Bayle, Scripture, and Toleration: How Pierre Bayle’S Use of Scripture in the Dictionnaire Informs His Thinking on Religious Toleration

Bayle, Scripture, and Toleration: How Pierre Bayle’s use of Scripture in the Dictionnaire informs his thinking on religious toleration.

Parker Allan Cotton

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Wycliffe College and the Theological Department of the Toronto School of Theology In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Theology awarded by Wycliffe College and the University of Toronto

Bayle, Scripture, and Toleration: How Pierre Bayle’s use of Scripture in the Dictionnaire informs his thinking on religious toleration. Parker Allan Cotton Master of Theology Wycliffe College and the University of Toronto 2017 Abstract

This thesis examines Bayle’s use of Scripture within the Dictionnaire and attempts to bridge the gap between questions of Bayle’s beliefs and attitudes towards religion and his well- acknowledged interest in religious toleration. Through a survey of the Dictionnaire it demonstrates that Bayle not only referenced Scripture often, and in seemingly pious ways, he does so in articles discussing moral failings of biblical heroes while maintaining that he is not attempting to undermine Christian faith. Two main insights emerge. First, the situating of toleration discussions within biblical/religious contexts in the Dictionnaire connects the two and sees Bayle questioning whether those who believe they are justified in persecuting can really have this confidence. In absence of this assurance, toleration is a preferred path.

Second, by demonstrating an alternative possibility to Bayle’s scandalous takes on Old

Testament figures and discussions of God, this thesis suggests that an atheistic reading of

Bayle is improbable.

Contents

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1 The Philosophical Commentary ...... 8

Chapter 2 Bayle’s Use of Scripture in the Dictionary ...... 14

Chapter 3 Analyzing Bayle’s Use of Scripture ...... 35

Concluding Thoughts ...... 43

Appendix: Search Terms and Frequency...... 47

Bibliography ...... 52

iii

Introduction

Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) has continued to be the focus of controversial discussion from his own time until today.1 Almost all scholars of early modern European thought regard Bayle as a central intellectual figure of his era. He is linked especially with laying the foundations for modern religious scepticism and religious toleration. The philosopher’s most notorious and massive work, the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique offers hundreds of articles describing important people, and providing locations for Bayle to record his thoughts on issues of interest.2 It is perhaps this notion, that he recorded his own thoughts, which provides the most difficulty to readers of his work. Certainly he does more than is expected of a compiler of an encyclopedia. He does not simply record the facts of an event, location or person but often adds a voice within sprawling footnotes. Whether this voice is always his remains hotly debated. Without including the rest of his scholarly works, one can appear to find contradiction between positions declared within the articles of the Dictionnaire itself.

And for one with such a vast repertoire of knowledge and engagement with hundreds of sources of his day, to take this as mere sloppiness is not plausible

1 One of, if not, the best, and most succinct, English language biographies is Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 2 While I have searched the Dictionnaire in the standard French scholarly edition [Pierre Bayle,Dictionnaire historique et critique, fifth edition, (Amsterdam/ Leyde/ La Haye/ Utrecht: 1740)], quotations from the Dictionnaire are taken from the English. Pierre Bayle, 1734 (2nd ed.), The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr Peter Bayle, trans. P. Desmaizeaux, London: Knapton et al..

1 2

Bayle is most widely known for his lasting impact in two discussions: his impact on toleration theories, and his influence on theodicy and the problem of evil.3 Though well versed in theological literature, having been educated in such, and serving as the editor of the journal Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, for which he wrote many reviews of theological books; Bayle’s thinking on the Bible has been only skimmed by the literature.

That examination of Bayle’s treatment of Scripture which has been undertaken has largely been done in a peripheral manner in one of the larger debates about his personal beliefs or toleration theory. Starting from Scripture, and looking at where Bayle himself chooses to engage the Bible, shall be our entry point.4

There are several goals in undertaking this project. First, by examining how Bayle uses Scripture within the Dictionnaire additional evidence may arise for describing Bayle’s personal faith position. The subject of intense debate with views ranging from orthodox

Christian to closeted atheist, Bayle’s personal beliefs have been notoriously hard to pin down. This is, in part, due to the perplexing criticisms that he offers towards the morality of

Biblical figures, church people and rational belief in God. However, if an examination of how Bayle handles Scripture could arrive at some guiding principles, it could, at the least,

3 See Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Zagorin offers helpful comparisons between Bayle and Locke, the two great Enlightenment toleration theorists. Bayle’s writing prompted Leibniz’s response, and coining, of Theodicy. 4 Few works dealing with Bayle and the Bible are available. Jean Bernier has written on the Bible and Bayle’s political philosophy in “La Bible dans la philosophie politique de Pierre Bayle” in Pierre Bayle et le politique, Edited by Xavier Daverat and Antony McKenna (Paris, Honoré Champion, 2014). Richard Popkin and Walter Rex entertain a brief debate on Bayle’s understanding of biblical criticism in Problems of Cartesianism Edited by Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nichols and John W. Davis, (Kingston: Mcgill-Queen’s University Press, 1982). Rhoda Possen’s 1974 Yale dissertation on the structure and function of the biblical articles is a more relevant piece and yet still focuses largely on the composition of these articles and viewing them as a unit within the Dictionnaire. The Biblical Articles in Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique: Their Structure and Function. PhD. Diss. Yale University, 1974. Finally, Maria-Cristina Pitassi has a continuing interest in Bayle and Scripture and has written on how Bayle understands the issue of examination and this controversy of reading the Bible between Protestants and Catholics. “The foundations of belief and the status of Scripture: Bayle and the issue of examination” in Reformation and Renaissance Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 2012) 56-69. All of the above are helpful and welcome resources and yet remained as peripheral aids on this project. A good indication that this route needs more travel.

3 offer insight into the compatibility of such a set of principles with the various hypotheses put forward for Bayle’s own views.

This leads into the second, and more prominent, goal of this project. Through engagement with recent work on the consistency and coherence of Bayle’s theory of religious toleration throughout his career, most notably by Michael Hickson, I will argue that

Bayle’s use of Scripture does contain a set of guiding principles. By interpreting Bayle’s use of Scripture as bolstering his argument for toleration, answers, even when debatable, can be offered to questions concerning his choice of figures and topics to engage, his criticism of these figures and topics and a way to navigate through Bayle’s path of composition. Most importantly, though Bayle’s writing is bound to remain incapable of complete synthesis, particularly due to the scattered and distinct nature of the Dictionnaire articles, a coherent agenda can be offered which removes much of the “Baylean enigma” and the difficulty in determining Bayle’s personal stance. This coherence allows for a charitable interpretation of this great philosopher in which he, while maybe wrestling with tough topics and remaining open to revision, does not blatantly and explicitly write himself into positions of contradiction.

While it lies outside of the scope of this project to examine the differences between the first and second editions of the Dictionnaire, published in 1697 and 1702 respectively, it is worth noting that the second edition greatly expanded the Dictionnaire, increasing it by

501 new articles and many additions to existing ones. This is worth noting for a couple reasons: 1) the second edition was published after the Consistory of the Walloon Church at

Rotterdam reacted against the first edition and required Bayle to defend his writings.

Claiming he was fulfilling the role of a historian and simply reporting, Bayle nevertheless

4 agreed with the Consistory that he could clarify some contested articles (Manichéens,

Marcionites, Pauliciens, Pyrrhon and David) in order to relieve the church of their concerns, thereby receiving permission to republish the work. The second edition thus contained

Bayle’s Éclaircissements offering revisions and defenses of the contested articles, with the exception of “David”, which he rewrote. Being a hinge of Scripture and controversy within

Bayle’s writings and the only greatly amended article, “David” is thus worth examining both before and after and will be the lone case requiring our return to the first edition within this project5. 2) The differences within the second edition are worth noting for the fact that many articles which were new to the second edition may be relevant for this study, for example,

“Jonah”. Speculation on any motivational change prompting the addition of these articles will be restricted to our current passage yet warrants mentioning. Bayle’s debates with contemporaries over topics such as toleration and God’s nature had developed between the two editions and may have prompted him to disguise his arguments within new articles written for the second edition. Though possible, our concern here will be with the final second edition form and how Scripture is used and referenced within it. Seeing as, with the exception of David, material was added, returning to the first edition or Bayle’s process of reflection between the two editions would serve to confuse and complicate my agenda, though it remains a worthwhile examination for any future work inquiring about the development of Bayle’s views rather than an attempt to determine what their final form in the

Dictionnaire may be.

It will be helpful to conceive of two main categories of Scriptural use within the Dictionary to describe:

5 Mara Van Der Lugt, Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 188-191.

1) Those places where readers would naturally turn with questions regarding Scriptural

passages, doctrine or character. For example, Bayle’s controversial remarks regarding

David.

2) Those places where Bayle expounds on a passage or uses a passage to prove and/or

reinforce a larger point. These are locations that may cast light on how Bayle himself

views Scripture and yet would be of little impact in the general perception of his

treatment of Scripture. Importantly, if Scriptural passages seem to be peripheral to the

general discussion in any one article and yet are cited or referenced by Bayle,

nonetheless this may indicate an unexpected reverence towards Scripture on his part.

Now one may suggest that Bayle’s use of Scripture “could be due to the times?” That is, could Bayle just reference the Bible in passing because that is what “everyone” did in the seventeenth century? Perhaps, but if there are equally many locations where he does not feel the need to reference Scripture with regards to say, moral behaviour, and sticks solely to

“reason”, then reference to Scripture would tend to lend support to an understanding of Bayle affording it privileged status in the given context.

Method

In addition to the obvious articles relating to the Bible, I have undertaken a method for searching through the Dictionnaire by using the ARTFL online, searchable Dictionary.

Such a method is needed by virtue of the sheer size of the work. Clocking in at just over 2000 articles in the final edition, some reaching several pages in length, searching the Dictionnaire is a daunting task even with computerized methods. By searching for the titles of biblical

6 books a list of articles worth examining for how Bayle understands Scripture is generated.6

This method is neither perfect nor comprehensive, but should be sufficient for the scope and goal of this project, determining what impact Scripture has on Bayle’s ideas of toleration.

Certain difficulties emerged where a title could not be shortened to a searchable form without generating far too many hits to parse, for example the book of “Kings”. In such cases I have taken liberties with my search terms that should capture the majority of examples, here searching passages containing both “livres” and “rois”. The problem remains that many of the passages generated by such searches are irrelevant to this project, referencing not the biblical book but something different. Additionally, in many cases Bayle the detailed historian gets in the way as a majority of passages are his recording that such and such author composed a commentary on such and such book. Noting these concerns, care should be taken when evaluating my search index not to overemphasize the amount of Scripture Bayle is referencing within the Dictionnaire while being mindful that this was not his primary purpose but a point of interest in grasping his personal beliefs.

It is well understood that much of Bayle’s thought must be gleaned from the massive footnotes attached to his articles, often running longer than the articles themselves. Yet Bayle spoke, at least in part, truly to the Walloon Consistory when he insisted he was a historian with the goal of recording, for many of these footnotes are long-running citations from other writers supporting small points within the articles. This allows Bayle to address one of his purposes in writing the Dictionnaire, which was to provide those without a large library access to the many important remarks of different thinkers through the purchase of the

6 See Appendix for full list and details of search terms.

Dictionnaire. This being said, those articles where Bayle goes on a long discussion in a footnote with his own voice are particularly noteworthy.

Assuming a model, of religious toleration throughout Bayle’s work, and seeing if

Bayle’s use of Scripture fits this has some possible issues. A notable problem with this approach and any search for passages that fit is the potential for confirmation bias. By assuming the model at the outset we run the risk of stretching Bayle’s words in order to fit every passage and thought into a support of toleration. Although noting the model is well attested in Bayle scholarship and scholarship is unanimous that this is a theme that concerned

Bayle throughout his life, there are diverse views as to Bayle’s scope and justifications for the toleration agenda. Nonetheless, given the overall consistency of Bayle’s commitments, it seems reasonable, where a segment of Bayle’s writing appears to run counter to this toleration agenda, to see if there is a possibility of interpreting the opposing passage in such a way that it is not counter to a theme Bayle appears to have thought highly of and maintained throughout his career.

Chapter 1

The Philosophical Commentary

Before jumping into the Dictionary it is worth examining a separate work of Bayle. The

Philosophical Commentary is a unique piece of writing in Bayle’s corpus. Here Bayle explicitly engages a scriptural passage, Luke 14:23 (And the master said to the servant, “Go out to the highways and hedges and compel them to come in, that my house may be full”) that he believes has been misinterpreted and abused in order to fuel religious persecution.

Examining Bayle’s use and interpretation of Scripture within this work offers insight into how we should expect him to approach Scripture in regards to toleration within the

Dictionary.

However, some cautions regarding this approach are in order. Primarily, Bayle is clear that this is a philosophical commentary. Meaning, we should not be expecting detailed exegesis of Scripture. Rather, Bayle will approach his argument from a rationalist perspective with a belief in clear and distinct ideas of morality.7 Thus for Bayle, when our reading of

Scripture leads us to views contra these moral principles we must question our method of interpretation.

Nevertheless, even if this passage and Bayle’s engagement with it within the

Philosophical Commentary is nothing more than a jumping off point for larger discussions of

7 Antony McKenna, “Pierre Bayle: free thought and freedom of conscience” in Reformation and Renaissance Review Vol. 14, No. 1 (April, 2012) 85-100. McKenna argues that Bayle’s moral rationalism continues throughout his career as opposed to skepticism guiding his later career.

8 9 religious toleration, this still says something about Bayle’s view of Scripture. Correcting the abuse and misreading that this passage afford is important to him, as is arguing that Jesus could not have intended such words to lead to such evils.

In regards to debates about Bayle’s orthodoxy, this defense of the proper interpretation of this passage and the character of Jesus may not settle it but at least indicates that for however much one may argue Bayle harboured dissatisfaction with the church, he saw goodness within the teaching of Scripture.

Although a dense work, many of Bayle’s arguments in the Philosophical

Commentary, set out in chapter after chapter, are nearly or completely identical with preceding ones in his Philosophical Commentary. They often vary in minute ways, approaching the problem in only the slightest of different ways. This provides an effective rhetorical strategy. The sheer number of apparently distinct arguments against the adoption of Luke 14:23 for a persecution proof text is likely intended to give opponents pause and inspire fellow advocates of toleration to have confidence that their interpretation is well founded. However, despite this massive amount of near repetition, much scholarship has missed some of the more unique arguments or approaches Bayle argues for, particularly those that address the nature of Scripture and how the persecutionists,8 though acting from religious motivations, are acting contrary to the character and words of Christ.

Bayle begins his commentary by clearly stating his guiding principle: “That all literal

Construction, which carries an Obligation of committing Iniquity, is false.”9 If our

8 That is, those of the “persecutionist” party as opposed to the “tolerationists”. 9 Pierre Bayle, A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke XIV. 23. Compel them to come in, that my House may be full. In four parts. 2 vols. (London: J. Darby, 1708), New edn by J. Kilcullen and C. Kukathas. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005)., 66.

10 interpretive method should lead us to read a passage as requiring us to sin, such a reading must be false and another must be sought. Bayle believes that natural reason can and must point us away from interpretations which devolve into persecution and wrongdoing. Placing the role of reason above the potential speculation of religion, Bayle writes, “Reason, speaking to us by the Axioms of natural Light, or metaphysical Truths, is the supreme

Tribunal, and final Judg[e] without Appeal of whatever’s propos’d to the human mind.”10

This is straightforward enough. One must check one’s beliefs against reason. Yet what status does this afford Scripture and religious truths? Has Bayle necessarily demoted them to a place of lesser importance? If the Bible is no longer the final Judge of our actions how can it remain authoritative?

Such questions clearly add fuel to the fire of the orthodox or atheist discussions within Bayle studies. Nevertheless, if Bayle’s goal is indeed to undermine Scripture by placing Reason as the supreme tribunal, he does not do a very effective job. For Bayle is insistent on the importance of Scripture and the importance of interpreting Scripture rightly.

Lest he stretch this as far as the Socinians, Bayle additionally clarifies the extent of the light of reason.11 It is provided to us in order that we may know moral laws. Speculative truths, such as those of religious doctrine, appear to be a degree removed from the sort of certitude we may naturally have about what is “good”. Speculative truths would seem to be excluded from certitude by Bayle under two paths: First, it is possible that God desires us to seek out religious knowledge and the quest of the conscience is as important as the ultimate truth reached. Second, these doctrinal positions are evaluated separately from any moral

10 Bayle, Philosophical Commentary, 67. 11 Ibid., 69.

11 decisions they may lead us to reach. This natural light of reason is, for Bayle, not at odds with “trusting God’s word” or such pious alternatives. Bayle makes clear that this “primitive universal Ray of Light . . . flows from the Divinity” and has been given to all in order that they may understand the moral laws.12

Though his insistence on the power of reason as a neutral arbiter is thoroughly part of his Enlightenment culture, Bayle also recognizes, in a move ahead of many in his time, that people are contextual creatures and bring their own upbringing and bias to a text when they interpret it. Whether or not his solution of reason as the sole mediator is acceptable to the modern interpreter, we can still immediately recognize the importance of his recognition of cultural contexts. Controversial in his day, Bayle insisted that a Muslim child brought up by

Christian parents would be Christian and vice-versa. Yet rather than diminish the ability of reason, Bayle sees this lack of a human neutrality as evidence for the necessity of a universal means of dialog and examination, one he is convinced will point us towards toleration.

Though much discussion has been had about the nature of Bayle’s moral rationalism and even of his willingness to take on a sedimented view of Augustine’s teaching within the

Philosophical Commentary, I have found little which addresses Bayle’s argument on its claims to a more pure Christianity. While most have recognized that Bayle’s moral rationalism is a predecessor of the ability to naturally determine “do unto others, as they would do to you” of modern liberal theology, this is not all Bayle says about his view endorsing the Gospel teaching. Despite writing a “philosophical commentary”, Bayle is doing more than simply affirming something through the natural light of reason; rather, he takes time to evaluate the Gospel claims as such that are made within Scripture.

12 Ibid., 70.

Bayle addresses the character of Jesus as found in the Gospel through his words and teaching. Jesus, says Bayle, displays the qualities of “humility, meekness, and patience.”13

He tells his followers to bless those that persecute them, to fly from persecution instead of fighting, and importantly he is the shepherd who goes before his flock, not driving them where he wants. All these are supportive from Scripture of the nature of Christ’s teaching being opposed to persecution.

Olivier Abel offers a further reflection on the rights of an erring conscience which

Bayle demonstrates in the Philosophical Commentary. First he notes that a criticism offered against Bayle is that should my conscience tell me to persecute you, who are you to stop me?

Must you not tolerate my persecution? Though Bayle might not have thought out all the repercussions from turning his argument on himself he does not allow for this possibility for

“what would happen if everyone did the same?” The natural light tells us this is wrong and conscience cannot justify crimes. Thus, permitted error must be confined to speculative truths.14

Importantly, for Bayle, this is all an act of humility, the very nature of the Gospel.

Abel explains, “The erring conscience is not, then, the autonomous individual, but the search for sustainable rules in the all-too-likely case that everyone is mistaken in one way or another.”15 There is a certain intelligence and modesty in admitting one’s mistakes. This is something Bayle is willing to extend and admire in even those he is not overly fond of. Take for example his later article in the Dictionnaire on Theodore Beza. Bayle is clearly not a fan of Beza’s more intolerant attitudes, and yet he admires the man for admitting and correcting

13 Ibid., 84. 14 Olivier Abel, “The Paradox of Conscience in Pierre Bayle”, in Reformation and Renaissance Review Vol. 14 No. 1, April 2012, 43. 15 Abel, “Paradox of Conscience”, 44.

13 mistakes in his Latin translation of the New Testament for, “none but those, who are ignorant of the difficulty of such a work, will think it strange, that he should make some alterations in each edition.”16 Perhaps Bayle’s openness to amend his own work after criticism should be re-evaluated on the basis of these remarks: he writes as an honest man who wishes to guarantee that his true message gets across rather than an impious one who got caught trying to sneak sedition through the church. The use of Scripture within the Philosophical

Commentary should prepare us for Bayle to both take seriously the importance of defending the character of God expressed through our interpretation of Scripture as well as the importance of “getting it right” that we take care to make sure our interpretation and use of

Scripture aligns with the intended meaning of the passage.

16 Dict., Art. “Beza”, Rem. E.

Chapter 2

Bayle’s Use of Scripture in the Dictionary

The survey undertaken by this project of Scripture used by Bayle found many leads. Of these the majority fall under two categories: 1) irrelevant references to various biblical books, generally in “fact-laden” passages describing what commentaries such and such author has produced; 2) those references that provide insight, albeit remarkably small, on what appears as honest piety from Bayle or alternatively, a comparative segment within an article using a well-known biblical passage as an example to contrast or elucidate some other viewpoint. To explain this second category, often remarks were made of “our Lord Jesus Christ”, prior to quoting the words of Jesus.17 Elsewhere, comments about the kingdom of God, or the Gospel were used and while done in more than a flippant remark, the article as a whole did not seem necessary of a greater elucidation in this project.18 Nevertheless, such passages offer further evidence of a Bayle who is willing to appear not only orthodox but display a degree of piety that would be unnecessary to maintain a protective veil of religiosity, though not ruling this out such a motive.

I have selected a handful of articles that do contain greater mention and focus on the nature of Scripture, on how Bayle understands of an event within, or on a political comparison. Being selective runs some risks, since I may have missed something or may be cherry-picking to prove my point. To the first concern, the Dictionary is such a massive,

17 See Dict., Art. “Grandier”; “Macedonia”. 18 See for example, Dict., Art. “Francis I”, Rem. P.; “Anaxagoras”, Rem. A.

14 15 sprawling work that even with thorough use of search terms and reading of all located passages, a key reference may well have been missed. Such precautions will have to make do. As for the second concern, I have attempted to draw on a variety of types of articles to help alleviate my bias and believe I have touched on the largest ramblings Bayle had.

The Dictionary is not a reflection on Scripture. This fact, while making such a project as this slightly more complicated, aids as a check on personal bias within my search.

Passages which ought to be useful to proving Bayle had a conscious link between his thought on toleration and his understanding of the Bible should be located in such articles as people would look to in order to learn about the Bible and Christian thought. Though the long- winded remarks attached to articles are often loosely related to the headword of the article, they are still related, and themes Bayle wishes to riff on and record his personal thoughts upon share some connection.

Concerning the explicitly biblical articles, these are dominated by the Old Testament.

Labrousse calculates these as making up 1% of the entirety of the Dictionnaire and, of the 23 total articles concerning figures from the Bible, only two are associated with the New

Testament.19 As we shall see, Bayle’s Old Testament articles are often filled with apparent impious remarks. And yet, if there a purpose to these besides attempting to undermine

Scripture, the Old Testament offers a wealth of examples, greater than the New, in terms of heroes with clear moral failings. More interesting is the fact that articles devoted to the New

Testament are mostly absent from his work. If one was concerned with undermining the

Christian faith, such articles would do well to be included.

19 Elisabeth Labrousse, Pierre Bayle II: Hétérodoxie et rigorisme, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 333.

Bayle is consistent in his critique of the moral behaviour shown in the Old Testament, a fact which Adam Sutcliffe attributes to Bayle’s emphasis on the divide between faith and reason.20 However the exact relationship between the faith/reason concerns and the criticism of the Old Testament is difficult to pin down. Presumably, based on Bayle’s insistence on the conscience knowing what actions are right, as in the Commentaire Philosophique, reason tells us that the actions displayed of the Old Testament are often immoral. The less expanded point is how this conflicts with faith. Whether the conflict comes from the esteeming of the

Bible, of the heroes within, or of the questionable commands God may be giving or at least allowing is not clear. Perhaps it is a complicated combination of these. Nevertheless, one gets the sense that there is some issue between faith and reason Bayle is addressing, not simply because these texts and stories are part of Christian Scripture but because something about them remains, or is considered, praiseworthy in the midst of moral failings. Sutcliffe offers an explanation of this particular concern of Bayle through noting his particular interest in

Judaism.

Sutcliffe states “If anything was more important to Bayle than the issue of the incommensurability of faith and reason, it was the practical, political imperative of religious toleration” and proceeds to turn his attention to the toleration argument in the Commentaire

Philosophique. Agreeing with his statement and noting that “this cause in a sense animates virtually Bayle’s entire oeuvre” I will reverse direction from Sutcliffe and address that sense of toleration with which Bayle seeds the apparently impious Old Testament articles.21

20 Sutcliffe, “Bayle and Judaism”, 124. 21 Adam Sutcliffe, “Bayle and Judaism” in Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Philosophe de Rotterdam: Philosophy, Religion and Reception. Edited by Wiep Van Bunge and Hans Bots. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 130.

David

Famously, Bayle is highly critical of, or perhaps highly honest about, King David and his moral failings. This candid approach was one of the issues the Walloon Consistory reprimanded Bayle for and resulted in his removing the most offensive segments of the

David article from his second edition of the Dictionnaire.22 These are the passages where

Bayle views David as morally flawed, but not necessarily in any greater way than we would be comfortable hearing from a pulpit today. Thus, it is not, at a quick glance, the case that

Bayle’s description of David is incongruent with a Christian faith in general. It was more a shock to those used to ignoring or passing over the moral failures of biblical heroes to dwell on them as people of God.

Perhaps Bayle’s “David” attracted such negative attention due to the structure of his attack on the Hebrew king. Bayle’s Remark H expands on the comment in the main article about “many other things in his life that deserve censure”, apart from his adultery that is, and

Bayle wastes no time providing a list of David’s faults. The final list is seven items long and nearly two pages in double column footnotes. Dealing with further adultery, lies, and murder, the extensive demolishing of the image of a faultless David is followed by a defense of

Bayle’s interpretation. Interestingly, just prior to offering why he has described David’s faults, Bayle quotes one further item from the Bible saying that “David according to the

Testimony of God himself was a Man of Blood; and therefore God would not permit him to

22 The offending passages were later reprinted by Bayle’s publisher, Rainier Leers. Controversy sells. Labrousse, Bayle, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 42. See also, Alex Barber, “’I Resolved to give an account of most of the persons mentioned in the Bible’: Pierre Bayle and the Prophet David in English Biblical Culture” in Scripture and Scholarship in Early Modern England. Edited by Ariel Hessayon and Nicholas Keene, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 231-248. Barber provides an account of how Bayle’s David was dealt with and interpreted in the eighteenth century.

18 build the Temple.”23 Bayle asks his readers to consider three things: 1) that David’s killing of

Uriah is not one of the greatest crimes, 2) It is permissible for a private person to judge of facts within Scripture, and when Scripture does not condemn nor praise an action each person should judge it themselves. 3) We must continue to judge and condemn sinful actions of even those inspired by God. If Bayle is granted these three points, as provided in the first edition of “David”, it is not difficult to reconcile his treatment of David with an orthodox outlook of faith. As mentioned, such criticism of David’s behaviour would not be shocking to hear today, so while it is certainly possible that it is a disguised attack on Christianity (and if so disguised, how can we determine between the two), it is not necessary to arrive at this destination.

Adam

Bayle has much of interest to say about Adam. In a particularly intriguing segment he explicitly declares that we do not have to believe that Adam was condemned to “infernal flames” but we likewise do not have to endorse the views of the Fathers that he was among the first to rise from the dead. “Reason requires us to believe, that his Faith and his Prayers obtain’d mercy for him, and that he made a very good End”24. Two points must be made about this: 1) Reason makes a surprising appearance here in the “Adam” article as the arbiter of our attitude towards Adam’s salvation while not being referenced prior. 2) Earlier within this article Bayle stresses the importance of understanding the words of Scripture as he

23 Dict., Art. “David”, Rem. I. This is actually offered in a passage defending David from some incorrect claims about his violent nature in an “I admit that, but…” format. 24 Dict., Adam.

19 argues against reading “their eyes were opened” (when Adam and Eve ate of the tree) as meaning that they were previously blind.25 Further, against the possibility of Adam being born hermaphroditic as some interpreters had apparently argued from “male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27), Bayle again stresses that we must understand the words of

Scripture straightforwardly and not in a strange if literal passage, presumably an endorsement of a common sense reading.26 These two points taken together allow some thoughts to be formulated regarding Bayle’s assigned role for reason in interpretation. When there is an interpretive possibility which does not raise so many difficulties (as in the case of being born blind, or created hermaphroditic), one should take it and avoid a strict commitment to literalism. To do so just is to allow reason to be part of the process of Scriptural interpretation. Where Bayle may run into trouble is in the insertion of reason where Scripture is silent. When he allows reason to lead us to the belief that Adam has achieved salvation, does he do so wholly independent of Scripture? I think not, for though Bayle cannot reference a passage here and he disagrees with the Church Fathers, though maybe only as far as illustrating they cannot be sure of their position, he allows reason to make a judgment based on what he knows Scripture has recounted of both Adam’s character and God’s.

Adam’s faith and God’s mercy do require us to believe, by reasoning from Scripture, in his having reached a “Good End”.

Bayle adds a remark for the second edition of his article on Adam in which he offers his standard defense against impiety, that he is simply an impartial recorder. Additionally, however, he claims he has tried to avoid the worst expressions of wickedness in his

25 Dict., Adam. Rem. C 26 Dict. Adam.

20 description and that, regardless, the Church Fathers are on his side for they recorded all the wicked actions of heretics.27

Luther

Bayle’s article on the Reformer offers great insight into his views on the Bible through both positive and negative assessments of Luther’s understanding of Scripture. The majority of the article is devoted to defending Luther from the many scandalous and downright false comments Luther’s opponents made against him, including: that he was conceived by a demon; converted to atheism; and several fables concerning his death be it by suicide or being “taken away by the devil”.28 Bayle has little patience for such propaganda and quickly dismisses it throughout his remarks. It is likely his historian’s motivation for an accurate depiction of the facts concerning someone’s life was the primary motivator for this defense.

For although Bayle admires much of Luther’s life, stating that “there must have been eminent gifts in Luther to produce such a revolution as he has done”, he nevertheless finds many of

Luther’s actions open to criticism as well.29 This is not a fanboy playing up his idol.

To Bayle, Luther makes some grave errors when it comes to his behaviour towards and following from the Bible. That is, Luther’s description of the Bible and his application of its moral teaching are both lacking for Bayle. Luther’s infamous remark that James was an

“epistle of straw” occupies three of Bayle’s remarks within the article. First, Bayle is

27 Ibid., Rem. G. 28 Dict. “Luther”, Rem. X 29 He produces this remark amidst a series of citations provided by those who attempt to downplay Luther’s contributions to the Protestant Reformation.

21 concerned, as mentioned, with the historical veracity of the claim. Bayle traces a debate between a Jesuit, Campion, attacking Luther for this comment and Luther’s Protestant defender Whitaker, claiming the remarks cannot be found. Whitaker ultimately claims to find a passage in a preface in which Luther wrote “the epistle of St James is by no means of equal dignity with the epistles of Peter and Paul, but is an epistle of straw,” though Whitaker remains adamant that Campion was wrong to leave out that Luther’s remark was made in comparison to other epistles and not standing alone.30 Having established the truth of the remark Bayle proceeds to criticize Luther and finds Whitaker’s defense severely lacking.

Bayle sees little difference between making the claim on its own or in comparison with other epistles. In either case a lower status is being ascribed to the epistle of James. Bayle insists that this is not appropriate, “for whoever says, that St James's epistle is an epistle of straw, in comparison of St Paul's, really says, that it is not canonical, or the production of an inspired writer.” Revealing much about Bayle’s view on Scripture he continues, “It would be absurd to pretend, that writers, inspired by God have not an equal authority, or that some are more credible than others. Would not this be to say, that the Holy Spirit neglected some of them, and left them to their particular opinions, true or false?”31 Bayle did not embark on discussion of what made Luther feel as though James was of a lower status, for he was not interested in chiming in on a theological debate here. Recognizing that Bayle still felt it necessary to defend the inspiration of the Bible along with the equal authority of the books makes it all the more interesting how an anti-Christian view of Bayle could be maintained.

30 Interestingly, Bayle shows a humble dedication to scholarly accuracy as he edits the second edition upon discovering that the locations cited for these remarks made during this dispute are not accurate. Ultimately, he still relies on an incorrect source. The correct reference to the passage seems to be taken from an examination for Heinrich Schmedenstede which Luther oversaw. See Barbara Sher Tinsley, Pierre Bayle’s Reformation. (Cranbury, NJ: Susquehanna University Press, 2001), 62. 31 Dict. “Luther”, Rem. P.

The comments on James were not the only action of Luther that Bayle took exception to. Bayle relates how Luther had consented to Phillip, the Landgrave of Hesse, having requested to marry a second wife. Bayle determines that, “the fear of disobliging the landgrave, carried it in Luther’s opinion, and his chief disciples, against the law of Jesus

Christ, conscience, reputation, and all other human and divine decisions.”32 These were men of “little faith” who felt the landgrave was needed to guarantee the success of the

Reformation and consented to his every demand. Bayle has little patience for Luther’s apologists, writing that “The most tolerable of what they offer is of such a nature, that they had much better have said nothing” and siding with those who condemn the action.33 For all the distaste Bayle has towards this mistake he defends Luther and his Reformation as still being of God. To Luther’s Catholic opponents, attacking the Reformer for his support of the landgrave’s second marriage, he retorts “if this fault hindered him from being an instrument in the hand of God to declare the truth, and reform the church, the Roman Catholics are to blame in believing that the Popes, who have been guilty of more crying sins than this, were, however, living oracles to the church, and the vicars of Jesus Christ.”34 Bayle did not appreciate hypocrites. Through his condemnation of Luther’s endorsement of polygamy on the basis of not just his moral rationalism but of the “law of Jesus Christ” and his expectation that the Lutherans would do so on this basis Bayle shows his high view of the moral teaching of Scripture.

32 Ibid., Rem. Q. 33 Dict. “Luther”. 34 Ibid., Rem. R.

Mahomet

Bayle’s article on Mahomet is generally favourable as he agrees with the way the

Mahometan nations and peoples behave, doing so in ways which Christians should emulate.

“I do not see, that this false prophet has derogated from the morality of the Gospel.”35

Moreover in his morals Bayle tells us we can find in Islam everything that opposes the corruption of the heart, as well as the same command which summarizes the law and the prophets, “Do to your neighbour, what you would that he should do unto you.”

Maintaining his goal and interest in fact-checking Bayle corrects those who tell falsehoods in order to lower the status of Mahometism. Though Bayle declares that he believes it to be a false religion as well, he still cannot tolerate those who denigrate Mahomet and his teachings through outright lies. “It is therefore an illusion to pretend, that the only reason why the law of Mahomet was propagated so readily, and spread so wide, was because it eased men of the yoke of good works, and troublesome observances, and tolerated a corruption of manners.”36

That the Gospel was preached by the unlearned and persecuted and yet spread over the whole world, Bayle claims, is proof that “it was the work of God.”37 Yet, this would not be such a proof if it was demonstrated that Mahometism spread without the use of violence.

Now, Bayle assures his readers that Mahometism did spread through the use of violence,

35 Dict. Art. “Mahomet”, Rem. L. Throughout reference to this articles I have maintained Bayle’s antiquated use of “Mahometans” to refer to Muslims. Lest I give the wrong impression I shall note here that Bayle is still very much a product of his times saying condemning things about Mahomet with frequency. This includes that Mahomet has been seduced by the devil, conducted himself inappropriately with women through many mistresses and the forced conversions and promises of paradise upon death to his followers. I mention this to temper, yet not wholly obscure, the radical way in which Bayle affirmed the (current) morality and pro- tolerationist aspects of Mahometans, as well as his care that they are factually represented. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., Rem. O.

24 conquering lands and converting by the sword, and then proceeds to inform them that if it were not for the first three centuries of Christianity this proof that the Christian faith is from

God would not be accessible, for Christians too have converted by violence. Importantly,

Bayle cites the words of his opponent, and example of intolerance, Jurieu, as all the evidence

Mahometans would need to demonstrate this is the case, for Jurieu approves of the Christian emperors extirpating paganism from the land.38 Bayle notes in a marginal summary of

Jurieu’s work that it argues that paganism would reign still under cover of the “doctrine of toleration”, and given the context of persecutions which “appear horrible to moderate men”

Bayle seems to be suggesting that even pagans did not deserve to experience conversion by violence -- a radical toleration. Harkening back to his Philosophical Commentary, here referenced, Bayle even has Mahomet give voice to the hypocrisy seen by asking the

Christians if they do not found their actions on the words of the Gospel “compel them to come in”.39 So the words of Scripture are spoken from the mouth of “the enemy”, within his article, in an ironic reversal illustrating how far Christians have strayed from the ideals of

Christ.

Perhaps, Bayle continues his reasoning, we can judge the true religion by different means. It cannot be temporal blessings which guarantee the truth of teaching, for

Mahometans have conquered far more land than Christians, from Gibraltar to the Indies.

Morals, one would think is a good option and yet, “it would not be very safe to leave it

[religion] to be tried by our morals, whether the Christian be the true religion.” Bayle does not think Christians are any worse than Mahometans, and yet, dares “not affirm that they are

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

25 less.”40 The most Bayle will settle on is that decisions on the true religion “must be fortified by confessions of faith” a position true to his fidiestic leanings and cognizant of the inability to have certainty of religious truths through external signs.41

Bayle continues his reflection on Mahometans and toleration by offering a shocking comparison. He writes, “The Mahometans, according to the principles of their faith, are obliged to employ violence, to destroy other religions, and yet they tolerate them now, and have done so for many ages. The Christians have no order, but to preach, and instruct; and yet, time out of mind, they destroy, with fire and sword, those who are not of their religion.”42 Again, reference to Jurieu is made, this time to him exclaiming that there is no comparison between the cruelty of the Mahometans to Christians and of Popery to true believers. In this manner Bayle sneaks Jurieu into the conversation once more to appear as his ally in supporting the claim that Mahometism has tolerated Christians better than

Christians practice toleration. Yet the reader remembers Jurieu praising the “proper” use of persecution through the conversion of the pagans by the Christian emperors, and Bayle takes care to remind the readers as well saying, “[Christians] would make fine work in the Indies, and in China, if ever the secular power there should favour them: assure yourself they would apply the maxims of Mr. Jurieu.”43 Jurieu wants to maintain the ability of the “true religion” to persecute yet as Bayle has argued previously in the article, the true religion is not easily determined, only by confessions of faith. Yet all religions will make this confession and no one mark posited can easily determine whether they are validated. The appeal to tolerate all

40 Ibid., Rem. P. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., Rem. AA. “time out of mind”, read: time and again, for hundreds of years, they do so. 43 Ibid.

26 is thus suggested: the true religion (according to Jurieu) may persecute; the true religion is indeterminable; we should withhold persecution.

In an amusing discussion of the tendency to ignore the vices of religious leaders

Bayle offers the following: “St Paul says only, that the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband; but, if he had spoke according to the humour of these people, he should have said, that all that belongs to an orthodox man, and all that he does, is sanctified by him.”44 Such reference is comical and yet we recognize the dangers in assuming that religious leaders can do no wrong. We tend to believe that “the crimes which he commits, are no crimes, than to think that he commits any crime” such are the “strange effects of prejudice” and yet on reflection the danger that can come from this is clear.45 This is how persecution may spread: what we know as immoral and wrong, becomes viewed as permitted and possibly even holy, should the zealot we look up to endorse and inspire this action.

Rimini

The article discussing Gregory of Rimini (Ariminesis), a fourteenth century philosopher, is quite short, dwarfed by the remarks attached to it. Bayle raises some issues within the main article which he debates at length in the remarks. Namely, “he taught that

God can lie or deceive us”. What great material for Bayle to discuss!

Bayle begins his debate by placing Gregory in opposition to Descartes. In his

Meditations and as part of his project of establishing a solid foundation for knowledge,

44 Ibid., Rem. II. 45 Ibid.

Descartes stood upon the premise that God cannot deceive us. Bayle has Gregory raise the problem of “deception for our good.” As a doctor may address to a patient or a father to a child, sometimes a small deceit is made to benefit the one being deceived; is it not possible

God can act like this?46 Further, this dynamic appears to be behind the action of God within

Scripture. Bayle cites such examples as Jonah preaching to Nineveh having been told by God it would be destroyed, the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart and the lying spirit given to some prophets. Yet Descartes has a response prepared: “we must distinguish between God’s way of speaking, accommodated to man’s capacity, and to the truths that have a relation to mankind, and the way of speaking that relates to absolute truths.”47 This first type is often found in Scripture as God engages with people at their level, but “the last ought to be that of philosophers”, that is, speaking related to absolute truth. Descartes further distinguishes between those “lies as consist in words” and the “inward and formal malice that is to be found in deceit.”48 God may, it seems to Descartes, “lie as consists in words” but does so without formal malice although making people believe some things that are false.

Presumably, this is always done for good, as a restating of the doctors and patient example at this point implies.

Bayle begins to openly discuss the problem in his own voice now, explaining that

“there are certain things and certain expressions in the Scripture, that will always confound the deepest Metaphysicians.” Where Descartes expected the support of the theologians, he was met with the theologians pointing out the mysteries of God. Basically, God is not as simple as Descartes imagined. However, Bayle does think that Descartes should have

46 Dict., “Rimini”, Rem. B. 47 Ibid. Bayle borrows his discussion from the “Second Objections to Descartes Meditations” and Descartes “responses to the Second Objections”. 48 Ibid.

“insisted more than he did on the nature of the expressions made use of by the holy writers, to accommodate themselves to the capacity of the people.” That Descartes’ depiction of a perfectly infallible God may be argued for, whether or not Bayle himself endorses it wholly, seems clear to Bayle. And yet this is because, or in spite of, the accommodating nature of the

Scriptural texts. There are mysteries in how God is described to us by the holy writers, and in a wonderful phrase Bayle says, “It was necessary that the Prophets should bring down God to man, and make him stammer with us, as a nurse stammers with a child, whom she suckles.”49

Bayle’s final recommendation to Descartes is that he should have “affirmed constantly, that the passages of the Scripture, wherein it is said that God does sometimes deceive, ought never to be literally understood” and to all his readers:

Let us remember, that if the Scripture does often represent God under popular, and consequently very false, notions, to accommodate itself to the capacity of those, for whom

God designed the revelation; it affords us in other places the corrective that we want, I mean the description of the Infinite Being in his immutable and most perfect majesty.50

Abraham, Sara, Agar, Abimelech

When even such minor character as Abimelech and Agar51 are given articles that are greatly cross-referenced and expanded on, it is a good indication that Bayle’s initial goals within the Dictionnaire have shrunk. To explain, the Dictionnaire as a whole is hugely weighted towards the beginning of the alphabet, with, for example, the first volume of four in

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Spelling in the Dictionnaire of Hagar.

29 the 1740 edition searched here devoted to just A and B. As Bayle proceeded with his project he shrunk down the number of entries, and although his exact criteria for what got an article and what did not remains unknown, it is certainly possible that the other extant resources on biblical characters inspired him to devote his time elsewhere. These four articles contain cross-references to each other and were likely constructed together, Sara maintaining an article in the final volume due to this preconstruction. Bayle does a fairly good job of avoiding covering the same material within the four by ample use of these cross-references and spends most of the space offering corrections to mistaken conclusions or blowing away superstitious fables on top of the stories, his standard approach to dealing with a biblical article.

Giving us some extra insight into his purpose in the construction of the Dictionnaire,

Bayle explains that he need not expand upon the brief summary of Abraham’s life which he provides. Protestants have this information from the Bible, Catholics have the dictionaries of

Moreri and Simon (and presumably Bayle has little to correct within their accounts.) Instead he believes it “more agreeable to the Nature of this Collection, to dwell upon the Falshoods and groundless Traditions relating to Abraham” and yet of these there are as many as to “tire the Patience of the most indefatigable Writers.”52 Picking several issues related to the

Patriarch’s conduct Bayle chooses to write large remarks providing his responses to these moral questions raised by Abraham’s life. The initial remarks on Abraham concern him being a religious refugee, forced to flee his land due to his faith, an aspect of the Patriarch’s

52 Dict. Art. “Abraham”.

30 life doubtless singled out by Bayle due to his own persecution and flight from France to the

Netherlands.53

Bayle’s article on Sarah is concerned with two main events and the difficulties which must be explained from them: 1) Sarah’s having been exposed to rape on account of

Abraham pretending they were not married and 2) Sarah’s treatment of Hagar. Bayle is glad to have the support of his Reformed predecessor, for he acknowledges that “One cannot easily clear Abraham and Sarah in this matter, . . . therefore they are in the wrong who are so angry with Calvin, for reproving them on this subject.”54 Aware of the backlash he faces when addressing moral failings within the Bible, Bayle attempts to shield himself, with mixed results depending on the article.

The remarks to the article on Sarah begin with a massive list of reasons, seven in total, and many words on why Sarah should be considered the sister of Abraham. For when

Abimelech accuses Abraham for not revealing that Sarah was his wife and saying she was his sister, Abraham replies, “she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father though not the daughter of my mother, and she became my wife.” (Gen. 20:12). It is plain to Bayle that,

“were in not for the ill habit contracted by some, of sacrificing the natural sense of the words of Scripture to the least difficulties that arise, there could not be two different opinions about the matter,” a position that initially seems at odds with his interpretive method within the

Philosophical Commentary.55 Yet in the Philosophical Commentary Bayle insists that the literal sense is wrong if it causes us to commit iniquity. Though Abraham’s incestuous relationship may fit the definition of iniquity quite well, there is good reason to think this

53 Ibid., Rem. A. 54 Dict., Art. “Sarah”. 55 Dict., Art. “Sarah”, Rem. A.

31 interpretive rule does not apply and the literal sense is still preferable under Bayle’s position.

Namely, this is not a commandment “to us” causing sin in those who listen, as “compel them to come in” does, but is a reporting of events, a matter which the historian side of Bayle takes very seriously. Thus, for Bayle, when the natural sense of Scripture can be maintained by resolving a few minor difficulties it should be maintained. Presumably such minor difficulties would not involve permitting immoral behaviour amongst Christians.

Descriptions of immoral behaviour, though not endorsements, are facts and not difficulties to be resolved.

In far more detail than the article devoted to Abraham, Bayle outlines the patriarch’s failings in his abandonment of his wife. “[F]ar from being a jealous husband” he is willing to sacrifice her body and the sanctity of their marriage for fear of losing his life and to do anything to protect himself. Bayle challenges his readers saying, “Not to acknowledge therein the infirmity of corrupt nature is to be voluntarily blind” for even the founder of the

Judeo-Christian faith cannot be excused from such an action.56 However Bayle’s condemnation of Abraham is softened from what we may expect from the philosopher.

Comparing Abraham to a more well-known Old Testament hero, he writes, “This fear is not the worst passage of this history. Who does not know the underhand dealings of David, in order to destroy the husband of his mistress.” Whereas Abraham reasoned, likely correctly, that he was in danger of losing his life should he be known as Sarah’s husband and this fear caused him to act in his immoral manner, David has no such excuse. David’s actions were committed without fear of his own life and as an abuse of power. Bayle does not expand on these thoughts as much as we would like, but it seems as though he has some understanding

56 Dict., Art. “Sarah”, Rem. B.

32 of a “justified immorality” that while not excusable, does not offend reason and this is, somehow, preferable. I would guess that functioning in well reasoned ways which nevertheless cause one to sin, allows an understanding and compassion which is of a greater good than acting out of irrational, unpredictable fears.

Bayle situates himself in a position that tries to take seriously the failings of biblical heroes while still recognizing their accomplishments and, I believe, avoiding the intentional undermining of Scripture he is often accused of. Bayle formulates his position in this way:

“We ought to keep at an equal distance from the irreverence of Faustus the Manichee, and from the superstitious flattery of some others.”57 Faustus, cited from Augustine’s Contra

Faustum, accuses Abraham of being an “infamous vendor of his marriage rights” and solely out of pride and greed (for he is eventually given gifts in order to leave the lands of Pharaoh).

Bayle finds others willing to excuse Abraham from his behaviour in a variety of ways: saying this event must not be interpreted in a literal sense (Origen); or that Abraham was told to act in this manner by a divine spirit; and even that he must have behaved this way to protect his life, since his life was so essential to fulfill the divine decrees.58 None of these excuses are acceptable. For Bayle, we must not twist the words of Scripture to save our heroes from their faults. Likewise, we must not twist our conscience when the natural light of reason illuminates their darkness.

Glancing at the article “Abimelech” we see Bayle continue his thoughts, attached through cross-references, on this breach of proper marital conduct in the Patriarch’s life.

After again faulting commentators, though this time the Church Fathers Chrysostom,

57 Ibid. 58 This last example Bayle finds particularly pathetic, writing “for if his life was necessary for the fulfilling of the divine decrees, he might have been assured that nobody could kill him.” Ibid., Rem. B.

Ambrose and Augustine, Bayle importantly adds: “Tis strange that these great Luminaries of the Church, with all their Virtue, and all their Zeal, should be ignorant that it is unlawful to save either one’s own Life, or another’s, at the expense of a Crime.”59

“Abimelech” also adds to our understanding of Bayle’s view of Scripture. He faults

Josephus not only for adding to the accounts of Scripture but of doing so and being a Jew. In

Bayle’s eyes this is worse than a pagan who would add to the words of Scripture, for

Josephus should understand them as divine and not “set himself in opposition to Moses.”60

Moreover, this is simply being a poor historian for “not finding the Facts unfolded and embellished to their Fancy, they have stretched and dressed them up as they pleased; and this is what at present we receive for History.”61 Should Bayle be accused of “playing up” his esteem for the Bible, his esteem for the proper recording of history, free of the author’s bias and personal additions, is an additional difficulty one must account for in this passage.

Interestingly, and perhaps providing evidence for these articles being constructed together,

Bayle here too, and in the article to follow, defends Calvin saying he, “makes use of all the right, that reason and Scripture give us of passing our judgment upon the quality of an action.”62

Regarding Hagar, Bayle adds from the Sarah article an interesting remark and further defense of Calvin that “the liberty Calvin took of censuring severely this action of Sarah and

Abraham, is of much greater use to Christian morality than the pains the Fathers have taken to justify Abraham and his wife. They have sacrificed the general interests of morality to the

59 Dict., Art. “Abimelech”, Rem. A. 60 Ibid., Rem. C. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., Rem. I

34 reputation of a private person.”63 Let it be recognized that Bayle was not simply playing the apologist for his Calvinist faith. In his article on Calvin he avoids much personal judgment of

Calvin’s teaching and morals, devoting himself to rehearsing a list of accomplishments and correcting false accounts; yet Bayle cannot avoid passing judgment on Calvin’s condemnation and execution of the heretic Servetus.64 In “Sarah” Bayle places himself alongside the founder of his sect in understanding the importance of not admitting special cases with regards to morality. A fault he recognizes in “Luther” as damaging this other great

Reformer’s legacy.

Turning to the article devoted to “Agar” Bayle draws upon a connection between the interpretation of this story and a justification for religious persecution provided by St.

Augustine. Already having disavowed this in his Philosophical Commentary Bayle, anonymously, cites himself and briefly explains that “[Augustine] maintained, from Sarah’s conduct towards Agar, that the True Church may inflict Chastisements on the False, exile it, torment it, and so on.”65 Not accepting the literal sense of Scripture and thus drawing figural interpretations of the true and false church from a story of two individuals can be just as dangerous, for Bayle, as maintaining the literal sense when it cannot be reconciled with proper moral conduct. Reason must be used in interpretation to insure that one does not find justification for all sorts of immoral behaviour.

63 Dict. Art. “Sarah”, Rem. K. 64 Dict. Art. “Calvin”, Rem. M. See also Tinsley, Pierre Bayle’s Reformation, 182. 65 Dict. Art. “Agar”, Rem. D., See also: Phil Comm., 306-308.

Chapter 3

Analyzing Bayle’s Use of Scripture

The Bayle Enigma

Discussion of what is known as the Bayle enigma is essential for drawing conclusions about

Bayle’s use of Scripture within the Dictionnaire. The enigma is succinctly described as “a problem not just of deciding whether Bayle succeeded in what he was trying to do, which would be difficult enough given the charged topics that he often dealt with, but even and especially in deciding the nature of what he was trying to do.”66 What Bayle’s aims are is a notoriously difficult question to answer and the problem is only increased when the

Dictionnaire is the work in question. The very nature of the work sees Bayle recording and describing a variety of positions within different articles and the question of what he actually believes is often left unsolved. If Bayle maintains contradictory opinions throughout his work, any consistency with his engagement of the Bible will, at the very least, be obscured by the back and forth flip-flopping many claim to find in Bayle.

A further conundrum associated with the Bayle enigma is the oft cited division between an early and late period in Bayle’s thought. Scholars holding to such a division see the earlier stage of Bayle’s career as focusing on the question of toleration, while seeing the later stage, including the Dictionnaire, as increasingly interested in the problem of evil. Both

66 Lennon, Thomas M. and Hickson, Michael, "Pierre Bayle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

35 36

Labrousse and Mori agree that Bayle has a break in his thought where he moves from questions of toleration to those of theodicy, though arriving at different positions on the question of Bayle’s personal faith. Labrousse sees Bayle as a Christian, albeit with some apparently heterodox positions, while Mori maintains Bayle was a closet atheist. For

Labrousse the move happens when Bayle finds evil no longer explainable, particularly after the rampant persecution following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes as Catholic authorities tried to capture and place Bayle on trial for his writing.67

Mori places the break during the (anonymous) writing of the Avis aux refuges in

1690. Mori sees the switch of Bayle’s targets from Catholics to Protestants in arguing against persecution as evidence that he no longer finds any religion compelling and supportive of tolerance. Though it is perhaps worth speculating that Mori’s work establishing the Avis as being written by Bayle has led him to overemphasize its impact, Bayle certainly has some shifts in his experiences in the time prior to the composition of the Dictionnaire that raise the question of how much his thinking has changed by the time of his greatest work.68

Michael Hickson has taken up this question by arguing that there is no significant break between an early and later Bayle and that Bayle’s entire body of work can be seen to support religious toleration, including the Dictionnaire.69 Hickson develops his argument by illustrating three distinct connections between theodicy and toleration in Bayle: a historical connection, a theological connection and a philosophical connection. The historical connection he provides is likely the strongest for making the case that there is something more going on with Bayle’s discussion of Manicheism. Hickson points out that Protestant-

67 Labrousse, Bayle, 31. 68 Gianluca Mori, Bayle Philosophe, (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999), 315. 69 Michael Hickson, “Theodicy and Toleration in Bayle’s Dictionary” in Journal of the History of Philosophy. 51:1 2013, 50. The preceding section owes much to Hickson’s insights.

Catholic debate around this time had made much use of Manicheism. Catholic authors were accusing Calvinism of being a Manichean heresy in making God the source of evil. Hickson finds confirmation of his thesis from the extent of Bayle’s references to these Protestant-

Catholic disputes within the “Manicheans” and “Paulicians” articles, particularly the debate between Pierre Jurieu and Louis Maimbourg.70

What Bayle is particularly putting forth as the problem of evil is that Manichean objections are not answerable by reason.71 A Manichean objection is stated by Bayle in

“Paulicians” as: “’to be a Manichean’ and ‘to make God the author of sin’ are two expressions that mean the same thing; and whenever one Christian sect accuses another of making God the author of sin, then in that respect it never fails to impute Manicheism to it.”72 Here again is another remark emphasizing that modern inter-Christian debate is behind

Bayle’s thoughts. Hickson explains it this way: “by arguing that the Manichean objections are insoluble, therefore, Bayle is claiming that these interconfessional Christian disputes are interminable, since no sect can ever fully satisfy its opponents’ Manichean objections.”73If both Protestants and Catholics are convinced the other is making God the source of sin, and both are reaching this position from the same texts, the Bible is not much help in clarifying the debate. For our purposes, it is worthwhile to note that Bayle does not hinge any of these arguments on Scripture, despite his audience being largely party to the Catholic-Reformed conflict. Apart from a reference to Romans 9:20 (shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus) along these lines concluding the remarks in

70 Ibid., 53. Hickson advises readers of Bayle not to skip over his citations in the margins as is often done saying, “these indicate the authors and works that constituted Bayle’s sources, and in some cases also his motivation and aim in writing the remarks.” 71 Ibid., 56. 72 Dict. “Paulicians”, rem. I, 73 Ibid., 58.

Paulicians, there is a noticeable lack of Scripture for such a theologically ripe debate, both ancient and modern.74 It seems to raise the question that Bayle may be avoiding using

Scripture to reinforce his point, though muddled by his maintaining that one’s faith position must be reached through divine revelation (Scripture) apart from reason.

The theological connection between theodicy and toleration covers much the same ground as the historical for Hickson, focussing on the content of the “Manichean” and

“Paulician” articles and clarifications as opposed to the sources Bayle references throughout.

Hickson finds the philosophical connection between theodicy and toleration within the less well-known “Synergists” article. Remark B details inter-Protestant conflict between

Melanchthon and Calvin and has Melanchthon praised for his tolerance even when they differ. Bayle, portraying Melanchthon as an image of himself (Bayle), according to Hickson and others, concludes that “every sect taxes the other with teaching impious things and horrid blasphemies, and carries animosity to the highest degree; and yet, it is about such doctrines that a mutual toleration should most readily take place.” Melanchthon demonstrated this toleration by “excusing them on account of the obscurity of the matter, and the goodness of their motives.”75 This explicit praise and call to toleration in religious disputes is not where

Bayle stops in these remarks, for he continues by way of a thought experiment involving

Solomon and a coded message. Bayle describes Solomon (God) as sending a coded message to a king and two men must decode it (religious disputers). Each believes they are correct and the other in error. Importantly, they both understand where they may have gone wrong, and both have used an understandable method to crack the code. Solomon explains to the men

74 However this passage of Scripture itself is noticeably ripe, and supports Bayle’s fideistic assertion that we may not grasp a solution to the problem of evil but can trust in God’s goodness nonetheless 75 Bayle, Dict. Art. “Synergists,” rem. B Hickson, “Theodicy and Toleration”, 66.

39 that “One of you makes me think what I have thought, and the other what I might have thought with an equal glory.”76 The principle which Bayle argues for clearly emerges: God tolerates both the “right view” and the “genuine belief” and we, not able to distinguish the two, should do the same. How we read the Scriptures likely matters for Bayle, but he does not bother to focus on these issues when people are unlikely to interpret the pertinent texts in the same way. Rather, like Bayle’s Melanchthon, we should appreciate the good, God honouring, intentions of dissenting views and tolerate them even when we disagree. This is where Bayle chooses to focus his discussion, by dwelling on how people view and treat the other rather than attempting to make them see how he views and treats biblical texts. It is not necessary to conclude that Bayle has given up on being able to responsibly teach and reason from faith positions drawn from Scripture, only that we must respect and tolerate the rights of others to err in this process as we may as well. Humility is the Baylean trump card.

Van der Lugt incorrectly critiques Hickson’s argument on the basis of it “hinging” on the article “Synergists”. The reality is Hickson draws on “Synergists” to support the larger assertion that Bayle’s discussions of the problem of evil have a linked purpose with his understanding of religious toleration. For van der Lugt, the issue of using “Synergists” as evidence of Bayle’s views is that it was added anew in the second edition of the Dictionary and as such cannot be “loadbearing”.77 While this is a good point to draw our attention to,

Hickson’s claim is simply that in “Synergists”, “the relationship between theodicy and toleration is more explicitly and rigorously drawn by Bayle than it is anywhere else” and this should not be surprising that he makes such a link in the second edition, after Bayle has been dragged across the coals by the Walloon Church for his writings on evil. Van der Lugt does

76 Ibid., 154.b 77 Van der Lugt, Bayle,Jurieu and the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 245.

40 not expand on her criticism, but would do well to note that this same point – that is, that within the second edition Bayle clarifies what he was trying to argue for with his problem of evil discussions -- was made by Hickson earlier in the same article as he points out that Bayle explicitly links toleration and the inexplicability of evil in his self-interpretation and explanation of his writings within his Clarifications released with the second edition.78 Van der Lugt’s concern is likely explainable due to her focus on the relationship between Bayle and his opponent, Jurieu, a focus not shared by this project. One of Bayle’s defenses of his writing come the second edition was to appeal to the same fideism that Jurieu espoused in order to prove his orthodoxy. If Jurieu is orthodox and Bayle’s views are the same as

Jurieu’s, Bayle must be orthodox. Van der Lugt claim, that fideism “might lead to toleration is undermined by the existence of Jurieu” due to Jurieu’s position being tied with intolerance, misses the point. For Bayle, it is not fideism itself as an epistemological method, but the inability to have certainty about purely religious doctrines – something that leads some to persecute -- that is being tied to toleration.79 While this may lead Bayle to claim a fideistic outlook, he does not shirk rational thought and the ability to have reasons behind our positions. He insists only that we lack the sort of absolute certainty and should think twice before we are willing to commit immoral acts on behalf of our claimed religious stances.

78 Hickson, Theodicy and Toleration, 51. 79 Van der Lugt, Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 245.

Remarks on Articles Examined

In examining a select few articles where Bayle utilises Scripture several trends emerge. It is not only within the Old Testament articles that Bayle displays a concern that those whom Christians look up to within their Scriptures are not acting as those Scriptures teach. Luther is criticized in this manner as well, despite the whole of the article being largely positive towards the Reformer. Is it perhaps too hasty to assume Bayle has a hidden purpose of subversion behind is criticism of biblical figures?

As far as toleration is concerned, it seems that Bayle often brings up the Bible within situations where he wishes to illustrate the difficulties that accompany religion. Often these passages, for example Mahomet or David, have reference given to toleration explicitly or implicitly through the marginal citations and extended comments.80

As Sandberg notices, in the most philosophic of Bayle’s articles, containing the most controversial statements on God and evil, it is always Bayle’s opponent Jurieu who is nearby, with Bayle drawing reference to Jurieu’s intolerance and inconsistencies.81 It is not a stretch then to think that a similar motive is at work in those places where Bayle approaches matters from a more theological or biblical position in order to get at the same inconsistencies of doctrine. It is not necessary to reach a conclusion that Bayle is attempting to undermine religious faith altogether when he draws attention the fallibility of reason in matters of religion. Rather, Bayle’s attention to toleration in these places offers support to a view which sees him undermining a false confidence in one’s secure knowledge of divine purposes,

“knowledge” that was used by men like Jurieu to support persecution. Bayle concludes a

80 Karl Sandberg, At the Crossroads of Faith and Reason, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966), 91-2., 81 93.

42 remark in “Paulicians” with reference to Jurieu saying, “there is no justness in his censures, and no connexion in his doctrines; his writings are full of wrong consequences, unevenness, contradictions, and variations.”82 It is preferable to maintain humility about the extent of one’s knowledge of God then to reach positions which detract from divine goodness and support one’s own agenda of persecution.

82 Dict. Art. “Paulicians”, Rem. I.

Concluding Thoughts

Where we expect the Dictionnaire to speak and it is silent

The simplest, perhaps too simple, answer to this question of why the Dictionnaire does not speak on certain subjects is that Bayle writes about topics where he is interested and concentrates on those places where his thoughts are original, or according to his original intent, corrective. Louis Moreri provided a wealth of information, including on biblical subjects, in his Grand Dictionaire and Richard Simon’s Dictionary of the Bible offered a critical, but thorough description of many characters and topics we would expect Bayle to cover. Bayle admits that these works are often, even when flawed, a good source of information to fill out some topics he begins to describe. Bayle then turns his attention to addressing questions not covered or not covered adequately within those authors.83

Ultimately, Bayle rarely displays a need to cover every aspect of a problem or story, or describe the entirety of a Scriptural figure’s life; they are used as entry points to questions which pique his interest, be it controversy, correction, or the work of a historian.

The ignoring of explicit biblical articles would not be evidence of a hidden atheist agenda under this assumption. What is ignored is covered elsewhere or of little interest to

Bayle, perhaps he finds nothing new or problematic for him to discuss. Neither would

83 See for example Dict., Jonah.

43 44

Bayle’s series of Old Testament articles be seen as a clandestine operation to undermine

Christianity. Rather, they are an intertwined series of novel remarks on the flaws of those biblical heroes esteemed by the Christian faith.

Can this connect to a larger agenda of toleration? Perhaps the hidden argument behind the exposing of flawed biblical heroes runs as follows: if even our heroes in the faith, the originators of it, are flawed and by all accounts offensive to God in their actions, then should we not be tolerant of those today that likewise damage what we believe is orthodox through their actions and beliefs?

Could such an argument hold water? Bayle often leads his readers to his point rather than spelling it out, as Hickson has argued regarding the notorious “Manicheans” and

“Paulicians” articles. Yet there seems to be a difference not being accounted for in these contexts, the distinction between moral vs. doctrinal failures. Future studies may be interested in exploring whether Bayle uses different language in condemning immoral behaviour and condemning faulty doctrinal conclusions, perhaps stemming from or leading to immoral behaviour. The relation between the two, if indeed they are separate categories of

“failure” to Bayle, is worth exploring.

Final Thoughts

When Bayle discusses toleration amongst religions as in the Philosophical

Commentary and as has been argued was his purpose with “Manicheans” and “Paulicians”, he is discussing doctrinal differences that lead to persecution. In his criticism of biblical

45 figures, taking David as the most prominent example, he is focused on exposing and describing moral failures.

Now the two may not be separate categories: one’s doctrinal failures could lead one to moral failing. For example, the very act of persecution could be based on a doctrinal misunderstanding of what it means to “love your neighbour”. That being said, there seems to be a link missing in making equivalent the following two claims: “anyone can be immoral so therefore tolerate” (the potential toleration link within the Old Testament articles), and

“everyone thinks they are practicing right religion so therefore tolerate” (Philosophical

Commentary, various Articles). The specific solution for linking these two claims remains elusive, but ground has been gained through this examination. Perhaps it is as easy as noting that a hero such as David still cannot be emulated perfectly and one’s conscience must assess his life. In doing so one realizes that they too can be “right in the eyes of God” and yet erring in their treatment of others. An outlook of humility is required that allows one to admit, and correct, errors in judgment and to withhold that judgment when needed. This is the humility

Bayle associates with the character of Christ and the gospel and which toleration requires.

Even when I “know” my religion is true, I will humbly go ahead of others, as Christ does in demonstrating this, not drive them forward in persecution.

I believe the articles selected, together with a demonstration of Bayle’s lifelong goal of toleration, have at least illustrated and gone on to demonstrate two things: first, a reading of Bayle as attempting to undermine Christian doctrine is problematic with appeal to the political references in these articles and the attention devoted to public toleration in discussions of doctrine; second, an understanding of Bayle as committed to drawing attention to the need for toleration with regards to religion remains firmly established.

Holding these two claims together will provide a necessary lens for reading Bayle’s work as a whole. This thesis has been more exploratory and corrective then conclusive. Work remains to be done on how Bayle understands Scripture and a broader examination of his works outside the Dictionnaire is called for to attempt to resolve remaining contradictions or misunderstandings in Bayle’s usage of Scripture. Still, the apparent esteem and respect of

Scripture, coupled with acknowledgment of toleration agendas at play in places where Bayle is accused of impiety offers a corrective to views of Bayle as a closet atheist or a man attempting to undermine Christianity. This view is not ruled out, but must do more than point to places in the Dictionnaire where Bayle shows problems with our view of God. We must ask, for example, whether justice has been done to Bayle as a questioning, but genuine, believer. The paths through a comprehensive understanding of Bayle as a religious thinker are complicated and winding. Exploration needs to be done, but a map of Bayle as a genuine

Christian has been shown as a profitable guide through his use of Scripture and a compass to a greater understanding of his thinking on toleration.

Appendix: Search Terms and Frequency

Genese/Gen 114

Exod/Exode/Exodi 35

Levitique 6

Nombres 54

Deutejonome/deuteronome/deuteronomii/deutéronome 10

Jofué/josué/josne/josu/josua/josue 35

Juges livre84 23

Ruth 5

Sammuel/samnel/samue/Samuel/samuele 182

Rois livre85 58

Chroniques86 39

Esdrae/esdras 8 nEhEmie 1

Estber/ester/esther 27

84 “Juges” = 481 85 “rois” = 567 86 Very few relevant

47 48

Job 111

Psalmes/psaume/pseaumes/pseumes 174

Proverbes 73

Ecclésiaste 7

Cantique des cantiques 18

Esai/Esaie/esale/esase/isaie 8

Jerémie/jéremie/jérémie/jeremiae/jeremie 60

Lamentatio/lamentation.lamentationem.lamentationes/lamentations 24

Ezéchiel/esecbiel/esechiel/exechiel/ezcchiel/ezecbiel/ezechias/ezechiel/ezechielem/ezech 85 ielis/ ezethiel/ezéchiel/zechiel

Daniel 209

Osée 2

Joël 3

Amos 10

Abdias 12

Jona/jonae/jonam/jonas 73

Micha/michea 2

Nabum 1

Sophonie 1

Aggée 2

Zacbari/zacbarie/zachar/zachariae/zachariam/Zacharias/zacharie 73

Malach/malachite/malchi 8

Matthieu/math 131

Marc 55

Luc 29

Jean evangile/evang 12

Apostres/apotrcs/apotre/apotres/aptres 47

Romains EpItre 39

Corinthiens 31

Galates 12

EphEsiens 10

Philippiens 3

Colossiens/coloss 2

Thessaloniciens/thess 6 timothEe 20

Tite EpItre87 5

EpItre Hébreux 5

EpItre Jacques 7

EpItre Pierre 22

EpItre Jean 32

EpItre Jude 1

Apocalypse/apocalypse/apolypse/lapocalypse 138

Intolérance/tolerance/tolerance 125

Bible 198

The nature of the search engine at http://artfl- project.uchicago.edu/content/dictionnaire-de-bayle meant that a level of creativity was involved in generating and filtering this list. The digitized Dictionnaire has many letters scan as others (notably s and f) and some missed entirely. While there is a “similar word” function that generated many of the oddities in my appendix it nevertheless will miss some. Further, this function can only work after five letters and not in any phrases. For some searches

87 Philémon is absent, I could not locate any references.

51 phrases were needed, for example searching “Jean” provided a massive list and I had to narrow it down by searching alongside “EpItre”. The downside of this is in these cases I could not search for short forms of the book that may be cited in the margins. Couple this with the knowledge that Bayle had no standard short form for biblical books and undoubtedly some results have been missed. Still, the vast majority will have been accessed and for the most important articles, which have more than one reference, they certainly will have been covered.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Bayle, Pierre, The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr Peter Bayle, 2nd ed. trans. P.

Desmaizeaux, London: Knapton et al... 1734.

———.Dictionnaire historique et critique, fifth edition, Amsterdam/ Leyde/ La Haye/

Utrecht: 1740.

———. A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke XIV. 23. Compel

them to come in, that my House may be full. In four parts. 2 vols. London: J. Darby,

1708. New edn by J. Kilcullen and C. Kukathas. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005.

———. Oeuvres Diverses, 4 vol., 2nd ed. The Hague: Husson, 1737.

Secondary Sources

Abel, Olivier. “The paradox of conscience in Pierre Bayle.” Reformation and Renaissance

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Barber, Alex. “’I resolved to give an account of most of the persons mentioned in the Bible’:

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Scholarship in Early Modern England. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006.

52 53

Bernier, Jean. “La Bible dans la Philosophie Politique de Pierre Bayle.” In Pierre Bayle et le

Politique, edited by Xavier Daverat and Antony McKenna. Paris: Honoré Champion,

2014. 17-31.

Hickson, Michael W. “Theodicy and Toleration in Bayle’s Dictionary.” Journal of the

History of Philosophy 51(1) (2013): 49-73.

Labrousse, Elisabeth. Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Lennon, Thomas M., and John M. Nicholas, John W. Davis, Ed. Problems of Cartesianism.

Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982.

Lennon, Thomas M. and Hickson, Michael, "Pierre Bayle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/bayle/.

McKenna, Antony. “Pierre Bayle: free thought and freedom of conscience” Reformation and

Renaissance Review 14 (1) (2012): 85-100.

Pitassi, Maria – Cristina, “The Foundations of Belief and the Status of Scripture.”

Reformation and Renaissance Review 14 (1) (2012): 56-69.

Possen, R. G. The Biblical Articles in Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique: Their

Structure and Function. Ph.D. diss. Yale University, 1974.

Sandberg, Karl. At The Crossroads of Faith and Reason. Tucson, University of Arizona

Press, 1966.

Sutcliffe, Adam. “Bayle and Judaism” in Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Le Philosophe de

Rotterdam: Philosophy, Religion and Reception: Selected Papers of the Tercentenary

Conference Held at Rotterdam, 7-8 December 2006.Edited by Wiep Van Bunge and

Hans Bots. Boston: Brill, 2008.

Tinsley, Barbara Sher. Pierre Bayle’s Reformation. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University

Press, 2001.

Van der Lugt, Mara. Bayle, Jurieu, and the Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2016.

Zagorin, Perez. How the Idea of Religious Tolerance Came to the West. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 2003.