THE GREAT NORTHERN DILEMMA: THE DISCONNECTION BETWEEN CANADA'S SECURITY POLICIES AND CANADA'S NORTH
LE DILEMME DU GRAND NORD : LE FOSSE ENTRE LES POLITIQUES DE SECURITE DU CANADA ET LES REALITES DU NORD CANADIEN
A Thesis Submitted
to the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada
by
Elizabeth Anne Sneyd Sub-Lieutenant (ret'd)
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in War Studies
April 2008
© This thesis may be used within the Department of National Defence but copyright for open publication remains the property of the author. Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition
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In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these.
While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. •*• Canada ii This thesis is dedicated to the late LCol (ret'd) Dr. John K. Marteinson, a teacher, a mentor and friend. It was he who really introduced me to Canadian defence policy as a field of study and who encouraged me to write about the North in the first place. This is for you, John.
v vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My thanks to Dr Joel Sokolsky for his willingness to be my thesis supervisor, and for his patience with the work's actual construction. My thanks to Colonel (ret'd) Alain
Pellerin and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute for opening my eyes to the
Canadian political process by taking me on as their intern for 2006-2007 and for letting me research the Arctic as part of my duties. Also, my thanks to Clare Stewart and Carl and Iain Sneyd not only for their support, but also for their editorial skills. Most of all, my thanks to my fiance Steven, without whom I would be lost.
DISCLAIMER
This is an academic work. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication
(where not otherwise cited) are the author's own, and do not represent the views of the
Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, the Royal Military College of
Canada, or of the Conference of Defence Associations and the Conference of Defence
Associations Institute. Errors are the author's own.
vu viii ABSTRACT
Sneyd, Elizabeth A. M.A. (War Studies). Royal Military College of Canada. November 2007. The Great Northern Dilemma: The Disconnection between Canada's Security Policies and Canada's North. Supervisor: Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky.
The Canadian government's approach to security in Canada's North is traditionally focused strictly on matters of sovereignty and defence, despite the expression of wider concerns, namely, societal and environmental issues, by the Territorial governments and by the aboriginal peoples of the regions. Through policy analysis, through study of the implications of past security-related events, and through examination of key players inside and outside of the region, this thesis presents a comprehensive look at the broader security situation in Canada's North today. This thesis argues that the federal "security" policy approach in this region reflects, firstly, the imposition of Canadian national security objectives on Canada's North rather than the integration of Northern security needs into the broader Canadian security policy. The federal approach also reflects the lack of a coherent, "whole of government approach" in federal policies concerning
Canada's North. This disconnection between security policy and the region it purports to serve has become increasingly obvious as Canada's North has once again become an area of international interest. This paper concludes that the federal government needs to work directly with the inhabitants of Canada's North to create a long-term strategy that encompasses a much wider range of security issues, and thus ensure that Canada's North is kept secure for all Canadians, in particular those who live there.
Keywords: Canada's North, security policy, human security, environmental security
ix X RESUME
Sneyd, Elizabeth A., M.A. (Etudes sur la conduite de la guerre). College militaire royal du Canada, septembre 2007. The Great Northern Dilemma : The Disconnection between Canada's Security Policies and Canada's North (Le dilemme du Grand Nord : le fosse entre les politiques de securite du Canada et les realties du Nord canadien) Superviseur : M. Joel J. Sokolsky, Ph.D.
La politique de securite du gouvernement du Canada dans le Nord se circonscrit traditionnellement autour des questions de souverainete et de defense, en depit des preoccupations plus globales - relatives a la societe et a l'environnement - manifestoes par les gouvernements territoriaux et les peuples autochtones de la region. Cet ouvrage examine les politiques, analyse les implications des evenements passes en matiere de securite et passe en revue les intervenants cles de la region et de Pexterieur pour dresser un tableau global de 1'environnement de securite du Nord canadien d'aujourd'hui.
L'auteur de ce document soutient que 1'orientation de la politique de « securite » du gouvernement federal pour cette region refiete, d'une part, l'imposition des objectifs nationaux du Canada en matiere de securite sur le Nord du pays plutot que l'integration des besoins du Nord en matiere de securite a la politique de securite globale du Canada; et d'autre part, l'absence d'une « approche pangouvernementale » dans les politiques federates sur le Nord canadien. Ce fosse entre la politique de securite du gouvernement et les realites de la region que celui-ci pretend servir est de plus en plus manifeste, aujourd'hui que le Nord canadien revet de nouveau un interet national. L'auteur en arrive a la conclusion que le gouvernement federal devrait travailler directement avec les habitants du Nord canadien pour elaborer une strategie a long terme qui englobe un
xi eventail beaucoup plus large de questions de securite, et garantir ainsi la securite du
Grand Nord pour tous les Canadiens, et en particulier la population locale.
Mots-cles : Nord canadien, politique de securite, securite humaine, securite environnementale
xn TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 - CANADA'S NORTH IN CANADA'S SECURITY POLICIES 15 •1.1 Introduction 15 1.2 Security Policy in the North equals defence policy? 16 1.3 Security Policy in the North equals human security policy? 33 1.4 Security policy in the North equals environmental security? 40 1.5 Summary 42 CHAPTER 2 -SECURITY LITERATURE AND CANADA'S NORTH 45 2.1 Introduction 45 2.2 After the Manhattan: 1969-1985 45 2.3 After the Polar Sea: 1985-1991 49 2.4 A New World Order: 1991-2001 59 2.5 A New World Order Redux: 2001- 64 2.6 Conclusions 68 CHAPTER 3 - THE REGION AND ITS PEOPLES 71 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 The People of the North 72 3.3 Political Structure in the North 74 3.4 The Territorial Governments as a regional unit... 79 3.5 Developing a New Framework: Speaking out about security in the North 82 3.6 Local Aboriginal Political Units 87 3.7 Inuit Perspectives of Security 91 3.8 Conclusions 97 CHAPTER 4 - KEEPING CANADA'S NORTH SECURE 100 4.1 Introduction 100 4.2 The CF 100 4.3 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 114 4.4 The Canadian Coast Guard 121 4.5 Conclusion 125 CHAPTER 5 - THE NORTH IN CANADA-US RELATIONS 128 5.1 Introduction 128
xm 5.2 Contention 129 5.3 Co-operation 137 5.4 Recent developments 142 5.5 Where to go from here? 148 CHAPTER 6 - THE NORTH IN CIRCUMPOLAR RELATIONS 150 6.1 The Northern circumpolar neighbourhood 150 6.2 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference 152 6.3 Other international aboriginal organizations 156 6.4 The Arctic Council 157 6.5 The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 162 6.6 The Northern Forum 164 6.7 Canada and the northern Circumpolar World 165 6.8 Conclusions 167 CHAPTER 7 - THE STATE OF NORTHERN SECURITY TODAY 170 7.1 Canada's North and the outside world 170 7.2 The people of the North and Northern Research 173 7.3 Northern Security vs. Northern Defence 175 7.4 Reinforcing the Northern Fortress 178 7.5 At last, the Northern Voice 192 7.6 Cuibono? 202 BIBLIOGRAPHY 206 Primary Sources 206 Secondary Sources 211
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Canada's Territories ,xv
LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Territorial Population and breakdown by age (2005) 72 Table 2: Aboriginal Population of the Territories (2001). 73
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xv
INTRODUCTION
In March 2005, Levi Barnabas, the MLA for Quttiktuq, called for Nunavut Territory to
hire an official photographer to come to the High Arctic and provide passport photos so
that the Inuit in his territory could visit their relatives in Greenland more readily. Many
of these people had never needed a photo ID before, but stricter entrance policies for the
European Union had been extended to include Greenland (as a Danish territory), which
meant that anyone travelling from Canada to Greenland would require a passport.
Obtaining a passport in northern Canada is far from easy, often taking over a year for
residents of Nunavut.
In the years since Barnabas' request, acquiring a passport has not become any
easier. During a question and answer period following a speech by U.S. Ambassador
David Wilkins in the fall of 2006, the issue was raised again, this time in the context of
the impending implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. When
questioned about exceptions being made for the people of the North, given the lack of
appropriate facilities, Ambassador Wilkins indicated that no exceptions would be made to
the rule requiring Canadians to have passports to enter the United States when travelling
by air after January 2007.2 The ensuing administrative backlog made it difficult even for urban Canadians to obtain or renew passports, and the deadline was extended in response.
Nevertheless, the passport issue highlights the practical difficulties faced when
implementing security policies into a remote area such as Canada's North.
CBC North. "Nunavut should do more to provide population with passports, says MLA". March 9, 2005. From http://www.cbc.ca/north/stpry/passports050309.html. Retrieved November 4, 2005. David Wilkins. Response to question after speech given to the National Press Club (Canada) on November 1, 2006. Attended by author. Ironically, an exception has since been made for children. 2
Another incident highlighting such difficulties occurred in September 2006. A
Romanian man, who had previously been deported from both Canada and the United
States, was arrested in Grise Ford after crossing from Greenland to Ellesmere Island in a
small motorboat.3 The local inhabitants were surprised that he had made it that far, a
distance of about 1000 km, in such a small vessel. The man, who had planned to carry on
to Toronto, was taken into custody by the RCMP shortly after he landed.4 Immigration
officials had to be flown into Grise Ford from Ottawa in order to take the illegal
immigrant into custody. Quaint though this story may be, it is a reflection of the lack of
federal bureaucratic personnel present in the North.
This thesis examines security policy in Northern Canada since the beginning of
the Cold War, and argues that there is a disconnection between the security policies set
by the federal Cabinet and the actual needs of the area. This disconnection can be
attributed to several factors. Firstly, the federal government has traditionally focused on
the larger picture when developing security policy for the North by determining what is
in the nation's best interests, and not considering whether it is in the region's best
interests. Secondly, as with Canadian defence policy (i.e., policies involving the
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces), security policy in the North has tended to be reactive rather than proactive. For instance, the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act of 1970 (perhaps one of Canada's earliest examples of environmental
security policy) was drafted and passed into law in direct response to the American
CBC News. "Romanian sailing into High Arctic had been deported". September 21, 2006. Available online at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2006/09/21/deport- romanian.html. 4 Ibid. It is presumed that he intended to travel to Toronto by different means than a motorboat since he attempted to sell his vessel to local hunters. supertanker Manhattan's, transit through the Northwest Passage in 1969. Interestingly,
these reactive policies are rarely revoked after the immediate threat is gone. And
although they may evolve over time, their essence remains.
Another cause for this disconnection between national security policies and the
needs of the area is that these policies are inevitably coloured with a southern
perspective. There are too few Northern lawmakers in the federal government (three
Members of Parliament and three Senators specifically) to have a discernible impact
when it comes to the development of defence and security policies. This is particularly
relevant when we consider that recently there have been no members from the North on
either the House of Commons Standing Committee of National Defence (NDDN) or the
Senate's Standing Committee of National Security and Defence.5 The Department of
Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC), is, of course, an exception to the rule, since this
department specifically interacts with the region. But INAC does not traditionally
participate in the formation or even initiations of security policy. Additionally, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has a Circumpolar Affairs division, but it deals
with foreign policy, which may or not may not be tied to domestic issues. It is therefore
difficult to say that security policy for the North is representative of the wishes of its
people.
To be fair, there are indications that there are a number of actors outside of the
Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) who recognize the need for a broader definition of security in Northern Canada. Some of these actors, such
There have been members from the North on these Committees as recently as the first session of the current Parliament, but there is no guarantee when members from the North will be on the Committees again. 4
as the Department of National Defence (DND) or the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) have traditionally been involved in the security policy development process.
Nevertheless, these Departments are restricted by their mandates in what they can
accomplish. Other actors, such as the Territorial governments and Aboriginal
Organizations, have only been able to involve themselves in this particular process in
recent years. They bring new voices and new ideas to the policy process. It is crucial to
identify these actors, and the issues that drive them.
This thesis argues that the federal "security" policy approach in the North reflects
the imposition of national security objectives on the North rather than the integration of
Northern security needs into the broader Canadian security policy. As in other nations,
security policy has long been a national responsibility in Canada. Often the term is used
interchangeably with defence policy, although one does not always mean the other. In
Canada, security policy is determined by the Prime Minister in Cabinet, as advised by the
Privy Council Office. Once a policy is adopted, its measures are passed to various
departments for implementation. The implementation can be broad or narrow, depending
on the policy's focus. As an example, the first National Security Policy, Securing an
Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (from April 2004) contains a number of measures that address six key strategic areas: intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health, transport security, border security, and international security.
Each of these key strategic areas concerns at least one department within the federal
government. By contrast, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence (an instalment of the former Liberal government's overarching foreign policy statement,
issued in the spring of 2005) concerns the transformation of DND and the Canadian Forces (CF) and is thus defence policy even as it forms part of a larger expression of
foreign policy.
As with other forms of policy, security policy is not formed in a vacuum. Rather,
it is part of an ongoing cycle from agenda-setting to feedback from the public6. An
important part of the policy process is consultation with the public since the Cabinet is
not the only actor in this process. There are also Members of Parliament, Parliamentary
Committees, national organizations and Non-Government Organizations who involve
themselves, and who provide a variety of fora for discussion.7 Each of these actors have
their own interests and seeks to protect these interests. As time progresses, some actors
may fade away from the policy process, and others may appear. Or actors' priorities may
change, as new issues arise or old issues are resolved. This in turn leads to an evolution
in the policy itself.
This assumes, of course that the government in power is interested in moving the
policy process beyond the consultation stage. When it comes to the incorporation of
northern security concerns into Canada's broader national security policies, there appears
to have been much talk and little action. Instead, the federal government returns time and
time again to the tried-and-true formula of "increasing the military presence in Canada's
Arctic". This suggests that the federal government does not feel that the northern voice has a valid and important place in the formation of policy. It also suggests that Canada's
North itself is not actually as important as the federal government claims it to be. Or
6 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 11. 7 Robert W. Reford. "The Public and Public Policy: The Impact of Society on the Canadian Security Policy Process", Canada's International Security Policy. David B. Dewitt and David Layton-Brown, eds. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1995, p. 313-318 6 alternatively, the North is considered too vital, whether for economic or security or diplomatic reasons, for the federal government to want to yield control of the region to another level of government, namely the Territories. If either view is true, then those who participate in discussions of Canada's North and its security needs are simply wasting their time.
This thesis is far from the first work to recognize that there is a problem in the way Canada treats its North. In 1990, in a paper for the Naval Officers' Association of
Canada, W. Harriet Critchley examined the challenges facing Canada's Arctic, and came to the conclusion that there existed a "national collective schizophrenia":
While many agree the Arctic does have a significant place in Canada's future, we are unwilling to give the Arctic a commensurate priority in our policies and in our national budgets.. .Many of us probably feel that Canadians should decide and control developments in our part of the Arctic, but we seem to be unwilling to put the instruments in place to do that.8
While Critchley's premise is sound, her choice of the term "national collective schizophrenia" is perhaps not quite accurate, at least in contemporary understanding of the term schizophrenia. A schizophrenic cannot control the contradictions of the disease
(unless treated, of course), whereas the federal government can work to ensure that its professed policies regarding Canada's North are in fact carried out. To enact or not is a government's prerogative. It boils down to political will, a will that is very often driven by economics.
W. Harriet Critchley. "The Challenge of Canada's Arctic and its place in Canada's Future". The Niobe Papers: Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource Development in Canada's Arctic. Calgary: The Naval Officers' Association of Canada, 1990, p. 11. Since this thesis is a policy analysis paper, it is meant to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of security policies that have been developed for and/or which affect
Canada's North. It is not intended to be an advocacy paper, except in that it is meant to put forth the argument that if the federal government is serious about bringing security to
Canada's North and its people, then it should admit the existing capability gaps and rectify them, rather than falling back on empty platitudes or token gestures.
Although the study delves much deeper into this topic later on, it is essential that readers understand what is meant when the terms "Northern Canada" or "the North" are used. There are a number of possible definitions. For example, some may consider the tree-line as an indicator of what is "North" and what is not. The difficulty with this is that the tree-line bisects the Territories, and follows a serpentine path whilst doing so.
Another possibility would be the use of the 60th parallel as our demarcation line. This, however, would require the inclusion of northern Quebec and Labrador in our discussion while excluding the southerly islands in Hudson Bay, which are part of Nunavut.
While the impact of security policies on northern Quebec and Labrador would certainly provide interesting comparisons with the experiences of the Territories, it would also add complications. As provinces, Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador administer their northern regions in a different fashion than the Territories. Indeed, it could be argued that the relationships between Quebec City and Nord-du-Quebec and St.
John's and northern Labrador are closer to Ottawa's relationship with the Territories than how things operate in the Territories themselves.9
9 We could similarly argue that the northernmost portions of Ontario, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia share similar cultures and environments to the southern regions of the Territories. 8
Another possibility would be to focus strictly on Canada's Arctic. Again, however, this presents difficulties, for what is the best way to identify the Arctic? If we rely on demarcation by the Arctic Circle, we discover that this eliminates the southern parts of the Territories, including two of the three Territorial capitals, Whitehorse and
Yellowknife. If we were to base our definition of the Arctic on eco-zones as identified in the Atlas of Canada, we find that the majority of "Arctic" Canada is to be found in
Nunavut, although the Southern Arctic eco-zone does extend into the Northwest
Territories and northern Quebec.10 Thus, this definition does not include Yukon Territory at all.
In light of all these considerations, therefore, this thesis takes the definitions of
"Northern Canada" or "the North" to mean the part of Canada's landmass and waters included in the three Territories: Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. The
Territories share more than geography. They share common challenges, including a harsh environment, a low population, and an asymmetric relationship with the federal government. The result is that they have more in common with each other politically, historically, and ethnically with than the rest of Canada.
As a policy analysis study, this thesis draws on primary resources from a number of government documents from both the federal and the Territorial level. As will be
Ecological Stratification Working Group. 1995. A National Ecological Framework for Canada. Report and national map at 1:7 500 000 scale. Ottawa: Agriculture and Agri- Food Canada, Research Branch, Centre for Land and Biological Resources Research; and Hull: Environment Canada, State of the Environment Directorate, Ecozone Analysis Branch. As illustrated by the Frontispiece. Any statistics in this document are derived from government sources such as Statistics Canada or the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, and are used more for demographic illustration than any other purpose. 9 discussed in further detail, there has been a flurry of federal policy statements concerning
Canada's North in recent years, a number of which addressed security issues specifically.
There have also been certain federal policy statements, such as the National Security
Policy of 2004, which are intended for Canada as a whole, even though its objectives may not be applicable to the Territories. The difficulty with using sources like these, however, is that some of these documents, such as Developing a New Framework for
Sovereignty and Security in the North, are either too recent or too low-profile to have been the focus of much academic study.
Media reports have been particularly useful as resources. The issues presented and addressed in this thesis have not gone unnoticed by the Canadian press, particularly in the past two years. Even foreign publications such as the New York Times and The
Economist appear to feel that the challenges faced in Canada's North are part of the bigger picture of what is happening in the Arctic, and are therefore of sufficient interest to receive semi-regular coverage. It is crucial, however, to treat such reports with some scepticism for their accuracy in reporting "the facts". Additionally, media groups tend to establish themselves on particular points of the political spectrum, with the result that they may be biased towards one policy and against another.
News reports aside, the media have provided important fora for discussion of a number of topics concerning Canada's North, particularly sovereignty and climate change. This discussion includes not only feature articles, but also editorials. In some cases, these works provide important initial analyses of the issues addressed in this work.
There are two other types of secondary resources used in preparing this thesis. The first 10 is conference-related material. There have been a number of colloquia, symposia,
conferences, sessions, and so forth conducted on Canada's North since the 1970s. The proceedings of such gatherings are important for our purposes for several reasons.
Firstly, they tend to bring together people from academia, government, and other interested parties who share common interests in the North. Secondly, conferences have been particularly useful in providing a voice to the peoples of the North, specifically to
assorted aboriginal advocacy groups such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. Thirdly, these meetings provide a public forum for the presentation of new ideas or for the
suggestion of alternatives to the status quo. It is questionable, however, whether the
government is willing to listen and whether it will even use proposals made in such
discussions when developing new policy.
The other type of secondary resource is, of course, the academic literature. As we will see in the next chapter, there has been much written on Canada's North in the past thirty-five years. Not surprisingly, perhaps, there is much overlap with the conference- related material, since many of the academics who write about the Arctic have also been participants in or even organizers of these gatherings. In some instances, these academics
are sought by governments to testify before committees or have even had their work citied in official government documents.13 Thus, many of the academics may also be
1 -j Cf. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. "Meeting No. 15 - Evidence." Retrieved from http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/fore/evidence/15_96-04- 30/forel5_blkl01.html on August 9,2007. Also The Territorial Governments. Developing a New Framework for Sovereignty and Security in the North: A Discussion Paper prepared by the Governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. April 2005, p. 8. 11
seen as advocates for Canada's North. It would be safe to argue that these situations, the
line between "primary" and "secondary" resources is blurred, as there appear to be
connections between these authors' suggestions and ideas that appear later in
governmental policy, such as a "northern foreign policy".
The first chapter of this thesis, "Canada's North in Canada's Security Policies"
provides the security policy framework for issues discussed later in the work. It begins
with an examination of certain government policy statements regarding security in
Northern Canada, and the historical context for these statements. We will see that
policies were often developed in response to perceived threats to Canada's sovereignty.
We will also see that after the end of the Cold War, the government focus began to shift
away from viewing Canada's North as a key strategic zone to viewing the North more in
the context of a greater picture. This has had a direct impact on policies concerning the
North.
Chapter 2, "Security Literature and Canada's North", examines the academic
literature on this subject area. We see that there are several key issues that dominate
discussions of Northern security (and thus, security policy). Three of these issues,
namely sovereignty, defence, and the Northwest Passage have been constants since
Canada acquired its North from Great Britain in the latter half of the 19 century. The
other two issues, circumpolar politics and the environment, have gained in prominence
over the past thirty years as a result of changing priorities in the North. Those who have written extensively about the North have generally adapted their research and their opinions to suit the times, although they may not always agree on solutions. 12
Chapter 3, "The Region and Its Peoples", begins our comprehensive look at the region in question. The first section is a primer on the North, particularly its
demographics. Next, the chapter addresses the development of the three Territorial
governments, particularly their increase in influence at the federal level of politics, and recent efforts by the three governments to work together to promote their own vision of
security for Northern Canada. The chapter concludes with an examination of the assorted
Aboriginal and Inuit organizations that represent a large majority of the population of the
Territories; discussing what they define security to be and what policies they feel the
federal government should introduce to ensure this security. On the whole, the people of the North have very different security priorities than their southern counterparts, and
Cabinet has, more often than not, overlooked these priorities when formulating policy.
Chapter 4, "Keeping Canada's North Secure", looks at those responsible for
enforcing and/or and protecting the security regime in Northern Canada: the CF (CF), the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
Each organization has a long history of providing security, law enforcement and public
safety in the North, and for the most part, these agents have not come from the North.
The exception is the Canadian Rangers, a group within the CF drawn from local populations. The CF, the CCG, and the RCMP all have an interest in acting more effectively in the North, but are subject to the whims of Cabinet.
Chapters 5 and 6 place Canada's North in larger contexts. Chapter 5, "The North in Canada-US Relations" addresses the complicated relationship between Canada and the
United States. It looks at the ongoing interest the United States government has in the area, and the influence bilateral agreements have on shaping security policy for the 13
North. Even as Canada and the United States are partners in the defence of the North
American continent, particularly with the North American Aerospace Defence Command
(NORAD) agreement, there has been a series of disagreements on Canada's sovereignty
in certain areas of the North, especially the Northwest Passage. Because of changes in
the security environment (particularly within the last five years), the United States'
interest in the North has changed, yet Canada persists in reviving old squabbles.
Chapter 6, "The North in Circumpolar Relations", places Canada's North within
the Northern international community. It looks specifically at Canada's membership in
several circumpolar organizations, e.g., the Arctic Council, the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference. These groups have enabled the people of the North to develop strong ties
with their counterparts in other countries. This has proved particularly effective in
developing alternative views of security, and also provided strong advocates for
influencing policy.
Since the issues concerning the North are constantly developing, it has been
difficult to choose a cut-off date for inclusion of information in the body of the text.
Indeed, the writing of this thesis has been extended somewhat because of important
events that occurred in 2006 and 2007, including procurement announcements by the
federal government and the release of a key study on Arctic icebreakers commissioned by
the United States Congress. Not wishing to draw out any further the gathering of
information, however, the date of December 1, 2006 has been chosen as the cut-off point
for new information for Chapters 1 through 6. Anything more recent is addressed briefly in the concluding chapter, "The state of Northern Security Today". 14
There is a disconnection between the objectives of Canada's national security policies and the needs of Canada's North. This disconnection is obvious not only in existing policy documents but also in the actions of the CF, the RCMP and the CCG, and is fuelled by priorities that have been determined for the North by Southern lawmakers.
This is despite the existence of a burgeoning community of Northern-based experts.
These experts are not traditionally involved in the policy development process, nor were they often consulted on security matters. The result is that these priorities are not necessarily what the region wants or needs. This raises the question of the validity of a
"Canada First" defence strategy, or rather, a "Canada First" defence strategy that suggests that the national security interest comes above else, no matter its impact on the nation's regions. Nevertheless, this is the policy point that is being continuously and currently implemented by the federal government in the North. 15
CHAPTER 1 - CANADA'S NORTH IN CANADA'S SECURITY POLICIES
1.1 Introduction
David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown suggest that the point of national security
policy is to address threats to that nation's core values, institutions, and individual
citizens:
when the threat is seen to be sufficiently pervasive to undermine the very life of the state and its citizenry, then the military is usually viewed as a principal instrument of influence or persuasion.. .But threats or challenges to national security are not always military in character, and neither are military forces the only instruments of security policy.14
It would certainly be wrong to say that Canada's security threats have always
been military in nature. A quick survey of Canadian history for the past two hundred
years easily disproves that assumption. Wars aside (and there were not that many) we
can identify the main threats to the "life of the state and its citizenry" to include crime,
various gradations of civil unrest, and natural disasters. Examples of civil unrest include
the Rebellions of 1837, the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919, the October Crisis of 1970
and the Oka Crisis of 1990. Examples of natural disasters are too numerous to list. In a
number of cases, although not always, the military has been called out to provide aid to
the civil power. Indeed, this became the forte of the Army at home (both Regular and
Reserve Force) in the 1990s as it was called out to respond to floods and ice storms.
As we will discuss further in Chapter 4, the CF is not the only instrument of
security policy in Canada. Crime and law violations are generally the responsibility of
David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown. "Canada's International Security Policy". Canada's International Security Policy Chapter 1. David B. Dewitt, David Leyton- Brown, eds. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995, p. 3. 16
the RCMP and assorted provincial and municipal police forces. The CCG and the corps
of border guards are equally responsible for keeping Canada safe and secure.
Nevertheless, until recently, Canadian security policy and defence policy have been
considered the same thing and the terms are often used interchangeably, particularly in
the context of the North.15
Other variants of security policy emerged in Canada towards the end of the 20
century, although there has been considerable resistance to their acceptance. Two of
these are of particular interest to this paper: human security and environmental security.
The labels for these categories are reflective of the issues they address: human security
concerns threats to people; environmental security concerns threats to the environment.
Both categories will be discussed later in the chapter. First, however, we must address
the concept of security equalling defence policy, and discuss where and/or whether the
North fits into such policy.
1.2 Security Policy in the North equals defence policy?
There have been six major defence policy statements issued by the Minister of National
Defence since the end of the Second World War. Of these six documents, five address
Northern issues specifically. The exception is Paul Hellyer's White Paper on Defence
from 1964, in which the North is not mentioned at all. If we look at the remaining
documents, however, we are able to understand better how the North has fit into defence policy.
The first defence policy statement, Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's
Defence Achievements and Organization, was issued in 1947, when Brooke Claxton was
C.f. Canada's International Security Policy. 17
Minister of National Defence. The text reproduces Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King's comments on the North:
The polar regions assume new importance as the shortest routes between North America and the principal centres of population of the world. In consequence, we must think and learn more about these regions. When we think about the defence of Canada, we must, in addition to looking east and west as in the past, take the north into consideration as well. Our defence forces must, of course, have experience of conditions in these regions, but it is clear that most of the things that should be done are required apart altogether from considerations of defence.16
Mackenzie King's comments were made to the House of Commons on February
12, 1947, when he presented the Canadian portion of the Joint Declaration on Defence
Co-operation to the House of Commons. He went on to emphasize that in his mind,
"Canada's northern programme is.. .primarily a civilian one to which contributions are made by the armed forces".17 Mackenzie King then made mention of a number of activities that had occurred in the North which had involved the armed forces, including the establishment of a communications system across the Northwest Territories, the administration of the Alaska Highway, and the ongoing aerial photography missions conducted by the RCAF. He also announced the establishment of a winter experimental establishment at Churchill, Manitoba, and made a point of noting the participation of the
Unites States in this and similar ventures.19
1 William Lyon Mackenzie King, quoted in Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization. Department of National Defence, 1947. Reproduced in Canada's National Defence, Volume 1: Defence Policy. Douglas L. Bland, ed. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997, p. 55. 17Ibid. 18 Ibid. 18
It is important to note that the "northern programme" as outlined by Mackenzie
King was not completely a product of the Cold War. Some of these activities had their genesis during the Second World War, or even earlier. The "communications system" to which Mackenzie King referred was established by the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals in 1923.20 Additionally, from 1927-1928, the RCAF conducted the Hudson Strait expedition, which established bases and conducted aerial survey work. This survey was
91 resumed in 1944, and continued until 1957.
During the Second World War, Canada and the United States had embarked on a number of construction projects that would provide mutual Territorial defence against the
Axis nations. These projects included roads (The Alaska Highway and the Northwest
Staging Route), pipelines (the Canol pipeline that sent oil from the fields at Norman
Wells to a refinery in Whitehorse), airbases (as part of the Crimson route which provided
99 an air bridge to Europe), and communication and weather stations. The political implications surrounding these projects will be discussed further in Chapter 5, but for the moment, it suffices to say that the Second World War brought military development to the North on a scale that had never been seen before.
In 1987, Kenneth C. Eyre wrote about the "polar passion" that gripped the
Canadian and US governments in the decade after the end of the Second World War, and 9^ identifies a surge in defence activity in the North. This period was one of co-operation between Canada and the US, and used Canada's North as an area of strategic depth (as 20 Department of National Defence. North of 60 - the Canadian Military in the Arctic. October 1985. 21 Ibid. 99 Kenneth C. Eyre. "Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947- 1987". Arctic 40: 4 (December 1987), p.294. 23 Ibid., p. 295. 19 opposed to being the first line of defence).24 The construction of the Distant Early
Warning (DEW) radar line along the 66th parallel, paid for and operated by the US, brought a new level of development to Northern Canada. The point of the DEW line was to alert Washington and Ottawa of the approach of Soviet intercontinental bombers, and allow for US bombers to get off the ground in order to protect the nuclear deterrents in place in the United States, but the system itself could not defend Canada's North from attack.
DND increased its presence in the north in other areas as well. The Royal
Canadian Navy conducted voyages in northern waters beginning in 1948 with the voyage of the aircraft carrier HMCS Magnificent to Hudson Strait, accompanied by two destroyers. Six years later, the Navy's first icebreaker, HMCS Labrador, was commissioned to conduct Arctic patrols. The Labrador later became the first military vessel to transit the Northwest Passage. Ultimately, though, the role of the Labrador did not fit into the operational interests of the Navy (i.e., developing its anti-submarine warfare technique and maintaining its position as a blue-water navy) and the vessel was transferred to the Canadian Coast Guard in 1957.
The establishment of a winter training school in Churchill was followed by the first Exercise Muskox in 1946. The goal of such exercises was to prepare Canadian soldiers for potential warfare against Soviet airborne troops. The difficulty with these exercises was mobility, given the lack of roads. Eyre notes that ".. .the vast majority [of training exercises] were carried out in winter when movement in the North is at its
Ibid., p. 294 Ibid., p. 295. Ibid. 20
easiest. Then, as now, there was an unfortunate tendency to equate northern operations
to winter operations."27 The soldiers who came to the area were assisted by a
Supplementary Reserve Group known as the Canadian Rangers. The Rangers, often
Inuit, acted as guides and observers across the North.
The introduction of the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) led to a change
of defence priorities in the late 1950s. The projected range of this new weapon was such
that it threatened the United States directly, which meant that the strategic depth provided
by Canada's North had disappeared to almost nothing. What little warning there would
be would come from the newly minted Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS) based at Thule Air Base in Greenland, Clear Air Force Station in Alaska, and
Scott Pond. Canada's North had no such warning system. Air defence came from fighter jets tasked under the North American Defence Agreement (NORAD), which came into
effect in 1959.28
The change of the strategic environment threw a bucket of cold water over
Canada's polar passion, at least as far as defence policy was concerned. Instead,
"NORAD, NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and nuclear weapons"
dominated the scene.29 As a result, the sovereignty/security role of the CF diminished
significantly. Aerial surveillance flights were cut back, while the Navy summer cruises
and Army winter exercises disappeared entirely and the Canadian Rangers were
essentially left to their own devices.30 Even much of the military infrastructure (the radio
11 Ibid., p. 296. N.D. Bankes. "Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic, 1947- 87", Arctic 40:4 (December 1987), p.287. 29 Eyre. "Forty Years of Military Activity", p. 296. 30 Ibid. 21
system and the Alaska Highway) was handed over to civilian departments for
administration. Only the DEW Line stations, military communications research facilities,
and NORAD's residual air defence remained.31 Even this capacity was reduced in the
early 1960s as 21 of the 42 Canadian DEW Line stations wrere decommissioned and
transferred to DIN A.32
It was not until the 1970s that Canada's military interests in the North began to be
resurrected. This was partly due to the man who occupied the position of Prime Minister
at the time: Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Trudeau's affection for Canada's North was widely
known. He had travelled a great deal in the area by canoe, including a trip along the
Coppermine River in the summer of 196633. It has been suggested that "his inclusive
sense of the country as a whole was informed by his first-hand encounters with rivers and
portage trails".34 Certainly, he had a very different perspective on Canada's North than
other prime ministers or party leaders.35
Trudeau's personal sentiments about Canada's North aside, the federal
government's attention was forced back to the region in 1969. In that year, the
31 Ibid. 32 Department of National Defence. "The Distant Early Warning Line Clean up Project". Backgrounder BG-01.013. August 31, 2001. From: http://www.mdn. ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=205 James Raffan. "A Child of Nature". Trudeau's Shadow: the Life and Legacy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Andrew Cohen and J.L. Granatstein, eds. Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1998, p. 70-71. 34 Ibid., p. 76-77. 5 There have been only two federal party leaders from Canada's North, but neither has served as Prime Minister. Erik Nielsen, interim leader of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1983, served as Member of Parliament for the Yukon from 1957 to 1987. Audrey McLaughlin, who replaced Nielsen as MP for the Yukon in 1987, was the leader of the New Democratic Party from 1989 to 1994. It could be argued that perhaps only Jean Chretien, Trudeau's Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs from June 1968 to August 1974 (and later Prime Minister from 1993 to 2003) shared Trudeau's views. Cf. pp.35-36. 22
Manhattan, an American oil tanker, made a round-trip transit through the Northwest
Passage for the purposes of testing the feasibility of the Passage as a shipping route. The
transit was widely criticized in Canada for environmental and political reasons. The
concept of shipping oil through the delicate Arctic eco-system was considered extremely
undesirable, particularly since response time in the case of an oil spill would be slower
out of necessity. There were also concerns about the impact that commercial shipping
would have on Canadian sovereignty. It is true that the Canadian government had
supported the initial Manhattan voyage by providing Canadian Coast Guard vessels to
accompany the tanker. Nevertheless, the federal government was unhappy with the
precedent that had just been set. Cabinet proceeded to develop several pieces of
legislation and policy that asserted Canadian claims in the North.
One of these policy documents, Defence in the 70s, was the first defence policy
statement since 1964. Defence in the 70s portrayed the North as Canada's "last frontier",
with "a unique physical environment presenting special problems of administration and
control".37 The role to be played by the CF in the North was essentially divided into two
parts. The first part was the protection of legal sovereignty through provision of a
"surveillance and control capability to the extent necessary to safeguard national interests
in all Canadian territory".38 Amongst the recommendations were eventual replacement of
the Argus long-range patrol aircraft and examination of the feasibility of subsurface
John Kirton and Don Munton. "The Manhattan Voyages and their aftermath". Politics of the Northwest Passage, ch. 4. Franklyn Griffiths, ed. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987, p. 71. Department of National Defence. Defence in the 70s. Reprinted in Canada's National Defence Volume 1: Defence Policy. Douglas L. Bland, ed. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997, p. 136. ™Ibid.,p. 138. 23
perimeter surveillance to monitor submarine activity. The document recognized that
air surveillance was the most feasible, since naval surveillance was restricted by the
seasons, and general ground surveillance was restricted by the size of the area.
However, Defence in the 70s pointed out measures that DND had already taken to
alleviate the situation, including the establishment of Canadian Forces Northern Region
Headquarters in Yellowknife in 1970.41 The document also raised the possibilities of
establishing other small bases in the Arctic Archipelago and of resurrecting the Canadian
Rangers program.
The second major part of the revised role of the CF concerned national
development. Specifically, "the Forces will be called upon.. .to assist development in the
civil sector, especially in the remote regions where disciplined task forces with wide
experience in adapting to unusual or challenging circumstances are required".42 Pollution
control in the North was identified as an area where "the Forces will make a major
contribution to the preservation of an unspoiled environment and an improved quality of
life".43 TheCF was also expected to provide relief and assistance in a variety of natural
disasters and emergencies. This was nothing new; the CF had assisted with flood control,
forest fire fighting, and search and rescue for many years. The difference now was that responding to environmental emergencies had been added to the list. The precedent for
39 Ibid., p. 146-147. 40 Ibid. Not to mention the lack of roads, suitable terrain, etc. 41 Ibid., p. 151. That same year, military liaison staff were also posted to Whitehorse, YK. 42 Ibid., p. 140. 43 Ibid., p. 141. 24 this had been set in 1970, when the tanker Arrow ran aground off Cape Breton Island and the CF assisted the Ministry of Transport Task Force with clean-up operation.
Defence in the 70s was an innovative piece of policy in that it placed a new
emphasis on Canada's sovereignty in general. The document expanded the role of the CF
in the North from its traditional role of providing surveillance (and thus assuring legal
sovereignty) and assistance to civil authorities to a wider view of security that included
environmental protection. Defence in the 70s heralded a renaissance of military interest
in the North, not in terms of the ideological battles of the Cold Wdeeper se, but in terms of
Territorial and continental defence.
A subsequent series of policy studies led to the Defence Structure Review, a
comprehensive study of issues including the disparity between equipment needs and the
defence budget and a review of air defence policy. An area of key concern was the
obsolescence of the majority of major equipment belonging to the CF. This was (and
continues to be) an ongoing issue of contention between the military and civilian
bureaucratic staff at the Department of National Defence.
In Defence in the 70s, Donald Macdonald also introduced a different perspective
on determining defence requirements. Douglas Bland perhaps put it best:
Donald Macdonald introduced a contrary notion that requirements would be determined based on what was available for defence. He insisted, moreover, that the defence department present "proposed defence activities in relation to other Government programs". The weakness of this approach is that it provides no appreciation of gaps in
John Anderson. "Canada and the Modernization of North American Air Defence". The US-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defence, Chapter 7. David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p. 170. 25
planning because there was no abstract model on which to compare what was required with what was available for defence.
This perspective led to struggles between the military and civilian bureaucratic
halves of the Department of National Defence, as the Trudeau government began to rely
on assessments made by public servants over those made by staff officers. The result of
these assessments was a curious situation in that while Defence in the 70s emphasized a
new role for the CF in Canada's North, this role was meant to be symbolic and primarily
expeditionary, much like the role played by the RCMP in the High Arctic in the 1920s
and 1930s. In other words, presence equalled sovereignty. The result was the launch of
a number of new programs and projects that brought the CF to the North on a non- permanent basis. The number of Canadian troops based permanently in the North was not increased, as it was deemed more effective to station operational units in the south
and to deploy them to the North as necessary.49 Still, there were more members of the
CF training and serving in the north than there had been since the early 1960s. The North became a forward operating area to which troops were to be deployed, much like Europe continued to be.
In 1970, the Navy sent its ships into northern waters for the first time since 1962, and even began to work on regaining a knowledge of ice-breaking. Since there was no
Naval icebreaker, officers, cadets and other ranks were sent for training on Canadian
46 Douglas Bland. Canada's National Defence. Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 1997, p. 116. 47 Ibid. 48 Eyre. "Forty Years of Military Activity", p. 297. 49 Ibid. 26
Coast Guard vessels.50 In addition, Naval long-range patrol aircraft began to undertake four long-range surveillance patrols per month over the North.51 That same year, the
Army launched a new series of Arctic indoctrination exercises which took soldiers to places in the North where soldiers had never been before. The training headquarters was based in Churchill, Manitoba, from which staff administered the NEW VIKING exercises as well as facilitating training of the new Airborne Regiment in Arctic warfare.
One process that began in the 1970s that was carried through into the 1980s was the modernization of NORAD. The expense of maintaining the aged
CADIN/PINETREE radar lines was becoming prohibitive. The line itself was in danger of losing its military value in the future.53 To rectify this and other problems, the
Canadian government proposed the formation of a bilateral group that would consider how Canada and the United States would share responsibilities for the modernization of
North American air defence. During this period, United States US E-3 Airborne Warning
& Control System (AWACS) were established in Canada. "Over-The-Horizon
Backscatter" (OTH-B) radar was installed to fill in the "dead areas' and four CF-18 squadrons were assigned by Canada to NORAD duty. In 1981, the name NORAD itself was revised to North American Aerospace Defence Command in order to reflect the importance of space as part of North American defence and the need for enhanced cooperation in space surveillance.
By the mid 1980s, the North American strategic picture had changed once more.
The hawkish and strongly anti-Communist Ronald Reagan had become President of the
50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Anderson. "The Modernization of North American Air Defence", p. 172-173. 27
United States in 1981. In 1985, a U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, the Polar Sea, transited the Northwest Passage, and raised the hackles of the Canadian media as a result of its direct challenge to Canada's claims to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic
Archipelago. The next Canadian Defence White Paper, produced by the Mulroney government and released in 1987, was highly reflective of this Zeitgeist. Unlike its predecessor, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, as it was called, took a very restrictive approach towards security policy. In the introduction, it stated
"sixteen years later, it is evident that the great hopes of the early 1970s have not been realized". Thus, "the realities of the present.. .call for a more sober approach to international relations and the needs of security policy."55 The view of Canada's North became equally restricted. The Arctic Ocean was portrayed as an area of growing strategic importance, a potential battlefield thanks to advances in military technology.56
The main military threat to North America was not the ICBM but rather the nuclear- powered submarine (SSN).
The role of the CF in Northern Canada remained two-fold: the protection of sovereignty and the provision of assistance to the civil authorities. The former task was clearly established as the priority. Challenge and Commitment addressed the commitment-capability gap faced by the CF, including the very limited capacity for the maritime forces to operate in the Arctic.57 The solution presented in the White Paper was
5 Department of National Defence. Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987. Reproduced in Canada's National Defence Volume 1: Defence Policy. Douglas L. Bland, ed. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997, p. 200. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid., p. 205. 51 Ibid.,?. 233. 28
a "vigorous naval modernization program", including the acquisition of nuclear-powered
attack submarines to more effectively patrol Canada's three oceans.58 The SSNs were
deemed the only vessels "able to exercise surveillance and control in northern Canadian
ice-covered waters" because of their ability to sustain high speeds for long periods. 9
Nuclear powered submarines were also the only vehicle capable of spending extended periods under ice. These two features made the submarines highly desirable.
The issue of surveillance in the other elements was also addressed in Challenge and
Commitment. The document addressed such nuances of the North American Air Defence
Modernization plan as the planned upgrade of airfields in Yellowknife, Inuvik, Rankin
Inlet, Kuujjuaq, and Iqaluit.61
Another aspect of NORAD surveillance briefly addressed in Challenge and
Commitments was radar, previously the prevue of the DEW, CADIN, and Pinetree Lines.
By the time Challenge and Commitment was released, construction on the North Warning
System (NWS) had already begun, replacing the now obsolete DEW Line. The still-in-
operation NWS "consists of minimally manned, long-range radar and unmanned, short- range, gap-filler radars", with stations located along the 70* parallel. The stations are
controlled from CFB North Bay and relay information about any airborne activity within their coverage activity. Canada assumed the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the NWS in Canada under the terms of the Canada/USA agreement on
58 Ibid., p. 244. 59 Ibid., p. 246. 60 Ibid., p. 245. 61 Ibid., p. 248-249. 62 Ibid., p. 248 Department of National Defence. "North Warning System". Backgrounder - BG 02.018, May 31, 2002. 29
North American Air Defence Modernization, which was signed in Quebec City, 17
March 1985.64
In addition to the role of maritime forces and surveillance in the Arctic, Challenge
and Commitment raised the commitment-capability gap issue faced by the land forces in
terms of protecting Canada:
Aside from the quick response capability of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and the valuable but limited surveillance in the Arctic provided by the Canadian Rangers, there is insufficient trained manpower or suitable equipment earmarked specifically for these missions.65
Again, the solution was expansion and modernization, something particularly required for
the Canadian Rangers so that they could maintain the force's significance as "a
surveillance force and as a visible expression of Canadian sovereignty in the North".66
Relatively little was said in Challenge and Commitment regarding the CF's role in
assisting the civil authorities. If anything, it was included in the document as an
afterthought. There was mention of the CF's traditional assistance in areas such as search
and rescue and during natural emergencies, and a commitment to continue to play central roles in such situations.67 Environmental protection, however, was clearly assigned to
other Departments. The only mention of pollution control was under the section entitled
"Sovereignty":
In peacetime the enforcement of Canadian laws throughout our territory is the responsibility of the civil authorities. This includes Canadian legislation on navigation and pollution in ice-covered waters...
64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 252. 66 Ibid., p. 257. 67 Ibid., p. 276-278 68 Ibid., p. 220. 30
Interestingly, the acquisition of a Polar 8 icebreaker was also mentioned in the section, as
having the potential to make a "significant contribution to the maintenance of a Canadian
presence and the exercise of sovereignty in Arctic waters".69 The acquisition of the
icebreaker was not mentioned further in the document, as it was not an initiative of DND
but rather the Canadian Coast Guard. Its inclusion in Challenge and Commitment was
perhaps more of a means of reassuring the Canadian public about the federal
government's plans to acquire an icebreaker on par with the Polar Sea, than for any other
reason.
Many of the proposals included in Challenge and Commitment never came to
fruition. Part of this was due to the sudden (and apparently unexpected) demise of the
Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. All at once, it seemed, the world had been turned
on its head. The policies oiglasnost and perestroika, rather than revitalizing the Soviet
Union, as was hoped, only crippled it, and its former satellite states began to assert their
independence. With the Soviet Union in tatters, the need for nuclear deterrence in
Europe was gone, and North America was no longer in immediate danger. In the early
1990s, wars and conflicts that were previously obscured by the ideological battles of the
Cold War now leapt to the forefront. The battles in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia were but two examples in which Canada found itself involved as part of a UN peacekeeping operation.
This had an effect on Canada's domestic policies to be sure. But fiscal concerns
also halted the progression of the implementation of Challenge and Commitment. The
SSN program proved not only expensive but also unpopular, leading to its cancellation. 31
Canada's descent into recession in the late 1980s had a major impact on government
spending, which no doubt contributed to the fall of the Conservative government in 1993.
The new government, headed by Jean Chretien, former minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs ushered in an era of government cutbacks, particularly in DND, in the name of
reducing the country's deficit.
It may come as no surprise, then, that the 1994 Defence White Paper, issued by
the Chretien government, placed even less emphasis on Canada's North than Challenge
and Commitment. Indeed, the only comment specifically about the CF's activities in the
North focused on the Canadian Rangers, who:
reflect an important dimension of Canada's national identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols.
Unlike other areas of the CF, the Rangers did not experience cutbacks under the
71
first Chretien government. On the contrary, the organization continued to grow. The
sociological benefits of the organization were already well-known, but it was surely the
low price tag that helped save the Canadian Rangers.
The federal government did not release a further major defence policy statement
for eleven years. This time, the defence policy statement was part of a larger
International Policy Statement. The strategic context was very different from the 1994
Defence White Paper because it was
70 Department of National Defence. 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994. Reproduced in Canada's National Defence Volume 1: Defence Policy. Douglas L. Bland, ed. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997, p. 355. 71 P. Whitney Lackenbauer. "The Canadian Rangers: A "Post modern" militia that works", Canadian Military Journal 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), p. 51. The Rangers will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 32
firmly grounded in the realities of the post-Cold War, post- September 11 world. It [was] also informed by the rich operational experience of the CF, both in Canada and in locations ranging from Afghanistan to the Balkans to Haiti.72
The events of September 11, 2001, awoke Canada from its complacency,
particularly once the traffic across the border between Canada and the United States
ground to a complete stop. The idea of creating a security perimeter around the continent
moved to the forefront, and suddenly the North had regained strategic importance. This
viewpoint was reflected in the 2005 Defence Policy statement in which the Arctic is
mentioned throughout as an area of operations. The CF was lauded for its "important
role in asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North", with particular mention made of the
long-range patrols, exercises, and the Canadian Rangers.73 In terms of future
development, there was an emphasis on increasing the CF's capabilities in the North,
including replacing the Twin Otter fleet with more modern aircraft and improving
communications between the Canadian Ranger Patrols and other components of the CF.74
Whether the Liberals would have carried out these programs is unknown as a few months
after the document was release, Parliament was dissolved and an election called.
The current Harper government has yet to publish any official defence policy
statements (major or minor). By mid-2007, a defence capability plan was in the works at
DND that would no doubt have mentioned Canada's North. This hypothesis is based on
the Harper government record of promoting a "Canada First" approach to defence policy.
Department of National Defence. "Message from the Minister", Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World — DEFENCE. Ottawa, 2005, no page number. 73 Ibid., p. 10. 74 Ibid., p. 20. 33
The "Canada First" approach first appeared during the 2005-2006 campaign as part of the
Conservative Party's platform. Stephen Harper promised that, once in power, his government would construct armed icebreakers and establish a deep-water port near
Iqaluit. Indeed, since coming into power, the Harper government has appeared to keep its promise of keeping Canada's North secure, at least if we are to judge by several key defence procurement announcements that have been made over the course of 2006.
Nevertheless, the defence capability plan has not yet been released, and there does not yet seem to be a coherent Northern security policy.
We will examine the situation of the Harper government further in Chapters 4 and
7, but it suffices to say for now that it is curious that the current government appears to be channelling two older philosophies regarding security in the North: the idea that the
North is a priority (Trudeau), and the idea that the North is best defended by the military
(Mulroney).
1.3 Security Policy in the North equals human security policy?
The term "human security" itself is still relatively new, although it is related to other concepts used in Canadian foreign policy such as "3D" (defence, development, and diplomacy), the "whole-of-government approach" or "RTP (responsibility to protect)" that are used today in Canada's overseas involvements, such as Afghanistan. In 1999,
Paul Heinbecker, formerly Assistant Deputy Minister (Global and Security Policy) with
DFA, wrote
The first current use of the term "human security" of which I am aware was by the late Dr Mahbub Ul Haq in the 1993 34
Human Development Report of the United Nations Programme.75
Heinbecker drew connections between the current concept of human security and previous initiatives of the 20* century, such as Woodrow Wilson's "14 Points" and the
1970s' Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.76 He argued that the advent
of globalization had laid bare numerous human security threats (violence, poverty,
77
disease), which, though ancient, had been hidden during the age of inter-state conflicts.
While Heinbecker's arguments may not have been original, they were representative of
the stance taken by the Canadian government as justification for its "effort to 7R conceptualize the operational content of human security".
Human security, as defined by DFA, focuses on the safety and well-being of
individuals and their communities, rather than on the security of states.79 This is based
on the recognition that the security of states is not always sufficient to ensure the well- SO being and safety of individuals, thus, defence policy cannot always provide security.
Conversely, the safety and well-being of individuals is considered integral to global peace and security, particularly in the context of interstate threats (such as pandemics or
small arms proliferation).81 Thus, international cooperation is generally required to properly address such issues.
75 Paul Heinbecker. "Human Security". Behind the Headlines 56:2 (Winter 1999), p. 4. 76 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 7Q C.f. http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/humansecurity-en.asp ™Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 6. 35
Heinbecker was quick to point out that human security is not an alternative to national security, but rather, that they are opposite sides of the same coin. Canadians expect equal protection by their government from non-military threats (drug trafficking, organized crime, environmental pollution, terrorism, and contagious diseases) as they do
go from military threats (enemy incursion, nuclear war, etc.). As a result, the government is required to adopt a multi-faceted approach to security.
It is crucial to recognize that Heinbecker's argument is focused on foreign rather than domestic policy. Indeed, as far as the federal government is concerned, "human security" falls under the purview of DFA. And yet, Heinbecker hinted that "human security" has a place in domestic policy too:
No one believes we are perfect, least of all self-deprecating Canadians. It is a rare Canadian, for example, who is not troubled by the way in which the interests of aboriginal Canadians have been mishandled. We cannot and do not claim perfection, but we can legitimately claim to have built a society that both encourages and benefits from diversity. We have embraced two languages, accommodated multiple cultures, tolerated literally uncounted religions, and integrated people from every country on earth.. .the human security agenda plays to Canada's comparative advantages. If we want to promote tolerance and reconciliation, it helps that Canada is a democratic, bilingual, multicultural country.
Does human security have a place in Canadian northern policy? Heinbecker does not address the issue that many Canadians, including many Northerners and many aboriginals, live in the very conditions that he deplored. Nonetheless, there are domestic
Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 36 policy documents issued by the federal government which carry the suggestion that protecting "human security" is not too far-fetched.
In 1972, Jean Chretien (then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development) presented Canada's North: 1970-1980 to the Standing Committee on
Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The document affirmed the government's policy on Northern Development in the 70's, and while not a traditional (i.e., security equals defence) security policy document, Canada's North was reflective of what can be identified as "human security" policy. It identified three challenges facing the North: fulfilling the needs of the native peoples, ensuring viable economic development, and maintaining ecological balance. Of these three challenges, the first was clearly identified as the most important:
The priority need in the North during the coming decade is to stimulate and strengthen the people programs, so that the native peoples in particular can have some hope of adjusting to the pace of economic and social change, and preparing themselves for participating meaningfully in Northern development.85
Very little was said in the document about Canadian sovereignty and security except that the maintenance of these things was one of the "national objectives in the
North". This paucity was to be expected - such aspects of government were the domain of DND rather than Indian and Northern Affairs, and thus were addressed by Defence in the 70s rather than Canada's North.
The next "human security" document concerning Canada's North did not appear for another 25 years. This is no doubt a reflection of the security tensions of the late
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Canada's North: 1970-1980. p. 34. Ibid., p. 10. 37
1970s and 1980s, particularly during the latter decade, as the Mulroney government
espoused the restrictive definition of security=defence=military. During that time, there
was little tolerance for a more holistic view of security such as there had been during the
early 1970s and as there would be in the 1990s. Development in the North continued, but
there was little in the way of new initiatives.
The emergence of the application of human security to Canada's North began in
the mid-1990s, at a time when security in Canada's North was not necessarily a priority
for DND, but was certainly an issue of interest to DFA. In 1997, the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade released a report entitled
Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the
Twenty-First Century. The Standing Committee made a number of recommendations to the federal government including four recommendations under the theme of "Northern
Sovereignty and Security". Three of these recommendations were particularly relevant to domestic concerns: reaffirm sovereignty over waters of Canadian archipelago, pursue
on demilitarization of the Arctic, and clean up abandoned military sites. The federal government responded to these recommendations in 1998, supporting the recommendations on sovereignty and environmental security. The government did not, however, support the demilitarization of the Arctic, indicating that "this would entail an abandonment of the Canadian military presence in the North.... The present-day
The fourth recommendation concerned addressing nuclear waste problems in Russia. 38 communication, navigation and transportation networks are just some of the products of a military presence in the North".
In September 1998, DFA released Towards a Northern Foreign Policy for
Canada, a consultation paper to guide discussions in meetings and round-table talks being held across Canada as part of the public consultation process. In this paper, the government indicated that the definition of "security" had broadened: "with the ending of the Cold War, discussions of security have come increasingly to deal with economic, environmental, cultural and social security. In the circumpolar world, these civil issues have assumed growing importance." Despite this, the Department stated that the
"Northern foreign policy" would focus on "traditional aspects of security", namely the exercise of sovereignty, the preservation of regional security, and the maintenance of the
CF's capability to aid civil authorities in the Arctic.90
The resulting foreign policy document was The Northern Dimension of Canada's
Foreign Policy, released by DFA in June 2000. The Northern Dimension identified globalization as the primary threat to the North, because of the introduction of transboundary issues, including pollution, climate change, and the spread of diseases such as AIDS.91 The document set out four "overarching objectives". First, the document aimed to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and
Government of Canada. Government Response to Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report "Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation Into the Twenty-First Century. 1998. 89 Department of Foreign Affairs. Towards a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada: A Consultation Paper. September 1998. 90 Ibid. Department of Foreign Affairs. The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy. Ottawa: the Communications Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, June 2000, p. 4. 39
Aboriginal peoples.92 Secondly, assertion and preservation of Canada's sovereignty in the North was key, although:
Time has changed the nature and implication of those threats [to Canadian sovereignty] - co-operation has largely overshadowed boundary disputes in the North. Public concern about sovereignty issues has waned, but Canadians still want their governments to enforce their laws and regulations concerning the management of the North.93
Thirdly, the policy aimed to "establish the Circumpolar region as a vibrant geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system."94 The final objective of the policy was "to promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic".95 The use of the phrase "human security" is an interesting one. It was used several times in The Northern Dimension, but was never explicitly defined. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean what was meant by "human security" by examining what was singled out in the policy's priority areas. These were identified in the document as strengthening the Arctic Council, establishing a University of the Arctic and a policy research network, encouraging cooperation in Northern Russia, and promoting sustainable economic opportunities and trade development.
As a foreign policy for the North, The Northern Dimension illustrated how
Canada's national interests could be implemented into relations with other Arctic nations.
As such, it is a very important document. What is questionable, however, is its impact at the domestic level. As we have seen, human security is a concept usually espoused by the Canadian government at the international level, rather than in domestic policies.
Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 40
While it is commendable that the Canadian government should take an interest in all the people of the Arctic Circle, should it not be equally willing to apply these principles to its own population? We will see in Chapter 3 that Canada's Territories have taken the
•initiative to adopt human security as a desirable concept for protecting their populations.
1.4 Security policy in the North equals environmental security?
Environmental security policy has an even more tenuous place in Canada's security policy environment than human security policy does. Franklyn Griffiths, one of the eminent scholars on the Arctic, wrote that
In the Canadian case, there is no natural fit between the three words "environment", "security", and "Arctic". "Environment" and "Arctic" are wholly compatible. So also are "Arctic" and "security" in the military-strategic sense of security which is however declining in significance. But "environment" and "security" are a mismatch. The question.. .is not how Canadians might conceive of international efforts to secure the Arctic marine environment or the NSR [Russia's Northern Sea Route] in particular in the years ahead. The question is whether Canadians or for that matter anyone should be employing a discourse of security in seeking to understand and act upon environmental problems.96
Griffiths suggested that Canada had experimented with the concept of environmental security in the 1970s with the creation of the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act and subsequent related legislation. The Act established Canadian boundaries for the archipelago and its waters, in response to the 1969 transit of the
Franklyn Griffiths. "Environment and Security in Arctic Waters: A Canadian Perspective". National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Northern Sea Route. Chapter 3. Willy 0streng, ed. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 104. 91 Ibid.,-p. 105. 41
Manhattan through the Northwest Passage. These boundaries included the waters of the
Arctic Ocean east of the 141st meridian, and extended Canadian sovereignty to the North
Pole. Enforcement was given primarily to Canada's Coast Guard, with support from the
CF. The Act also established that all waters within 100 nautical miles of shore were
considered part of Canada's "Arctic Waters".98 These claims were and remain highly
controversial. Many in the international community, particularly the United States, felt
that Canada had acted unilaterally and refused to acknowledge Canada's sovereignty,
particularly over the Northwest Passage.
In terms of environmental security policy, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act and its succeeding variations remain paramount for Canada's North. The Act is also
unique in that it is the only one that could be identified as an environmental security
policy specifically developed for the North. This may seem surprising in the
contemporary context, based on the attention currently being given the issue of climate
change. But as Griffiths argued, it is difficult to think of environment and security in the
same contexts. The chief difficulty lies with the nature of the subject. The environment
is an ephemeral thing that cannot be contained within Canada's borders. It also concerns
all aspects of the land, the sea, and the air. Thus, while human security can be considered
to be a broader view of security policy than traditional security, because it concerns
individuals, environmental security is even broader out of necessity. It is a very difficult
thing to manage, and certainly cannot be addressed in an overarching policy, so
governments are forced to focus on specific issues. These issues have to be prioritized,
and herein is the problem. Who should be the ones to identify the areas of concern in the
Government of Canada. "Interpretations: "Arctic waters". Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. 42
Arctic environment? Traditionally, it has been the government, acting on the advice of scientists and scholars. The people of the North have had far less of a voice, despite the reality that they must live with the impacts of government policy.
Griffiths argued that before creating further environmental security policies for
Arctic waters, the concept of "environmental security" needed to be tested." Griffiths is absolutely right. Canada needs to define what environmental security is before it can begin to employ it effectively, in the North and elsewhere.
It should be noted that Defence in the 70s also invoked the tenets of environmental security, in that the document ascribed the role of environmental protectors to the CF:
The Forces will make a major contribution to the preservation of an unspoiled environment and an improved quality of life by supporting the civil agencies in exercising pollution control in the North and off Canada's coasts.1
This role appears to have disappeared from defence policy by 1987, since it is not mentioned at all in Challenge and Commitment or any of the subsequent major defence policy statements thereafter. There is, however, tacit recognition in the later policy statements that responsibility for pollution prevention and control really falls under other federal agencies.
1.5 Summary
The Canadian government's definition of security policy has both expanded and contracted in the years since the end of the Second World War. This definition has generally been dependent on the strategic importance of the North at the time. During
99 Ibid., p. 132. Defence in the 70s, p. 13. 43 times when the North has been strategically important, the late 1940s and 1950s and the
1980s, the Canadian government has generally relied on a narrow definition of security.101 During those times, security policy and defence policy were similar if not the same, with the CF acting as the chief enforcer of such policies. During times when the strategic importance of Canada's North was in eclipse, as in the 1960s and 1970s, and the
1990s, the federal government reduced its emphasis on traditional security and began to allow an expanded definition that accommodated aspects of human and environmental security.
There are two key ideas which remain generally the same in these documents, no matter what era. Firstly, these documents perpetuate the stereotype that the North and the
Arctic are one and the same, and that this is a desolate, frozen wasteland. As we know, this is not entirely accurate, particularly as one heads south. But these policy documents do not even make note of the gradations of the Northern climate. Instead the North is portrayed as a uniform whole. This does a disservice to the southern inhabitants of the
Territories whose climate is similar to the northern regions of the provinces.
The second idea is tied to the notion of "the Arctic" as an empty stretch of land, and that the North is Canada's "final frontier". This basic assumption lies behind CF activities (and RCMP and CCG activities to some extent) in the North. Defence policy documents assign a dual role to the North - an area that requires protection from incursion, and an area for the CF to conduct cold-weather training. Both aspects of this role have their limitations. Firstly, in terms of protection, the CF is consigned to an almost purely expeditionary role in the North, the exceptions being the Canadian
101 This is even applicable in the post 9/11 environment where homeland security has become the concept dujour. 44
Rangers, and JTFN. This is a continuation of the old practice of treating the North as a
Forward Operating Area. Secondly, while the use of the North for cold-weather training
is crucial for the CF (for domestic security rather than international security at this
present time), not all of the North remains in snow-bound conditions for the entire year.
Indeed, it appears that the Northern winter may shorten as a result of climate change.
For the most part, the federal government persists in viewing the North through an
out-of-date and obscured lens. The retention of such a viewpoint has the potential for a
negative impact on defence and security policies for the North because it is not based on
contemporary reality. 45
CHAPTER 2 -SECURITY LITERATURE AND CANADA'S NORTH
2.1 Introduction
The amount of academic literature written on northern Canada is as vast and as varied as
the North itself. What are the key issues when discussing security in Northern Canada?
Who has written about them? It is important to examine the existing academic literature
to identify these factors. For the most part, this subject area has concerned historians and
political scientists, although biologists, anthropologists, legal scholars, and even members
of the CF have also contributed a great deal of work on the subject.
It is also important to look at the historical contexts of these pieces of literature.
Often, they are written in response to current events. At other times, they advocate
alternative options to existing government policy. Nevertheless, we cannot examine such
works as independent or isolated phenomena. So, then, the literature shall be divided into
four time periods, determined by major events that had an impact on the strategic picture
of the North in the past forty-odd years: the transit of the Manhattan, the voyage of the
Polar Sea, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the events of September 11, 2001.
It is, of course, impossible to examine every piece of literature written about
security in the North. This chapter, then, aims to highlight the more relevant works in the
Northern canon. In some cases, we will revisit different authors, since their careers span
more than one period under examination.
2.2 After the Manhattan: 1969-1985
Immediately after the Manhattan incident, academic literature about Canada's North began to appear with a vengeance. Indeed, it was during this period that several 46
influential works were published. These works did not necessarily address security in the
North specifically, but they were important expressions of philosophies or points of view
about the way the North was and the way it should be handled by the federal government.
In 1971, Carleton University published Canada's Changing North, edited by
William C. Wonders. This volume reproduced works from the 1960s by authors from a
variety of backgrounds, including history, ecology, and anthropology. Many of these
articles had previously been published in journals with a "Northern" focus such as Arctic
or The Polar Record, but they gained a new audience through Canada's Changing North.
The volume remains noteworthy for its inclusion of articles about Canadian sovereignty,
analysis of Canada's Northern Policy, and the viewpoint of the Inuit.
In "Boundary Problems relating to the sovereignty of Canada's Arctic", originally
published in The Musk-Ox in 1969, Margaret W. Morris reviewed Canada's claims to
sovereignty in the Arctic. Morris predicted that problems would arise from the transit of
1 07
the Manhattan as a result of the lack of delimitation of Canada's boundaries. She also
suggested that unequivocal delimitation would help lead to the establishment of political
coherence in Canada's North.
In "Canada's Northern Policy", David Judd reviewed the federal government's
history in the North. He found that the North was a liability for Canada, because of the
expense involved. From this review, Judd drew two conclusions about the relationship between the government and the North. First,
Margaret W. Morris. "Boundary Problems relating to the sovereignty of Canada's Arctic". Originally published in The Musk-Ox 6 (1969), pp. 32-58. Reproduced in Canada's Changing North. William C. Wonders, ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1971, p. 312. m Ibid.,-p. 337. 47
the pressing issue of sovereignty, excepting, perhaps, future definitions of Territorial waters, has passed and has been replaced in Canada by a moral and political concern for the welfare of her northern people. These social problems will keep successive Dominion Governments in the North for decades more. And second,
There is as yet no final rejoinder to the contention of 1879 that the North is unlikely to prove "of any value to Canada". The North today, means subsidy.105
Judd predicted that the Canadian government would focus its efforts on the
development of northern resources in order to make the region self-sufficient. This, in
turn, would improve the lives of northerners.106 He would no doubt be saddened to know
that human security such as he advocated still has not been effectively adopted in
Canada's North, and many problems have worsened over time. Further, sovereignty
remains the pressing issue for the federal government.
Perhaps the key work of this period, and certainly that with the highest profile
was Nordicite canadienne by geographer Louis-Edmond Hamelin. This book, published
in 1975, won a Governor General's award, no doubt partly because of its timeliness, but
primarily as a result of its in-depth look at Canada's North. Nordicite canadienne
presented the concept that the North was not just a physical space, but also a way of
thinking. Hamelin examined a variety of aspects of the North, from place names, to the
status of the Territories, to the place of the First Nations. He came to the conclusion that
although the big political and economic decisions made about the North continued to
104 David Judd. "Canada's Northern Policy: Retrospect and Prospect". First published in The Polar Record 14:92 (May 1969), pp. 593-602. Reproduced in Canada's Changing North. William C. Wonders, ed. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1971, p. 349. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid., p. 350. 48 come from the South: "Le Sud est loin d'avoir compris tout ce qui est nord dans ce Nord.
Mais Sud et Nord etant profondement lies.. .".107 To Hamelin, it was a matter of mutual cooperation and understanding. The future of the North should not be reduced to an
1 no either/or scenario (i.e., ralentir revolution ou continuer dans la mime direction) .
Rather, it was a matter of achieving consensus amongst the 10 political entities in the
North, including the federal government, about what the North should be.109
Hamelin's work was influential in the shaping of another key academic work published in the -post-Manhattan period. In 1979, Franklyn Griffiths, a political scientist at the University of Toronto, published an essay entitled A Northern Foreign Policy, based "largely on conversations" with officials, academics, and businessmen. x Griffiths had been studying the Arctic for some time, but A Northern Foreign Policy took his ideas to a different level. Griffiths argued that Canada needed to take the initiative in response to increasing international activity in the Arctic region: "There is much to be done in the circumpolar North if Canada's varied interests are to be met to fullest advantage in the coming years."111
A Northern Foreign Policy examined a number of key events occurring that would impact Canada's North, including the establishment of the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference, the sessions of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(which were then underway), and a mounting United States interest in Canada's Arctic
"The South is far from understanding that all that is north about the North. But the South and the North will always be strongly linked". Louis-Edmond Hamelin. Nordicite canadienne. Montreal: Editions Hurtubise HMH Ltd, 1975, p. 403. 108 Ibid. "Evolve or go on in the same way". 109 Ibid.,-p. 404. 110 Franklyn Griffiths. A Northern Foreign Policy. Wellesely Papers 7. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979, p. 5. m Ibid., p. 7. 49 based on energy needs. Based on these events, Griffiths argued that Canada needed to establish a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. Included in his recommendations was a process for developing such a policy based on extensive departmental and public consultation and coordination.
2.3 After the Polar Sea: 1985-1991
The voyage of the Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage in 1985 not only set off a diplomatic storm, it also ignited academic interest in the area. The result was a golden age of literature about Canada's North. A number of books and articles appeared in this period intended to educate (and in some cases influence) people about the region.
For their December issue in 1987, the editors of Arctic, the journal of the Arctic
Institute of North America, decided to focus on the theme "Forty years in the Arctic".
The result is a valuable compilation of articles which examine the key issues that affected the Arctic from the end of the Second World War up to and including the Polar Sea. In
"Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development", Frances
Abele, of Carleton University, provided a political history of the North from its roots as a colonial region to the current political changes. To Abele, the history of Canada's North was key to understanding the history of Canada because the development of the North bore such strong similarities to the development of the rest of the nation. In her analysis,
Abele identified four "areas of congruence" in which the recent political history of the
North "compresses into sharp focus basic national issues and fundamental patterns of
Ibid., pp.74-75 50
Canadian development".113 Firstly, Abele argued that "northern constitutional development bears the mark of Canada's colonial heritage", even to the point of excluding the Territories from the constitutional talks of the 1980s.114 Secondly, the northern version of Macdonald's National Policy disappeared and reappeared through the
20th century, much as the original version had in response to economic forces.115 Thirdly,
as in the West, the northern National Policy provoked regional resistance, particularly amongst the First Nations.116 Finally, the political development of the North aided in
117 bringing the unfinished business of native land claims to the national agenda. Abele's article, while not specifically addressing security or defence, provided valuable background information for understanding the political situation in the North until the mid-1980s.
Kenneth Eyre's article, "Forty years of military activity in the Canadian North,
1947-1987" addressed the history of the CF in the North. Eyre's article became famous for its use of the term "surge" to describe elevated interest in the North in response to a situation.118 Eyre, a member of the Arctic Institute of North America, identified three surges between 1947 and 1987: 1947-64 (from the early stages of the Cold War until the publication of the Arctic-free White Paper); 1970-80 (from the aftermath of the
Manhattan voyage until the economic crunch of the second Trudeau government), and
Frances Abele. "Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development". Arctic 40:4 (December 1987), p. 310. 114 Ibid., p. 318. Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Eyre, "Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-1987", p. 294. 51
1987 onwards (the publication of Challenge and Commitment). The article was also noteworthy for its inclusion of the history of the Canadian Rangers. After reviewing these periods in history, Eyre came to the conclusion that although military activity had impacted on northern infrastructure, the North had only begun to impact on the military.120
In a related article, "Forty Years of Canadian sovereignty assertion in the Arctic,
1947-87", N. D. Bankes, of the University of Calgary's Faculty of Law, provided a survey of assorted sovereignty policies, not only those concerning the Northwest Passage but also those addressing the Arctic Archipelago and waters. Bankes utilized a specific definition of "sovereignty" for the article, namely "sovereignty" as equal to "effective occupation", the latter term being qualified based both on the nature of the land and its habitability and by the state's proof of a "better title [to the land] than that claimed by another state."121
In the article, Bankes set out to prove that the greatest threat to Canada's
1 77 sovereignty in the Arctic has been the United States and no other country. First,
Bankes reviewed the history of Territorial claims in the Arctic, particularly those made with regard to the establishment of American weather stations in the Arctic Archipelago and the creation of the DEW Line. For Bankes, the issue of terrestrial claims was settled with the establishment of weather stations at Resolute, Eureka Sound, Mould Bay,
uy Ibid., pp. 294, 296, 298. 120 Ibid., p. 299. 171 N.D. Bankes. "Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic, 1947- 87", Arctic 40:4 (December 1987), p. 286. 122 Ibid, p. 285 52
Isachsen and Alert. As far as maritime claims (which, of course, remain a matter of
international dispute today), Bankes identified three forms under which these claims
could be classified: functional jurisdiction claims, Canadian internal waters, and the
Northwest Passage. With these claims, Bankes found that the "key Canadian statements
and actions on Arctic Territorial sovereignty and on more functional claims to jurisdiction have all followed directly from a threat, perceived or real.. ."124 And, as
Bankes pointed out, these threats emerged from the United States. Bankes' conclusion
was an important one, because it helped define the process behind Arctic policy
formation. At the same time, however, articles such as these helped to encourage the
belief that the United States was (and is) the primary threat to Canada's North.
Other "all-encompassing" surveys of Canada's North, specifically the Arctic
appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Franklyn Griffiths, for example, edited an
entire volume devoted to the Politics of the Northwest Passage. In his introduction,
Griffiths noted that
The chapters you will read here seek to provide baseline information on Canada's Arctic dilemmas and on Canadian propensities in dealing with them during the decade and more before the September 1985 decision to lay the claim to the Passage on the line. To know better where we are coming from is to improve the prospect of getting where we want to go as a country with much to give as well as keep in the Arctic.125
Two chapters are of particular interest to this thesis. In "Inuit Politics and the
Arctic Seas", Peter Jull introduced the Inuit perspective into discussion, providing a look
Ui Ibid., p. 287. 124 Ibid., p. 290. 1 nc Franklyn Griffiths. "Preface", Politics of the Northwest Passage. Franklyn Griffiths, ed. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987, p. ix. 53
at the rise of the Inuit political voice, not only in Canada, but also on an international
level. To accomplish this, he examined the Inuit of both Greenland and Alaska as well as
those of Canada, noting that the Inuit in all parts of the North American Arctic have had
their lives turned upside down since the Second World War. Jull also charted the
history of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and clarified Inuit political objectives. Of
particular concern was the concept of pan-Inuit integration, i.e., the creation of a
transborder Inuit homeland. Jull was forced to admit, however, that there was no
prospect for such a political development at that point.127
Another chapter, "Defence and policing in Arctic Canada", by Harriet Critchley
looked at more traditionally empowered political players in the North: the CF, the
RCMP, and the CCG. Critchley argued that there were few activities in Canada's North
that required monitoring.128 Enforcement, however, was sorely needed. She analyzed
both activities and capabilities of defence and enforcement agencies. She found that
1 9Q
capabilities barely met current requirements, and that the future looked even grimmer.
In 1988, one year after the release of Politics of the Northwest Passage, another
compilation of work based around Canada's North appeared. The Arctic Challenge -
Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an emerging
International Region, edited by Kari Mottola, focused more generally on the security
challenges facing the North. Some chapters presented a traditional definition of security.
"Canada's changing defence priorities: comparing notes with the Nordic States", by
126 Peter Jull. "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas". Ibid., p. 55. 127 Ibid., p. 62. 128 Critchley, W. Harriet. "Defence and Policing in Arctic Canada". Politics of the Northwest Passage. Ch. 10, pp. 200-215. 129 Ibid 54
David Cox, set out to explain Canada's defence priorities to a foreign (specifically
European) audience. Cox addressed the changing strategic threats to Canada, and thus the need for the current Canadian Defence White Paper (Challenge and Commitment).
Cox then compared Canada's experiences to those of the Nordic countries, and suggested that the former had a lot to learn from the latter.131
John Merritt, in his chapter "Factors Influencing Canadian Interest in Greater
Non-Military Co-operation in the Arctic", suggested that Canada and the Nordic countries had many similar interests.132 As indicated by the chapter title, Merritt looked at trends in economic relations, trade, foreign policy, and defence initiatives. He also examined aboriginal issues, environmental management, and commercial navigation.
Whereas Cox suggested that Canada had a great deal to learn from the Nordic Countries,
Merritt went further and suggested that a number of steps could be taken by the Nordic countries to promote their cooperation with Canada.
In "Les problernes de droit international dans l'Arctique", included in the spring
1989 issue of Revue Etudes Internationales, Donat Pharand looked at the issues concerning the entire Arctic, not only that in Canada.134 Pharand examined the legal status of the Continental Shelf, the Arctic Ocean and its sea-bed, the Northwest and
1 ^0 Cox, David. Canada's changing defence priorities: comparing notes with the Nordic states". The Arctic Challenge - Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region Ch. 1. Kari Mottola, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 15-38. 131 Ibid. Merritt, John. "Factors Influencing Canadian Interest in Greater Non-military Co operation in the Arctic". The Arctic Challenge-Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an emerging international region, Ch. 13, pp.281-301. 133 Ibid. Pharand, Donat. "Les problemes de droit international dans rArctique". Revues Etudes internationales 20:1 (March 1989), pp. 131-164. 55
Northeast Passages, and even the Arctic airspace. He argued that the Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed area that needs common legislation.135 Moreover, Pharand suggested that the creation of an Arctic Basin Council could create co-operation among states bordering the ocean.136
In the same issue of Revue Etudes Internationales was an article by John Halstead entitled "L'importance politique et strategique de 1'Arctique: Une perspective canadienne" which adhered to the concept of the Arctic as a strategic area. Halstead argued that stability in the Arctic was a necessary element of the area's importance.137
Halstead suggested that this importance would only increase over time. In order to protect national interests, the Canadian government needed to improve its security (read military) measures in the North.
That same year, another compilation was published: Canadian Ocean Policy:
National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, edited by Donald McRae and Gordon
Munro. In "Canada and the delimitation of Maritime Boundaries", Donald McRae examined Canada's maritime boundary policies and the problems that arose from these policies.139 While the chapter was not Arctic-specific, but rather an overview of national policies, it remains extremely useful in placing the Northwest Passage and other areas into context.
135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Halstead, John. "L'importance politique et strategique de PArctique: Une perspective canadienne". Revue Etudes internationales 20:1, p. 43. Ibid. 139 McRae, Donald M. "Canada and the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries". Canada's Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, Ch. 7. Donald M. McRae and Gordon Munro, eds. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, pp. 145-163. 56
Another chapter, "Striking a new balance: Seapower, Security, Sovereignty, and
Canada" by Joel Sokolsky, also did not focus strictly on the Arctic, but looked at Canada-
US relations and at the role of seapower in US-USSR strategic relations. Sokolsky
argued that Canada would face a number of difficulties as the government seeks to strike
a new maritime balance between collective defence commitments and national
sovereignty interests.140 Sokolsky warned that changes to maritime strategies and
positions would likely increase the importance of Canadian waters.
Other scholars also looked at the North in context of Canada-US relations. In
"The Long Polar Watch: An American Perspective on Canada's defense of its Arctic", published in The American Review of Canadian Studies, Melvin Conant analyzed the
resources available to maintain defence security in the Arctic, compared with Canada's
international security commitments. Conant also examined the political motivations behind Canada's defence policies. He concluded that the Canadian emphasis on defence
of its sovereignty over Arctic waters was of secondary interest to concerns overseas.
In "Sovereignty versus defence: the Arctic and Canadian-American relations",
David Lenarcic and Robert Reford looked at the Polar Sea crisis, the Beaufort Sea
Boundary, and other issues concerning both countries. They suggested that the
differences in views on the Arctic were more fundamental and meaningful than the
Sokolsky, Joel J. "Striking a new Balance: Seapower, Security, Sovereignty, and Canada". Canada's Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, Ch. 9. Donald M. McRae and Gordon Munro, eds. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, p. 210. 141 Ibid. 142 Conant, Melvin A. "The Long Polar Watch: An American Perspective on Canada's Defense of the Arctic". The American Review of Canadian Studies 18:3 (1988), p. 372. 57
similarities.143 In the end, Lenarcic and Reford suggested that Canadian-American Arctic
interests were both complementary and contradictory.1 4
Two other important works appeared in this period. The first, by Gail Osherenko
and Oran R. Young, entitled The Age of the Arctic: hot conflicts and cold realities, was
perhaps the most comprehensive work on the subject at the time of its publication, and
remains a valuable resource today. In The Age of the Arctic, Osherenko and Young
examined the region as a whole, with all its nuances. Rather than presenting any specific
arguments or conclusion, the work is more of a textbook, examining amongst other things
the Arctic as a strategic arena, the Arctic as economic frontier, the Arctic as a homeland,
and the Arctic as an ecosystem. The book is particularly useful for placing the Arctic in
the historical context of the dying years of the Cold War since it provides an opportunity
to compare the situations of the Canadian Arctic with the Nordic Arctic and the vast
Soviet Arctic.
In 1990, the Calgary Branch of the Naval Officers' Association of Canada
published a Niobe Paper devoted to Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource
Development in Canada's Arctic, which gathered together presentations that addressed
many of the issues already raised in this chapter. In "The Challenges of Canada's Arctic
and its place in Canada's future", W. Harriet Critchley looked at Canada's national
interests in the Arctic, and the government's capability of pursuing those interests.
Critchley encompassed four key areas in her paper: sovereignty and security, resources,
Lenarcic, David and Robert Reford. "Sovereignty versus defence: the Arctic in Canadian-American relations". Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic. Edgar J. Dosman, ed. London: Routledge, 1989, p. 159. 144 Ibid.,?. 172. Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young. The Age of the Arctic: hot conflicts and cold realities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 58 the environment, and political development.146 She found that the federal government needed to develop and expand its capability in the North, lest the North fall into someone else's hands by default.147
This fear was also reflected in F.W. Crickard's paper entitled "Sovereignty, security and United States maritime interests in the northern seas". Crickard, a retired
Rear-Admiral, argued that both Canada and the United States had vital maritime interests in the Arctic.148 He outlined both nations' maritime interests not only in the Arctic, but in the rest of the North as well, dividing these interests into three classifications: trade, energy, and defence. Crickard called for the establishment of a comprehensive northern policy that would not only accommodate those interests but also allow cooperation between the two nations.149
By the time Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource Development in Canada's
Arctic was released, it was clear that the Cold War was reaching its end. The Berlin Wall had been toppled, and the Soviet Union was collapsing, finally meeting its end in 1991.
Seemingly overnight, the strategic importance of Canada's North dropped, as it lost its status as a buffer zone. Cooperation between the Arctic countries on areas of common interest was suddenly possible now that the ideological conflict had ended.
Critchley, W. Harriet. "The Challenge of Canada's Arctic and its place in Canada's Future". The Niobe Papers: Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource Development in Canada's Arctic. Calgary: The Naval Officers' Association of Canada, 1990, pp. 1-12. 141 Ibid, p. 11. i A o Crickard, Fred W. "Sovereignty, Security and United States Maritime Interests in the Northern Seas". The Niobe Papers: Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource Development in Canada's Arctic, p. 64. 149 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 59
2.4 A New World Order: 1991-2001
Buoyed by the general optimism that followed the end of the Cold War, the literature on security in northern Canada broadened its horizons and began to embrace different definitions of what security in the North could be. While these definitions were not new, they had been difficult to accept in the Cold War environment, but now that the constraints set by ideology and alliances were lifted (or greatly reduced), these definitions began to openly appear in a variety of formats.
At "A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada", for example, government representatives and academics met to discuss the merits of a foreign policy focused on northern issues. This idea was, of course, no means new, having been championed by academics such as Franklyn Griffiths as early as the 1970s, a trend which continued through to Fred Crickard in the late 1980s. Now, however, it was being openly discussed by governments in a public forum. The ultimate result of such conferences was the release of A Northern Dimension, as discussed in the previous chapter.
In 1995, Richard Langlais published Reformulating Security: A Case Study from
Arctic Canada. Langlais looked specifically at Ellesmere Island and its residents and the impact of traditional security policies. Through interviews, Langlais discovered that the people of Ellesmere Island had ambiguous feelings about these policies and the impact they had on their lives. He concluded that the traditional view of security was too narrow
This was a conference convened by the Canadian Polar Commission and the Canadian Centre for Global Security in Ottawa on April 29 and 30, 1994 60 to accommodate the needs of the people.151 Langlais advocated a holistic approach to developing security policy that incorporated human interest and ecological interests.
Mari-Anna Suurmunne came to a similar conclusion in Redefining Security in the
Arctic Region. Suurmunne analysed concepts of security as they applied to the Arctic region as a whole, and found that the traditional definitions were too narrow. She proposed that peoples' security should function as a theoretical tool to broaden the limits of reality within the study of international relations.153 In other words, international relations should not focus solely on state-level actors, but should include the populations of these states as well.
In a similar vein to the works by Langlais and Suurmunne, Franklyn Griffiths discussed the feasibility of incorporating the environment into discussions of security in
Canada and the United States in two chapters in National Security and International
Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Northern Sea Route, edited by
Willy 0streng. In "Environment and Security in Arctic Waters: A Canadian
Perspective", Griffiths indicated that Canada had already created policies which could be considered "environmental security", but he recommended that there be a working group on environment and security in Arctic waters.154 In "Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security", Griffiths suggested that the Arctic Ocean did not figure into the U.S.
Langlais, Richard. Reformulating Arctic Security: A Case Study from Arctic Canada. Goteborg, Sweden: Goteborg University, Department for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Human Condition, 1995, p. 318. 152 Ibid, p. 322. 153 Ibid, p. 185. 15 Griffiths, Franklyn. "Environment and Security in Arctic Waters: A Canadian Perspective". National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic — the Case of the Northern Sea Route. Chapter 3. Willy 0streng, ed. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. 103-133. 61
security picture. Similarly to Canada, there was a lack of agreement in the discussion of
environment and security in the United States. Only further study could resolve this.155
Other works also began to introduce the northern (particularly aboriginal) voice
into discussions on Canada's North. In "Issues affecting subsistence security in Arctic
societies", anthropologist Milton M.R. Freeman argued that the communities of the North
were at risk because of southern-driven policies.156 Freeman suggested that economic
incentives and sustainable resource use were the best ways to ensure the security of the
people of the North, because a happy populace would lead to a secure environment.
Freeman argued that above all, the resource users needed to be involved in the
management of the Arctic resources.
In "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples", published in 1998 as a
chapter in Issues in the North, Rob Huebert addressed the involvement of aboriginals in
the newly created Arctic Council. Huebert further explained the political implications of
such involvement, namely that it granted a modicum of self-governance to those
aboriginal groups involved. Huebert suggested that the Arctic Council constituted an
important development in the international process of global governance.159
155 Griffiths, Franklyn. "Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security: the case of the missing Arctic waters". National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Northern Sea Route. Chapter 5. Willy Ostreng, ed. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. 179-203. 156 Freeman, Milton M.R. "Issues affecting subsistence security in Arctic societies". Arctic Anthropology 34:1 (1997), p. 7-18. 157 Ibid. 1 CO Huebert, Rob. "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples". Issues in the North Occasional Publication Number 44, Vol. 3. Jill Oakes and Rick Riewe, eds. Winnipeg: The Canadian Circumpolar Institute and the Department of Native Studies, University of Manitoba, 1998, p. 146-148. 159 Ibid, ^. 150. 62
Huebert continued his advocacy of Arctic cooperation in "Canadian Arctic
Security issues: transformation in the post-Cold War era". In this article, published in
International Journal in 1999, he looked at the circumpolar security regime(s) and the
current issues challenging these regimes. He also looked specifically at Canadian
circumpolar security. Huebert came to the conclusion that traditional views of security
were still strong in the Arctic countries, but this did not mean that cooperation was
impossible.160 Indeed, he suggested that the threats of yesteryear (i.e., nuclear war
between the United States and Russia) were not so far away. Thus, the key to Canadian
circumpolar security was to keep the US and Russia engaged in cooperative behaviour,
such as in the Arctic Council.161
The post-Cold War period also saw the publication of a number of retrospective
pieces on security in Canada's North, particularly as the world commemorated the fiftieth
anniversary since the end of the Second World War and the commencement of the
nuclear age. In "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy, 1945 to the present" (published
in 1995), Ron Purver adopted Kenneth Eyre's method of dividing the military history of
Canada's North into "surges of interest" to examine both the development of relevant
security policies and Canadian policy towards Arctic arms control. Purver's argument was that the common denominator behind these policies was the actions and policies of
Huebert, Rob. "Canadian Arctic Security Issues: transformation in the post-Cold War era.". InternationalJournal 54:2 (Spring 1999), page unknown. Ibid. Purver, Ron. "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy, 1945 to the present". Canada's International Security Policy Ch. 4. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton- Brown, eds. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1995, pp. 87-110. 63
the United States. He noted, however, that given the changing geo-political situation, this
would not necessarily be the case in the future, and thus the future was hard to predict.1 3
That same year, Christopher Kirkey revisited the 1988 Canada-United States
Arctic Cooperation Agreement in an article for International Journal. Kirkey reviewed
the history of the Polar Sea incident and Canada's and the United States' national
interests. He suggested that the resulting negotiation process evolved into a mutually
satisfactory outcome because of the friendly relationship between Canada and the US,
and because of the use of integrative bargaining.164 The lynchpin, however, was the good
relationship between Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan. Without this, it is unlikely
that resolution would have been achieved so quickly. 5
In 1999, Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel examined the place of the Northwest Passage in
Canada-US relations since 1946. Elliot-Meisel specifically addressed the controversy
and argued that it was time to settle the issue of the Northwest Passage once and for
all.1 She indicated that it was up to Canada to back up its claims to the Passage.
Otherwise, the federal government needed to back off and allow the Passage to become
an international strait.167
The last decade of the 20l century was a time when new ideas and new voices
appeared in the academic context of Canada's North. Discussion was much more diverse
163 Ibid. 164 Kirkey, Christopher. "Smoothing troubled waters: the 1988 Canada-United States co operation agreement". InternationalJournal 50 (Spring 1995), p. 422. lis Ibid. 166 Elliot-Meisel, Elizabeth. "Still unresolved after fifty years: the Northwest Passage in Canadian-American relations 1946-1998". The American Review of Canadian Studies 29:3, pp. 407-unknown. Retrieved from ProQuest on October 3, 2005. 167 Ibid. 64
than it had ever been, and it seemed that the North would become increasingly important
in the future. This flexibility would not, however, last long into the 21st century.
2.5 A New World Order Redux: 2001-
The geographic distance between Canada's North and the continental United States
meant that the events of September 11, 2001 did not impact on the people of the North in
the same way that they did on the people in the borderlands to the south. The effect was
more gradual and insidious. The majority of the academic literature of this period has
thus far focused on a limited range of connected issues: Sovereignty, the Northwest
Passage, and the threats posed by climate change. This is the same triad that appears to
dominate Canadian security policies involving the Arctic.
Academics from a variety of backgrounds have examined these issues and the
manner in which they connect to one another. Discussion of one will invariably lead to
another, often in this fashion: Within x years, as a result of climate change, the Northwest
Passage will be ice-free in the summertime, meaning the Passage will be useable by more
than icebreakers. If foreign vessels decide to make use of the Northwest Passage, this
will pose serious threats to Canadian sovereignty, particularly if they do not obtain
permission from the Canadian government. Although this may seem like a simplistic
reduction of a number of arguments, these basic facts are not in dispute. It is the finer
details that have become controversial.
Nowhere was this most apparent than in an academic dialogue that took place between Franklyn Griffiths and Rob Huebert during 2003 and 2004. The dialogue started with an article by Griffiths that was published in International Journal in the Spring 2003 65
issue. Griffiths criticized the thesis that Canada's sovereignty was on "thinning ice"
because of the threat of climate change and suggested that Canadians were mistaken
about the real issues surrounding Arctic sovereignty.168 He then advocated the
establishment of a co-stewardship relationship between Ottawa and the Inuit.
Huebert's response was published in InternationalJournal in the Summer 2003
issue. He suggested that Griffiths had presented a "straw man" argument.1 9 Huebert
reviewed a number of key issues, including the impact of climate change on the Canadian
Arctic, and the developing nature of Arctic shipping. He argued that Canada needed to
take action in the Arctic now, before the impact of climate change grows larger.170
Griffith's response, "Pathetic Fallacy: that Canada's Arctic Sovereignty is on
thinning ice", was published in Canadian Foreign Policy in the spring of 2004. He
argued that increased summer-months foreign shipping is the key threat facing the Arctic,
not climate-change.171 He then argued that Canada should focus its efforts on becoming
1 77
keeper of the Northwest Passage.
Rather than focusing on the future, a number of scholars addressed the present,
and what action needed to be taken as soon as possible to resolve these situations. K.N.
Salchert, in his Masters of Defence Studies (also written for the Canadian Forces
College) argued that the Canadian government needed to take effective substantial action
to secure effective control over sovereignty in the Arctic, and that this action needed to Griffiths, Franklyn. "The Shipping news: Canada's Arctic sovereignty not on thinning ice". InternationalJournal 58:2 (Spring 2003). 169 Huebert, Rob. "The Shipping News part II: how Canada's Arctic Sovereignty is on thinning ice". InternationalJournal 58:3 (Summer 2003), exact page unknown. 170 Ibid. 171 Griffiths, Franklyn. "Pathetic Fallacy: that Canada's sovereignty is on thinning ice". Canadian Foreign Policy 11:3 (Spring 2004), p.l. 172 Ibid, p. 14. 66 take effect immediately.173 Rob Day made a similar argument in an opinion piece for
Frontline magazine. Day argued that Canada needed to affirm the sovereignty of its littoral waters through the deployment of a fully capable military force.
In an article for the Canadian Military Journal, Andrea Charron agreed that
Canada needed to assert its sovereignty, but that the government had to be careful in
choosing its method, arguing that a hurried approach might pose the real threat. Guy
Killaby, in the same issue of Canadian Military Journal pointed out that the law of the
sea had a significant influence on naval operations, which could affect enforcement of
Canadian sovereignty. In his view Canada's near-term challenge was not enforcing sovereignty in the North but rather assessing and determining the legal status of those claims.176
A third article in the Winter 2005-2006 article of Canadian Military Journal addressed Arctic sovereignty. Here, Rob Huebert examined what he considered to be a
Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security, fuelled in part by government interest.177
Huebert identified a false dichotomy in the relationship between Arctic sovereignty and
173 Salchert, LCdr K. N. "Northern Apathy - The Time has Come for the Canadian Government to take Immediate and Substantive Actions to Secure Effective Control over the Sovereign Waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago". Canadian Forces College, Master in Defence Studies thesis, 2002. Day, Rob. "Sovereignty and Military Power". Frontline 2:5 (September-October 2005), p. 42. 1 7S Charron, Andrea. "The Northwest Passage in Context", Canadian Military Journal 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), p. 41-48. Killaby, Guy. "Great Game in a cold climate: Canada's Arctic Sovereignty in Question". Canadian Military Journal 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 31-39. 1 Huebert, Rob. "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" Canadian Military Journal. 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 17-29. 67
security. He suggested that it appeared likely that the federal government will continue
1 78
to pursue Arctic sovereignty.
Some academics retain a broader view of the security situation in Canada's North
than others. In a presentation to the 3r Northern Research Forum Open Meeting, held in
Yellowknife and Rae Edzo in 2004, Ron Huebert presented an overview of different
types of security in the Arctic, arguing that the nature of this debate carried ramifications
for all northerners. Huebert discussed "traditional", "environmental" and "human"
security, and was quick to point out that one challenge faced by those developing security
policies for the North was the task of identifying the main threats to the Arctic.179 His
argument was that these needed to be identified as soon as possible so that appropriate
responses could be developed. Lassi Heininen presented similar conclusions at the
Open Meeting.
One scholar who focused on the growing importance of aboriginal peoples was
Natalia Loukacheva, who examined the legal status of the Inuit of Greenland and
Nunavut for her doctoral thesis in 2004. Loukacheva found that both Greenland and
Nunavut were evolving towards having jurisdiction in security matters, a consequence of
their evolution toward self-government.181 Loukacheva argued that the Inuit in both
178 Ibid. i nQ\ Huebert, Rob. "Arctic Security: Different Threats and Different Responses - A Discussion Paper" Presented to the 3rd NRF Open Meeting in Yellowknife and Rae Edzo, September 15-18, 2004. 180 Ibid. 1 O I Loukacheva, Natalia. Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic — legal status of Inuit (case study of Greenland and Nunavut). Doctor of Juridical Science thesis. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004. p. 240. 68
Territories should become legitimate de facto spokespersons for their homelands, rather than accepting policies developed from afar.182
In "The Northwest Passage revisited", Douglas Johnston offered a comprehensive review of issues concerning the Northwest Passage. After reviewing the evolution of
Canadian Arctic sovereignty, Johnston recommended the establishment of a transit
management regime for the Northwest Passage. The key to such a regime is the people
and institutions of the North, including the relationship between the Territories and the views of the Inuit and the aboriginals.
The issue of Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic has become particularly relevant to the people of the North, an issue we will discuss further in Chapters 3 and 4.
Generally, it is included in reviews of CF capabilities as a whole rather than on its own.
In an article for Frontline Canada, however, E.G. Lennox evaluated the current SAR
capabilities and compared them with safety responsibilities. Lennox found that the
system was currently insufficient and thus ineffective in serving the needs of the North.
He recommended the deployment of SAR planes to the North, specifically to Iqaluit and
Yellowknife.
2.6 Conclusions
Scholars are amongst the strongest external advocates for the North. While government documents are typically subject to the restrictions of policy stances or party lines, this is usually not the case with academic pieces. Some of these works, such as Nordicite canadienne and A Northern Foreign Policy are revolutionary in the big ideas they
Ibid, p. 260. 69
introduce to the Northern debate. Others, such as "The Challenges of Canada's Arctic
and its place in Canada's future" or "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" provide
critiques of governmental actions and policies, past and present. Still others, such as
"Forty years of military activity in the Canadian North" or "The Arctic in Canadian
Security Policy" provide important retrospectives that highlight the key trends that have
dominated this aspect of governance over time. Finally, works such as "Inuit Politics and
the Arctic Seas" and "Reformulating Security" bring aboriginal issues to the fore in a
ways that were perhaps overlooked before. The result of this eclectic assortment of
works is a large canon of works on security in Canada's North. The impact of these
works can be seen in the defence policy statements of the 1990s and 2000s, but most
particularly in A Northern Dimension for Canada's foreign policy.
There is one major lacuna within the security literature written about Canada's
North, and that is the northern voice. While a number of scholars included fieldwork and
interviews in their studies, there is little to no literature written on security in Northern
Canada by the people who actually live there themselves. This is not a surprise when one
considers that on average, the percentage of the Northern population with a post-
secondary degree is lower than the national average.183 Indeed, postsecondary education in the North is in its adolescence. Until recently, Northerners who have wished to pursue
In the 2001 census, 15.4% of Canadians over 15 identified themselves as having a post-secondary degree. While inhabitants of the Yukon rates slightly higher, at 16%, only 13.6% of the inhabitants of the Northwest Territories over 15, and 7.6% of the inhabitants of Nunavut identified themselves as having a post-secondary degree. Cf. Statistics Canada. "Population 15 years and over by highest level of schooling, by province and territory (2001 Census)"Available online at: http://www40.statcan.ca/cbin/fl/cstprintflag.cgi. Retrieved on May 28, 2007. 70 studies beyond high school have had to travel South. While this situation has changed with the establishment of Aurora College and the University of the Arctic, the academic exodus from the North continues. While some post-secondary graduates, such as Paul
Okalik, (premier of Nunavut and a trained lawyer) have returned to the North, not all have. Thus, there has been little in the way of a Northern "brain trust" on this issue that the people of the North can use to directly promulgate their ideas and concerns.
Interpretation has had to come through southern scholars in order to be viewed as expertise by the federal government and other agencies. While there is nothing to suggest that these scholars act with anything other than their best intentions, we must realize that the North they portray and envision is the North as seen through a southern filter. 71
CHAPTER 3 - THE REGION AND ITS PEOPLES
3.1 Introduction
Forty percent of Canada's territory is found north of the 60th parallel. Aside from
highways extending from British Columbia and Alberta into Yukon and the Northwest
Territories, the region is inaccessible by car. Rail transport is similarly non-existent. The
only way to access much of northern Canada is by air or by water, and even then, it is not
an easy journey. Nunavut, the largest region in Canada, extends over three time zones,
and comprises 21% of Canada's total area. Its capital, Iqaluit, is the closest to Ottawa,
but it is also the furthest north, located on Baffin Island. There are no ferries or bridges
between the mainland and Baffin Island, nor are there currently any deep harbours, thus
most shipping is conducted by air. The Northwest Territories, sandwiched between
Nunavut at the east and Yukon at the west, is bigger than the province of Ontario, but
smaller than Quebec. Its capital, Yellowknife, is located on Great Slave Lake, the source
of the Mackenzie River, the only major inland water route of the Territories. Yukon, the
smallest of the Territories (although larger than any of the Maritime Provinces), is the
only Territory that shares a border with the United States. Its capital, Whitehorse, is
located approximately 175 km north of Skagway, Alaska.
The environment of Northern Canada is notoriously harsh, a reality which has
impeded extensive development. Part of this is due to location. The famous (or
infamous) midnight sun of summer and polar night of winter are felt throughout the
Territories, and the contrast is even more pronounced as one heads further north. Thus,
summer days and winter nights are much longer in Northern Canada than in the rest of the country. There are also extremes in temperature, from -50 degrees Celsius in the 72
dead of winter to 14 degrees Celsius in the summer. This in turn has an effect on the land and the sea. Scientists have identified 10 ecological zones in the Territories alone, ranging from the forests of the Yukon to the barren plains of the Northern Arctic
Archipelago.
3.2 The People of the North
The harshness of the climate does not permit the agriculture which proved so necessary to
the growth of the Prairie provinces. In addition, the distance of the Territories from the rest of Canada, and the lack of year-round open waterways have hindered industrialization on the same scale as in Ontario and Quebec. As a result, the Territories
are underdeveloped and sparsely populated, as we can see in Table 1:
Population %of Population % of Population % of Population (2005)184 0-14 years old185 15-64 years old186 65 years old and older187 Yukon 31,000 18.3 74.7 6.9 Northwest 43, 000 24.5 70.9 4.7 Territories Nunavut 30, 000 34.6 62.7 2.6 Canada 32, 270, 500 17.6 69.3 13.1
Table 1: Territorial Population and breakdown by age (2005)
Of the three Territories, the North-West Territories has experienced the greatest population growth since 2001 (from 40, 800), although Nunavut is not far behind (from
1 QO 28,100). In terms of birth rate, however, Nunavut is the leader. Not only did it
1 R4 Statistics Canada. "Population by year, by province and territory (as of July 1)", October 27, 2005. Retrieved from http://www40.statcan.ca. 1 RS Statistics Canada. "Population by sex and age group, by province and territory (Proportion of, both sexes)", October 27, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.40.statcan.ca. mIbid. m'ibid. 1 RR Ibid. Yukon Territory experienced the least amount of growth, going from 30, 100 people in 2001 to 31, 000 in 2005. 73
experience a steady increase in live births from 2000-2001 to 2004-2005, it has the
highest pregnancy outcome rate in Canada: 98.2 births per 1, 000 women in 2002.189 As
we can see in Table 1, this has had an impact on the age of the population.
Relative youth is not the only factor that sets the Territories apart from the rest of
Canada. The Territories also have a high proportion of Aboriginal, Metis, and Inuit
people, as illustrated in Table 2:
North Aboriginal % of total American Metis Inuit Population population Indian Yukon 5,600 535 140 6,540 23 Northwest 10,615 3,580 3,910 18,730 50.5 Territories Nunavut 95 55 22,560 22,720 85.2 Canada 608,850 292,305 45,070 976,305 3.3
Table 2: Aboriginal Population of the Territories (2001)190
The relationship between the native peoples of the North and the government in Ottawa is
fundamentally different than the relationship that the federal government has with native
peoples in Southern Canada. The "Indian" population of the Yukon and the Northwest
Territories is mostly comprised of a number of First Nations who traditionally speak one
of 13 different languages from the Northern Athabaskan linguistic family. In the
Northwest Territories, five of these languages share the designation of "official" with
English, French, and Inuktitut. Inuktitut, the language of the Inuit people, is spoken in
1 QG Canada's national average in 2002 was 40.7 live births per 1, 000 women. Yukon had a pregnancy outcome of 39.3, and the NorthWest Territories had a pregnancy outcome of 54.7. Statistics Canada. "Pregnancy outcomes by province or territory of residence (Live births) 2002", May 25, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.40.statcan.ca. 190 Statistics Canada. "Aboriginal Identity Population, 2001 Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories - 20% Sample Data", 2001. From http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/english/census01. Retrieved November 6, 2005. 191 Chipeweyan, Cree, Tlicho (Dogrib), Gwitchin, and Slavey. In the latter part of the 19th century, there was great debate about whether French should be established as an 74
eight dialects across the Territories. Its most prevalent use is in Nunavut, where it is one
of the three official languages. Like many indigenous languages in the world, the
languages of the North are in danger of extinction. Still, this form of classification
reminds us that the people of the North should not be regarded as homogenous.
3.3 Political Structure in the North
As with other parts of Canada, the North is administered by several levels of government.
The federal government has traditionally been the main administrator, although the
Territories have become more autonomous in recent years. Still, a number of federal
Departments, including Indian and Northern Affairs, Environment, and National Defence
continue to play a large role. Yet the Territories are unique unto themselves. Each has a
different legislative history and a unique political structure.
Of the three Territories, the Yukon has the longest legislative history, dating from
its formation as a stand-alone territory in 1898. Initially, the Yukon was governed by a
Commissioner and an appointed legislative council of six. This council was expanded to
ten members in 1902. The following year, five members were elected locally. By 1909,
all members were elected rather than appointed. A severe reduction in gold revenues,
accompanied by a massive decline in the population of the Yukon (from 40,000 in 1898
official language of the Northwest Territories. In 1877, French was made an official language, but this was overturned in 1892, when the Territorial government decided to be English-only. The issue was revived in the 1980s, when the federal government pressured the Territorial government to make the Northwest Territories bilingual. After protests by aboriginal leaders, it was decided to include Chipeweyan, Cree, Gwich'in, Inuinnaqtun, Inuktitut, Inuvialuktun, North Slavey, South Slavey and Tlicho as official languages as well. Cf. Government of the Northwest Territories. "The Official Languages Act". Revised Statues of the Northwest Territories 1988 -. Available online as http://www.gov.nt.ca/langcom/pdf/Official_Languages_act.pdf. 75
to 4,000 in 1918) led the federal government to reduce the size of the Council to three
members. In 1951, the size of the Council returned to five members, in response to
increased population as a result of the Yukon-Alaska Highway. Shortly afterward, the
capital was moved from Dawson City to Whitehorse.
In the 1960s, the Yukon began to gain some autonomy when three elected
Council members were appointed to the Advisory Committee on Finance. In 1970, the
Yukon Commissioner was granted permission to establish a five-member Executive
Committee. Serving on the Committee gave its elected members opportunity for
ministerial experience. In 1979, the Committee became the Executive Council,
somewhat similar to a provincial cabinet, and the Commissioner assumed a role similar to
the Lieutenants-Governor of the provinces. By this time, the old Council had evolved
into a legislative assembly with 16 elected members. This number was increased in 1993
and again in 2002, so that there are now 18 elected members.
Recently, the Yukon has undergone a period of devolution, acquiring provincial like responsibility over its resources and lands. The territory is now at a point where it considers itself to be a province de facto, although constitutional change is necessary to make the Yukon a province dejure.
The oldest of the three Territories, the Northwest Territories, has gone through the greatest number of changes since its creation in 1870. Initially, the Territories covered the old fur-trading Territories of the Hudson's Bay Company (Rupert's Land) and the
North West Company (the North-western Territory).192 The area was vast, from
The fur-trading operation of the North West Company was forced to merge with the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821 after the British government changed the regulations for 76
Labrador in the East to the Pacific Ocean in the West, and as far north as the Arctic
Ocean. Almost as soon as the Territories came into the Dominion of Canada, they began to shrink, with the creation of the Province of Manitoba in July 1870. The physical and political boundaries continued to change right up to 1999, when Nunavut Territory was established in the eastern half.
The legislative history of the Northwest Territories is as dynamic as its borders.
During its early history, the Territories had a fully elected Legislative Assembly. This was supplemented in 1897 with the establishment of an Executive Council, responsible to the Assembly in a similar fashion to that of a provincial cabinet. This Council was instrumental in the establishment of Alberta and Saskatchewan as provinces, but after that change, the Territories reverted to little more than a federal colony, run by a
Commissioner. It was not until 1921 that the Commissioner was provided with an
Ottawa-based Council for assistance in administration of the Territories. Only in 1947 was a Northerner, J.G. McNiven, first appointed to the Council.
In 1951, the Northwest Territories Act was amended to allow for three elected members from the District of Mackenzie to sit on the Council with the five appointed members. The Council also began to alternate meeting sites between Ottawa and the
Territories. By 1966, there were seven elected members sitting on the Council, including three members from the Eastern Arctic (one of whom was Inuit). That same year, the
Carrothers Commission recommended that the Territories make a gradual return to responsible government. In 1967, Yellowknife was established as the seat of government and the Council began to evolve into a fully-elected legislative assembly. By 1979, the the fur trade, creating an area called Rupert's Land, more than two million square miles in size. 77
Council had evolved into the 22-member Legislative Assembly, with the right to choose
its own Speaker, and to select members to sit on the new Executive Council. The
Commissioner no longer presided over the Assembly, and held a limited role on the
Council. Eventually, the role of Commissioner reached a point where it was equivalent
to that of a provincial Lieutenant-Governor.
In the early 1980s, the issue of dividing the Territories emerged again. Shortly
after the repatriation of the Constitution, members of the Assembly travelled to Ottawa to
assure protection of aboriginal rights. The members also sought (and received) federal
approval-in-principle for the division of the Territories and the creation of Nunavut. A plebiscite vote soon followed, in which the people of the Northwest Territories voted in
favour of division.
While working towards the formation of Nunavut, the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories also continued to establish itself in Yellowknife. Members were now able to review the Territorial budget and set spending priorities in a manner not possible before. The title of Government Leader was changed to Premier in 1994.
Although the size of the Assembly has tended to wax and wane over the years, it has consisted of 19 members since 1999.
Unlike the provincial legislatures, the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest
Territories is non-partisan. Candidates for Speaker, Premier and for cabinet posts are chosen by secret ballot, and the remainder of the members become Regular Members. As stated on the Legislative Assembly website, "the consensus system of governing is more in keeping with the way that aboriginal peoples have traditionally made decisions. 78
Unanimous agreement is not necessary for decisions to be made, motions passed, and
legislation enacted. A simple majority carries the vote."
Canada's newest Territory, Nunavut, was established on April 1,1999. The
concept of Nunavut was first introduced by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) as part of
the settlement of Inuit land claims in the Northwest Territories. The Inuit had never
signed treaties with the Canadian (or indeed any other) government, and were thus not
legally subject to the Indian Act, meaning the Inuit were caught in bureaucratic limbo.
The initial Nunavut Proposal put forth in 1976 included the Inuvialuit (the Inuit of the
Beaufort Sea and the Yukon North Slope), but this changed when the Inuvialuit split
from the ITC in order to pursue a separate land claims agreement.
In 1980, the ITC unanimously passed a resolution calling for the creation of
Nunavut. Ten years later, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN, a part of the ITC
specifically focused on the land claims agreement) and the federal government signed an
agreement-in-principle supporting the division of the Northwest Territories and providing
for a plebiscite on boundaries. In January 1992, TFN and the federal government reached
a final agreement on the creation of Nunavut, pending the plebiscite and the conclusion
of the Nunavut Political Accord. In May that year, an overall majority of voters in the
Northwest Territories and the Nunavut area voted in favour of the proposed boundary,
and the Accord was signed by all parties in October 1992. The following month, the
Inuit of Nunavut ratified the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. This Agreement and the
Nunavut Act were adopted by Parliament and received Royal Assent in 1993.
Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories. "Concencus [sic] government". http://www.assembly.gov.nt.ca/visitorinfo/factsheets/index.html. Accessed April 26, 2006. 79
The Nunavut Implementation Commission was given the task of realizing the new
Territorial government. The Commission released two reports: Footprints in New Snow
and Footprints II which addressed concerns such as decentralization. The second
document effectively became the blueprint for the Government of Nunavut. After a few
amendments to the Nunavut Act, the new Territory came into being on April 1, 1999.
Because Nunavut is effectively a "homeland" for the Inuit of the eastern Arctic,
the Territory has incorporated a number of Inuit principles into its institutions. Perhaps
the most noteworthy of this is Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit or IQ, which is a concept that
embodies Inuit traditional knowledge and values, and guides the government in framing decisions, policies and laws that reflect the key philosophies, attitudes and practices of Nunavut's Inuit majority. Applying this principle in the day-to-day governance of Nunavut represents a considerable challenge; but the practice of IQ is a goal to which the GN remains deeply committed.194
The structure of the Nunavut government is derived from the Northwest Territories in
that it relies on consensus, and not party alliances. Although much of Nunavut's focus has been on establishing itself as a territory, it has been forced to address other issues
such as climate change, sovereignty and security. All of these issues are older than the
Territory itself.
3.4 The Territorial Governments as a regional unit
Despite the fact that the Territories comprise over one-third of Canada's total area, they have far less clout on a federal level than their provincial counterparts. For one thing,
Government of Nunavut Communications. Consensus Government. Date of publication unknown, p. 2. 80 they do not have the population base that the provinces do. Thus the region is represented on a federal level by only three electoral districts, one per territory (and one less than Prince Edward Island). Even then, it is over-represented in comparison to urban
Canada.
In terms of their place within the Canadian federation, the Territories are not as autonomous as the provinces. Although the provinces were granted the right to amend their own constitutions (e.g., the Ontario Act), the Territories do not have the same power. The Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut Acts remain federal statutes.
Thus, only the federal government can make amendments.
Furthermore, it is only in recent times that the leaders of the Territorial governments have been able to participate at the same level as Provincial governments.
As a general rule, the Government Leaders were only invited into First Ministers
Conferences when the agenda of such meetings addressed issues concerning the North.
Tony Penikett, Yukon Premier in 1990, commented that
it was like children waiting to be invited in for Sunday dinner.. .we were to be seen but not heard...Frankly, nobody south of 60 degrees knew what a Government Leader was.. .changing my title has forced federal departments and the provinces to look at developments here. It was a useful way to get attention.195
It was not until the mid-1990s that the Territories became full members of the
First Ministers' Conference. Also around that time, the Territories were invited to join the Western Premiers' Conference. There are several possible reasons for this change.
Firstly, as we will see, the Territories acquitted themselves well during the consultations
195 Quoted in Angela Wheel cock. "Territories in Transition". Canada and the World 56:9 (May 15, 1991), p. 14. 81
and negotiations leading up to the Charlottetown Accord, although they were not initially
included in the constitutional negotiations that had dominated Canadian politics since the
1970s.1 Secondly, the process of devolution from the federal government to the
Territories meant that they were being granted more responsibility over their land and
resources. While the Territories cannot be made into provinces without the consent of
the existing provinces, they are turning into province-like units. Thirdly, the discovery of
new energy and mineral resources in the region has substantially boosted the region's
economic potential.
Nevertheless, the Territorial Premiers have felt that the federal government does
not take their views seriously, particularly when discussing issues such as security in the
North. In response, the Territories have begun to act together as a region. This is
certainly not a new phenomenon in Canadian politics. As in other countries, it is
common practice in Canada to group some of the provinces into geographic regions, e.g., the West, the Maritimes. More often than not, the provinces within these regions share
common economic interests or a common topography. Also, these provinces may feel isolated from the centralized power of Ottawa, and thus seek strength in numbers. It is only natural therefore that the Territories would follow a similar path. There is one collaboration that is of particular interest to us - the development of a Territorial agreement on the issue of security in the North.
James Ross Hurley. The Canadian Constitutional Debate: From the Death of the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 to the 1992 Referendum. Originally presented at the 1992 Conference of the Association of Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand, December 16, 1992. From http://www.pro-bcp.gc.ca. 82
3.5 Developing a New Framework: Speaking out about security in the North
In September 2003, the three Territories signed the Northern Co-operation Accord, an agreement intended to
Promote cooperation between the Three Governments on matters of mutual concern and interest, to promote sharing of information relevant to such concerns and interests and to enhance the working relationship among the Three Governments.197
The Accord does not address the issue of security in the North, although it does lay the groundwork for future discussion of such issues. The Accord was followed in December
2004 with the release ofNation Building - Framework for a Northern Strategy, a document which explores the "matters of mutual concern and interest" in greater depth.
The proposed goal of the Three Governments regarding reinforcing sovereignty, national security and circumpolar cooperation was
To ensure that Canada plays a leading role and promotes concerted international action on circumpolar issues, and that northern concerns are taken into consideration in national efforts to reinforce sovereignty, security and circumpolar cooperation.
The proposed examples of objectives for the Northern Strategy included the enforcement of security and surveillance in the North (while being cognizant of northern interests), reinforcement of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, establishment of effective northern-based search and rescue capacity, and leadership in circumpolar cooperation.199
Issues such as "building healthy and safe communities" and "protecting the environment"
The Territorial Governments. Northern Cooperation Accord. Signed in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, September 3, 2003, p. 2. 1 OS The Territorial Governments. Nation Building - Framework for a Northern Strategy. December 2004. 83
were established as separate but related long-term goals for the Three Governments to pursue.
In April 2005, the Three Governments released Developing a New Framework for
Sovereignty and Security in the North, a discussion paper aimed at establishing a "new
federal-Territorial dialogue on sovereignty and security in the North". The paper
argued that the federal government needed to share its leadership role in advancing its
security goals in the North with the Territories, given the new influence held by
Northerners.201 This influence included the larger role of the Territorial governments in managing their own lands and resources, in developing their economies and in protecting their citizens.202
Perhaps the most pressing domestic security issue identified in Developing a New
Framework was the lack of an efficient Search and Rescue (SAR) system in Canada's
North. This deficiency has also been an area of particular concern for certain international airlines (whose flight paths take them over the North Pole) for some time. It chiefly affects the Arctic region, since it is the most remote and the least developed. The main difficulty lies in the lack of a highway system or even local civil institutions with the capability to respond to such emergencies.203 Even the capability of the CF to respond in a timely fashion is extremely limited. This was made clear in 2001, when it took 40 hours for a SAR team to reach the site of a plane crash in the Northwest
The Territorial Governments. Developing a New Framework for Sovereignty and Security in the North: A Discussion Paper prepared by the Governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. April 2005, p. 4. 201 Ibid, p. 6. 202 Ibid, p. 7. E.G. Lennox. "It's time.. .Search and Rescue in the Arctic". Frontline. 2:5 (2005), p. 17. 84
Territories. By the time the Hercules aircraft arrived from Winnipeg and the Griffin helicopter arrived from Cold Lake, Alberta, the three survivors of the crash had died of hypothermia.204 The CF has taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such disasters. In
2005, for example, 20 members of the Canadian Rangers practiced rescue techniques using the hull of a US Air Force DC-3 that crashed on Ellesmere Island in 1940.205
While six Regular Force soldiers also participated in the exercise, the focus was on the
Canadian Rangers, the philosophy being
If an airliner goes down somewhere in the Arctic, Ranger patrols could be fairly close by and dispatched quickly to get there and set up shelter and do basic first aid.206
It is indeed possible for Rangers to travel to an area in the Arctic on snowmobile, all- terrain vehicles, or by boat (depending on the time of year), more quickly than a Search and Rescue (S AR) Team to travel from 8 Wing in Trenton or 17 Wing in Winnipeg, a journey that could take many hours. Still, not all northern communities have Ranger
Patrols, nor is there any guarantee that a disaster would occur near those that do, or near human habitation at all. The continued lack of a timely SAR capability in the North raises the question whether the federal government's theme of Canada First really extends to include Canada's North.
In Developing a New Framework, the three Governments noted that, overall,
Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy failed to address issues of concern to the North, with two exceptions, the modernization of the emergency
204 Ibid., p. 18. Adrian Humphreys. "A plane goes down in the Arctic: North of Resolute: Military trains for the inevitable airliner disaster", National Post March 3, 2005, p. A3. Colonel Norm Couturier to Adrian Humphreys. Ibid. 207 Canada Press NewsWire 545667571 October 29, 2003. 85
preparedness system and transportation security measures. The Governments called
for a comprehensive assessment of Canada's North in terms of northern emergency
response capability, as one way of assuring the security of northern peoples.209
Another key area of common interest and concern was the protection of the
northern environment. Developing a New Framework argued that the region is at risk
from all forms of human activity. In terms of pollution, the paper relied on the
commonly-used characterization of the North as a "sink" for PCBs, radioactive, and
chemical contaminants.210 The paper also identified climate change as a major
environmental threat to the North, particularly because it opens up new transport routes
and changes traditional hunting grounds. There was, as well, concern about the effect pollution and other effects from military and industrial development in Northern Russia
would have on Canada's North, although the paper did credit the Arctic Council with
911 helping to address this issue.
In addressing "traditional" security issues, the Governments clearly expressed their concern about the potential effects for northerners. While supporting the role played by the CF, particularly the Canadian Rangers, the paper questioned the impact of the operation of the U.S.-based National Ballistic Missile Defence System. The concerns arose partly from the proximity of the System to Canada's borders, particularly the proposed interceptors for Fort Greely in Alaska, less than 200 km from the Yukon-Alaska border.212 Also raised were concerns of possible contamination through construction,
The Territorial Governments. Developing a New Framework, p. 10. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid, p. 7. 211 Ibid., p. 11. 212 Ibid., p. 10. 86 contents of the sites, or even attack. The Governments acknowledged that they had been provided with "official's briefings" on the BMD system, but decried the fact that they were never consulted or informed about the impact of the system on the North.
The impact Developing a New Framework will have on the northern security regime remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Governments should be lauded for taking matters into their own hands and presenting their vision of what security in Canada's
North should entail. Developing a New Framework presented a combination of concepts of security, from "traditional" to "environmental" to "human" which serves to emphasize that these concepts are indeed conducive to domestic politics. That the three
Governments have worked together to create such a document speaks well for the future of the North as a distinct political region within Canada. The proposals made in this paper, particularly those addressing increased research seem both reasonable and achievable. The question is, however, whether the federal government is willing to embark on this new Federal-Territorial dialogue. It is certainly not a situation unique to
Canada. On May 26,2003, the Danish Government and the Greenland Home Rule
Government released a Joint Declaration in Principle, in which Greenland has the potential to be involved in security policy issues as an autonomous unit.214 To be fair, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland is very different from that of Canada and the Territories. Also, the government of Nunavut has indicated that it is not asking for jurisdiction in traditional security matters but that it is asking to be involved in
115 Ibid., pp. 10-11. Cf. Natalia Loukacheva. Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic - legal status oflnuit (case study of Greenland and Nunavut). Doctor of Juridical Science thesis. Toronto: University of Toronto Graduate Department of Law, 2004, pp.244-245. 87
development projects.215 Still, a precedent has been set thait could encourage inhabitants
of the North to demand a greater voice in the evolving security regime.
3.6 Local Aboriginal Political Units
The three Governments are necessarily representatives for all their respective citizens,
regardless of ethnicity, in the Canadian federation. This does not always mean, however,
that they have been the best representatives for the aboriginal peoples of the North. Nor
has the federal government. The relationship between the federal government and the
aboriginal peoples of the North has been tumultuous. Unlike their southern counterparts,
many First Nations in Canada's North were never involved in treaty negotiations. The
exceptions were Treaty No. 8 (1899), covering the region south of Great Slave Lake and
east of the Hay River, and Treat No. 11 (1921), which included the rest of the Mackenzie
Valley, the southeast tip of the Yukon, and part of the western Arctic coast.
Nevertheless, all "Indians" of Canada's North have traditionally been placed under the
administration of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and subject to the provisions of the Indian Act?n In effect this made them wards of the Crown, with mixed results.
215 Ibid., p. 247. 216 Ibid., p. 256. 217 Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Canada's North. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991, p. 5-1. The Dene Nation holds the position that these treaties were agreements of peace and friendship, never of land surrender. 218 The Department has undergone a number of name changes over the years. "Indian and Northern Affairs" is the most current. 88
The Inuit were similarly appointed wards of the state in 1953, which led to their
91 Q resettlement into villages with poorly insulated houses throughout the North. While these villages (in theory) provided and continue to provide the full range of Canadian public services and facilities, they have also been damaging for the traditional hunting/fishing-based economy. This and the imposition of a foreign (non-Inuit) political culture have until recently left the Inuit with very little political control over their lives or what matters most to them. 20 An example of this marginalization was conducted in the name of Canadian sovereignty in the early 1950s, when Inuit from Northern Quebec were taken to Ellesmere Island. They were effectively left to their own devices, despite being 991 totally unfamiliar with the High Arctic environment. Although the settlements of
Resolute Bay and Grise Ford eventually stabilized, bitter feelings remained.
The release of the 1969 White Paper on Indian Affairs, which advocated the assimilation of all aboriginals into mainstream Canadian society, galvanized aboriginal protest across Canada.222 The federal government responded by providing funding for aboriginal organizations at all levels of government, in order to engage aboriginals in
"participatory democracy".223 Between 1968 and 1982, seven native organizations were founded in the North, both on a Territorial and on a "people" level. Most of these aboriginal political associations were offshoots of the Indian and Eskimo Association 91 Q Gail Osherenko and Oran R. Young. The Age of the Arctic: hot conflicts and cold realities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 82. 990 Peter Jull. "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas". Politics of the Northwest Passage, Chapter 3. Franklyn Griffiths, ed. Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987, pp. 53-53. 991 Kevin McMahon. "Strangers in the Land.. .again". Peace and Security 3:1 (Spring 1988), p. 3. 999 Frances Abele. "Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development". Arctic 40:4 (December 1987), p. 314. 223 Ibid. 89
(IEA). The IEA was formed in the 1960s to research the rights of aboriginals and to assist fledgling aboriginal associations across the country in becoming politically involved.
The Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories was founded in 1970 to protect the interests of the Dene. Two years later, the Metis and Non-status Indians of the Northwest
Territories was incorporated. The following year, the Council for Yukon Indians (CYI) was formed from the Yukon Native Brotherhood and the Yukon Association for Non status Indians.
The Inuit, however, felt it was important to have their own organization, given their significant cultural, linguistic, and social differences from other aboriginal groups.
Thus, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (now called Inuit Tapiiisat Kanatami) was formed during a series of meetings that took place in February 1971.224 Until 1982, ITC was responsible for addressing land claim issues, but differences of opinion between the Inuit of the Western and Eastern Arctic led to the establishment of two new organizations, the
Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE, representing the Inuvialuit of the
Western Arctic) and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN). The ITC continued to provide national representation for Canadian Inuit.
Reclaiming the land has been a priority for all of these organizations. So, too, has been the preservation of the northern environment. On issues of security, however, the most outspoken group has been the Inuit, both on a national and an international level. It would be reasonable to suggest that the Dene and other aboriginal groups share the same or similar views on security as the Inuit, but their views have not been as well-
224 Tapirisat was the Inuktitut word chosen to represent the English word "Association". Kanatami means Canada. Cf. "Transcript of First ITC" Meeting held February 18, 1971, Toronto. Available online at http://www.itk.ca/corporate/liistory-origin-transcript-first- meeting.php. 90 documented as other groups. This may be due to the conventionality of thinking of northern Security and Arctic security as one and the same. Also, the dominant issues in the interior of the Northwest Territories have been land claim issues and the proposed construction of a gas pipeline in the Mackenzie Valley.
The establishment of pipelines to facilitate the transportation of gas from the
Beaufort Sea coast south has long been an area of contention for the aboriginal peoples in
Canada's North, particularly the Dene. The Mackenzie Valley pipeline was initially proposed in the 1970s, but was delayed for ten years after the release of the Berger
Report in order to address land claim concerns. The revival of the project also resurrected old concerns about the environmental impact of construction, particularly the potential impact on caribou migration routes. There are also concerns about the impact of a gas spill on the Mackenzie Valley ecosystem, although these concerns were partly assuaged by Berger's recommendations.225
There is, however, at least one area of common concern across Canada's North, namely the environmental degradation caused by the deterioration of military installations, in particular, the remnants of the assorted Early Warning radar instalments.
After being declared redundant in the 1960s, these sites were left to deteriorate. The result has been over forty years of PCB pollution from rusting electronic transformers.
Although the federal government ordered clean up of the sites in 1985, the process is only now being completed, in a cooperative effort between the federal government and the aboriginal peoples of the North.226
Isaac Mabindisa. "Thomas Berger revisits the North". Aurora Online. 2001. Sharron Cosgrove. "Dew Line clean-up in Nunavut continues". The Maple Leaf. June 23, 2004, p. 18. 91
3.7 Inuit Perspectives of Security
With regard to "local" Inuit perspectives of traditional security, particularly those
espoused by the ITC/ITC, the Inuit are ambivalent. In the late 1980s, reporter Kevin
McMahon visited Iqaluit and noted the reactions of the Inuit to a CF training exercise:
.. .none of the 3, 200 townsfolk complained about the inconvenience or the graphic, if benign, demonstration of the growing militarization of Canada's North. Nor did they when Iqaluit learned it will be one of the five "forward" operating locations for CF-18 fighters. What makes this strange is that Iqaluit is also a town where many people say they oppose Arctic militarization...
The Inuit have several pertinent reasons for disliking Arctic militarization. They have
little experience with war, or even enemies, aside from past skirmishes with other
aboriginal groups.228 The degradation of 21 former DEW line sites has affected the
Arctic and sub-Arctic wildlife. Indeed, as mentioned, the Inuit (and the peoples of the
Inuvialuit Settlement Region) have been working with DND since the mid-1990s to
ensure that these sites are left in an environmentally safe condition, and that there is no further contamination of the food chain.229
At the same time, especially since 1970, the CF has brought resources to the
North. The Canadian Rangers in particular, have brought money and skills to most remote communities in the Arctic. While the Rangers are issued a minimum amount of
227 Kevin McMahon. "Strangers in the land.. .again". Peace and Security (1988), p. 2. 228 Ibid., pp. 2-3. There were Inuit men who volunteered during the Second World War, but they had previously been exposed to "white" culture. 229 Environmental Sciences Group. "Dew Line Cleanup". Retrieved from http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/esg/dlcu_e.html on January 28, 2008. 92 equipment, this equipment has the potential to benefit anyone in the community.23 The rifle and its ammunition can be used to hunt food, an important consideration given that the cost of living is so much higher in northern Canada.231 The first aid kit that is issued to patrols can likewise be used to help anyone in need. Even the money that Rangers earn on their training exercises may be pooled among members of the community, particularly where there is high unemployment.
Many communities recognize, however, that the Rangers bring more than material goods. The Rangers provide a way for northern Canadians to remain in their communities and retain strong ties to their heritage and lifestyle, while still serving their country. This is an important way of ensuring the longevity of communities in the
North, particularly if the Rangers can fulfil other roles in the community such as teachers, businesspeople, or administrators. The Rangers therefore provide reasons for
Northerners, aboriginal, white, or otherwise, to remain in the North. Certainly, having the Ranger organization in place has a similar positive impact on the youth who are involved in the Junior Canadian Rangers Program, since the Rangers act not only as teachers, but also as positive role models in the face of problems like addiction, unemployment, and racism.
Chapter 4 provides an examination of the more military aspects of the Canadian Rangers. A series of reports broadcast in March 2005 by the Canadian Broadcast Corporation focused on life in Nunavut, where it costs 17 dollars for a jug of milk. 232 Lackenbauer. "The Canadian Rangers: A Canadian Success Story". Paper delivered at the Canadian Arctic Research Council (CARC) Conference on Thinning Ice: Climate Change and New Ideas about Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic, Ottawa, January 2002 (to be published in conference proceedings), p. 7. 233 Ibid. 93
Since the Rangers generally have a good standing in their communities, those who lead the Rangers are often viewed with much respect. The choice of Patrol Leader or Section Leader therefore often has a broader impact, since community elders are often involved in the process. The elders are more likely to elect those who they see as having potential to lead the community. A result of this is that a number of members of the
Canadian Rangers have been deeply involved in their local or Territorial governments.
One third of the Members of the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, for example, are or were Rangers.234 The Rangers organization, then, has become a major source of empowerment for many aboriginals in Canada. It is an important example of human security in Canada's North.
The ITC has been concerned with environmental security since its initial meeting, when delegate Noah Qumak commented:
We all know now that the explorations are causing disturbances and contaminating the sea animals and fish in and around the surroundings of our communities. If this continues, and we let it be as is, the hunting areas will be more distant from the communities so the Inuit must think and consider whether or not the exploration companies should compensate us for the harm they are doing us and for more harm in the future.
To the Inuit, as with Canada's First Nations, protection of the land is key. It is not merely a matter of environmental security, it is human security and subsistence security. as well. The degradation of the northern environment has gained international attention in recent years with the emergence of the concepts of global warming and climate change. To the Inuit, climate change is considered a threat to their traditional lifestyle.
234 Ibid., p. 8. 94
Changes to the weather in the North have been dubbed uggianaqtuq, or "behaving like a familiar friend acting strangely".236 Premier Paul Okalik of Nunavut recalled that when he was a boy, the people of his village, Pangnirtung, could play hockey in the spring on the frozen bay, but now the bay was freezing later and thawing sooner, making the ice dangerously unpredictable.237 Changes have also been noticed with the local wildlife, particularly the behaviour of polar bears.238 Climate change is too big and too controversial an issue for the Inuit to address on their own. Nevertheless it is something that is affecting them directly, in many ways that Southerners would have difficulty imagining.
An interesting example of local Inuit involvement in security issues was the creation of Ellesmere Island National Park and Reserve in 1986. Richard Langlais presented the establishment of National Parks in Canada's North in the context not only of ecological protection but also national sovereignty. He argued that for the Inuit, the creation of the Park (named Quttinirpaaq in Inuktitut) presented an opportunity to introduce their concept of security into the national debate. Other groups had focused on sovereignty or environmental protection when creating a context for the Park's creation. To the Inuit, however, it was a much more complex situation. At the signing ceremony, Tagak Curley, then Minister of Economic Development and Tourism for the
Northwest Territories commented
Martin J. Whittles. "Hot issues in a cold place". Opinion Canada 6:25 (July 1 2004),
Paul Okalik. Speech to students at Queen's University. October 3, 2005. 238 Tenille Bonoguore. "Polar bears' cannibalism, deaths raise concerns". The Globe and Mail June 14, 2006, p. A9. Richard Langlais. Reformulating Arctic Security: A Case Study from Arctic Canada. Goteborg, Sweden: Goteborg University, Department for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Human Condition, 1995, p. 165. 95
We have, I think, ensured that Canadian sovereignty does exist because native people, the Inuit people - live up here and that Canada must not compromise it for national Parks but because people are there and therefore, we can also complement that Park.. .1 could say harvesting of the wildlife.. .fishing should not be compromised. That mineral exploration and the mining industry should not be compromised. There are the other concerns that we will address to the federal government.. .we need these resources and we need to be understood for these. But, we will help the federal government decide what other appropriate areas should be considered for Parks. But don't think just because we need to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic - but because it's going to truly benefit many Canadians socially.240
To Langlais, this speech was highly illustrative in that it presented
A view of security as being composed of aboriginal, ecological, economic, military and national aspects [that] can be seen emerging around the creation of the Park reserve, a combination that none of the other interests involved in, nor reporting or analyzing, the Park reserve's role were to mention.
This is an interesting idea, that the National Parks of the North are representative of ideals of national security. Would this argument be applicable to all the National
Parks in the North? Consider two things. Firstly, the National Parks in the North are intended to provide security for the wildlife populations within their boundaries, such as the caribou calving grounds in Iwavik National Park (Yukon Territory). This in turn provides subsistence security for the people who depend on the wildlife as a food source.
Secondly, the locations of the National Parks, while primarily based on the preservation of a particular ecosystem, also appear to be determined by national interests. Of the ten
240 "Tagak Curley, Minister of Economic Development and Tourism, Resolute Bay, September 20, 1986, Transcript of a speech" reprinted in Highlights ofEllesmere Island from Langlais. Reformulating Arctic Security, pp. 164-165. 141 Ibid.,?. 165. 96
National Parks or Reserves located in Canada's North, three are located along the Yukon-
Alaska border (Iwavik, Vuntut, and Kluane Park and Reserve). Two are located close to branches of the Northwest Passage (Aulavik on Bank Island, and Tuktut Nogait, near
Cambridge Bay). Two (Auyuittuq and Sirmilik) are located on Baffin Island, separated from Greenland by the Devon Strait. And Quttinirpaaq is located on Ellesmere Island, southwest of CFS Alert, Canada's northernmost defence establishment, less than 1000km from the North Pole.
What the federal government has not done is establish National Marine
Conservation Areas (NMCAs) in Canada's North. This is no surprise, given that the only
NMCAs exist on the Great Lakes and at the confluence of the Saguenay and St.
Lawrence rivers. There are currently no plans to establish NMCAs on any of Canada's ocean coasts. This may be due to a variety of reasons, including concerns of conflict with the fishing industry and disruption of shipping routes. It is more likely, however, that the federal government does not wish to provoke international outrage. Canada has a history of unilaterally extending its maritime boundaries through legislation, which has led to diplomatic disputes in the Grand Banks and Northwest Passage areas.
It will be interesting to see what rhetoric is used in the future to describe the establishment of National Parks in Canada's North, particularly in the Arctic
Archipelago. Perhaps the federal government may adopt a similar broad point of view as that expressed by Tagak Curley twenty years ago. It is more likely, however, that new
Parks will be presented in the light of ecological preservation and national sovereignty. 97
3.8 Conclusions
This chapter examined two categories of political units that allow the people of Canada's
North to interact with the federal government in order to promote their interests, particularly on issues such as security. The first category encompasses the Territorial governments. The second category includes aboriginal political units that operate on a regional, intranational scale.
What does the term "security" mean to the people of the North? It means the protection of the people and of the land, not from military threat but from other more insidious and common dangers, including environmental degradation, high unemployment, substance abuse, etc. As a result, the security priorities of the North are different from those espoused by the federal government. If we were to break these priorities down by types of security policy, it might look something like this:
• Traditional security: Improvement of SAR capability in the region
• Human security: The development of the Northern economies and infrastructures to provide meaningful employment for the people in the North and to help combat social problems such as addiction.
• Environmental security: The protection of the Northern environment from degradation, including lessening the effects of climate change.
This is a tall order to be sure. These are certainly not issues that can be solved overnight, nor can a single governmental department address them. It can be argued that these issues are ones that affect all Canadians, so why should the North be treated any differently? This is not an easy question to answer. It would be perilous to paint the people of the North as noble savages degraded by the mainstream North American
We will address international northern aboriginal organizations in Chapter 6. 98 lifestyle. The North did not develop the lifestyle with which it is now faced, it was brought from the South. The South therefore owes it to the North to help it overcome the challenges and detrimental impacts of Southern culture.
The concept of the protection of sovereignty as a military venture is foreign to the
North. Tagak Curley's idea that Canada owes its sovereignty in the North to its occupation by native people seems to be a better fit. What would be ideal would be a commitment at all levels of government to put their efforts into developing the Northern infrastructure while incorporating environmental and cultural needs.
In terms of increasing the military presence in Canada's North, such a thing would only be appealing to the people of the North if they saw some tangible benefit in it.
Programs such as the Canadian Rangers, as we will see in the next chapter, have been successful because they bring positive leadership directly to isolated communities, to the same degree that the federal and Territorial governments cannot. Increased Search and
Rescue is another aspect of a military presence that can be seen to have a positive effect on Northern communities, and thus is highly desirable.
The lead must come from the political units that exist in Canada's Territories.
On the one hand we have the Territorial Governments, who act on behalf of all their citizens, on the other, aboriginal organizations, which look after the interests of their people. Both groups have become increasingly involved in national politics. The
Territorial Governments have evolved to a point at which they are not very different from provinces in responsibilities. At the same time, they are structured in a manner that is acceptable to various aboriginal traditions. Additionally, the Territorial Governments 99
have developed a very broad definition of security that encompasses environmental,
human, and defence concepts.
While the "local" aboriginal organizations have been more involved in the
settlement of land claims than in addressing security concerns, they have been vocal
about issues concerning the northern environment, ranging from the construction of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline to the establishment of National Parks. They have also
expressed concerns about the lack of SAR capability, and about the social and economic
issues that threaten their security on a daily basis.
These two types of political units have both experienced growth in influence, particularly over the last twenty years. They are far more effective representatives than their federal counterparts (MPs and senators), if only because of strength in numbers.
The onus is on them to make the needs of the region known, and they have been doing so.
The question remains, however, whether their plaints have fallen on deaf ears. 100
CHAPTER 4 - KEEPING CANADA'S NORTH SECURE
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, we examined some of the policies developed by the federal government to ensure security in the North. We saw that the majority of these policies were traditional, defence-based security policies, which placed the security of the North in the hands of the
CF. Since the end of the Second World War, the CF has been the primary agent of security policy. It is not, however, the only agent. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Coast Guard have played equally important (but perhaps less visible) roles. This chapter will examine the three institutions' capabilities to provide military and civil security to the North. It will also discuss whether these institutions have worked to incorporate a broader view of security into their operations, and if so, how.
4.2 The CF
As of January 1, 2006, the CF switched to an Operation Command-based model. Under this new model, Canadian Forces Northern Area became part of Canada Command, and was renamed Joint Task Force North (JTFN). Under this arrangement, JTFN became responsible for all CF operations in the Territories.243 JTFN operates out of three locations. The majority of operations have their headquarters in Yellowknife: JTFN
Headquarters, 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, 440 Transport Squadron, Canadian
Forces Recruit Centre and Regional Cadet Support Unit. There are also two JTFN detachments: JTFN Detachment Yukon, based in Whitehorse, and JTFN Nunavut, based
Department of National Defence - Joint Task Force North News Room. "New Canadian Forces operational commands take charge of domestic, special and international operations". News Release. January 1, 2006. 101
in Iqaluit.244 JTFN does not, however, include Canada's northernmost defence
installation, Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert.
CFS Alert, located about 817 kilometres south of the geographic North Pole is the
northernmost permanently inhabited settlement in the world. It was established in the
early 1950s as a weather station; the military station followed in 1958.245 CFS Alert has
a full-time strength of approximately 70 personnel, most of whom are there for six-month
tours (some positions are only three month long deployments).246 CFS Alert is one of the
supporting stations for the Canadian Forces Signals Intelligence Operations Centre. As
such, it falls under the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group, assisting with
signals intelligence collection and the operation and maintenance of radio frequency
direction finding facilities.247
JTFN Headquarters has a small staff of some 82 personnel, comprised of 47 members of the Regular Force, 18 members of the Reserves and 17 civilian staff members. JTFN HQ "provides planning advice and liaison support to CF and visiting foreign units exercising in the North".248 It is also responsible for operations in the North
244 Department of National Defence. "JTFN Fact Sheet". Last modified April 24, 2006. From http://www.cfna.forces.gc.ca/aboutus/fact_sheet_e.asp. 245 Department of National Defence. "Organization: Canadian Forces Stations (CFS) Alert". Available online at http://www.img.forces.gc.ca/org/cfiog/alert_e.asp. 246 Ibid. Department of National Defence. "Organization: Canadian Forces Signals Intelligence Operations Centre (CFSOC)". Available online at http://www.img.forces.gc.ca/org/cfiog/cfsoc_e.asp. 248 Department of National Defence. "Joint Task Force North (JTFN)". News Backgrounder BG-06-001. January 3 2006. From http://www.cfna.forces.gc.ca/press/pressdetail.asp. 102 ranging from Joint Operations to Northern and Sovereignty Patrols to North Warning
System site inspections.249
JTFN Detachment Yukon acts as a central control point for JTFN units operating in the Yukon Territory or northern British Columbia. The Detachment dates from 1970, when it was established to improve liaison and coordination with local authorities. It has a staff of five, most of whom deal with logistics and administration. The Detachment
Commander acts as a liaison for the JTFN Commander when dealing with the Territorial government and regional representatives of other agencies.251 The Commander of JTFN
Detachment Nunavut fulfils a similar role in Iqaluit.
440 Squadron is the only formed CF unit based full-time in Canada's North.
Based at 18 Wing in Edmonton from 1971, 440 Squadron flew CC-115 Buffalo and CC-
138 Twin Otters on search and rescue and transport missions.254 A two-plane detachment was maintained at Yellowknife. After the closure of 18 Wing in 1994, 440 Squadron moved all operations to Yellowknife. Currently, the Squadron is tasked with airlift, utility and liaison flights in support of JTFN. Search and rescue is a secondary task, as the Squadron does not have a dedicated search and rescue capability. The Squadron has 46 total aircrew and technicians, with 38 members of the Regular Force and 8
249 Department of National Defence. "JTFN Fact Sheet". 250 Department of National Defence. "Detachment Yukon History". Last modified April 5, 2006. From http://www.cfna.forces.gc.ca/units/whitehorse/history_e.asp. 251 Department of National Defence. "JTFN Detachment Yukon". Last modified April 24, 2006. From http://www.cfna.forces.gc.ca/units/whitehorse/history_e.asp. 252 Department of National Defence. "JTFN Detachment Nunavut". Last modified April 24, 2006. From http://www.cfiia.forces.gc.ca/units/iqaluit/index_e.asp. 253 Department of National Defence. "440 Squadron History". Updated December 17, 2005. From http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/l7wing/squadron/440hist_e.asp. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 103
members of the Reserves. The fleet comprises four CC-138 Twin Otters with the
capability to land using skis in the wintertime and tires in the summer, which means that
the Squadron is able to conduct "off-airport" operations as necessary. The relatively
slow speed of the planes, however, does not permit any sort of rapid deployment, nor are
they large enough to accommodate a Ranger Patrol. This has forced JTFN to rely
increasingly on commercial air. To rectify this problem, the Commander of JTFN asked
for the addition of Dash-8 aircraft to the squadron's fleet in 2000, but this has yet to
257
occur.
As noted previously, JTFN hosts other units within the CF who conduct training
and operations within JTFN's Area of Responsibility (AOR). An example of a "southern" unit that has operational responsibilities within JTFN's AOR is 405 Maritime Patrol
Squadron. 405 Squadron is based out of 14 Wing, located in Greenwood, Nova Scotia and is responsible for sovereignty patrols over the Arctic Archipelago. These patrols also help the enforcement of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, since crew members keep watch for ships that may discharge illegal pollutants, and report offenders to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. To accomplish long patrols, 405 Squadron uses CP-140 Auroras, which have the ability to fly for long durations, up to thirteen hours at a stretch. Given the distances that the Squadron is required to cover during sovereignty
256 Department of National Defence. "440 "Vampire" Transport Squadron". Updates December 7, 2005. From http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/17wing/squadron/440_e.asp. 257 Department of National Defence - Director General Strategic Planning. Arctic Capabilities Study. June 2000, p. 10. 258 Department of National Defence. "405 Maritime Patrol Squadron". 14 Wing- Greenwood: Squadrons and Units. From http ://www. airforce. forces. gc. ca/14wing/squadron/405_e. asp. 259 Ibid. 104 patrols, this ability is crucial. The number of patrols per annum has declined substantially since the mid 1990s, with only two scheduled for 2006.260
The other major Air Force unit that includes JTFN in its operational responsibility is 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD). 1 CAD uses locations within JTFN as Forward
Operating Locations (FOLs) for Canada's CF-18 Hornet jet fighters. The FOLs are located in Yellowknife, Inuvik, Rankin Inlet, and Iqaluit, which allow the CF-18s, which are short-range fighters, to exercise Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and to fulfill
NORAD requirements.261 That the FOLs are associated with NORAD means that they are also used by the United States Air Force for exercises. The FOLs were used by the
CF-18s as recently as March 2006, when two fighters from 4 Wing in Cold Lake conducted familiarization training in Inuvik and Yellowknife. There are some disadvantages to increasing the use of CF-18s in the North, however. The fighters are very expensive to fly, and unlike the Aurora aircraft, are strictly short-range aircraft.
This forces them to remain close to the FOLs where, as noted by the Director General
Strategic Planning in 2000, "sovereignty is not at risk".263
Canada's naval vessels have played less of a role in Canada's North in the recent past than they did during the Cold War. This is unfortunate, given that two-thirds of
260 Department of National Defence. "JTFN Fact Sheet". Cf. Department of National Defence. Arctic Capabilities Study, p. 10. The fate of the Auroras themselves has become precarious. Cf. Chapter 7. Department of National Defence - Air Force. "CF-18's to conduct Forward Operating Location Familiarization Training in Canada's North". March 24, 2006. From http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/news/2006/03/24b e.asp. 262 Ibid. Department of National Defence - Director General Strategic Planning. Arctic Capabilities Study. June 2000, p. 23. 105
Canada's shoreline is found within Nunavut alone. The Arctic Capabilities Study
released in June 2000, noted
The maritime forces now have no capability to operate in the North. A capability to conduct coastal patrols and monitor foreign shipping would be highly effective means of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the North.264
One reason the Navy was absent from the North for the 1990s was a shift towards
international operations, such as the Gulf War of 1991 and the embargo operations off
Haiti from 1993 to 1994.265 This focus remained in place with the dramatic naval deployments as part of Canada's participation in Operation Apollo.266 The first naval northern deployment since 1989 occurred in August 2002 when the Marine Coastal
Defence Vessels (MCDVs) HMCS Goose Bay and HMCS Summerside visited Killinik and Iqaluit. As part of their duties, the vessels aided 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group with a patrol to Resolution Island.267 This was the first time since the late 1970s that a joint exercise of this size had been held in Canada's North.
The next joint exercise was even larger. Dubbed NARWHAL 04, this joint exercise saw all elements of the CF come together to respond to a semi-fictitious event: the crash of an enemy satellite onto Canadian territory. The exercise involved
264 Ibid. Lieutenant-Commander Ian Anderson. "Northern Deployments: Naval Operations in the Canadian North". Canadian Naval Review. 1:4 (Winter 2006), p. 7. 266 Ibid. 267 Ibid., p.8. Ron Huebert. "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?". Canadian Military Journal. 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), p. 25. 269 Anderson. "Northern Deployments", p. 9. This event did actually occur on January 24, 1978, when COSMOS 954, a Soviet nuclear-powered surveillance satellite, crashed into the Northwest Territories, spreading radioactivity across 124,000 km2 of Canada's North and as far south as northern Alberta and Saskatchewan. The clean-up operation, a 106 members of Golf Company, 2 Royal Canadian Regiment, the Pangnirtung Ranger Patrol,
HMCS Montreal, All and 440 Squadrons.270 In addition to exercising CF response to an
Arctic emergency, the exercise provided an opportunity for CF members to interact with the people of Pangnirtung.271 The exercise was also notable in that HMCS Montreal (a frigate), joined by HMCS Goose Bay crossed the Arctic Circle. This was the first time that an MCDV had crossed the Arctic Circle, and the first time since 1982 that a major
Canadian warship had sailed in Canada's Arctic waters.272 The next NARWHAL exercise is scheduled to be held in the Mackenzie Delta area in 2007, the first time the CF has conducted a joint exercise in the western Arctic. The Navy has also been noticeably absent in the waters of Hudson Bay. Last year, two MCDVs, HMCS Glace
Bay and HMCS Shawinigan became the first Canadian warships to visit the Bay since
1975, circumnavigating the shoreline in Operation HUDSON SENTINEL.274
A tri-service effort, known as Operation LANCASTER, was launched by Prime
Minister Harper (unusual for a CF exercise) in August 2006. It was perhaps less unusual that Prime Minister Harper used the opportunity to reaffirm his government's commitment to the "Canada First" strategy:
The North is poised to take a much bigger role in Canada's economic and social development, we must ensure the unique ecosystem of the North, and the unique cultural coordinated effort between Canada and the United States, lasted until October 1978 and resulted in the recover of only about 0.1 % of the satellite's power source. C.f. http://www.hc-sc.gcca/ed-ud/event-incident/radiolog/index_e.html 270 Capt Joseph G. Frey. "Ex NARWHAL: Testing the CF's Ability to Respond to Emergencies in the Far North". August 23, 2004. From http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Feature_Story/2004/aug04/23_f_e.asp. 271 Ibid. 272 Huebert. "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security", p. 25. 273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. traditions of the First Peoples of the North, are respected and protected.275
Operation LANCASTER followed after a similar exercise, Operation
BEAUFORT, which was held in the western Arctic in August 2006. Unlike the earlier exercise, however, Operation LANCASTER received a great deal of media coverage, likely as a result of Prime Minister Harper's involvement. During Operation
LANCASTER, CF members from all elements conducted sovereignty patrols along the
Baffin Coast and in Lancaster Sound. A highlight of the exercise was a Community Day hosted by the residents of Pond Inlet. Another unique aspect was an integrated fisheries patrol conducted by the Navy and Fisheries and Oceans Canada in the Davis Strait.276
Such exercises are currently only possible late in the Arctic summer. One of the main obstacles traditionally faced by the Navy in conducting operations in the Arctic
Archipelago is the limited ice capability of its fleet. At present, only four classes of vessels have any sort of ice capability. The destroyer class and frigate class ice capabilities permit operations in both new ice less than ten centimetres thick and brash
977 ice. The Auxiliary Oil Replenishment ships and MCDVs' ice capabilities permit
978 operations in first year ice, up to fifty centimetres thick. All four classes fall significantly beneath the ice capability level of a light icebreaker. What this means in terms of operational capability is that Canadian Naval vessels are unable to operate in the
97S Stephen Harper. Quoted in "Operation Lancaster Designed to Assert Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic", broadcast on Halifax Live on August 12, 2006. 216 Ibid. 977 Brash ice is accumulations of ice made up of fragments not more than two meters across, and usually found during the melting of ice pack. Kyle D. Christensen. Arctic Maritime Security and Defence: Canadian Northern Security Opportunities and Challenges. Ottawa: Department of National Defence - Operational Research Division, 2005, pp. 54-55. 278 Ibid. 108
High Arctic, in much of the Beaufort Sea in the western Arctic and in many waterways in the Arctic archipelago. This has restricted the Navy to operations in the Baffin region.279
During the 2005-2006 election campaign, Prime Minister Harper promised the construction of three new armed naval heavy icebreakers to be stationed in the Iqaluit area.280 Arctic security experts met this promise with some scepticism. Rob Huebert argued that
To a certain degree, when Harper is talking about adding three new icebreakers, he is not talking about increasing Canadian capabilities but rather he is talking only about maintaining current capabilities.281
Huebert expressed a number of concerns regarding the proposed icebreakers. In particular, he pointed out that a prolonged bidding war amongst the contractors would
989 scuttle the project as it had the promise of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker in the late 1980s.
Huebert also noted that the regular navy would be expected to staff the new icebreakers, despite their complete lack of experience. He suggested that the federal government would do better to give the new icebreakers to the Canadian Coast Guard instead.
On June 26, 2006, DND announced the procurement of three Joint Support Ships
(JSS) as part of the Harper government's Canada First strategy. The JSSs are meant to
279 Ibid. p. 55. 9SO Rob Huebert. "Arctic Sovereignty and Security and the New Government". On Track 11:1 (Spring 2006), p.21. 281 Ibid., p. 22. 282 Ibid. The Navy's only foray into icebreaking was in the 1950s when it operated HMCS Labrador. Ibid. 284 Ibid., p. 24. 109 replace existing AOR ships and allow greater interoperability for the Navy. In terms
of ice capability, the JSSs will be able to navigate in first-year Arctic ice up to seventy
centimetres thick. This is still less than light icebreaker capacity. Thus, the JSSs will not be able to operate at times and in areas different from today's fleet, making any improvement minimal.288 It is more likely that the JSSs will be used strictly in support of
CF expeditionary ventures, where they are certainly needed, but this does little to boost the Navy's capability in more frigid climes. In July, 2007, the Harper government announced the acquisition of up to 8 Arctic Patrol Vessels (a matter which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7), which clearly demonstrated that the JSSs would be operating outside Canadian waters.
Through 2006, there were indications that the Harper government intended to proceed with the construction of a deep-water port somewhere in the Arctic Archipelago, although the exact location remained a mystery until August 2007. The Canadian Press interviewed Colonel Chris Rousseau, director-general of military engineering during
Operation LANCASTER. Rousseau's task was to inspect potential sites for the deep- water port and winter training school. He compared his task to that of Lieutenant-
Colonel John By, who oversaw the construction of the Rideau Canal, "[the canal] made a
9RQ difference in terms of economic development, but it was built for military purposes..."
285 Department of National Defence. "Canada First" Defence Procurement - Joint Support Ship". Backgrounder BG-06.015. June 26, 2006. From http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1958. 286 Ibid. 987 Christensen. Arctic Maritime Security and Defence, p. 54. 288 Ibid., p. 55. 98Q Bob Weber. "Choosing spot and building new Arctic port compared to building Rideau Canal". The Canadian Press. August 24, 2006. Available online at: 110
Rousseau justified the construction of a naval facility in the Arctic, decrying the lack of flexibility currently available to the CF, "We don't want to be in a situation where we have to choose between a sovereignty thing and an international thing."290 As with the
Arctic Patrol Vessel Program, the establishment of the deepwater port was not announced until August 2007, so this will be examined further in Chapter 7.
One aspect of the CF that continues to grow in Canada's North is the Canadian
Ranger organization. Unlike the Regular or Primary Reserve Forces, the Rangers are only found in Canada's isolated and sparsely populated areas, which generally means the northern portion of the country. Recruited from their own communities, the Rangers provide an important federal presence where there would otherwise be very little or none at all. In the previous chapter, we examined the social impact that Rangers had on their communities. Here we will look at the role Rangers play as members of the CF.
The Canadian Rangers have existed since 1947, and in many respects have changed very little. In 1998, the Rangers were reorganized so that the organization corresponded with other army reserve units in terms of Command structure. Now, the
Rangers are divided by geographic location into five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups
(CRPGs) which correspond with the five Joint Task Force Regions of Canada Command.
It is 1 CRPG that conducts the majority of sovereignty and security patrols in the
Arctic,291 The sovereignty patrols tend to involve four or five Rangers, and entail planting the Canadian flag throughout the Arctic Archipelago. Security patrols consist of
http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?id+d5bal 1 el -b403-43b3-8c42- bbf6e97aba.. .Accessed August 25, 2006. 290 Ibid. See Chapter 7 for further discussion on this issue. 291 Najwa Asmar. "1 CRPG guards our sovereignty", The Maple Leaf 'July 31, 2002, p. unknown. Ill visiting 47 radar stations, and occur three or four times a year. Security patrols could also involve tracking down poachers from Greenland.292
Each Patrol Group is commanded by a Major, and has a Regular Force and/or
Reserve staff known as Ranger Instructors (often Warrant Officers and above), who perform reviews and conduct visits to and inspections of patrols in addition to running the annual training courses. Due to the size of their areas, Ranger Instructors are generally in the field for nearly two-thirds of the year.293 All Rangers receive instruction in first aid, search and rescue, map reading, and weapons training, regardless of what their actual duties may entail. They can also be trained in planning evacuations from natural disaster sites, in assisting after major air disasters, in communications, and in setting up bivouac sites.294
While search and rescue operations in Canada's isolated areas have become one of the most recognizable tasks of the Canadian Rangers, another task that is arguably just as important is sharing traditional knowledge with members of the Regular Force and the
Reserves. The CF has been conducting exercises in the North since the 1970s, and has almost always used Rangers as guides or as support. This tradition has continued up to this day:
They are the only people who can start a snowmobile at 55 below zero using methods nobody down here has thought about" said Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Berube at defence headquarters in Ottawa. "They have an uncanny sense of
Ibid. 293 Gloria Kelly. "Canadian Rangers instructors: A link between the CF and remote regions", The Maple Leaf, October 30, 2002, p. unknown. 294 Chief of Reserves and Cadets. "Canadian Rangers - Frequently Asked Questions". From http://www.rangers.forces.gc.ca/pubs/rangers/faq_e.asp. 112
direction. They can always take you from point A to point B. We really don't know how they do it... 95
While the Canadian Rangers have traditionally been one of the least expensive ventures of the CF, it is uncertain whether the organization will remain so. In 2002, for example, members of 1 CRPG celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Rangers by travelling to the North Magnetic Pole. Operation Kigliqaqvik involved 29 Rangers from across the country and cost $750,000, most of which likely paid for transporting the
Rangers to their starting point of Resolute Bay.296 This number is small by military standards (a northern exercise in August 2004 cost $5.4 million). Having said that, if the federal government wants the Rangers to conduct more patrols in the North, then they must be prepared for an increase in costs, particularly if the military aircraft are not available to provide transport. As Captain Conrad Schubert, Information Officer for 1
CRPG said:
The forces only have a handful of flying Hercules aircraft. They have a much larger number sitting on the ground waiting for [repair]. They say it's in Haiti; It's in Afghanistan; it's somewhere else.. .So we are chartering these aircraft at enormous expense because the force just doesn't have enough. We always look across at the Alaska National Guard and they have more Hercules than Canada does in the whole country. Maybe we should apply for foreign aid.297
Peter Moon. "In this army, a red ball cap is regular gear Military / Paid a pittance to serve in the remote North, Rangers are a proud elite who can teach the regular army a thing or two". The Globe and Mail November 14, 1994, p. Al. "Arctic Patrol awestruck at "the edge of known land" - Rangers complete trek to magnetic North Pole", The Toronto Star (Ontario edition) April 19, 2002, p. A23. 297 Adrian Humphreys. "Military rents planes for Arctic mission: Cost of sovereignty patrol doubles". National Post June 10, 2004, p. Al. 113
Joking aside, the costs of sovereignty patrols are increasing, and this may give future
governments reason to re-evaluate whether the Canadian Rangers would be worth the
extra money.
Nevertheless, the Canadian Rangers organization has been and continued to be
(for the moment, at least) important to the Canadian government precisely because it
provides defence on the cheap, i.e., it provides a military presence in the North and in
isolated areas that would not otherwise have one. The Rangers are further useful because
they help to assert, and demonstrate, Canada's sovereignty over the islands of the Arctic
Archipelago, and because they act as guides or provide assistance to the CF during
training exercises. They aid the civil authorities by conducting search and rescue and body recovery operations. They have even assisted in times of natural disaster. The
Rangers also play an important role in their communities, by acting as conduits of traditional information to the Junior Canadian Rangers, and by assuming leadership roles.
The Rangers are, however, a terrestrial force, which places certain limitations on their capability. Their ties are strongest with the Army, both Regular Force and militia, since it is with them that they have the most in common. The Rangers' sovereignty patrols are conducted on the land, not on the sea or in the air (although air transportation is usually provided by the Air Force). As a result, their patrols are limited to where they can go on foot, by sled or by snowmobile.
298 Although it should be noted that these islands (with the sole exception of Hans Island) have not been the object of international dispute for many, many years. Cf. p. 115. 114
4.3 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
As of 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) provided its services to the
North via three divisions. "V" Division in Nunavut has 25 detachments. "G" Division in the Northwest Territories has 21 detachments serving 33 communities. "M" Division in the Yukon has 13 detachments. In addition to policing duties, members of the RCMP participate in Emergency Response Teams, Search and Rescue, and act as Crisis
Negotiators all on a volunteer basis. The total number of RCMP personnel in the North is less than 500.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police was the first federal institution to bring security to Canada's North. Formed by Sir John A. Macdonald in the early 1870s, the force was a key part of his National Policy, for it provided security for the development of the West. The North-West Mounted Police (as they were then known) was a paramilitary organization intended to reduce the need for a military presence in the West.
It was also intended to act as a constabulary, tasked to
perform all duties which are or shall be hereafter assigned to constables in relations to the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and of offences against the laws and Ordinances in force in the North West Territories, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders, and others who may be lawfully taken into custody.299
Although the NWMP suffered some setbacks in the early years, it soon proved its worth during the Klondike Gold Rush. It was the NWMP who ensured security in
Dawson City, and who monitored the Chilkoot and White Passes leading into the Yukon.
The exploits of Sam Steele and his red-tunicked Mounties quickly became part of the
299 Canada. "An Act respecting the Administration of Justice, and for the establishment of a Police Force in the North West Territories", Statutes of Canada, 1873 36 Vic, c 35, section 19.1. 115
northern mythos, immortalized (and romanticized) in a number of ways from
quintessential Canadian souvenirs to Dudley Do-Right.300
The RCMP continued to be the symbol of Canadian sovereignty in the North even
during the post-Gold Rush decline. The force was soon tasked with monitoring Canadian
sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago. An RCMP outpost was established on Herschel
Island in the western Arctic in 1903, and was soon followed by similar actions in the
eastern and central Arctic.3 '
Major J.D. Moody and six men of the RCMP conducted the first sovereignty
patrol in 1903 aboard the Neptune, an old wooden sealing vessel. The Neptune visited
whaling stations in Cumberland Sound and then headed into Hudson Bay, wintering in
Fullerton Harbour.302 The following spring, the Neptune visited Cape Herschel on
Ellesmere Island, Lancaster Sound and Pond Inlet. Throughout both voyages, Moody
announced to whalers that the Canadian government intended to "actively enforce
'if\'i regulations and restrictions on their operations".
The Canadian government had already planned other sovereignty voyages utilizing the C.G.S. Arctic, commanded by Joseph Bernier. As with the voyages of the
Neptune, the Arctic carried a small contingent of RCMP on board. Beginning in 1904,
A cartoon series that appeared on the American Rocky and Bullwinkle Show in the 1960s. Dudley Do-Right spoofed both silent movie and Mountie cliches, including the line "they always get their man". The series was not shown on Canadian television for a number of years because of perceived negative stereotypes. 301 Peter Schledermann. "The Muskox Patrol: High Arctic Sovereignty Revisited". Arctic 56:1 (March 2003), p. 101. Ibid. 303 Ibid., p. 102. 116
Bernier's expedition travelled through the Arctic Archipelago, building stone cairns on each island that contained "official Canadian declarations of possession".304
The sovereignty of the islands was first officially questioned by Knud Rasmussen, the administrator of Thule station, in 1920, after it became clear that Inuit from
Greenland had been travelling to Ellesmere Island to hunt muskox and polar bears. The
Canadian government had banned killing muskoxen (save for subsistence hunting by the
Inuit) in the Arctic Archipelago in 1917, and thus considered this a breach of Canadian law. Rasmussen disagreed, asserting that the area in question was considered "no man's land".306
The Canadian government responded by deploying the RCMP to various points through the Archipelago. Through the 1920s, stations were established at Craig Harbour,
Dundas Harbour, and the Bache Peninsula. These RCMP detachments were very small, consisting of perhaps a couple of RCMP officers, and of Inuit families (often from
Greenland) who had volunteered to live at the detachments and assist the officers in adapting to the land.307 One of the main duties for the RCMP was sled patrols to the assorted islands in the Archipelago, in order to reinforce the Canadian presence in the
High Arctic. As an example, in 1929, Inspector Joy, Constable Taggart and their Inuit guide Nookapingwa travelled 1700 miles through the High Arctic by dog sled.
™Ibid. Was it, perhaps, also an example of environmental security policy? 306 Ibid. Ibid., p. 102-103. Southern supplies were delivered annually, provided the supply
1AshiO p was able to make it through the icy passages. 308 Ibid, p. 104. Nookapingwa, one of the Inuit lilivinv g at Dundas Harbour, was an assistant to the RCMP from 1924 to 1933, travelling on nearly all longer sled patrols. 117
The pressing need for the RCMP detachments (at least, in terms of being symbols
of Canadian sovereignty) faded in the early 1930s, when Norway agreed to drop its
claims to the Arctic islands.309 This did not mean, however, that the RCMP ceased
sovereignty operations. On the contrary, the force took another approach with the launch
of the St. Roch, a schooner intended to cruise Canada's Arctic waters as a patrol,
transport, and supply vessel. Built in Vancouver, the St. Roch was launched on May 7,
1928, and arrived at the RCMP detachment on Herschel on July 24.310 The St. Roch
served as the RCMP vessel in the Western Arctic until 1939, when it was recalled by the
RCMP. Often, the St. Roch would winter in the Arctic, frozen in the ice, only returning
to Vancouver when repairs were deemed necessary.311 The St. Roch was a crucial lifeline
between remote Arctic communities and Canada's South. As a former crewmember
explained
At the time the RCMP was the Canadian government's official presence in the North. There was no local government, no game wardens, no social workers, no military - the RCMP did it all....[having to] carry mail, ferry Eskimo children to school, ran sick people to the hospital, explore new shipping routes and perform all manner of official chores. n
309 In 1930, Dr. O.D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State (External Affairs), negotiated a settlement with the Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup and the Norwegian Government in which the Canadian government paid Sverdrup $67,000 for the maps, records, and observations he had made in 1898-1902 during the second Expedition of the Norwegian vessel the Fram. During that Expedition, Sverdrup had claimed Axel Heiberg Island in the name of the Norwegian King. 310 James P. Delgado. Arctic Workhorse: The RCMP Schooner St. Roch. Victoria, B.C.: Touch Wood Editions, 2003, p. 19. 311 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 3 Bill White, former crewmember of St. Roch. Quoted in Delgado. Arctic workhorse, p. 25. 118
The St. Roch remains most famous, however, for being the first vessel to sail the
Northwest Passage from west to east. This voyage was initially only partly in the interest of asserting Canadian sovereignty over the Passage. The Canadian government was contemplating the occupation of Greenland in order to protect the world's largest cryolite mine from Nazi Germany, and the St. Roch was one of the few government vessels that could be spared. In the end, the United States guaranteed the safety of the mines, and the
St. Roch was no longer needed for that task.314 St. Roch's initial attempt on the
Northwest Passage (1940-1941) ran into difficulties with ice and was halted when the vessel was ordered to Tuktoyaktuk. The second voyage, begun in August 1941, was also fraught with difficulty, but succeeded, arriving at Pond Inlet on September 2, 1942. The
St. Roch returned to the Arctic in 1944, and made a second transit of the Passage (using the northern leg, this time) in only 86 days.315 The St. Roch continued to serve the Arctic until 1951, when it was decommissioned as an RCMP vessel.
As the sole non-military representatives of the federal government in the North from the 1920s to 1960s, the RCMP was instrumental in implementing the government decision to establish residential schools and fixed northern communities. This caused the RCMP to be viewed in a negative light, particularly by the Inuit after members of the force shot some 20,000 sled dogs in the 1950s and 1960s. This issue has been recently revived by the Inuit of Nunavut, forcing an inquiry by the RCMP. The final report has
511 Delgado. Arctic workhorse, p. 31. 314 Ibid. 315Ibid.,p. 43. 316 Ibid., p. 44. 317 Natalie Salat. "Night Beat in Iqaluit". The Quarterly (RCMP Veterans' Association) 70: 3 (Summer 2005), p. 18. 119
yet to be published, but its findings may once more affect relations between the Inuit and the RCMP.
Recognizing the dim view held by some northerners of the RCMP, the force has made safer and healthier aboriginal communities one of its strategic priorities, aiming to
Contribute to the long-term wellness and safety of Aboriginal communities by being involved in initiatives surrounding education, employment, health, and cultural development while at the same time finding ways to prevent/resolve conflict by focusing on crime prevention partnerships, restorative justice processes and a holistic and culturally sensitive approach to problem solving.318
Some of these initiatives are nationally based, such as the Drug Abuse Resistance
Education program, or the promotion of sustainable development. Other projects are local, including an initiative by the RCMP Air Services to develop a safer flight path
O 1 Q approach into the community of Ross River in the Yukon Territory. The RCMP has also made a concerted effort across Canada to promote safe and healthy communities by recruiting more aboriginals into the force. This has had some success in improving relations between the RCMP and northern communities.320
Suicide is seen as a threat to northern communities, being identified as the "single •591 most important issue facing Nunavut" by one RCMP officer. Small communities, such as those in Nunavut, are particularly affected, since "here you either know the individual,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Departmental Performance Report 2004/05, p. 70. 319 "Air Approach named after RNWMP member". The Quarterly (RCMP Veteran's Association) 70:3 (Summer 2005), p. 93. 320 Natalie Salat. "Night Beat in Iqaluit". The Quarterly (RCMP Veterans' Association) 70:3 (Summer 2005), p. 18 321 C/Supt. John Henderson. Quoted in Salat. "Night Beat in Iqaluit", p. 15. 120 or know someone who does". 22 "V" Division, which is responsible for policing in
Nunavut, assisted in the establishment of the Nunavut Suicide Prevention
Council/Embrace Life Council, launched in January 2004. The Council focuses on suicide awareness and prevention through education, including coordination of World
Suicide Prevention Day.323 Similar approaches have been taken to prevent domestic and substance abuse.
The RCMP continues its role in sovereignty patrols, through the RCMP vessel
Mackenzie and others. The force also encourages community participation in the
Coastal/Airport Watch Program. The purpose of this program is to
Assist in the identification of persons, vessels, vehicles and aircraft that may constitute a threat to Canada's national security, or that are involved in illegal activities such as drug importation.
While it may not seem applicable to Canada's North now, the Coastal/Airport
Watch Program may gain importance in the future if the prognosis for the northern climate is correct. More specifically, if climate change results in substantial ice loss in the summer months, and if the Northwest Passage becomes a desirable shipping route, then the Coastal/Airport Watch Program may prove essential to monitoring international activities within Canadian borders.
Of the three federal security institutions, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has perhaps the broadest view of northern security. While the force is tasked with
322 Ibid. 323 Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 2004-2005: The Year in Review, "V" Division, Nunavut, p. 8. 324 Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 2004-2005: The Year in Review, "G" Division, Northwest Territories, p. 2. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. "Coastal/Airport Watch Program". From http ://www.rcmp. ca/caw/index_e.htm. 121
sovereignty patrols and with policing northern communities, it is also deeply involved in northern communities. This involvement had its negative effects in the past, but the force
seems to have learned from past experiences.
4.4 The Canadian Coast Guard
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has played the smallest role in Canada's North, compared to the CF and the RCMP. The CCG has its origins in the Marine Services of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, formed around the time of Confederation, although the CCG itself did not exist until 1962. It was established to provide a marine search and rescue branch within the Department of Transportation. The CCG was also intended to provide a visible Canadian presence in the far North. Chronic underfunding has meant, however, that the CCG has had great difficulty in performing both parts of its mandate, particularly in the North. In 1995, the CCG was transferred from Transport
Canada to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), a move that has been described as a mortal blow for the organization.
The CCG is an entirely civilian organization, unlike its counterpart in the United
States. It cannot even be classified as paramilitary as none of its vessels are "armed or fitted to be armed if such a requirement should occur".328 Nor does the CCG have an explicit and distinct mandate. Rather, it exists to support DFO in "protecting the marine
Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Safe, secure, sovereign: reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard. Report of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Tom Wappel, M.P., Chairman. March 2004, p. 2 327 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 328 W. Harriet Critchley. "Defence and Policing in Arctic Canada". Politics of the Northwest Passage. Franklyn Griffiths, ed. 122 and freshwater environment, in maintaining marine safety, and in facilitating maritime commerce and ocean development."329 The CCG is also responsible for the DFO fleet.
The presence of the CCG fleet in the North is very limited. Currently, there are only five CCG vessels based in the North, all at Hay River in the Northwest Territories.
Four of these vessels are Special River Navaids Tender Vessels, the fifth is an Inshore
Multi Task Patrol Vessel. These ships monitor boating and shipping along the course of the Mackenzie River and on the waters of Great Slave Lake. Additionally, there are CCG vessels involved in the Icebreaking Program, but they are based out of southern Canadian ports rather than the North. It should be noted, however, that a CCG vessel, the St-
Laurent, is one of only two ships to reach CFS Alert, achieving an ultimate northern latitude of 82°59" in August 1971, a record that remained unbroken until August 1977.330
The Icebreaking Program is perhaps the highest-profile role played by the CCG in
Canada's North. The Program, which has existed since 1930, encompasses several services. Since 1971, the Canadian Ice Service of Environment Canada has provided the
CCG with a "suite of services" including data acquisition, data analysis and interpretation
ill and ice forecasting/"1 The CCG uses this information to manage Ice Operations Centres, to monitor ice regimes, and to provide ice information broadcasts, amongst other
Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Safe, secure, sovereign: reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard, p. 3. 330 The other vessel to reach CFS Alert was the USCGS Staten Island in 1953. The vessel that broke the St-Laurenfs record was the Soviet icebreaker Artika, which reached the North Pole. Department of National Defence. "Organization: Canadian Forces Stations (CFS) Alert". Available online at http://www.img.forces.gc.ca/org/cfiog/alert e.asp. Canadian Coast Guard - Icebreaking Division. Icebreaking Program Report on Performance: Arctic Operations - Summer 2003. Ottawa: Icebreaking Division, January 2005, p. 4. 123 things. The CCG icebreakers provide assistance to other vessels by acting as escorts through ice-covered waters and by freeing trapped ships when necessary. The icebreakers assist at harbours by breaking out approaches to enable easy entry and departure for vessels, and by monitoring ice conditions and water levels to prevent flooding during spring break-up.333 It is a curious statement on federal government acquisition that the biggest vessel in the Icebreaking Program, the CCGS Louis S. St-
Laurent, was modernized in the late 1980s, rather than the federal government purchasing a Polar Class 8 icebreaker similar to the USCGS Polar Sea as promised.
The icebreakers also assist with what is possibly the most important event in many northern communities, the annual Eastern Arctic Sealift. This Sealift ships goods to various points in the Eastern Arctic to "meet the requirements of all Canadian Federal
Departments, Government of the Northwest Territories [now Nunavut], Hamlets,
Municipalities, and the United States Air Force, DND- North Warning System".334 For the sealift, the Eastern Arctic is divided into several areas including the US Air Force base in Thule, Greenland and some settlements in Labrador and northern Quebec. In
1996, eight CCG icebreaker vessels were used. In 2003, the number was down to four.
Continuing with the precedent set by the voyage of the Manhattan, the CCG icebreakers continue to escort foreign vessels through Arctic waters. This is seen as a way of maintaining and asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, since "a CCG icebreaker is frequently the only federal resource positioned in a particular area of the
332 Ibid., p. 6. 333 Ibid. 4 Canadian Coast Guard - Arctic Office. (1996) Eastern Arctic Sealift Operation and Co-ordination Plan. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1996, p. 5. 124
Arctic".335 It is also a means of enforcing the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, by monitoring the activities of foreign vessels.
In 2004, the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans released a report on the
CCG in which it recommended that the CCG become an independent federal agency under its own minister. The Committee also recommended that the CCG have its mandate expanded to include coastal security: "In other words, the Coast Guard would have responsibility for actually guarding the coast and as such would have a formal role in national security."
The Committee felt that the CCG was the logical choice to provide
"comprehensive surveillance of Canadian waters", and thus needed to be equipped with the shore-based component of the Automatic Identification System as well as High
Frequency Surface Wave Radar installations. As of the end of 2004, the Canadian government required all ships of a certain size entering Canadian waters to have an AIS transponder on board for just this purpose.
A further recommendation of the Committee was that the CCG either become a branch of the Canadian military (specifically the Navy) or a paramilitary agency. The
Committee cited high costs to leaving Canada's coasts unprotected, including
"environmental damage, illegal fishing, economic losses resulting from U.S. security concerns, and even challenges to Canadian sovereignty".339
335 Canadian Coast Guard - Icebreaking Division. Report on Performance 2003, p. 6. 336 Ibid.,-p. 43. 337 Ibid. 338 Ibid., p.7. 339 Ibid., p. 45. 125
Whether the Committee's recommendations for the future of the CCG are implemented or not remains to be seen. It seems unlikely, however, that Canadian Forces
Maritime Command would be willing or able to incorporate the CCG into its fleet. It seems equally unlikely that the federal government will approve arming CCG vessels.
What cannot be ignored, however, is that as with the Navy, the CCG's fleet is aging. In
2006, Gary Sidock, the acting director general for the CCG, commented to a reporter that the ice-breaking fleet needed to be replaced "perhaps not immediately, but fairly shortly."340 Replacing the fleet would be an expensive and lengthy venture, costing as much as $500 million per vessel and taking as long as ten years for construction.
4.5 Conclusion
Out of the three government organizations examined in this chapter, the RCMP undoubtedly has the largest presence in Canada's North, acting as the North's law enforcement agency. It is also the most involved with the people of the North because of its close ties with its communities.
The Coast Guard has the smallest presence, with the exception of its icebreaking capability, even though this is in danger of being lost unless equipment is replaced.
Nevertheless, we can safely say that more people in the North have encountered a member of the RCMP or of the CF then they ever have a member of the Coast Guard.
This is unfortunate, because the presence of an Auxiliary Coast Guard in coastal
340 Gary Sidock, quoted in CBC News. "Arctic icebreakers aging, new ones to cost billions: Coast Guard". October 2, 2006. Reproduced online at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2006/10/02/icebreakers-new.html. Accessed October 2, 2006. 126 communities would surely go far in improving maritime SAR in the North. The CF provides the majority of SAR assistance in the North, primarily through 8 Wing Trenton and 17 Wing Trenton. The low population density of the North precludes the CF from providing a full SAR to JTFN - the expense outweighs the number of actual SAR incidents, particularly in proportion to the rest of the nation.
The day-to-day presence of the CF in Canada's North is very limited, and for the most part expeditionary. The members of the Regular and Reserve Forces posted to
JTFN and to CFS Alert are there only on a temporary basis, and for the most part come from Canada's provinces rather than the Territories. Training exercises in the North, often billed as "sovereignty exercises", are expeditionary in nature, launched from southern bases and conducted in the North.
The exception to all this is the Canadian Rangers, although this organization has developed the way it has almost by accident. Originally intended as a means of surveilling the North and of training Canada's soldiers for Arctic warfare, the Rangers have become jacks-of-all-trades, providing leadership in their communities to a degree that does not exist elsewhere in Canada. Yet, while the Patrols conduct sovereignty exercises, they are in their own way as limited by geography as anyone else. The
Canadian Rangers do not possess a maritime capability, even though such a capability would be ideal for those Patrols located in the Arctic Archipelago, or along waterways in the North. Likewise, the Canadian Rangers are not trained as a militia or even a constabulary. They do not have any official capability to protect their communities in the military or policing sense. 127
The problem remains that the people of the North have little or no say about the operations of any of these organizations. All three are tasked with protecting national interests and the safety of the Canadian population, and the federal government determines these interests, with generally little regard for local needs. Additionally, there is much of the Arctic Archipelago which remains uninhabited or even uninhabitable by humans. This suggests that other means of enforcing sovereignty, such as aerial or naval patrols should not cease. 128
CHAPTER 5 - THE NORTH IN CANADA-US RELATIONS
5.1 Introduction
In a speech on March 25, 1969, Pierre Trudeau introduced what is perhaps the most famous description of Canada's relationship with the United States of America.
Speaking to members of the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Trudeau said:
"Americans should never underestimate the constant pressure on Canada which the mere presence of the United States has produced. We're different people from you and we're different people because of you. Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt."342
Trudeau's comments came at a time when his government was in the process of developing ways of asserting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. The government was also in negotiations with the United States government and Humble Oil Company for supporting the first commercial transit of the Northwest Passage by the tanker
Manhattan. Weeks before the speech, Trudeau had asked his staff to review Canada's international claims to the Northwest Passage. These claims would appear a year later in the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, and entered into Canadian law in 1971.
As long as Canada has had a North, the American elephant has been present. And while Canada may not have been affected by every twitch and grunt, we have certainly been affected by a fair number of them. The Yukon-Alaska highway and the Distant
Early Warning lines are examples of security projects produced at the instigation of the
Pierre Trudeau. Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., March 25, 1969. C.f. Stephen M. Walt. "Taming American Power". Foreign Affairs. September/October 2005. 129
United States. These programs have been beneficial for Canadians to some degree. But
we have not always interpreted gestures from the elephant to be friendly. When it
concerns Canada's North, these twitches can be seen as hostile.
This chapter looks at the ambiguous relationship between Canada and the United
States and what this has meant for security in northern Canada. It focuses strictly on bilateral relations between the two nations, since Canada's place in the circumpolar North will be addressed in Chapter 6. The first section of this chapter addresses areas of tension between Canada and the United States, particularly the issue of Arctic sovereignty. The
second section examines where and how Canada and the United States co-operate on northern issues, particularly in relation to North American security. The final part of the chapter examines recent developments in the relationship.
5.2 Contention
Although the level of interest held by the United States in Canada's North has risen and fallen over the years, it has never disappeared altogether. Likewise, Canada's fear of
U.S. incursion or worse, invasion, has existed longer than the nation itself. Early politicians had reason to be concerned. In 1866, for example, a bill was introduced in the
United States Congress proposing two ideas which alarmed British North America. The first idea was the "admission of the States of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Canada East and Canada West" into the Union.343 The second idea was that the United States would purchase the HBC Charter for 10 million dollars.344 Nothing concrete came of this bill, in part because bills do not a policy make, but more importantly because Canada had
Ibid., p. 35. Atkin, Maintain the Right, p. 25. 130 beaten the United States to the chase.345 To be sure, Sir John A. Macdonald, then
Canada's Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, did not care for such an expensive action, but recognized its political importance: "I would be willing, personally, to leave the whole country a wilderness for the next half-century but I fear that if Englishmen do not go there, Yankees will".346 In the end, Canada purchased the HBC Charter, and the
North-West Mounted Police were established to protect the new Territory.347
The first real diplomatic squabble between Canada and the United States over the
North arose over the border between British Columbia and Alaska. A treaty signed in
1825 between Russia and Great Britain had set up principles for establishing a border along the 141st meridian, extending from the Beaufort Sea down to the Portland Canal
(the southern reaches of the Alaskan panhandle). After the United States purchased
Alaska in 1867, and the province of British Columbia joined the Dominion of Canada in
1871, the Canadian government requested a survey of the Panhandle area, which was critical for controlling access to the Pacific Ocean, but the Americans dismissed this request as impractical. The rapid population growth in Dawson during the Gold Rush, particularly with American prospectors, soon made the formalization of a border necessary. This was almost achieved in 1898, but the government of British Columbia rejected the proposal. Finally, in 1903, the Hays/Herbert Treaty entrusted the decision to a tribunal composed of six men, three American and three Canadian-British. After much deliberation the final border was established. The final agreement was initially very disappointing to Canada. There was a sense that Lord Alverstone, the Canadian-British
345 This was certainly the opinion expressed by the Colonial Office. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, p. 38. 346 Ibid. 347 Cf. 3.3 Political Structure in the North. 131 appointee, who had sided with the Americans had betrayed Canada's interests, although it was noted that of all the appointees, Lord Alverstone had been "the only person who appears to have approached the matter from a purely judicial standpoint and with a determination to take an impartial and not a partisan attitude in the controversy".348
Nevertheless, the decision "made Ottawa determined not to let more of the North go to foreigners by default".349
Over one hundred years later, there is yet another border dispute between Canada and the United States. In the Beaufort Sea exists an area of several hundred square kilometres, within which are believed to be vital sources of petroleum and other types of natural gas. The United States has indicated that it wants to lease out the area for mineral exploration.350 The Canadian government asserts that the maritime border should be an extension of the land border, and thus follow the 141st meridian. The United States, however, feels that the maritime boundary should follow a path equidistant from the coast of both nations. This issue may come to a head if the United States decided to sign onto the Law of the Sea Treaty, an occurrence which is becoming increasingly likely.
The other main issue of contention between Canada and the United States, at least in terms of sovereignty in the North, is the status of the Northwest Passage. We have already discussed how Canada laid claim to the Passage, and conducted sovereignty
"The Alaskan Boundary". The Canadian Law Review (February 1904) 3:2, p. 59. 349 Ken S. Coates and William R. Morrison. Land of the Midnight Sun: A History of the Yukon. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, p. 136. Steven Gibb, Gerry Klein, Les MacPherson, Sarath Peiris, and Lawrence Thoner. "Claim to Arctic: use it or lost it". The StarPhoenix. September 26, 2003. p. unknown. TCI Bob Weber. "Arctic boundary dispute may heat up". CNews, retrieved from http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2007/05/20/pf-4195386.html on August 2, 2007. 132 voyages with the RCMP schooner St. Roch. We have also discussed the voyage of the SS
Manhattan, and the impact this had on Canadian defence policy.
Even after the passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the United
States refused to acknowledge Canada's claims to the Northwest Passage. Other nations such as Poland and Sweden tacitly accepted Canada's position by requesting permission before using the route. This permission was granted, and the ships made the transit without incident. The USSR also gave support to Canada's claim, conscious of its own need to gain international support for its claims to the Northeast Passage.
This brings us to 1985 and the voyage of the Polar Sea. Because the United States did not recognize Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, it did not request permission from the Canadian government prior to sending the Polar Sea into the
Northwest Passage. It merely made an announcement of the voyage in May 1985, stating that travel through the Northwest Passage was much faster and cheaper than travel through the Panama Canal. This created an uproar in the Canadian media which spread to the Canadian public.354 The outrage focused on two issues. Firstly, since the United
States Coast Guard was (and is) a branch of the Armed Forces, functioning under the
Department of Defense when called into service, the Polar Sea was in essence a military vessel that had entered Canadian waters uninvited. Secondly, the sole purpose of the
Polar Sea voyage seemed to be a direct challenge to Canada's claim to the Northwest
"A Northern Dimension for Canada's Foreign Policy", Independence and Internationalism, ch. 10, p. unknown. Reproduced in "The Question of Sovereignty". Northern Perspectives 14:4 (September/October 1986). 353 Christopher Kirkey. "Smoothing troubled waters: the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Co-operation Agreement". InternationalJournal, p. 403. 354 Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel. "Still unresolved after fifty years". The American Review of Canadian Studies 29:3 (Fall 1999), p. 407. 133
Passage, a reiteration of American claims that the Passage was a strait. Such a challenge could not go unanswered, and scholars, nationalists, and the opposition parties called for action.355
The Mulroney government found itself in hot water. Although the United States had not asked for permission to use the Northwest Passage, Ottawa had given its permission upon hearing of the voyage. Joe Clark, the Minister of External Affairs went as far to say: "the action.. .being taken by the government of the United States does not compromise in any way the sovereignty of Canada over our Northern waters".356 Clearly, the government had not expected such a negative reaction from the public.
Forced into action to avoid further embarrassment, the Mulroney government announced a number of measures on September 10, 1985 to "strengthen the Canadian position on northern waters".357 These proposed measures included the construction of a
Polar Class 8 icebreaker (like the Polar Sea), increased naval and aerial sovereignty patrols in the area, the establishment of straight baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, and legislation that would extend Canada's jurisdiction to areas claimed by Canada.
355 Kirkey. "Smoothing troubled waters", p. 404. Quoted in Kirkey. "Smoothing troubled waters", p. 403. 357 Ibid, p. 404. •ICO "1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the Territorial sea is measured.. .3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters... 5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. 6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off the Territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." United Nations Convention on the 134
Joe Clark commented, "the policy of the Government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and to preserve Canada's sovereignty over land, sea and ice undiminished and undivided".359 Clark also indicated his government's willingness to meet with representatives of the United States to discuss co-operation on Northern issues.
The State Department replied: "We stand by our previously stated position. We regret that Canada is taking this action but we appreciate that Canada recognizes that the matter affects U.S. interests".360
Negotiations between Canada and the United States began in the fall of 1985.
The Mulroney government's stated goal was the recognition of Canada's full sovereignty over its Arctic waters, including the Northwest Passage, although the government also clearly wished to diffuse what was turning into a volatile domestic issue, and to improve its reputation before Parliament and the Canadian public by not yielding to the
Americans.361 The United States government, too, had its own agenda. It had no intention of letting the Northwest Passage, which it deemed an international strait, become Territorial waters. Such an action could run the risk of limiting the "transit of submarine and surface naval fleets" elsewhere in the world. Although the United States did not believe that Canada would close off its waters to American ships, the State
Law of the Sea (1982) Article 7. Accessed from http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdfonMay 16,2007. 359 Debates, September 10 1985, 6483. 360 Quoted in Kirkey. "Smoothing troubled waters", p. 405. 361 Elliot-Meisel. "Still unresolved after fifty years", p. 407. 135
Department did not want to set a dangerous precedent elsewhere in the world such as the
Straits of Malacca in Asia or the Straits of Hormuz near Iran.
In 1986, while in the midst of the negotiations, Canada passed the Territorial Sea
Geographical Co-ordinates (Area 7) Order. This document clearly established the outer limits of Canada's historic internal waters, including the Northwest Passage, using the straight baseline method.363 Canada based its argument on an International Court of
Justice ruling, the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) of 1951. The ruling recognized the concept of historic title to coastal waters and the use of straight baselines.364 Its position was reinforced by the first United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1958. The difficulty with the application of straight baselines is that
Article 35a of the UN Law of the Sea Convention exempts waters that had not previously been considered internal waters.365
The American stance, that the Northwest Passage was an international strait, also had legal precedents to support it. If it could be established that the Passage is a waterway joining one area of high seas to another, then it would qualify as an international strait, even if some of the channels were considered too shallow for commercial use. The United States was also (and remains consistently) insistent on the right of "transit passage" through international waters, including the Gulf of Sidra and the
Charles F. Doran. "Canadian relations with the United States". Current History 87 (March 1988), p. 100. 363 Andrea Charron. "The Northwest Passage in Context", Canadian Military Journal 6:4 (Winter 2005-2006), p. 43. Ibid. 365 Ibid., p. 44. Ibid. 136
Black Sea.367 The other aspect of the United States' legal standpoint involved usage. If, as in the Corfu Channel, there was enough international maritime traffic through the
Passage, it could be considered a strait.368 This argument is not, however, particularly strong, given that ice conditions in the Northwest Passage prevent the same level of maritime traffic as a strait that is ice-free.
The Northwest Passage negotiation process lasted from the fall of 1985 to January
1988. During the final phase of negotiations, President Reagan stated, "the Prime
Minister and I also had a full discussion of the Arctic waters issue, and he and I agreed to inject new impetus to the discussions already under way. We are determined to find a solution based on mutual respect for sovereignty and our common security and other interests". This solution was the Canada-United States Agreement on Arctic
Cooperation, which was signed by both nations in January 1988. The Joint Agreement, as it is known, is restrictive in its focus, in that it only applies to United States Coast
Guard icebreakers that must now request permission from the Canadian government prior to entering the Northwest Passage.371 The Joint Agreement does not acknowledge
"Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) Article 38, para 2. 368 Ibid., p. 45. 369 Ibid. Canada, House of Commons. Debates, April 6, 1987, 4965. 371 Elliot-Meisel. "Still unresolved after fifty years", p. 407. 137
Canada's claims to the Passage nor does it address the issue of submarines. The result is
a document that is not particularly useful outside its scope.
Still, at the time of its release, the Joint Agreement was considered advantageous to both sides. If anything, it contributed to continental defence by strengthening Canada-
US relations, and demonstrating solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat. It left the
Mulroney government free to pursue goals that it had set out in its Defence White Paper,
Challenge and Commitment. This White Paper included a number of initiatives intended to prevent recurrence of the Polar Sea incident, such as the installation of an underwater surveillance system in the Arctic Archipelago and the establishment of a "three ocean navy" which would include a Class 8 icebreaker and nucleair submarines. As for the
United States, the Joint Agreement had little impact on military operations in the North since its submarines were still free to come and go as they pleased. The issue seemed to be settled, at least so far as both parties agreed to disagree.
5.3 Co-operation
The dominant area of cooperation between Canada and the United States since 1958 has been the North American Air Defence Agreement.374 NORAD's headquarters are located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, at the moment, the Command Center is based inside Cheyenne Mountain. It is led by a US four-star Admiral, assisted by the Deputy
Charron. "The Northwest Passage in Context", p. 46. 374 In his presentation, "NORAD: A Strategic Asset or A Squandered Opportunity" from May 2006. David O'Blenis provides an excellent overview of NORAD's structure, from which this description is derived. David O'Blenis. "NORAD: A Strategic Asset or A Squandered Opportunity". May 2006. Available online at http://www.cda- cdai.ca/pdf/NORAD.pdf 138
Commander, a Canadian Lieutenant-general.375 The NORAD commander and deputy commander report to the Chief of Defence Staff in Canada and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the United States.376 The Commander of the Canadian NORAD region is always a CF officer, with an American deputy. The Commander of the Alaskan and
Continental US Regions is always American, with a Canadian deputy. Canada's membership in NORAD allows the CF access to threat intelligence, US plans for North
American defence, etc., that would not normally be available in a bilateral command arrangement.
NORAD's initial mission was the detection, identification, and engagement of
Soviet Long Range Aviation bombers. Canada was an important buffer for North
America, leading to the establishment of the Mid-Canada and Pinetree Lines in southern
Canada, and the Distant Early Warning radar chain in the North. This mission quickly changed in the 1960s and 1970s as the Soviets deployed land and submarine-based ballistic missiles with a range capability that encompassed North America. Canada's
North lost its strategic importance as NORAD's focus shifted to integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA, which is the detection and warning of aircraft and ballistic missiles). Objects of engagement included threat aircraft and tracking space objects, and objects that existing radar warning networks could not readily track. Instead, the United States focused on the development of space surveillance and missile warning systems that came under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD. This period
5 All previous NORAD commanders have been four-star generals. This has historically been the case, although the Commander of NORAD can technically be from either nation. The situation is currently compounded by the fact that the NORAD Commander is also in charge of US Northern Command, and thus reports to the US Secretary of Defense as well. 139 also saw the creation of NORAD's hardened underground combat operations centres at
Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs and at CFB North Bay in North Bay, Ontario.
The early 1970s was a period of reduced funding for air defence as the United
States accepted the concept of mutual vulnerability to ICBM attack. The 1975 NORAD
Agreement consequently reflected a new direction in its mission: to ensure sovereignty of air space during peacetime. For NORAD, the late 1970s was marked by the development of modernization plans: the Joint US-Canada Air Defence Study (1978-1979) and the
USAF's Air Defence Master Plan (AFMP). The latter plan became the keystone for cost- sharing discussions between Canada and the United States.
The 1980s saw the advent of the Soviet Union's long-range cruise missiles, launchable from the Soviet bomber fleet. At that time, NORAD did not have the capability to detect, let alone engage cruise missiles, which meant that the Command needed to be modernized, and quickly. The 1981 NORAD Agreement included a change in name for the Command to the North American "Aerospace" Defence Command which reflecting the extension of its mission. F-15s, F-16s and CF-18s were assigned to
NORAD to boost the Command's air fleet.377 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the DEW line was replaced over a nine-year period with the North Warning System (NWS), and
Forward Operating Locations were established in northern Canada to allow fighter planes the capability of engaging Soviet bombers long before they reached the most populous
Canada's initial interception force was the CF-100 Canuck intercept. Initially, the CF- 100s were to be replaced by the Avro Arrow, but the cancellation of the Arrow obviously prevented this. Instead, the Air Force was given 66 surplus CF-101 Voodoo interceptors by the United States. The Voodoos entered service in 1961, and were upgraded in 1972. The Voodoos were officially retired in 1984, and replaced by the CF-18 Hornets, the class that remains in service today. 140 areas of North America (southern Canada and the continental United States). AW AC aircraft and air-to-air refuelers were also added.
In 1996, NORAD's mission was reasserted as aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America, and the Agreement was amended to include a consultative mechanism on issues concerning aerospace defence and to include a promise from both parties to follow sound environmental practices in NORAD-related operations. This was, of course, in addition to the traditional NORAD responsibilities of ITW/AA, or air sovereignty and air defence of North America. It is important to note that the latter consisted of two components. The first, the surveillance and control of the air space around North America, was meant to address external threats, and it was something that
NORAD did quite well. The second component involved assisting in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of hijacking and drug trafficking. NORAD's capability to respond to these internal threats was limited. At no time did this become more evident than during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The impact that the events of this day had on the strategic picture of North
America is more relevant for this paper than the events of the day themselves. It was immediately clear that the strategic depth of North America had changed once again, and the American and Canadian defence structures needed to improve their capabilities.378
No longer could the governments rely on a reasonable amount of time between identification of a threat and an actual attack. The United States was the first to make changes to the way it defended the continental United States, by giving this responsibility
378 Dwight N. Mason. "NORAD and the Maritime Defence of North America". Presented at Transformation and Technology: A Canadian Maritime Security Perspective, hosted by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (Dalhousie University) in Halifax, Nova Scotia, June 15-17 2006. to Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), formed in 2002. A fraternal twin of NORAD,
USNORTHCOM dealt with homeland air defence, although the introduction of USCG officers onto the USNORTHCOM staff added a previously missing maritime dimension.379 The formation of NORTHCOM led, in turn, to the formation of the Bi- national Planning Group by Canada and the United States.
Rather than join USNORTHCOM, Canada established Canada Command
(CANADACOM) in 2006. USNORTHCOM sees CANADACOM, not NORAD as its natural partner in Canada. CANADACOM has a fairly broad mandate for military operations in the defence of Canada and its approaches, a mandate in which the US is naturally interested. The difficulty is that CANADACOM identifies itself as an inter- service command, with the authority for nearly all military operations in Canada. The exception is NORAD. However, the absorption of NORAD activities in Canada into
CANADACOM, while not necessarily a done deal, has been foreseen in key planning documents. °
A number of future models for North American defence were put forward in the
Bi-national Planning Group's final report, released in March 2006.381 Some of these models would require the downgrading of NORAD, another suggested the creation of a
North American Defence Command.382 Ultimately, the NORAD agreement was revised to include the development of a maritime warning capacity, and the agreement itself was renewed for an indefinite period, the first time in the Command's history.
3/y Jockel and Sokolsky. "Renewing NORAD", p. 53. 380 Ibid., p. 56. Cf. "Canada-United States Basic Defence Document" July 2006 381 Jockel and Sokolsky. "Renewing NORAD: Now if not forever", p. 56. 382 Ibid. 142
NORAD risks obsolescence if the United States decides to assume all responsibility for ITW/AA, since this is traditionally NORAD's primary raison d'etre.
This is also a large part of Canada's role in the bi-national structure, which may also become obsolete if Canada holds to its decision to not participate in North American missile defence. In the end, as the United States continues to evolve its missile detection and tracking systems for missile defence, first NORAD's ITW/AA capability
"1QA and then NORAD will become irrelevant.
NORAD's new role of maritime warning is quite limited since it does not include maritime surveillance and control. Rather, a cell based at NORAD will be responsible for "processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas [including internal waterways and external approaches] or attacks against North America..." Yet, it may be this new role that saves NORAD from complete irrelevancy. Nevertheless, it certainly does not ensure the creation of a
"unified and seamless all-domain bi-national North American defence system" or even a
"maritime defence system".386
5.4 Recent developments
In recent years, both the Northwest Passage and NORAD have come into the spotlight again. During the 2005-2006 election campaigns, the old debate regarding the Northwest
Passage was resurrected. The National Post reported that a U.S. submarine might have
383 Ibid. 384 Ibid, p. 55. 385 Ibid., p. 57. 386 Mason. "NORAD and the Maritime Defense of North America", p. 3. 143 surfaced near the North Pole.387 Although this incident has not been officially confirmed, the very idea of it revived the fears brought on by the voyage of the Polar Sea twenty years ago. Conservative leader Stephen Harper's election campaign made the most of this news by announcing his party's "Canada First" Strategy. Amongst other things, this strategy revived the concept of underwater surveillance and introduced a proposal to construct a deep-water port at Iqaluit. The latter promise was reiterated in August 2007, and will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7.
What is most peculiar is that Harper chose Arctic sovereignty as the first major issue he would address as Prime Minister. On January 26 2006, Prime Minister Harper criticized comments made by David Wilkins, the United States Ambassador. The day before, Ambassador Wilkins had referred to the waters of the Northwest Passage as
TOO
"neutral waters", and stated that the two nations had "agreed to disagree" on this issue.
The State Department said afterwards that Wilkins' use of the term "neutral waters" had been an error, but by then, the damage was done. Prime Minister Harper rebuked
Wilkins, saying that Canada would defend its sovereignty in the area, and made reference to the "Canada First" strategy389.
Was and is the United States as interested in the Northwest Passage as some
Canadians seem to think? There are conflicting views to consider. In 2004, Paul Cellucci, who was then the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, suggested that given the post-September
11th, 2001 security environment, it might be better for the Passage to remain under
387 CBC News. "Tories plan to bolster Arctic defence". December 22, 2005. Accessed from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2005/12/22/harper221205.html on May 18, 2007. 388 Mike Blanchfield. "New PM rebukes U.S. envoy's criticism". The National Post January 27, 2006, p. Al, A4. 389 Ibid. 144
Canadian control. Franklyn Griffiths questioned the sense in establishing the
Northwest Passage as an international strait:
Wouldn't it compromise the perimeter? Would it not give something of a free ride through the northernmost reaches of the continent to such security risks as human smugglers, criminals, and terrorists bent on moving material south of the Canada-US border or attacking critical continental infrastructure through Canada? Isn't the US interest better served by a regime that treats the central portion of the Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters subject to Canadian law and law enforcement?391
Meanwhile, discussion arose in 2006 in the United States of the need to replace the Polar class icebreakers. A recent report commissioned by the U.S. Congress, entitled Polar
Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs addressed this very issue, noting that both the Polar Star and the infamous Polar Sea are reaching the end of their service lives. The report expressed concern that if these vessels are not replaced in short order, then "U.S. icebreaking capability is now at risk of being unable to support national interests in the North and south [Antarctica]".392 The report also contained sections that could be perceived as counter to Canada's national interest, including:
Possible ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea implies that the United States would require extensive mapping of the U.S. continental shelf off Alaska, should the United States wish to use Article 76 in the Convention to extend its continental shelf beyond the 200
Canadian Press. "U.S. Protected by Canadian Control over Northwest Passage: Cellucci". Ottawa Citizen, October 8, 2004. Franklyn Griffiths. "The shipping news: Canada's Arctic sovereignty not on thinning ice". InternationalJournal 58:2 (Spring 2003). 392 National Research Council (United States). Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs. Washington, D.C. The National Academies Press, 2006, p. SC-1. Available online at http://fermat.nap.edu/openbook/0309103215/gifmid/Rl.gif. Accessed October 4, 2006. nm economic zone and/or to counter Territorial claims by other Arctic nations.
While the report never specifically addresses the Northwest Passage dispute, it
does make reference to the Passage in connection with Canada in two different contexts.
The first identifies the Northwest Passage as being "primarily north of Canada" (as
opposed to the Canadian view that it is part of Canadian territory). 94 The other context
deals with surveillance of shipping:
A more accessible Arctic in the near future has profound implications for changing the polar mission of the U.S. Coast Guard given the expectation for increased surveillance of commercial ship traffic transiting either the Northern Sea Route (across northern Russia) or the Northwest Passage (Canada)...
This text suggests some ambiguity. If we are to believe the first example, the
Northwest Passage is an international strait which runs north of Canada. And yet, the
second example suggests that the Passage runs across Northern Canada, i.e., is part of
Canadian territory. It is a subtlety, certainly, but an interesting one nonetheless.
The announcement of the release of the icebreaker report was met with some consternation by the Canadian media. Both the Globe and Mail and the Ottawa Citizen published editorials expressing their concern. The Globe took an academic approach:
There is no doubt that the United States has strategic interest in the north. It, like Canada, has citizens and territory above the Arctic Circle. It, like Canada, has a role to play in patrolling northern waters, as the eastern entrance to the passage, the Bering Strait, is off Alaska. It, like Canada, should maintain military icebreaker capability in the region - but not to police Canada's Territorial waters.. .Washington's disregard of Canada's jurisdiction
393 Ibid., p. S-2. 394 Ibid. 395 Ibid., p.2-12. 146
over the Northwest Passage is more than an irritant in relations between close allies - it is mystifying.
The Citizen took a more histrionic approach:
If the U.S. made a real effort to use the passage without Canadian permission, we could do little to stop it. We barely have the capability to monitor our Arctic waters, let alone patrol them. We've never been able to repel a determined U.S. attack on our territory, but we should at least have the capacity to make such an attack obvious and embarrassing.397
An point of view that is often overlooked is that the United States is not interested
in resolving the Northwest Passage issue further, because of the impact this may have on
US naval interests in other parts of the world that are perhaps less friendly to Americans,
notably the Straits of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca or even the Straits of Gibraltar.
Maximum freedom of the seas is paramount, even at the cost of straining relations with a
neighbour.398
NORAD, too, has come under fire in the past few months. Although the
agreement was renewed indefinitely in May 2006, there was provision for a joint review
of the accord within at least four years or at the request of either government. Since
the recent renewal left a number of key issues unresolved, it is likely that a review will
396 "An Arctic mystery". The Globe and Mail. October 2, 2006. Available from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20061002.EARCTIC02/TPStory. Accessed October 4, 2006. 397 "Hands off our north". The Ottawa Citizen, October 2, 2006. p. A10. •3QQ Rebecca Dube. "As ice melts, debate over Northwest Passage heats". USA Today, April 4, 2006. 399 Jockel and Sokolsky. "Renewing NORAD", p. 53. take place within the next four years. NORAD is under pressure to change and the recent
renewal has only delayed the inevitable.400
Perhaps the most pressing issue is how much control of homeland security the
governments wish to retain under NORAD, and how much they will wish to transfer to the national level, given the formation of USNORTHCOM and CANADACOM.401
Although NORAD's responsibilities have expanded with its new (albeit limited) role in maritime warning, it may face retrenchment in other areas, particularly if
USNORTHCOM wishes to assume responsibility for the air defence of Washington and of the President on his excursions to Texas. To help clarify such issues of responsibility, Canada and the United States signed the Canada-United States Basic
Defense Document, in Calgary on July 8, 2006. The stated purpose of this document was
"to provide guidance from the Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada (Chief) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States (Chairman) to senior military leaders for the defense [sic] of Canada and the United
States"403
Specifically, the document contains terms of reference for the vision, the military objectives, and the military requirements shared by Canada and the United States. It also outlines the command responsibilities for the Commanders of USNORTHCOM,
CANADACOM, and NORAD. Although not widely circulated, the document is extremely useful when attempting to define the Canada-US security relationship.
One area of continental defence in which Canada and the United States continue to disagree remains ballistic missile defence. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States
400 Ibid., p. 54. 401 Ibid. 402 Ibid. Canada-United States Basic Defense Document, July 2006, p. 1. 148
moved ahead with the deployment of a national ballistic missile defence system. After
toying with the idea, Canada decided in 2005 to decline participation for the time
being.404 This had a temporary detrimental effect on relations between the two countries,
because it was perceived as a partial reversal of the tradition of mutual defence first
affirmed at Ogdensburg in 1940.405 It also strengthened the cause of those who wish to
see the relationship between Canada and the US equalized with those with other nations,
"comme les autres", that is, a bi-lateral defence relationship rather than a bi-national
defence relationship.406
It is likely, however, that despite the strong anti-Americanism that has been
defined by many as key to the Canadian identity, public opinion in Canada would hardly
support a change to the unique Canada-US relationship. A chill on Canada-US relations
is not necessarily within Canada's best interests, particularly if we accept the viewpoint
that North America is not a single "homeland security" theatre, even as it appears to be a
single strategic area.407
5.5 Where to go from here?
In this chapter, we have laid out the key issues defining the Canada-US relationship as far
as Northern security is concerned. It is a cooperative partnership unlike any other in the
world. The key to the success of the partnership is that there are certain issues, such as border disputes, which are traditionally not publicly discussed. This gentlemen's
agreement regarding the Northwest Passage has been threatened in recent months as the
404 Jockel and Sokolsky, "Renewing NORAD", p. 53. 405 Mason. "NORAD and the Maritime Defense of North America", p. 3. 406 Ibid., p. 4. 407 Ibid. 149
Harper government has asserted Canada's sovereignty clams in conjunction with the
Canada First defence strategy. Fortunately, the issue has not yet escalated into a major international dispute as other problems have taken precedence.
The indefinite renewal of the NORAD agreement, despite the coordination challenges posed by the ever-evolving NORTHCOM and CANADACOM, was and remains an important event for Canada-US relations. It ensures a level of continuity in joint operations, which is surely to Canada's benefit. There is no immediate reason to think that there is cause for the status quo to be altered. This is not to say that it would be impossible. If, for example, the United States was faced with another major security crisis on the scale of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it might lead to a re-vamp of the entire
North American security regime. Alternatively, (and more positively), a boom of energy resources in the Beaufort Sea or elsewhere in the Western Arctic could lead to a re negotiation of the Canada-US relationship, since territorial disputes would necessarily gain urgency in the face of economic demands. 150
CHAPTER 6 - THE NORTH IN CIRCUMPOLAR RELATIONS
6.1 The Northern circumpolar neighbourhood
We have discussed in previous chapters how Canada's North has been overlooked at
times, seen within a narrow context during other periods. This is also true of the
international North, or the Northern circumpolar neighbourhood. The North has been
seen as the last frontier of Europe, the Ultima Thule, for centuries. It was explored by
men from Scandinavia and from Russia long before the existence of Canada or the United
States. As a result, the Scandinavian countries and Russia have long had a vested interest
in things Northern, in Europe and elsewhere, but usually in a limited, resource-based
capacity
The Northern circumpolar neighbourhood is not an overly-crowded one, at least,
in comparison with other regions in the world. There are eight Arctic nations: Canada,
the United States, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and
Iceland. Greenland, although run by an autonomous Home Rule government, is still a
Danish territory. Although these nations are in toto heavily populated (estimated at 550,
000, 000 people in 1998), their Northern populations are tiny in proportion. °8 The
aboriginal population of the region, estimated at 1, 242, 000 in 1998, is less than 1
percent of the nations' total population.
"Ownership" of the international North is dynamic, making sovereignty an
important issue. Just as Canada has had difficulties with other countries accepting its
claims to the Northwest Passage, Russia has had disputes over its claims along the
408 Rob Huebert. "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples". Issues in the North Occasional Publication Number 44, Vol. 3. Jill Oakes and Rick Riewe, eds. Winnipeg: The Canadian Circumpolar Institute and the Department of Native Studies, University of Manitoba, 1998, p. 143. 151
Northern Sea route (also known as the Northeast Passage). The 20th century was a
particularly turbulent time for the northern map. Sovereignty disputes over the Canadian
Arctic archipelago, over Spitzbergen and Svalbard were nearly all settled in the interwar
period. Yet the Second World War saw parts of the North change hands. Ties between
Denmark and its domains of Greenland and Iceland were severed after Denmark was
absorbed into the Third Reich. The two islands were subsequently occupied by the Allies
for the duration. Norway was also occupied by the Germans. Finland fought first the
Soviet Union and then the Germans in order to maintain its independence. Only Sweden remained neutral.
The end of the Second World War saw the return to old borders, at least as far as the North was concerned. Different lines could however, be drawn based on political ideology. On the one side were the Northern signators of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Canada, the United States, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark (and by extension,
Greenland). On the other side was the Soviet Union. After some initial skirmishes,
Finland established semi-cordial relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, but maintained its non-aligned stance. Sweden again retained its neutrality.409
Even while ideological conflict was dividing the North, however, there was international cooperation in other areas. Oran Young wrote of a "cacophony of Arctic initiatives".410 He identified twenty-three "selected Arctic Institutions and Organizations" ranging from intergovernmental regimes to indigenous peoples organizations. Not all of these are relevant to Canada's North. This chapter focuses on several international actors
409 Oran R. Young. "The Structure of Arctic Co-operation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities". Prepared for the 4th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Rovaniemi, August 27-29 2000, p. 3. 152 that have a vested interest in northern security in Canada. Since we have already discussed Canada's military alliances, however, this chapter examines those actors espousing a broader view of security. We will then examine the place that Circumpolar
Affairs holds within the Canadian Government.
6.2 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) is the international organization representing all
Inuit, regardless of nationality (Inuit in the Soviet Union were not permitted to join because of Cold War politics, although that is no longer the case). The first session of the
ICC, held in 1977 in Barrow, Alaska, was devoted to the development of conservation and environmental policy in response to resource development in the Beaufort Sea. The meeting evolved into a discussion of broader issues affecting the Inuit, and raised the possibilities of Inuit home rule and the establishment of an organization for the Inuit similar in structure to the United Nations.411 The exact structure of this organization remained in flux until the second assembly held in Nuuk in 1980. The ICC charter was introduced at this meeting, with a preamble that stated the collective hopes of the Inuit, recognizing amongst other things that
International and national policies and practices should give due consideration to protection of the Arctic and sub- Arctic environment and to the preservation and evolution of Inuit culture and societies [and]
Gary Luton. The Arctic Ocean: A Regional Sea. M. A. Thesis. Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1984, pp. 103-104. 153
That in furtherance of our spirit of co-operation with the international community, we seek to promote world 412
peace...
Unlike other international minority organizations, the ICC initially concerned
itself strictly with the Arctic world, addressing familiar issues, rather than venturing into
international human rights politics. Part of this was due to pure logistics, with limited
funding, and with communications amongst members being much more difficult than
today. It also derived from the concept of the ICC acting as an international vehicle
for Inuit co-operation, not for all indigenous peoples of the North.
In 1983, the ICC was given non-governmental organization (NGO) status by the
United Nations. This has provided the organization with a great deal of political
legitimacy, although it could be argued that this effectively killed any chance of the ICC
evolving into a UN of the North. Still, the ICC has become an influential voice in
circumpolar affairs, particularly in addressing environmental and security issues. The
ICC was an early participant in the demilitarization movement, continuing to express its
commitment to the promotion of international cooperation and world peace. 15 At the
July 1986 General Assembly, delegates from Canada, the United States, and Denmark mandated the ICC to develop a foreign policy that included a stance on defence matters.
Particular emphasis was placed on the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapons-free
The Inuit Circumpolar Conference. "Charter of the General Assembly". Reprinted in Ml. "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas", pp. 57-58. 413 Ml. "Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas", p. 59. Language also remains a difficulty, with several different dialects of Inuktitut, English, Russian, and Danish all being potentially used. 15 Mary Simon. "Circumpolar Cooperation: An Inuit perspective". Submitted to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Session VI - Peace and Security in the Arctic - the Circumpolar Dimension, October 3, 1987, p. 1. 154
zone in the area through international treaty.416 Unfortunately, the implausibility of such
a zone was discovered after an ICC study into the impacts of military activity on the
Arctic. Soviet dependence on its Arctic submarine bases was a major obstacle.417 That
same year, the ICC expressed its desire for greater cooperation and strengthened relations
between the ICC, DND and the Department of External Affairs, so that Inuit concerns
would not be "lost in the shuffle".418
The ICC was also an early advocate of what would later be termed "human
security". In a presentation to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control
Affairs on October 3, 1987, the president of the ICC, Mary Simon expressed her
organization's belief that extensive circumpolar cooperation was key to promoting Arctic
and global peace. She acknowledged that "such cooperation would best flourish if it also
included meaningful arms control initiatives".419 Simon also expressed the ICC's
concerns about defence issues that did not seem to be adequately addressed. These issues
ranged from the possible illegality of nuclear weapons to the need for in-depth Inuit
participation in defence and arms control issues. Simon was also quick to point out that
"... northern economic opportunities should not replace proper socio-economic
development in the Arctic for peaceful purposes".420
416 Ibid., p. 2. 417 McMahon. "Strangers in the Land.. .Again", p. 2. 418 Peter Jull. Submission to "Cooperation, Conflict, and Isolation in the International Arctic", Seminar 4 (Canada's Interests in the International Arctic) of the National Symposium on the North. Toronto, 30 October 1986. Changing Times, Challenging Agendas: Economic and Political Issues in Canada's North, National Symposium on the North. Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1988, p. 118. 419 Simon. "Circumpolar Cooperation: An Inuit perspective", p. 2. 420 Ibid., p. 5. 155
Although the nuclear threat has abated, and climate change has come to the fore,
the ICC has not abandoned its interest in defence issues in Canada. Rather, it has put
forward a concept of "sustainable security", expressed by Dalee Sambo in 1993. Similar
to Inuit approaches discussed in Chapter 3, "sustainable security" includes
recognition of the principle of self-determination; full respect for land and resource rights; recognition of the right to development and the right to peace; direct participation in international, national and regional processes that affect indigenous communities; respect and recognition of native rights; recognition as distinct societies; security in hunting and fishing rights; the right to a safe and healthy environment; and removal of threat of environmental destruction.421
The ICC has also become an advocate of exerting Canadian sovereignty in the
Arctic. The sentiment behind this is that the Inuit have contributed greatly to Canadian sovereignty already, first by relocation and then through the Canadian Rangers. The current Vice-President of the ICC, Sheila Watt-Cloutier has argued that the Inuit were quicker to respond to the Polar Sea incident than the federal government did, by urging the federal government to use "the well-documented use and occupancy of the Arctic by
Inuit to confirm, assert, and express Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage".422
The ICC does, however, face numerous logistic and financial obstacles to its success. Travel in the North is expensive and arduous. To be sure, the introductions of teleconferencing and the Internet to the North have facilitated rapid communication
As summarized in Loukacheva. "Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic", p. 244. 422 Sheila Watt-Cloutier. "Remarks at a Conference sponsored by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, the Canadian Polar Commission, and the University of Calgary Centre of Military and Strategic Studies". Ottawa, January 25, 2002. 156 between ICC delegates, but there are always instances where technology cannot replace person-to-person interaction.
Another obstacle, which the ICC shares with other international organizations, is language. The Inuit may share a language, but there are dialectal differences to the extent that Inuit from Barrow Inlet and Greenland may not be able to understand each other.
Additionally, younger Inuit raised on southern culture and by southern educational methods may be less familiar with Inuktitut than with English, French, or Danish. They may find it difficult to communicate with Inuit raised in more traditional environments.
The ICC will no doubt continue to be the voice of the Inuit on pan-northern issues for some time to come, because of the strength it provides in numbers and the integrity of its international reputation. Nevertheless, it will have to evolve along with the people it represents, in order to remain relevant in the future.
6.3 Other international aboriginal organizations
While certainly the oldest international aboriginal organization in Canada, the ICC is not the only one found in Canada's North. The Gwich'in Council International was founded in 1999 in Inuvik by representatives from the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and
Alaska. The Arctic Athabaskan Council was created on June 26 , 2000. As with the
ICC, the primary focus of these two organizations is the protection of the northern environment. Climate change is a major concern. Do these organizations subscribe to the concept of "sustainable security"? It is difficult to say for certain. It will be interesting to see how these organizations will evolve during the 21st century, namely what issues they will choose to focus their efforts on, and whether they will be successful in their efforts. 157
It will certainly take time and dedication before such groups can attain the political prestige of the ICC, but since they cater to specific aboriginal groups, a positive future is
likely.
6.4 The Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is also a fairly new actor in circumpolair relations. It is the first state- level multilateral organization devoted entirely to circumpolar affairs. It has also included three northern Aboriginal organizations as "Permanent Participants", with the right to participate in all Council fora, including decision-making sessions.
The idea of an Arctic Council was officially supported by Prime Minister
Mulroney during a visit to Leningrad in 1989. Shortly afterwards, an independent panel of Canadian Arctic experts met to examine the potential for such a Council and its structure. The model proposed by the panel was one in which the aboriginal peoples of the North and the Arctic Territorial governments would each be represented by a delegation equal in status to those of the Arctic nations.
The concept of including indigenous "Permanent Participants" at a level higher than that of NGOs on the Council was first used in the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS).425 Indigenous participation in AEPS was first allowed in 1993 after intensive lobbying by the ICC. The three organizations accorded this treatment were the
ICC, the Saami Council of Scandinavia, and the Associate of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation. The Indigenous People's
Huebert. "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples", p. 141. Ibid., p. 143. Ibid., p. 144. 158
Secretariat was established in Copenhagen in 1994 by the Government of Denmark and the Greenland Home Rule Office in order to act as a co-ordinating body for the three organizations, and to assist them in coordinating their positions.
There was some initial difficulty in establishing the Arctic Council because of concerns expressed by the United States regarding the Council's scope. Canadian officials continued to lobby the United States for support, culminating in a series of meetings between Andre Ouellet, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Warren
Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State. These meetings resulted in the United States revising its position and supporting the Council initiative.427 The creation of the position of Ambassador of Circumpolar Affairs was another move by the Canadian government which facilitated the establishment of the Council. Mary Simon, former president of the
ICC, was appointed to the post in 1994. Simon had been a member of the original independent panel that had developed the Council proposal in the early 1990s, and after her appointment conducted extensive meetings with all parties. After holding a series of bilateral discussions, senior Arctic officials met in June 1995, and reached agreement on the Council. The Arctic Council Declaration was officially signed on September 19
1996. Since its creation eleven years ago, the Council has expanded to include three more Permanent Participants. The most recent additions were the Gwich'in Council
International and the Arctic Athabaskan Council in October 2000. Thus, almost all aboriginal people in Canada's North have representation at the Council.
Ibid., p. 144-145. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., p. 146. 159
The Council's mandate, as set out in the Declaration, is to ensure the well-being
of the inhabitants of the Arctic, and to promote sustainable development. The Council is
also intended to address "common Arctic issues", with one exception. The exception, which is actually footnoted in the text of the Declaration, is that the Council "should not deal with matters related to military security". This had been one of the stumbling blocks preventing the establishing of the Council. Although the Canadian government had hoped to include "traditional" security issues in this new Arctic forum, the United
States steadfastly refused.430
Of course, the stricture applies only to issues of military security. While defence issues are taboo, the same does not apply to environmental and human security issues.
Lassi Heininen suggested that
although security-policy per se is officially excluded from the official agendas, if stability, environmental protection including nuclear safety and sustainable development are the main aims of the current international cooperation in the North, then security is there, both meaning comprehensive and traditional security.
Or sustainable security, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The problem with sustainable security, at least as far the Arctic Council is concerned is that different delegations may have differing definitions. In fact, Rob Huebert suggested a clash between the concepts of sustainability versus conservation as the core issue facing the Council in the late
1990s.432 The Permanent Participants, supported by Canada and Norway, argued (and continue to do so) for the right to harvest marine and fur-bearing animals. This position
429 The Arctic Council. "Declaration", September 19, 1996. 430 Huebert. "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples", p. 146. 431 Lassi Heininen. "Security in the North". Presented at the 3rd NRF Open Meeting in Yellowknife and Rae Edzo, Canada, September 15-18, 2004, p. 12. 432 Ibid., p. 150. 160
was opposed by the United States, who had been lobbied intensively by animal rights
433
groups.
The division of the Arctic Council on this issue is illustrative of the selective
approach that nations such as Canada or the United States may make when it comes to
environmental matters. On the issue of marine and fur-bearing mammals, the United
States is pro-environmental preservation and pro-animal rights. This concern does not
necessarily extend to the protection of terrestrial fur-bearing mammals living in Alaska's
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, whose environment would be endangered if the Refuge
were opened up to drilling.
It is also illustrative of the clash of ideas that occurs when Northern culture
encounters Southern perceptions. Milton M.R. Freeman suggested that the urban-based
animal rights campaigns led by radical environmentalists and animal welfare
organizations were essentially an assault on the lifestyles led by the people of the
North.434 He argued that trade bans, intended to affect commerce, have affected the
subsistence security of northern populations. These populations, because of their small
sizes and distance from mainstream society, are only affected negatively.435 By entering
into co-management agreements with national management agencies many northern
resource users have been able to safeguard their traditions and values. 6 This is
precisely what has occurred with the establishment of the Nationals Parks in Canada's
North. The Parks protect the wildlife and yet allow the people of the North, be they Inuit
Milton M.R. Freeman. "Issues affecting subsistence security in Arctic societies". Arctic Anthropology 34:1 (1997), p. 8. 435 Ibid. 161
or Athabaskan or Gwich'in, to hunt the wildlife for their own survival. These types of
arrangements can work very well on the domestic level. How can they be made effective
on an international scale?
Huebert drew attention to the reality that the marine-mammal issue could cause
problems with the operation of the Arctic Council. The American delegation supported
an open-door policy for observers. On the other hand, Canada and Norway were
concerned that this would enable animal rights groups, such as the International Fund for
Animal Welfare, to be given observer status on the Council. The Canadian delegation
held the position that observer status should be reserved for groups with a northern focus.
A glance at the Council's observer list suggests that the Canadians and Norwegians won
this particular argument, given that the only wildlife related group who has observer
status with the Arctic Council is the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, an
international body for "cooperation on the conservation, management, and study of
A'lQ marine mammals in the North Atlantic".
The efforts of the Arctic Council will no doubt become increasingly important as the effects of climate change on the North become more and more pronounced. There is, however, the potential for deadlock if members of the Council cannot agree on the appropriate actions to take.
Huebert. "The Arctic Council and Northern Aboriginal Peoples", p. 150. 438 The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission. Retrieved from http://www.nammco.no/Nammco/Mainpage/ on August 9, 2007. 162
6.5 The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region
The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region seeks to support the
Arctic Council by working in close co-operation with the governments of the Arctic
States.439 It holds a permanent Observer position on the Council, on the position that active dialogue between governments and parliaments is essential to successful international co-operation and global governance.440 The Standing Committee exists on the premise that parliamentary participation is essential in such dialogues because it helps anchor views and positions, making it easier to make decisions on practical issues at the national level.441 The Standing Committee has been strongly supportive of Canada's addition of a Northern Dimension to its foreign policy. It has also given high priority to the concerns of indigenous groups from across the North.442
The Committee is unique for two reasons. Firstly, its members are all serving parliamentarians in their own countries, which means a direct link between the interests of the Committee and the interests of the parliamentary backbenchers. Like the Arctic
Council, it also allows full participation by the Saami Council, the ICC and the Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. Secondly, the Committee does not shy away from addressing military security issues. The Final Document from the First Nordic
Council's International Conference for Parliamentarians on Development and Protection
Reproduced in Richard Langlais. "Arctic co-operation organisations: a status report for the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region". The 4th Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Rovaniemi, Finland, August 27-29 2000, p. 28 440 Ibid. 4 * A counter-argument could be made that the home governments embroil their parliamentarians in such discussions for the sole purpose of delaying action on undesirable issues. 442 Ibid., p. 30. 163
of the Arctic region, held in Reykjavik on August 17, 1993, states that the Governments
and groups represented will
support all efforts to create a total ban on nuclear weapons tests, and to put all other civilian and military use of nuclear technology and nuclear material, including waste management, under strict international surveillance and control443
In the 2006 Conference Statement, the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region
called for Governments in the Arctic Region and the Institutions of the European Union to "strengthen their cooperation regarding marine security, especially search and rescue matters" 444 This phrase is repeated verbatim in the 2007 Conference Statement.445 The wording seems vague at best, but further explanation is provided in a submission that the
Standing Committee made to a European Union hearing regarding its Green Paper on maritime policy.446 The submission identifies increased shipping activities "relating to the transport of goods, oil and gas, tourism, research, etc." as the major challenge to maritime security in the Arctic Ocean.447 The Committee then calls for "greater co ordination to prevent accidents and, should one nonetheless take place, to agree on joint
Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians. "Final Statement". August 1993. Available online at http://www.Arcticparl.org/resource/static/confl_statement.pdf. Retrieved on May 22, 2007. 444 Seventh Conference Of Parliamentarians Of The Arctic Region. "Conference Statement". Kiruna, Sweden, 2-4th, August, 2006. Available online at: http://www.Arcticparl.org/resource/static/conf7_conference_statement_final_draft.pdf. Retrieved on May 22, 2007. 445 Eighth Conference Of Parliamentarians Of The Arctic Region. "Conference Statement". Brussels, Belgium, 28th February-1 March 2007. Retrieved from http://www.Arcticparl.org/resource/images/Conference%20Statement%201%20March% 202007.pdf on August 2, 2007. 446 Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. "Contribution to the European Union hearing regarding the Green Paper on maritime policy from the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region". Retrieved from http://www.Arcticparl.Org/resource/images/l 181220274235.pdf on August 2, 2007. 441 Ibid.,-p. 3. 164 mechanism to combat its effects".448 The impact of such statements is debatable, nevertheless, the fact that they have been made in public fora allows them a place in discussions on Northern issues.
6.6 The Northern Forum
The Forum is an organization comprised of twenty-four regional governments and businesses from ten northern countries. It was established in November 1991 and is based out of Anchorage, Alaska. The mission of the Forum is
To improve the quality of life of Northern peoples by providing Northern regional leaders a means to share their knowledge and experience in addressing common challenges; and; To support sustainable development and the implementation of cooperative socio-economic initiatives among Northern regions and through international fora.449
In 2000, the Northwest Territories was listed as a member of the Forum, but that no longer appears to be the case. The Yukon Territory was a founding member of the
Forum, and the Province of Alberta has joined as well. What sets the Northern Forum apart from other international organizations described in this chapter is that it continually seeks broader business contacts as "a way to affirm its conviction that economic development is an essential issue throughout the North".450 The Forum has also been forced to affirm that it complements rather than competes with the Arctic Council, providing regional interaction that falls outside the Council's mandate.451 Projects that
44y The Northern Forum. "Mission Statement", Reproduced in Langlais. "Arctic co- operation organisations", pp. 23-24. 4*° Ibid.,-p. 27. 165
the Forum has given priority to fall into four general areas: boreal forest management,
circumpolar air routes, education, and wildlife management.452
Unlike other international organizations discussed in this chapter, the Northern
Forum is primarily economic in nature and in its interests. It is also not representative of
all of Canada's North, since it only includes the Yukon as a member. Both these
circumstances affect the Forum's credibility in its claims to helping the people of the
North.
6.7 Canada and the northern Circumpolar World
In Canada, Northern Circumpolar Affairs are handled by the Aboriginal and Circumpolar
Affairs Division of DFA, using the Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy as
its mandate.453 The Circumpolar Affairs movement within DFA took off in 1994,
emerging from the conference A Northern Policy for Canadians. A key step was the
appointment of Mary Simon, former president of the ICC, as Canada's first Ambassador
for Circumpolar Affairs. It was during Simon's tenure (a result of her leadership) that the
Canadian government was able to assist with the growth of the Arctic Council and the
Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. Simon's tenure also oversaw the strengthening of the ICC, and the creation of the Gwich'in Council
International and the Arctic Athabaskan Council.
Simon was succeeded by Jack Anawak in 2003. Anawak, who had been key in the realization of Nunavut (and therefore a controversial choice in some Inuit circles, who
4i2 Ibid., p. 26. Southern Circumpolar Affairs are also handled by this division, but they obviously do not fall within our discussion. 166
had not cared for his methods), seemed poised to maintain the same level of government
interest in circumpolar affairs. In 2006, the federal government committed $150 million
as its participation in the International Polar Year, and renewed the Northern Dimension
program for five years. These commitments, however, came at a cost: the Ambassador
for Circumpolar Affairs position was eliminated as a cost-saving measure. The duties of
the Ambassador were now to be carried out by a "senior bureaucrat".454 This action was a
blow to Canada's North. Anawak commented that the decision was an unfortunate one
In view of the fact that the Arctic Council is a very important body, and upcoming issues, like climate change and global warming, are very important issues that Arctic Council is dealing with, as well as the upcoming International Polar Year.455
Duane Smith of the ICC also expressed his disappointment, saying
It should be concerning for all the people living in the Arctic because the level of attention that the Arctic ambassador's office provided was immediate and dealt with all the issues directly456
The "senior bureaucrat" who was put in charge for Circumpolar Affairs for DFA
was Paul Gibbard, director of the Aboriginal and Circumpolar Affairs Division, whose
previous postings with Foreign Affairs included First Secretary for the Canadian
Embassy in Cuba and Canadian Deputy Director, US Transboundary Division.457 While
5 CBCNews. "Circumpolar ambassador job axed". October 3, 2006. Available online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2006/10/03/circumpolar-cuts.html. Retrieved June 16, 2007. 455 Ibid. 456 Ibid. Cf. International Council for Canadian Studies. The International Canadianist January 2004. Retrieved from http://www.iccs- ciec.ca/pages/z_pdfs/canist_04_01_en.pdf on June 16, 2007. Also http://www.caj .ca/news/news-archives/00July 14.html 167
there is no reason to question Mr, Gibbard's bureaucratic abilities or his experience on
addressing boundary issues involving the United States, the fact that he was assigned this
portfolio in place of someone with years of experience in the North sent a very strong
message about how the federal government felt about Circumpolar Affairs and about
Northern issues in general. It seems that someone within DFA may have noticed this
since Adele Dion, director-general for human rights and human security is now Canada's
senior Arctic official.458 Ms. Dion has some experience in Circumpolar Affairs and Arctic
issues, having served as Canada's Ambassador to Finland beginning in 2001. This has no
doubt boosted her credibility in northern circles.
6.8 Conclusions
This chapter examined three types of international organizations that involve Canada in
circumpolar relations: aboriginal, governmental, and economic. All of the organizations
examined support a broad definition of security for the North beyond defence matters - in
some instances, such as the Arctic Council, this broader definition is absolutely essential to ensure the participation of the United States. The Arctic Council is also unique for its inclusion of aboriginal organizations such as the ICC as full members.
The ICC is the oldest circumpolar organization in which Canada is involved, and arguably the most influential on aboriginal rights in the North. Other organizations have emerged in recent years which will no doubt gain importance during the 21st century, provided the North remains a cause dejour. The Northern cause has received a
Lee Berthiaume. "DFA left in the cold on Arctic issues". Embassy August 1, 2007, p. 10. 168 significant political boost as a result of the amount of time and energy that these organizations have contributed.
The input provided by all groups, aboriginal, economic, and political has been invaluable. In many instances, they have introduced "Northern" alternatives to the security conception imposed on Canada's North by the South. They have also provided alternatives to a security agenda that is largely driven (or at least influenced) by Canada's relations with the United States. This has proved particularly important in areas concerning Canada's Arctic wildlife, where a Nordic type of species management is conducive to the Northern lifestyle. Nevertheless, there is a danger that accepting these alternatives will merely result in the substitution of one imposition of "foreign" concepts in place of another. Does the North really need another influx of such ideas? Surely it has had more than its fair share.
What is needed for the North is a "Made-in-Canada" solution, or rather, a "Made- in-Canada's North" solution. In order to accomplish that, the federal government needs to listen to and incorporate the Northern voice into its environmental security policies.
This depends, as always, on the will of the federal government, who, at present, is sending mixed signals about the importance of Canada's involvement in Circumpolar
Affairs. It should be remembered that the federal government has the tendency to adopt a NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) approach when it comes to the incorporation of certain practices. The concept of "human security", for example, is one actively exercised by
DFA in its overseas activities, including in Circumpolar Affairs (given that its senior representative holds both portfolios). Domestically, however, it is scarce to be found.
The federal government also tends to welcome multilateralism when it comes to solving 169 other nation's problems. One only needs to look at Canada's forays into the Balkans and into Southwestern Asia for examples. When it comes to Canada's own problems, however, Canada acts unilaterally. Assistance from other nations is not desired.
We see this demonstrated in the government's current actions. On the one hand, the government has committed money to Canada's participation in the International Polar
Year, has extended the Northern Dimension mandate, and continues to participate in the
Arctic Council and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.
On the other hand, it eliminated one of the key Northern voices within the federal government by eliminating the Ambassador position in the name of cost-cutting and thus diminished the status of Circumpolar Affairs. It is yet another example of how the needs of the North and the priorities of the federal government do not always match. 170
CHAPTER 7 - THE STATE OF NORTHERN SECURITY TODAY
As stated in the Introduction, the bulk of the research for this thesis concerns events that took place prior to December 1, 2006. Since that date, however, there have been a number of occurrences that have ensured that Canada's North remains a major topic of debate, domestically and internationally. It is useful to review these recent developments in part because they affirm arguments already presented here, and because they will surely shape future policies concerning the region.
7.1 Canada's North and the outside world
Two very different chains of events from early 2007 illustrate how susceptible the North can be to the imposition of international solutions in order to solve (or at least address) what are perceived by / 'exterieur to be Northern problems. Towards the end of
December 2006, the United States made an announcement that sent ripples through the
North: Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthorne proposed listing the polar bear as a
"threatened species" because "we are concerned the polar bear's habitat may be literally melting".459 While the announcement was lauded by environmentalists, it was met with great concern in Nunavut. Steve Pinksen, director of policy, planning and legislation for the territory's Environment Department commented:
We are disappointed. It has a potential for impacts directly upon our economy, particularly in the smaller communities, and that's always a concern.. .If the listing goes forward and there's any restrictions on imports into the US or taking
CBC News. "U.S. could designate polar bears a "threatened species". December 27, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2006/12/27/polar-bear.html January 9, 2007. 171
of bears by American hunters, that would very likely have a direct impact on our sport hunts".
A few days later, Nunavut's Environment Minister, Patterk Netser, indicated that the
Territory would submit its comments to the US government within the prescribed
comment period.461 Netser appeared at a hearing before the US Fish and Wildlife
Service, to affirm Nunavut's concern: "[polar bears] are not endangered. They are not
threatened at the moment. We have an abundance in the area."462
The results of the US Fish and Wildlife Service's study will not be known until the end of 2007, and so the polar bears remain in limbo. Nevertheless, the frustration felt by the people of Nunavut about those who wish to hamper the Northern lifestyle in the name of ecological preservation is not restricted to the fate of the polar bear. Similar
comments were written by Mary Simon, President of the ITK, in an article describing her recent trip to Europe to speak out against bans on seal products: ".. .it was hard not to walk out and have to listen to people who think they know what is best for us, and how we should live our lives.. ,".463 Simon reflected on the effects that a ban would have the
Inuit community, given the impact that a 1983 European ban on seal pelts had already had
The economy of some of our communities and the livelihood of many of our Inuit hunters was damaged.. .once a market is destroyed, it is destroyed for
460 CBC News. "Nunavut fears fallout from polar bear proposal". December 28, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2006/12/28/polar-nunavut.html on March 9, 2007. 461 CBC News. "Polar bears not threatened: Nunavut". January 2, 2007. Available online at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/01/02/polar-reaction.html. 462 CBC News. "Don't put polar bears on "threatened list", Nunavut tells US". March 9, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/03/09/nu-bears.html 463 Mary Simon. "Sealskin Politics in Europe - Opening Day". Above & Beyond (May/June 2007), p. 58. 172
everyone... .Our economy is now a mixed economy, but the consumption of seal meat, and the sale of seal pelts, continues to make important contributions to our economy, diet, physical well-being, and cultural survival and is based on practises of sustainable use.464
A few weeks after Kempthorne's statement about the polar bears, another nation
made an announcement that had the potential to impact on the North. On a visit to
Ottawa early in January, the Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin offered the use of
his nation's icebreakers to keep the port at Churchill, Manitoba ice-free year round, a
means of completing the so-called Arctic Bridge between Churchill and Murmansk in
Siberia. Levitin's offer was supported by the Manitoba's Minister of Infrastructure and
Transport, Ron Lemieux. Lemieux commented
It is an idea whose time has come.. .They are looking at a way to get those goods into the heartland of North America.. .and they are looking for ways to use Churchill as a port of entry, and they are looking to use Winnipeg as an air hub. The Russians want to do this right now. 65
Other than indicating that the Russian proposal was an "interesting idea", there has not
yet been much response from the federal government.466 This is not surprising. Using
foreign icebreakers of any nationality to keep the Arctic passages clear would require a
major overhaul of the current regime in Canada's Arctic, as these vessels would have to
be granted right-of-way while in Canadian waters, and there would be a greater
requirement in general for a monitoring presence in the region, likely from Canada's
Coast Guard.467 One also has to question the impact that a year-round open path through
464 Ibid. 465 Shawn McCarthy. "Russia offers to break the ice to open Port Churchill". The Globe and Mail. January 10, 2007. 466 Ibid. 467 Ibid. 173
Canada's Arctic waters would have on the people and the environment of the North.
While certainly it could be beneficial to communities along its path, the "Arctic Bridge"
could have a serious effect on the hunting culture of the North if it interferes with the
migration of animal populations, not to mention on the animal populations themselves,
already beleaguered with the consequences of climate change.
Ultimately, these are issues that mainly fall outside the traditional definition of
Northern security, because they affect the people and the environment of Canada's North,
not necessarily Canada's sovereignty or Canada's national security. Unfortunately, this
means that these issues will likely not be recognized as legitimate security concerns by
the current federal government, and may therefore be perceived as less critical. If, however, the federal government were to adopt a clear whole-of-government approach to
security in Canada's North, such issues could be more readily addressed.
7.2 The people of the North and Northern Research
The atypical winter of 2006-2007 caught the attention of many Canadians. From wild windstorms in British Columbia to record low temperatures in eastern Canada, the weather was unsettling to say the least. Even John Baird, the Environment minister, commented on it as he visited Vancouver's storm-damaged Stanley Park:
We've had unusually warm weather in parts of the country and unusually harsh weather in other parts of the country and I wanted to come out first hand and see it.. .It's demonstrably worse than anything you can seen on television and it's a wake-up call468
Levitz, Stephanie. "Wacky weather wake-up call on climate change: federal environment minister". Canadian Press. January 8, 2007. Retrieved from http://ca.news.yahoo.eom/s/capress/070108/national/storm Park&printer=l on January 9, 2007. 174
The wake-up call could not have come at a more appropriate time as the international scientific community began the fourth IPY. The IPY program, officially launched on March 1 in Paris, is the first comprehensive study of the Arctic and the
Antarctic in 50 years. It will involve more than 50,000 scientists working on 228 projects ranging from climate change to northern culture.469 There was some controversy in
Canada surrounding the IPY programme, as the end of 2006 approached and the federal government had not yet announced to which research proposals $150 million would be allocated.470 Additionally, the ICC president, Duane Smith, expressed concern that northerners were not active participants in the development of these proposals:
.. .It seems like it's an old system where the researcher would come up, poke and probe you and/or analyze the surroundings without even informing the people what's going on in their own backyards471
Mary Simon expressed similar concerns:
If there are studies to be done and research to be done.. .we have to be part of that and be an integral part of it, not just something that other people are studying, so it's very important to create that partnership.472
Simon's fears, at least, were allayed when the government announced that her national group's research proposal (addressing diversity and resiliency across the North and how
CBC News. "International Polar Year program to chronicle climate change" February 26, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/02/26/science- poles.html on March 9, 2007. CBC News. "Northerners fear Polar Year funding delays will leave them out in the cold". December 18, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2006/12/18/ipy-delays.html on March 9, 2007. 471 Ibid. 472 Ibid. 175
communities are adapting to climate change) had been approved. 73 The ITK was not the
only First Nation group to have its proposal accepted - the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation
also received funding to study the impact of climate change on health, wildlife, and the
environment.474 Another project involves all Canadian Inuit in examining the role and
importance of marine fat in preventing cardiovascular and mental disorders.475
It remains, however, that the vast majority of research conducted on Canada's
North is conducted by outsiders, a reality evinced by Smith and Simon. This means that
despite the intentions of the researchers, the Northern voice may be distorted within or
filtered out of the research entirely. This is particularly pronounced in security issues, and
is a reflection of the lack of a substantial resident academic community in Northern
Canada. This is a void that can only be filled through time and through further investment
in Northern education. Until then, Southern solutions will continue to dominate the
federal government's response to Northern security issues.
7.3 Northern Security vs. Northern Defence
The launch of the IPY programme coincided with some troubling news from the North.
On February 26, 2007, Environment Canada announced that the edge of the ice floe along the Davis Strait and the coast of Baffin Island was twice as close to shore as normal, and
CBC News. "Simon applauds human dimension of polar research projects" March 3, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/03/02/simon-ipy.html on March 9, 2007. 176 thinner than usual.476 Scientists attributed the ice conditions to a late start to the ice season. The impact on the environment did not go unnoticed. Peterloosie Qarpik, of the
Pangnirtung Hunters and Trappers Organization commented that the ice was not safe for travel or even the wildlife (hunters had observed seal pups falling into the water because the ice was so thin).477 Despite the increased risk to human life posed by the changing conditions, this announcement has received very little attention. Instead, the federal government continues to maintain its narrow view of the North as a frontier to be protected by expeditions and as a training area. This view has been clearly demonstrated by recent CF activities in the region.
In the spring of 2007, over a three-week period, 24 Regular Force members and
Canadian Rangers conducted a wide-ranging patrol across the High Arctic in the name of
Canadian sovereignty.478 Accomplished by dividing the patrol into three smaller patrols at Resolute Bay, EX NUNALIVUT 07 involved more than a trek across the frozen landscape. One patrol, accompanied by a member of the RCMP, headed to Alexandra
Fiord, to investigate allegations of polar bear poaching by Inuit from Greenland.479 This aspect of the operation, however, was overshadowed by the difficulties encountered by the patrols before they even reached Resolute.480
476 CBC News. "Ice near Baffin Island reduced by half: Environment Canada" February 26, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/02/26/ice-floe.html on March 9, 2007. 477 Ibid. Department of National Defence. "News Release: Canadian Forces Patrol to Confirm Arctic Sovereignty". JTFN NR-07.002 March 22, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2224 on March 26, 2007. 479 Ibid. 480 Bob Weber. "Arctic takes toll on sovereignty patrol, but ingenuity sees soldiers pres on". The Canadian Press, March 31, 2007. Retrieved from 177
Another major exercise in Canada's North took place in April 2007, primarily in
Norman Wells, west of Great Bear Lake in the Northwest Territories. As with EX
NUNALIVUT 07, the exercise was multi-pronged, in this case, involving sovereignty
patrols and emergency response simulations.481 The first scenario involved a simulated
terrorist attack on Canada's oil and gas infrastructure, and its participants included not
only the CF and the RCMP, but also emergency preparedness officials, and two energy
companies, Imperial Oil and Enbridge Inc.482 This aspect of the exercise generated some
media interest because of the links to anti-terrorism. The other aspects - the sovereignty
patrol, and a simulated response to an airline disaster - received little attention.
This Op NARWHAL was unique from previous ones because it was not a purely
"Arctic" exercise, Norman Wells being located south of the Arctic Circle, and far inland
from Arctic waters. Military exercises in this part of Canada's North appear to be few
and far between, since the emphasis has nearly always been on the Arctic Archipelago.
The Norman Wells simulation, with its emphasis on anti-terrorism, has also engaged the
CF and the RCMP in a slightly different manner than previous editions. This suggests that the CF may be pursuing a more expanded role in keeping Canada's North secure, in terms of geography and in terms of mandate beyond the traditional constraints on the definition of security.
http://www.cp.org/premium/ONLINE/member/National/07033 l/n033103A.html on April 2, 2007. 481 Department of National Defence - Air Force News Room. "Air Force participation in Op NARWHAL." April 24, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/news_e.asp?cat=l 14&id=3047 on June 19,2007. 482 Bob Weber. "Arctic "attack" terrorism response". The Globe and Mail, April 3, 2007, p. A7. 178
7.4 Reinforcing the Northern Fortress
Perhaps not surprisingly, Arctic sovereignty has remained the key priority of the federal
government in Northern security, and the primary topic of discussion in the context of the
Northwest Passage. In an article published in the Globe and Mail on December 20, 2006,
John Ibbitson called for Canada and the United States to set aside their claims to the
Northwest Passage, and for the Arctic to be governed by treaty in the same manner as
Antarctica. To Ibbitson, the alternative was unacceptable:
The alternative would be for Canada to increase its military presence in the region through naval installations, airfields, icebreakers, submarines and patrol aircraft - which would tempt the United States to assert its claims by sending vessels through, as it has done in the past, while everyone braces for the day when some rusty Liberian tanker decides to give the passage a shot.
Ibbitson's comments preceded the release of several new works vying for a place
within the northern security canon. In Whose War is It? How Canada Can Survive in the
Post-9/11 World, historian Jack Granatstein commented on the importance of the Arctic
to Canada, including the natural resources that will emerge in the North as the permafrost
thaws. The official release of Whose War is It? coincided with the release of Defence
Requirements for Canada's Arctic, a study published by the Conference of Defence
Associations Institute. Although the study examined the issues of Arctic security from a
number of defence angles, including recommendations for boosting the CF's capabilities
in the region, the section that received the most attention was "Chapter 3 - The Law of the Sea and the Northwest Passage", written by James Kraska, the Oceans policy advisor
John Ibbitson. "Let's defuse Northwest Passage row". The Globe and Mail, December 20, 2006, p. A6. 484 Ibid. 179
to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his chapter (which was fully backed by the
US Government), Kraska refuted Canada's claims to the Northwest Passage as excessive,
and argued that Canada could get better international support for its efforts in the
Maritime Arctic by making the Passage an international strait regulated by the
International Maritime Organization. 85 In a sense, Kraska's arguments were nothing new, a simple reiteration of the US government's long-held position on the issue of the
Northwest Passage. Still, it served as an impetus for elements within the Canadian media to criticize the current government for scaling back on its election promises regarding the
North.486
Another critique of the current government's approach to solving Arctic security issues appeared in the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence's report
Canadian Security Guide Book 2007- Coasts, released on March 28, 2007. The Senate
Committee argued in its report that the CCG should be responsible for icebreaking in
Arctic waters, not the Canadian Navy, since it is within the CCG that Canada's icebreaking experience lies.487 To accomplish this, the Senate Committee recommended that the government "procure three, year-round, class 10 icebreakers with constabulary powers for Canadian Coast Guard presence in our Arctic waters".
485 James C. Kraska. "Chapter 3 - The Law of the Sea and the Northwest Passage". Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic. Brian MacDonald, ed. The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007, pp. 36-59. 486 "Our Arctic". The Hamilton Spectator February 22, 2007, p. A16 (reprint of an editorial from the Winnipeg Free Press) 487 The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canadian Security Guide Book 2007-Coasts. March 2007, p. 10. Retrieved from http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/l/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repl0mar07-4- e.pdfonJune 19,2007. AUIbid.,v- 11.' 180
Initially, it appeared that there would be little response from the federal government on the issues and concerns raised about the Northwest Passage. During the summer of 2007, however, the Harper government revealed its plan for Canada's North.
On July 9, 2007, while at CFB Esquimalt in British Columbia, Prime Minister Harper announced that DND would acquire up to eight Polar Class 5 Arctic Patrol vessels for the use of the Navy. The mandate of these new vessels was explained by the Prime Minister in terms that linked it directly to the Canada First defence strategy:
In defending our nation's sovereignty, nothing is as fundamental as protecting Canada's Territorial integrity; our borders, our airspace and our waters.. .More and more, as global commerce routes chart a path to Canada's North and as the oil, gas and minerals of this frontier become more valuable, northern resource development will grow ever more critical to our country.489
Within Canada, the announcement of this capital expenditure was met with acclaim in some media outlets and criticism in others. In the Globe and Mail, for example, Ian
Bailey noted that although Prime Minister Harper had hinted at "conflicts over global interest in the resources of the region", he had not identified any specific threats and challenges present in the North. James Travers, in the Toronto Star, offered an even more cynical view, arguing that while the Arctic Patrol Vessel program would be useful
489 Prime Minister's Office. "Prime Minister Stephen Harper announces new Arctic offshore patrol ships". Retrieved from http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=l&id=1742 on July 10, 2007. 490 Ian Bailey. "Harper plans Arctic patrol fleet". The Globe & Mail. July 10, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070709.wharper070 9/front/Front/frontBN/rbc-front on July 10, 2007. 181
for patrolling Canada's coastlines and major rivers, ultimately the program was based
more on party politics than on actual security threats facing the region.491
Reaction from the United States was initially muted. The day after the
announcement, however, Rear-Admiral Timothy McGee of the US Navy was quoted in a
press conference as saying that the US Navy "absolutely needs to boost its presence in
the Arctic as part of an international "coalition approach".492 The reasons for such a
comment were explained in comments from Rear-Admiral Brian Salerno of the US Coast
Guard, who said that global warming "has implications for national energy security". 3
Salerno's comments, and what appeared to be a renewed US interest in the Arctic seemed incongruous at first, but as the summer of 2007 progressed, it quickly became clear that the Arctic was becoming a "une region fortement convoitee".494
Only a couple of weeks after the announcement of the Arctic Patrol Vessel program, Russia began a concerted effort to assert its claims to the Arctic Ocean by means of a scientific maritime expedition to the North Pole by the atomic icebreaker
Rossiya and the Akademik Federov, a scientific research vessel. The aim of the mission was to gather scientific data to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge (an underwater mountain ridge some 2,000 km long) was a geological extension from the Russian mainland. If this
1 James Travers. "Arctic issues make for good politics". The Toronto Star, July 10, 2007. Available online at: http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/234195. 492 Hugo Miller. "U.S. Bolsters Arctic Presence to Aid Commercial Ships". Bloomberg.com. July 10, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=aK9JSBhBiJMg&refer=cana da on July 10, 2007. 493 Ibid. 4 An avidly sought-after region. As described in "Une region fortement convoitee". Radio-Canada. July 30, 2007. Retrieve from http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2007/07/30/006-russie-exploration- arctique.shtml on August 1, 2007. 182 were determined to be the case, Russia could claim the Ridge (and all waters above it) as part of Russian territory according to the rules of the Law of the Sea.495 The part of the mission, however, which gained the most notoriety and thus garnered the most publicity, occurred on August 1, 2007, when two mini-submarines were launched from the
Akademik Federov to voyage to the seabed directly under the North Pole, collect specimens of aquatic Arctic flora and fauna, and mark the spot with a titanium capsule containing the Russian flag.
Even before the Russians successfully completed their mission, it stirred up great controversy in the Canadian media and amongst Arctic experts. Michael Byers, of the
University of British Columbia and a well-known expert in international law, drew parallels from the current situation in the Arctic to the space race of the 1960s.497 He pointed out in an article for the Toronto Star that the Russians were acting within legal limits, simply trying to obtain the needed scientific information to support its claims before its ten year grace period expires.498 He argued that Canada too, needed to act on its claims to its seabed, and quickly.499 To accomplish this, Byers advocated a three-
5 Vladimir Isachenkov. "Russian ships near North Pole". The Globe and Mail August 1,2007. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070801.wrussArctic0801/BN Story/International/home on August 1, 2007. 496 Unnati Gandhi and Alan Freeman. "Russian mini-subs plant flag at North Pole sea bed". The Globe and Mail, August 2, 2007. 497 Michael Byers. "Canada's Arctic race with Russia". The Toronto Star, July 29, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/240704 on August 1, 2007. 498 Ibid. A nation has ten years after signing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to file a submission with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental shelf regarding its claims to the seabed. Russia signed the Convention in 1997, thus it has until the end of 2007 to complete its final submission. Canada has until 2013 to file its submission. 183
pronged (scientific, defence, and political) approach that would counter the Russians:
investment in seabed mapping, new icebreakers and in serious diplomacy.500
Despite the international furor and debate that arose around the mission, the initial
response of the Canadian government left something to be desired. DFA appeared to see
the Russian flag-planting as little more than a symbolic gesture. A spokesman for the
Department only reiterated Canada's traditional claims: "Canada's sovereignty over the
lands and waters of the Canadian Arctic is long-standing, well-established and based on
historic title".501 Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay himself commented on the CTV
show Question Period, "Look, this isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world
and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this territory'".
Others, however, took the Russian expedition and its claims to the North Pole
more seriously. Federal NDP leader Jack Layton used the opportunity to criticize the
Arctic Patrol Vessel acquisition program, arguing that it was misguided and could not
take the place of the heavy icebreakers promised during the last election campaign.
Layton also took the side of the North, stating that "Canada must move quickly to make immediate, strategic investments in its Arctic and recognize that the greatest challenges in the North are social, economic and environmental".504
The Russian successes in the Arctic in the summer of 2007 put Canada's lack of heavy icebreakers into sharp focus. There had already been criticism in a number of
500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 Sympatico MSN. "MacKay dismisses Russia's Arctic claim". August 2, 2007. Retrieved from http://news.sympatico.msn.ctv.ca on August 2, 2007. Ironically, this is standard practise on Canadian sovereignty exercises in the Arctic. Cf. p. 110. 503 Merita Ilo. "Layton calls for Arctic protection push". Canadian Press, August 5, 2007. 504 Ibid. 184
circles after the announcement of the Arctic Patrol Vessel program that these
"slushbreakers" were insufficient to protect Canada's Arctic. Michael Turner, former
Deputy Commission for the Canadian Coast Guard, wrote a scathing piece for the Ottawa
Citizen in which he expressed his disappointment that
the Harper government's decision to spend billions on new Armed Forces icebreaking patrol vessels comes at a time when the Canadian Coast Guard is desperately worried about the future of its existing icebreaking fleet, and scratching around for the money to keep its units in operation.505
The views of Turner, and others like him, were publicly supported by politicians and
academics alike. Rob Huebert wrote "Just as the police need patrol cars, helicopters and
other instruments to enforce Canadian domestic laws, Canada needs a wide range of
instruments to deal with a wide range of new challenges in its Arctic".5 6 Similarly, after
the completion of the Russian mission, Gerard Kenney wrote "It is now crystal clear that
his [Prime Minister Harper's] plans for six or eight fragile naval patrol vessels that can go
nowhere near the Pole are absolutely inadequate for protecting our sovereignty
claims".507
It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Canada waited with bated breath to see
what would happen next, given that the CF was due to conduct another exercise (the
latest instalment in the NANOOK series) the first week of August, and given that Prime
Minister Harper was scheduled to visit the Arctic at the same time. It was expected that
Michael Turner. "Guarding Canada's northern coast". The Ottawa Citizen, July 13, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.canada.com on July 13, 2007. 506 Rob Huebert. "The battle for the Arctic is heating up". The Globe and Mail, July 30, 2007, p. Al 3. 507 "Neglecting the North". The Ottawa Citizen, August 7, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.canada.com on August 7, 2007. 185
he would use the opportunity to make an important announcement regarding the North,
but only insiders knew precisely what that announcement would entail.
In the end, he made two announcements regarding the federal government's plans
for the North. The first was an expansion of the Nahanni National Park Reserve by 5,400
square kilometres, in order to "ensure that more of this precious land, the unique wildlife
populations it sustains, will be protected for future generations". While any expansion
of a National Park is usually welcome, this announcement was seen as little more than a
token gesture by some environmentalists who had been campaigned for protection of the
entire watershed.509
The announcement regarding the expansion of the Nahanni was quickly
overshadowed on August 10l , when Prime Minister Harper fulfilled some of his
campaign promises by announcing a major expansion of the CF presence in the Arctic.
10. That day, at the conclusion of the CF Exercise NANOOK, he announced the
establishment of a CF Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, the development of a
deep-water port in Nanisivik, and the boosting of the Canadian Rangers by an additional
900 personnel.510
Resolute Bay was chosen as the location for the new CF Arctic Training Centre
"because of its strategic location as the Gateway to the High Arctic and because it
Alexander Panetta. "Harper announces expansion of Park in remote North". The Toronto Star, August 9, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/244570 on August 9, 2007. 509 Ibid. 510 Prime Minister's Office. "Expanding Canadian Forces Operations in the Arctic" Backgrounder. August 10, 2007. An often glossed-over fact is that the planned expansion of the Rangers is meant for the entire organization, not merely for 1 CRPG. 186 currently possesses adequate facilities that meet CF requirements".511 One only need look at a map of Northern Canada to see that Resolute Bay is located on the northern edge of the Northwest Passage, one of the few Northern communities that can make such a claim. The community is also at the geographic centre of the Arctic Archipelago, which was no doubt another factor in its favour. The "adequate facilities" are buildings currently belonging to DND and to the Department of National Resources, which need only to be refurbished and maintained, which is much easier than building a facility from scratch.
The Centre will provide "year-round training facilities and a location for pre-positioning training equipment and various types of vehicles in the High Arctic" as well as training in a number of Arctic Warfare and Survival Training courses.512
Nanisivik, an abandoned mining community in the northwestern corner of Baffin
Island was chosen as the site for the docking and refuelling facility partly because of its location (inside the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage), and partly because of its existing facilities: a deep-water berthing facility already exists, there is a sheltered harbour, and a nearby jet-capable airstrip.513 The point of having a deep-water port so far north is that it can act as
a staging area for naval vessels on station in the High Arctic, enabling them to re-supply, refuel, embark equipment and supplies, and transfer personnel. This will extend the range of our ships in the Arctic during the navigable season.514
The chief difficulty with the Nanisivik site is that the soil is contaminated by heavy metals from more than 25 from years as a lead-zinc mining facility. Although the
511 Ibid. 512 Ibid. 513 Ibid. 514 Ibid. 187
mine's owner, Breakwater Resources claims all contaminated soil has been removed
from the port site, the company admits that the clean-up process remains incomplete.515
It is to be hoped that they do a thorough job so that there are no lasting effects on the
environment in the area or on the individuals who will work at Nanisivik once it opens in
2012.
The augmentation of the Canadian Rangers from 4,100 to 5,000 is not surprising,
given the relative inexpensiveness of such a task (as opposed to establishing several
additional CF facilities in the North). According to the PMO, the additional numbers will
"allow new patrols to be added and existing patrols to be strengthened in the North and
further south".516 Additional funding for the Rangers will assist in the maintenance of
Command and Control system, and support the Ranger Modernization Project. This
Project includes "replacement of the Lee Enfield rifles currently in service, uniform modernization and enhancement of transportation capabilities".
The announcement of such a major investment opened the floodgate for
discussion about Canada's North and the wider Arctic region both at home and abroad.
Emilien Pelletier, the Canada Research Chair in Molecular Ecotoxicology in Coastal
Areas at PUniversite du Quebec a Rimouski, expressed his disappointment that Canada
seems intent on protecting its sovereignty through military means, rather than by developing polar exploration technologies, or by the establishment of a permanent
515 CBC News. "Harper to announce Northern deep-sea port, training site". August 10, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/10/port-north.html on August 10, 2007. 516 Ibid. Ibid. 188 scientific base in Canada's Arctic region, and argued that only through scientific proof
CIO could Canada hope to validate its Arctic claims.
The editors of the Toronto Star agreed that the Prime Minister's visit to the Arctic sent a much-needed political signal to the world, but that "a series of Arctic initiatives, however forward-looking does not necessarily constitute a coherent policy", and called for a Parliamentary review into what has and what remains to be done to ensure Canada's legal title in the region.519
The absence of any announcement regarding icebreakers was noted once again.
In an article for the Halifax Chronicle Herald, Rod Stright, former director of operations for the Canadian Coast Guard, called on the federal government to fulfil its campaign promise of three new armed heavy icebreakers for Canada's Arctic, arguing that this investment would not only boost Canada's control over its Arctic region, but would also be directly beneficial to Inuit communities.520
Other nations joined the race for the North after the Russian expedition to the
North Pole. While the current US administration's position on the Northwest Passage has not changed, Canada's argument for jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage was publicly supported once again by former US Ambassador Paul Cellucci in August 2007, just prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Summit held in Montebello,
518 Emilien Pelletier. "II faut demilitariser l'Arctique". Le Devoir, August 10,2007. Retrieved from http://www.ledevoir.com/2007/08/10/152932.html on August 13, 2007. 519 "Debate Canada's Arctic strategy". The Toronto Star, August 12,2007. Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/245240 on August 13, 2007. 520 Rod Stright. "New Coast Guard ships would best fit our Arctic ambitions". The Chronicle Herald. August 12, 2007. Retrieved from http://thechronicleherald.ca/print_article.html?story=852819 on August 13, 2007. 189
Quebec.521 He reiterated his position that "it's in our security interests that the Northwest
Passage be considered part of Canada".522 This statement was publicly rebuffed by
President Bush at the Summit: "There are differences on the Northwest Passage.. .We
believe it's an international passageway".523
Not surprisingly, perhaps, Mr. Cellucci's comments and the reaffirmation of the
United States position on the issue received a fair bit of coverage in the Canadian media.
John Ivison argued that it was "down to Mr. Harper to convince Mr. Bush that Canada
has the cannonballs to police its own waters".524 Following the same logic, an editorial in
the Toronto Star saw Cellucci's comments to mean that the US's position might be
cor
softening. The editors argued that "tacit US acceptance of Canada's claim, and a
stepped-up Canadian military presence would deter terror in a region that stretches from
Alaska to Labrador".526 The editors of the Globe & Mail were less optimistic, arguing
that "once again, the Americans have poured icy water on Canada's claims to sovereignty
over the Northwest Passage".527 They felt, however, that the Americans remain wrong
521 CTV Newsnet. "Question Period. Interview with Paul Cellucci". August 19, 2007. Ibid. 523 Alexandra Panetta. "Arctic chills friendly tone of summit". The Chronicle Herald, August 22, 2007. Retrieved from http://thechronicleherald.ca/print_article.html?story=854762 on August 22, 2007. 524 John Ivison. "Security the key to the North", The National Post, August 21, 2007. Available online at: http://www.canada.com/components/print.aspx?idr=7ef7fc2f-a533-412d-88e2- 45b507080b67 525 "Canada's Arctic stake". The Toronto Star, August 21, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/248110 on August 22, 2007. 526 Ibid. 527 "The U.S. interest in Canada's claim". The Globe & Mail, August 22, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20070822/ EARCTIC22/Comment/comment/commentEditorialsHeadline/l/l/3/ on August 23, 2007. 190 and that "Mr Bush should recognize that firm Canadian legal control over shipping would be the best protection against foreign adventurism or terrorist incursions".
The announcements regarding the re-enforcement of Canada's Northern Fortress were certainly timely, and not only because of the Russian mission to the North Pole.
The day prior to Prime Minister Harper's announcement, Denmark announced that it too would be launching a scientific expedition. The goal of this expedition, being conducted in cooperation with Sweden, was aimed at gathering scientific evidence supporting
Denmark's claims to the seabed north of Greenland. Helge Sander, Denmark's minister of science, technology and innovation, suggested in an interview that
"preliminary investigations done so far are very promising", even to the point that
Denmark could be able to claim that the Lomonsov Ridge is in fact an extension of the northern coast of Greenland, and thus "there are things suggesting that Denmark could be given the North Pole". The unresolved issue of Hans Island, it appears, has been set aside for the moment in favour of the petroleum reserves thought to be below the Arctic seabed. For the Danes, it was (and is a matter of good economics). Poul Kristensen, the
Danish ambassador to Canada, commented "we are speaking of values in the billions... and therefore the area, of course, is of interest to us".
The United States, too, announced and launched an Arctic expedition in August
2007: 20 scientists aboard the US Coast Guard icebreaker Healy conducted a four-week scientific cruise to the Chukchi Cap, north of the Bering Strait, the fourth such voyage in
528 Ibid. Randy Boswell. "Denmark hopeful about North Pole claim". CanWest News Service, August 11, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.canada.com on August 13, 2007. 530 Ibid. 531 Ibid. 191
four years.532 As with the Russian and Danish-Swedish expeditions, the voyage of the
Healy was intended help solidify US claims to its seabed. The chief problem with this,
and other US expeditions like it, is that the United States has not yet ratified the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, "it doesn't have a seat at the table as critical
decisions are made on how to divvy up the ocean bottom, and the US has fallen a decade
or more behind other countries in conducting the survey work".533 It is anticipated that
President Bush and the Republicans in Congress will "try to remedy this blunder when
Congress reconvenes".534
Curiously, Canada seems to be focusing its oceanographic efforts elsewhere, at
least, at the moment. At the end of July 2007, the CCGS Amundsen left Quebec City for the first leg of a 15- month expedition involving an international team of scientists, including Canadians and Americans.535 The expedition was focused primarily on matters of marine biology, notably research on the Circumpolar Flaw Lead system and on northern health via the Qannuipitali? Inuit Health Survey. Certainly, the voyage of the
Amundsen is a critical one for the human and environmental security of the North, with research on subjects ranging from mercury contamination of Hudson Bay to the general state of health of the Inuit people, and the results of this research will surely have an impact on future Northern policies. Nevertheless, the voyage of the Amundsen is not the
Peter N. Spotts. "US Coast Guard joins in Arctic oil rush". The Christian Science Monitor. August 20, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0820/p02s01-usgn.htm on August 20, 2007. 533 Ibid. 534 "The Great Arctic Oil Rush". The New York Times, August 12, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com on August 13, 2007. fir Peggy Curran. "Icebreaker-turned-laboratory begins 15-month Arctic voyage". Can West News Service, July 27, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.canada.com on July 27, 2007. 192 same sort of mapping mission as that conducted by the Russians, the Danes or the
Americans. Mapping of the seabed was conducted in the early phases of the voyage, but only of the Makkovik Margin, off the coast of Labrador. There do not seem to be any further plans in place for an expedition to map Canada's seabed claims further north, and yet as one newspaper noted, "the urgency in establishing Canada's rights grows daily more pressing".537
The federal government cannot and should not take solace in the fact that the
United States has yet to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. While this may give Canada's claims an edge in the Beaufort Sea, recent actions by Russia and by
Denmark are equally or more pressing, depending on the geological data collected on their respective sea-bed mapping expeditions. This is an area where Canada lags, and the federal government has just over six years to catch up.538
7.5 At last, the Northern Voice
Until recently, the Northern voice was more likely to appear in news reports on specific
CF activities in Canada's North than with regard to most other stories concerning
Northern security policies. This is linked, no doubt, to the popularity of the Canadian
Rangers, particularly since they are viewed as a success for the CF. It is therefore common to see a Ranger's comments included with those of other CF members in news reports of exercises where Rangers are involved. As with other members of the CF,
fir The log books of the Amundsen voyage are available through the Arcticnet website at: http://www.arcticnet-laval.ca/index.php?fa=ResearchHome.showThemeProjects&theme= 215 8&logbook_year=2007 "Canada must do all it can to play catch-up in warming Arctic". The Province, August 12,2007. Retrieved from http://www.canada.com on August 13,2007. 538 Ibid. 193
however, the Rangers do not openly criticize their organization or defence policy, they
only address their own experiences. If there is agreement or if there is dissent, it must
remain hidden. While such a policy of discretion is necessary for the good of the CF, it
does restrict our understanding of the people of the North's views on defence matters.
It is gratifying, therefore, to see that Northern voices have become increasingly
prominent in the Canadian media as the "race for the North" has intensified. Specifically,
the opinions of Northern leaders have been automatically sought on the Russian
expedition to the North Pole and to Prime Minister's two rounds of announcements
concerning Northern security made in the summer of 2007.
In response to the announcement regarding the Arctic Patrol Vessels, Premier
Paul Okalik commented to CyberPresse that while it was good to have a military presence in Nunavut, the federal government also needed to create development
opportunities that would foster the sovereignty by occupation that already exists in the residents of the High Arctic.539 Okalik's comments were supported by the mayor of
Iqaluit, Elisapee Sheutiapik, who commented that since settlements such as Resolute and
Grise Ford were initially established by the federal government as symbols of Canadian sovereignty in the region, the government was obliged to provide inhabitants with the means of making a living.540
Other Northern voices chimed in with the belief that while the Arctic Patrol
Vessel acquisition program would be good for the North, it fell far short of what the
539 "L'Arctique a besoin de plus qu'une presence militaire, disent les dirigeants locaux", Cyberpresse, July 11, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cyberpresse.ca/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070711/CPACTUALITES/7071 1 on July 13,2007. 194
federal government needed to invest in the region. In an opinion piece for the Globe and
Mail, Peter Wilson, former director of informatics and communications for the Nunavut
Planning Commission, argued that the announcement was a "declaration of sovereignty
by Ottawa over the people who have lived in Canada's Arctic for thousands of years, not
a declaration of our sovereignty to other nations".5 Wilson argued instead that "there
are many important things that only Canada can do in its Arctic - all of them assert
sovereignty. And we can do them right now, for very little money." Using this broader
perspective of security needs, Wilson focused on five areas where improvements could
be readily made: a monitoring and reporting program for the Arctic environment, a better
wildlife management program, a "realistic" search and rescue operation, a process that
will give northerners the tools and ability to manage the land and its resources, and a
northern -based Arctic aerial monitoring program to improve regulatory efficiency
overall.542
In a column in the Ottawa Citizen, Paul Kaludjak, President of Nunavut
Tunngavik Inc., argued that while his organization supported the deep-water port and
Arctic Patrol Vessel programs, "these vessels and the port should be a component of a
sovereignty strategy that engages northerners, not the strategy itself'.543 Kaludjak took
issue with Prime Minister Harper's statement that the rationale of "use or lose it" is a
poor one, arguing that
Peter Wilson. "The true North may be strong, but the plan to protect it is feeble". The Globe and Mail. July 17, 2007, p. A17. 542 Ibid. 543 Paul Kaludjak. "The Inuit are here, use us". The Ottawa Citizen, July 18, 2007, p. A15. 195
the Arctic is not an uninhabited wilderness. It is our homeland and has been for centuries. More than 50,000 Inuit - proud Canadians - live in the Canadian Arctic.544
To illustrate Inuit loyalty to Canada, Kaludjak alluded to an incident during the voyage of
the Manhattan in which a group of Inuit hunters stood on the ice in front of the ship's
prow, causing the supertanker to stop.545 Kaludjak's solution to protecting Canada's
sovereignty interests was to use the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement as part of a
"full-blown sovereignty assertion strategy"5
Similarly, in a piece published in the Globe and Mail towards the end of July
2007, Mary Simon expressed support for the revived interest in the Arctic and Prime
Minister Harper's "willingness to back up that interest with bold pronouncements and money", but exhorted the federal government to think beyond a ship-purchasing program
for means of asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. 7 Simon argued further
"Arctic sovereignty is too important to be treated as just an adjunct to foreign relations or
foreign investment. It must be built from the inside out." Simon's article advocated a
"practical program of action" that would focus on resolving some long standing issues in the North, including the implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, as well
Ibid. 545 Ibid. Eyewitness accounts of this incident are hard to immediately find, although it is also recounted by Michael Byers of the University of British Columbia in his works on the Northwest Passage. It does not appear in either of the major contemporary articles published in National Geographic or Time about the Manhattan transit, but this does not mean it did not occur. It is certainly a powerful image and warrants further research. 546 Ibid. 547 Mary Simon. "Inuit: the bedrock of Arctic sovereignty". The Globe and Mail July 26,2007. Retrieved from http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/LAC/20070726/ COARCTIC26/Comment/comment/comment/l/l/3/ on August 1, 2007. 548 Ibid. 196
as social issues such as high unemployment and high high-school dropout rates amongst
the Inuit population. To Simon, the rational for such a program was obvious since
Inuit are, and expect to remain, the permanent majority population of the Arctic... Coherent policy-making for the Arctic must commit to two things: a credible power-sharing partnership between Inuit and the government; and a determination to overcome the obvious gaps in basic measurements of well-being that separate Inuit from all other Canadians.549
Prime Minister Harper's announcement regarding the creation of the CF training
centre at Resolute Bay and the deep-water port at Nanisivik was met with mixed
reactions in the North, reactions that gained national coverage in the Canadian media.550
For those living in Arctic Bay, the new port was seen a potential source of employment
and tourism, and even a means of lowering transportation costs for the community. At the
same time, there were concerns about the impact that increased marine traffic could have
on the wildlife living in the area (and thus the impact this would have on the families that rely on hunting for sustenance), as well as the degree of noise pollution that would
develop in the region.551 Additionally, the choice of Resolute Bay as the location of the training centre upset local leaders (specifically those from Iqaluit and Cambridge Bay) who had hoped for the influx of new federal funds into their communities. Given how
chronically under-funded the North is, and how rarely opportunities such as the training
centre and the port come to the region, their bitterness is understandable.
549 Ibid. 550 CBC News. "Northerners divided over proposed Arctic military facilities". August 13, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/08/13/Arctic- reax.html on August 13, 2007. 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid. 197
Two weeks after the announcement regarding Resolute Bay, Nanisivik, and the
augmentation of the Canadian Rangers, the Hill Times (a widely read publication in the
Ottawa region) published its latest policy briefing on the timely subject of Canada's
North. Significantly half of the articles in the policy briefing were by Northerners who
represented all levels of government and all three Territories. Liberal MP (Yukon) Larry
Bagnell argued in his piece that the federal government needs to devote more effort to
mapping Canada's sea bed, in order to bolster Canada's claims in the face of those of
other nations.553 He also criticized the federal government for its inaction in resolving
the Beaufort Sea dispute with the United States, asking "when will this government stand
up to protect Canada's Western Arctic?"554
Dennis Fentie, Premier of the Yukon and MLA for Watson Lake, focused his piece on the challenges his Territory is experiencing as a result of climate change, particularly flooding and the changes to long-established land use patterns, which "is creating one of the greatest challenges to security in the North today".555 Fentie highlighted Yukon's new Climate Change Strategy, arguing "comprehensive monitoring and research activities, assessments and adaptation plans will help us strengthen communities, economies and ecosystems" and that "the lessons of climate change in the
North offer a way forward for Canada as a nation".556
553 Larry Bagnell. "Research, military presence and vibrant northern communities will affirm northern sovereignty". Policy Briefing: Canada's North. The Hill Times, August 20, 2007, p. 29. 554 Ibid. 555 Dennis Fentie. "Yukon experiencing record high-water levels and flooding". Policy Briefing: Canada's North, p. 28. 556 Ibid. 198
NDP MP (Western Arctic, NWT) and party critic for northern affairs Dennis
Bevington also focused his article on environmental issues, specifically the state of affairs in the Mackenzie Valley. Bevington criticized the federal government for failing to alleviate "the crushing burden the regulatory process has created in resource development in Canada's three Territories".557 This burden, he argued, could be partially lifted by proper implementation of measures contained within the Mackenzie Valley
Resource Management Act:
The Conservative idea to streamline this legislation without a process to legitimize any changes in guidelines, policies and timeframes is bad. Changing the MVRMA without the formal agreement of the First Nations involved is fraught with legal uncertainty, and is not necessarily required.
Bevington also cautioned that he and other northerners were not swayed by recent rhetoric from the Prime Minister regarding "ending the paternalism that northerners have suffered in the past." Rather, "the people of the North remain unconvinced that the bureaucrats and southern politicians really have any thought of significant power passing from their hands while the resource riches of the NWT are not locked up by others". 5
Gordon Van Tighem, mayor of Yellowknife also addressed the issue of regulatory regimes in his article, although he kept his comments general to the North rather than addressing a specific case.5 He advocated the establishment of a
fully resourced federal economic development agency for the North. Armed with a strong mandate for diversifying
Dennis Bevington. "Enough stalling on environmental assessment and permitting'' Policy Briefing: Canada's North, p. 28. 558 Ibid. 559 Ibid. 56 Gordon Van Tighem. "How about we create a fully-resourced, federal economic development agency for the North". Policy Briefing: Canada's North, p. 25. 199
northern economies, such an agency could provide essential services, such as financing, strategic advice and toolkits for northern communities and businesses.
The key to success for such an agency, Van Tighem wrote, would be the acceptance of
northern communities as essential partners, since "Northern issues must be addressed by
Northern voices".562
Van Tighem took this quote from A Northern Vision: A Stronger North and a
Better Canada, the follow-up document to the Territories' Developing a New Framework for Sovereignty and Security in the North, which was described in more detail in Paul
Okalik's article for the policy briefing. Okalik identified the key themes of the
document: that the North must be the primary beneficiaries of northern resource
development in order to meaningfully contribute to the Canadian federation, that
Northern society must adapt to climate change or essentially perish, that Canada should
actively seek cooperation with its circumpolar neighbours on common issues, and that
Canada needs "an effective framework for policy development on northern issues - both international and national".563 Okalik wrote that the Territorial Premiers agreed with
Prime Minister Harper's assertion that "Canada has a real, growing, long-term presence in the Arctic", because they believe that the Territories fulfil this role.5
Joseph Handley (Premier and MLA), focused his article on the need for strong, sustainable communities in the North, although he did tie it to A Northern Vision as
561 Ibid. 562 Ibid. 563 Paul Okalik. "The primary themes are sovereignty, climate change and our placement in the globe as an Arctic nation". Policy Briefing: Canada's North, p. 20. 564 Ibid. 200 well.565 Handley called upon the federal government to give its [financial] support to a permanent road bridge across the Mackenzie River at Fort Providence in order to provide year round road access to Yellowknife.566 Handley asserted that this would also spur the completion of an all-weather permanent highway from Yellowknife to Tuktoyaktuk.
Handley also urged the finalization of agreements that would allow for the devolution of management and control of the North to its local governments. Handley noted that A
Northern Vision is
About partnership - partnership with Ottawa, with provinces, with industry and, most important, partnership with northern aboriginal governments - partnership which is defined by getting it right at the outset. In our view, "getting it right" is finding the right balance between the development of northern resources for the benefit of our people, our communities and all Canadians and the stewardship and protection of our land, forests, water, and animals to ensure a healthy environment for generations to come.567
Although not part of the Hill Times policy briefing, a piece by Sheila Watt-
Cloutier, former chair of the ICC, appeared shortly afterwards in the Ottawa Citizen that addressed similar themes to those laid out by her political counterparts. Watt-Cloutier focused specifically on climate change and the threat it poses to the Inuit.5 She posed the question
when will our government again stand on principle, putting the human rights are all guaranteed before narrow, economic interests? When will we again take serious action to honour our international legal obligations under
5 Joseph Handley. "Northerners must benefit from development". Policy Briefing: Canada's North, p. 22. 566 Bid. 561 Ibid. 568 Sheila Watt-Cloutier. "Canada has lost its way". The Ottawa Citizen, August 29, 2007, p. A13. 201
the Kyoto Protocol? What of our international leadership on climate change?.. .By not putting our own house in order, we have forfeited our own international influence.569
Watt-Cloutier urged the federal government to begin to "consider rights first in all of its
decisions, environmental and economic, foreign and domestic", including support of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. After all, she argued,
"Canada must realize that thriving, human communities speak stronger than any fleet of
ice breakers or barracks full of soldiers", and establish equitable partnerships with Inuit
communities in assessing the impacts of climate change.570
It is highly encouraging to see that Northern leaders, both political and Inuit (or
both, as in the case of Paul Okalik), are being actively solicited to give their opinions on
security issues in the North, on the new projects for JTFN, and on recent developments.
After all, they are the ones whose lives will be directly affected for good or otherwise by
these matters, so it is important that they are given the opportunity to participate in public
fora and be widely published in the Canadian press. It is a reflection, in a sense, of a
political coming-of-age. The North no longer necessarily needs Ottawa to speak for it.
What, however of the other aboriginal peoples of the North? They are surely as
affected by the changes to the North, and form part of the aboriginal majority with the
Inuit. Northern reaction to Prime Minister Harper's announcement about the expansion of
Nahanni National Park did not receive the same level of national coverage in the press as reaction to bolstering the CF presence in the High Arctic. Yet the Dencho who live in the
Nahanni region will have their lives affected as surely as their Inuit counterparts living further north will be affected by the existence of Resolute Bay and of Nanisivik. It is
569 Ibid. 570 Ibid. 202
encouraging that their Territorial leaders are willing to speak for them, but do not these
people themselves also deserve to be heard?
7.6 Cuibono?
Does the North benefit from current security and defence policies? To a point, yes,
because these policies are shaped around issues of national interest - what affects Canada
affects the North and vice-versa. There are also the economic benefits resulting from the
presence of the Canadian Ranger patrols in many Northern communities and from other
CF activities in the North. This will only increase with the establishment of the Arctic
Training Centre and of the harbour facilities at Nanisivik. Additionally, the RCMP not
only provides law and order to Northern communities, but also assists in addressing
social problems, similarly to other regions of Canada.
The problem, as we have seen, is that most of the security concerns of the North
are not being addressed as such by the federal government in its security policies.
In a constitutional monarchy such as Canada, it is all too common to experience the
"tyranny of the majority", in which the needs of the few are sacrificed in order to fulfil the needs of the many. In the case of the North, we see the security needs of the North being sacrificed or overlooked in the name of national security and national defence. The ideas used to shape security policies in the North are tied to Southern interests and
Southern priorities. As we have seen, the current solution to keeping the North secure presupposes that security concerns are external in origin. It further posits that boosting the CF presence in the area on a transient, expeditionary basis will provide the necessary protection to Canada's interests. Thus, the federal government pursues a multi-pronged approach to northern security: the assertion/protection of sovereignty and surveillance
are its top priorities. SAR, emergency/disaster response, and even icebreaking, are given
less weight as security priorities despite the higher risk of occurrence.
By contrast, we have seen that Northern security priorities encompass a much
broader range of issues. The matter of sovereignty in the Arctic is perceived as a non-
issue, because of the Inuit's occupancy of the land. The need for an effective SAR
capability is the top "traditional" security concern because of risks associated with travel
and with the traditional hunting cultures. Indeed, the implementation of a SAR regime
in the North, even though it is a "southern" concept, is one aspect of Canada's defence
policy that has been fully embraced by the people of the North because they are able to
see its immediate benefits to their lives. As the Northern environment, in particular the
winter freeze-up, becomes increasingly unpredictable, S AR incidents may rise, putting
further strain on current resources. Indeed, rather than having to import resources to the
communities, it may be less expensive in the long run for the federal government to focus
its efforts on boosting community-level security. Possibilities for this include the
establishment of Auxiliary Coast Guard units along Northern waterways/coasts or even the implementation of a boat-rescue education program in Northern communities.
Ultimately, the greatest security threats to the people of the North do not come from outside Canada's borders, but rather in a multitude of domestic concerns: a deteriorating environment, high employment, little infrastructure, etc. While the
Territories are emerging and developing political units, they are fortunate to possess leaders who are focused on their populations' needs, and who have much to offer in the way of solutions. Aboriginal participation in the DEW site-clean up is an excellent 204 example of this. The federal government would do well to recognize this asset, for the people of the North have much to offer. Certainly, the Resolute Bay and Nanisivik sites will be areas of employment to a point. Depending on the type of skilled labour required to renovate and maintain these facilities, however, it is quite likely that the majority of labourers will be drawn from outside the North.
It is telling that until recently, the Northern voice has been effectively missing from the current debate on Arctic sovereignty and the Northwest Passage. The opinions and criticisms put forth have for the most part been generated in Canada's South, by
Southerners, in order to influence an almost entirely Southern-based government. It is important to know how the people of the North feel about this issue, because their lives will be directly affected by the government's actions in the region, no matter what those actions are. Similarly, we cannot assume that the North has united behind a single opinion any more than we might assume that all Maritimers think alike or all
Torontonians think alike. It is important to know what the range of opinion encompasses, in order to understand the region's needs and desires.
The federal government has advocated a whole-of-government approach in other nations, most notably Afghanistan, yet there is no unified plan for assisting any of
Canada's troubled regions, let alone addressing security concerns in the North. If there is inter-departmental interaction it is not readily apparent. Instead, it appears that DND heads in one direction, DFA in another, and DIAND in a third. What is particularly troubling is that the only place where the federal government assigns "human security" in the North, is to DFA as a result of A Northern Dimension. To make matters worse, the point of this venture is to address human security concerns elsewhere in the circumpolar 205
region, not within Canada. This lack of a coherent northern policy sends a confusing message to the people of the North and Canada as a whole. It has likewise not gone unnoticed in academic communities or in the Canadian media.
Nevertheless, the situation in Canada's North has much improved since the end of the Cold War. The disconnection between the federal government and the North on matters of security appears to be more easily fixed in the 21st century than it was in the
20 . Great strides have been made in terms of incorporating the people of the North into
federal projects, but there is still a long, long way to go. The federal government needs to work directly with the Territories and with the Inuit and the assorted First Nations to develop a long-term strategy that can encompass traditional, human and environmental
security concerns in the North. The government then needs to ensure it is implemented effectively. This will require much patience and flexibility, but it will surely create a stronger North in the end. 206
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CURRICULUM VITAE 228 CURRICULUM VITAE
Sub-Lieutenant (ret'd) Elizabeth Anne Sneyd was born in Hamilton, Ontario on
December 27, 1977. SLt (ret'd) Sneyd enrolled in the Canadian Forces as an officer in the Cadet Instructor Cadre in 1999, working with #31 Royal Canadian Sea Cadet Corps
"Lion" in Hamilton, Ontario and at Trenton Air Cadet Summer Training Centre at CFB
Trenton in assorted training administrative, and support capacities. She attained the rank
of Sub-Lieutenant before transferring to the Supplementary Reserve in August 2003. She has since worked at HMCS Ontario Summer Cadet Training Centre and returned to
Trenton Air Cadet Summer Training Centre, but remains on the Supplementary Reserve.
As a civilian, SLt (ret'd) Sneyd worked for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute in
Kingston, Ontario from February 2005 to February 2006, compiling databanks on
Canada's peacekeeping missions to Cyprus and to Haiti. From August 2006 to August
2007, also as a civilian, she worked for the Conference of Defence Associations Institute in Ottawa, Ontario as the Project Officer, a position funded by her receipt of a 2006-2007
Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum Internship. She remains with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute until the end of 2007 as their
Special Events Co-ordinator. She is now the Programs and Services Manager for the
Canadian Association of Internes and Residents in Ottawa.
SLt (ret'd) Sneyd attended McMaster University, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts
(Honours) in Japanese Studies and Anthropology in 2000. Her coursework covered a wide range of topic in particular linguistics, folklore, indigenous issues and Japanese 230 culture. She completed a second Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Political Science at
McMaster in 2003 where she focused on comparative public policy, democratization and human rights, indigenous politics and international relations. She achieved standing on the Dean's Honours List in the Faculty of Social Sciences. In May and June 2001, SLt
(ret'd) Sneyd attended l'Ecole de la langue francaise de Trois-Pistoles as a participant in the Summer Language Bursary Programme. After graduation, SLt (ret'd) Sneyd spent a year teaching English at the Maragame City Branch of the Nova Group in Kagawa
Prefecture, Japan. SLt (ret'd) Sneyd began the Master of Arts in War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada in September 2004. Her course work has focused on Canadian defence policy and on international relations. Her Master of Arts thesis addresses security issues and priorities in Northern Canada.
List of Publications:
"The Nacho Nyak Final Agreement", Treaties with American Indians: An Encyclopedia of Rights, Conflicts and Sovereignty, Volume II. Donald L. Fixico, ed. Broomfield, CO: ABC- CLIO, 2008, pp. 403-404. "The Vuntut Gwitchin Final Agreement", Treaties with American Indians: An Encyclopedia of Rights, Conflicts and Sovereignty, Volume II. Donald L. Fixico, ed. Broomfield, CO: ABC- CLIO, 2008, pp. 404-405. "Lessons learned at the Western Front". On Track 12:2 (Fall 2007), pp. 28-30. "Why Canadians Should Pay Attention to the Six-Party Talks". On Track 12:1 (Spring 2007), pp.41-45. Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic (Vimy Paper 2). Brian MacDonald, ed. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007. [As Editorial Assistant] "Notes on the 9th CDAI Graduate Student Symposium", On Track 11:4 (Winter 2007), pp. 36-37. "The Anishinabe Algonquin National Council" Encyclopedia of American Indian History, Steven Danvers, ed. Broomfield, CO: ABC-CLIO, 2007. "Review of A Fatherly Eye by Robin Jarvis Brownlie." Ethnologies 26: 2 (2004), pp. 324-327. "Review of Supernatural Enemies by Hilda Ellis Davidson and Anna Chaudhri". Ethnologies 26:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 242-244. "Rip Van Winkle". B.C. Folklore [Journal of the British Columbia Folklore Society] 15 (Fall 2000), pp. 15-30.