direct resultresu1toft~~Libe~ty of the Liberty in-in The cryptologiccryptologic holdingsholdin s of of I cidentandcident and atat GeneralGeneral Carter'sCarter's-urging, urging, NSA'sNSNs Com-Com munications SecurityOrganizatiofiSecurity Organization revised, for exam-exam I were small in comparison withwith thosethose held by the Liberty. ple, its its physicalphysical securitysecurity doctrinedoctrine (l{AG-lD)(HAG-1D) to limit (TS-CCO)('T'S-CCO) After the Liberty incident, aa review review of of keyiIlgmaterials)nnormalkeying materials in normal circumstances toto a four- four USN-855's cryptologiccryptologic documentary holdingsholdings showedshowed month's su,pplysupply and toto curtailcurtail possessionpossession ofof thosethose that thethe SigintSigint unitunit heldheld technicaltechnical reportsreports suchsuch-as as materials to thatthat whichwhich waswas clearlyclearly essentialessential toto mission mission TEXTA, TechinsTechins (Technical Instructions),Lnstructione), tasking requirements.requirements."II TheTheincidents incidents alsoalso gave gave impetus to the records of all kinds,kinds, InformalInformal Technical Notes, andand use of alternativealternative meansmeans forfor technicaltechnical support,support, suchsuch Comint Technical ReportsRep():rtsf6rl for IMiddle as OpscommOpscomrnequipment equipment for teletypeteletype exchangesexchanges onon Eastern, IIcountries, andand the U.S.S.R.U.S.S.R. — specific technicaltechnical problems.problems. AndAnd aa smallsmall amountamount ofof documents which would havehave made possible, granted water-soluble paperpaper came into use for technicaltechnical docu-docu a seriousserious compromise,compromise, a country-by-countrycountry-by-country index to mentation subject toto possiblepossible loss atat sea. But measures the SigintSigint successsuccess achievedachievedby bythe the U.U.S. S. for thethe such as these did not solve solve the problem in its entirety. countries concerned. The Sigint unit alsoalso heldheld collec-collec (U) (c-cco)-(C-CCOI_ In thethe 1970s19708 NSANSA initiatedinitiated twotwo proj-proj tion managementmanagement records recapitulating intercept as-as ects to examineexamine the useuse of of technical-support materials ·P.L. 86-36 signments by case notation at U.S.U.S. SigintSigintsites sites world-world by exposedexposed sites, Projects'Projectsl// 1I wide. In addition,addition, USN-855USN-855 held muchmuch/of of the MussoMusso The latter diddid not not getget beyondbeyond.the-survey the survey stage.stage. UnderUnder (Manual of U.S.U.S. SigintSigint Operations)Operations) library spellingspelling Project'Projectl 'NSAINSA considered the useuse of of microfilmmicrofilm out SigintSigint policypolicy and procedures.procedures. It heldheld numerousnumerous to reducereduce thethe sizesize of of files files and and examinedexamined techniquestechniques forfor records denoting'denotingI // I fast microfilm/fischemicrofilm/fische destruction, destruction,but but failed to win win IAndjtAnd it heldheldthen then currentcurrent Sigint S.. igint productproduct forfor adoptionaddptioIl,because because of disinterest andand generalgeneral disincli-disincli L...;..~""':':""';':" 'MiddleJMiddleEastern Eastern countries,countries, and the nation to use use microform.microform. Size of files andand time factors IU.S.S.R. in the destructiondestruction processprocess continue as problems toto thisthis (3-CCO)(S OCO) USN-855 had received this comprehen-comprehen timetime. :122 sive documentationdocumentation primarilyprimarily fromfrom NSA'sNSA's collectioncollection (C-CCO)(0 000) The LibertyLiberty and Pueblo incidents management, telecommunications,and and G GroupGroup of-of should serve to remindremind cryptologiccryptologicmanagersofth~ managers of the fices, Naval Security GroupGroup Headquarters,Headquarters, andand U.S. need to exercise restraintjntllellseQLSiginLequip"restraint in the use of Sigint equip I IUSN-855IUSN~855was;ifiaSerise,NSA was, in a sense, NSA EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c I ment and documentationdocumentation in high-riskhigh-risk areas. EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . (d I in microcosm.'microcosm. 9 (C(G CCO) GGO) Asked ifif the ship hadhad tootoo muchmuch SigintSigint Unanswered Questions (U) documentation and equipment,equipment, oneone USN-855USN-855 survivorsurvivor (U) A persistent question relating to the commented, Liberty incident is whether or not thethe IsraeliIsraeli forcesforces Entirely too much. much. ThereThere isis no no way way emergencyemergency destructiondestruction could be carried outout unless unless you you were were given...two given... two day's noticenotice which attackedattacked the shipship knewknew that itit was was American.American. that you'reyou're going going to get hit. hit. And And usuallyusually you'reyou're not not given given any any Several authors and not a a few few of the Liberty's crewmen notice.1°10 and USN-855 staffstaff areare convinced that that they did. Their (C(G CCO) GGO) Casual examination of document list-list belief derived from consideration ofof thethe long timetime the ings reveals, ofof course,course, countlesscountless recordsrecords whichwhich were were Israelis had the shipship underunder surveillancesurveillance priorprior to the ItA:NDL! "itA: e6M1N'f eHA:NN!LS 6NLY N6f6ltN -pep-seettelLTOP SECRET 63 -EfEeRET-SECRET E(.3EO, 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) attack, thethe visibilityvisibility of the flag,flag, and thethe intensityintensity ofof initiated by the DepartmentDepartment of State. InIn May May 1968, 1968, the attackattack itself.itself. Israel paid thethe U.S.U.S. GovernmentGovernment $3,323,500$3,323,500 as full full (C-CCO)(O-CCO) Speculation asas to to IsraeliIsraeli motivationmotivation payment on behalf of the familiesfamilies ofof the 3434 men men killed killed varied. Some believedbelievedthat that Israel expected thatthat the in thethe attack."attack. 13 ElevenEleven monthsmonths later,later, IsraelIsrael paidpaid complete destructiondestructionof ofthe the shipship and killingkilling of the $3,566,457 inin compensation toto the menmen who who had beenbeen personnel wouldwouldlead leadthe the U.S.U.S. toto blame the U.A.R.U.A.R. wounded."wounded. 14 The U.S.U. S. claimclaim ofof $7,644,146$7,644,146 for material for the incidentincident and bring the U.S. intointo thethe warwar on on damage to the Liberty itself was not settled until 1818 the sideside of of Israel.Israel. Ironically,Ironically, eveneven though the Liberty December 1980 whenwhen IsraelIsrael agreed to pay pay $6$6 million.million. had nono specific mission againstagainst Israeli communications, (U) After returning to NorfolkNorfolk in JulyJuly others felt IsraeliIsraeli forcesforces wanted the ship and menmen out out 1967, the Liberty languished therethere while NSA tried of the wayway in order to denydeny the U.S.U.S. any any SigintSigint onon unsuccessfullyto to obtainobtain DoD budgetary approval to Israel's preparations toto attack.attack Syria -— anan attack the restore her toto SigintSigint operationaloperational status;status; thethe proposedproposed U.U.S.S. might try toto prevent.prevent. budget figurefigure was $10,200,000. WhenWhen thisthis effort failed, (8 COO) Authors of .thethe severalseveral booksbooks now now in in the Liberty was decommissioned onon 2828 JuneJune 1968.1968. In print aboutabout thethe Liberty.'Liberty, whether membersmembers. ofof the 1970 thethe ship waswas turnedturned overover to to thethe MaritimeMaritime Liberty's complementor/ or not,not, have not had accessaccess to Administration and sold for scrapscrap forfor $101,666.66.$101,666.66. In I Ii Sigint reports on the IsraeliIsraeli 1973 the ship camecame to an an ignominiousignominious end as she she was was helicopter pilot voicevoice communications, nornor have they cut up in in Baltimore'sBaltimore's CurtisCurtis BayBay shipyard.shipyard. had accessaccess to to thethe confidentialconfidential IsraeliIsraeli Government'sGovernment's (U) There was one aspect of the Liberty explanation givengiven toto thethe U.U.S. S. Department of State. tragedy which shouldshould notnot go unnoted. This was its adverse and lingering affect on the Liberty's survivors. (C-CCO)(O-OeO) In part becausebecause ofof the presspress speculationspeculation Oral interviews with USN-855USN-855 personnel some 13 years at thethe time,time, PresidentPresident JohnsonJohnson directeddirected thethe DirectorDirector after thethe event,event, showshow thatthat timetime hashas notnot healedhealed all the of Central Intelligence,Intelligence, Richard Helms, toto prepare a scars.'scars." ApartApart fromfrom bitternessbitterness towardtoward thethe IsraeliIsraeli Gov-Gov report by 13 June, five daysdays afterafter the attack, assessingassessing ernment, there still remainsremains dismay thatthat the U.S.U. S. the IsraeliIsraeli intentions.intentions. TheThe CIACIA assessmentassessment drewdrew heav-heav Government oror SixthSixth Fleet did not come come to Liberty's ily upon the SigintSigint reportsreports referredreferred toto above. above. While While aid in in timelytimely fashion.fashion. these reportsreports revealedrevealed somesome confusionon on thethe part ofof (U) The contributionscontributions of technicaltechnical re-re the pilotspilots concerning thethe nationality of thethe ship, theythey search ships to thisthis nation'snation's SigintSigint productionproduction alsoalso tended toto rule rule out out any any thesisthesis thatthat thethe IsraeliIsraeli NavyNavy should not go unnoted. These were unique in theirtheir and AirAir Force deliberately attacked a shipship theythey knewknew time, often irreplaceable, often unheralded.unheralded. ThatThat the to be be American.American. TRS program came to an end end in in 1969 1969 was was not for for lack Denouement (U)(U) of competence andand dedication of the menmen who who servedserved or for for lacklack ofof NSA'sNSA's appreciationappreciation for their contribu-contribu (U) On 11 11 JuneJune 1968,1968, exactlyexactly oneone yearyear tions, but ratherrather forfor budgetarybudgetary considerationsconsiderations by the and three days after the attackattack onon thethe Liberty, her Department ofof Defense.Defense. commanding officer,officer, CaptainCaptain William Loren Mc-Me Gonagle (promoted(promotedafter after thethe attack), waswas presentedpresented the CongressionalCongressional Medal of Honor byby thethe Secretary ofof Notes the NavyNavy for for gallantrygallantry andand couragecourage displayeddisplayed duringduring Liberty's hours of trial.trial. FollowingFollowing thatthat award, thethe Source documents areare inin thethe "Crisis Collection" of of thethe NSA History Presidential Unit CitationCitation waswas conferredconferred upon thethe Collection. Liberty and crew crew on 14 14 JuneJune 19681968 atat Portsmouth,Portsmouth, Virginia. '(U)'(V) The Russ Russ Report,Report, pppp 9-10; 9-10; RichardRichard HarveyHarvey interview, 16 Jul 1980. 1980. (C(0 CCO)GGO) Scores of individualindividual decorationsdecorations '(V)2(U) Walter Deeley,Deeley, MemorandumMemorandum forfor the (Bronze Star,Star, Silver Star., etc.)etc.) werewere given given to to crew crew D/DIRD!DIR - "V.S.S."U.S.S. Liberty," 14 Jun 1967. 1967. members, andand 170 Purple Hearts werewere earnedearned byby '(U)'(V) DIRNSA msg toto JCS/JRC, 0815032081503Z Jun 1967.1967. \V)4(U) CINCLANT msg toto JCS, 121414Z121414Z Jun 1967. 1967. Liberty's complement, including two NSA civilians, complement, including two NSA civilians, '(U)5(V) Interview with Gene Sheck, 1111 Aug Aug 1980. 1980. Donald L.L. Blalock andand Allen M.M. Blue (the latter, '(e-ee6)6.(C-CCO) NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint"Critique-Sigint ReadinessReadiness BravoBravo posthumously). Crayon," pp. 24, 29. 29. '(V) NSA Staff, MemorandumMemorandum forfor the Record,Record, (U) Claims against the government of Is '(U) Claims against the government of Is- "Telephone Conversation with with Mr.Mr. Morton A.A. Brill, OCCE,aCCE, 5 Jul rael forfor compensationcompensation concerning deathsdeaths and injuriesinjuries 1967; NSA, TlT1 Memo,Memo, "Missent Traffic from RUEPCR,"RVEPCR," 14 Jul of U.S. U.S. personnelpersonnel and damage toto the Liberty were 1967. 64 SECRET IIANBI:lH faA CO!'fHN'f CIIANNHI:lS ONI:lY -effiffiDENTI*IfrCONPIDHN'fIAL 'lfer U.S.u.s. Army Communications SupportSupport Unit, An- randum to ADC, ADC, "Cryptographic"Cryptographic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 17 nual History Report, FY 1967,1967, vol. I, 1 1 Oct 1967. 1967. Aug 1967. 9'(U)(U) NSA Staff (PO4)(P04) MemorandumMemorandum to DIRNSA,DffiNSA, '"(U)2(U) Interview with Richmond D. Snow, Snow, 21 21 Aug Aug "Classified"Material Material AboardAboard U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 11 Jun 1980. "(U) U.S. Department of State Bulletin,Bulletin, 1717 JunJun 1967. Enclosures toto the memorandummemorandum consist of a 160-page160-page listing "(U) 1968, p. 799. 799. of documents known to have been given to USN-855 by NSA NSA and and '"(U)4(U) U.S. Department ofof State Bulletin,Bulletin, 2 JunJun NAVSECGRU elements. 1969, p. 473. 473. NU)]o(U) Interview with Paddy E. Rhodes, 1313 Jun 1980.1980. "(U)AU) The Liberty's Captain, WilliamWilliam L. Mc- Mc- "(U) ADC Memorandum to DIRNSA,DffiNSA, "Crypto-"Crypto- Gonagle, nownow retired,retired, was invited to be be interviewedinterviewed but declined,declined, graphic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 2 Oct Oct 1967; 1967; DIRNSADffiNSA memo-memo- stating he hadhad refusedrefused allall otherother suchsuch requests.requests. UONFIDHN'fIAL 65 UNCLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY Citations are unclassifiedunclassified unlessunless otherwiseotherwiseindicated indicatedat at thethe beginningbeginning of the reference. Example: (C-CCO) Smith,Smith, John. Sigint Aspects of the War in the East. NSA, 1980. 1980. (TSC)(TSC) The first securitysecurity classification,classification, C-CCO, isis forfor thethe citation itself; the second,second, TSC, is the classificationclassification of the document.document. DocumentsDocuments appearing inin this bibliographybibliography are available inin thethe OfficeOffice of of CryptologicCryptologic Archives andand History, T54. Books and Articles onon the Six Day War and the U.S.S. LihertyLiberty Draper, Theodore.Theodore. Israel and WorldWorld Politics.Politics. New York: Viking Press, 1968.1968. Ennes, James M.M. Assault on the Liberty. New York: Random House, 1979. 1979. Kosut, Hal, editor. "Israel and thethe Arabs:Arabs: TheThe JuneJune 19671967 War," Facts on File, New York, 1968. 1968. Pearson, Anthony.Anthony. Conspiracy of Silence.Silence. London: Quartet Books,Books, 1978. 1978. Yost, Charles W. "The Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli War; HowHow It Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, JanuaryJanuary 1968.1968. Cryptologic Histories Electronic SecuritySecurity Command.Command. History ofof the 6910th SecuritySecurity Wing,Wing, 1 January - 30 30 JuneJune 1967.1967. (TC-CCO)('i?S eeO) Electronic Security Command.Command. History ofof the 6931st Security Group,Group, 11 JanuaryJanuary - 30 30 JuneJune 1967.1967. (~S-CCO) Electronic Security Command.Command. History ofof the 6948th Security Squadron, 11 JanuaryJanuary - 30 JuneJune 1967.1967. (TO('i?S CCO)eeO) Kagnew Station, OfficeOffice of Operations. Annual Historical Report, FY 1967,1967, vol.vol. n.II. (T3-CCO)('T'S eeO) Rasmuson, John R. AA History of KagnewKagneui Station andand AmericanAmerican ForcesForces inin Eritrea, 25 May 1973. (U) (U) U.S. ArmyArmy CommunicationsCommunications Support Unit. Annual Historical Report,Report, FY 1967,1967, vol. I, 1 October 1967.1967. t~S·CCO) Investigative Reviews of of Liberty Liberty Incident House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff. AA Report to the CommitteeCommittee on Appropriations - U.S.U.S. HouseHouse ofof RepresentativesRepresentatives onon thethe EffectivenessEffectiveness ofof thethe WorldwideWorldwide CommunicationsCommunications Systems and NetworksNetworks of thethe DepartmentDepartment ofof Defense,Defense, vols.vola, I andand II.II. {TS)~ Israel DefenceDefence Forces.Forces. Preliminary Inquiry FileFile 1/67,1/67, 21 July 1967.1967. (U) (U) NSA Staff. "Report"Report to the Director,Director, NSANSA - U.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR-5),(AGTR~5), 2323 MayMay -- 8 June 1967,"1967," 1212 JuneJune 1967.1967. ~(TSC) Russ, Joseph R. MG, USA. "Report of the JCS FactFact FindingFinding Team - U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 JuneJune 1967."1967."~ (TC -Seereitive)-Seulliti,e) U.S. NavyNavy CourtCourt ofof InquiryInquiry 7816-67;7816-67; Liberty Incident, 88 JuneJune 1967;1967; RecordRecord ofof Proceedings.Proceedings. ~(TS) Oral History Carter, MarshallMarshall S.,S., LTG,LTG, USA.USA. Interview,Interview, JanuaryJanuary 1969.1969. (C-CCO) Connell, John. Interview,Interview, 1515 SeptemberSeptember 1980.1980. +Si-fSt' Cwalina, Benjamin G. Interview, 9 May 1980.1980. ~i-ei- Fossett, BirchardBirchard C.,C., CDR, CDR, USN. USN. Interview,Interview, 2222 MayMay 1980.1980. (0 (S CCO)eeO) UNCLASSIFIED 67 UNCLASSIFIED Harvey, Richard. Interview, 16 July 1980.1980. ffSeT Hickman, Richard W. Interview, 3030 April 1980. ( (S-CCO) - ) McFarland, TerryTerry L.,L., CTC. Interview, 23 June 1980. (8(8660) CCO) O'Connor, JamesJames G.,G., CDR, USN. Interview,Interview, 2222 MayMay 1980.1980. (C-CCO) (8 eeO) Rhodes, Paddy E.,E., CTC.CTC. Interview, 13 June 1980. (8(0 CCO)eeO) Sheck, Eugene.Eugene. Interview, 11 August 1980. fCPS€t(T3C) Way, Clyde W., CTC. CTC. Interview,Interview, 6 JuneJune 1980.1980. ('PSC) Wilson, Robert L. Interview, 66 May 1980. (6(8 CCO)660) Messages (Listed byby Date/TimeDate/Time Group.) CINCLANT. 121414Z121414Z JunJun 67.67. +8.)-t6t CNO. 142227Z142227Z Jun 67. +8}tst 102136Z Aug 67. -tst(-51- COMSERVRON 8.8. 240020Z May 67. 1'6t-(-6.)- COMSIXTHFLT. 052015Z Jun 67. {Jaitst 062349Z JunJun 67.67. ter+6* 070626Z Jun 67. t6t+8i- 071503Z Jun 67. +Si-tst 081250Z Jun 67. Etcr 081320Z JunJun 67.67. (U) 081349Z Jun 67. ieTE 081514Z JunJun67.~ 67.-tet 081649Z JunJun 67.67. 4PO4-~ 090513Z Jun 67.67. -(-€*~ 0923-7Z Jun 67. tei-i€T CTF 60. 081316Z 081316Z Jun 67. -~(-Si- CTF 100. 130934Z 130934Z Jun 67. ~ E0EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) CTF Jun --1 EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . (d) 150200Z Jun 67.67.~ CTG 60.5. 090758Z 090758Z JunJun 67.67. 4-G4-~ 092119Z JunJun 67.~67.-(4)- 101750Z Jun 67. +G*~ DIRNAVSECGRU. 131706Z Jun 67. (C-CCO)(8 eeO) DIRNAVSECGRUEUR. 091058Z Jun 67. (C(6660) CCO) 091814Z Jun 67. (8(8660) CCO) 111442Z JunJun 67.67. (8(0 CCO)eeO) 111931Z Jun 67.~67.*84- 191326Z Jun 67. (E(8 CCO)6eO) 191358Z JunJun 67.67. ~(SC) 68 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DIRNSA. 231729Z231729Z May MayMay 67. 67.67. {184-4-84-~ 232133Z May May 67. 67.67. (8 (3-CCO)(3 CCO)000) 252317Z MayMay 67. 67. ~ (SC) 2-6Z2--6Z MayMay 67. +setfaeliS€'7 270006Z May May 67. 67. (8 (C-CCO)(S-CCO)000) 292013Z May MayMay 67. 67.4-S+ 67.44+~ 292201Z292201 Z May May 67. 67. iSet 022333Z JunJun 67.67.~ 072104Z JunJun Jun 67. 67.E -iSt(-91- 081356Z Jun Jun 67. 67.67. (113-CCO) ('t'8 000) 081503Z JunJun 67. (8 000) 091345Z Jun JunJun 67. 67. i€T tei- 101718Z JunJun 67.67. (8 (8(0 CCO)CCO)060) ca. 21-Z21-Z JunJun 67.67. ffS+ 081648Z AugAug 67. 67.67. -(-~(-C4)-)- JCS. 052235Z 052235Z Nov Nov 65. 65. ~ 291602Z May MayMay 67. 67.-+e)- 67.{G}~ 011545Z JunJun 67. +Si+ts+18.)- 070259Z JunJun 67. +Si-ts+e81- 072230Z JunJun 67.67. +6-)-+e4-~ 080110Z JunJun 67.67.~67. (TS)(TG) 081529Z JunJun 67.67.~-(-Si-4)- 102140Z JunJun Jun 67.-(-S-)67.~ 67. 3)- NAVSHIPENGCTR. 141551Z Jun Jun 67.~67.494-67.484- NSAEUR. 140829Z 140829Z140829Z Jun Jun Jun 67. 67. 67. I'S+iSt tSt 161530Z Jun Jun 67. 67. (0 (C CCO)660) State, DepartmentDepartment of.of. Message Message no. no.no. 200139 200139200139 to American toto AmericanAmerican Embassy,Embassy,Embassy, TelTelTel Aviv,Aviv, 11 11 11 June June 1967. 1967.1967. +&) *€f€t TF 60.5.60.5. 090758Z090758Z Jun 67. +etf€t USCINCEUR. 300932Z 300932Z300932Z May May May 67. 67. 67. +C..)- +G)-~ 010035ZJun Jun 67.67.tst 'ill'tSt 020717Z JunJun 67. 67. -+3i- iSt 101045Z1Q1045Z JunJun 67. fST 101105Z Jun 67.-+S+67.~ USCINCNAVEUR. 311750Z 311750Z May May 67.-(€4-67.-(£4-67.~ 011305Z Jun 67.67. +G++4)-~ 020717Z JunJun 67.-+R)-67.67.~-(-8+ 031016Z JunJun 67. +0)-te,i-~ 051352Z JunJun Jun 67. 67. 67. (&' tat(6- - 051850Z JunJun 67. -+Si~(-Si 061357Z JunJun 67.67. +Gi-+4)-~ 081517Z Jun Jun 67. 67. tet 091459Z JunJun 67.67. -EIS*-+64-~ 100025Z Jun 67.67. +G+(Cc-fet 111031Z Jun Jun 67. 67.-6 -KOi'8t 111311Z JunJun 67.67. (&3 ffl?{$j 120950Z JunJun 67.67. {-Sttst{S} 151003Z Jun Jun 67. 67. -4-84-~+84- UNCLASSIFIED 69 UNCLASSIFIED VSDAO,USDAO, Tel Aviv. Aviv. 081414Z 081414Z Jun 67.67. +6++et 131335Z JunJun 67.~67.*Si- 151615Z JunJun 67.67. (8(3 -NF) ?tF) VSN-446.USN-446. 091355Z JunJun 67. (8(8 CCO)GGO) U.S.S.V.S.S. Liberty.Liberty. 241732Z May 67. +e3-~ 021132Z JunJun 67.67.~ -E•G+ 021330Z JunJun 67. tet~ 022108Z JunJun 67.67.~ -(-64- 061844Z Jun 67.67. +Poi-~ 062036Z JunJun 67. i€'Ttet 080634Z JunJun 67. fflT 080742Z Jun 67.67.~-(46-)- 080856Z JunJun 67. +rni-#It 081715Z JunJun 67. (U)(V) 200'735Z200735Z JunJun 67. (S-Cfty~'t'e) 021630Z Aug 67.~67.-(Qi- U.S.S. Saratoga.Saratoga. 081235Z JunJun 67. (U)(V) 081237Z JunJun 67. (U)(V) 081254Z JunJun 67. (U)(V) Memoranda, Letters, Bulletins, Reports,Reports, andand Briefing Briefing Alger, Julie. "A ReviewReview of the TechnicalTechnical Research Ship Program,Program, 1961-1969,"1961-1969," 1 May 1970. 1970. (TSC)('f'~e) Deeley, Walter G. Memorandum forfor thethe Deputy Director. "V.S.S."U.S.S. Liberty," 14 June 1967.1967. (S eee) Deeley, WalterWalter G. Letter toto thethe ViceVice DirectorDirector forfor OperationsOperations (J3), 2929 JuneJune 1967.1967. ~-(4)- JCS/Joint Staff:Staff: J3. JCSJCS citecite no.no. 2308/378,2308/378, "Note by the Secretaries to the JCSJCS on on U.S.S.V.S.S. Liberty Incident," 2424 June 1967.1967. (TS(CPS Cotsitive)Se:neil:he) Joint CommandCommand and ControlControl RequirementsRequirements Group. Memorandum for for thethe Joint ChiefsChiefs of of Staff, "Fact FindingFinding Team," 1818 JuneJune 1967.1967. +6-}-fBt National MilitaryMilitary CommandCommand Center:Center: NSANSA SeniorSenior OperationsOperations OfficerOfficer Log, Log, 0730-1530, 0730-1530, 8 June 1967.1967. ~ Memorandum forfor thethe Record,Record, 15301530 EDT,EDT, 8 June8 June 1967.1967. 4--T-S}f'f'St NSA: Director. Handwritten note to D1, 8 JuneJune 1967.1967. (U)(V) Director. MemorandumMemorandum for the Record,Record, 88 JuneJune 1967.1967. ~(CC) Director. Handwritten note circulated to seniorsenior staff, 1010 JuneJune 1967.1967. (U)(V) Director. Letter toto MG MG J. J. R.R. Russ,Russ, USA,VSA, 1212 JuneJune 1967.1967. i€t Director. MemorandumMemorandum to ADC,ADC, "Cryptographic HoldingsHoldings of V.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty," 17 August 1967.~1967.44)- Deputy Director. Memorandum forfor thethe Record, "V.S.S."U.S.S. Liberty," 8 June 1967.1967. ts€t'(3C) Deputy Director. Memorandum, "Directorate's TemporaryTemporary Mid-East InformationInformation Group," 8 JuneJune 1967.4Q+1967. ~ Deputy Director. MemorandumMemorandum for the Record,Record, "Inquiry"Inquiry fromfrom House House AppropriationsAppropriations CommitteeCommittee RegardingRegarding V.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty," 20 June 1967.1967. (CC)~ Deputy Director. Penned,Penned, long-handlong-hand comment, 26 August 1967, attached toto copy copy of of IsraeliIsraeli DefenceDefence ForceForce Preliminary Inquiry File 1 1/67,/67, 21 21 JulyJuly 1967.1967. (U)(V) NSA Staff. Informal paper, "Airborne Collection inin MiddleMiddleEast," East," undated - ca. 1967. 1967. ~(TSC) NSA Staff. Memorandum forfor the Director, NSA,NSA, "Classified Material Aboard V.S.S.U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855),"(VSN-855)," 11 June 1967.1967. ('T'S eeo UP) 70 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED CONffflHNftAL (C(6 CCO)660) NSA Staff. "Critique -- SigintSigint ReadinessReadiness BravoBravo Crayon,"Crayon," 1010 July July 1968. 1968. ('f'SC-!,P) NSA Staff. ADC ADC Memorandum toto the Director,Director, NSA,NSA, "Cryptographic"Cryptographic HoldingsHoldings of U.S.S. Liberty," 2 October 1967.1967. +S}-t6t NSA Staff. "Fact SheetSheet forfor DIRNSA,"DIRNSA," undated -- ca. ca. 1967. 1967. (C(8 CCO)660) NSA Staff. "Informal Paper onon Liberty's Communications," 2222 JuneJune 1967.1967.-f8€t -E&5* NSA Staff. T1 Memorandum,Memorandum, "Missent TrafficTraffic from RUEPCR," 14 July 1967.1967. (U) (U) NSA Staff. "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16 16 June 1967.1967. ~( ) NSA Staff. "Questions"Questions by GeneralGeneral Carroll,Carroll, Director,Director, DIADIA - -Answers Answers ProvidedProvided byby G G Group/PO4,"Group/P04," 2727 June 1967.1967. (TCC)f'PS€t (C(6 CCO)660) NSA Staff. Note for thethe Director,Director, "Sigint"Sigint ReflectionsReflections ofof Liberty Incident," 2727 JuneJune 1967.1967. fS€t- (0-(C CCO) NSANSA Staff. Staff. "Status"Status of ofOperationsOperations ActionsActions RelativeRelative toto SigintSigint ReadinessReadiness Bravo/Crayon,"Bravo/Crayon," ReportReport no. 13, 13, 9-10 June 1967.1967. (T3-CCO)('f'S eOO) NSA Staff. Memorandum for the Record,Record, "Telephone Conversation withwith Mr.Mr. Morton A. Brill, OCCE,"OCCE," 5 JulyJuly 1967.1967. (U) (U) NSA Staff. "Trip ReportReport ofof EugeneEugene Sheck and LT Deprey," 27 June 1967.(3-CCO)1967. (S-CCO) NSA Staff. "U.S.S. Liberty - Chronology, 2323 MayMay -- 88 June."iS'Ct-June." (SC) NSA, G62. "Briefing onon thethe 19671967 Middle East Crisis," undated.undated. (TGC)ffBe)- State, Department of. Memorandum to thethe DirectorDirector';., NSA,NSA, 22 22 August August 1967. 1967. (C(0 Sensitive)8eftlliei,e) Bulletin, 1717 June 1968.1968. (U) (U) Bulletin, 2 June 1969.1969. (U) (U) USNAVEUR ContingencyContingencyWatch Watch Team.Team. Memorandum, "U.S.S."U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 1212 JuneJune 1967.1967. (FOUO)(VQ\JQ) U.S.S. Liberty. "Ship WeatherWeather ObservationObservation Sheet," 88 JuneJune 1967.1967. (U) (U) White House. Daily Diary, 8 June 1967.1967. (U) (U) Sigint and and Technical Technical ReportsReports OPINS No. 2855, 2855, Manual of U.S. SigintSigint Operations,Operations, 12 March 1965.1965. (3-CCO)(8 eCO) (C-eeel)- SigintSigint Reports:Reports: 22[I]R23-67' R23-67, 082015Z082015~Ju.n67·±S€t Jun 67. (CC) 60EO 1.4.(c)1. 4. (c) 2 R24-61;090B31ZR24-67, 0908312 Jun 67. fS€t- 2 R27-67, R27-67, 091422Z Jun 67. i'S€T (0 000) "Station"Station FacilitiesFacilities BookBook - U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 31 DecemberDecember 1966.1966. (S(8 CCO)66Q) P.L. 86-36 II2\NBI:':B YU eOl\HN'f €IUNNHIlS ONIlY CONFIDENTI....1. 71 SHCRET INDEX Addington, "Red,""Red," 2727 Cyprus AGTR, auxiliary general technical research ship. navigational restrictions for, 19, 19, 21 21 See U.S.S. LibertyLiberty Air Force Security Service.Service. See also Sigint units establishment ofof TechnicalTechnical ProcessingProcessing Dayan, Moshe, 3 CenterCenterl 118=1918-19 Deeley, Walter, 58 Al 'Arish,`Arish, 3,25,37,393, 25, 37, 39 Defense.. C()IIIDlU.nicatioIlsCommunications.. ~ystem,System, 2222 Algeria Department ofof Army Army CommunicationsCommunications Center.Center, 1 119 Pentagon ··EOEO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) Armstrong, LCDR PhilipPhilip M.,M., 27-28 communications errors,errors, 21-22 Arthur, CAPTCAPT Russell, Russell, 43 43 Deprey, LT Allan, 52 Doorman, Project. See National SecuritySecurity Agency,Agency, Projects DoormanDoorman and and Lifeblood Lifeblood Bennett, LTLT MauriceMaurice H., 17,17, 28-29, 28-29, 31, 31, 44, 44, 47 47 Durham, Billy,Billy, 55 Bishop, LCDR Benjamin M., 47 47 Blalock, DonaldDonald L.,L., 17, 26, 45, 48, 6464 Blue, Allen M.,M., 17, 26, 45, 64 EC-121 flights. See Sigint collection, airborne Bolstridge, Col LeslieLeslie J.,J., 59 el-Attassi, Nureddin,Nureddin, 111c=J-1 Breedlove, Maj, 21-2221-22 Electronic Security Command.Command. See Air Force Security ServiceService El-Kasir,El- Kasir, 38-41 C-130 flights. See Sigint collection,collection, airborne EUCOM, European Command.Command. See U.S. Commander-Commander Carter, LTGLTG MarshallMarshall S., 57-58,57-58, 6262 in-Chief, Europe; see also Lemnitzer, Castle, CDR ErnestErnest C., 32, 32, 34 34 GEN L.L. Central IntelligenceIntelligence AgencyAgency European SecuritySecurity Region.Region. See Air Force Security assessment of Israeli intentions, 64 Service Chernyakov, Yurij Niklolaevich,Niklolaevich, 32 CINCEUR. See U.S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, Europe; see also also Lemnitzer, GENGEN L. L.L. L. Firestone, LT Philip G., 47 47 CINCLANT. See Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fitzpatrick, RADM FrancisFrancis J.,J., 58 CINCUSNAVEUR. See U.S. NavalNaval ForcesForces Europe; Europe; FTMFI'M SystemsSystems Company,Company, 52-53 see also McCain, ADM JohnJohn S.,S., Jr. Collection. See Sigint collectioncollection Galavotti, LT E. L., 21 21 Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Garrett, ColCol William William A., 58 reluctance to use U.S.S. Belmont.Belmont, 62 Gaza Strip, 3 responsibility for Liberty, 15, 17 17 t0EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) Commander, Service Squadron 8, 17 17 EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . (d) COMSERFORSIXTHFLT, Commander, ServiceService Forces, Sixth Fleet. See Arthur, CAPTCAPT Russell Russell Golan Heights, 3 COMSIXTHFLT. See U.S. Sixth Fleet;Fleet; see also Goldberg, ArthurArthur J.,J., 2121 Martin, VADMVADM William William I. Golden, LT George, George, 35 Connell, John, 15, 20-21 20-21 Green, Lt ColCol Robert T., 4747 Cook, RADM RalphRalph E.,E., 58 Gulf of Aqaba, 3,3, 5, 23 23 Cowardin, Charles, 48 Coyne, Patrick, 58 CPA, closest closest point of approach.approach. See U.S.S. Liberty,Liberty, Hanley, CAPTCAPT M.M.J., J., Jr., 2121 navigational restrictions Harvey, Dick, 19-20 Cryptanalysis. See Sigint processing and reporting Helms, Richard, 64 Cwalina, Benjamin G., 55 Holleran, William M., 45 -REetter-SECRET 73 -sEeRET-SECRET INSCOMM, Intelligence and Security Command.Command. Lee, LT R. H., 4747 See Army Security AgencyAgency Lemnitzer, GEN L. L., 17. 17. See also U.S. Commander-Commander Intelligence requirements in-Chief, Europe Middle East tensions, 5 Lewis, LCDR DavidDavid E.,E., 15, 17 17 Six Day War, 5 Libya navigational restrictions for, 17 17 I I Iraq Lifeblood, Project. See National SecuritySecurity Agency,Agency, 1 1 Projects DoormanDoorman andand LifebloodLifeblood involvement inin SixSix DayDay War, 3 Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV),(LTV), 52"'::5352-53 1 1 Linguists. SeeSee Sigint processing andand reporting Israel acknowledgementof oferror error ofof attack,attack, 32 Martin,Marti:ri,VADMWilliaIlll.~2~,22, VADM William I., 20, 22, 43, 45, 6161 compensation paidpaid forfor attack,attack, 64 McCain, ADM JohnJohn S.,S., Jr;,17",18,43,47Jr., 17-18,=43, 47,,52 52 Department of State reaction to attack, 4141 McFarland,McFa,I'land.CTGTerryL., CTC Terry L., 26-27,26=27,29 29"`''ED1.4.(c)";'EO 1. 4 . Ie) I I McGonagle, CDR William L. involvement inin SixSix DayDay War,War, 3 actions during and immediately afterafter attack, 26-3126-31 Israeli DefenceDefence Forces Court of InquiryInquiry Congressional MedalofMedal of Honor award, 64 proceedings, 37-40, 47 proceedings, 37-40, 47 enrouteenroutetoellstern to eastern Mediterranean, 15, 20, 20, 23 23 military attack on the Liberty, 26-29, 37-40 McNamara, Robert S., 58 navigational restrictionsrestrictions for, 19-2219-22 McTighe, LTLT JohnJohn T.,T., 55 1 -----' Morocco 19 Johnson, GEN HaroldHarold K,K, 6262 1 119 Morrison, Brig Gen John, 5757 Johnson, Lyndon B. advised ofof attack,attack, 3232 requests CIA assessment, 64 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 1, 3 Joint ReconnaissanceReconnaissance Center. See U.S. Joint ChiefsChiefs National Military CommandCommand Center (NMCC),(NMCC), 32 of Staff National SecuritySecurity AgencyAgency Jordan actions takentaken asas result of attack, 32, 34, 34, 45, 45, 52, 52, I I 54-58 involvement inin SixSix Day War, 3 coordination withwith JCSJCS Fact Finding Team, 58-59 relations with PLO, 11 I I relations with U.A.R., 11 NSA Europe and Liberty, 17, 47, 52 52 ProjectsDoorman Doormanand andLifebl~ LifebloodrI Jorgensen, CDR C. G., 21-22 reaction toto IsraeliIsraeli PreliminaryPreliminary Inquiry,Inquiry, 41•41 reactions to Six Day War,5War, 5 P. L. 86-3686- 3 6 :E4gnew.Station··I'--"""":''::'"""Kagnew Station. _ relations with JointJoint ReconnaissanceReconnaissance Center, 15,15, 'EOo 1.1.4.(c)4. Ie) Keller, BGBG William,William, 52 19-2119:::21 Kidd, RADM I.I. C., 54 role in safety evaluations, 15, 19, 61-62 Kiepfer, LT Richard F.,F., 32,~2,35 35 technical control and support of TRS program,program, 15,15, II 17, 21 21 Klumfoot, Clarence R., 4747 Temporary Mid-East Information Group, 58, 61 61 Koczak, LCDR Edward, 58 National SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil Kosygin, Aleksei N. Special Committee and Liberty, 57-58 jVg;", Alekse' N. NavalNavalComeeunicatinnaStation Communications Station EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . Ie) EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . Id) Asmara, 19-20, 2222 Liberty, 32 Greece, 22 Morocco, 19, 22 22 Leahy, CAPT H.H. G., 43 43 Naval Security Group, EuropeEurope Lebanon communications assistanceassistance to Task Group 100.6, 100.6, 47 47 navigational restrictions for, 19 19 staff of Task GroupGroup 100.4, 100.4, 47 I I technical research ships, 43-44 74 Asfeiterf-SECRET IIANBtiH ·,'iA CO!'tflN'f CIIANNELS ONLY t42!ED 1.4.1.4.(c)Ie) -SECRET-BEeRHT O'Connor,LT LT JamesJames G.,G., 26-29 O'Malley, ENS.,ENS., 2828 Owen, CAPT WilliamWilliam D.,D., 58 Palestine LiberationLiberation OrganizationOrganization (PLO), 1 Pawlinkowski, CTCCTC AlfredAlfred J.,J., 47 6910th691Oth SecuritySecuritv Wing,Winlr.1 Pickett, MG G. B., 59 Platzek, CDR E.E. H., 4747 Precedence assignment in message traffic, 22 6931st SecuritySecurity Group.GrouPik Priddle, Maj Harlan E.,E., 58 6948th SecuritySecurity SquadronSquadron Renken, RADM HenryHenry A.,A., 47-48 Rhodes, CT3 PaddyPaddy E.E. (Dusty), 15, 26 26 Rostow, Walt, 32 Russ, MG JosephJosephR., R., 52,52, 54,58--6054, 58-60 Russell, LTC C.C. K.,K., 2121 Saudi ArabiaArabia conflict withwith U.A.R.,U.A.R., 1,/31, 3 I I 1 Security measuresmeasures file reduction atat exposedexposed sites,sites, 62--6362-63 /// minimizing compromise of Liberty's records, 43-45, 48, 51-52, 54-56 EO 1.4.(c)1. 4. Ie) E0EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . I d) rules for press coverage and interviews,interviews,48 48 surveillance of Soviet destroyers, 44 Sheck, Eugene, 19-20, 52 Shukairy, Ahmed, 11 Sigint alertsalerts Sigint Readiness Alfa, Middle East, 11 Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon,Crayon,3-5, 3-5, 11, 19 19 Sigint collectioncollection USN446,USN-446J 1airborneairborne,, 11-13,11-13, 1818 \\\ USN-855.USN-8M. See U.S.S. LibertyLiberty USN-856USN-856D Liberty's collection equipment, 16-17 Six Day Day WarWar EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . Ie) EO 1.4.(d)1. 4 . Id) intelligence requirementsrequirements generated by, 5 technical research ship program, 10, 13, 15, 5'7, 64 resume of,of, 1-4 U.S.U. S. navigationalnavigational restrictionsrestrictions resultingresulting from, 19 19 VHF/UHF, 6,6, 10-13 I I Smith, Bromley,Bromley, 58 Sigint communications,communications, 18-19 Smith, CAPTCAPT Carl M.,47, 55 1..."..,....,. _ (Pivy'LTGB.li:"Spivy, LTG B. E, 58 Sigint processingprocessing andand reportingreporting "",,,,,.,. !'EOEO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . Ie) I ITechnicalProcessingCentet,Technical Processing Center, 18:;;;1918-19 Comint on Liberty attack, 34-35 Syria II I..,...... ,...--.....,....,..."'"':':":"""-=--=-:--~ linguists, 17, 19, 23, 62 62 involvement inin SixSix Day War, 1, 3 NSA as as backupbackup processor,processor, 1818 navigational restrictionsrestrictions observedobservedby by U. U.S.,S., 19-20 technical reportingreporting byby Liberty, 23 relations with Peoples Republic of China, 11 HA~9I.E \qA €OMlN~ CIIANNBtlS ONtly SECRETSHCRHT 7575 -SEeRETSECRET- Syria (continued) reviews DODDOD messagemessage precedence usage, 60 I U.S. Department of State relations with U.S.S.R.,U.S.S.R., 1, 3 criticizes Israeli attack, 4141 I I U.S. EuropeanEuropean Command.Command. See U.S. Commander-in-Commander-in Chief, EuropeEurope Technical Processing Center (TPC)(TPC)I 118::~~,18719, U.S. JointJoint ChiefsChiefs of StaffStaff 62 ...... actionsactions-subsequent subsequent to Liberty attack, 3232 Technical research shipship specialspecial communicationscommunicationsrllrectioDlltoLibf!.rty, directions to Liberty, 17 s stem CO M , 16-18 Fact Finding`Team,FindingTeaU).~47tl>2, 47, 52, 54, 58-59, 61 system (TRSSCOMM!, 1..6- 18... JointFact ReconnaissanceReconnaissance Center;Center,54,J5,17, 15,58-59, 17, 2061 reaction to Six Day War, 2020 .... "',. safety evaluations,evaluations, 61-6261~2 EO 1.4.1. 4 . (c)(c) U.S. NavalNaval SecuritySecllritYGroup,58-59,62 Group, 58-59, 62 U.S.U·~·NaVYjEurope Navy, Europe actions subsequent to i"ibertyLiberty attack, 28-29,28-29, 3232 Ulino, Albert W., 45 I{moo, Albert W., 45 I activation of TF 100,100~ 4747 communicationscommunicationsdifficulty difficulty with Liberty, 20 convenesconvenes.Naval Naval Court of Inquiry, 4747 United Arab RepublicRepublic (U.A.R.) involvement inin actions to withdrawwithdraw Liberty, 21-23 charges of U.S.U.S.-U.K.-u. K complicitycomplicity with Israel in Liberty, 21-23 JCS Fact FindingFinding Team's visit, 5252 Six Day War, 3, 20 20 navigational restrictions, 1919 IL.:----:------~.."."...... - operational controlcontrol ofof Liberty, 17-18, 2020 involvement inin SixSix DayDay War, 3 U.S. Navy Navy Ships EngineeringEngineering Center, 5252 navigational restrictions observed byby U.S.,U.S., 19-2219-22 U.S. Navy Navy Task Force 60, 28 relations with Jordan, 11 U.S. Navy Navy Task ForceForce 63, 32 32 relations with U.U.S.,S., 3 U.S. Navy Navy Task ForceForce 100, 100, 47-48, 5252 relations withwith U.S.U.S.S.R.,S.R., 1, 3 U.S. Navy Navy Task GroupGroup 100.3, 47-48 rivalry with Saudi Arabia, 1, 3 U.S. Navy Navy Task GroupGroup 100.4, 47-48 I U.S. Navy Navy Task GroupGroup 100.6, 100.6, 47 47 Yemen actions, 1-2 U.S.N.S. Muller. See Sigint units U.S.N.S M U l..l..er See Sigint unitsl United Nations U.S.N.S. Valdez. See Sigint units United Nations 31,33.4~ 44,48~--- actions during Six Day War, 3-4 U.S.S.U.S. S. America, 31, 33,_43-44, 48 Middle East peace-keepingpeace-keeping attempts,attempts, 1 U.S.S. Belmont, 15, 43-44, 57, 62 I I u.S.S.···Davisi···42~44,··47U. S. S. Davis, 42-44, 47 ·EO4E421.4. 1.4. (c) United States U.S.S. Georgetown, 15 AID personnel inin Yemen imprisoned, 1-3 U.S.S. Jamestown, 15. SeeSee Sigint units I relations with U.A.R., 3 U.S.S.U.S.S.~ibf!rty Liberty '------support of Israel, 11 armament of, 16 16 U.S.U. S. Army Army CommunicationsCommunications Support Unit.IUnit.1 attack onon 26-3026-30 I i 1..- _ attempts toto withdraw,withdraw, 21-2321-23 U.S. Chief, Chief, NavalNaval OperationsOperations (CNO)(CNO) awards for, 64 Norfolk surveysurvey team,team, 55-56 communications of,of, 16-17, 19-2019-20 recommends withdrawal ofof Liberty, 21 damaged equipment assessment, 52-54 U.S. Commander-in-Chief,Commander-in-Chief, EuropeEurope deployment toto easterneastern Mediterranean, 15,15, 17-2217-22 actions subsequent to Liberty attack, 31,31, 45, 45, 47 47 Israeli post-attack reconnaissance,reconnaissance, 30-3130--31 actions to withdrawwithdraw Liberty, 21 JCS Fact FindingFinding Team's visit, 5454 JCS Fact FindingFinding Team's visit, 5252 navigational restrictions, 17, 19, 21-2221-22 operational controlcontrol ofof Liberty, 1717 operational control of, 15, 17, 20, 20, 22 22 U.S.U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, post-attack documentdocument disposition,disposition, 32 Appropriations Committee press coverage, 48, 52 reviews communicationscommunications problems during Liberty rationale for eastern MediterraneanMediterranean incident, 59-6059~0 deployment, 5, 12-1312-13 76 SE€RE'f' SHeREi' U.U.S. S. S. Liberty (continued)(continued) U.S.S.R. safety factors,factors, considerationconsideration of, 19-20, 61-62 relations with Middle EasternEastern countries, 1, 3 Sigint mission of,of, 15-17, 19,19, 23 23 I I E0EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) Sixth FleetFleet rescuerescue operation,operation, 43-4743-47 Six Day War involvement,involvement, 4, 19 19 USN Attache in Tel Aviv Aviv as intermediary, 3434 U.S.S. Little Rock,Rock, 31, 43, 52 52 Vance, Cyrus, 32 32 U.U.S.S. S. S. Massey, 43-44 Vineyard, CAPT MerriwellMerriwell W., 21 21 U.S.S. Oxford, 15-2015-20 U.S.S. Papago, 32, 35, 43-45,43-45, 47-4847-48 U.S.S. Saratoga, 28-29, 31-3231-32 Way, CT3 Clyde W., 27, 29 29 U.S. SixthSixth FleetFleet Wheeler, LTG EarleEarle G., 21, 21, 59 actions taken in reaction to attack, 28-29,28-29, 31-32,31-32, Wilson, RobertRobert L.,L., 17, 25-27, 29, 36, 44, 44, 51 51 34 indications of possible hostilehostile intent,intent, 2020 JCS Fact FindingFinding Team's visit, 5252 Yemenmen Yr navigational restrictions, 19-20,19-20, 3131 EO 1.4.(c)1. 4 . (c) operational controlcontrol ofof Liberty, 17, 19-2019-20 U.A.R. intervention, 11 Sigint direct support of,of, 1111 Yerushalmi, Lt Col Col Yishaya,Yishaya, 3737 T5-JunTS-Jun 8181-53-3475-S3-3475 IIANBI:iH YIA eOl\HN'I' eIIANNIH~8 ON~¥ SECRETSHeRBT 7777