The German Princes' Responses to the Peasants' Revolt of 1525

Central European History 40 (2007), 219–240. Copyright # Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association DOI: 10.1017/S0008938907000520 Printed in the USA

The German Princes’ Responses to the Peasants’ Revolt of 1525

Thomas F. Sea

HE German Peasants’ Revolt of 1525 represented an unprecedented challenge to the princes and other petty political rulers of the areas involved. While localized uprisings had occurred with increasing fre- T 1 quency in the decades prior to the 1525 revolt and an uneasy awareness of growing levels of peasant discontent was widespread among most rulers of southern and central German lands, the extent of the major rebellion that developed in early 1525 took everyone by surprise. No one was prepared to respond, either militarily or through more peaceful means. Even the Swabian League, the peacekeeping alliance of Imperial princes, prelates, nobility, and cities that eventually assumed primary responsibility for suppressing the revolt, did little to mobilize its resources for almost six months after the ﬁrst appeals for help from its members against disobedient subjects reached it.2 When the League did mobilize, its decision created further problems for League members, since most sent their required contingents to the League’s forces only to discover that they needed the troops badly themselves once the revolt spread to their own lands. Since the Council of the Swabian League adamantly refused to return any members’ troops because this would hinder the League’s own ability to suppress the peasant disorders, many members found themselves vir- tually defenseless against the rebels.

1For detailed analysis of some of the more serious of these earlier uprisings, see A. Rosenkranz, Der Bundschuh. Die Erhebungen des su¨ddeutschen Bauernsta¨ndes in den Jahren 1493–1517, 2 vols., Schriften des Wissenschaﬂichen Instituts der Elsass-Lothringer im Reich (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universi- ta¨tsbuchhandlung, 1927); Gu¨nther Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 10th ed. (Darmstadt: Wis- senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), 1–91; G. Egelhaaf, “Ein Vorspiel des Bauernkriegs aus Oberschwaben,” in Analekten zur Geschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1886), 215–255. 2The League extended the powers of its emergency mobilization committee to include cases of peasant unrest in the fall of 1524 after requests for aid had been received from Archduke Ferdinand of Austria and other members. There was no active response from the League until mid-February 1525, however. See Horst Karl, “Der Schwa¨bische Bund,” in Der Bauernkrieg in Oberschwaben, ed. Elmar L. Kuhn (Tu¨bingen: bibliotheca academica Verlag, 2000), 421–43; C. Greiner, “Die Politik des Schwa¨bischen Bundes wa¨hrend des Bauernkrieges 1524/1525 bis zum Vertrag von Weingarten,” Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins fu¨r Schwaben und Neuburg 68 (1974): 7–94. For the rationale behind the League’s actions, see T. F. Sea, “The Swabian League and Peasant Disobedience before the German Peasants’ War of 1525,” Sixteenth Century Journal 30 (1999): 89–111.

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Nevertheless, some of the more powerful rulers in the areas of the revolt— primarily Imperial princes—decided to take countermeasures of their own in addition to the efforts of the Swabian League, even though by so doing their financial and military resources were strained to the utmost degree. Although it is generally conceded that the princes emerged victorious from the 1525 revolt,3 a careful examination of the military, financial, and political responses of selected German princes reveals how severely tested their resources had been by the experiences of the rebellion. Military recruitment procedures upon which they had counted proved unavailable or unreliable, forcing them to resort to extraordinary measures to raise troops. Such measures in turn required financial resources far greater than those normally available to most princes. Even when they managed to raise military forces for use against the rebels, most princes felt that they needed far more troops than they had. Efforts to maintain the peace within their own lands required spreading their resources thinly in garrisons and patrols that could not always guarantee that the rebel threat would be averted. Some rulers found they could muster no effective resistance to the rebellion. Faced with such difficulties, some princes decided that the best solution was to negotiate with the rebels, only to find that negotiations aroused the suspicions of neighboring rulers and that an agreement with the rebels did not always last. By the time the rebellion was suppressed, the princes may have been the “victors,” but their experiences during the revolt had left them with a lasting fear of peasant disorders that could not easily be dispelled, as the post-rebellion measures to prevent renewed uprisings demonstrated.

Military Mobilization The German princes theoretically had several levels of military responses available to them for meeting the rebel threat. They could call up the entire force represented by their subjects, forming the Landwehr for the defense of the homeland. They could selectively mobilize their subjects, calling upon those nobles and cities in their lands who owed military

3Classic statements concerning the completeness of the princes’ victory come from authors as diverse as Friedrich Engels, The German Revolutions, ed. Leonard Krieger (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 116–17 (originally published in 1850), and G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 296–99. See the significant modification of this interpretation by Peter Blickle, The Revolution of 1525, trans. Thomas A. Brady, Jr. and H. C. Erik Midelfort (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 176–85. E. Franz, “Hessen und Kurmainz in der Revolution 1525. Zur Rolle des fru¨hmodernen Staates im Bauernkrieg,” in Aus Geschichte und ihren Hilfswissenschaften. Festschrift fu¨r Walter Heinemeyer zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Hermann Bannasch and Hans-Peter Lachmann (Marburg: Elwert [in Komm.], 1979), 628–52, argues that the benefits for a prince depended heavily upon the efficiency of his rule prior to the peasants’ revolt.

service. They could recruit and pay experienced Landsknechte. Each of these alternatives presented difficulties.4 Given the nature of the peasant threat, few princes had enough confidence in the loyalty of their subjects to issue a general mobilization order. The results of such orders, for those who did use them, were hardly satisfactory. Both the Count Palatine and the Wu¨rttemberg Regency (acting on behalf of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria) found that the troops they had raised through at least partial mobilization of their subjects were so untrustworthy that they had to be immediately released.5 In some instances, as in Branden- burg-Ansbach and the Bishopric of Wu¨rzburg, the issuance of a general mobilization order backfired completely, driving the subjects of the prince, better equipped than they might otherwise have been, into the arms of the rebels.6 On the other hand, much depended upon the timing of such mobilization orders. Landgrave Philipp of Hesse, who mobilized in mid-April before the uprisings had reached his lands, was able to raise an effective force.7 The Dukes of Bavaria, after resisting the issuance of a general mobilization throughout the early stages of the campaign against the rebels, decided after the attack upon their territories by the Allgaü rebels on May 11–12 to call up the peasants in the area. This startling decision was based partly on desperation, but also on a desire to convince the restive Bavarian peasantry of the confidence of the dukes in them. In view of the reaction of some of the Bavarian peasants along the Lech river border, who had mobilized of their own accord to protect their villages

4For an attempt at an overall analysis of the princely military alternatives and their relative effectiveness, which is unfortunately not always entirely accurate because of incomplete understanding of the Swabian League’s military operations, see S. Hoyer, Das Milita¨rwesen im deutschen Bauernkrieg 1524–1526, Milita¨rhistorische Studien 16, Neue Folge (Berlin: Milita¨rverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [VEB], 1975), 107–146. 5Baden-Wu¨rttemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart (hereinafter referred to as WHStA), H54, Bu¨. 10, no. 15–16, 22 (April 23 and 25, May 3, 1525). See K. Hartfelder, ed., “Akten zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Su¨ddeutschland,” Zeitschrift fu¨r die Geschichte des Oberrheins 39 (1882): 390–92, no. 22, 23, 28. 6Wu¨rzburg: Lorenz Fries, Die Geschichte des Bauernkrieges in Ostfranken von Magister Lorenz Fries, A. Scha¨fﬂer and T. Henner, eds., 2 vol. (Wu¨rzburg: Verlag des historischen Vereins von Unterfran- ken, 1883), 18–20. Cf. R. von Thu¨ngen, Der Bauernkrieg in Franken unter Conrad III, Bischof von Wu¨rzburg (Wu¨rzburg: Kabitzsch & Monnich, 1926), 18–21. Brandenburg-Ansbach: L. Mu¨ller, “Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs im Riess und seinen Umlanden,” Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins fu¨r Schwaben und Neuburg 16 (1889): 10, note 2; C. Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir und der Bauernkrieg in den su¨dlichen Grenza¨mtern des Fu¨rstentums unterhalb des Gebirgs (Nuremberg: Kgl. Bayer. Hofbuch- druckerei/G. P. J. Bieling-Dietz, 1892), 12–13, 22, 30. 7This was partly due to Philipp’s own eloquence in persuading his reluctant troops that their interests lay in maintaining his rule. See O. Merx, “Der Bauernkrieg in den Stiftern Fulda und Hersfeld und Landgraf Philipp der Grossmu¨tige,” Zeitschrift des Vereins fu¨r hessische Geschichte und Landeskunde, N.F. 28 (1904): 260–63; Tom Scott and Bob Scribner, eds. and trans., The German Peasants’ War: A History in Documents (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, and London: Humanities Press International, 1991), 159–60, no. 55–57.

against the invasion, the dukes took a calculated risk that apparently worked out quite well.8 Nevertheless, most of the princes were selective in their mobilization policies, preferring a smaller force that they could trust to the larger total Landwehr. Principal sources upon which the princes could draw for troops were their fief- holders, who held their lands against the obligation to supply troops for the princes’ campaigns, the so-called Diener von Haus aus (nobles, not otherwise bound to a prince, who contracted to supply a certain number of troops on demand in return for a yearly retainer), and cities and towns that were subject to the prince. In each of these cases, the ability of the sources to supply troops was severely complicated by the absence of most of the reliable and experienced Landsknechte, who were fighting in Italy for Emperor Charles V.9 Mobilization of the forces owed by the territorial nobility in the lands of a prince was often a first step toward military preparedness. The results obtained by different princes varied widely. The Dukes of Bavaria, who issued a call to their nobility in February because they feared attack from the exiled Duke Ulrich of Wu¨rttemberg,10 found that they could realize nowhere near the number of troops theoretically available from this source. The replies of the Bavarian nobility to the ducal mobilization order revealed that many nobles who held land from the dukes lacked (or claimed to lack) the resources to meet their required military obligation. Reductions and compromises on the number of troops owed were often necessary, though the ducal officials attempted to maintain a hard-line policy. A second major limitation on the effectiveness of this method of raising troops was the complexity of the military

8Reports from Bavarian officials about complaints among the peasantry that the dukes didn’t trust them, since they hadn’t been mobilized, began to arrive in late April and early May. Bavarian Haupt- staatsarchiv, Abteilung I: Allgemeines Staatsarchiv, Munich (hereinafter cited as BHStA), Kriegsakten 73, fol. 125, 127. The mobilization order itself, citing the example of the self-mobilized peasants of Peissenberg and expressing the utmost confidence in the peasants of all Bavarian lands: BHStA, Kriegsakten 73, fol. 282–84, 286–89. A major debate developed in the late nineteenth century between W. Vogt and S. Riezler over the exact intentions of the Peissenberg peasants: W. Vogt, Die bayerische Politik im Bauernkrieg und der Kanzler Dr. Leonhard von Eck, das Haupt des schwa¨bischen Bundes (No¨rdlingen: C. H. Beck, 1883), 142–155, and S. Riezler, “Die treuen bayerischen Bauern am Peissenberg, Mai 1525,” Sitzungsberichte des ko¨nigl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hist. Classe (1891): 701–70. One of the more recent researchers concerned with the problem con- cluded that Riezler was probably right—that the Peissenberg peasants were assembled to protect their lands against the Swabian intruders. See F. Zimmermann, “Unbekannte Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs,” Zeitschrift fu¨r bayerische Landesgeschichte 27 (1964): 190–244. 9Scott and Scribner, The German Peasants’ War, 150–51, no. 48. It should be noted that the Italian wars had not completely drained the supply of Landsknechte; however, those who remained tended to be older, possibly partially reestablished in peasant communities, and perhaps therefore less inclined to allow themselves to be recruited against the rebels. See the difficulties experienced in the early days of the rebellion with the troops recruited by the Swabian League in F. L. Baumann, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Oberschwaben, Bibliothek des Literarischen Vereins in Stuttgart 129 (Tu¨bingen, 1876), 544, (no. 17); 727–28, (no. 20). 10BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 2–3 (Feb. 12, 1525); Kriegsakten 71, fol. 11–12 (Feb. 21, 1525).

obligations of many of the Bavarian nobility. The most frequent excuse, after inadequate means, for not responding to the ducal call-up was that troops had already been supplied to another prince or princes, usually either Archduke Ferdinand of Austria or the princes of the Upper Palatinate. Nobles who had taken on additional military obligations in this fashion usually recognized their duty to the dukes, but pleaded for more time to raise the extra troops.11 Although the Bavarian nobility raised a signiﬁcant number of troops, ducal counselor Leonhard von Eck’s opinion of their overall military capacity in a letter to Duke Wilhelm would appear justiﬁed:

I would be glad to see the mobilization of the ofﬁcials and Landsleute. I expect it to be rather modest, and I am writing to remind your Grace to keep my frequent warnings on this matter in mind. I have often argued that both your Grace and my lord Duke Ludwig expect more horse than it will be possible to raise.12

Other princes had similar problems with the mobilization of their nobility. Mar- grave Casimir of Brandenburg-Ansbach called a Landtag to discuss possible ways of dealing with the rebellion and was advised by his nobles to enter into negotiations with the rebels.13 Nor were the nobility of the Bishopric of Wu¨rzburg eager to mobilize.14 Conflicting military obligations also hampered the use of the troops to be delivered by the Diener von Haus aus to various princes. This system, which replaced the fief with a yearly commission binding the noble to deliver an agreed-upon number of troops on demand, was used by several of the more powerful princes to provide a flexible and immediate military response.15 Nobles entering such a contractual relationship were usually professional commanders of independent means who maintained their forces from stipends from several princes. In particular, the counts and Freiherren of the Swabian area were active in this type of service. The Diener von Haus aus seldom planned on being asked to meet all his military obligations to different princes at once. Thus, when the princes began to issue simultaneous call-ups, many of these nobles found their resources strained to the breaking point. Johannes, Freiherr zu Schwartzenberg, described his position succinctly in a letter to Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria:

11This assessment of the military capabilities of the Bavarian nobility is based upon their responses to the February mobilization order, which are scattered throughout BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, especially fol. 4–84. Cf. J. Jo¨rg, Deutschland in der Revolutionsperiode, 1522–1526 (Freiburg: Herder, 1851), 49–50, note 8. 12Vogt, Die bayerische Politik im Bauernkrieg, 405. 13Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, 24. 14Fries, Bauernkrieges in Ostfranken, 17–18, 39–42. 15See H. J. Cohn, The Government of the Rhine Palatinate in the Fifteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 155–56, for a full description of the Diener von Haus aus relationship.

If further demands are to be made upon me, I beg that they be issued somewhat earlier, since I am also obligated to other princes who are issuing similar orders, so that I can meet my obligations to both your Grace and others.16

The conflicts that developed when more than one obligation could not be met sometimes put the noble involved in a difficult position. In such cases, the order that was received first usually took precedence.17 Still another problem in the use of this system was that the nobles involved often needed their troops to put down the rebellion in their own territories, further cutting down their ability to respond to orders from the princes. For example, one of the Diener ordered to mobilize by Archduke Ferdinand of Austria was Margrave Ernst of Baden, whose lands were in the thick of the rebellion. Even though the Austrian mobilization orders were issued as early as August 1524, the failure of the Margrave and other Diener to respond ade- quately left the Habsburg military capability still largely dormant throughout the fall of that year.18 Mobilization of troops from the cities and towns within the lands of a prince was apparently somewhat more effective, since the city councils could usually raise the required number of troops from within their own communities. Stock- piles of arms and other supplies were also available in the cities. Even if the required number of troops could not be raised in the city itself, the council could still provide the money to hire mercenary replacements. Also, the infantry supplied by the Landsta¨dte was a necessary supplement to the horse of the nobility. Here again, however, the actual response to princely mobilization orders often did not live up to expectations. Complaints from Bavarian commanders in March and April show that the troops supplied by the Bavarian cities were ill-equipped, totally inexperienced, and not completely reliable.19 Leonhard von Eck considered the mobilization of troops from the cities a doubtful measure, arguing that it would unduly excite them and perhaps increase their unreliability.20 Furthermore, many of the city troops were clearly unhappy at being called upon to serve far from their homes in garrisons established along

16BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 8. 17See the letter from Burckhardt von Embs to Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria pleading prior orders from Archduke Ferdinand of Austria: BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 18. Duke Wilhelm later insisted that the obligation to him must be met ﬁrst: BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 52. 18H. Schreiber, ed., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg. Gleichzeitige Urkunden, Urkundenbuch der Stadt Freiburg, N.F. I–III (Freiburg: Franz Xavier Wangler, 1863–66), 13–15, no. XIV. See the similar reply of Count Botha von Stolberg-Wernigerode to Duke George of Saxony as late as May 1525: M. Ko¨buch and E. Mu¨ller, eds., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg in Dokumenten (Weimar: Hermann Bo¨hlaus Nachfolger, 1975), 70–71, no. 27. 19See BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 163, 190, 308–09; Kriegsakten 72, fol. 76–77, 243; Kriegsakten 73, fol. 37–38. 20Eck to Duke Ludwig of Bavaria, April 10, 1525: BHStA, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 270–71.

the river Lech border between Bavaria and Swabia. Perhaps because of these difficulties, the Bavarian dukes demobilized their city troops at the end of April after only a month’s service, asking instead that the city councils supply money to pay Landsknechte that the dukes proposed to hire.21 These problems with the more traditional forms of military responses upon which princes could draw were further augmented if the rebellion had already broken out in a prince’s lands before he was fully mobilized. In such cases, it was often impossible to raise any troops at all. The Bishop of Augsburg, for example, found it impossible to supply even minimal garrisons to his cities.22 The Wu¨rttemberg Regency maintained that it could not raise any troops from within Wu¨rttemberg and thus was forced to sit and watch the progress of the rebellion.23 The Bishop of Eichsta¨tt took few mobilization measures when the rebellion broke out in his lands, arguing that, since many of the rebels were actually from the territories of neighboring princes, it was their duty to aid him in putting down the revolt. His apparent inaction sparked the anger of other princes.24 Because of the problems encountered in the mobilization of sufficient troops from these traditional sources, most princes also engaged simultaneously in a crash program of special recruitment once it became clear that the uprisings were serious. Recognizing the value of troops from outside the immediate area in which they were to be serving, some princes, such as the Dukes of Bavaria and Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, turned to sources bordering on their own territories. The Dukes of Bavaria recruited a force of Bohemian Landsknechte to help defend the northern borders of Bavaria, although the difficulties that they caused soon raised doubts about their value.25 Archduke Ferdinand raised a force of 1,000 men from Italy and from the Germans return- ing from Pavia in early May, only to find that almost 800 were unreliable. One hundred and thirty of these troops actually went over to the rebels, and the remainder were not fully trusted by the Archduke’s commanders.26 The Count Palatine, the Archbishops of Trier and Mainz, and Landgrave Philipp

21BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 78–82; Kriegsakten 73, fol. 80–81. 22See the Bavarian warning to the bishop about the necessity of garrisoning Gu¨nzburg: BHStA, Kriegsakten 27, no. 35. The bishop’s inability to protect the city of Fu¨ssen led to its temporary occupation by Austrian forces. 23WHStA, H54, Bu¨. 12, no. 6 (April 3, 1525). 24BHStA, Kriegsakten 70, fol. 7, 30, 48. Josef Seger, “Der Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” Eichsta¨tter Studien 38 (1997): 179, 227–28, explains the Bishop’s almost complete lack of resources. See also Theodor Neuhofer, Gabriel von Eyb, Fu¨rstbischof von Eichsta¨tt 1455–1535 (Eichsta¨tt i. Bay.: Ph. Bronner [P. Seitz] & M. Daentler GmbH, 1934), 150. 25BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 143; Kriegsakten 72, fol. 46. For negotiations over recruitment and conditions of service, see Kriegsakten 68, fol. 118–20, 127–28, 130–40, 149, 160–62, 164–66, 191–92. For grievances of the Bohemian commanders over alleged unfair treatment, see Kriegsak- ten 68, fol. 151–52, 154–55. 26BHStA, Kriegsakten 73, fol. 180–82, 216–18.

of Hesse all recruited in the Netherlands with varying success,27 while the Bishop of Wu¨rzburg turned to the territories of the Saxon princes for troops.28 Other princes, lacking the resources or the good relations with such external sources of troops, were forced to rely on Landsknechte recruited from their own areas, with all the problems that entailed.29

Financial Expedients Whether recruited internally or externally, hired troops required considerable cash outlays to keep them in the field. These expenses, combined with those required for the support of troops with the forces of the Swabian League, required extraordinary financial measures from most princes. Few kept enough cash on hand to meet even one month’s pay for a sizable military force. Thus, the princes turned to borrowing and special levies to raise money for the suppression of the rebellion. Competition for loans from the usual sources, such as the Fugger company, was intense. At one time or another during the rebellion, Archduke Ferdinand, the Dukes of Bavaria, the Swabian League Council, and various individual nobles were all requesting loans from Jakob Fugger.30 Occasionally, a prince found that he could borrow part of his needs from his own subjects. The campaign of Philipp of Hesse, for example, was partially financed by loans from a rich Hessian noble, Tylo Wolff von Gudensberg.31 Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria accepted loans or donations from several of his counselors.32 The Statthalter of the Archbishop of Mainz bor- rowed from the cathedral chapter and from the University of Mainz.33 Duke

27Hartfelder, ed., “Akten,” 388–90, no. 21; W. Struck, Der Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen. Darstellung und Quellen (Wiesbaden: Selbstverlag der Historischen Kommission fu¨r Nassau, 1975), 76, note 383; 132–33, no. 20. 28Fries, Bauernkrieges in Ostfranken, 120ff. 29For example, neither the princes of the Upper Palatinate nor Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg- Ansbach could recruit in Bohemia because of their traditionally poor relations with the nobility of the area, who were the principal commanders of the mercenary forces. A portion of Bavaria’s Bohemian forces, when offered a chance to enter Margrave Casimir’s services, refused because of his notorious insolvency. Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, 30. Cf. Hoyer, Milita¨rwesen, 129–134, on the extensive difficulties encountered in hiring mercenaries. 30See Archduke Ferdinand’s letter of March 3, 1525 to Jo¨rg Truchsess, confirming that he had arranged a 10,000-florin loan from the Fuggers: Scott and Scribner, The German Peasants’ War, 152–53, no. 51. Negotiations with the trading companies of Augsburg over loan requests caused considerable ill will against the Fuggers and other leading merchants: U. Artzt, “Die Correspondenz des schwa¨bischen Bundeshauptmanns Ulrich Artzt von Augsburg aus die Jahren 1524–27. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Schwaben,” ed. W. Vogt, Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins fu¨r Schwaben und Neuburg 7 (1880), 281–82, no. 228; 301–02, no. 266 (Bemerkung); 323, no. 306; 336–38, no. 334–35; 345, no. 354. Cf. Hoyer, Milita¨rwesen, 128–29. 31W. Falckenheiner, Philipp der Grossmu¨tige im Bauernkrieg (Marburg: Universita¨tsdruckerei/ R. Friedrich, 1887), 30. 32Even Leonhard von Eck offered a modest amount to the duke in the form of wine and silver plate. E. Metzger, Leonhard von Eck, 1480–1550 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), 45. 33Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 119–21, no. 8.

Philip of Palatine-Neuburg requested credit in vain from the Eichsta¨tt cathedral chapter, while the Bishop of Eichsta¨tt himself turned to Willibald Pirkheimer for aid in arranging a loan.34 Levies on the cities and towns in princely territories were also extensively used, sometimes with the understanding that they would be paid back, sometimes without. Principal sources of funds for some princes were special forced loans from the clergy in their territories. Leonhard von Eck suggested to the Dukes of Bavaria that the monastic institutions in particular ought to be a good source of money for the support of the ducal forces, since they had the most to fear from the rebellion.35 Acting upon his advice, the dukes circularized the cloisters within their lands in mid-February, citing the danger from the rebellious peasants in Swabia and asking for a total sum of more than 23,000 florins to enable the dukes to defend the Lech border. Ducal officials who carried the messages to the cloisters were instructed to argue that it was better for the clergy to support their Landesherr, even if it strained their resources beyond capacity, than to lose everything to the rebels. Naturally, the situation was painted as blackly as possible to convince the prelates of their danger.36 The response from this forced loan was good enough to encourage the dukes to levy a second contribution upon their clergy in early May 1525. Both the regular and the secular clergy were included in this request, an extension of ducal authority that threatened to involve the dukes in difficulties with neighboring bishops.37 Once again the response from the clergy was overwhelmingly favorable, although the strain was beginning to tell upon some of the less wealthy monasteries. Complaints of overassessment began to come in, and some of the cloisters found that the only way they could raise the required sums was by pledg- ing their own credit, mortgaging or even selling part of their lands.38 The dukes encouraged such measures, urging those prelates pleading poverty to turn to the “treasures, silver plate, and other properties” of their cloisters in order to contribute to their own defense.39 To make the situation appear as serious as possible, the dukes played down the agreement reached between the Swabian League commander, Jo¨rg Truchsess, and the Upper Swabian peasants at Wein- garten, indicating that they had received no definite word on it yet and that the

34Seger, “Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” 230; Neuhofer, Gabriel von Eyb, 151–52. 35BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 13–15. 36See the general instructions for the mission to the prelates: BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 43–47, as well as the special instructions for Chancellor Augustin Lesch on his mission to the Abbot of Tegernsee: fol. 40–41. A partial list of the amounts demanded is given by fol. 54–55. 37Dukes Wilhelm and Ludwig discussed the matter at some length and sent letters to the bishops about their measures: BHStA, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 280–84; Kriegsakten 73, fol. 55–56. 38The replies of the regular clergy are scattered throughout BHStA, Kriegsakten 68. See especially fol. 268, 280, 283–84, 286, 290–92, 295, 300, 304, 306, 314. 39Ducal draft reply to Abbess Beatrice of Geyenfeldt, May 16, 1525: BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 285.

rebels probably wouldn’t hold to the agreement.40 The invasion of Bavarian territory by the Allgaü rebels on May 11 and the subsequent burning of the monastery of Steingaden strengthened the ducal arguments still further.41 Less than a month later, the Bavarian dukes turned to their clergy for one more contribution of the same amount.42 Although the level of response was still surprisingly high, resistance among the clergy to the ducal forced levies rose considerably with this third request. The dukes found themselves forced to threaten “further measures” in particularly delinquent cases.43 In addition, the dukes had ordered all the plate and other treasures of the cloisters deposited with ducal officials in the major towns for safekeeping in early April.44 Recalci- trant prelates were informed that the dukes would confiscate the necessary sums from these stores in the event of non-compliance.45 In August 1525, the dukes returned to the well again, on the grounds of the threat represented by the Salzburg uprising. This time, however, the levy was directed against the properties of “foreign” clergy within Bavaria. One-half of all incomes from such properties was to go to the dukes.46 Detailed inventories of these incomes were ordered, and ducal officials were ordered to seize property in the event of resistance.47 These measures called forth a storm of protest from the six neighboring bishops and cathedral chapters (Salzburg, Passau, Regens- burg, Freising, Eichsta¨tt, and Augsburg) that were principally affected.48 Urgent embassies from these ecclesiastics resulted in partial or total remission of the levies against their property in return for voluntary payments in support of the dukes’ forces.49 The monetary support of the clergy in Bavaria was probably a major factor in the ability of the dukes to support their forces throughout the suppression of the Peasants’ Revolt, and may well have contributed substantially to the failure of the rebellion to spread into Bavarian lands. It was also obvious that the dukes saw the crisis as an opportunity to increase their control over the clergy within their lands and strengthen their position with regard to the holdings of non-Bavarian clergy, although post-rebellion litigation before the Council of

40BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 375–76. 41See the clever use of the news of this incursion to increase the sense of urgency in the instructions to the ducal embassies to the Bavarian prelates: BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 378–79; Kriegsakten 73, fol. 296–97. 42BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 316–23. 43BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 2a-4. 44BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 56, 372–73. 45BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 5; Kriegsakten 68, fol. 348–49. 46BHStA, Kriegsakten 75, fol. 245–47. 47BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 203. Inventories of these incomes were prepared: Kriegsakten 68, fol. 204–40; Kriegsakten 69, fol. 87–186, 201–248, 320–325, 334–52. 48One of the sharpest protests came from the dukes’ brother Ernst, administrator of the Bishopric of Passau: BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 7, 14–15, 18. 49BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 38–39, 48.

the Swabian League was instigated by some of the bishops involved to declare the ducal exactions unjustified.50 While the actual financial position of some of the ecclesiastical institutions was probably not as bad as they made it seem, it is possible that the debt load incurred by the Bavarian clergy during the Peas- ants’ War may have permanently weakened their position vis a` vis the secular authorities, though such a conclusion would require further research for substantiation. Several other principalities, including Hesse, the Upper Palatinate, Palatine- Amberg, and Brandenburg-Ansbach, resorted to similar measures against clergy in their territories.51 Ecclesiastical princes, of course, could call on the resources of the members of their cathedral chapters and often raised sums to be used against the rebels through loans and special levies, with the consent of the chapter members.52 Opportunities for the other princes to exploit the resources of their clergy varied according to the degree of devastation in their territories, since plundered monasteries were of little use in financing the counter-rebellion effort. Other financial alternatives were either tried or discussed by some princes in order to enable them to raise enough mercenaries to meet the rebellion in their lands. Most melted down their own stores of plate early in the campaign.53 The Dukes of Bavaria discussed the possibility of confiscating the plate of the clergy, which they already held for “safekeeping.”54 Duke Ludwig suggested a general levy upon peasant lands in Bavaria as an alternative to calling up the Landwehr.55

50The Bavarian Dukes had previously resorted to this kind of measure, especially during the Bavarian Inheritance War in 1504, though not repeatedly, and not to the same extent against the holdings of external bishoprics. See Helmut Rankl, Das vorreformatorische landesherrliche Kirchenregiment in Bayern (1378–1526), Neue Schriftenreihe des Stadtarchivs Mu¨nchen 51 (Munich: Kommissionsbuchhandlung R. Wo¨lﬂe, 1971), 165–66, 225, 259; Jo¨rg, Deutschland in der Revolutionsperiode, 354–370; Vogt, Die bayerische Politik im Bauernkrieg, 168–75. 51Hesse: Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 80–81. Upper Palatinate: see the complaint of the monastery of Mu¨nchmu¨nster, which was being dunned by both Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, in BHStA, Kriegsakten 68, fol. 344. Palatine-Amberg: J. B. Goetz, Die religio¨se Bewegung in der Oberpfalz 1520 bis 1560 (Freiburg i. Br.: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1914), 23– 24. Brandenburg-Ansbach: Gottfried Krodel, “State and Church in Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulm- bach 1524–1526,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 5 (1968): 162. 52For example, the Bishop of Augsburg. See his letters to his cathedral chapter members in March and April 1525: BHStA, Kriegsakten 27, no. 36, 40. 53For example, Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg, who sold all his silver: M. Thomas, Markgraf Kasimir von Brandenburg im Bauernkrieg (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1897), 33, and both Dukes of Bavaria: BHStA, Kriegsakten 69, fol. 382. 54BHStA, Kriegsakten 75, fol. 133–34 ( July 11, 1525). Duke Wilhelm also suggested in this letter a forced loan from the “richer nobility and burghers.” 55BHStA, Kriegsakten 76, fol. 209 ( June 22, 1525).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Athens, on 27 Sep 2021 at 13:41:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938907000520 230 THOMAS F. SEA Princely Forces and Preventive Measures Despite their desperate financial and logistical efforts, few of the princes were able to field what they considered an adequate military force against the rebels. One of the largest of the independent princely armies was that raised by the Count Pala- tine, who marched with an estimated force of 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot (of which 300 horse and 1,500 foot had been contributed by the Archbishop of Trier, plus 200 horse from Landgrave Philipp of Hesse). Philipp of Hesse himself had a force of 350 horse and 1,400 foot early in the campaign, which he apparently expanded by additional recruiting, if the figures of 2,000 horse and 5,000 foot that he quoted in his offer of help to the Bishop of Wu¨rzburg were not unduly exaggerated. The Dukes of Bavaria had between 600 and 700 horse and 1,200 to 1,300 foot stationed on the Lech border, and probably close to an equal number of each scattered along their other borders and serving with the forces of neighboring princes, including the almost 1,000 Bohe- mian foot recruited in April. Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg successfully defeated the rebels at Ostheim with a force of between 400 and 600 horse and 500 to 1,000 foot. The actual size of the forces maintained by the Archduke of Austria is almost impossible to ascertain because of the Archduke’s habit of quoting different figures to different people, depending upon what he wanted from them. In terms of the effectiveness of the Habsburg effort, it is quite possible that the rumors of the Archduke’s total lack of forces in his Swabian lands were true. Aside from these major princely forces, the other princes were able to raise only modest troop contingents. Duke Friedrich of Palatine-Amberg oper- ated successfully against the rebels in the Riess area and the Eichsta¨tt bishopric with a force of about 500, equally divided between horse and foot, though his forces were later supplemented by 200 horse and 300 foot from the Dukes of Bavaria. The Upper Palatinate princes had about 180 horse and 140 foot, with which they covered the same area. None of the ecclesiastical princes, except the Archbishop of Trier, would seem to have been able to raise an effective military force beyond isolated garrisons in their cities and major castles.56

56For the size of the princely forces in the ﬁeld—Count Palatine: K. Hartfelder, Zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Su¨dwestdeutschland (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1884), 191. Landgrave of Hesse: G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 240 (later offer to Bishop of Wu¨rzburg: von Thu¨ngen, Bauernkrieg in Franken, 23). Dukes of Bavaria: Jo¨rg, Deutschland in der Revolutionsperiode, 451; Vogt, Die bayerische Politik im Bauernkrieg, 161–64. Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg: Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, 28; Thomas, Markgraf Kasimir, 50. Duke Friedrich of Palatine-Amberg: Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, 28; Seger, “Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” 236. The princes of the Upper Palatinate: Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Abteilung II, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Mu¨nchen (hereinafter cited as BGStA), K. Blau 341/12c, 37–42. Landgrave Philipp of Hesse’s 200 horse with the Palatinate forces: BHStA, No¨rdlingen Literalien II/14, no. 28. Cf. the Archduke of Austria’s claim to be recruiting more than 500 horse and 1,500 foot by Easter: BHStA, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 198, and his admission in early March that he had still not even met his troop contribution to the Swabian League: Scott and Scribner, The German Peasants’ War, 152–53, no. 51.

Granted, even a very small force of experienced and disciplined troops often proved more than a match for the rebel assemblies. Subjectively, however, the princes and their officials did not feel confident of their ability to meet the rebellion without overwhelming force. This lack of confidence and timidity often prevented effective action to nip the uprisings in the bud in their own territories. Only Landgrave Philipp of Hesse appeared to recognize the value of immediate action against the rebels, marching out with little more than a token force at first in order to impress the potential rebels with his power and determination to quell the rebellion.57 Other princes, while they may have mobilized immediately, took little or no action until it was forced upon them. In a few instances, preventive strikes were considered, aimed mainly at seizing the alleged ringleaders of the uprising. Archduke Ferdinand planned a commando raid in early January to take Hans Mu¨ller von Bulgenbach, the former Landsknecht who was at the heart of the Black Forest-Stu¨hlingen uprisings.58 Nothing ever came of it. Bishop Christoph of Augsburg toyed with the idea of seizing the troublesome Memmingen preacher Schappeler, who was allegedly sympathetic to the peasants, but dismissed the idea on the grounds that it would cause too much disturbance.59 More ambitious preventive measures, aimed at assuring subjects of the prince’s ability to protect them against the rebels and simultaneously at maintaining surveillance over areas suspected of disaffection, usually took the form of regular patrols by small groups of horsemen. Such groups could not hope to stem any serious outbreak of rebellion, but served mainly as a deterrent. Like the Dukes of Bavaria, the princes who used this system effectively established a regular round of “visits” to peasant villages and markets. The ducal officials who led the patrols were instructed to deliver “friendly warnings” and assurances of the determination of the dukes to keep the rebellion from reaching their lands. They also received wide latitude for positive action if they felt that it would serve a constructive purpose. Occasionally, the patrols did seize suspicious persons for interrogation, but this aspect of their activities was delib- erately played down in order to avoid disturbances.60 Assurances of protection against the rebels were also especially important for the towns within a prince’s territories. The councils of many of the Landsta¨dte felt particularly exposed to the peasant threat and uncertain of their ability to control their communities. Thus, princely officials exerted themselves to

57Merx, “Bauernkrieg in den Stiftern,” 263. Philipp issued a general mobilization order on April 16–17 and marched against the rebels on the 24th. 58F. L. Baumann, ed., Akten zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs aus Oberschwaben (Freiburg: Herder, 1877), 86, no. 65. 59Ibid., 90–91, no. 70. 60The initial orders for establishing surveillance patrols: BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 51–52, 149–50. Typical reports from patrol commanders: Kriegsakten 71, fol. 58–60, 275–77, 322–24; Kriegsakten 72, fol. 9; Kriegsakten 73, fol. 324.

bolster the confidence of these important potential centers of supplies and support for the rebels. Measures ranged from stationing troops in cities that were in areas considered most likely to revolt to simple verbal assurances of the support of the prince. Garrisoning of the principal towns and marketplaces in a prince’s lands was dependent upon the availability of troops. Only a very few princes felt they had enough forces to scatter them in this fashion. Furthermore, the presence of “foreign” troops was not always welcomed by the citizenry, causing more difficulties than it solved.61 Thus, the princes often chose the alternative of ordering the burghers themselves to maintain special strict security precautions during the uprising. Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg even ordered that the entire popu- lation of his city of Ansbach (not just burghers) be required to take an oath of allegiance to him in an attempt to forestall possible conflict between the members of the council, ordinary citizens, and the remainder of the community, which did not possess citizenship rights.62 In the absence of sufficient military resources to establish garrisons, such expedients were never entirely satisfactory. Princely officials almost universally complained about the faint-heartedness of city councils during the uprising, although they sometimes realized that part of the problem was their own inability to provide adequate military support.63

Negotiations With The Rebels This subjective sense of the inadequacy of princely resources to mount effective resistance to the rebels, springing partly from the very real limitations on the princes’ military capacity and partly from the fear and uncertainty created by the amorphous nature and unprecedented spread of the rebellion, caused some princes to consider peaceful means of dealing with the revolt in their territories. Perhaps the most striking effort to reach an accommodation with the rebels was the decision of the Bishop of Augsburg in February to negotiate personally with his rebellious peasants. In a letter to his cathedral chapter the bishop explained his reasons: In the undoubted hope (but with little trust) that it [i.e., his personal intervention] will or may return the people to obedience, once their complaints have been graciously heard and decided upon. Since we have been advised to go to them in person to pacify them and to prevent further spread of the uprisings

61For example, the difﬁculties between the Bavarian garrisons and the citizens of Schongau (BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 161–62) and the careful instructions of the dukes to their commanders about maintaining good relations with the restive citizenry of Wembding (BHStA, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 84). Hostilities developed anyway (BHStA, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 233–34). 62Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, Beilage VII, 87. See also his response to the city of Roth: Seger, “Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” 206–07, especially note 263. 63Perhaps typical are the complaints of the ofﬁcials of the Count Palatine: BGStA, K. Blau 103/6, no. 255–59.

and rebellions, we intend personally to leave immediately to investigate their complaints as the opportunity presents itself, so that we may keep as many as possible loyal to our see.64 Despite his good intentions, the bishop was almost totally unsuccessful in his attempts to placate the peasants personally during the last week of February, although they did hand in a series of complaints to him.65 Other princes who attempted to settle the grievances of the rebels personally included the Count Palatine and his brother, Duke Friedrich of Palatine- Amberg. The count, although better prepared than many princes to act against the rebels, did not feel strong enough to attack the Geilweiler Haufen in his territories. In the personal negotiations that ensued, Elector Ludwig promised to call a Landtag to consider the peasant grievances, on condition that the assembly disperse immediately and undertake nothing more against his lands. Although the negotiations apparently ended in agreement, the elector later had second thoughts about the propriety of such an arrangement, and, after some hesitation, began military operations against the rebels on the grounds that they had broken the agreement by not dispersing.66 Duke Friedrich, confident of victory against a rebel assembly in Eichsta¨tt territory, nevertheless offered to negotiate a settlement before attacking “to prevent further spread of the uprising.” When the peasants rejected his overtures to mediate between them and their immediate overlords, Friedrich captured the leaders of the already dispersing Haufen, possibly through treachery.67 Other princes, for various reasons, also attempted to open negotiations with the rebels in their territories. Archduke Ferdinand of Austria was involved through his officials in a variety of negotiations and mediation attempts, the most notable of which was the so-called Fu¨ssen Agreement, which promised the Archduke’s personal presence at a mediation day in late June or mid-July. The Bishop of Wu¨rzburg, who had fled his bishopric when the rebellion

64BHStA, Kriegsakten 27, no. 32. See also G. Franz, ed., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg. Aktenband, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 162–63. 65The bishop’s activities earned him the suspicion of his neighbors. See the report of a Bavarian spy: BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 123–24. For further difﬁculties encountered by the bishop, see F. L. Baumann, Geschichte des Allga¨us III (Kempten: Jos. Kosel, 1895), 22–24. 66Cf. the differing interpretations of the elector’s motives provided by G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 224–27; P. Harer, Wahrhafte und gru¨ndliche Beschreibung des Bauernkriegs, G. Franz, ed., Schriften der Pfa¨lzischen Gesellschaft zur Fo¨rderung der Wissenschaften 25 (Kaiserslautern: Verlag d. Gesellschaft, 1936), 53, 59, 96; K. Hartfelder, Zur Geschichte, 184–90, 204–06, and A. Waas, Die Bauern im Kampf um Gerechtigkeit 1300–1525 (Munich: Verlag Georg D. W.Callwey, 1964), 159. 67BHStA, Kriegsakten 70, fol. 26–29, 121, give Friedrich’s account of the matter. The question of the duke’s possible breach of faith is raised by Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, 28–29. See also the interpretation of Seger, “Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” 231–33, and S. Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns 4 (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1889), 120, 133–34. It might be noted that the duke had nothing to gain from delay, since he did not expect to receive any reinforcements during the time between his offer of mediation and his attack. Also, it would seem clear that the delay allowed the great majority of the rebels to escape punishment.

broke out “to gain aid,” attempted to establish contacts with the apparently victorious rebels through Count Georg von Wertheim. Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg-Ansbach offered negotiations on the basis of the Twelve Articles even after he had crushed one group of rebels at the battle of Ostheim. Repre- sentatives of Margrave Philip of Baden joined with envoys of the city of Strasbourg to negotiate the Treaty of Ortenau in May 1525, which established peace in Baden territory on the basis of the Twelve Articles of the Peasants. Even the intransigent Dukes of Bavaria offered concessions on ﬁshing and hunting rights as a means of pacifying their increasingly restive peasants.68 The assumption so often made that these negotiations were merely an insin- cere delaying tactic on the princes’ part is an oversimpliﬁcation of the situation. Negotiated settlements to peasant grievances in previous years were not at all uncommon as a means of settling disorders and disagreements.69 In many cases the skilled negotiators of the princes were able to win quite favorable settlements from the rebels, with only minor concessions being made by the prince in return for the dispersal of the rebels. Realization of this by the peasants, plus the inability of the peasant leaders to control their followers, often meant that it was the rebels who violated the agreements. The negotiations also served a valuable propaganda purpose, allowing the princes to demonstrate to their own peasants their willingness to meet some of their complaints. Both Margrave Casimir and the Dukes of Bavaria used their contacts with the rebels to circulate mandates promising their peasants complete forgiveness for their “forced” participation in the rebellion and concessions on their grievances if they returned home at once.70 Furthermore, one of the principal causes of the failure of these agreements to take effect was the suspicion that they created among neighboring rulers. The Dukes of Bavaria looked askance at the negotiation efforts of the Bishop of Augsburg in the border regions along the Lech where the territories of the two principalities intermingled, since his intentions were not clear. Indeed, several rebellious villages in the area attempted to play the princes off against one another without success.71 In areas where the holdings of different

68On the Fu¨ssen agreement: Baumann, Geschichte des Allgaüs, 87–103. On Wu¨rzburg: Schreiber, ed., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, II, 94–95. On Brandenburg: Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, Beilagen 19, 22, 24. The Treaty of Ortenau is reprinted in translation in Scott and Scribner, The German Peasants’ War,284–88. On Bavarian concessions: BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 230; Kriegsakten 72, fol. 45, 132, 348–50. 69Sea, “The Swabian League and Peasant Disobedience,” 89–111. 70Casimir’s mandate: Ja¨ger, Markgraf Casimir, Beilage XX. The Dukes of Bavaria included a harsher threat to act against the families and property of those still with the rebels in the event of non- compliance: BHStA, Kriegsakten 70, fol. 82. 71See BHStA, Kriegsakten 71, fol. 185 (request for information on the bishop’s intentions, doubt- ing the efficacy of his efforts), fol. 202 (duke’s claim that he can do nothing in the area without an understanding with the bishop ), fol. 195–97 (village of Schwabsoyen refuses to deal with the ducal officials, as they have already sent their complaints to the bishop), fol. 253 (bishop asks no action until his negotiations are over), fol. 278 (dukes are reluctant to act against villages over which they hold high justice, but the bishop holds low justice).

princes were heavily mixed, any agreement reached by one without the consent of the other(s) was doomed from the start, especially since it often seemed as if the negotiating prince was considering his own interests at the expense of others. The opposition of the Swabian League Council to agreements of any kind in the later stages of the suppression campaign also played a role. Finally, as it became clear that the forces of the League were going to be successful against the rebels, agreements reached in the ﬁrst periods of frightened reaction to the rebellion seemed humiliating. All of these factors were important in the failure of the negotiated settlements, at least as much as the alleged insincerity of the princes.

Post-Rebellion Problems Once the rebellion had been successfully suppressed, either by a prince’s own efforts or through the forces of the Swabian League, many problems remained for most princes. Even though the main suppression forces were quickly demobilized after the defeat of the peasants, there was still a need to keep watch against renewed rebellion. Patrols were often established to guard against such out- breaks, as well as to track down fugitive rebel leaders and administer summary punishment against them. Landgrave Philipp of Hesse, Elector Johann of Saxony, and Duke George of Saxony reached an agreement for common patrols to prevent further uprisings after they had defeated the peasants at Mu¨hlhausen.72 The Dukes of Bavaria, Duke Friedrich of Palatine-Amberg, and the princes of the Upper Palatinate reached a similar agreement in June 1525, allowing their patrolling officials to cooperate in the apprehension of suspected rebel ringleaders.73 Such surveillance efforts were costly, however, and most rulers soon relinquished the task to the Swabian League, which required its members to contribute to regular patrols for several years in the areas where its troops had been active in the suppression campaign.74 Measures to disarm the peasants, instituted by the Swabian League as part of the articles of surrender imposed upon the rebels and confirmed by a formal order to all League members in August 1525, were rigorously pursued by some princes and ignored by others. Those who refused to implement the confiscation of peasant weapons argued that leaving their subjects weaponless left them defenseless against crime and violence. Those who

72Scott and Scribner, The German Peasants’ War, 169, no. 62. 73BHStA, Kriegsakten 70, fol. 196, 199, 201; Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns, 4, 166. 74Thomas F. Sea, “Schwa¨bischer Bund und Bauernkrieg. Bestrafung und Paziﬁkation,” in Der Deutsche Bauernkrieg, 1524–1526, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift fu¨r Historische Sozialwissenschaft, Sonderheft 1 (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 133–37. Many princes simply contented themselves with exhortations to their local ofﬁcials to be extra vigilant for signs of renewed disorders. Cf. the warning of Elector Johann of Saxony to his representatives about the possibility of punishment creating new unrest: Ko¨buch and Mu¨ller, eds., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 132–33, no. 58.

supported the measure pointed out that peasants didn’t really need weapons and that disparities in carrying out the disarmament edict would cause disagreements between peasants of different rulers. In the end, most peasants were either left with the right to possess weapons or were disarmed for a fairly short period of time before receiving their weapons back.75 Specific mandates setting forth the terms of pacification and punishment for the rebels were proclaimed by some princes as a means of regularizing the procedures to be employed.76 Special courts and commissions were set up in some territories to handle the extra load imposed by the need to deal with those who had participated in the rebellion but escaped summary punishment.77 Occasion- ally, the stern measures of repression were accompanied by concessions designed to remedy some of the peasant grievances, such as the permission issued by the Dukes of Bavaria allowing peasants to use dogs to prevent crop damage by wild- life or the actions of the officials of Landgrave Philip of Hesse in settling peasant grievances against their landlords.78 In the long run, realization by princely and Imperial officials that more effective peaceful means for handling peasant grievances would prevent new uprisings may well have resulted in the establishment of more accessible legal channels of complaint for the peasants to use.79 The costs of the suppression efforts were partially recouped through fines and reparations payments imposed upon the peasants, although conflicts often developed over which authority had the right to impose such payments.80

75Sea, “Schwa¨bischer Bund und Bauernkrieg,” 137–39. For a summary of the arguments used, see the letter of Wilhelm Truchsess von Waldburg, Archduke Ferdinand’s Statthalter in Stuttgart, to Duke George of Saxony in 1526: G. Franz, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftl. Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 593, no. 208, and the debate at the Speyer Imperial Diet in 1526: W. Friedenberg, Der Reichstag zu Speyer 1526 (Berlin: 1887, Reprint: 1970), 441, note 2. Typical enforcement measures by the Archbishop of Mainz in the Rheingau area: Struck, Bauern- krieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 250–51, no. 118. 76For example, the mandate of Duke George of Saxony: Ko¨buch and Mu¨ller, eds., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 130–31, no. 57. See also his directive with regard to the conditions under which former rebels were to be allowed to surrender without fear of execution: ibid., 102–03, no. 43. Cf. the memorandum of the Archbishop of Mainz in Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 245–46, no. 114, and the measures imposed by Landgrave Philip of Hesse in E. Franz, “Hessen und Kurmainz,” 632. 77W. Leiser, Strafgerichtsbarkeit in Su¨ddeutschland. Formen und Entwicklungen, Forschungen zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte 9, ed. S. Gegner (Cologne and Vienna: Bo¨hlau Verlag, 1971), 190–91, 208–209; Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 188–89, no. 60. 78Bavaria: Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns, IV, 167; Hesse: E. Franz, “Hessen und Kurmainz,” 634. 79This argument has been convincingly presented in the work of Winfried Schulze, “Die vera¨n- derte Bedeutung sozialer Konﬂikte in 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” in Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, ed. Wehler, 277–302, and Bauerlicher Widerstand und feudale Herrschaft in der fru¨hen Neuzeit, Neuzeit in Aufbau 6 (Stuttgart/Bad Canstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1980). See the brief summary of Schulze’s work in Thomas Barnett-Robisheaux, “Peasant Revolts in Germany and Central Europe after the Peasants’ War: Comments on the Literature,” Central European History 17 (1984): 386–88. 80For a general discussion of the problems involved with reparations, see T. F. Sea, “The Eco- nomic Impact of the German Peasants’ War: The Question of Reparations,” Sixteenth Century Journal 8, no. 3 (1977): 75–97.

Most princes vigorously opposed the assertion of the Swabian League of its sole right to collect reparations in the areas where its forces had played a principal role. Often, some kind of compromise agreement was reached which partially spared a prince’s subjects.81 Strict enforcement of reparations requirements, such as that imposed under the personal supervision of the Bishop of Wu¨rzburg or the Archbishop of Trier, could result in the collection of major sums from the defeated rebels.82 Extraordinary fines, such as the 120,000 gulden imposed upon the city of Mu¨hlhausen by the victorious princes, and exorbitant legal claims, such as the more than 30,000 gulden that the Archbishop of Mainz attempted to collect from Go¨tz von Berlichingen as compensation for damages allegedly inflicted by his—apparently “involuntary”—rebel leadership role during the uprising, may have swelled the coffers of the princes still further, although they could not always be fully collected.83 Levies imposed by princes upon ecclesiastical properties, as well as actual sei- zures of territory and annexation of neighboring ecclesiastical rulers’ rights and jurisdictions during and immediately after the peasant rebellion, were a major source of difficulties in the years following the revolt. The Dukes of Bavaria, who had relied so heavily upon contributions from the regular clergy in their territories to finance their military efforts, were condemned by the Papal legate Campeggio for having “plundered” their monasteries and eventually had to return the ecclesiastical treasures that they had held for safekeeping.84 Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg-Ansbach, who had confiscated monastic properties during the rebellion and imposed a special tax upon the clergy after the revolt to recoup his expenses in protecting them, found himself

81For example, that reached between the commanders of the Swabian League and the Archbishop of Mainz (who had not even contributed to the suppression of the rebellion in his own lands): M. von Roesgen, Kardinal Albrecht von Brandenburg. Ein Renaissancefu¨rst auf dem Mainzer Bischofsthron (Moers: Steiger, 1980), 82–84; Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 186, no. 60, or the successful efforts of Count Wilhelm Werner von Zimmern to have his peasants exempted: Hansmartin Decker- Hauff, ed., Die Chronik der Grafen von Zimmern, vol. 2 (Constance/Stuttgart: J. Thorbecke, 1967), 322–3. The Bishop of Bamberg, on the other hand, asked that his lands be spared and was turned down: Baumann, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Oberschwaben, 745, no. 20. 82Wu¨rzburg: G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 207–08; Trier: Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 85. The Bishop of Wu¨rzburg demanded more than 200,000 gulden from his subjects. More than 100,000 gulden were collected in the Electorate of Saxony: Ko¨buch and Mu¨ller, eds., Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 144–145, no. 64. 83Mu¨hlhausen was compelled to pay 10,000 gulden immediately, 30,000 gulden within a year, and the remaining 80,000 gulden over an indeﬁnite extended period, with payment guaranteed by “pawning” the villages controlled by the city to the princes, who governed the city in rotation until it received its rights again in 1548: Baumann, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Ober- schwaben, 1, 114–15; Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 82–3. Compensation claims against Go¨tz von Berlichingen, which the archbishop was eventually forced to withdraw in 1534, are listed by H. Ulmenschneider, Go¨tz von Berlichingen. Ein adeliges Leben der deutschen Renaissance (Sigmarinen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1974), 194–96. 84Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns, IV,125–26. Ducal ofﬁcials had seized some of the monastic treasures by force. Cf. Metzger, Leonhard von Eck, 119.

enmeshed in acrimonious disputes with neighboring ecclesiastical princes over his alleged infringements upon their jurisdictions.85 Duke Friedrich of Palatine- Amberg seized control of the monasteries of Waldsassen and Weissenohe during the rebellion, and although he was forced to surrender them temporarily after the revolt was over, his jurisdiction over both was eventually conﬁrmed by mid-century after long and difﬁcult legal wrangling.86 Landgrave Philip of Hesse was able to assert princely rights over the abbey of Hersfeld immediately when the uprising broke out and attempted to do the same with less success over the abbey of Fulda.87 Archduke Ferdinand of Austria placed the lands of the Bishop of Brixen and the Teutonic Knights in the Tyrol under his administration temporarily as part of his agreement with the rebels.88 The Archduke’s forces compelled the town of Fu¨ssen, subject to the Bishop of Augsburg, to renounce its allegiance to the bishop and accept Austrian authority as a condition of protecting the town against the peasants, an action Ferdinand had to rescind later due to the intervention of the Swabian League.89 The League also intervened against the revision of the oaths of allegiance by the monks of the abbey of Kaisheim, extorted from them by the commander of the troops of the Upper Palatinate, allegedly without the knowledge or approval of his princes.90 The Dukes of Bavaria retained control of the Bishop of Eichsta¨tt’s towns of Beilngries and Berching to cover their war costs and reached agreement with the Arch- bishop of Salzburg to hold the lordship of Mattsee for similar reasons.91 The proliferation of such incidents of aggression during the peasants’ revolt would appear to justify the complaints of the ecclesiastical rulers, presented as late as the 1530 Augsburg Imperial Diet, against the burdens imposed upon them by the “protection” of the secular princes.92

85C. Scott Dixon, The Reformation and Rural Society: The Parishes of Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulmbach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21, 91–92; Krodel, “State and Church,” 161–63, 169 note 66; K. Schornbaum, Die Stellung des Markgrafen Kasimir zur reformatorischen Bewegung in den Jahren 1524–1527 (Nuremberg, 1900), 92–94, 98, 107–8; Neuhofer, Gabriel von Eyb, 114. 86Waldsassen: Goetz, Oberpfalz, 60–70; R. Langhammer, Waldsassen. Kloster und Stadt (Waldsassen: Kommissionsverlag Albert Angerer, 1936), 70. Weissenohe: K. Ko¨hle, Landesherr und Landsta¨nde in der Oberpfalz von 1400–1583, Miscellanea Bavarica Monacensia 16 (Munich: Neue Schriftenreihe des Stadtarchivs Mu¨nchen, 1969), 37–38. 87Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 82–83; G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 241–44. 88G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 162. 89Baumann, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Oberschwaben, 406–11, (no. 11); 420–75, (no. 12). 90Ibid., 262–66, (no. 3). 91Eichsta¨tt: Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns, IV,132–35. The bishop had rejected a Bavarian request for a “loan” of 12,000 gulden for the expenses of defending Eichsta¨tt territories. He did, however, concede to a Bavarian demand for a special levy upon clergy subject to his jurisdiction in Bavarian lands: Seger, “Bauernkrieg im Hochstift Eichsta¨tt,” 228–29. Salzburg: Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns,4, 159. Mattsee was redeemed by the archbishop in 1527, but Bavaria retained high justice rights. 92H. Grundmann, ed., Protokoll des Augsburger Reichstages 1530 von Valentin von Tetleben, Schriften des Vereins fu¨r Reformationsgeschichte 177 (Gu¨tersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1976), 70, 101–02.

Finally, some princes may have used the opportunities presented by the suppression of the rebellion to strengthen their internal authority over towns and villages that had been compromised by their cooperation with the rebels, although their success was sometimes limited by the need for the approval of territorial estates, particularly in Upper Swabia.93 While further regional studies are needed to confirm the extent and effectiveness of the princes’ measures in the larger, more powerful princely territories, the new oaths required from forty- two Hessian towns by Landgrave Philip and the revised conditions imposed by the Archbishop of Mainz upon his towns of Bingen, Dieburg, and the “nine towns” of the upper diocese were perhaps typical of princes’ attempts to reassert their control on stricter terms than before the rebellion.94 In some cases, such as the confrontation between Elector Ludwig of the Palatinate and the city of Weissenberg at the end of the campaign against the peasants, the disorders were even used by princes to enhance their side of disputes with Imperial cities.95 The suppression of the peasants’ revolt required the princes who mounted their own campaigns to overcome considerable military, financial, and political challenges. When the usual methods of military mobilization proved inadequate, many princes resorted to emergency recruiting of mercenary troops, often with less than satisfactory results. Some princes, especially ecclesiastical rulers, were totally unable to mobilize any kind of military force. For those princes who did mount a military effort against the rebellion, the strain of paying substantial numbers of mercenaries stretched their financial resources to the limit. Loans from many different sources were solicited. Forced contributions, levied particularly against ecclesiastical institutions, also helped to alleviate the financial problems. Despite these expedients, many princes found themselves in increasing financial difficulties by the end of the rebellion—a situation that they attempted to remedy by assessing damages and fines against the defeated

93Peter Blickle argues strongly in Revolution of 1525, 181–182, that the emergence of effective territorial estates in Upper Swabia represented a limitation on princely powers and concludes from that evidence that the princes’ post-revolt measures throughout the area of the rebellion had little effect upon their authority. It is doubtful that this conclusion can be supported for the larger territories. 94Hesse: Struck, Bauernkrieg am Mittelrhein und in Hessen, 83–84. Mainz: ibid., 90–92, 473, no. 47 and 53; E. Franz, “Hessen und Kurmainz,” 640–52. 95G. Franz, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, 227. General suspicion of the Imperial cities for their roles during the rebellion, and increased efforts to apprehend suspects allegedly being harbored in the cities in the aftermath of the revolt soured relations between the princes and the cities to a much greater extent than was already the case. See Bavarian charges against the city of Kaufbeuren in Baumann, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Oberschwaben, 359–60, no. 3, and the suspicions of Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg-Ansbach and Duke Friedrich of Palatine-Amberg about city complicity in the rebellion in BHStA, Kriegsakten 70, fol. 145–46, 149, Kriegsakten 72, fol. 186–89. Harer argues in Wahrhafte und gru¨ndliche Beschreibung, 32–33, that princely opinion was heavily inﬂuenced by the allegedly unnecessary surrender of the city of Heilbronn to the rebels. For a general discussion of the role of the cities in the rebellion, see T. F. Sea, “Imperial Cities and the German Peasants’ War,” Central European History 12 (1979): 3–37.

rebels. Even those princes who successfully raised a military force seldom felt confident in moving alone against the larger rebel contingents. Nor were they sure of their ability to maintain the peace in areas that had not yet joined the rebellion. As a result, negotiations with the rebels often occurred, though with little lasting success due to the suspicions aroused among other rulers by apparent concessions to the rebels, as well as the rebel leaders’ inability to control their followers. In the end, those princes who overcame the obstacles and managed to take the field against the rebels usually achieved easy victories. They were often able not only to defeat the rebels but also to exploit their success to acquire additional rights, jurisdictions, and even territories at the expense of their subjects and their less-ambitious or less-competent compatriots, acquiring new respect from their peers in the process. On the other hand, princes who were less active and successful worried about the possible impact on their reputations.96 The fear of renewed rebellion did not die slowly, but the experiences of the suppression campaign, the relief over their success in the face of such great difficulties, and their subsequent exploitation of that success undoubtedly prompted many princes to share the sentiments of the Archbishop of Mainz, who had a special fountain constructed in the town square of Mainz in 1526 to commemorate the defeat of the great rebellion.97

UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

96See Eck on the reputation gained by the Bavarian dukes during the rebellion: Metzger, Leonhard von Eck, 24, and Knebel’s praise of Bavaria for its ﬁrmness: Baumann, Quellen zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Oberschwaben, 254. Archduke Ferdinand’s difﬁculties and apparent inaction during the revolt caused him much embarrassment: Paula Fichtner, Ferdinand I of Austria: The Politics of Dynasticism in the Age of the Reformation, East European Monographs 100 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 30, and even prompted the Wittelsbach princes to consider sending a formal embassy to the Emperor to complain of Ferdinand’s actions: Riezler, Geschichte Bayerns,IV, 149. 97Roesgen, Kardinal Albrecht von Brandenburg, 86.