~ep SEeRB~-

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Approved for Releas signed: Date: 02-Jul-2003

~,6'f ftf3t.f3~*Bt.f3'f6 Peftf316~,~,~'fle~,,~I:B ~Wli I)O~~~~ji~ ~O~!'!'_Y~li~ogi~rgRg ~.~'_:;iRI_~

Classified by NSA/CSSM 123-2 Review in April 2011

Tep SEeRET Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director, NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Office of Cryptologic Archives and History, T54.

~

j

) 1f9P SB6RB!I! H~.IBH.~

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series Crisis Collection Volume 1

William D. Gerhard Henry W. Millington

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1981

~;ell3 RHI.H*S*B~B 1139P9RBI8~~ ...~~fFl9...:.\LS

~ep 8B8RB~ H~.~R UNCLASSIFIED (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Contents ~ i Page ! , ! vii :f ix i t, f ::::~o~:::~:=::::~~:~;::::::::::::::::::~Chapter I POLlTIC~Mn.lTARY , B~CKGROUND", (U) 1 1

f t Chapter II CONSmERATIONS LEADING TO THE SHIP'S DEPLOYMENT (U) 5 ~ I ; { ~ 1__\--~--~:-::~E;e~~-~ i The Technical Requirements Collection'Factors f~r Intelligence (U) (U) ':::: ':::::--:: : 5 I 6 6 10 i 10 i ; ; j f Chapter U.S.S. Abidjan AUborne Air The Liberty Force III Decision Liberty's at to Collectors DEPLOYMENT Security Rota, Rota, to Deploy Modus 31 24-31 Service's (U) ; May the May Operandi to TO 2 Technical Liberty 1967 June THE (U) (U) 1967 (U) MEDITERRANEAN Processing (U) Center (U) (U) ~: 11 12

15 15 17 17 18

Chapter Enroute Operational Directions Liberty's IV to THE Processing to Operational Area Withdraw ATrACK(U) ,, Three, Mission Area the 8 June Liberty (U) Three (U) : (U) : (U) 19 21 23 23 25 Chapter U.S. Chronology Israeli Israeli Reconnaiaaance VVaahington Johnson Explanation Israel Air Torpedo-~t Post-Attack Sixth Liberty General Liberty V Attack Naval Fleet Reports Pr~ecutor's Helicopter THE Recovers Licks LDforms Quarters Begins of Attache ~act8 Informed Reexamined Reconnaissance ISRAELI Its Israeli Attack Error of ~ygin VVounda (U) Conversations Drill the (U) Charges (U) Helicopters Actions (U) (U) Liberty (U) EXPLANATION (U) (U) (U) of (U) (U) Negligence (U) to (U) the Liberty (U) (U) (U) : ~ ~- 25 25 26 28 30 31 ; i 32 ~ 32 ;, 32 32 ¥ \ 34 1 34 ~ 35 ~ 37 37 38 40

Chapter Replacement Medical Commander, V I Assistance RECOVERY Inquiries Sixth Fleet (U) AND (U) Arrives INITIAL (U) ASSESSMENT (U) 43 43 43 .! 43 ! ~ t i j i UNCLASSIFIED ill ~ ~ f, lib) 11) nib) (3)-50 USC 403[lib) UNCLASSIFIED 13) -18 USC 798 'lIb) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Page

Chapter Chapter Bibliography Illustrations Command FTeparations Damage JCS Accounting The File Assistance Unanswered Recovery Blalock Clearing Liberty's Joint Denouement Cleanup Evacuation Safety Availability Congreasional Comm VIII VII JCS Reduction NSA fact Survey unica Eatimates Returns Continues Survey (U) Damaged (U) of Arrival Review Finding THE Review Investigations to A tions of for Sensitive of Queations (U) at at NSA FINAL Review VVilson Linguista Classified for INCmENT Norfolk ~ta at Home Problems at (U) and for Team's Exp~ed AJeas ~ta Personnel~eet":_JL+ (U) Malta LOOK Collection Materials (U) (U) Reaction (U) (U) (U) (U) ~Gj Initiated Material (U) (U) Intemewa (U) Collectora UNDER (U) -' Missiona (U) (U) ! (U) (U) ---~.1__J.~ ~-+--- l_L___L (U,)! ~~___l~ l-t--tr ~-~--~~ ~~W ~ tr-1t ---~-+ ~+--+~ (U) ~~-~~ ~~-4~ H-~~ ~~J+- 4c~~ UJ+ +~~t -~~ of 4~ ~+ LL 1..:' L Mobile (U) Platforms (U) « 45 45 47 47 48 48 51 51 52 52 54 55 57 57 58 59

61 61 62 62 62 63 64 67

Maps

FTojected EC-121 and Track C-130 of Liberty Aircraft on Collectipn 8 June 1~8 QQQ.~ (U) Rout;es IE~8 -~ = (e-eeO, QQQ ~~j 6 7 12 30

Photographs i I

U.S.S. U.S.S. Scorched DanLaged U. ~ual-Inorse F4 Israeli Liberty's DaBsault Egyptt Sigint Liberty S" PhantoIn S" " analysts Motor Little America Papago, Liberty Docked ~irage Antenna Starboard Gun Ftghter Torpedo Rock Positions I ~ount (U) in (U) Ocean Jet ~a, Configuration (U) U.S.S. of BoInber (U) (U) Boat Liberty Tug I Spain (U) (U) (U) (U) (U) j ~8e8T-= ! L ke e68~ 2 8 9 16 18 26 27 29 31 33 34 35 38

an Sht " p EI -Kasl"

, r (U) 40

iv UN CLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

Page ! Vice ~n~d ~anu~-morse Helicopter Dish Inspection Sijpnt Navy Commander Liberty Admir~ Antenna Divers Equipment Davi. 1. Arrivine in of Malta BI~ock Evacuating William Recover Torpedo-Damaged Martin (V) on P~itions in Liberty (V) Ruined (V) ~~ta 1. Classified Visit. Liberty's ~cGonagle Destroyed (U) by (V) V.S.S. Liberty Torpedo Debris Wounded Hull ~e (U) (U) (U) Blast~8 eeet (U) (U) ee~ 40 ,), ~2 « i 45 46 ,I 48 1 ~9 1I 50 1 51 .1 53 ~ 54 :: 55

i;

.!

~ I ! .i

1 t I

I UNCLASSIFIED v ! Si~Ri~-

Foreword

E8 889~ The Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty some 14 years ago was, indeed, a wrenching experience for U.S. Sigint agencies. The l~, particularly in the case of those Sigint specialists who gave their lives or were wounded, was difficult to accept. The knowledge that the tragedy resulted not only from Israeli miscalculation but also from faulty U.S. communications practices was even more difficult to accept. ~S-ee6) The passageof time has made it possible for the authors to reexamine the Liberty incident objectively and answer a number of persistent questions. The authors accordingly set forth the technical rationale for the Liberty mission, the particulars of the Israeli miscalculation, the details of the American communications failures, a narrative of the attack and of attempts to minimize the compromise of cryptologic materials, and the lessons to be learned from the event. E~ 889! Finally, this is also an account of the way the U.S. Sigint agencies organized their response to requirements brought on by a crisis situation. As such, it has much to offer the student of U.S. cryptologic operations. . ,~ E8 888" A word about the authors, who worked on this project part time after they had I, retired. An experienced operations officer and research specialist, Mr. Gerhard headed the NSA- ~ SCA Task Force that produced the Southeast Asia History Series, as well as the Special Research ~ .. ~ Element that produced studies of Sigint crisis situationslb).. (3)-P.L. 86-36whospent most of his .., career in research and documentation activities, was for years in charge of the NSA Library.

Vincent J. Wilson, Jr. Chief, Cryptologic History and Publications Staff

8i~Ri~ vii UNCLASSIFIED

Authors' Note

Many people contributed to the completion of this history. The authors gratefully acknowledge the efforts of members of the NSA History and Publications Staff who offered substantive suggestions and labored over publication format and preparation.. -Vincent J. Wilson, Jr., Chief; Henry Schorreck, Historian~{b){3)-P.L. 86-361Editor; an(b,,(3)-P.L. 86-.36:ecretary.Robert D. Farley, of the History Staff, spent many hours arranging for and conducting interviews of personnel intimately associated with the Liberty incident. In turn, I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 I painstakin I transcribed the interview tapes. To (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Cryptologic Records Declassification Staff, we are indebted for his security classification review. Both Bob Rush, Electronic Security Command, and James Gilbert, Intelligence and Security ColIlmand History Staff generously provided useful source materials from their collections. ; ~

I: , I. William D. Gerhard I (b) (3}-B.L. 86-36 I 8 December 1980 i I.I

I

f

~ L

I UN CLASSIFIED ix I t

r 8fieRHif

Chapter I

(U) A brief look at the Middle Eastern (U) The United States supported the situation during early 1967 is necessaryfor an appre- United Nations' efforts to maintain peace in the area ciation of the mounting political and military tensions and, while championing the right of the State of Israel that ultimately led to the U.S. decision to p~ition to exist, urged restraint and respect for the rights of the U.S.S. Liberty in the eastern Mediterranean. all nations. (U) Since the mid- 195Soviet Union and Communist China were quick to take ship by the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.' advantage of unsettled conditions there to extend their In late January 1967, when U.A.R. aircraft bombed own influence over governments wherever p~sible - Najran in Saudi Arabia, relations between the two often competing with one another in this effort. countries were further strained. In Yemen, the U.A.R. supported the insurgents against the Royalists. Jordan, (U) By the end of the 195~ the Chinese trying to keep from becoming embroiled in Israeli- Communists had begun to assert themselves, especially Arab frictions, ordered in March a halt to Arab in Iraq and Syria. In May 1966,Syria's new president, infiltration into Israel through Jordanian territory as Nureddin el-Attassi, scoffed at waging a conventional well as a cessation of Palestine Liberation internal war against Israel and urged what he called a "people's agitation against the Jordanian Government. war of liberation," Chinese-Communist style. 1 The i- (U) Between January and April 1967, the " head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), '" Syrian-Israeli frontier was the scene of a series of .I Ahmed Shukairy, also admitted to receiving Chinese J escalating clashesranging from potshots at tractors to aid. PLO representatives had been sent to Vietnam exchangesof fire between tanks, artillery, and aircraft. ;i and communist China to observe communist guerrilla Both sides refused, at different times, to permit the techniques, and PLO troops were receiving arms from Communist China. J United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission to mark the armistice line at disputed points and insisted on (U) As for the Soviets, they had particular farming and patrolling disputed areas.~ cause for not wishing to see the Syrian Government ~S88e! On 7 April 1967, a Syrian-Israeli clash humiliated, defeated, and, perhaps, overthrown. The escalated from an exchange of fire between tanks to increasingly radical Syrian Governments which had attacks by both Syrian and Israeli aircraft. By the assumed power since the beginning of 1966 had come end of the day, Israeli planes had appeared over the to rely more and more on Soviet military and economic outskirts of Damascusand six Syrian planes had been aid, to permit increasing numbers of Soviet advisers shot down. This event triggered a Sigint Readiness to be stationed in the country, and all in all to offer ..AIfa" called by NSA for Middle East targets. The the most promising field (or Soviet penetration and AIfa was terminated three days later.6 influence in the Middle East. The Soviets genuinely fa eee! As the tempo of the civil war within feared massive Israeli retaliation that might topple Yemen increased, U.A.R. aircraft dropped poison-gas the Syrian Government; they therefore spurred the bombs on Yemeni Royalists on 22 April. Later that Egyptians on to vigorous counteraction, the full reper- month when the Yemeni Government imprisoned two cussions of which they could not foresee.J Americans from the Agency for International Devel-

II.'.:-~BJJB','11. ee:'.ffiilf elIMi~iBI.S e:','t¥ 8BGRB~ 1 N ~ t=: Z 'Z n ~ t'" ~ 00 i ~- 5 ~ ~ ~ t:1

(U) The V.S.S. Lib"rty was eommissioned in ~ay 1945 as a vietory ship and later eonverted into a technieal research ship (December 1964). She had an overall length of 455 feet. a maximum speed of 18 knots with an allowable personnel complement of 9 officers and 151 enlisted men along with an additional 6 officers and 128 enlisted men from the Naval Security Group.

(Photograph courtesy of the Department of the Navy.) (FifO"" UNCLASSIFIED) -8BeR~~ -

Israel had complete mastery of the sky having virtually destroyed four Arab air forces.'\ i ! From 11-14 May. U.A.R. aircraft at- ,~ ~~Qj Forty-five minutes after the launching of the Israeli air offensive, Israeli troops started their [~:C:~d_~ownaln__~aUdiAr:bi:~r-- crusbing ground attack against U.A.R. forces in the ~S ~88j! ! When on 14 !May the U.A.R. placed Sinai. fu the Gua Strip, Israeli ground forces took its air de£en~ unita on full alert and deployed its Rafah and Khan Yunus. Meanwhile tank columns tactical n~iyal!units, NSA expanded its Alfa to ~mbrace raced thirty miles west into the Sinai to capture AI all Middl-i E~t targets. q ! ,! .Arish. With this rapid spread lof hostilities. NSA I (U) !! On 17 M~y, the U.A.R. !requested instituted a Sigint ReadinessAIf~ I that the iUnited Nations! Emergency Forcie (UNEF) ;1 r4,,;! withdraw Ifr~m the Gaza !Strip. The U.1't: complied, i! (U) On Tuesday,;6 June, U.A.R. President and Na8S~r fn\mediately ~egan moving tr~ps into the II Nasser, charging that U.~; and British planes had Sinai. This i decision by! the U.A. R. gOvernment -"I intervened in the war on;the side of Israel, cl~ed the presuma~ly! encouraged !by the Soviet:' and Syrian~' Suez Canal to all ship'ping and severed diplomatic -to moye 'its armed fQrces up to the Sinai armistice relations with the "U.S. In turn, the U.S. broke line thU$ teestablish~ the direct !ii:gyptian-Isr~~li diplomatic ties wit~;Cairo. military ! c~nfrontation/ which had ,been the ~~jor (U) 9Ii the battlefield, Israeli tank col- immediate icause of th;'e 1956 war. 1°,,' ;' umns advancedtoward the Suez Canal on three major IS 8Seji ! Five ~ays later on ,23 May 1~7, the fronts: through Al .Arish toward AI Qantarab in the U.A.R. ~lqckaded th~ Strait of Tiran, thereby' cl~ing the Gulf Or Aqaba to Israeli shipping and prohibiting north; through Abu 'Uwayjilah along the central route toward Ia1i1ailia; and to Al Qusaymah on the southern unescorted tankers! of any flag from re~~hing the route. Farther south, other columns advanced to AI Israeli port of ElatC This action reproduced another Kuntillah in the Sinai. element that had brought on, the 1956 war. Because Israel had repeatedly asserted that she would go to (U) Operating against the Jordanian war if the U.A.R blocked the Gulf, NSA raised its forces, Israeli troops captured the cites of Janin, Alfa to a Sigjnt Readines~ "Bravo Crayon" for all !Qalqilyah, and Ram Allah and took the high ground Middle! East communicatioris.11 ! north of Jerusalem on 6 June. (U); The U.A.R. blockade precipitated (U) On 7 June, Israeli units swept across quiet but full-scale mobiliZation by Israel. Arab forces the Sinai to advance within eighteen miles of the Suez were repositioned, and QD 30 May Egypt and Jordan Canal in the north and reached toward the Mitla Pass , in the south. Other Israeli forces captured Ash Shar- signed a five-y~ar military, alliance,, completing Arab encirclement of Israel. Shortly,thereafter, Soviet naval mah at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, breaking the blockade at the Strait of Tiran. Also on the 7th, vessel~! ente~ed,~ the.'' Med~terranean th~ough the Dardenelles. j I' / II Israel gained control of the Gaza Strip plus the West (U) !! ! On ,1 Junci, as pressure; to open the Bank of the Jordan River. The Jordanian army and Strait pf Tiran bu~it witpin Israel, MIsraeli air force time both sides agreed, on 10 June, to observe the conqb~tr;:a~~ ~ U.A.R. targets, the remaining Israeli U. N. ceaae-fire, the entire southwestern corner of jets!! ~atcJ~ ~60rdinated attacks against airfields in Syria was in Israeli hands, including the Golan Heights Jor4~n:;!gyiia, and Iraq. Israeli raids against Arab air which dominated Israeli territory in the Jordan Valley basMf.e?z1tinued throughout 5 June and by nightfall and around the Sea of Galilee. ~i!f!,! II.R":BI:B'.q.~ ee:.H~iIf effMi~,etS 6~it.¥ Si~H~~3 (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 -(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 -'- 8B~BB~

fs-eee~ On this same day, when the Soviet 'IV) CharlesW. Y~t, "The Arab-laraeli War; How representative to the U.N. threatened direct Soviet It Beran," For~i,n AHoirl, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968),p. 31a. intervention if the Security Council did not halt the 'IV) The United Areh Republicwe. formed in 1958 with the union of EcYPtaDd Syria and th~n diaeolvedin September -;-fighting, NSA extended Bravo "Crayon') 1961.Even thoughthe unionwe. diaaolVed,Egypt w.. .till ref~rred :=]5 A ceaae-nre, negotl- to AI the U.A.R. until 2 September1971 when the nam~ waa ! ated by the U.N., finally went into! effect and all changedto the Arab Republic of Egypt. In thia hiatory V.A.R. ia usedthrouChout to meanEiYPt. ! h~tilitie8 ceased at 1830 hours M~-East time on slVJ IbM!, p. 300. f Saturday, 10 June 1967. ! "8 8891 NSA (P2), "Sicint Readin- Bravo Crayon Critique,"!fb) 13)-P.L. 86-361y 1968,p. 8. 'IV) Ibid. 'IV) Ibid. Notes! '(VI Ibid. Sourcedocument. are in the "Cri.is Collection"01 the NSA History '.IV) CharlesW. Y~t, "Th~ Arah-Israeli War; How Collection. ! It SeiaD," Forei". ARair., vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan 1968),p. 319. ",C CCQj NSA IP2), "Sicint Readineae Bravo Crayon Critique,"I(b) !3)-P.L. 86-361y 1968, p. 8. '(U) Theodore Draper. j.rael GIld World Politic.. "(V) Ibid. Viking Pre", New York, 1968, p. 35. ! "(V) IbM!,p. 9. '(V) HAl K~ut, editor! I.r~l GIld t~ Arab.: Thr JUM 1967 War. Fact. on Fila, New ~ork, 1968, p. 32. "(V) Ibid. IsIU) IbM!.

(b) 13) (bl (1) (b) 13)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) -so USC 403 Ib) 13)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) 13)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

- H-A---:DLR'.~_A- (;Q~.II~;; 61~":;~~LB 9:-~¥

J

4-8B~KE:t ~ep BB~Ri~

Chapter II

-~S GG9j- Looking back upon the Liberty inci- dent today, Americans might well question why the U.S. introduced an intelligence ship into a war theater in which Americans were not direct participants and exp~e that ship to the risk it did. The decision to - deploy, it should be noted, came before the Six Day War erupted. It came after careful NSA consideration of customer requirements for intelligence from this troubled region, of technical factors which would govern the collection of Middle East communications, and of the need to develop technical Sigint data in the event future U. S. involvement in Middle East h~tilities should bring a requirement to support U. S. forces. The NSA decision to request the Liberty's deployment on 23 May, the day it raised its Sigint readiness condition to Bravo-Crayon, was, moreover, only one of many actions taken to improve Sigint collection, proceaaing, and reporting in the critical weeks before the Six Day War as the NSA action office, G6, began a round-the-clock Sigint operation at Fort Meade.'

The Requirements for Intelligence (U)

~ee) The long-standing Middle East tension had produced a growing requirement from U.S. intel- ligence users for information on a number of military

of informationI from .sigint, and it is up to the Sigint'. to t~a:nalatetheir .I requIrements mtoI collection ~d processing actionsl

,iff ;' , ..'1:;;~--5 H.,-~;DI.B~~... se:.miql el:"':~,B~8 e-;::.~

(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403,b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

I-:ies-fS-eee, 'f6P 8B6RB~

j 1 J .! i . -~-~e~ (~'i,..,..u~~ I

Technical ;COllection Factors (U)

~CO~ ~

~~~t= 1.r = =--

" ""

r/' -E1I18-eeO/j~ l._-\ Rg:~~:gF--"J

,.- -'~i S8er

,.. ,... 6 -~9B::§Be~~:"-'-'" 1:'\l'::::~B ~":.~89:.=:':' 811.\1'::::11.8g:"~¥ (b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~ I ~gp 8BgRB!F 6~.mti ! f i t i ~ ~ .I "

!-,~ j ~"'/ I

II ~.! !/ !.I;! ,

!f9P SBGRB!f~~.IB~_~ ; (b) (1) :-:9'9:-":: (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 ,. t

,.."

,

...,.'

'.

8 (bl (11 (bl (3) -50 USC 403 (bl (3) -18 USC 798 ;4\j (bl (3)-P.L. 86-36

~""" ~ IbJ 13)-50 USC 403 Ib) 13) -18 USC 798 !bJ,,13,!-l':,L. 8~:-36 ~ep 8B8RBIfH:.fB~~ \ \ '\ """ """', i ,.\ "". """"" \ \ U~~.lDtercept"ot,YHF/UHF \ \, "~mmu~icatioDB(P> \ \" '... "", ""'""" ~B~,eeJ " S1DceDorm'&1reception oi"Vf:IF/UHF co~UDica~i0D8depends on a l~-of-e. ht relationahi .'

, " , , I BucceaBfulcollection of VHF/UHF com- munl~tlonB depended ~. intercept b~r---, Bites locat~ near the tranamlttera and by .ubome ~ollec- tors ~hich could By orbita .~ their .vicinity. CI~e-in \interc~pt facilitiea located pr~.fer~iy within ground- \wave 4iatance of tranamittera .~re also a prerequisite, ~o e~ective intercept 9C"' )ow-powered HF \ ~mm~icationB. """'... ~e~ ~ ~J \ Sigint co.llectora ha~ gradually in- \ Creased their knowledge'"of Middle East VHF/UHF \ cbmmubicationJ. HF ccimmunicationa Occasionally re- \ C~rred :0 other communications in the VHF \~es. ...

-~8-eeej-

.l~~-e) -~~8 ~~g ~~~! ~-~8-ee8-~iP!I

.~~~ - ~..,

--'-"

-"" .-.

(b) (1) 10 '9P SB8RB!fH:.m~~ -:-~9P9ft:~~ (b) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) 11) (b) (3)-18 USC 798 Ib) 13) -50 U5C 403 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 j Ib) 13)-18 U5C 798 -(b) 13)-P.L. 86-36 ---~

~ !F9PBieRi!!! H:.IBaA

I Ii C7 ~ Electrical communicationsbetween INSCOM detachmentaand their parent INSCOM organization,the U.S. Army CommunicationsSupport Unit, as well as their communicationswith NSA, were via U.S. Army Strategic CommunicationaCommand facilities, off-line, and encryptedon KL-7A equipment usingthe Adoniasystem (KAK-199). !~i SS8 ~iP' I -tIi18-eeOr-

£~~~J r--, ;:;- Airborne Collectors (U) ~:t:86 ~fPj

!~seee-~~~ I --;

~~8 QQe~~iP1f r (b) (1), :-:8P8R:-: 1f9P SHeRE!!!B~.IB~~ 11 (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P .L. 86-36 ~9P 8~E;R~!FY~.m?~

..1 ,-) "\ ... .,.. SRAEL USN ..r

II t.- ')

0 R ..0 A-

../) . I S R A . SUEZ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

te-eee, After NSA declared a Sigint Readiness condition for the eastern Mediterranean. collection ftights of the EC-121 and C-130 aircraft were increasedto once daily instead or the usual eight ftights a month. (Fi8ure i- eB::r:~Be-'.~~-~lo ~~g,

producingComint responsiveto requirements,partic- ularly th~e relating to the U.A.R. and to merchant .shipping.' -I

~ "'e7- --1 , ' :L1 ,,~~~g'May and early June 1967, the u.~ ~jgiJ1t'organization performed moderat~ly "f """",,:::~~~~:::::W1its existing ground and air collection I~/! ,...;::;;;;:::,,"'"";"12~9P BBeftBIf f:f:.tBti [ 1'

(b) (1) (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 -.'"

...33°-3Z~ (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-50 USC 403 ---(b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 ,"', " .. " i\ "'\ "'" ""'" !F9PSieRi" ti:.fBti

Arab countries would break diplomatic relations with ~-~._~. and that,1 I

. ~~~~;ii~ ~~'-! "...:... i --

E~S-eee)i For consistent, cl~-in intercept, Sig- int 8peci~liatadecided that the 88signmentof a collec- " tion 8h;jp to work offshore from the U.A.R. W88in """"""~rder.!iItwas natural that they would decide upon IhipbOme collection. A technical research 8hip (TRS) was;I""~ccording to one estimate at the time, the equivalent of 13 airborne collectors and, besides that, ~u more "ec9nomical to operate than the airborne collectors.I' 1Ii"~ddition to tasks such as sustained I :.: ", /collection as in the case of U.S.N.S. Muller I ~~8 SSQj NSA conSidered the cat~gorie8 9( Mid- dle East communications for which the existing collec- tion organization was either inadequate or for which! I the special ships were it offered small promise folsustained intercept.! prepared by design for qulCXreaction to exigencies of one kind or another. II is See! Choice of a ship for the Mediterranean narrowed between the U.S.N.S. Valdez/~ , then near Gibraltar, and the Liberty in port at Abidjan, Ivory Coast. NSA ch~e the Liberty because she had superior speed (18 knots va. 8 knots for Valdez), because her VHF/UHF multichannel collec- tion capability was better, and becauseshe was,unlike ISigint . Valdez, at the beginning of a deployment.!9 NSA accordingly requested the Joint Chiefs of StamJoint collectIon managers concluded that the :tbeD existing , ReconnaissanceCenter (JCS/JRC) on 23 May 1967 to collection organization would be able; ~t: ~~t~ only to divert the Liberty to the Mediterranean. make a moderate response to m~y;'of.-t~~~jptelligence requirements in view of technit;a1 ~i~~iOn8 in the collection of VHF/UHF comm~i~at;ion.;t ""... Notes ~~8 eee~ -In the case of ;t~~ ,~irp(;rPe co~ectors, the Sigint planners felt that ~h~ .ve~age\orbit ijme of Sourcr documrntl arr in thr "Cri,iI Colkction" of the NSA Hietory the C-1308 and EC-121s -a;b~i ~y~ holirs on station Collection. after allowing for time to ~d/(to~'orbit:areas -:...was too 8hor.t for the 8u8tained/;~fiec:tion desired. ""'\ I(UJ NSA Staff, "Fact ShHt for DIRNSA,"uDdated. (U) Expansion!,°' ~bome ct>llection -~ '16 6691 NSA Staff, "Critique-Sigint Readin- Bravo a p~ibility, but additio~4;~!tcraft in s~cient num~ Crayon," 10 July 1968,pp. 31-47, hereafter cited "Critique-SRB berg would be difficult ~~!'~tain, and t~ere was the\, Crayon" and NSA Staff, "Report to the Director, N8A: V.8.S. Liberty CAGTR.o),~ May-8 JUlIe1967," 12 JUlIe 1967,pp. 1-4, consideration of downt~~;::tor maintenaIi~e which for ""'" aircraft was greater t1i~;:tor other platf6"ms.I' , hereaftercited "Report to the Director, NSA." JCU) "R.port to the Director, NSA," p. 1. -iIPS-eee ~~j In th~';~~8e of ther--1sites, Sigint oJ,Seeej- Informal information from NSA Staff Officer, planners considered;!;~heir fixed' JOCatlo'n8and the '1 (June 1980). -'CV) NSA Staff, "Operation. St;tf Summary,"ca- resulting confineme~f/ of their VHF/UHF intercept to 16 Jun 1967. line-of-sight diatan~~s from those locations. They also 'CU) NSA CG62), "Brieq OD 1967 MiddJe But correctly anticipa~d that, in the event of war, certain Crail," UlIdateddocumenti "Report to the Director,NSA," Tab C. (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 :-~epe! ~ 1f8P SBeRB'f ~~'flBti 13 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

! e9~:PIBB~;IFI~

'(U) John R. RaamulOD, A Hi,tory of Ka,n.ru I'(U) NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection ill the Middle Station and Am.rican Forc~. in Eritr,a, 25 May 1973. Eut," undated; NBA Staff, "Operatiom Staff Summary," ea. 16 "(U) Kacnew Station, Ottice of Operetiona, Annual Jun 1967; "Report to the Director, NSA," p. 2; "Critique-SRB Hiltorical R.port. FY 1967, vol. n ; "Critique-SRB Creyon," pp. Creyon," pp. 17.18. 11-12,20. "IU) NSA Staff, "Operatiom Staff Summary," ca. '(U) NSA StaB', "OperetioDi St&iI Sum~ry," ce. 16 Jun 1987. 16 Jun 1967; "Critique.sRB Creyon," pp. 20, 37. 'flU) NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," un. 1°(UJ Electronic S~curity Command, Hiltory of th~ dated; "Report to the Director, NSA," Tab A; "Critique-SRB 69318t &curity Group, 1 Jan-30 Jun 1961, pp. 8-9, 16, 6~2, 78, Crayon," pp. 16.17. Interview with CeDe Sheck, 11 AUK 1980, p. 2- 88, 92; "Critique.sRB Crayon," p. 21. .IAfG1- U.S. Army CommunicatiODa Support Unit, I'(U) Juli~ Alger, "A Raview of the Technical Ra- AnllUGl Hi.torical Repart, FY 1967, vol. 1; (U) "Critique-SRB .earch Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970; Interview with Gene Crayon," pp. 12.14, Sheck, 11 AUI 1980, p. 5. "(U) NSA Staff, "Fact Sheet for DffiNSA," ~ u.S. Army Communicationa Support Unit, undated. Annual Hi.torical R~port, FY 1961, vol. I, 1 Oct 1967; (U) "(U) Julie Aller, ..A Review of the Technical Re. "Critique.sRB Crayon," pp. 12-1.; (U) "Raport to the Director, March Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970. NSA," Tabl A and B. "(U) "Critique-SRB Crayon," p. 18.

14 S9~~IBH~~~A.!. BHeRB!f SP9KB

Chapter III

~-t- With Sigint unit USN-855 on board, "through the naval component commander to a specific the V.S.S. Liberty had been in operation for two years fleet or force commander." In May 1967, the U.SoS. and four months when NSA sent its messageto the Liberty, an auxiliary general technical research ship JCS asking for deployment of the Liberty to the (AGTR) was operating under the control of the Com- Mediterranean. During this time it had undertaken mander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The TRS commanding of- five separate missions off the west coast of Africa to ficer was Commander William L. McGonagle. ~~ ~~QI The JCS also specified that technical control of Sigint activities was to be exercised by the Director, National Security Agency via direct com- ship munication to the ships or through the Director, Naval had executed a Dumber of difficult tasks .,'- locating Security Group. A collection assignment, the JCS new communications. I stated further in its 1965 message, would take into account technical factors as determined by NSA and safety factors as determined by military operational ~8 6881 Other U.S. Sigint ship& at th~ time - commanders. . included the U.S.S. Oxford and Jame~iown i~!South- !S SS8! Liberty's Sigint detachment, USN-855, east Asia, the U.S.S. Georgetown and Befmoni' in therefore, came under the technical control of the I I South America, the U.S.N.S. Muller off 9ub~~' and Director, NSA and under the management control of the U.S.N.S. Valdez enroute to the V.Sf' f~m the the Director, Naval Security Group. On board the Mediterranean. I j! "j I;::;'" Liberty, the Sigint detachment was known as the "Research Department." Its space below decks was D.S.S. £jhertf~ Modus 9pe~a~~i (D) compartmented with access permitted only to staff

, , having the proper clearances. Commanding officer of " , , the ResearchDepartment was Lieutenant Commander (U) U.S. reconnaissa,nce,op,~rations came under the purview of the J-3, J

,i (b) (1) ~I~R~!F SP9KE 15 (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 e6:,.fl6 fi:,.o;w.M..

iV* 11

.,-..~

,~;

:i,i";;,,1i

':(fi;~;;':}~ --, (U) A small portion of the antenna configuration of the U.S.S. lloerly included: (11) Long-wire VLF/LF antenna (34) Discone antenna (12) ECM antenna (35) Monocone antenna (27) 10' whip antenna (36) ECM antenna (32) ECM antenna (41) VHF-receive antenna (33) ECM antenna (42) 35' whip antenna (Figurei. UNCLASSIFIED)

~L:1J- Typical of communications arrange- Ee-ee8! Sigint collection ~itions included one ments of the AGTR class, the Liberty had circuits for for direction finding, 17 for radiotelephone, 20 for the ship's command in one location and those for its manual morse, 7 for automatic morse, 7 for electronic Sigint detachment in a separate location. Liberty's countermeasures, and 33 for nonmorse search and naval communications station, which served the com- development, the latter for frequencies both above mand, had a "receive" terminal for fleet broadcasts, and below 30 Mhz. three circuits for on-line ship/shore radiotelephone and voice communications, and one additional orderwire (U) Perhaps the m~t visible technicalfeature full-duplex circuit. In a separate location, USN-855 of the ship was its antennas, some 45 in all. had an on-line, full-duplex radiotelephone circuit, a secure one-channel moon-relay system -technical research ship special communications system (U) Not so visible was, however, the ship's (TRSSCOMM) -and a "receive-only" terminal for armament, which was minima! -four .5O-caliber fleet broadcasts. In case of need several off-line en- machine guns, 2 forward and 2 aft, one Browning cryption devices were also available. automatic rifle, and a number of small arms.2 16 ~Q~~mi~!'!'!.Y. IW;:;~B \~ ee:.milf eIW:::BI2Se:::.¥ ., i

'. 8B{;HB!FBPeliB

Abidjan to Rota. 24-31 May 1961(U) provisions and fuel, acquiring the military documen- tation neceuary for its asaignment to Commander-in- ~s eeet- The TRS was at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Chief. U.S. Navy Europe and later to the U.S. Sixth at the end of May on its fifth African cruise when, in F1eet, and repairing ita TRSSCOMM which had a response to NSA's messageon 23 May, the JCS/JRC, faulty hydraulic system. with approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, -E8e~ -Six Arabiq hinguists directed movement of the ship to the eastern Medi- ~'OinedUSN-855 for the ~pecte<1 work on u.:lR. and terranean via Rota, Spain, and requested the Com- communic~tioD8. Three of the Arab lin- " guilts, A civilians Allen M. Blue, Donald L. Bla- mander-in-Chief, Atlantic to change operational con- trol of the ship to the Commander-in-Chief, Europe t lock, and Robert 1...Wilson, were among the specialists upon its arrival at Rota.] At the time, the Liberty / who came on boa~ I the remaining lingui.ts was under the operational control of the Commander,! being Naval Sec~rity Group specialists. The NSA Service Squadron 8, a component of the Commander-! linguists hrought;:'with them selected technical mate- in-Chief, Atlantic, and on 24 May the Commander; rial~j I Aasignment Service Squadron 8 issuedsailing orders to the Libert>" of ~ivilian lin~ists to work on board a U.S. Navy ship with information copies to Commander, Sixth FI~t w~ not unu:aual. On TRS deployments along the and others, directing the ship to move at once; to AfricaIj I civilian lin- Rota.. The Liberty departed Abidjan at 003

~- I I oJunem oraer LO conIlrm Llle arnV81 01 tlle I (U) When the Liberty arrived at Rota oft 31 May, it came under the operational control of the f personnel, special equipment, and technical materials u.s. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Gen. L.1... Lem- ,i~ : needed in the eastern Mediterranean.9 In order to '. i ,.... aaaiatUSN~5'a reporting and transcribin~ functions, nitzer) who turned over control to the Command~r-m~:

Chief, U.S. Navy Europe.6 While delegating hiS c@'; if' NSA hAn"nrpvinl1Rlv Ar,.RngPN ..nth I ~! C trol, General Lemnitzer still wanted operational in~or-i mation on the ship's progre88 and ask-lid on1 !ii:~~ that situation reports (Sitreps) and p~nedint~~4~d movement (Pim) reports from the Liberty arriY.e"' at , his headquarters daily and that arty incid,e'ftfs be I

reported as soon as ~ible in accordance ,:With the" ...ESeeej To facilitate the planning for USN- existingf8 888~ reconnaissanceMter takingreporting control, ~tructio~,!iA9m#'aJ John IIIS, 855's coUectionmission, Sigint managers had desig- nated five opetational areas numbered west to east in McCain, Jr., Commander-in-Chief; U.~. J;oj~,.;y Europli, the eastern Mediterranean near the coastline of the directed the Liberty to send to hiS h~'8qq~~rte~ d.ily U.A.R., IaraeJ, Lebanon, and Syria, each measuring Sitrepa and pcmition reports and ~: t,~~'e rep9r'ta to abo~t5O-by-50 miles. In proposing the five operational l include the Pim for the next 2!4 ,{~r&1 ~d any 8;re"aato the JCS, the Director, NSA had indicated t comments on status of the ~hip: ,~l:Ie 4iJ.ected the ...his preference, based on wave propagation analysis of . Liberty to depart for the eas~m:~~it,rr~ean when,'" U.A.R. communications, for operational area three ready, provided guidelines fo¥ ita ,~y~gWithin int~r;: (32:00-33:00N to 34:00E) if operational and safety national waters, and asked! Cc;>t;'Yd~e'~ence to ~tab- factors did not dictate otherwiae.'o With the territorial JlBned communications proc~~# ~o~'ihe regi911: NSA limits established by Middle East countries in mind, also received the situatio~! I;epo~/being required by JCS subsequently directed the Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, E~r.o~ ,~Jid CqJrimander-in- Europe to deploy the Liberty to operational area three Chief, U.S. Navy Europ~' ,#fi/:~ed t~eSe, along with with cl~t point of approach (CPA) to Algeria, Libya, ship p~itiOD8 given in !-~ift:r;~y's ~aiiy informal tech- and the U.A.R. of 13 nautical miles during transit. nical summaries, to plo!t,!~~::a r~utine basis the course On arrival in operational area three, CPA was to be fthL Obt l "n,',',' 0 e I er y. j,£,,:~" ",' 12.5 nm to the U.A.R. and 6.5 nm to Israel. II Acting (U) At """" " prepared for its upon the JCS message for Commander-in-Chief, Eu- deploymentto the Mediterranean, taking OD- rope and after hearing from the Liberty that it had 8BeRB~ BP6lfH 17 (b) (1) i (b) (3) -50 USC 403 f [b) (3) -18 USC 798 i [b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ~ S~SR~~

(U) The l,oertJ' docked in Rota, Spain. to be readied Cor deployment to the eastern Mediterranean. In Rota. the operational control oCthe l,oerlJ' was turned over to the U.S. Commander-in-ChieC.Europe. who in turn delegated the control to Admiral John S. McCain. Jr.. Commander-in-ChieC.U.S. Navy Europe. (Photograph courtesy of Robert L. WiJaon.) (Figur.i. UNCLASSIFIED)

completed repairs to the TRSSCOMM hydraulic sys- the intercept acquired directly from the airborne tem, Admiral McCain directed the Liberty to follow -collectors utJon their return to base. At the time" the schedule prescribed by JCS. I! The Liberty then departed Rota on 2 June at 123OZ through the Strait I was processing the intercept of t;hE of Gibraltar on a course paralleling the North African airborne coilect9rs with NSA performing the ba.~kuJ: coastline. processing on A~bic language materials and retiinins: fuil responsibilit~ for processing of interceptea Air Force Security Service's Technical communications. \Courier time for delivery qt tapes tl Processing Center (U) NsAJ -!was 72 hours./ ES ee8j While the Liberty was enroute to Rota E8-888t from Abidjan, NSA was arranging with the Air Force Security Service (AFSS), now the Electronic Security Command, for more expeditious processing of Navy's VQ-2 EC-121 and Air Force's C-130 intercept, which had increased considerably from the now daily flights off the Israeli and U.A.R. coastline. The objective was to establish a technical processing center (TPC) for -IIM~B~B ",II...e9:,H~~ el~\l"~iBlIB 9~~¥ \,;::::~::...,. 18 -8B6RET- (b) (3) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 ~J (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 --- BfieRE'f

and 33 other addressees including the Commander, Sixth Fleet that as of OOOtZ, 7 June, the Liberty would be guarding the fleet broadcast from the Naval Communications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia, which served the eastern Mediterranean. In accordance with customary communications procedures, the Liberty would guard the fleet broadcast of the Naval Com- J ---! munications Station, Morocco, until it reached the 18 e88~ eastern Mediterranean. (V) The Commander-in-Chief, V.S. Navy Europe apprised Commander, Sixth Fleet, Vice Ad- miral William L Martin, on 3 June, that the Liberty's , mission was to conduct an "extended independent surveillance operation in the eastern Mediterranean" and that Sixth Fleet might be called upon to provide When the TPC became operationa~'on logistic and other support. \7 1 June, the linguists, divided into four operst~bnal (U) With the outbreak of the war on 5 shifts, processed the tapes as they were brhught into June, the Commander-in.Chief, U.S. Navy Europe in the TPC compound from the aircraft, a~d th~' ana- a messageto the Commander, Sixth Fleet and others lysts/reporters issued their contents with ,'a minimum took note of the movement of some 20 Soviet warships of delay as Critics, Spots, electrigrams, or! in the technical supplements to post-mission fi~~ht 7~ports.II with supporting vesselsand an estimated 8 or 9 Soviet , ! submarines into the eastern Mediterranean and Ae- Enroute to Operational Area Three (U) gean and, along with other guidance, instructed Vice i ii' Admiral Martin to keep his ships and aircraft at least ! i! 100 nm away from the coasts of Lebanon, Syria, \8 ~~Q~ On 29 May in a messageto USN-855, Isrsel and the V.A.R. and at least 25 nm away from th.e Directo~, N~A had outlined the mission f~r the Cypn:s. I~ The Commander, Sixth Fleet directed his

LIberty dunng lts voyage to the eastern Medlterra- . t t I I t th t d 1'1 N ' ." .urn s 0 comp y a er a ay. el th er th e C 0 m - nean,"d the" changmg geographlcal" and hearablllty con- d . Ch" f U S N E th C - thSl eratlonst . to govern speclft c coII ectlon" actlvlty.. durmg.man er-m-" le, ..avy urope nor e om Th D. t NSA d i. d USN 855 mander, Sixth Fleet dlrectlves included speclfic m- i e np. e lrec or,eslgnate -, " , positions for search and develop~en~of Moroccan HF, structlons to the V.S.S. LIberty. H !'I VHF, VHF, and radioprinter /communications and ~ ~8er- Liberty was to the south of Italy when " Algerian HF, VHF, and possible/VHF multichannel the Six Day War broke out. With the war's inception, communications. VSN-855 wasitoforward by electrical the Liberty assumed a readiness condition, and USN- transmission technical sum~ar~ks of Moroccan and 855 began to keep abreast of events from NSA and Algerian com~unications to!NSA~ with information I field site Sigint Readiness Crayon and other reports copies going toil! I I on the Middle East situation and, of course, from its and courier delivery of tape!! and t{affic to NSA's ", own intercept.!u Memhers of the VSN-855 felt some Middle East Office, G6.14! ! """" \" apprehensionas they approached what they now knew ESeee j Liberty's ~qve into the Ma~iterranean "'"to be a war zone; they appreciated perhaps more than proceeded according to !~lan. ~t rep~rted" t.hat .it '~efore the need for general quarters drills, but they overtook and passed t~rfJe Sovlet ships dur~.ng ltS t~k comfort from their noncombatant status and, of passage throug~ the S~~.it of. Gibraltar: IS FoU~~ng c~urse,the visihility of the flag. One VSN-855 survivor the North Afncan. co8;S;tllne,.lts collectlon posltiQ,~s rec~lls being told that "...if anything were to happen were on the prescnbed ;Algenan and Moroccan com~ '. " .I. ; ..."', we were Wlth m' ten mmu. t es 0f a.lr strl'ke and help. munlcatlons. OrlentatlOn and trammg for the main "'" N ' f . d ,.11 obJectlve,..i U.A.R. c~munlcatlons.i ..", detracted some- "'"',.', one 0 us were very ..., worne . what from performatjce on the secondary Algerian and '.~~ ~~':::,j While lt was neIther NSA s responsl- Moroccan assignmen:ts, but this was to be expected. 16 bility no,r intention to adjudge the safety factors of (U) At j133oz, 2 June the Liberty in- the"{.ibe~ty's mission, in view of the outbreak of formed the Navy !' Report Office in London hostiliti~~~'",NSA'sGene Sheck and Dick Harvey did ., ..gi~RB!f 19 11*:,.8t£..11.. e6:.ft:,~ effM...i...£~"~\6:,.t¥ " (b) (1) (bJ (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (bJ (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (bl (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 --" (bJ (3)-P.L. 86-36 1f6P SHeRHIFti:.m~~ ask the NSA liaison officer to the JCS/JRC, Mr. J. intelligence interest, or engage in harassment." Ad- Connell, on 5 June if any consideration was being miral Martin alBo instructed the Liberty to copy the given there to a change in the Libertys operational fleet broadcast and to use his fast carrier task force area. They reminded Connell that during the 1962 (TF-60) tactical circuits if necessary.25 Liberty did not Cuban miasile crisis five years earlier the U.S.S. receive, for one reason or another, this message.26 Oxford had been pulled back from the Havana area. (U) On 7 June at OBOCYl.the Liberty was The NSA concern was for the technical collection off the coast of the U.A.R. and approaching opera- arrangements which would have to be adjusted if the tional areas two and three. Despite the Immediate Liberty was to be withdrawn. The NSA liaison officer Precedence assigned to the Liberty's Sitrep/P~it re- discussed the matter with JRC's ship-movementofficer port at OOOSZ,7 June, giving ita p~ition at OSOOZat and then advised Sheck and Harvey that no action 33-00N 28-54E, it took, according to a JCS postmor- was then under consideration.22 tem report, lome fifteen and one-half hours for the (U) On 6 June, as it was paasing between Liberty's p~ition report to reach the Commander, Libya and Crete, the Liberty reported to Sixth Fleet Sixth F1eet, the action addressee.27Liberty was now that its TRSSCOMM, which had had malfunctions in guarding the fleet broadcast of the Naval Communi- its power supply and hydraulic systems on the trip cations Station, Asmara. On this day a number of from Rota, was again operating satisfactorily and, in actions were under way to minimize the appearance of reply to a Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe U.S. involvement in the Middle East hostilities and query concerning Pims not being received, provided to change the Liberty's onerational area. the date-time group of Pima previously sent. -~~8~~ ~86j USN-855's communications on the 6th to NSA were normal -its 24-hour summary for 5 June, ita informal technical summary no. 3, a Spot report, its follow-up to a\ ~ritic,r- - ana oLner reports all Demg receiVe

U.A.R. communications might best take place in 20 nm CPA, JRC's Major Breedlove, skipping normal operational area two to the west of the originally Commander-in-Chief, Europe channels, on Yocom specified area three. The Director, NSA asked at called Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe'. com- 2104Zthat the JCS/JRC change the Liberty's schedule mand center to convey the JCS/JRC decision and to "to satisfy technical requirements." Since this request direct that the Liberty be moved back to a CPA of reached the JCS/JRC as the latter was having second 100 nm to the coasts of Israel, U.A.R., and Syria and thoughts about the Liberty, no action would be taken a CPA of 25 nm to Cyprus. He indicated to Lieutenant on the NSA request. E. L. Galavotti, the operations duty officer there, that a confirming JCS message would follow. Breedlove Directions to Withdraw the Lihert.r(U) explained the urgency of the matter "because time -~I; ~g8t- In view of the sensitivity regarding the [was] getting short to where she will be in th~e U.A.R. charges of U.S. complicity with Israel and limits." Galavotti said he would go to Sixth Fleet right following a question from the U.S. Chief of Naval away and had an appropriate message ready by Operations about the wisdom of Liberty's assignment 080001Z for release by his superiors to Sixth Fleet. in the war zone,]1 the JCS/JRC made a new assessment Some fourteen minutes after calling Commander-in- of the danger inherent in the Liberty's operations. Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, Breedlove called the Com- JRC considered the distance of the Liberty from the mander-in-Chief, Europe JRC watch officer, informing Sixth F1eet, some 300 to 400 miles. After it learned him of the verbal request to NAVEUR and telling him from NSA the degree to which the collection mission that N AVEUR had promised to take action.)5 would suffer if the ship's CPA was changed,]2 JRC (U) Within the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. decided to accept the mission degradation. At the Navy Europe command center, an unfortunate delay time of these deliberations -2300Z, 7 June -the took place, however, in relaying this JCSI JRC instruc- Liberty arrived on station in operational area three. tion to the Sixth Fleet for action. Mindful that this (U) In a message conveying the sense of directive had skipped channels and was only verbal, urgency then developing in the Pentagon staff, JCS Galavotti's superior, Captain M. J. Hanley, Jr., Dep- expressed concern in a message at 2230Z to Com- uty Chief of Statf', U.S. Navy Europe, directed that mander-in-Chief, Europe over the Middle East situa- the messageto Sixth Fleet not be releaBed until the tion and stated that the JCS-directed operational area date-time group of the JCS confirming messagewas at for the Liberty was "for guidance only" and could be hand. NA VEUR policy allowed for acceptance of oral "varied as local conditions dictate." JCS also in- instructions from higher headquarters to move ships structed the Commander-in-Chief, Europe to change and aircraft only if given by flag or general officers or CPA to the U.A.R. to 20 nm, to Israel 15 nm.]] if firm evidence of a messagedirective were provided Although a copy of the message was to have gone to -for example, the date-time group of a confirming the Liberty, it would not reach the ship prior to the message. Instead of releasing the message, Captain attack. The Department of Army Communications Hanley told the NAVEUR command center duty Center in error sent it to the Naval Communications officer, Commander C. G. Jorgensen, to apprise Com- Station in the Pacific.)4 mander-in-Chief, Europe of the matter and ask that (U) Further deliberation within the JCSI headquarters to obtain the date-time group of the JRC following discussions with the Chief of Naval confirming JCS message. Jorgensen then called the Operations, who was pressing for a 100-mile CPA for U.S. European Command's (EOCOM) command duty the Liberty, now resulted in a JCS decision to move officer at 08003OZ,who indicated he would check and the Liberty well off the h~tile shoreline. Contributing call back. The JCS confirming message,JCS OSOllOZ to the decision, as JRC's Captain Merriwell Vineyard was, of course, not yet released at the time of the (USN) told NSA's JRC representative, John Connell, call. Its transmission by the Department of Army late on the 7th, was the desire of General Wheeler, Communications Center in the Pentagon to Com- Chairman, JCS, to support in any way the U.S. mander-in-Chief, Europe was at 080211z.)6 p~ition taken at the U.N. in answerto U.A.R. charges (0) Not hearing from the higher head- of complicity. U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg quarters, Commander Jorgensen repeated his call at had stated on the 6th to the Security Council that 0325Z on 8 June to check again on the status of the "All Sixth Fleet aircraft are and have been several action and again asked EUCOM to obtain a date-time hundred miles from the area of conflict." group, this time speaking with a duty officer in the (U) At 235OZ,one hour after the JCS had JRC section of EUCOM, Lieutenant Colonel C. K. given its instructions restricting the Liberty to the 15- Russell. European Command's delay of three hours in

IW,B~B ":1* 8e:.HP,1fell...~~,B~8 e~i~¥ ~Q~~~IIJH~;~I.A.!.21 UNCLASSIFIED responding to NA VEUR had resulted from its aaaump- preparations on board the U.S.S. America for a press tion, based on Breedlove's call from the JCS/JRC, conference relating to the U.A.R. charges of U.S. that NA VEUR was already taking action.)7 Shortly complicity with Israel in the pr~ecution of the war thereafter, Russell was able to give Jorgensen the and to Sixth Fleet's need to transmit other traffic of required JCS date-time group, the meaaage having equal or higher precedence.]' Meanwhile Liberty was, just arrived in the EUCOM JRC duty officer's hands, of course, already in its operational area. Its p~ition but this was about the same time as NAVEUR's at 08O800Z was within 30 nm of 31-45N 33-30E in information copy of JCS OSOllOZ, the confirming area three. message, arrived in the NA VEUR command center (U) When it rains, it pours, and there itself -the time, 0325Z, 8 June. A precious four would be even further delays in the attempts to get hours had gone by since Major Breedlove's call. the word to the Liberty. (U) JCS's investigating team, the U.S. (U) Commander Jorgensen then asked for Navy Court of Inquiry, and later a congressional staff a telecon with Sixth Fleet's staff duty officer and at gave cl~e attention to the Sixth Fleet mesaageto the OS0355Z was experiencing difficulties in establishing Liberty, following the Btatus of the message in the contact because of atm~pheric conditions. He then critical hours before it came under attack. Essentially, had his radio operator contact Sixth Fleet by single the findings were these: sideband radio and request the telecon as soon as pOssible. The two-way telecon with Sixth Fleet began Time Status at 08041OZ. 0030Z, 8 June Sixth Fleet Staff Duty Officer had messageready for release by Assistant (U) When the Sixth Fleet staff duty officer Chief of Staff (Operations). told Jorgensenhis command did not have JCS OBO11OZ 0917Z Message released with Immediate as yet (the Army Communications Center, Pentagon, Precedence. having misrouted this messageto Hawaii), Jorgensen 1035Z Message transmitted to the Naval passed it to him three times before gaining an ac- Communications Station, Morocco, knowledgement at OB044OZfrom the Sixth Fleet's duty for relay to the Liberty, the delays officer, who was having difficulty in hearing NAVEUR. owing to the transmission of equal or Jorgensen then sent a confirming message: "From .higher precedencemessages. Unaware CINCNA VEUR Command Duty Officer to COM- that the Liberty. pursuant to its in- SlXTHFLT Duty Officer. Be advised that JCS OBO1lOZ structions, was now guarding the fleet FORAC. Official msg follows." broadcast of the Naval Communica- tions Station, Asmara, the Sixth (U) Ironically, the Sixth Fleet's duty offi- Fleet routing clerk erred in sending cer then indicated to Jorgensen that Sixth Fleet did this messageto Morocco. not hold reference (a) on the critica] JCS meaaageand J050Z Messagereceived at the Naval Com- asked for a copy. Since NA VEUR also was without a munications Station, Morocco, and copy of the referenced message,despite both NAVEUR passed over Defense Communications and Sixth Fleet's having been designated for infor- System to DCS station, Asmara. mation copies (JCS 7337/07223OZ), Jorgensen would Through error, the Asmara DCS sta- obtain it from Commander-in-Chief, Europe and later, tion sent the message to the Naval on obtaining a copy, outline to the Sixth Fleet's duty Communications Station, Greece, at officer its contents which had, by that time, been 1238Z. The latter sent it back to the overtaken by events. Asmara DCS station. 1510Z Asmara DCS station delivered the (U) From OB044OZJune 67 it became the message to the Naval Communica- Commander, Sixth Fleet's responsibility to direct the tions Station. Liberty to a safer area of operations than the one in 1525Z Naval Communications Station, As- which she was then steering. Vice Admiral Martin's mara, put the message on its fleet message to the Liberty, directing it not to approach broadcast. the coast of the U.A.R., Syria, or Israel cl~er than 100 nm, went out some four and one-ha]f hours later, The Liberty would not receive the critical messagein at OS0917Z,the delay in this case being attributed to time.

22 UNCLASSIFIED 8BGRB!f 8P6ltB (U) The action messagesdirecting with- .ljlJer'}'~ Processing Mission (U) drawal of the Liberty to a CPA of 100 nm were three in number: JCS OBOllOZ, Sixth Fleet OBOO17Zreferred to in the foregoing, and Commander-in-Chief, Europe's ~8-88e1- On station in operational area three, OBOO25Zto NA VEUR confirming informal exchanges USN-855's processing and reporting constituted a giving action on the JCS messageto NAVEUR. Infor- complex undertaking. It was to provide daily technical mation copies of the JCS and the CINCEUR action summaries for use by other collectors and NSA, messageswere to have gone to the U.S.S. Liberty, enabling them to remain up to date on the Liberty's and it is, of course, entirely possible that timely operation. Upon completion of ita deployment, USN- receipt of these might have triggered a withdrawal 855 was to provide traffic and unprocessed tapes to action on the part of the Liberty's Commander Mc- NSAI Gonagle. But the same unkind fate guarding the action messageswas also looking after the information copies. ;~~eet- These too ran into communications problems of one kind or another, and the Liberty would not receive them. 39

Operational Area Three, 8 June (U)

fseee, Once on station off Port Said in oper- Notes ational area three, USN-855 employed its collection Sourc~ docum~nt. ar~ in th~ "Cri.is Col/~ction" of the NSA History p~itions primarily to develop U.A.R.t I Collection. ---I:ommunications

'(V) Julie Alger, "A Review of the Technical Re- search Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970. 'te-eeel Source documents u.ed for informatioD OD Librrty's mode of operatioD include: NSA StatioD Facilities Book - U.S.S. Librrty (USN-8551; (UI NSA OPINg No. 2855, Manual of U.S, Sigint Oprrations, 12 Mar 1965; (U) JCS m_age cite DO. 5838, 002235Z Noy 65; ADd (U) NSA oral hi-tory interview with rrrry 1.. McFarlADd OD 23 JUD 1980. '(U) JCS mag cite Do. 6499, 291602Z May 1967. " 4(UI COMSERVRON 8 mag, 24002(Yl May 1967. \ 5(UI Librrty mag, 2~1732Z May 1967. \ '(U) USCINCEUR mag, 300032Z May 1967. ','(UI USCINCEUR -g 010035Z Jun 1967, ,'(U) NSA Staff, "Informal Paprr OD Librrty', Com- il!uDlcatioD'," 22 JUD 1967; NSA oral hi-tory interview with GeDe SheckoD, ' 11 Aug 1980. " ..!i~ ~89t- Source documeDt8 relating to Liberty', prepa- , ratIOD8'at Rota include: DffiNSA mag to NSAEUR Office, GermaDY, ~ The...'Liberty had no specific assign- ~ May ,1967; DffiNSA mag to USN-855, 252317Z May 1967; aDd DIRNSA, mag, 232133Z May 1967, ment to intercept I&raeli comJDunitatioIiIl/while it was '0(',1), DIRNSA ID8gto JCS/JRC, 292013Z May 1967. in operational a~ea three. Op1iss~on6f this tasking II(U~ \, JCS ID8g cite no. 6724, 011D45Z JUD 1967. was, in part, oyiing to the la~k O;f H~brew linguists. IJ(UI', \ Liberty ID8g to CINCNAVEUR, 021132Z JUD But on the mo~ing of 8 June i~ YHF (i/earch p~itions 1967; CINC"/:'lAVEUR ID8g, 02fJ717Z JUD 1967. IJ(U) " " Source documents u,ed in diacuuiOD of the Air did produce ...three tapes of ~ra~li !~ir traffic. The contents were, as determined la~er~rQutine operational Force's T~iuclude: ESC, History of the 6931st Security Group, I Jon-3D Jl.n, 1967; NSA Staff, "OperatioD' Staff Summary,'" ca. messages....'As a by-product of \~ar~hing for U.A.R. 16 Jun 1967;',NSA Staff, "Airborne Collection in the Middla Eut," commun~cationsin the Sinai, USI:-l~5 also identified UDdated; NS~',StaJf (G621, "BriefiDg OD tha 1967 Middle Eut some 22 frequencies as Israeli, \ ~~t again there was Cri-ia," uDdat~ nothing relatable in any way \:tP the forthcoming '4(U) ',', DIRNSA !D8gto USN-855, 292201Z May 1967. attack. 41 W 15(U) '\, Liberty ID8g, 022108Z JUD 1967. , ; Ib) (1) (b) (1) Ib) 13) -50 USC 403 Ib) 11) SEeRfiT 8pe~B 23 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) 13) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 Ib) 13) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 ~~~~IDB~~~I 12 -

I'(U) NSA StaB (G62) , "Briefing on the 1967 Middle "(U) NSA oral hiatory interview, Terry L. Mc- Eat Criaia," undated. Farland, 23 Jun 1980. "(U) JCS m8I cite no. 7239. 070259Z Jun 1967. "(U) CINCUSNAVEUR mag

24 -~9~~IBB~t7":"1. --11.~~rBIIR ",':.'.ee:.HPilf ell*f~f~ltS OfC!: ee~,.Pff)H~,.Tf2tt

Chapter IV

(U) Thursday morning, 8 June 1967, found (U) Later in the morning, at 1006 hours, the Liberty cruising slowly in international waters on an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar station as directed. At approximately 0830 hours (local crossed astern of the Liberty at a distance of about time), the Liberty notified the Commander, Sixth three to five miles. The plane circled the ship around Fleet that her position for the next 24 hours would be the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and within 30 nautical miles of coordinates 31-45N and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. This recon- 33-30E.I The sea was calm and the clear sky permitted naissance was repeated at approximately 30-minute visibility of ten miles; a light breeze ruffied the intervals. It was impossible to see any identifying Liberty's ensign.2 markings on the aircraft. The plane never approached (U) Liberty's projected course for that day the Liberty in a provocative manner and made no was to proceed to a point 13 nautical miles from the attempt to signal the ship. Nor did the Liberty U.A.R. coast at 31-27.2N, 34-00E (Point Alpha), attempt to signal it.7 Subsequentinvestigations of the thence to 31-22.3N, 33-42E (Point Bravo), thence to attack on the Liberty identified the aircraft as a 31-31N, 33-00E (Point Charlie) retracing this track French-built Noratlas NORD 2501, piloted by Israeli until new orders were received. Normal steaming speed Air Force. wasto be five knots and typical steaming colors (which -te+- Though this plane was unidentified, indicated conditions were normal) were flown.! A the thoughts of Robert L. Wilson (one of three NSA "condition of readiness three, mooified" was set; i.e., civilians aboard the Liberty) must have been shared a normal steaming watch, except that one man was by his shipmates. Wilson remembered thinking when stationed at each of the forward two .5O-caliber he saw the plane, that ..it must be Israeli because machine guns, numbers 51 and 52. Lookouts on the what else is flying out here at this point in the war bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and and also it's coming from the direction of Israel and 54 just aft of the bridge, in the event of a surprise air it's going back to Israel, so it was obvious that it was or surface attack.4 Israeli. I didn't think much of it. They were just out (U) At about 0930 hours, it was possible there checking us out. That's what I would do too.'" to visually sight the minaret at AI 'Arish on the (U) Being sensitive to its exposed and U.A.R. coast. This was used as a navigational aid and unprotected position, the Liberty reported to the the ship's p~ition was verified as being within its Naval Security Station Command, at approximately operating limits. There were no other conspicuous or 1100 hours, that she had destroyed all 8uperseded outstanding navigational features in the area. S May publications (e.g. crypto documents)and intended to destroy all irregularly superseded material daily becauseof the "current situation and shallow water in Reconnaissance of the Liberty (U) operating area."9 (U) Shortly before 0900 hours (local time), two delta-wing, single-engine jet aircraft orbited the General Quarters Drill (U) Liberty three times at 31-27N, 34-00E. The planes' altitude was estimated at 5,000 feet, at a distance of (U) After the lunch hour, at 1310 hours, approximatelytwo miles. Liberty notified the Com- the Liberty's crew was exercised at general quarters mander, Sixth Fleet and others of this reconnaissance, for drill purposes for a mandatory noncompetitive stating that identification was unknown and that no exercise to train the crew in chemical-attack proce- amplifying report would be submitted. 6 dures. This was a routine activity, part of the ship's ~gN~I~i~;B.Y. 25 -8HeR!T-

Ib) 11) Ib) (3) -50 USC 403 Ib) 13) -18 USC 798 Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (U) The Dassautt Mirage jet bomber of the type which attacked the LIner'T on 8 June. (Photograph COUrt88Yof Jane', All the World', Aircraft.) (Fi,urc i, UNCLASSIFIED)

training program eatabliahed by the Commander, Ser- approaching airplanes that had been picked up on Vice Force, Atlantic Fleet, and was not related to her radar by the lookouts. It was 1400 hours, From the miaaion in the eaatern Mediterranean. The drill waa starboard wing of the bridge, Commander McGonagle performed aatiafactorily and the ahip returned to her observed a single jet aircraft that appeared similar, if "modified condition three" at 1345.10 not identical, to those that had been sighted earlier (U) Following the general quarters drill, in the day and about which a sighting report had been the Liberty's Commanding Officer, Commander Wil- submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was liam L. McGonagle, fixed her position by radar aa about 135°, its position angle was about 45°-50°, its being 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret at AI elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approx- 'Ariah, which W8ato the aoutheast (bearing 142" true.) imately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to McGonagle that the plane was traveling parallel to, Air Attack Begins (U) and in the same direction as the Liberty. With his binoculars trained on the aircraft, the Commander ~8 ~~Qj Amidships below deck, the Liberty's was unaware of a second plane swooping in from the Research Department (tbe Sigint collection, process- port side to launch a rocket directed toward the ing, and reporting area) resumed normal operations. bridge. When the rocket exploded two levels below the Robert L. Wilson was in the analysis/reporting area bridge, McGonagle ordered the general alarm to be together with the other civilians, Allen M. Blue and sounded. Donald 1...Blalock, plus the Marine linguists. Things had been slow and Wilson considered going up on deck to do some sunbathing but changedbis mind. Com- (U) CT3 Paddy E. (Dusty) Rhodes was munications Technician (CT) TerryL. McFarland, headed below decks from his GQ station, damage seated at his manual-morse position, wa~1 I control detail. At the end of the GQ drill, the I trhat far below deck it was diffi- Commander had ordered the whaleboat engine tested .cult for anyone to h~ar much of what was happening and, when Dusty heard a muffled explosion, he topside. thought, "Those damned deck apes blew that boat up (U) During the general quarters (GQ) and rve got to go back up and fight the fire." drill, Lieutenant James G. O'Connor (Assistant Tecb- Simultaneously, Dusty heard the general quarters nical Operations Officer of the Research Department) alarm. Scampering back up the ladder, he could smell had been officer of the deck on the bridge. At the burning powder and started "dogging down" doors conclusion of the drill, he went up to the 04 level when a rocket tore through a bulkhead to his right (above the bridge) to see if he could locate the ripping steel all about. 26 -8B8RfiCf- II :BIJH..~~ 8e:.HPiIf 81IMiPiBt.S6:..1.\1 c;Q ~.r~~ 15~~1fI*I.

(U) Down in the Research Department, L. Wilson went up to the second deck from the Terry McFarland, wearing his headphones, was va- processingand reporting (P&R) spaces to empty safes guely aware of flickers of light coming through the on that upper level. bulkhead. He didn't realize that these were armor- fQ eeej- Hearing the general quarters alarm, piercing tracer bullets slicing through the Liberty's CT3 Clyde W. Way ran from the mess deck to his akin. The "flickers" were accompanied by a strange station in the T-Branch spacesone deck above the R noise that sounded to Terry like chains being pulled Branch. Way plugged in his radio receivers and heard acr~s the hottom of the ship. Next, he saw Seaman nothing; he called the R2 area only to learn that their "Red" Addington race down the ladder from above reception had also gone dead. with blood running down his right leg from a wound in (U) Topside, one level above the main the knee. "Some body's up there shootin' at us," said deck, the exploding rocket had started a blazing fire Red. Nobody spoke, but Terry could see the fear in in two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed below the the faces about him. Someone ordered the men to bridge on the port side. McGonagle quickly ordered perform emergency destruction, and they turned to his Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Philip dumping classified material in the weighted, white M. Armstrong, to go down and release the gasoline canvas bags specially made for this purpoee. Robert, cans. Lieutenant O'Connor joined the Exec. Just as

(Figure i, UNCLASSIFIED) ~~~ULi 1!!-~ GQA"~ GII.~~~!il.i Q~I.¥ ~g~~i~!'!'!.Y.27 UNCLASSIFIED

both reached the top of the ladder to proceed down, (U) In the first minutes of the air attack a bomb hit near the whaleboat on the starboard side, the Liberty suffered a complete ll»s of external com- immediately aft of the bridge. Armstrong and O'Connor munications because of badly damaged radio trans- were thrown back onto the bridge and other personnel mitting equipmenta and antenna systems. In spite of in the pilot-house were blown from their feet. Mc- this, emergency restoration of hicom voice capability Gonagle grabbed the engine order annunciator and was completed within minutes. All U.S.S. Liberty rang up all head flank speed -an order for maximum communications immediately thereafter were via the speed. At the same time, he ordered Lieutenant hicom voice network-I] Maurice H. Bennett to report to the Chief of Naval (U) The coordinated strafing, rocket, and Operations (CNO) via the high-command radio circuit incendiary air attacks created three major fires topside (hicom) that the Liberty was under attack by uniden- that covered large areas of the Liberty with flames tified jet aircraft and required immediate assistance. and heavy smoke. Eight men were killed or died of This Flash message, giving the Liberty's p<»ition as injuries received during the air attack: two killed or 33-25E, 31-23N, was received by the aircraft carrier mortally wounded on the bridge, two killed at machine V.S.S. Saratoga (CVA-60) and relayed to Commander, gun 51, one killed at machine gun 52, one died from U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Commander, Sixth Fleet; wounds received on the main deck starboard side, and and Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60).11 Liberty's two died of wounds received on the 01 level portside. transmission was not made without difficulty. During Throughout the topside area, 75 men had been the attack and intermittently thereafter, the hicom wounded by shrapnel and shock of exploding rockets. voice circuit was subjected to loud jamming regardless of frequency. This electronic interference was de- (U) During this period, the Liberty grad- scribed as a steady carrier without modulation.12 ually built up speed from five knots; her exact speed was not known but it is doubtful that she exceeded 11 (V) After being blown back onto the bridge or 12 knots while under attack. floor, Lieutentant O'Connor realized he had no feeling in his body from the waist down. To get out of the way, he dragged himself into the combat information Torpedo-Boat Attack (U) center (CIC) behind the bridge, where several others had also sought safety. Lying face down, O'Connor (U) At about 1424 hours, look-outs sighted three high-speed boats approaching the Liberty from soon noticed that there was a lot of blood on the floor the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately and then realized it was his. About this time, Ensign 135" at a distance of about 15 miles. The boats O'Malley stepped into the CIC and helped stop appeared to be in a wedge-type formation, spaced O'Connors bleeding by stuffing a T-shirt into the holes in his back. about 150 to 200 yards apart, and closing in a torpedo- launch attitude at an estimated speed of Z7 to 30 (V) A few moments after the bomb blast knots. Commander McGonagle ordered a sailor from on the starboard side, Commander McGonagle was hit the bridge to man the starboard gun and take the by flying shrapnel and knocked off his feet, but, though boats under fire. Using the hicom circuit, the Liberty's shaken up, he remained on the bridge, totally in radioman reported the approach of the torpedo boats. command. This was received and relayed by the U.S.S. Saratoga (V) For the next five or six minutes, air- to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe and to the craft made criss-cr<»s attacks on the Liberty at about Commander, Sixth Fleet.I' one-minute intervals, hitting her with rockets and (U) It was then that the Commander no- machine-gun fire. A final count entered into the Court ticed that the Liberty's American flag had been shot of Inquirys record, showed 821 separate hits on the down. He immediately ordered a signalman to hoist ship's hull and superstructure. The attacking aircraft the "holiday ensign" -the largest Bag aboard (ap- were later identified as French-built Dassault Mirage proximately 7 x 13 feet) -from the yardarm, the jet fighters whose armament consisted of two 30mm normal flag halyard having been destroyed. There was cannon, two 1,OOo-poundbombs, and four rocket pods smoke from the burning whaleboat and other topside (18 rockets each). fires in the vicinity of the bridge. (U) During the first or secondstrafing run, (U) Commander McGonagle passed the the ship's public-address system, the electrically pow- word, "Stand by for torpedo attack." He held his ered intercom system, and m<»t sound-poweredphone course, since turning away from the boats would bring circuits were severed or destroyed. the ship closer to land, and turning toward them would 28 UNCLASSIFIED ee~,.PIBH~~H*1J

swing the ship broadside toward the attackers, giving ammunition box, causing the gun to fire in the them a larger target. direction of the attacking boats. (U). When Robert L. Wilson heard the (U) At this time, the motor torpedo boats torpedo attack warning, he remembered one of the opened fire with their gun mounts, killing the Liberty's seamen telling him to sit on the floor and brace his helmsman. In a matter of secondsone torpedo crosaed feet against the wall. astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time was (U) In the processing and reporting area, then 1434 hours. A minute later, a second torpedo CT Terry McFarland was told to "tuck pant legs into struck the ship on the starboard side, just forward of your socks, button top collar, get rid of loose material, the bridge and a few feet below the water line. Again, and lie flat on floor and hold your head in your hands using the hicom net, the Liberty broadcast that the to protect your face." ship had been torpedoed and was listing badly. The (U) When the motor torpedo boats were Saratoga picked up the transmission and relayed it to approximately a mile away, the center boat was seen the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe and to flashing a signal. light. Because of smoke and flames the Commander, Sixth Fleet. I ~ in the direction from which the boats were approach- (U) To Lieutenant O'Connor, lying on the ing, Commander McGonagle could not read the signals, floor of the combat information center, the torpedo's but he saw what he believed to be an Israeli flag. As deafening explosion seemed to lift the ship right out the air attack had knocked out the Liberty's starboard of the water, and when it settled back he thought it signal light, he attempted to signal with a hand-held was going to rollover. Aldis lamp. This may not have been powerful enough (U) In the Research Department where to penetrate the smoke pouring from the fires started the torpedo struck, everything went black; oil and by the attackers. Believing that the air attack might debris were everywhere. Water rushed in and equip- have been in error, Commander McGonagle quickly ment fell over Terry McFarland, but he managed to shouted to the starboard forward gun to withhold fire. keep clear and make his way in the darkness to the The gunner fired a short burst at the motor torpedo ladder to go topside. When he got out there was about boats before he understood the CO's order. At the a foot and a half of air space left. same time, though unattended, the after gun on the (U) CT Clyde W. Way was in T-Branch starboard side opened fire: flames from the burning spaces above the processing and reporting area. With whaleboat had ignited bullets in the gun and in the the explosion below, all equipment fell to the floor and smoke poured from the P&R hatch. Way started pulling men out as they came up the ladder. There was no panic. A Marine went down the ladder to help locate men p~sibly trapped in the water. As the water

..,;.: rose in the ResearchDepartment, Lieutenant Maurice Bennett realized that he had to close the hatch to contain the flooding. Attempts to contact the Marine _. M who had gone back failed, and Lieutenant Bennett 2 reluctantly and sorrowfully ordered the hatch closed. McFarland and Way then went topside to help fight ~ - fires and attend the wounded. (U) The torpedo e~pl~ion had torn a hole in the side of the ship that extended from a few feet above the water line to below the turn of the bilge. It was shaped like a tear-drop, and was 39 feet acrOBSat its widest point. Its immediate effect was to flood all compartments on two decks below the water line, from frame 53 to frame 66. These frames supported water- (U) During the attack. severe damage was tight bulkheads, and marked the location of the done to one of the two forward area 50-caliber Liberty's Research Department and store rooms. gun mounts. Twenty-five men died in these spaces some from the lIS ssel Photograph courte8Y of Robert 1.. WillOn, NSA.) blast, others drowned. (Fi,u,.~i. UNCLASSIFIED) (U) The torpedo hit did not start a major fire, probably becauseof the immediate flooding of the~

112~~:BiJH'.'Ii. e9:-.~'-; SI~..~:~:il.8Q~!L¥ 6ePfRBB~;H*f2 29

.-- UNCLASSIFIED

.~. ...

..j ).. 33°- \. I SRAEl:.< ~.r

32"--

0 R..OA-'N

../j ./ . IS R A SUEZ UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(U) The projected track or the Lihert}' on the day or attack. (Fi,urei. UNCLASSIFIED)

affected area, but the Liberty immediately listed nine were 62-ton craft, capable of 42 knots, with a crew of degrees to starboard. Power and steering control were 15 and armament consisting of one 4Omm cannon, lost temporarily and the ship came dead in the water. four 2Omm cannon, and two torpedos. The time was 1440 hours. (U) The three torpedo boats also stopped Post-Attack Reconnaissance(U) and then milled around astern of the Liberty at a (U) At about 1515 hours, two helicopters range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the - approached the Liberty and circled around the ship at boats signaled by flashing light, in English, "Do you a distance of about 100 yards. The Star of David require assistance?" Not being able to signal by light, insignia was clearly visible. One of the helicopters was Commander McGonagle ordered a signalman to hoist numbered 04 or D4, the other 08 or DB. The helicop. the international flag signal for "not under command," ters departed, returned, and departed again. meaning that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty (U) CommanderMcGonagle designated the I and that they should keep clear. One of the torpedo mess decks as a casualty collection station, and the boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. All wounded were taken there by repair party personnel boats retired toward shore at 1505 hours. The attack- and other crew members able to assist. ing torpedo boats were later identified as French-built (U) Reports received from damage control motor torpedeo boats of the Israeli Ayah class. These central indicated that the flooding was under control.

30 UNCLASSIFIED

... UNCLASSIFIED

Power was restored to the bridge at 1520 hours, but Sixth Fleet Reacts (U) steering control could not be regained from the bridge, making it necessaryto give rudder orders by telephone (U) Aboard his flagship, the guided-missile to men in the "after steering" compartment, and for light cruiser U.S.S. Little Rock (CLG-4), the Com- some time they operated the ship's heavy rudder by mander, Sixth Fleet received (from the Saratoga) the hand. Liberty's messagesabout the air and torpedo boat (U) At 1536 hours, the Israeli torpedo attacks. At 1450 hours, fifty minutes after the attack boats again approached the Liberty from the star- began, he ordered the aircraft carrier U.S.S. America board, at a range of five miles. During the next hour (CV A~6) to launch four armed A-4 Skyhawks and the and a quarter, the boats returned toward the ahip carrier U.S.S. Saratoga (CV A~O) to launch four several times before disappearing over the horizon armed A-1 attack planes to defend the Liberty. The without further signal or action. America was also directed to provide fighter cover and (V) Communications were restored at tanker aircraft to refuel the fighters, if necessary.16 about 1600 hours, and Commander McGonagle dic- At this time, the Sixth Fleet was located south of tated a message to Lieutenant Bennett providing Crete, approximately 450 miles west of the Liberty. additional information concerning the attack by un- id~ntified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats (U) At 1516 hours, Commander, Task had been identified as Israeli. A preliminary estimate Force 60, implemented Sixth Fleet's directive and of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the instructed his carrier pilots to "destroy or drive off condition of the ship, was also provided. Transmission any attackers who are clearly making attacks on the of this messagewas delayed because shipboard emer- Liberty. Remain over international waters. Defend gency measures demanded immediate attention to yourself if attacked.I'IT preserve the safety and stability of the ship and (U) On the heels of this action, at 1520 minimize new casualties. hours, the Commander, Sixth Fleet, informed U.S. (V) Fifteen minutes later two unidentified Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) of the at- jet aircraft approached the Liberty from the starboard tack and aircraft being deployedto defend the Liberty. side and reconnoitered from a distance before disap- It was estimated that the first aircraft would be on pearing from the scene. the scene at 1715hours. II

(U) U.S.S. LI"ttJe Rock, a guided missile light cruiser and the flagship of the Commander,Sixth Fleet. (Photograph courtBlY of the Department of the Navy.) (Figure i, UNCLASSIFIED)

UNCLASSIFIED 31 UNCLASSIFIED

(V) Following this, at 1549 hours, the (DST). Walt Rostow informed the President and Commander, Sixth Fleet relayed to the Chief of Naval immediately drafted a "hot line" message to the Operations (CNO) and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Kremlin. President Johnson approved the following Navy Europe, (CINCUSNA VEUR) his message of text which was sent to Chairman Kosygin at 1117 instruction to the carriers concerning the use of force hours (DST): and observance of Israeli and Egyptian territorial limits. 19 We have juat learned that V.5.S. Liberty, an auxiliary ahip, hu apparently been torpedoed by larael forcH in error at!' Port (V) Commander, Task Force 63, reacting Said. We have inatructed our carrier, Saratoga now in the to the Liberty's plight, sent a messageto Sixth Fleet Mediterranean to dilpatch aircraft to the lCene to inveltigate. We wh you to know tbat inveltigation iI the Bole purpOle of at 1610 hours recommending that fleet ocean tug thil flight of aircraft, and hope that you will take appropriate V.S.S. Papago (ATF-160) of the Abnaki class be atepl to lee that proper partiN are informed. We have pal8ed diverted to proceed at maximum speed to assist the thil me..age to Chemyakov but feel that you Ihould know of Liberty. thil development urrently." The message was received in M~cow at 1124 hours Washington Informed (U) (DST).25 At 1210 hours Kosygin replied by "hot line" that he had passed the messageto President Nasser (U) An hour and eleven minutes after the of Egypt.26Thereafter instructions were issued by JCS Liberty was attacked, the National Military Command and Commander, Sixth Fleet to withdraw the aircraft Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon was phoned by launched to defend the Liberty. By 1849 hours Sixth CINCEUR and told of the situation asknown. At 0915 Fleet reported all planes recalled and accounted for.27 hours (DST), 8 June, NMCC phoned the NSA Sigint Command Center to notify NSA of the attack.2o (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance notified the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, (U) At the White House, President Lyn- by phone at 1700 hours that all news releases on the don B. Johnsonwas busy telephoning cabinet members Liberty affair would be made at the Washington level and congressionalleaders when he was interrupted at -no releases were to be made aboard ships. This 0949 hours (DST) by Walt Rostow, his Special Assist- information was relayed to the Commander, Sixth ant for National Security Affairs, and told that "the Fleet.21 Liberty, has been torpedoed in the Mediterranean. The ship is located 60-100 miles north of Egypt. Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the 6th fleet. Libert}" Recovers (U) ...no knowledge of the submarine or surface vessel which committed this act shall keep you informed. ,,21 (U) Unaware of what was happening at fleet headquarters or in Washington and Tel Aviv, the (U) Roatowphoned again at 1014 hours to Liberty was struggling to regain full engine power and advise the President that the Liberty was "listing to reach deeper water. The gyro compass was out but badly to starboard. The Saratoga has launched 4-A4's and 4-A1,s ,.22 the pilot-house magnetic compass appeared to be working. Israel Reports Error (U) (U) The ship remained at general quarters while the crew effected post-attack emergency meas- (U) In Tel Aviv, Israel, the U.S. Naval ures. Sixth Fleet was notified that the Liberty had Attache, Commander E. C. Castle, was called to the carried out the emergency destruction of all crypto Foreign Liaison Office, Israel Defence Force at approx- publications and key cards. Her only means of com- imately 1600 hours (local time) and told that Israeli munication remained the hicom circuits.29 air and sea forces had attacked the Liberty in error. (U) Liberty's medical officer, Lieutenant Immediately the U.S. Defense Attache office sent a Richard F. Kiepfer, Medical Corps, USN, performed Flash messageto advise the White House, Department one major operation and gave emergency treatment to of State, and others of this development.1J wounded men as best he could. He manned the main battle dressing station, together with one hc.pital Johnson Informs Kosygin (U) corpsman, while thE! other corpsman operated a sec- ondary station in the forward part of the ship. Both (U) The message was received by the stations were flooded with seriously injured men and White House, NMCC, and other members of the U.S. for a time there was little opportunity to do more than military and intelligence community at 1045 hours give first aid. Bleeding was stopped, men were given 32 UNCLASSIFIED

;i.Ij ~z ~ ~ ~c= ~ ~ -rn (V) The V.S.S. Amerit:.I was ordered by the Commander. Sixtb Fleet to launch rour Skybawks to t'" -'W! derend the uoerly. ~ (?botOlr.ph rteay of the Deportment nf the NoyY) ~ = (Fi",rei. UNCLASSIFIED) 00 s~ t 0 -SZeft!T SP8KB -

morphine for pain and treated for shock, and those naled a wave-ofI to the transfer attempt. Simultane- with lung wounds were treated to ease breathing. ously, the helicopter pilot said he could not make the (U) At 1750 hours, Sixth Fleet advised the transfer becauseof the Liberty~s speed. A few minutes Liberty that destroyers were on the way at maximum later an impromptu package weighted with an orange speed and that the Liberty was to proceed on a course was dropped from the helicopter onto the forecastle. of 340. magnetic until 100 miles from present position, Inside the package was a messagewritten on a calling then turn 270. magnetic. card of "Commander Ernest Carl Castle, United U.S. Naval Attache Helicopters to States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, Tel Aviv." On the back of the Libert? (U) the card was written, "Have you casualties?" Using an (U) Back in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Foreign AIdis lamp, the Liberty attempted (or ten to fifteen Liaison Office was arranging for a helicopter to fly minutes, to reply to this message with "affirmative Commander Castle, U.S. Naval Attache, to the Lib- casualties." It was not clear to thOle on the ship that erty so that he might communicate with its command- the reply was understood. Castle, however, had re- ing officer. The helicopter left Dov Hoss (now Sde- ceived the messagebut was uncertain as to whether Dov) airfield on the northern side of Tel Aviv at 1810 the number flashed was four or forty. The bodies of hours and proceeded directly to the Liberty. By 1835 three crew members had not yet been removed from hours, the Israeli Sikorsky helicopter, carrying Com- the forecastle and must have been observed by those mander Castle, was over the ship hovering at approx- in the helicopter. With the waning light and approach imately 30 feet from bridge level. Lettering on the of dusk the helicopter departed the ship at approxi- tail of the helicopter was SA32K and on the fuselage mately 1900 hours.]! were the numerals 00 or D6. The helicopter had (U) Shortly thereafter, at 1915 hours, the neither an electric megaphone nor hand-held signal Liberty transmitted to CNO a post-attack situation report. 32 light with which to communicate with the Liberty.JO (U) Wearing civilian clothes, Commander Israeli Helicopter Conversations (U) Castle could not convey his identity to the bridge of ~ Back at NSA, within an hour of Liberty but by visual means indicated that he wished to be lowered aboard the ship. At first, Commander learning that the Liberty had been torpedoed, the Director, NSA sent a messageto alII ]inter- McGonagle prepared to receive the attache but, con- cept sites requesting a special search of all communi- sidering the obstructions in the forecastle area, sig- cations that might reflect the attack or reaction.]] No

(PhotQIraph courtMY of the Department of the'Navy.) (Fi,u,.~i. UNCLASSIFIED),!

34 -Q~~~~'"U':'...,A\.r. A u..nT-.~w"n "'~~ (b)Ib) 13)II) -50 USC 403

Ib) 13) -18 USC 798 Ib) 13)-P.L. 86-36 8HeRH!f Spe~~H

(U) U.S.S. PapaKo,ocean tug or the Sixth Fleet. was sent to aid the llnertyand was used to recover classified material adrift from the torpedo hole in the liberty's hull. (Photograph courte.y of the Department of the Navy.) (Figurei. UNCLASSIFIED)

communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo suffering fr.om the loss of blood and experiencing a boats werr available. However. °lne of the airborne great deal of pain from his wounds. By remaining on platforms I ,had collected voice the bridge. McGonagle believed his presence there conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and would give reassurance to the crew. The Liberty's the control tower at Hazor Airfield (near Tel Aviv). doctor. Lieutenant Kiepfer, had seen McGonagle on Control told helicopter 815 at 1431 hours that "there the bridge but made no effort to get him below to a is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped battle dressing station. In Lieutenant Kiepher's words, into the water from it. You will try to rescue them." The Commanding Officer at that time W88 like a rock upon Although there were other references to a search for which the reet of the men supported themselve.. To know that he W88on the hridge rrievoully wounded. yet having the conn the men in the water, no personnel from the Liberty and helm and ...calling every change of coone, W88the thing had jumped overboard. At 1434 hours, the control that told the men "we're going to live." When I went to the tower told helicopter 815 that the ship was Egyptian bridge and law this. I should lay that I knew that I could only inault this man by .uggelting that he he taken below for and that he could return home. At 1510 hours, the treatment of his wound.. I didn't even .uggeet IL IS controller asked 815 to identify the nationality of any (U) The attack had demanded the very survivors. Subsequently, the helicopter pilot reported best from the Liberty's crew and they had responded seeingan American flag on the ship. In another portion exceptionally well. Damage control competence mini- of the conversation, the pilot of helicopter 815 reported mized Liberty's structural wounds and kept her afloat. that number GTR 5 was written on the ship's side The engineering crew under Lieutenant George Golden and that behind the ship were several uninflated life maintained power to the engines so that the Liberty boats. At 1521 hours the helicopters were instructed could move away from dangerous shoals in the attack to return home.J4 area and head toward the Sixth Fleet. The medical Liberty Licks Its Wounds (U) officer and his two corpsmenneeded help and they got it. In Kiepfer's words, (U) As darkness settled over the Liberty, Any time we needed one volunteer. we'd ,et ten. If anything Commander McGonagle remained on the bridge, still had to be done ,.. there were hand. everywhere. When we

SHeRHT SP8lfH 35 "9~..RBB~;7~

uked for two pint. of bl~ for tran.fulion, we had people on "(UJ U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry 7816-67; Liberty the adjoilLmc tablea who were .aying, "If you need lOme, I have Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proeeedinp. thia type." Theae were people already wounded.'6 'J(UJ MG J.R. Ru.., USA, JCS. "Report of the FaCt NSA civilian, Robert 1.. Wilson, remembered, too, Findinr Team, U.S.S. Liberty Incident, a Jun 1967", p. 39. that surprisingly there was no panic. When the men (Hereafter cited al the Ruel Report.) were ordered to do something, they did it. Everyone "(UJ U.S.S. Sarato60 mac 081237Z Jun 1967. was kept busy. Though some were obviously scared to "(U) U.S.S. Soratala mac 081254Z Jun 1967. "(UJ COMSIXTHFLT mlg 08125OZ Jun 1967. death, there was simply no panic; nobody ran rampant "(UJ CTF 60 IDI( 081316Z Jun 1967. through the ship. No one slept much that night. 'I(UJ COMSIXTHFLT mac 08132OZ Jun 1967. Helping the wounded became everyone's job -even "(UJ COMSIXTHFLT mar 081349Z Jun 1967. th~e with no medical training. Men learned to dress '.(UJ National Military Command Center, "Memo- randum for the Record, 1530 EDT, a Jun 1967 and NSA Senior wounds or do stitches. In some cases to quiet a man, Operationl Officer Loc, <1130-1530,a Jun 1967. he was given a bottle of rum to drown his pain. With "(U) The White Houle Daily Diary. a Jun 1967. the lengthening hours of darkness, deepening depres- 9:49 e.m. telephone call from Welt Roetow, p. 2, and the White sion and shock caused some men to break down and HoUle Memorandum to the Preeident from W. W. Roatow, 9:50 a.m., a Jun 1967. succumb to the fears they had been able to restrain "(U) The White Houle Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, during the attack and immediately thereafter.37 10:14a.m. telephone call from Walt Roetow. p. 3, and Memorandum (U) Alone, battered, and scarred but un- to tbe Preeident from W. W. Roetow, 10: 15 a.m., a Jun 1967. vanquished, the Liberty steamed steadily on through- "(UJ Other addreu- for U.S. DefenaeAttache out the night toward a rendezvous with Sixth Fleet Office, Tel Aviv, mlg 081414Z JUD 1967, were: OSD, CNO, JCS, Sixth ~..t, and NAVEUR. USDAO, Tel Aviv mag 151615Z Jun destroyers. Three musters were taken to identify the 1967. dead, the seriously injured, and th~e who were "(U) Yurij Niko]aevich Chemyakov was Miniater- missing. Casualty messageswere completed as quickly Counaelor at the Soviet Embauy in Washin(ton, D.C., from 1965 as p~sible and necessary messagenotifications sent. to 1969. He often lubitituted for the Ambauador. "(U) The White Houle Daily Diary, a Jun 1967, p. 3 Ind "hot line" mIl to Chairman K..YKin fom Preaident Johnlon, Notes a Jun 1967, 11:17 a.m. Source document. art in the "Cri.i. Collection" of tht NSA Hi.tory "(U) The White Houle Daily Diary, 8 Jun 1967, p. Collection. 6. "(V) JCS mlg 081529Z Jun 1967, and COM- '(V) U.S.S. Liberty mag 080034Z Jun 1967. SIXTHFLT mlg 081649Z Jun 1967. '(V) U.S.S. Liberty, "Ship Weather Ob.ervation II(V) CINCVSNAVEUR mag 081517Z Jun 1967. Sheet," 8 Jun 1967. "(V) COMSIXTHFLT mag 081514Z Jun 1967. '(V) CINCUSNAVEUR mog 151003Z Jun 1967. JO(U) VSDAO, Tel Aviv mag 151615Z Jun 1967. '(V) U.S. Navy Court af Inquiry 7816.07; Liberty JI(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816~7; LiMrty Incideut, 8 Juu 1967; Record of Proceedings. Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedinga. '(V) Ibid. J'(L") V.5.S. Liberty mil 081715Z Jun 1967. '(U) U.S.S. Liberty mag 080742Z Juu 1967. JJ(V) '(V) U.S, Navy Court of Inquiry 7816.07; Liberty ~e~~ Iucideut, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedings. '(V) Robert 1.. Wilaou, oral interviaw tranacript, 6 May 1980. .l--,.IU) u.s. NavyColiri of Inq~~7816-67; Liberty IncideDt.8~lIn 1967;Re~rd:of Proceed~... '(V) U.S.S. Liberty mag 080856Z Juu 1967. ! "IU):' ~id:, : I.(U) U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816.07; Liberty i "IUT : Oral ~tmie. traDlcripta: Robert L. WillOD, Iucideut, 8 Juu 1967; Record of Proceedings. ! 6 ~y 1980;,CTCCl):d~"W. WIY, 6 Jun 1980;aDd CTC Terry L. I'(U) U.S.S. Saratolo mag 081235Z Jun 1967. ;f ~cFarl~;,c23,JuD~c1980.

j::::.;;~~:~::~--P (b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

36 e9~:RBB~:!fI*ll HM..BtB ',~ ee:C.H~iIfel:"rl:':::BII8 9~~¥

'..j ee:;PfBfif~lff*t.

Chapter V

The clallitication of parovapJ.. in thi. chapter which deriue froM tM .tate~nt of the r.ra«li Defence Forc«1 Court of f1lquiry Na.val Operations ordered the target erased from the relUlt. from a ,ouernment of f,roel requell to th. Deportmentof combat information center plot table because he had Stat. that the information "b. treated on a r..triceed and conti- no current information u to its location. Thus from drntial bOli.." this moment on (approximately 1100 hoUrs) the Lib- erty no longer appeared on the combat information ~~I- The Israeli Defence Forces Court of center plot table at Israeli Navy Headquarters. Inquiry into the V.S.S. Liberty incident presented its -fGt- Between 1100 and 1200 hours, Navy findings to the Military Advocate General who rec- Headquarters received reports that AI' Arish (occupied ommended that a preliminary judicial inquiry be held by Israeli ground troops) was being shelled from the to determine if there was any individual or individuals sea. These reports came from two separate sources, against whom any charges should be brought. The the Air-Ground-Support Officer and the Israeli South- examining judge was Lieutenant Colonel Yishaya ern Command. At 1200 hours, the Head of the Naval Yerushalmi. He gave his decision under date of 21 Department ordered three torpedo boats of the division July 1967. From the report of that decision comesthe at ABhdod to proceed toward AI 'Arish to locate the following Israeli account and explanation of the attack target. Air Force Headquarters was advised of this on the Liberty' navy action and it was agreed that, when the torpedo boats located the target, aircraft would be dispatched. Chronology of Israeli Actions (U) Accordingly, the commander of the torpedo boat division was ordered to establish radio contact with !S~ At 0000 hours (local time) on B June the aircraft as soon as they appeared over the target. 1967, an Israeli aircraft, with a naval observer on (U) The torpedo boats located an uniden" board, located a ship 70 miles west of Tel Aviv. On tified target at 1341 hours 20 miles north of AI .Arish tbe basis of this information, Israeli Navy Headquar- and reported that it was moving toward Port Said at ters marked the object in red (meaning an Wlidentified a speed of 30 knots. A few minutea later, the torpedo target) on the combat information center plot table. ~ At about 0900 hours, another Israeli boat division commander reported that the target, plane reported sighting a ship 20 miles north of AI then 17 miles from him, was moving at 28 knots, and .Arish. The pilot reported that the ship was ..coloured since he could not overtake it, he requested the gray, very bulky, and the bridge amidships." The ship dispatch of aircraft towards it. This was done; the was then identified by the Israelis as a supply veasel aircraft executed a run over the ship (Liberty) in an of the American Navy; thereupon, the marking on the attempt to identify it but saw no flag or other combat information center plot table was changed to identification mark. They did, however, report to green (a neutral ship). headquarters that the ship was painted gray and two -!,v"!- Later that morning at 1005 hours, the guns were situated in the bow. On the assumption Naval Liaison Officer at Israeli Ail' Force Headquarters that the ship was an enemy target, Air Force Head- reported to the Acting Chief of Naval OperatiOns at quarters gave the aircraft an order to attack. Navy Headquarters that the ship sighted earlier was -fG1- During the first stage of the attack "an electromagnetic audio-aurveillance ship of the the aircraft strafed the ship with cannon and machine U.S. Navy, named Liberty, whosemarking was G.T.R.- guns and during the second stage dropped bombs on 5." Upon receiving this data, the Acting Chief of it which caused fires and smoke aboard the ship. As ~9~~~ti::,.r:w~ 37

L- e6~~PIBfi~,~I*1r-

(U) Israeli motor torpedo boat of the class which attacked the Liherlf'. (Photocraphcourt.y or Jane', Filhting Ship,.) (Filure i, UNCLASSIFIED)

the torpedo boats drew near, the aircraft were ordered -f67- Throughout the contact, no Israeli to leave the target. During the last run, a low-flying plane or torpedo boat saw an American or any other aircraft reported to headquarters that it saw the flag on the ship. It waa only an Israeli helicopter, sent marking "CPR-5" on the ship's hull. after the attack. to render assistance -if necessary ~ Upon receipt of this information about -that noticed a small American flag flying over the the ahip's marking, the Naval Operations Branch, at ship. At this time, the vessel waa finally identified ''as approximately 1420 hours, ordered the torpedo boat an audio-8urveillance ship of the U.S. Navy." division commander not to attack inasmuch as the aircraft may have p~sibly identified the target incor- Israeli Prosecutor's Charges of rectly. The division commander was ordered to ap- proach the ship in order to establish visual contact Negligence (U) and to identify it. He reported that the ship appeared -ter Based on the foregoing account, the to be a merchant or supply veasel and that when he Israeli Chief Military Prosecutor submitted a number signalled the ship and requested its identification the of charges of negligence to the examining judge of the ship replied with a signal meaning "identify yourself Preliminary Inquiry. The examining judge was then to first." At the same time, the division commander was decide whether or not there waa sufficient prima facie consulting a book on the identification of Arab Navies evidence to justify bringing the accused to trial for and making comparisons with the target before him. He concluded that the target was an Egyptian supply negligence. ship named El-Kasir. Simultaneously, the commander -t8+ Given below are the charges brought of another of the torpedo boats informed the division by the Chief Military Prosecutor together with the commander that he, too, thought the ship was the El- judge's findings. Kasir. Therefore, at 1436 houn, the division com- -fer 1. Charge: The first charge related to mander authorized the torpedo attack to begin. Only the failure of the Acting Chief of Naval Operations to after a torpedo struck the ship and one of the torpedo report to the Head of the Naval Department that the boats approached it from the other aide were the American ship, Liberty, was seen in the morning hours markUlgB "CTR-5" noticed on the hull. Then the order of the day of the incident sailing in the vicinity of the was gi',en to ceasethe attack. Israeli coast. 38 ee:;ffBfi:;7...:tL ~9~~IB6~':w;f*1.

Finding: Though the Head of the Finding: Though the torpedo boat Naval Department testified that he did not know of division commander claimed he never received the Lhe Liberty's presence in the area on the day of the messagenot to attack, the deputy commander oc the incident, the Officer of the Watch at Navy Headquar- boat te8tified that he had received the mel8are and ters testified that the Head of the Naval Department pa88edit on to the division commander. The examining was on the Navy Command Bridge when the Com- judge believed that, in the heat of battle, it was manding Officer of the Navy ordered the marking (on p<»sible that the messagee8caped the awarenessof the combat information cen1~erplot table) of the the division commander and, in any event, there was American supply ship changed to green (indicating a insufficient evidence to commit any accu8edperson to neutral veaael). Since the J\.cting Chief of Naval trial. Operations was an eyewitness to the event, he con- -f:et- 5. Charge: That it was negligenceto cluded that the Head of the Naval Department did give the order to attack a warship without previously know about the presence of an American supply ship establishing, beyond doubt, ita national identity and in the area. In view of this, the examining judge found without taking into account the presence of the Amer- no negligence on the part of the accused. ican 8hip, Liberty, in the vicinity of the coast of -t6-r- 2. Charge: That the Acting Chief of Israel. Naval Operations failed to report to the Head of the Finding: To the examining judge, Naval Department that the hull markings on the ship there was no doubt that the dominant factors in the .observed by one of the attacking aircraft were similar initial attack decision were the speed and course of to thoee on the Liberty. the target. Th~e in command were entitled to aaaume Finding: Witnesses testified that that the reported speed (28 knots) of the ship was when the Naval Liaison Officer at the Air Force correct, within the usual limits of reasonable error of Headquarters telephoned the Naval Command Bridge 10-15 percent, relying upon the existing means of about the hull markings and their similarity to thoee determining the speed of the target. It was, therefore, of the Liberty. the officer to whom he spoke repeated concluded that this was a military vessel, and since the message in a loud voice so that it was heard by all the Liberty was classed as a cargo ship, there was no present on the Command Bridge including the Head reason for surmising, in view of the speed, that the of the Naval Department. The examining judge stated, target could p~ibly be the ship, Liberty. If one adds therefore, that there was thus no reason to repeat to to this other factors such as the report of the shelling the Head of the Naval Department a fact that had of the AI .Arish coast for hours on end, the ship's been audibly announced to thoee present. The charge course toward Port Said, the aircraft report that the was dismissed. target was a warship and carried no naval or other -fer 3. Charge: That the Naval Liaison identification marks, and the ship's location clC8eto Officer at the Air Force Headquarters was negligent shore in a hattle zone, the cumulative effect negates by not reporting to the Air Force the information any presumption whatsoever of a connection between about the presence of the Liberty in the area. the American supply ship and the target discovered Finding: The examining judge con- by the torpedo boats. Thus, the examining judge sidered this charge unfounded. The responsibility for concluded that the assumption it was an enemy ship the defense of Israel against enemy naval actions rests was reasonableand that the order given to the aircraft solely with the Navy. Even though Air Force Head- to attack was justified. quarters ordered the aircraft to attack, it was really te~ 6. Charge: That it was negligent to an order issued by the Navy, passed on through Air order the torpedo boat to attack the ship upon an Force Headquarters. The Naval Liaison Officer at the unfounded presumption that it was an Egyptian war- Air Force Headquarters was entitled to assume that ship, and this as a consequenceof not taking reason- the decision to attack was made after considering this able steps to make proper identification. report about the Liberty. There was no reason to feed Finding: The examining judge con- the Air Force with information and considerations sidered it noteworthy that the identification of the that did not concern it. target as the El- Kosir was made both by the division -fer- 4. Charge: That the Naval Depart- commander and the commander of a second torpedo ment's order not to attack the ship (the Liberty), "for boat. Upon examining photos of the two ships, he was fear of error and out of uncertainty with regard to the satisfied that a likeness existed between them, and true identity of the ship," was not delivered to the that an error of identification was p~sible, especially torpedo boat division. when the identification was made while the ship was ee;,.FlD!;,.'fIXt 39 "Q~:~IBB~..EfI*t

(U) U.S.S. LIner/.' was-mistaken by the Israelis ror this Egyptian ship. EI-K8SJr. (PhotO(Taphcourteey of Jane'. Fi,htin, Ship..) (Figure i. UNCLASSIFIED) clouded in smoke. The Chief Military Prosecutor (U) In summation, the judge concluded argued that this identification was unreasonable be- that in all the circumstances of the case the conduct cause it was inconceivable to think that this auxiliary of the naval officers concerned in the Liberty incident ship El- Kasir could shell the AI .Arish coast or that could not be considered unreasonable to an extent she could move at a speed of 28 knots. In reply, the which would justify committal for trial. examining judge said that it seemed reasonableto him that the El- Kasir might have been part of the vessels Explanation Reexamined (U) that shelled the coast and failed to get away from the (U) Reexamination of Israel's explanation area or that the ship had come to assist in the of why its air and naval forces attacked the Liberty evacuation of Egyptian soldiers struggling away from reveals egregious errors in both command judgments areas occupied by Israeli forces. Further, the judge and operational procedures. said that there was no doubt that the Liberty's refusal -fet- The incident is doubly tragic when it to identify herself to the torpedo boats contributed is realized that three hours before the attack occurred, largely to the error of identification. Israeli Navy Headquarters was made aware of the

(U) U.s.s. £loert.r arriving in Malta arter the attack. (Figurei. UNCLASSIFIED) 40 ee~:FIBB~:~.~~ eep~PlBB~~~I."::'

Liberty's presence, including exact name, ship type~ mander becausehe believed it quite p~ible that the and hull number. The first error in responsible military meBBage"escaped the awareneBBof the division com- operations came when the Liberty's identity was totally mander in the heat of battle," erased at 1100 hours froJ:Dthe combat information ~ The final error was the identification center plot table at Naval Headquarters because no of the Liberty as the Egyptian supply ship El-Kasir. exact location for her was known after 0000 hours on The fact that two separate torpedo boat commanders 8 June. made the same falae identification only raises the ~8j The next sin of omission was the question of the veracity of both commanders. The El- Israeli Navy's failure to share with the Air Force full Kasir was approximately one-quarter of the Liberty's details about the Liberty's presence off the A1 .Arish tonnage, about one-haIf its length, and offered a coast. This combat parochialism was alm~t certainly radically different silhouette, To claim that the Liberty a factor contributing to the attack on the Liberty - closely resembled the El-Kasir was most illogical, the examining judge's opinion to the contrary. Even (U) The Department of State expressed the Israeli examining judge alluded to such poeaibility its view of the torpedo attack in these words: when he said: The lub.8quent attack by !lraeli torpedo boat., .ub8tantially Indeed, whoever peruael the Imple evidence pfMented to me, after th. v_I wu or Ihould have been identified by !lraeli may conceivably draw lame I~n r8lardiDc the relatioD8 military forca, manil..t. the lame reckleu dilregard for between the two &rm8 of the Tarael Defence Forc8l, which human life. The ailhouette and conduct of V.S.S. Lib~rty were involved in the incident, and the operational procedurel readily diltinruilhed it from any v_I that could have be~n -f;et- in time of war In spite of the fact that the Israeli Air conaideredhoatile lt could and Ihould have been acrutinized vilually at cloae range before torpedoa were fired The United Statal Goyernment lIp~ct. the Goyernment of !lrael Force did not have a11 the information about the aJao to tUe the dilciplinary meUUrN which international Liberty that was available to the Navy, the pilots of law requiru in the .vent of wrongful conduct by the military the attacking planes were at fault for failing to make peraonnel of a State...(and] to ilaue inatructiona neC881aryto p~itive identification of the Liberty before attacking enaure that United States peraoDDel and property 1ril1 not the ship. Though the pilots testified to the contrary, again be endangered by the wrongful .ctiona of !lraeli every official interview of numerous Liberty crewmen military peraoDDel.' (U) When NSA's Deputy Director read the gave consistent evidence that indeed the Liberty was decision of the Israeli Defence Forces Preliminary flying an American flag -and, further, the weather Inquiry, he summed up his personal feelings on the conditions were ideal to assure its easyobservance and subject by calling it "a nice whitewash.'" identification. These circumstances -prior identifi- cation of the Liberty and easy visibility of the Amer- Notes ican flag -prompted the Department of State to inform the Israeli Government that Source document. are in the "Cri.i. Collection" of the NSA Hi.tory the later military attack by Taraeli aircraft on the U.S.S. Collection. Librrty iI quite literally incomprehenlible. AI a minimum, '(U) Jarael DefeDceFolca, Prelimioarv InQuiry File the attack mult be condemned u an act of military rIck. 1/67, 21 July 1967. Forwarded to Director, NSAI I_ne.. refiecting wanton dilr8lard for human life.' -ter In the chain of mistakes, the nest one '(U) Department of State Telegram No. 210139, to occurred when the division commander of the attacking the U.S. Embauy, Tel Aviv, 11 June 1967. torpedo boats failed to hear his deputy tell him that '(U) Ibid. Naval Headquarters had ordered the boats not to 4(U) A peDDedloDc-haod comment by Louia W. Tordella, Deputy Director; NSA. 26 Auguat 1967, attached to the attack for fear of having mistaken the ship's identity. copy of tbe Jarael Defence Forcel Prelimioary Inquiry (cited in The Israeli examining judge exonerated the com- footnote1).

(b) (J (b) (~ -50 USC 403-18 (b) (~ USC 798-P.L. (b) (~ 86-36

e6P,PlBB~~\L 41 A- N

""

(V) V.g.g. DIY/s. one o( the two destroyers to reach the lIoerly. runs. line to the stricken ship. The Ol..ia &S8umed .11 communications (unctions (or the lIoerly. I~ Q881 PhotOl,aph COUrt-, of Hobort 1. WiIaoa. NSA.) (F;"".;. UNCLASSIFIED) S9:"'~'IBB~~!f1*l. -

Chapter VI

(V) Sixteen and one-half hours after the America reached the Liberty and began evacuating Liberty was attacked, V.S. assistance finally reached the seriously wounded back to the carrier. One hour her. At 0025 hours (local time) on 8 June, the later, the America rendezvoused with the Liberty. destroyers V.S.S. Davis (DD-937) and V.S.S. Massey Thereafter, the group of ships set a course for Soudha (DD-778) rendezvousedwith the ship at 33-0IN, 31- Bay, Crete, some 300 miles away. 59E, a position 420 miles east-southeast of Soudha Bay, Crete. The carrier, V.S.S. America. was still 138 miles from the Liberty, closing at 30 knots.. Commander, Sixth Fleet Arrives (U)

(U) Later that afternoon, Vice Admiral Medical Assistance (U) William L Martin, Commander, Sixth Fleet, boarded (V) The Commander of Destroyer Squad- the Liberty for one hour to visit its captain and crew ron Twelve, Captain H.G. Leahy, and other personnel and to personally survey the damages sustained. Fol- from the Davis and Massey immediately boarded the lowing his visit, Vice Admiral Martin recommendedto Liberty to assis~ in controlling damage and in treating the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, Admiral the injured. Only after this transfer did Commander John S. McCain, Jr., that the Liberty proceed direct McGonagle relinquish his watch on the bridge. He was to Malta for dry docking rather than to Soudha Bay exhausted and in danger of having his wounds become first because of the primary necessity to protect the infected. Temporary command of the Liberty was cryptomaterial and equipment. Admiral McCain gave assumed by the Operations Officer of Destroyer Squad- his approval.' ron Twelve. Upon completion of a medical assessment, (U) Also visiting the Liberty during the the Commander, Sixth Fleet was advised that the ..late afternoon of the 9th was Captain Russell Arthur, Liberty was ready to transfer 15 seriously wounded Sixth Fleet Maintenance Officer, who reported to the and 9 dead to the America when its helicopters U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe the following cor- arrived. The possibility of anyone being alive in the rective actions: "established water-tight boundaries at flooded spaces was deemed unlikely. Bulkheads were frames 52 and 78 and at second-deck level and made firm and the flooding contained, so that the Liberty repairs to gyro, engine-order telegraph, rudder-angle was completely mobile to 10 knots. The Davis assumed indicator, fathometer, sound-powered phones and all communications functions for the Liberty. Further, bridge-steering control." The Liberty's crew was aug- Sixth Fleet was advised that, upon arrival of the fleet mented as necessary, and accompanied by the tug ocean tug, V.S.S. Papago. the destroyer Masseycould Papaga, and the destroyer, Dauis, she proceeded return to fieet duties.2 toward Malta at 10 knots.s (V) While Liberty's on-board needs were being tended to, two boats from the destroyers Replacement Inquiries (U) searched the area around the Liberty for two hours looking for classified papers that might be washing out ~S 888, A p~sible replacement for the Liberty from the pear-shaped, gaping hole in the fiooded was already being considered. At approximately 1300 Research Department spaces; no classified items were hours, the Director, Naval Security Group Europe recovered.) sent a me9s~g.et the America and (V) At approximately 0915 hours, all s~ip~ the Little Rock requesting the got under way and headed toward t_~~_carrierAm.erica status 0 Arabic mgulSts (civilian and military) aboard from the the Liberty for possible transfer to the V.8.S. Bel- --j-b)(1) W_~~Dl.i ~'!-'- ~g~.Q~t~ ~11.\J:t~tBI,8 e:-.':.¥ ~O~ill)i~~_\l. 43 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ee:~'mB~:~\L

(U) Helicopter from the V.S.S. America lowers a Jitter to receive the Libert?'s wounded. The helicopter took the wounded hack to America, which was several miles away. !~e eeQj Photograph courtesy of Robert L. WiJIOn, NSA.J (Figurei. UNCLASSIFIED) mont, another technical research ship just arrived in ruptured Research Department's operations space NorfOIWi for repairs.6 Three hours later, at prompted NAVEUR to direct Sixth Fleet on 9 June to 1555, replied to this inquiry. The only do whatever ia feasible to keep any Soviet ships out of Liberty's remaining Ara lc1inguist aboard the Liberty was wake maiDtaiD oblervstion of Liberty', wake and if poaaible find out what sort of documents are being lost iD the wake take Robert L. Wilson (NSA civilian); all otpPf!l WPfPI whatever step' may be reasonable and appropriate to reduce wounded (and evacuated};~illed, or missing~ ~, pouibility of compromiae, noting that a compromise could have also forwarded Lieutenant Bennett's request that a both political and tecbnicalupecu.1 team from the Naval SecurityG~oup Europe meet the (U) Liberty's escorts reacted quickly and Liberty when she docked at Malt-a to assist in evalu- most effectively to minimize the uncontrollable loss of ation of compromise of cryptomateri~ls and prepara- sensitive materials. Though a Soviet guided-missile tion of reports.' destroyer (DDG 626/4) of the Kildin class remained in the vicinity of the Liberty between 1320 and 1600 Recovery of Sensitive Materials{y> ,hours on the 9th, she was kept under constant sur- \veillance and did not stop or recover anything. The (U) Mounting concern over the pos8ib~e Davis, Massey, or Papago trailed in Liberty's wake- loss of sensitive documents drifting out of the Liberty's- constantly to recover papers adrift. The first night,

1 e e ~;PIB H~, "-;f*t.

there was, quite naturally, a clamor for specific information about casualties -their names and extent of injuries. The Liberty forwarded the best information obtainable, but data about th~e missing was elusive. During the Israeli attack and immediately thereafter, the Liberty conducted no search for per- sonnel becausenone had been reported overboard and she was trying to clear the area as soon as possible. On 10 June, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe notified JCS that the Liberty's flooded compartment could not be opened to account for missing personnel until the ship was drydocked. To do otherwise would risk further flooding and peril the ship and the lives of the survivors who were taking the crippled vesselto port. I I

Assistanceto NSA Per~onnel ~e66e~

te ee8j At NSA, when it was learned (through Navy personnel channels) that its employees Donald L. Blalock and Allen M. Blue were listed among Liberty's casualties, steps were taken to obtain more definite information and to notify next of kin. Late on the night of 8-9 June, the Chief and Deputy Chief, NSA Civilian Personnel(Messrs. William M. Holleran and Albert W. tnino) drove to the Silver Spring home (U) VADM William I. Martin (right), Com- of Allen Blue's wife, Patsy, to notify her that Allen mander of Sixth ~eet, visited the liberty on was missing in action.'2 the afternoon of 9 June. ~~ ~~Q~ On 10 June, the Director, NSA sent II~ (;~Qj Photograph courtelY oCRobert L. Wilson. NSA.) (Figurei. UNCLASSIFIED) a messageto NSA Europe directing that a represent- ative be sent to meet the Liberty at Malta to provide the Papago picked up one classified item ten miles maximum assistance and guidance in respect to NSA behind Liberty.9 personnel, local liaison, and informational reporting to Ie e88, Enroute to Malta, the Papago contin- NSA. The Director, NSA directed NSA Europe to ued to take exceptional measuresto recover materials. arrange for Robert L. Wilson's transportation home Always in Liberty's wake, she used boat hooks and by quickest means and to relay messagesfor his wife. crab nets to pick up floating material. Lights were All appropriate assistance was to be given to Donald rigged on Papago's bridge wing so that visibility at L. Blalock in arranging for his return to the U.S. night was even better than during the day. When Information copies of the messagewere sent to Senior material could not be recovered, Papago ran over it U.S. Liaison Officer, London and to the Director, with her propeller and then backed down over it to Naval Security Group Europe.l] shred the paper into small pieces. Although some paper with typing on it did not disintegrate in nine hours when placed in water by Papago's CO, it was Cleanup Continues (U) believed that ocean-wave action would have causedthe fanfold paper (which was in multi message blank (U) As the Liberty steamed westward on lengths) to ball up and sink or at least not be easily 10 June, Commander McGonagle had the shrapnel visible. Total materials recovered by the PaDaRo removed from his leg and was resting comfortably. wei~hed ei~ht p~u~d8:1 With adequate provisions of food, fuel, and water on (U) In Washington, afte~..the-'general10 de- board ship to reach Malta, there was concern about crew morale and Sixth Fleet was requested to have a tails of the attack on the ~i~e,.tyhad been absorbed, helicopter pick up the Liberty's outgoing mail as soon ".~iB~B '.':.~89:.H~i~ 811 ~I~.BI2S9~112¥ ~9~tFIBB~,H~ 45

(b) (1) (b) (3) 0 USC 403 (b) (3) 8 USC 798 -(b) (3) .L. 86-36 89~;~IDiN~_A_L

(U) Liberty's forward dish antenna after the strafing attack by Israeli jets. I~Q QeQj Photograph courte.y or Robert L. WillOn, NSA.) (Figure i, UNCLASSIFIED) 46 ee;,.PIDHf,Tfitt tt*ii6tE -.~* e6~.ftf,'f etIJtf,f,HtS 6~,t¥ SBERBIf as possible and at the same time deliver mail addressed Preparations at Malta (U) to the ship's company.I. The Liberty continued clean- up operations aboard ship as well as the grisly task of (U) To provide for the handling of the accounting for personnel that were missing. On 11 Liberty when she arrived at Malta, Admiral McCain, June, the Papaga recovered one body floating six miles activated Task Force (TF) 100, effective 12 June, astern of the Liberty; another person previously re- under the command of Rear Admiral Henry A. Ren- ported missing was now confirmed dead after recovery ken, Commander, Service Force Atlantic Fleet sta- aboard ship. 15 tioned in Norfolk, Virginia. CTF 100 was charged with: Command Investigations Initiated (U) 1. Supervising the drydocking, removal, and ship- ment of remains of personnel killed in action; (U) While the Liberty limped steadily to- 2. Preventing disclosure of classified information ward Malta under the watchful protection of the Dauis and material to unauthorized personnel; and and Papago, U.S. military commands in the Pentagon 3. Readying the Liberty for repair by Com- and in Europe were feverishly arranging for the mander, Service Force Sixth Fleet. drydocking of the ship plus full-scale investigations of These functions were expected to be completed within the events and circumstances surrounding the attack two days after Liberty's expected arrival in Malta on itself. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a fact- 13 June. Subordinate task group commanders were finding team on 9 June and initiated plans for the instructed to be prepared to report in person to Rear team to visit, in turn, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Admiral Renken at the U.S. Embassy in Malta by Navy Europe; U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe; noon, 12 June.19 Commander, Sixth Fleet; and the U.S.S. Liberty.'6 (U) Of the eight subordinate task groups (U) On the 10th, after conferring with the that comprised Task Force 100, the Director, Naval Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, the U.S. Security Group Europe was directed to provide person- Commander-in-Chief, Europe recommended to JCS nel for TG 100.4, (Security); this group was to assume that a Navy Court of inquiry be established. In his responsibility for all materials requiring special han- message to JCS, CINCEUR gave his rationale for this dling, including their removal from the Liberty, trans- action as follows: fer to secure storage, and continuous security at all Have reviewed available data with respect to l,ib~rty with times.2O CI:-lCUSNAVEURin generalframe of chronologybefore acci- -~~ 888j -Captain Carl M. Smith, Director, Na- d~ntal attack, during attack and subaequentthereto. We both val Security Group Atlantic, was designated Com- have many very pertinent and as yet unansweredquestions as we appreciateWashington haa. At the sametime, lit] must be mander, TG 100.4; other TG 100.4 personnel were recognized[that] crewmembers of Liberty from whomanswers Commander E. H. Platzek; Lieutenant Commander must be gotten are at point of exhaustion, suffering from Benjamin M. Bishop; Lieutenant Philip G. Firestone, woundsand shock, dead or misaing. It simply doeanot make USNR; Lieutenant R. H. Lee; Lieutenant M. H. sense,legally or otherwise, to initiate barrage of uncorrelated Bennett (from the Sigint component aboard the Lib- questioning via long-haul communicationsat this time. Ob- viously facts must be developedinvolving actions and judgments erty): and CTC Alfred J. Pawlinkowski. AdditionaIly, of crew, Liberty command and chain of command, and also NSA Europe named Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. lega! baae muat be eatab]ishedtor p068ib]eclaima againat Green, USAF and Clarence R. Klumfoot (NSA security governmentof Israel. Therefore, I strongly endorseestablish- officer) to assist TG 100.4 as necessary.2\ Of this ment of Court of Inquiry by Commander-in-Chief,U.S. Navy group, Bishop, Firestone, and Pawlinkowski were fur- Europa, as proper procedure...althoughit May be soMewhat ther designated to assist Lieutenant Bennett, as he tima-consumingand create impatienceamong tb.-e whodesire more rapid answers. had requested, with the evaluation of security com- JCS gave immediate concurrence and on 11 June, the promise and preparation of required reports.22 Commander-in-Chief, U,S. Navy Europe convened the tS ee8j To assist TG 100.6 (Communications) court in London with directions to proceed promptly with its services, the Director Naval Securit Group to the Mediterranean and board the Liberty at sea as Europe also arran ed with soon as possible.11 . (U) In Israel, too, high-level~~Yestigations for TF 100 inasmuch as the communications guardship were being considered- On 13 J~~e,-the.'lsraeli Defence provided by Sixth Fleet to the Task Force lacked the capability. 23 Force Chief of Staff~General Rabin, appointed an official Cour~.of.hiquiry to examine the Liberty (U) After Rear Admiral Renken left Nor- folk, guidance for his TG 100.3 (Public Affairs) was .~.~~.i.gent;J'." (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 HMiBI2B ",':* ee:,HPi~ eH ~.~.~~8 e~~¥ SHeRB!f 47 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L- 86-36 e9~.~IBB~:~I~

classified matter safeguarded. If newsmenasked about these restrictions, they were to be told that the actions were being taken primarily out of consideration of families of missing personnel, since remains may be in the exposed compartment and visible to photogra- phers; and because communications spaces normally contain classified equipment and are closed to the public, since it must be assumed that some classified equipment is exposed. Additionally, no interviews of the officers or crew of the Liberty were to be granted until authorized by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, after completion of the Court of Inquiry. If queried by the press about the reason for such policy, the security officer (TG 100.4) was to say that these men are potential witnessesbefore the Court of Inquiry and it is the desire of the convening authority anGthe President of the Court that recollections of witnesses remain as fresh as possible and not be influenced in any way by outside discussions. The doctrine of security at the source was to be followed at all times and there was to be no censorship of newsmen's material. 25 (U) Upon arriving at Malta, Rear Admiral Eg eEe, NSA civilian. Donald L. Blalock. was Renken met with his task group commanders and American embassy officials on Tuesday, 13 June, to a member of the Sigjnt unit aboard the complete plans for docking operations, which would lJoerlf. Slightly wounded. he was evacuated commence on Liberty's arrival -then estimated at to the AmerIca with the rest of the lloerlf's wounded. about 2300 hours that night.26 "~ (;~QI -Photograph courtesy of Robert L. Wilson. :-ISA.) (Figur~i. eB::.-.Bt;::~..Ii: eeBj Blalock Returns Home (U) compiled and radioed for delivery to him as he passed ~ eeet- That same afternoon, NSA civilian, through RDta, Spain, enroute to Malta. TG 100.3's Donald L. Blalock (earlier evacuated from the Liberty mission was to satisfy the legitimate interests of to the U.S.S. America with minor shrapnel wounds) newsmen without compromise of classified information, was released from America's medical department and unwarranted interference with operations, or invasion flown to Athens. There he was met by NSA Europe of individual rights of privacy. Further, it was directed representative, Charles Cowardin, who arranged for that all public affairs activities be conducted with the Blalock's travel to the United States. Blalock arrived aim of maintaining the credibility of the official at Washington National Airport the following day.21 announcements regarding the mission of U.S.S. Lib- erty; i.e., she was a communications research ship Liberty'8 Arrival at Malta (U) that was diverted from her research assignment to provide improved communication-relay links with the IS SSQ~ Liberty's arrival in Malta was delayed several U.S. embassies around the entire Mediterra- until 0030 hours, 14 June. Precautionary safety meas- nean during the current troubles. 24 ures had required additional shoring of damaged (U) Specific ground rules were set forth bulkheads and her speed was reduced. Divers from the for press coverage of Liberty's arrival in Malta. Papago immediately began an underwater inspection Newsmen were not to be permitted in the immediate of the ship's hull to determine whether or not changes vicinity of the dockyard while the Liberty entered the in the keel blocks would be necessarybefore drydocking dock, unless CTF 100 was satisfied that the torpedo could begin. The keel was found to be straight and hole was adequately covered; while the drydock was undamaged. At 1400 hours the Liberty entered the pumped out, regardless of covering; and after the dock drydock; by 1530 hours a canvas net had been tied was pumped out, until all remains were removed and across the damaged side of the ship and screens had

48 ee~,t1IBti:'~H~ 11.~P~BI2B":1... e8~.HfiCP ellMifiit:8 8~it:¥ I:: :z ~ ~ ~ Z 'tJ n fJ1 t'" - ;... ::a 00 ~ (U) The llber/y arrived in ;-.Ialta on 14 June. The torpedo hole is visible just above the water line. and the ahip ia riddled 00 0 - with holes from the rocket lire. -'-j li'botOC'lph -".y oCthl o.pI"mlot of 'hi NIVY.) ~ ~ ~ (Fil"'« ,. U.\lCLASS/FlED) 0 ~ ~ ~ n n E ~ -cn -~ =~ ~

(0) At the drydock in Malta. workmen inspect the torpedo-damaged hull of the lIoerl.r. III comparison to the huKe pieces of twisted metal. the workmell appear very small. IPho"'C,apbaMln.y of ,b. Depanmontof tho Navy.' IFi"". ,. UNCLASSIFIED! ee:,.ffBi:,.'fI2\'t

been installed across all drydock drains. During the Lieutenant Colonel Green (from the NSA Europe pump down, navy swimmers and men in a rubber raft Btaff), he returned home. Later Wilson learned that picked up oil-covered pap'~r as it floated out of the his wife had been continually informed by NSA per- ship. When the drydock was completely drained, a Bonnelof what was going on from the time the whole thorough search of the entire drydock and each drain incident began; they had even offered to have Bomeone screen was conducted by indoctrinated Naval Security Btay with her.29 Group personnel. NSA Europe personnel, sent to Malta, witnessed all drainage operations.21 Clearing Damaged Areas (U) (U) In Malta the search for and removal Evacuation of Wi)son (U) of bodies began at 1830 hours on the 14th and continued until approximately midnight, by which Ee see! Earlier, as soon as the Liberty entered time the remains of 20 men, including Allen Blue, had Malta, NSA Europe personnel boarded the ship to see been recovered. Bodies of the remaining five missing NSA civilian Robert L. Wilson. When Wilson said he men were presumed l~t at sea enroute to Malta. did not wish to stay aboard any longer, he was quickly Liberty's death toll stood at 34. ushered to the U.S. Consulate in Valletta for a short Ie ee8~ Clearance of the damaged area contin- debriefing. Immediately thereafter, accompanied by ued. Prior to opening the hatch leading down to the

(U) Navy divers Gilbl~rt Damelio. John P. Highfill, and Daniel McDuffie recover classified debris adrift as the pump.downoperations continue on the £/oerty in Malta. (Photosraph courte.y of the Department of the Navy.) (Filurr il UNCLASSIFIED) i}*f"..BbB'.~* ee:'.u:,;-:61IM;~;BbB e~;~' 69~,.PIBB~,.IfI*l. 51 ~9~J~19B~J~~

Research Department space, a guard was posted and removed from the spaces at Malta becauseof extensive all personnel were required to log in when authorized damage. In the Research Department and non-morse access.Crews of indoctrinated personnel began remov- search and development areas on the second deck, ing all classified equipment and documents to a secure very little outward damage was noticeable. However, space one deck above the damaged area. This recovery the shifting of the racks and breaks in the air process proved to be very slow because the classified conditioning ducts indicated considerable shock dam- equipment and material was mixed with the mass of age; each and every piece of gear would require twisted wreckage. Of course, no repair to the ship's complete checks. Additionally, internal wiring and side could begin until the damaged area was freed of patching facilities between all research spaces would all classified papers and equipment. By 19 June, all have to be checked. From the initial inspection, it was classified matter (including 168 large canvas bags)had obvious that considerable replacement of internal been stowed under guard in a secure space aboard the wiring would be required. Preliminary, informal esti- Liberty.3o mates made by the engineers inspecting the Liberty (U) On the afternoon of Thursday, 15 indicated that the cost to reconfigure the platform June, newsmenand photographers were given a rigidly would range between four and six million dollars.]} controlled tour of Liberty's topside area plus several compartments on the lower decks, near (he point of JCS Fact Finding Team's impact, from which all classified equipment had been removed. Later that afternoon, Task Force 100 was Interviews (U) officially dissolved. Some task force personnelremained with the Liberty, however, to help wind up adminis- (U) While the Liberty was being cleansed trative, public affairs, and supply matters. The Sixth and surveyed in the Malta shipyard, the Navy and Fleet Maintenance Officer also remained to supervise JCS investigative bodies were busily interviewing ap- Liberty's repairs.J! propriate personnel aboard the Liberty and at various European command headquarters. Damage Survey at Malta (U) f8 888, Headed by Major General Joseph R. Russ, USA, the JCS Fact Finding Team arrived in London on Tuellday morning, 13 June and spent most ~~ ~ee, In Washington, the Naval Ships En- gineering Center wascoordinating a visit to the Liberty of the day at Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe to survey damage in order to expedite repairs to the Headquarters interviewing Admiral John S. McCain, ship's electronic system; it was recommended that the Jr., and members of his staff'. Late that afternoon, inspection team include contractor personnel plus NSA the team flew to Stuttgart to talk with U.S. European and NSG people.J2 Thus, Eugene Sheck, Comint Command personnel involved in the Liberty incident. Collection (Mobile) Management, K12, and Lieuten- The following day's interviews also included one with ant Allan Deprey, USN, Sigint Engineering (Mobile Brigadier General William Keller, Chief, NSA Europe. I 1K32, in company with representatives of Points covered in the talk with Keller were: the Naval Security Group, Naval Ships Engineering 1. Explanation of the mechanics involved for Center, and contrat;tor respresentatives of Ling-Temco- tasking in satisfaction of both national and theater Vought (LTV) and the FTM Systems Company visited consumer intelligence requirements; the Liberty on 19-21 Ju~e. Their findings confirmed 2. Technical reports issued by the Liberty (the the massive damage to the Sigint electronic JCS Team was provided a copy of Liberty's reports configuration. ""', from 2 through 8 June); and ~~ eeej With the exceptio~ of the TRSSCOM 3.1 system antenna, all antennas were~ither destroyed, damaged, or burned to some degree; ~}~ost complete replacement of the antenna system would~ required. ,,' In Research Room no. 1, equipment not com,pletely Both the JCS team and J-3 EUCOM app~,~reasatis- destroyed by the torpedo explosion had been totally fled with General Keller's explanations~;4' submerged in heavy oil and salt water for six daya, (U) On 15 June, the te~8pent two hours rendering it beyond salvage. The processing and re~'" visiting Vice Admiral William I,.'Martin, Commander- porting spaces, transcribing positions, maintenance ",n-Chief, Sixth Fleet, aDd/staff aboard his flagship, shop and cryptographic room were severely damaged; the U.S.S. Little Rock~,The team arrived in Malta at all equipment was either destroyed by the explosion or 1815'b:,~u,rson ,~,he,/}5thand departed for London at 52 g9~~IBB~~~I~ ff*::;BtH '.~* ee:,H~i'fef~:;-::;Bl,at:::.¥ (b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (bl (3) -18 USC 798 (bl (3) .,.P.L. 86-36

1~ ee~:I!IBB~t~I...1, -

E~ ~~Q~ In the Sigint spaces. several manual-Morse positions were destroyed by the torpedo blast. as reported by the inspection team sent to Malta. This team was composed of personnel from ~SA. NSG. and contractors from Ling-Temco-Voughtand FTM Systems Company. (Photographcourte.y or the NSA/NSGin.pection team.) (Firurei. ~Q_"...~B~'i=..~.. eee,

11.'kl~~I2B","I ee:.II~flf eHM,~,tii:8 e~,i:¥ ee~tFlBB~t!fl~\L 53 e6~,.ftBti~,.IfI*1.

0700 hours the next morning. At Malta, Major General detailed lists of all technical support materials that Russ and his team visited the Liberty and also spoke had been forwarded to the Liberty.)S with Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, President of the Naval (U) In Malta, Liberty personnel attempted Court of Inquiry. The JCS team returned to Washing- to make an inventory of registered publications but ton in the early evening of 18 June. found it to be fragmentary at best. The registered publications vault and cryptospaces were completely Accounting for Classified Material (U) destroyed by the torpedo attack. In spite of the fact that, just before the attack, most registered publica- f8 eeej Though activities aboard the Liberty tions had been put in weighted canvas bag9, it was immediately upon arrival at Malta had centered on discovered that these bags were torn apart by the readying the ship for repair, the requirement to blast of the torpedo explosion; no bags remained account for all on-board classified material had not intact. Further, those publication9 that were recovered been overlooked. Not only had many classified docu- were unusable: they were either soaked in oil and salt ments been lost, but the records and inventories of water or damaged by the blast. None could be page sensitive materials and registered publications carried checked for completenes9.All paper and metal residue aboard ship had also been destroyed. To reconstruct from the damaged area were placed in canvas bags Liberty's list of holdings, the Director, NSA requested and secured in locked spacesaboard ship under twenty- appropriate field station and NSA elements to compile four-hour guard.J6

~~ ~~Q~ The NSA/NSG inspection team reported that the equipment in this Sigint space had been totally ruined by the torpedo blast. I! (Photograph courteay of the NSA/NSG inapection team.) ;"" (Figurei. ee~~f'fBB:.7f.tf: eee, Ii e6i,.rt6~:,.Tfxt

(U) The Captain or the LIner/?, CDR William L. McGonagle. surveys the damage done below the bridge from the rockets fired by the Israeli aircraft. (Photograph courte.y of the Department of the Navy.) (Figurti. UNCLASSiFiED)

(U) After Liberty personnelhad completed to determine whether a sorting operation was possible, this action, Captain Carl M. Smith (who had been and to make recommendations for further actions or TG 100.4 commander) informed the Director. Naval disposition of material. The survey team membership Security Group that would be drawn from the Naval Security Group, Naval despite [the] fact that all clasaified material cannot be accurately Intelligence Center, and NSA.J8 accounted for and loas at scene (is] unknown, [am] confident that ~ 8ee-r N8A representatives to this team poasibility of compromisa iI reuonably unlikaly while Liberty were: Billy Durham, Operations, Comsec Status, [waaJ en route [to] Malta and zero thereafter. It waa a time- conauming taek under difficult conditiona but thoroughnesa of all (813); Benjamin G. Cwalina, Security, Research Divi- haa resulted in maintenance of highest degree of security integrity. sion, (M55); and Lieutenant John T. McTighe, USN, All can take juetifiahle pride in dedication, wiJlingnesa, and high Operations StatI, (G04). On 31 July, these three morale of thoae participating in the Bal',age operation." traveled to Norfolk, Virginia, and boarded the Liberty. just returned from Malta. There they were joined by Joint Survey at Norfolk (U) other members of the survey team, principally N8G personnel. Following a brief tour of the ship, the team (U) Recognizing that the Liberty had had was taken below decks to the Research Operations extensive reserve, on-board cryptographic keying ma- spaces, where the canvas bags of residue were piled. terials that might require replacement Navy-wide and Sailors from the Liberty's Sigint complement, dressed DoD-wide, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed in rubber overalls and gloves, selected about six or that a joint survey team meet the Liberty when she seven bags at random from the grimy, oily 160-plus returned to Norfolk and take a sampling of the residue total and, one by one, opened each and dumped its 11 91,1 ".q...69:.II~t~ 611.~t~:II,B9~:1,¥ 6e~,PIB3r,.lff*t 55 6e...~PIBti~,.tff*t .

contents on the floor in front of the survey team. It those of scores more. The investigations then under was not a pretty sight and had malodorous qualities way would affect even more people. resulting from the combination of oil, brackish sea water, burned metal, paper, and pieces of human Notes flesh. The team immediately agreed that it would be Sourcedocume"t. ore i" the "Cri.i. Collectio,," of the NSA imp~sible to make a page-by-page check of the bags' Hi.toryCollection. contents. From looking at this sampling, the survey team concluded that: '(U) COMSIXTHFLT mal 000513Z JUD 1967. '(U) Commander, Tuk Group (CTG) 60.5 mag 1. Eighty percent of the material was unidenti- OOf1l58ZJun 1967. '(U) Commander. Taak Group 60.5 mIl 092119Z fiable; Jun 1967. 2. Some of the material was definitely discernible, '(U) CINCUSNAVEUR mIl l00025Z Jun 1967. readable, and classified; and 'CUI COMSIXTHFLT mag 0023.7Z Jun 1967. 3. Some of the classified material was identifia- '(U) DmNAVSECGRUEUR mil 00ltXi8Z Jun 1967. 'CUI I 'mlg 001355Z Jun 1967. ble, in part, by short titles and cover markings or I(U} ClNCUSNAVEUR mlr 091459Z Jun 1967. name-plate designations; e.g., large bound volumes or '(U) CTG 60.5 mlr 092119Z Jun 1967. books. ,c(U) DlRNAVSECGRUEUR mlr 191358Z Jun 1967. "(U) USClNCEUR mag 101100Z Jun 1967. I1(U) DIRNSA Jnag001345Z Jun 1967. The team recommended that: '1U) DIRNSA ~ag 101718Z Jun 1967. 1. No attempt be made to conduct a detailed bag- "(U) CTG 60.5 mil 10175OZJun 1967. by-bag search for the sole purp~e of identifying "(U) U.S. Na~ Court of Inquiry 7816-67; Liberty Incident, 8 Jun 1967; Record of Proceedingl. classified material; "(U) Joint Chiefa of St.ffmlg cite no. 7642, 10214OZ 2. The Commanding Officer of the Liberty be Jun 1967. ' authorized to destroy the bagged material held on "(U) USCINCEUR mlr 101045Z Jun 1967. and CINCUSNAVEUR mil 111311Z Jun 1967. board; and 'I(U) U.S. Defenle Attach. Office. Tel Aviv mil 3. Prior to the process of burning, an effort be 131335ZJun 1967. made to empty each bag at the incinerator to deter- "(U) CINCUSNAVEUR mag 111031Z Jun 1967. mine the p~sible existence of identifiable registered 'D(U) Ibid.: "(UI DlRNAVSECGRUEURmag 111931ZJun 1967. publications and that each such complete publication "(U) DlRNAVSECGRUEUR mIl 091814Z Jun 1967. be accounted for prior to its destruction.J9 "(UI DlRNAVSECGRUEUR mIl 111442Z Jun 1967. "(U) CINCUSNAVEUR mil 12095CYlJun 1967. (U) CNO concurred with the survey team's "(U) Ibid. "(U) Comm.rider, T.ak Force (CTF) 100 mer recommendations and authorized destruction as re- 1300m Jun 1967. , quested. At the Director, NSA's request, all remaining "(U) DmNAVSECGRU IDSg131700Z Jun 1967 and Comsec material (excluding that in canvas bags) NSAEUR meg 140829Z Jun 1967. aboard the Liberty at the time of attack was segre- "(U) CTF 100 IDSg150200z Jun 1967 and NSAEUR mar 16153CYlJun 1967. i gated and forwarded to NSA for inspection,4O "(U) Robert L WiIaon, oral interview tranacript, 6 ~e eeer- With this command approval, Lib. May 1980. i erty's CO arranged for appropriately cleared personnel 'D(U) DlRNA VSECGRUEUR mag 191326ZJun 1967. to fill a trailer with bagged residue and burn it at the "(U) CTF 100 mlr 150200z Junl967. II(U) NAVSffiPENGCTR mas 141551Z Jun 1967. Norfolk incinerator. A list of documents identified in "(U) NSA; K12, 1<32Trip Report (by Eugene Sheck the burning process was forwarded to CNO. At NSA, and Lt. DepreyJ. Z7 Jun 1967. M55 determined that there was only minimal security "(U) NSA; D1 mag for Gen. Carter through NSA Rep NORAD, circa 21 Jun 1967. damage and no compromise had occurred. "(U) NSA; Statua of Operationa ActioDi Relative to ~S eeer- Though incinerator flames consumed Sirint Readinesa Bravo/Cra~on, Report no. 13,9-10 Jun 1967. the last bits and pieces of oil-soaked residue from the "(U) U.S.S. iLiberty mag 200735Z Jun 1967. assault on the Liberty these ashes did not mark the "(U) DmNAVSECGRUEURmag 191326ZJun 1967. "(U) CNO ~g 142227Z Jun 1967. end of the train of events set in motion on 8 June "(U) U.S.S.! Liberty mar 02163CYl Aug 1967 and 1967. The Israeli attack had already taken the lives (b),-, (3)-P.L.'i(b)- 86-361o:aIr,mNS;A Interview mag ~1648Z tranlcript, Aug 19679 May and 1980. CNO mag of 34 Americans -25 from the Siginit unit, including Allen Blue, and 9 of the Liberty's crew -and touched 102136Z Aug 1967. i

IIMi9~! ~': 8e~.m,~ell2'.~,~fBI2S 6:';t¥ 56 -~Q~JFlBH:~H~~ (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P .L. 86-36 -- -- (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 U 403SC (b) (3) -18 U 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 SfieRtitf-

(b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 Chaptervn

(U) FollowiIig the attack. on the Liberty, prepared to recommend all neceaaaryaCtion to insure both the Executive and the Legislative Branches set the security of the technical material arid equipment, about ascertaining the basic facta surrounding the should the ship go under but, in discuaaionswith the incident. Other than the U:S. Navy Court of Inquiry JRC, ruled out the deliberate scuttling £?fthe ship and the cursory Israeli Board of In~iry immediately since its presence in shallow water made compromise after the event, reviews went fo~ard under the of materials and equipment a distinct possibility. auspices of the House Appropriations Committee, the f8888, Other concerns were for the ~eassign- JCS, and NSA. In addition, a Special Committee of ment of the Liberty's intercept mission to other the National Security Council elicited information to collectors, I lin the answer the Administration's questions on the incident. face of the inevitable attention the press would give The NSA Review and Reaction (U) to this incident, and for developing a core of infor- mation for the expected questions the Agency would (U) The eighth of June proved to be a receive from DoD and other officials. busy day for NSA's directorate. Having received a -tS 68Q~ As the eighth of June wore on, the Critic message on the Liberty's dilemma, Brigadier NSA staff considered wavs to re8BBi~ Liberty's mis- General John Morrison of NSA's Production Organi- ~ zation, notified the directorate of the event at about 0000 hours, Washington time. Some 45 minutes later, the directorate learned that the attack had been by the Israelis. 'Should tJie"" E8-888j Immediate concern was for the saf~ty U.S. actively enter the h~tilitie8 as a belligerent, of the personnel and the security of the materials on they were willin2 to consider assiR1lmentof certain board. During the day urgent requests went out from Sigint tasks I NSA(NMCC), to theother National offices inMilitary the Pentagon,Command and Center the

Bureau of Naval Personnel to ascertain if the names of any of the three NSA civilians on board appeared {Finally, they considered on the casualty list. Both General Marshall S. Carter redeployment of the U.S.S. Belmont, scheduled for and Dr. Louis W. Tordella became aware that the refitting at Norfolk at about that time. Only the last ship was in shallow water, 35-40 fathoms. And they mentioned seemed promising in consideration of the knew, of course, that the ship held technical materials Liberty's VHF/UHF mission, but full approval for which would reveal the misBion of the Bhip and that assignment of the Belmont would not be forthcoming. it had electronic equipment which would compromise They also confirmed that the U. S. airborne collection U.S. BucceBSin demultiplexing VHF and UHF multi- fiightB out of AthenB would continue without channel communications. Accordingly, Dr. Tordella interruption. asked JRC'B Captain Merriwell W. Vineyard, USN, to E8-888j The NSA directorate examined Lib- have all documents on board the Liberty burned &1:';~ ertY~8J I If there should be questions about all equipment.~.~~~~.i.~.p~i.Qle...GenerarCaiter'was the civilians on board, what Bhould be said? Dr.

(b) (1) 11.~;BI2BYo'":... ee:.H~ilf elWi~iil:S 6~~tY 8BeRfitf 57 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 ~b)!!)..::! L. .86-=-36- ~

SC 8BERfi!f

TordeUa discussedthis matter with &ar Admiral quality of the report. NSA was then in a position to Ralch E. Cook. the Director. Naval Security Group. give copies of this comprehensive report to the JCS Fact Finding Team and to the Special Committee of the National Security Council (NSC). 4G- 8eet- Directed as it was to develop a core of information on the event, the NSA group did not seek to identify remedies for faulty procedures or, for that matter, to make any recommendations at all. Major responsibility for that fell to the JCS and others. The, \ This stated that the group did have to field searching questions being asked Liberty's presence off Port Said was "to assure com- \,the Agency by others. munications for the U.S. Government poets in the ~E;E;er- The JCS Fact Finding Team was ask- Middle East and to assist in relaying information fg specific questions such as these: concerning the evacuation of U.S. dependents and \, ° Does NSA receive and plot situation reports? Does other citizens from the Arab-Israeli war area." As was it', keep the track? its custom, NSA's staff worked cl~ely with the Pen- \0 Why was an Opscomm circuit not established tagon's Public Information Office and referred all between NSA and the Liberty? public queries NSA received to that Pentagon Office. 0\Were there any communications problems during ~~ ~SQI There was, finally, on that long day of transit in the Mediterranean? 8 June, the need to establish quickly a core of .Did NSA fail to receive any technical summaries, information on the incident to prepare for the many product, or other communications from the Liberty, questions being asked and decisions to be made. nonreceipt of which would have been indicative of Already the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. Mc- commUnications difficulties? Namara, had called General Carter asking for "precise .Was there any departure from normal command information" on the ship's complement, the number relationships in the handling of the Liberty's cruise? of civilians, the meaning of ..AGTR" which appeared , on the ship's hull, and other matters which he felt ~E;~ And Patrick Coyne of the National , would be needed for a public release. Discussions also Security Council's Special Committee asked broad took place with White House staff members Patrick questions such as these: Coyne and Bromley Smith, who elicited details on the , .What information was received from the Liberty incident. from the ti~e it arrived on station until the incident? fe-eeBI To take care of this need for infor- .Were there any Sigint reflections of the Israeli mation, General Carter established in his outer office attack? " a Temporary Mid-East Information Group consisting of three NSA individuals -Mr. Walter Deeley of the .Would../le receive all of our Sigint holdings relating Production Organization U(b) (3)-E'.L. 86-36nd Lieu- to the inciderit? (U) \ Although questions remained which tenant Commander Edward Koczak, USN, of the would require ADswers,the work of the NSA group was Director's statf'. The main function of this group was essentially complete by the middle of June 1967. I to gather information on the event and to anticipate the numerous questions to be directed to NSA over The JCS Review (U) the coming weeks. (U) On 9 June, immediately after the ES-8eB~ With timely help from agency compo- nents, the group assembled basic data on the ship Liberty incident tne JCS fielded a five-man team from its organization, ~ with the necessary clearances, to itself. onl examine communi~ations and control aspects of the Ion operational and technical respon- sibilities, and on the technical rationale for the '~vent. Senior meniber of the JCS team was Major mission; it also compiled a chronology of events and a Ge~eral Joseph R. ~s, USA. Other team members compendium of key documents and messages.Assem- were'.~ar Admiral Francis J. Fitzpatrick, USN; bling the information in a large red notebook entitled Colonei'William A. Garrett, USAF; Captain William "Report to the Director NSA -U.S.S. Liberty (AGTR- D. Owen, U~N; and Major Harlan E. Priddle, USAF. 5), 23 May-8 June 1967," the group presented the (U) ',In spelling out the terms of reference completed report to the Director on 12 June -rather for the team, Lieuten~t General B. E. Spivy, Director respectable staff work in view of the timeliness and of the Joint Staff,'~ked the team to examine the

(b) (1) 58 8B6RE!f 11 ":9I.i ..'1... S9:C.H~~ SII.\l'i~iBI.8 9~~¥ (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 ee~~IBti~,.Tf*t means employed in iBBuing operational directives of recommendationsdealing with emphasis on dedicated the JCS to the U. S.S. Liberty and the specific orders command-and-control circuitry rather than on to the Liberty between 1 June and 8 June 1967, and common-usercircuitry, with measures to improve fleet to iqentify and develop information OD con.B.icting control communications via communications latellite directives, delays in me88agetraffic, and noDreceipt of technology, and with the amalgamation of NATO and orders. The team was to report ita findings, alODgwith U.S. military communications. recommeDdations, to the JCS. ~ ~~er- Other than the three recommendations ~" "88~ The JCS team visited NSA, other on which it participated as an action agency, NSA Washington-area principals, and concerned military was concerned about Bomeof the other findings in the staffa and commands in Europe and the Mediterra- report. One recommendation was, for example, that Dean. On 10 June, as the team began ita fact-finding "procedureBgoverning the control of Burveillanceplat- miBBion, GeDeral Carter called General Russ and forms be made more definitive with respect to tech- offered the total cooperatioD of NSA and followed nical reaearch.hips to insure that "artificial barriers through on this offer by making as much information between operational elements of staffa and NSA/Naval available to him ae required, although General Russ Security Group" owing to aecurity considerations be had already decided not to concentrate on sensitive eliminated "in order to improve the value and timely (that is, special intelligence) matters. utilization o{ the Sigint products at all major command (U) As the work of the fact-finding team echelons." Insofar 81 NSA was concerned, this rec- was drawing to a clc.e, GeDera)Russ provided on 18 ommendation was off the mark since Sigint product June a preliminary report to the Chairman of the already went directly to all commandsand not through Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, USA. NSA/Naval Security Group Itaffa. NSA commented He apprised the Chairman of the four me88agesfrom formally on this point in a letter to Major General higher headquarters on 7/8 June to subordinate com- G.B. Pickett, Vice Director for Operations (J-3); in mands designed to change the Liberty's CPA, receipt its commentary on the Russ report for the JCS, the of which by Liberty "would undoubtedly have resulted J-3 discounted this recommendation. in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene (U) When copies of the JCS Fact Finding of action " Despite the Liberty's having been either Team's report reached NSA at the end of June, an action or an information addre88eeon each of these General Carter instructed the chief of his telecom- messages,General Russ's team found no evidence that munications organization, Colonel Leslie J. Bolstridge, the ship received anyone of them. Nor did his team USAF, to review the report in minute detail with a find, for that matter, any evidence of con.B.icting view to "correcting our procedures wherever we can directives governing the Liberty's operation. General profit from this debacle of military communications." Russ also made note of the irregular procedure JCS Since the Russ report primarily dealt with command- itself had adopted in bypassing Commander-in-Chief, and-eontrol Communications, the Russ recommenda- Europe when it passed verbal instructions to Com- tions had only marginal pertinence to NSA's own maDder-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Europe, and he recounted communications.2 the reasons for delays at NA VEUR and Sixth Fleet in translating the JCS directive into action. Congressional Reyjew (U) (U) By 20 June the JCS Fact Finding Team had completed its work, had prepared its report, (U) Following a hearing focusing on the and had made its recommendations to the JCS. Of JCS messageswhich failed to reach the Liberty, the the 17 recommendations made, 9 concerned the mis- House Appropriations Committee on 14 August 1967 sions, functions, operational responsibilities, and op- directed ita Surveys and Investigations staff to examine erational controVtechnical tasking and guidance mat- the effectivenessof the DoD worldwide communications ters; the other B related to communications, traffic system. The staff studied the delays and nondelivery management, methods, facilities, and availability of of messagesoriginated on 7 and 8 June directing the trained personnel. In reviewing and commeDting on withdrawal of the Liberty as a springboard to ita the report's recommendations for the JCS, the J3 and broader review of DoD's worldwide communications. J6/JCS reserved follow-on action for the first category The staff produced a two-volume report for the chair- of recommendations to the Joint Staff but assigned man of the congressional committee. Volume I re- responsibilities to various other agencies for study and viewed the communications problems in the Liberty implementation actions in the second category of incident, volume n the worldwide communications recommendations. NSA drew assignments on three systemsand networks of the DoD.

IIM;BIIB ','::* ee:,Hfilf el:',-~,~,BIISe~~¥ ~g~~DB~~.\L 59 UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In its work, the Surveys and Investi- changesin reporting formats, U.S. military sales gations Itaff interviewed JCS, NSA, Naval Commu- policies, and reorganization of Army Reserve units. In nications Command, Department of Army Communi- contrast, actual instructions called for assignment of cations Center, and JCS Message Center personnelin Immediate precedence to "situations which gravely the Washington area and m~t of the military com- affect the security of national/allied forces or populace, mands and communications centers in the Pscific and and which require immediate delivery to the addres- European regions which had been involved with Lib- sees" -for example, amplifying reports of initial erty's communications in one way or another. enemy contact, reports of unusual major movements (U) Essentially the staff covered the same of military forces of foreign powers during peacetime ground that General Russ's team plowed earlier. They or during strained relations, attack orders, and urgent worked their way through all the communications intelligence measages. errors made during the attempts to withdraw the (U) While the congressionalstaff directed Liberty on 7/8 June. The staff was somewhat more m~t of its attention to DoD command communica- critical than the JCS Fact Finding Team of the failure tions, it also took note of Criticomm which, they found to deliver to the Liberty the information copies of the functioned throughout the crisis relatively free of JCS and CINCEUR messages directing withdrawal problems. The staff was aware of steps NSA took to (JCS OS011OZJune 67 and CINCEUR 080025ZJune keep Criticomm free of the overburdening traffic 67). Specifically, they wanted to know if a typical common in crisis situations, particularly an 8 June commander would take action on an information copy action in which NSA directed the curtailment of of this kind from a higher command before receiving electrical forwarding of all routine reports so that the implementing messageof his immediate superior. crisis-related traffic could flow expeditiously.] They tested the matter with unnamed U.S. Navy officials who had commanded both large and small naval vessels and learned, according to the report, that there would have been no question that if the Notes Liberty had received the information copies, "the

Captain of the Liberty would have moved within Sourc~ docu_nt. ar~ in th~ "Cri.i. CoU~ction" of the NSA Hi.tory minutes without waiting for an implementing order." CoU~ction. (U) In its volume 11, the congressional staff took full note of the breakdown of the precedence ~(~- LTG Manhall S. Carter, Memorandumfor system in communications and drew upon DoD- the Record, 8 June 1967; Dr. Louia W. Tordella, Memorandum, provided information for the Middle East crisis. Of "Directorate'a Temporary Mid-Eaat Information Group," 8 June 1967; Walter G. Deeley, Memorandumfor the D/DIR, "V.S.S. lome 452 high-precedence, (Flash and Immediate) Liberty," I. June 1967;NSA St&!!, "Report to the Director, NSA," crisis-related DoD messages, only 22 percent of the 12 June 1967; and DIRNSA letter to MG J. R. Rul&, (JCS Fact Flash and 30 percent of the Immediate messages FiDdiDgTeam), 12 June 1967. actually met established precedence criteria. '(VI The Ruu Report; NSA Director, handwritten (U) Part of the" delay in transmitting the note., 8 and 10 June 1967; JCS/J-3, "Note by the Secretarieato the JCS on V.S.S. Lib~rty Incident," JCS no. 2308/378,24 Jun~ Immediate-precedence Sixth Fleet withdrawal message 1967jJoiDt Command and Control RequirementaGroup, Memoran- to the Liberty, it will be recalled, was owing to the dum for the JoiDt Chiefs of Staff', "Fact FiDdiDgTeam," 18 June urgency of equal or higher precedence (that is, Flash) 1967; Walter G. Deeley,letter to Vice Director for Operations(J. messages. During the crisis, originators assigned Im- 31, 29 June 1967. mediate precedence to messageson subjects such as '(VI HouaeAppropriations Committee Surveys and InvestigationsSt&!!, A Report to the Committeeon Appropriation. these: enlisted men reassignments, h~pital-patient .U.S. Hou.e 01 R~pr~.entGtiu~. on th. EHectiu~M" 01 th~ reports unrelated to the crisis, friendly ship locations WorldwideCommunication. Sy.t~m. Gild N~twor~. 01 th~ DaD, and movements, setting up of press conferences, U.S.S. Lib~rty Incident, vol. I pp. ~-50. vol. II, pp. 75-76.

60 UNCLASSIFIED ~Q~~Di~:!FI*~

Chapter VIII

Eeeee, Perhaps the Liberty has undergone the platforms operated and were, JCS/JRC believed, scrutiny long enough. First the Israeli Court of Inquiry in the best position to evaluate safety factors.! examined the event, exculpation of Israeli nationals E8e8Bj In the Liberty incident, the Com- apparently not being hindmost in the court's calcula- mander, ~irth Fleet, was responsible for the safety of tions. Then the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry studied the ship. But Vice Admiral Martin was not in a the incident. The JCS review actively sought to position to evaluate the expected intelligence gain or identify faulty procedures and practices for corrective assign degrees of importance to the expected intelli- action. The NSA review was essentially fact-finding in gence gain in terms of changing risk factors. Judgment nature. And the House Appropriations Committee on the value of the intelligence to be gained could review, made as it was without all the information come only from DoD-level intelligence agencies-and, available to the JCS team, nonetheless reconstructed in the case of the Liberty, particularly from NSA. many of the basic findings of that team and sought to use them as a mirror in which to observe problem !~ C;~gj In the aftermath of the incident, there areas in DoD's worldwide communications. Despite the was indeed some soul searching on this point within official scrutiny, it is still necessaryto comment briefly NSA. The head of NSA's Temporary Mid-East Infor- on a few subjects of interest and concern to cryptologic mation Group told Dr. Tordella in mid-June that he organizations. believed NSA could not really absolve itself totally from the safety considerations. He believed that NSA Safety Estimates for Collection Missions may have to demonstrate "that the need is not established frivolously" and questioned whether or not of Mobile Platforms (U) \ the intelligence requirements against which NSA worked at the time were really of 8uch a compelling ~ One principal area of concern was the nature as to justify using the special operational areas manner in which safety factors were adjudged. Prior in the Middle East which NSA designated.] to the Liberty incident, commanders did not essen- tially regard mobile collectors as integral components 18 88Bj One has to pose this question. Had of their commands. After all, JCSIJRC assigned the NSA sent a messageto the JCS/JRC on 5 June, the schedules and routes, the platforms existed to satisfy day war broke out, and stated simply that the agency "national intelligence" and -as they may have which initiated the mission in the first place, NSA, thought -not their own intelligence requirements, now believed the risk to its cryptologic materials and and NSA was on the sidelines as a major interested personnel outweighed its estimate of technical and party. As General Russ learned, commandera accord- intelligence benefits to be derived, would there have ingly felt some uncertainty as to their specific respon- been more expeditious action by JCS/JRC to cut the sibilities in supporting these platforms. The General mission short? NSA may have drawn a mild rebuke reasoned therefrom, and so stated in his report, that for presuming to evaluate safety factors. But the commanders must have adequate knowledge of a ship's hypothetical NSA messagemight have added to the mission if they are to control and support it effectively. position the CNO was taking at about this time to increase the 8hip's CPA, and it might have stimulated (U) JCS/JRC looked to the unified and specified commands to provide for the safety of the JCS/JRC action earlier than 080110Z. mobile collectors. The regional commands were in close IS 8"8j On 8 June NSA was, however, of a touch with political and military conditions in which totally different mind. Since it did not want to lose

II:'" ~:BIIB ~112~8Q~.H~~~ 811 ~::-;8I1SQ~;II ¥ ee~~BH~:':".a:tL 61 £Pep 8I3GHI]~

the coverage it had planned for the Middle East, it sent a messageto the JCS/JRC prop~ing assignment of the U.S.S. Belmont to the eastern Atlantic/Medi- terranean as soon as p~sible after that ship's expected arrival at Norfolk on the next day.J The Director, NSA later withdrew this request in the face of reluctance on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic4 and reevaluation of the CPA constraints on mission effectiveness. ! E8 eee) In reflecting on the Liberty/Pueblo incidents in an oral history interview, General Mar~ shall S. Carter said .: u a result of both of th~e traumatic experiences, we bave reviewed our procedures and found there wu little ch~e needed in NSA.JCS relation.hip., but there were IOme chaDC" needed in the cbain of command superviaion and monitor~.... of juat where the ship is, and what it is doinC. and ~u it ... neceuary. , ... , ' ~8 888~ As it turned out, the Liberty incide~:e Communications Problems (U) -and some six months later the Pueblo seizure .:- (U) Errors made in the handling of com- brought about some modification in the...'JCS/JRC munications accounted, in some measure, for the procedures for weighing risk vs. intellige~e-gain fac- Liberty tragedy. Studied in great detail by the JCS tors. Instead of relying entirely on military ~se8s- Fact Finding Team and reviewed by the staff of the ments, the new procedures took into account HouseAppropriations Committee, the communications intelligence-agency information relating to potential problems posed a challenge for the JCS and for DoD ~ agencies in the immediate post-Liberty period. - (U) NSA was not the DoD action office for correcting faulty communications procedures, but it (U) NSA should not yield or should yield was indeed a very interested party to corrective actions grudgingly to others, this review would suggest, in stimulated by the Russ Report. Doing what he could, safety evaluations of missions involving large holdings General Carter called Army Chief of Staff, General of Sigint materials, equipment, and personnel. Harold K Johnson, about the considerable number of mishandled messages in the Department of Army's Availability or Linguists ~E~ communications center in the Pentagon, particularly Eg gg8j Looking back on the Liberty incident, those coming to NSA, and on 3 July provided General one perhaps should fault the cryptologic organization Johnson's staff with examples of mesaagemishandling for not assuring the presence on board of qualified during the Liberty incident. Department of Army's Hebrew linguists for on-station examination of Israeli response was poaitive, and soon thereafter its Com- voice communications uncovered in the intercept from munications Staff added page monitors on its circuits the nonmorse search and qevelopment mission and for to NSA to check assignment of address groups. Errors not even having a tokeh misSion on Israeli voice diminished from some 40 to 7 a day out of an average communications. It t~rned out that Hebrew language daily total of 1,000 transmissions. General Carter also tapes produced by !USN-855 from the search and insisted, as noted earlier, that his staff examine the development missioll 9ri the morning of 8 June did not Russ Report recommendations relating to DoD com- contain informatiqn on the forthcoming Israeli attack, munications for any possible application to NSA's Criticomm network. 7 but NSA did not learn this until it had received these tapes and had pt9:i:esl~d them several days after the event. For all NSAand USN-855 knew at the time, File Reduction for Exposed Collectors (U) information ~ri!!Is;i~eli intentions towards the ship tI%lS-ee8-t,p~ The Six Day War and the Liberty might well h~~ been on those tapes. incident created conditions in which Sigint personnel -fg g8er- had to take fast action to prevent l~s of their documentation and eQuinment.I ~:::::::.

,~:: """""--

(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403

-, (b)(b) (3)-P.L.(3) -18 USC86-36 79B - ~QP 8I3GBB~

not specific to USN-85S's eastern Mediterranean mis- sion, records which could have remained behind at Rota. This same judgment would probably not apply, on the other hand, to on-board Sigint equipment, I virtually all of which was essential to the mission.

-ter- The Liberty's experience, together with 'The report stated: the Pueblo capture, led to some emphasis on file Technical documents, operational aidl, etc., &bould be limited reduction and on measures to facilitate destruction of to thoee required to carry out t!1e miuion; filel !1eld and cryptologic materials and equipment. The incidents containing information t!1at mayor may not be needed at lome future date Ibould be eliminated. The library of training pointed up, as no others had done before, the need for manuala ought to be limited to thc»e covering items of equip- scaling the distribution of technical documentation to -ment in U8e at the detachment; anyone who cannot read a specific and minimal levels necessaryfor execution of tasks, and following the incidents some moderation in the supply of documentation was in evidence. \' - (U) As a direct result of the Liberty in- cident and at General Carter's urging, NSA's Com- : :--1 "I municationspIe, its physical Security security Organization doctrine (KAG-1D)revised, for to exam- limit : ~E1P8ee8j -After the Liberty incident, a review of keying materials in normal circumstances to a four- :: USN-85S's cryptologic documentary holdings showed month's supply and to curtail p~seB8ion of those :: that the Si~int unit held technical reports such as materials to that which was clearly essential to mission requirements.II The incidents also gave impetus to the use of alternative means for technical support, such as Opscomm equipment for teletype exchanges on specific technical problems. And a small amount of water-soluble paper came into use for technical docu- mentation subject to possible loss at sea. But measures such as these did not solve the problem in its entirety. ~~j In the 197

-. !Size of files and time factors in tne aestructlon process continue as problems to this ~eor- USN-855 had received thiscomprehen- time.12 sive documentation primarily from NSA's collection ~S SSe! The Liberty and Pueblo incidents management, telecommunications, cand G Group of- should serve to remind cryptologic managers of the fices, Naval Security Group ~eadquarters, and U.S. need to exercise restraint in the use of Sigint equip- f -"1 USN~5 was, in a sense, NSA ment and documentation in high-risk areas. ! in microcosm.9 c E8 88Qj Ask~cif the ship had too much Sigint Unanswered Questions (U) documentation and equipment, one USN-855 survivor ... commented CC (U) A perslstent questIon relatmg to the Euti' rely too'cmc uch There .11 D d t ' Liberty incident is whether or not the Israeli forces couldb&carried out .0 unleaayou were way liveD...two emergency daY'1 el ructlODDotice which attacked the ship knew that it was American. tha~you'regoing to let hit. Andulually you'reDot given any Several authors and not a few of the Liberty's crewmen ~otice.'o and USN~5 staff are convinced that they did. Their ~-eeer Casual examination of document list- belief derived from consideration of the long time the ings reveals, of course, countless records which were Israelis had the ship under surveillance prior to the

(b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 f1*r,.Dt.B-.~ ee:.HfiTeUMif,!I:S ePil:Y-PiepeftPi ~ep 8BGRB~ 63 (b) (3) -lB USC 79B (b) (3) -P.L. B6-36 -Bl3eftfiCf

attack, the visibility of the flag, and the intensity of initiated by the Department of State. In May 1968, the attack itself. Israel paid the U.S. Government $1,323,500 as full !S Se8j Speculation as to Israeli motivation payment on behalf of the families of the 34 men killed varied. Some believed that Israel expected that the in the attack. I) Eleven months later, Israel paid complete destruction of the ship and killing of the $3,566,457in compensation to the men who had been personnel would lead the U.S. to blame the U.A.R. wounded.I' The U.S. claim of ~,644,146 for material for the incident and bring the U.S. into the war on damage to the Liberty itself was not settled until 18 the side of Israel. Ironically, even though the Liberty December 1980 when Israel agreed to pay ~ million. had no specific mission against Israeli communications, (U) After returning to Norfolk in July others felt Israeli forces wanted the ship and men out 1967, the Liberty languished there while NSA tried of the way in order to deny the U.S. any Sigint on unsuccessfully to obtain DoD budgetary approval to Israel's preparations to attack Syria -an attack the restore her to Sigint operational status; the proposed U.S. might try to prevent. budget figure was $10,200,000. When this effort failed, t8 ee8j Authors of the several books now in the Liberty was decommissioned on 28 June 1968. In print about the Liberty, whether members. of the 1970 the ship was turned over to the Maritime Liberty's complement or not, have not had accessto Administration and sold for scrap for $101,666.66. In 1- --ISigint reports on the Israeli 1973 the ship came to an ignominious end as she was helicopter pilot voice communications, nor have they cut up in Baltimore's Curtis Bay shipyard. had access to the confidential Israeli Government's (U) There was one aspect of the Liberty explanation given to the U.S. Department of State. tragedy which should not go unnoted. This was its te-eeej In part becauseof the press speculation adverse and lingering affect on the Liberty's survivors. at the time, President Johnson directed the Director Oral interviews with USN-855 personnelsome 13 years of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, to prepare a after the event, show that time has not healed all the scars.I! Apart from bitterness toward the Israeli Gov- report by 13 June, fiv~ days after the attack, assessing the Israeli intentions. The CIA assessmentdrew heav- ernment, there still remains dismay that the U.S. ily upon the Sigint r'eports referred to above. While Government or Sixth Fleet did not come to Liberty's these reports revealed some confusion on the part of aid in timely fashion. the pilots concerning the nationality of the ship, they (U) The contributions of technical re- tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy search ships to this nation's Sigint production also and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew should not go unnoted. These were unique in their to be American. time, often irreplaceable, often unheralded. That the TRS program came to an end in 1969 was not for lack Denouement (U) of competenceand dedication of the men who served or for lack of NSA's appreciation for their contribu- (U) On 11 June 1968, exactly one year tions, but rather for budgetary considerations by the and three days after the attack on the Liberty, her Department of Defense. commanding officer, Captain William Loren Mc- Gonagle (promoted after the attack), was presented the Congressional Medal of Honor by the Secretary of Notes the Navy for gal~antry and courage displayed during Liberty's hours of trial. Following that award, the Source docum,nt.r are in th~ "Cri.ri.r Col/~ction»of th~ NSA Hi.rtory Presidential Unit Citation was conferred upon the Col/~ction. Liberty and cre;\..-on 14 June 1968 at Portsmouth, Virginia. ! '(U) The Ruaa Report, pp 9-10; Richard Harvey interview, 16 Jul 1980. \~ ~~Qj jScores of individual decorations '(U) Walter Deeley, Memorandum Cor the (Bronze Star, ~ilver Star., etc.) were given to crew D/Dm -"U.S.S. Liberty," 14 Jun 1967. . members, and! 170 Purple Hearts were earned by '(U) DffiNSA mag to JCS/JRC, 081503Z Jun 1967. '(U) CINCLANT mag to JCS, 1214142 Jun 1967. Liberty's compiement, including two NSA civilians, '(U) Interview with Gene Sheck, 11 Aug 1980. Donald L. BI~lock and Allen M. Blue (the latter, ~eer NSA Statf', "Critique-SigiDt Readme.. Bravo posthumously){ Crayon," pp. 24, 29. (U) ! Claims against the government of Is- '(U) NSA Staff, Memorandum Cor the Record, "Telephone onver.ation with Mr. Morton A. Brill OCCE 5 Jul rael for comp~nsation concerning deaths and injuries 1967; NSA, .14 JuJ of U.S. personnel and damage to the Liberty were 1967.

64 8tie1:;i~T 11;tI;8ti -.~* ee:.Hrilf ellKfi~iit,8 e~i~¥ (bOj(1)

(b) (1) (b) (3)-50 U 403SC (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -18 U 798 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

SC ~9.-.~BB~~!fI*12

~ u.s. Army Communicationl Support UDit. An- randum to ADC, "Cryptolraphic Holdinp of U.S.S. Lib~rty." 17 nual Hiltory Report. FY 1967, vol. I. 1 Oct 1967. Aug 1967. '(U) NSA Staff (P04) MemoraDdum to DmNSA, :'(UI Interview with Richmood D. Soow, 21 AUI "CI...ified .Material Aboard U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 11 JUD 1980. 1967. Encloaurea to tbe memorandum CODliatof a 16G-pageliating "(VI U.S. D~partment of State Bulletin, 17 Jun of documeDta known to bave beeD liveD to USN-856 by NSA and 1968, p. 799. "(U) U.S. Departmant of State Bulletin, 2 Jun NAVSECGRU elementa. 1969, p. 473. IDCUI Interview with Paddy E. Rhlxiea. 13 JWI 1980. "(VI The Lib~rty', Captain, William L. Mc- "CU) ADC MemoraDdum to DIRNSA. "Crypto- Gooalle, DOWr~tired, wu invited to be interviewed but declined, graphic Holdinga of U.S.S. Liberty," 2 Oct 1967; DffiNSA memo- ,tatinl he had refu,ed all other luch reque.ta.

ee~:r;r;IBH~;TI*I. 65 UNCLASSIFIED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Citations are unclassified unleaa otherwise indicated at the beginning of the reference. Example: (C-CCO) Smith, John. Sigint Aspects of the War in the East. NSA, 1980. (TSC) The first security classification, CoCCO,is for the citation itself; the second, TSC, is the classification of the document. Documents appearing in this bibliography are available in the Office of Cryptologic Archives and History, T54.

Books and Artic]es on the Six Day War and the U.S.S. LIbert"

Draper, Theodore. Israel and World Politics. New York: Viking Press, 196B. Ennes, James M. Assault on the Liberty. New York: Random House, 1979. Kosut, Hal, editor. "Israel and the Arabs: The June 1967 War," Facts on File, New York, 1968. Pearson, Anthony. Conspiracy of Silence. London: Quartet Books, 1978. Yost, Charles W. "The Arab-Israeli War; How It Began," Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, January 196B.

Cryptologic Histories

Electronic Security Command. Histo/'y of the 6910th Secu/'ity Wing, 1 Janua/'y. 30 June 1967. t:r6~eeej Electronic Security Command. History of the 6931st Secu/'ity Group, 1 Janua/'y -30 June 1967. t:r8 88e! Electronic Security Command. Histo/'y of the 6948th Secu/'ity Squad/'on. 1 January. 30 June 1967. E~8 888! Kagnew Station, Office of Operations. Annual Histo/'ical Repo/'t, FY 1967, vol. n.~~8 888! Rasmuson, John R. A Histo/'y of Kagnew Station and Ame/'ican Fo/'cesin Erit/'ea, 25 May 1973. (U) U.S. Army Communications Support Unit. Annual Histo/'ical Report, FY 1967, vol. It 1 October 1967. f~S~ee8~

Investigative Reviews or Liberty Incident

House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff. A Report to the Committee on Appropriations -U.S. House of Representatives on the Elf ectivenessof the Worldwide Communications Systemsand Networks af the Department of Defense, vols. I and ll.-ffft'I- Israel Defence Forces. Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67, 21 July 1967. (V) NSA Staff. "Report to the Director, NSA -V.S.S. Liberty (AGTR",), 23 May -8 June 1967," 12 June 1967. f~88j Russ, Joseph R. MG, USA. "Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team. U.S.S. Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967."~ 8efts.i.-:ej U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry 7816.07; Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967; Record of Proceedings.i~8~ -

Oral History

Carter, Marshall S., LTG, USA. Interview, January 1969. ~eeee! Connell, John. Interview, 15 September 1980. -t&t- I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 IInterview, 9 May 1980.~ F088ett, Birchard C., CDR, USN. Interview, 22 May 1980. !8-eee!

UNCLASSIFIBD 67 UNCLASSIFIED

Harvey, Richard. Interview, 16 July 1980.-+-rBe,,- Hickman, Richard W. Interview,30 April 1980.-+B-eee-r- McFarland, Terry L., CTC. Interview, 23 June 1980.~ e88r O'Connor,James G., CDR, USN. Interview, 22 May 1980.~eeer- Rhodes,Paddy E., CTC. Interview, 13June 1980.-fS-eee;- Sheck,Eugene. Interview, 11 August1980. ~:P8e~ Way, Clyde W., CTC. Interview,6 June 1980.~e',- Wilson, Robert L. Interview,6 May 1980.~eeet

Messages (Listed by Date/Time Group.)

,/(b) (1)! CINCLANT. 121414ZJun 67.-f8?- (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 CNO. 142227ZJun 67.-f8r- (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 102136ZAug 67.-tSr

COMSERVRON8. 240020ZMay 67.~

COMSIXTHFLT. ~2015Z Jun 67.-$t- 062349Z Jun 67. oter 070626Z Jun 67.-f;Bt- 071503ZJun 67.~ 081250Z Jun 67.-.fe1- 08132OZJun 67.-fY7- 081349Z Jun 67.~ 081514Z Jun 67.-fe;t- 081649Z Jun 67.-fet- 09~13Z Jun 67.-f8t- 0923-7Z Jun 67.-Ice1-

CTF 60. 081316ZJun 67:-.f:sr-

CTF 100. 130034ZJun 67.~-Gr~ 150200zJun 67.-te.t ~

CTG 60.5. 000758ZJun 67.~"j - 002119ZJun 67.-t61- 10175OZJun 67.-tet-

DIRNAVSECGRU. 13171x;ZJun 67. ~S sse~

DIRNAVSECGRUEUR.001

68 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

DIRNSA. 231729ZMay 67.-fBr 232133ZMay 67. ~"'89T 252317ZMay 67.-t&e',- 2~Z May 67. ESe! 270000ZMay 67. ES888~ 292013ZMay 67.-(et- 292201ZMay 67.-E8er 022333ZJun 67.~",;- 072104ZJun 67.-+:Br 081356ZJun 67.~q:S-eee) 081503ZJun 67.-ES-eee~- 091345ZJun 67~ 101718ZJun 67.~ "Ger- ca. 21-.Z Jun 67~ 081648ZAug 67.~

JCS. ~2235Z Nov 65.~ 291602ZMay 67.~ 011545ZJun 67~ 070259ZJun 67.-f&7- 07223OZJun 67...{eT- OBO110ZJun 67. EIfS'r OB1529ZJun 67.-t81- 10214OZJun 67,-fe,-

NAVSHIPENGCTR. 141551ZJun 67.-fBt-

NSAEUR. 140829Z Jun 67..fB:,- 16153OZ Jun 67. f8 88Qj

State, Department of. Messageno. 200139 to American Embassy, Tel Aviv, 11 June 1967.-fet-

TF 60.5. 090758ZJun 67.-te1-

USCINCEUR. 300032ZMay 67~ 010035ZJun 67..J.8r 020717ZJun 67.-f9T 101045ZJun 67.-fBt- 101100ZJun 67.-fBt-

USCINCNAVEUR.31175OZ May 67.-te1- 011300ZJun 67~,--- 020717ZJun 67.~ 001016ZJun 67.~ 001352ZJun 67.~ 00l85OZJun 67.-f:&1- 001357Z Jun 67..ltet- 081517ZJun 67.-+er 091459ZJun 67.-f&t- 100025ZJun 67.-f:et- 111031ZJun 67..f81- 111311ZJun 67-':&7- 12095OZJun 67.-t5T- 151000ZJun 67~"'t- UNCLASSIFIED 69 UNCLASSIFIED

USDAO, Tel Aviv. 081414ZJun 67.4er 131335ZJun 67.-t9t- 151615ZJun 67.~

USN-446. 001355ZJun 67.-E8-eee,

V.s.s. Liberty. 241732ZMay 67.-fet- 021132ZJun 67.~ 02133OZJun 67.-fet- 0221OSZJun 67.-fE;1- 001844ZJun 67.-fet- 002036ZJun 67.~ OSOO34ZJun 67. ~ OS0742ZJun 67. (V) OS0856ZJun 67.~ OS1715ZJun 67. (V) 200735ZJun 67.~~~'-~ 021630ZAug 67. -f;et-

U.S.S. Saratoga. 081235Z Jun 67. (U) 081237Z Jun 67. (U) 081254Z Jun 67. (U)

Memoranda. Letters. Bulletins. Reports. and Briefing

Alger, Julie. "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970.~8e?- Deeley, Walter G. Memorandum for the Deputy Director. "U.S.S. Liberty," 14 June 1967.~ S68t- Deeley, Walter G. Letter to the Vice Director for Operations (J3), 29 June 1967.4&1- JCS/Joint Staff: J3. JCS cite no. 2308/378, "Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 24 June 1967. 1'f8 B~~~ttt.-ej Joint Command and Control Requirements Group. Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Fact Finding Team," 18 June 1967.~ National Military Command Center: NSA Senior Operations Officer Log, fJ730-1530,8 June 1967.~er Memorandum for the Record, 1530 EDT, 8 June 1967.~ NSA: Director. Handwritten note to D1, 8 June 1967. (U) Director. Memorandum for the Record, 8 June 1967.~ Director. Handwritten note circulated to senior staff, 10 June 1967. (U) Director. Letter to MG J. R. Russ, USA, 12 June 1967.-t&1- Director. Memorandum to ADC, "Cryptographic Holdings of U.S.S. Liberty," 17 August 1967.-f&1- Deputy Director. Memorandum for the Record, "U.S.S. Liberty," 8 June 1967..f&er Deputy Director. Memorandum, "Directorate's Temporary Mid-East Information Group," 8 June 1967..J.J;1- Deputy Director. Memorandum for the Record, "Inquiry from House Appropriations Committee Regarding U.S.S. Liberty," 20 June 1967.-teer Deputy Director. Penned, long-hand comment, 26 August 1967, attached to copy of Israeli Defence Force Preliminary Inquiry File 1/67, 21 July 1967. (U) NSA Staff. Informal paper, "Airborne Collection in Middle East," undated. ca. 1967.~S6t- NSA Staff. Memorandum for the Director, NSA, "Classified Material Aboard U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 11 June 1967. ~'f8-eee-t,7,

70 UNCLASSIFIED e9:":~IBE~t~.~ -

E~ ee8~ NSA Staff. "Critique -Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon," 10 July 1968,-ttJIS8~~~ NSA Staff. ADC Memorandum to the Director, NSA, "Cryptographic Holdinp of U.S.S. Liberty," 2 October 1967.~ NSA Staff. "Fact Sheet for DIRNSA," undated -ca. 1967.-f:&-eear NSA Staff. "Informa] Paper on Liberty's Communications," 22 June 1967.-t8er NSA Staff. T1 Memorandum, "Missent Traffic from RUEPCR," 14 July 1967. (U) NSA Staff. "Operations Staff Summary," ca. 16 June 1967~':'Bet- NSA Staff. "Questions by Genera] Carroll, Director, DIA -Answers Provided by G Group/PM," 27 June 1967.~8e~- ES eee~ ?iSA Staff. Note for the Director, "Sigint Reflections of Liberty Incident," 27 June 1967.-t':Y'v7- ~~ eee~ NSA Staff. "Status of Operations Actions Relative toSigint ReadinessBravo/Crayon," Report no. 13, 9-10 June 1967. E~Beee~ NSA Staff. Memorandum for the Record, "Te]ephone Conversation with Mr. Morton A. Brill, OCCE," 5 July 1967. (U) NSA Staff. "Trip Report of Eugene Sheck and LT Deprey," 27 June 1967-+s..eeerr- NSA Staff. "U.S.S. Liberty -Chronology, 23 May -8 June."~~ NSA, G62. "Briefing on the 1967 Middle East Crisis," undated.~"'eJ State, Department of. Memorandum to the Director: NSA, 22 August 1967- ~C iBBBjij':e1 Bulletin, 17 June 1968. (U) Bulletin, 2 June 1969. (U) USNAVEUR Contingency Watch Team. Memorandum, "U.S.S. Liberty Incident," 12 June 1967...4~8~6J U.S.S. Liberty. "Ship Weather Observation Sheet," 8 June 1967. (U) White House. Daily Diary, 8 June 1967. (U)

Sigint and Technical Reports OPINg No. 2855, Manuaoo U.S. Sigint Operations,12 March 1965_~ ~e6'{- Sigint Reports: R23~7, 082015Z JUD 67.--f£-.."'i R24~7, 090831Z Jun 67.~ R27~7, 091422Z Jun 67.~ -'C C~~;-"Station Facilities Book .U.S.S. Liberty (USN-855)," 31 December 1966.~"=f:ir-

(b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.t. 86-36

IfM,BtH ","K ee:,Hf'lf effM,f,HtS ef't¥

GQ~~IQi~;~I.\L 71 8B8R13!1! INDEX

Cyprus navigational restrictions for, 19, 21

Dayan, Moehe, 3 Deeley, WaIter, 58 Defense Communications System, 22 Department of Army Communications Center, Pentagon communications erron, 21-22 Deprey, LT Allan, 52 Doorman, Project. See National Security Agency, Projects Doorman and Lifeblood Bennett, LT Maurice R., 17, 28-29, 31, 44, 47 Durham, Billy, 55 Bishop, LCDR Benjamin M., 47 Blalock, Donald L., 17, 26, 40, 48, 64 Blue, Allen M., 17, 26, 45, 64 I EC;..!~1 flights. See SiRint corection, airborne Bolstridge, Col Leslie J., 59 Breedlove, Maj, 21-22 Electronic Security Command. See Air Force Security Service El- Ka8ir. 38-41 C-130 flights. See Sigint collection, airborne EUCOM, Europe~Command. See u.S. Commander- Carter, LTG Marshall S., 57-58,62 in-Chief, Europe; see also Lemnitzer, Castle, CDR Ernest C., 32, 34 GEN L.L. Central Intelligence Agency European Security Region. See Air Force Security assessment of Israeli intentions, 64 Service Chernyakov, Yurij Niklolaevich, 32 CINCEUR. See U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Firestone,LT Philip G., 47 (b) (1) Europe; see also Lemnitzer, GEN LL. (b) (3)-50 USC 403 CINCLANT. See Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fitzpatrick, RADM Francis J., 58 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 CINCUSNA VEUR. See U.S. Naval Forces Europe; FTM SystemsCompany, 52-53 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 see also McCain, ADM John S., Jr. Collection. See Sigint collection Galavotti, LT E. L., 21 Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Garrett, Co)William A., 58 reluctance to use U.S.S. Belmont, 62 Gaza Strin. 3 responsibility for Liberty, 15, 17 Commander, Service Squadron 8, 17 COMSERFORSIXTHFLT, Commander, Service Forces, Sixth Fleet. See Arthur, CAPT Russell Golan Heights, 3 COMSIXTHFLT. See U.S. Sixth Fleet; Beealso Goldberg, Arthur J., 21 Martin, VADM William I. Golden, LT George, 35 Connell, John, 15, 20-21 Green, Lt Col Robert T., 47 Cook, RADM Ralph E., 58 Gulf of Aqaba, 3, 5, 23 Cowardin, Charles, 48 Coyne, Patrick, 58 CPA, cl08est point of approach. See U.S.S. Liberty, Hanley, CAPf M. J., Jr., 21 navigational restrictions Harvey, Dick, 19-20 Cryptanalysis. See Sigint processing and reporting Helms, Richard, 64 I (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 I Holleran, William M, 45

~~~~9LB '.tI.,- GQ~.g~ GA_1-~EYS omx SB8RB!f73 (b) (3)-50 USC 403 SSeftST (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 INSCOMM, Intelligenceand SecurityCommand. Lee, LT R. H., 47 See Army Security Agency Lemnitzer, GEN I... 1...,17. See ouo U.S. Commander- Intelligencerequirements in-Chief, Europe Middle East tensions, 5 Lewis, LCDR David E., 15, 17 .Six DAY War. n L -naviJationaJ restrictions for, 17

Lifeblood. Project. See ~ational Security Agency, Projects Doorman and Lifeblood involvementin Six !JavW~. 3 Ling-Temco-Vought (L1iY>, 52-53 Linguists. See Sigint pz;ocesaingand reporting Israel "', ...' acknol~ledgementof error of ~ttac~, 32 ! Martin. VADM Willia~ L, 20. 22, 43, 45, 61 compensation paid for attack,'64 , I McCain, ADM JohnS.i, Jr., 17-18, 43. 47, 52 Department of State reaction to attack, 41 .j McFarland,CTC Terry L.. 26-27, 29 ~e;ent in Six Day War, 3).', """, ;1 McGonagle,CDR William L. Israeli Defence Forces Court of Izi:quirY... j actionsduring and i~mediately after attack, 26-31 proceedings, 37-40, 47 ...~:,'; CongreBBionalMedai of Honor award, 64 military attack on the Liberty, 26-29, 37-40 enrouteto easternMediterranean, 15, 20, 23 navigational restrictions for, 19-22 \, ' McNamara,Robert S., 58 McTiEhe. L T John T.. 55 [" I Johnson, GEN Harold K, 62 "i " Johnson, Lyndon B. '\ MorrISon, 13ng Gen John, (.. advised of attack, 32 '-: requests CIA assessment,64 " Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 1,3 Joint ReconnaissanceCenter. See U.S. Joint Chiefs National Military Command Center (NMCC), 32 of Staff National Security Agency actions taken as result of attack, 32, 34, 45, 52, CC::J ~ '-"'\ 54-58 involvement in Six Day War, 3, '; c~dination with JCS Fact l'mding Team. 58-59 relations with PLa, 1 \ , '--- -- relations with U.A.R., 1 " , NSA Europe and Liberty, 17, 47. 52 ! I I \', Projects Doorm~ri and Lifeblood,! Jorgensen,CDR C. G., 21-22! \ , reaction to Israeli Preliminary fuquiry,!'41 ;, .., ! " ,reactlons to SlX, Day War, 5 Kagnew Station. 1 I, \ " ',relations with 'Joint Reconnaissance Center, 15, Keller, BG William, 52 1 ',' , \. " 19-21 ! Kidd, RADM I. C., 54 / '."', ...,~:~.. ", " role in safety e~aluations, 15, 19.:61-62 -Kiepfer. LT Ri~hard F., 32,25 .'."'..."::::::... \\ 'technical contrbl and support o~!TRs program, 15, (.b)(3)-P.L. 86-3.6 ,I """. "":::'., '\', 17, 21 , I' :: .

Klumfoot, Clarence R., 47 ! """" '\::::... \Temporary Mid-East 1nf6rmation Group, 58, 61 ',..', .." ' KDczak, LCDR Edward, 58 ""...... ::;... Nli,tional Security Council, !! ri>8ygin, Aleksei N. \... ";:::.. Spetial Committee andLib~rty, 57-58 ...\. -:::::"Nav.l', Communi~ations Station ,', "", """ :'::::::::::As~~ra, 19-2p, /22 il! ;!:.' Liberty, 32 .'. .."Gree,e,22 if i... ""'.'" "'¥ordit~?, 19, )2* ::1 Leahy, CAP!' ':I. G., 43 Lebanon \ ! "'.""', Nav~ S~~\:lrity,t:ro~Pr'.'Europe .CoIlt~u'~icati~s ~8istance to Task Group 100.6, 47 ,.stai!~~'f~ski(;~up 100.4, 47 L.naVigat:onal i'e8t:ict:.1~~"~~:,'",~,~:::~L&~i\G9~m~B~~~1~ ,hi...43-44 i 74 Sfieftfilf' ;! -J

(b) (1) (b) (1) (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (bl (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 - (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 BB6RtiT -

O'Connor,LT JamesG., 26-29 O'Malley, ENS., 28 .-I Owen, CAPr William D., 58

PalestineLiberation Organization(PLO), 1 Pawlinkowsk.i,CTC Alfred J., 47 Pickett, MG G. B., 59 Platzek, CDR E. H., 47 Precedenceassignment in messagetraffic, 22 Friddle, Maj Harlan E., 58 , - Renken,RADM Henry A., 47-48 Rhodes,CT3 PaddyE. (Dusty), 15, 26 ! Rostow,Walt, 32 RUBS,MG J~epb R., 52, 54, 58-60 Russell,LTC C. K., 21 !

::::: _~-l """ file reduction at exposed Bites, 62.;.r,3 minimizing compromise of Liberty's records, 43-45, 48, 51-52, 54-56 rules for preas coverage and interviews, 48 surveillance of Soviet destroyers, 44 '7 (bl (11 (hi (31-SC USC 403 Sheck, Eugene, 19-20, 52 (bl (31 -18 USC 798 Shukairy, Ahmed, 1 (bI13)-P.L. 86-36 Sigint alerts Sigint Readiness AIfa, Middle East, 1 Sigint Readiness Bravo Crayon, 3-5, 11, 19

Sigint collection (b) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 I airborne, 11-13, 18 --~ (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 -~ USN-855.See U.S.S. Liberty . ,r II' \\ Six Day War intelligence requirementl generated by, 5 .technical research shin nJ'nnR m 1 Q 1~ 1" ;1;7, 64 resume of, 1-4 U.S. navigationalrestric tionl Smith, Bromley,58 Smith, CAPr Carl M.,47,

/" Spivy, LTG B. E., 58

,..,,""" L .. . -Comint on Liberty attack:, 34-35

, involvementin Six Day War, 1, 3 NSA a~b~Ckupproces8or, 18 navigationarr~trictions observedby U.S., 19-20 t~~hrilca1 reporting by Liberty. 23 relations with Pe~ples Republic of China, 1 (b) (1) (b) (31-50 USC 403 IIM,B~B .."ti..e6:'f~"'f eHirf,.!,.~ ()!,-a.y. Sfi6RB!F 75 (bl (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (b) (3)-18 USC 798 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

55 8BeHHIf

I{continued} reviews DOD messageprecedence usage, 60 U.S. Department of State cDS =:~lt 3 criticizeslaraeli attack, 41 U.S. European Command. See U.S. Commander-in- Chief, Europe Technical Pr'~e88ingCeDtei (TPC),' , 1&-19, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 62 ! : ;L--l actions subsequentto Liberty attack, 32 Technical reaeat~hship lpe~ial com~unicationl directions to Liberty, 17 system(TRSSCOMM), 16-18 Fact Finding Team, 47, 52, 54, 58-59, 61 , \ : , ! Joint ReconnaiSlanceCenter, 15, 17, 20 reaction to Six Day War, 20 safety evaluations, 61~2 U.S. Naval Security Group, 58-59, 62 U.S. Navy, Europe .' \. ' , \ Ullnoo Albert Woo45 [ILL ! actions subsequentto Liberty attack, 28-29, 32 \ 1. I i activation of TF 100, 47 communications difficulty with Liberty, 20 United Arab Republic (U.A.R;;) ! convenes Naval Court of Inquiry, 47 charges of U.S.-U.K complicity with Israel in involvement in actions to withdraw Liberty, 21-23 -Six Day War. 3. 201 JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 52 navigational restrictions, 19

I operational control of Liberty, 17-18,20 ~ U.S. Navy Ships Engineering Center, 52 involvement in Six Day War, 3 U.S. Navy Task Force 60, 28 navigational re8triction8 ob8erved byU.S., 19,..22 U.S. Navy Task Force 63, 32 relation8 with Jordan, 1 U.S. Navy Task Force 100, 47-48, 52 relation8 with U.S., 3 relation8 with U.S.S.R.,l, 3 U.S. Navy Task Group 100.3, 47-48 rivalry with Saudi Arabia. 1, 3 U.S. Navy Task Group 100.4, 47-48 U.S. Navy Task Group 100.6, 47 ' \_-y emen actIons,. 1- 2 J U.S.N.S. Muller. See Sigint units, I United Nation8 U.S.N.S. Valdez. See Sigint unitaL J actions during Six Day War, 3-4 U.S.S. America, 31, 33, 43-44, 48 I Middle East peace-ke~Eini attempt8, 1 U.S.S. Belmont, 15, 43-44, 57, 62 U.S.S. Davis, 42-44, 47 United State8 ti ; U.S.S. Georgetown, 15 AID personnel in Yemen imprisoned, 1-3 U.S.S. Jamestow~;15. See Sigint unital I relations with U.A.R.,:3 U.S.S. Liberty , armament of, 16 , support of Israel, 1 i : if! attack on 26-30 .'.' U. S. Army Communicatio~ Support:Unit;C===:J attempts to withdraw, 21::'23 ~;! : U.S. Chief, Naval Operatiq~!(CNO) !' a~ards for, 64 . Norfolk 8urvey team, 55+5& ! !! communicationa.of, 16-17, 1~20

recommend8withdraw~!qfLibe!rty ,21 damaged equipment assessment,52-54 U. S. Command~r-in-Chie~;; ~rope i! .../ deploy~ent to eastern Mediterranean, 15, 17-22 actionsaction8 to8ub8e~ent withdraw to Liberty,+~ertY'att~ck, 21 ! 31, 45, 47... lar~eli'"poet-attack reconnaissance,30-31 JCS Fact-Finding Team's visit, 54

JCS Fact Findmg Tea~~~f vi8it,!~2 ...,."" . .navigational restrictions, 17, 19, 21-22 operational control of lJiberly, 17 ', .""", " operationai"'~ontrol of, 15, 17, 20, 22 , "'" , U. S. Congre88, House of~pre8entative8;... ",' post-attack d~ument disposition, 32 ...' Appropriations CQ~itiee ...' . press coverage~...48, 52 , reviews communicat,ion !1?z:°ble~du~iJig Liberty rationale for e~ern Mediterranean

incident, 59-60, deployment, ~, 12-13

76 8BeRE~ flXf,BtH -.11..ee:.ftf,f elWifiB~ e~&¥ (bl (1) (b) (1) (hI (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3) -50 USC 403 (hI (3) -18 USC 798 (b) (3) -18 USC 798 (h) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 -S~~R~~ -- U.S.S. Liberty (continued) U.S.S.R. safety factors, consideration of, 19-20, 61-62 Sigint mission of, 15-17, 19, 23 ~Q!1! _~thMiddle E~ countries, 1,3

Sixth Flep.t rescue operation, 43-47 ,. Six Day War involvement,4, 19,. USN Attache'in Tel Aviv as intermediary, 34 U.S.S. Little Rock, 31, 43, 52 U.S.S. Massey, 43-44 Vance, Cyrus, 32 U.S.S. Oxford, 15-20 Vineyard, CAPT Merriweii W., 21 U.S.S. Papago, 32, 35, 43-45, 47-48 , U.S.S. Saratoga, 28-29, 31-32 ,'" U.S. Sixth Fleet f' Way, CT3 ClydeW., 27, 29 actions taken in reaction to attack, 28-29, 31-:32, Wheeler,LTG Earle G., 21,59 34 ...f Wilson, RobertL., 17,25-27, 29, 36, 44, 51 indications of possible hc.tile intent, 20 ' JCS Fact Finding Team's visit, 52 f navigational restrictions, 19-20, 31 ",/:""" operational control of Liberty,J7, 19"'26 " U.A.R. intervention, 1 Sigint direct suppo~tQf,w Yerushalmi, Lt Col Yishaya, 37

Ib) (1) Ib) (3)-~0 USC 403 Ib) (3) -18 USC 798 (b) 13) -P.L. 86-36

11)) (1) (b) (3) -50 USC 4:13 Ib) (3).18 USC 798 (b) (3) .P.L. 8E-36

T5-';un 81-53-3475 11:~~;BI2I3 '.1.~ e8~.HP,:P 811.~,P,I3I2B 8P,I2¥ SBERfilf 77