A PIPS Research Journal
Conflict and Peace Studies
VOLUME 7 Jan-Jun 2015 NUMBER 1
Editor Muhammad Amir Rana
Associate Editors Safdar Sial Muhammad Ismail Khan
Pak Institute for Peace Studies
CONTENTS
05 Editor’s note Comments 07 Parliamentary watch: Summary of the debates in the joint session on Yemen crisis Muhammad Ismail Khan 17 Crisis in Yemen: threats of another proxy war in Pakistan Shahzad Raza Papers 25 Madrassa reforms: the debate Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore 43 Exploring the drone syndrome Asmatullah Wazir 53 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan Zeeshan-ul-Hassan Usmani Backgrounders 71 The mystery of Jundullah Farhan Zahid and Andrew McGregor 89 National Action Plan: performance so far Azam Khan and Aamir Saeed Regional view 105 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties Ahmad Khan
131 Guidelines for contributors 133 Note on contributors
EDITOR’S NOTE
This is the fourth biannual issue of Conflict and Peace Studies, a flagship publication of Pak Institute for Peace Studies. Until 2012, the journal has regularly been published as a quarterly research journal. Started in the last quarter of 2008, as many as 20 issues of the PIPS research journal have been published so far with their primary focus on conflict, insecurity, militancy and militants’ media, religious extremism, radicalization & de-radicalization, terrorism & counterterrorism, human rights and regional strategic issues.
The journal has been well received by academic and research quarters. Besides adding to existing knowledge, it has been contributing to increase understanding among policymakers, and regional and multilateral institutions about situation-specific needs, early warnings, and effective options or strategies to prevent/de-escalate conflict and risk of violence in Pakistan and the region.
PIPS is thankful to Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) for continuing its support for the publication of Conflict and Peace Studies for the second year in a row. In 2014, too, PIPS had sought collaboration with and financial assistance from NOREF to publish two biannual issues of the journal. This joint PIPS-NOREF publication is meant to achieve the following objectives:
To produce and publish context-specific research work on subjects of conflict, religious extremism, violent radicalism, militancy and terrorism, etc., in local and regional perspectives and disseminate to analysts, research institutes, institutions of higher education, policymakers, media and civil society organizations and others;
To enhance the empirical knowledge-base and scholarship on interstate and intrastate conflicts and viable options of achieving peace, security and stability in the South Asian region, with particular focus on Pakistan;
To increase understanding among policymakers and regional and multilateral institutions about situation-specific needs, early warnings, and effective options or strategies to prevent/de-escalate conflict and risk of violence; and
Editor’s Note
To improve the effectiveness of local, regional and international partners by strengthening the evidence base and conceptual foundation for engaging in conflict prevention and de-escalation interventions in Pakistan.
Muhammad Amir Rana
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COMMENT
Parliamentary watch: Summary of the debates in the joint session on Yemen crisis
Muhammad Ismail Khan
This summary is drawn from the Legislators across the board debates legislators conducted in the appreciated the government’s joint session of parliament from April decision of conveying in the joint 6th to April 10th 2015. All the quotes session, hoping that a consensus and figures are extracted from the response reflective of the aspiration proceeding of the session, available of the people of Pakistan will come online through forward. Even Pakistan Tehreek-e- http://www.na.gov.pk/en/debates. Insaf (PTI), which had earlier php.1 boycotted parliamentary proceedings on the grounds of A joint parliamentary session was alleged rigging in 2013 elections, held to deliberate upon Pakistan’s participated in the debate. response to the war in Yemen was held from April 6th to 10th 2015. The policy statement touched upon three areas: evacuation of Pakistanis The debate of the session was started from Yemen, request by Saudi Arabia by a motion moved by federal for Pakistani troops, and Pakistan’s minister for defence affairs, who also response to that request. Elaborating presented Pakistan’s policy the policy statement, the defence statement on Yemen crisis. minister said that the Saudis have
1 The debates were conducted in the 4th Day 3: joint sitting of the second parliamentary
Comments requested aircraft, naval vessels, and legislator set aside the notion of ground troops, to fight alongside the Yemen conflict being a government- coalition forces striking in Yemen. opposition tussle, terming it “open terrorism” by rebels. Sharing the parameters of any Pakistani response, the defence According to the defence minister, it minister said that Pakistan values its was President Hadi, who later ties with Saudi Arabia, any escaped to Saudi Arabia, had “violation” of its “territorial requested the Gulf Cooperation integrity” will, therefore evoke Council (GCC) countries for military “strong response” from Pakistan, action, under Article 51 of the United which (like Saudi Arabia) condemns Nation’s charter. The request for the “overthrow of the legitimate defence support too meant Pakistan government of Yemen.” become part of the GCC-led coalition, which has launched air strikes in Pakistan’s position on Yemen Yemen.
Pakistan shared Saudi Arabia’s But, several other legislators position on Yemen, torn by civil war. questioned this stance, asking the To Pakistani government, the government to stick to legality. First overthrow of Hadi government by of all, Pakistan should learn whether Houthi rebels in late 2014 is the air strikes are legally sanctioned overthrow of a brotherly Muslim by the Security Council. Yemen, country by non-state actors using some parliamentarians said, is as force. To support Hadi’s government sovereign a country as KSA is. is to stand with a legitimate government. Several legislators questioned the “conflicting claims” on the To Pakistani government, the issue of sending troops to overthrow of Hadi Yemen: has the government government by Houthi rebels already committed troops or in late 2014 is overthrow of a is it really asking the brotherly Muslim country by parliament for guidance? non-state actors using force.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s Shireen Several legislators supported Mazari wondered if the Article 7 is government’s positing on the overall really been invoked, asking which issue. A government minister country has come under armed wondered if “we will allow rebels to attack. In any case, Oman, Yemen’s takeover Pakistan.” Another neighbor, is not part of the coalition.
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Likewise, another legislator from the an in-camera meeting to deliberate same party, Shah Mehmood sought upon all details. clarification on the air strikes in Yemen, asking if it is aggression or Causes of conflict in Yemen, not, given that tomorrow, such acts and Pakistan’s role can be questioned. Legislators explained different “Conflicting claims” causes for internal chaos in Yemen, mostly on these lines: Several legislators questioned the “conflicting claims” on the issue of Autonomy sending troops to Yemen: has the government already committed The chaos in Yemen manifests troops or is it really asking the struggle for autonomy within parliament for guidance? Yemen. The country’s six northern regions, populated by Houthis, are Some, for instance, made a reference demanding autonomy for long. to the news appearing in Saudi Because they were denied powers, media, according to which Pakistan they overthrew the Hadi has already made solid commitments government. A way out thus would to KSA. One legislator pointed that be a consensus-backed interim Pakistani flags were already spotted government, which represents all in the coalition countries attacking regions. Yemen. The parameters guiding Pakistan’s response to the Saudi Tribal war request also appeared supportive of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the role of The crisis in Yemen is basically a the defence minister, one said, tribal war or “internal political power should come after the foreign struggle” between tribes in Yemen. ministry takes a decision of What is happening in Yemen has engagement in Yemen crisis; that the occurred there several times in the policy statement was uttered by past five decades, said PML-Q’s defence minister hinted at a decision Mushahid Hussain. A legislator from already been taken. Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) said Yemen, like FATA, is a As if responding to some such tribal society. To properly deal with concerns, Prime Minister Nawaz the issue, better first properly Sharif had clarified in the debate that understand their tribal culture. not all details can be shared in parliament. While some legislators questioned the utility of holding joint session, others asked for conveying
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Inter-state fight legislator, is being “reshaped”. Another said, “The status quo in Yemen-Saudi Arabia conflict is issue Middle East is unraveling”, pointing between two sovereign countries, towards “a revolt against which has often at odds for some longstanding family dictatorships.” time. Houthis themselves were once KSA’s allies, recalled one legislator. Pakistani officials were therefore suggested to think about plugging Intra-Arab fight itself in the changing environment in the Middle East. One legislator even termed it an “internal fight of Arabs.” Already, Crisis in the Muslim world Arab League has constituted a force of 40,000 troops, saying it is their A few, however, hinted towards fight. One member said that while introspection. Advising not to pin all India enjoys observer status in Arab blame on external elements, a League, Pakistan doesn’t. legislator asked, “Who asked Qaddafi [Libyan President] to Proxy war enforce personal dictatorship for forty years?” One legislators asked Yemen has become a battlefield of religious parties, parliamentarians, proxy war between Iran and Saudi and intellectuals to come up with Arabia, several legislators either said response. directly or hinted indirectly. Great game One legislator, for instance expressed concern over the kind of support Some legislators, mostly from the Houthi rebels are getting in the form religious parties, read the conflict in of weapons and ballistic missiles. Yemen as yet another element of the Head of Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (JAH) “great game of superpowers”, eager said that many rebels smuggled to divide Arab countries and exploit weapons across the border towards resources of the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia, to the point that the Yemen, they said, was a peaceful KSA has to evict Yemenis once. These country, where tribes were made to rebels, he said, found support from fight each other, resulting into Iran. Still, he said, Saudis didn’t today’s situation. intervene in Yemen, until its president asked for help. Sectarianism
The Arab Spring Some legislators also analyzed the conflict’s sectarian dimensions, along The evolution of conflict in Yemen Shia-Sunni lines. cannot be studied in separation to the latest developments in the Middle To be sure, many legislators reject the East, which, in the words of one notion that Yemen crisis is a sectarian
10 Comments war. JUI-F’s chief, Fazlur Rehman, set Some legislators mixed the set of aside the notion of the conflict as explanations discussed above, sectarianism, simply because unlike offering a more nuanced view. PML- media, Iranian Constitution Q’s Mushahid Hussain Syed, for categorize Houthis, a sect within instance, termed the conflict as tribal Shias, as Sunnis. The point was power struggle, which has become a reiterated by another legislator, proxy war in Middle East, where saying that if studied deeply, KSA and Iran are supporting Houthis, also known as opposite sides. “Ansarullahs” are “are more towards the Hanafi school of thought with One parliamentarian, Hasil Bizenjo modifications.” from Balochistan National Party, questioned the utility of discussing JUI-F’s chief questioned the sectarian the internal situation of Yemen; the impression of the war, asking if parliament, he said, is unnecessarily anyone said that the attack on discussing tribes and sub-tribes of Taliban or on Saddam was an attack Yemen. Warning against such a on Sunnis. diagnosis, he reminded how Pakistan blundered in Afghanistan when Pakistan charted its support on the PML-Q’s Mushahid Hussain basis of ethnic groups. Syed, for instance, termed the conflict as tribal power Balancing Iran-Saudi struggle, which has become a relations proxy war in Middle East. Saudi fears Yet, should the conflict drag on, Besides debating the issue of Yemen, legislators argued, the sectarian legislators discussed at length the inclination could not be denied. One threat to Saudi Arabia. legislator said that the perception is that of Sunni alliance taking on Parliamentarians largely supported Houthis in Yemen. Another said that Pakistan’s relation with Saudi should Pakistan go there, militants Arabia, pointing to following associated with Al-Qaeda in Arabian incidents: Peninsula (AQAP) can make its way in Pakistan, via Afghanistan, and fan Two million Pakistanis work in hatred. Saudi Arabia; the remittances they send support Pakistan’s Beyond single causes economy a lot.
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Saudi Arabia has helped unlike others, readily supporting Pakistan in natural disasters, Pakistan. with one legislator claiming that Another claimed King Faisal also King Abdullah personally asked warned Bangladesh that if it for money for Pakistan when it mistreated the Pakistani Prisoner was hit by earthquake. of Wars, Saudi Arabia will treat the Bangladeshi prisoners the The Saudis have even helped same way. Pakistani political leaders, such Earlier, in the start of the debate, as by bailing out Nawaz Sharif the defence minister said that when he was removed in a coup many Pakistanis were safely in 1999. evacuated from Yemen, thanks also to Saudi Arabia which After 1998 nuclear tests, when provided Pakistan with “safe the international community was corridor” and “no-fly zones”. imposing sanctions against Pakistan, the KSA gave Pakistan Legislators underscored that free oil. And last year, in 2014, the Pakistani Muslims, like others, deem KSA gave Pakistan handsome themselves duty-bound to secure the amount. holy sanctuaries against any threat.
Saudi-Pakistan’s military-to- Several, however, asked for military ties are also cordial: delinking the protection of the holy since 1981, Pakistani troops are sites from Saudi Arabia’s. PPP’s stationed there; a brigade is Aitzaz said that “Saudi state, Saudi lodged in Tabuk, and another at government, and the two holy sites” Khamis Mushahid. When, in are three different things. MQM’s 1991, Saddam attacked Saudi Farooq Sattar asked for Arabia and Kuwait, Pakistan differentiating between “House of sent brigade plus a battalion. Kaaba” and “House of Saud”. Another legislator said even when Some legislators claimed that the Saudi dynasty didn’t exist, Mecca Saudis has always been ready to and Medina still existed. support Pakistan in its war with India. One legislator claimed that JAH’s Sajid Mir questioned this during 1965 war, Saudi King distinction, terming it “academic and Faisal not only sent Pakistan artificial”. Saudi state, he said, is the planes but also the spare parts. land of noble sanctuaries; its rulers, Likewise, another recalled that in “servant of the sanctuaries”. He 2001, when India stationed recalled that King Fahd refused to be troops on the border with called as “His Majesty”, and instead Pakistan, he found that Saudis, preferred “Servants of the
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Sanctuaries”. It is the same state, Mir context of Yemen crisis, not for Saudi said, which expanded the Arabia’s territorial integrity. The sanctuaries, providing more and issue, therefore, should be the more space to pilgrims. The Saudis, former, not the latter. In any case, he said, supported Pakistan, without others said, Saudis have not attacked saying they will be neutral. And Yemen, not the other way around. therefore, it must be defended. Several legislators wondered if Saudi integrity would even be threatened Several, however, asked for by the chaos from Yemen. It was delinking the protection of the reminded that a major city of KSA holy sites from Saudi lies 2000 miles away from Yemen, Arabia’s. which, in any case, is militarily inferior to KSA’s, having the region’s most-sophisticated air power. One Senator Aitzaz Ahsan sought legislator said, “Saudis’ airpower elaboration on what entails violation would not allow the movement of of KSA’s sovereignty, as mentioned any troops in the deserts, just like the in the policy statement: will Saudi’s Americans killed Saddam forces sovereignty be threatened by internal evicting Kuwait.” Another said, the infighting or external attack? One KSA already is installing barbed legislator wondered if tomorrow, wires along Yemen. Saudis start revolting against their government, will Pakistan go and However, Saudi’s concerns were shoot them, too? MQM’s Tahir justified too, in the debates. Some Mashadhi wondered if the Kingdom likened Yemen is to Saudi Arabia, is “foreseeing uprising of their own what Afghanistan is to Pakistan. people”, due to which they are Instability in Yemen will affect KSA, “hesitant to use their own forces.” they argued, therefore, having legitimate grievances. The debate also referred to securing the Gulf of Some likened Yemen is to Eden, a major global trade route. Saudi Arabia, what Moreover, KSA faces a major Afghanistan is to Pakistan. challenge from violent outfits like Instability in Yemen will ISIS and Al-Qaeda. affect KSA, they argued, therefore, having legitimate grievances. Several legislators wondered if Saudi integrity would even be threatened by the chaos One legislator, however, argued that from Yemen. the troops request has come in the
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KSA, chief of JAH said, fears of being history, and therefore mixed lesson: encircled by Iran, which has also been supporting monarchy in Syria One legislator said that Pakistan and rebels in Bahrian. Thus, to the has never sent troops to the Arab north and south, KSA faces, on the world. Only once did Bhutto one hand militant groups and what send Pakistani pilots to assist KSA thinks are Iran-backed regimes Syrian Air Force in the six-day or actors, Houthi being one of them. war in 1973. That assistance was meant to fight Israel, not any Iran, the next-door neighbour other Muslim country, he said. Today’s realities are different. Assuming the divergent interests of Iran on the issue, some legislators Senator Farhatullah Babar said warned against damaging Pakistan- that in 1967, General Ayub sent Iran relations. Iran too has expressed Brigadier Zia ul Haq to Jordan, its concerns to Pakistan over its where evicted out the leaders of expected involvement in Yemen. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).The same The two countries share 780 km leaders, he said, later refused to border. Hasil Bizenjo said that support Pakistan in our Kashmir “closer neighbor” is different than cause. Another legislator said “distant neighbor”. Iran will be the that the incident is known as source of the much-needed gas “Black September” in which over pipeline in the future. Some 15000 Palestinians died. legislators from the western However, Ijaz ul Haq, son of Zia provinces, KP and Balochistan, also ul Haq, contested that Pakistani warned that Pakistan should avoid troops didn’t go there; instead, getting into a situation where its four officers were stationed western border with Iran gets conflict there. prone. The nuclear agreement Iran signed with the west show Iran is Legislators reminded how opening up in international arena. Pakistan continues to suffer for The regional situation around jumping into Afghan war in Pakistan will be different, if sanctions 1980s. Likewise, since 2001, on Iran are lifted. Pakistan continues to suffer further for participating in Solutions American war, some said.
The military option To be sure, legislators reminded that under the existing security On the option of sending troops to agreement with KSA, the troops in Yemen, legislators offered mixed Saudi are not mandated to fight in
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Yemen. The troops are not there for can express the right of pre-emptive combat, but to defend the KSA. strikes.”
Some legislators argued that PPP’s Farhatullah Babar called for committing troops to a distant land limited defence support, “only for don’t sit well with Pakistan’s existing the protection of installations in resource. The country is already thin Saudi Arabia”, like training facilities, on resources, as troops are busy in logistical support, intelligence North Waziristan, and conditions on sharing, and mountain warfare the border with India are equally assistance and medical relief. unfavorable. The defence minister also said, according to a legislator, Another legislator said that like the that already 40% of the troops are U.S. on Iraq, Saudi Arabia and GCC committed in war against terror. The countries, forming “coalition of the country’s war doctrine, said a willing” didn’t go through the UN’s legislator, calls for checking internal Security Council. “If we bypass the security threats. UN now”, the legislator said, “tomorrow, non-super powers will fear that the precedent can be set Several said Pakistan should against them.” Article 7, the legislator not send troops simply argued, has been sidestepped. because the war in Yemen is not Pakistan’s war. Another legislator said that the military at best can have advisory. Even if we are to send troops, send PML-Q’s Mushahid recalled that the non-officers, another said. some time ago, the foreign secretary shared that Pakistan refused sending troops to the international coalition Legislators advised the against ISIS, because the move, the government of several steps, secretary said, will be diversion from some of them being the the country’s internal fight against following: ceasefire in Yemen; militancy. cessation of fire in Yemen; constitution of interim, Several said Pakistan should not consensus government in send troops simply because the war Yemen; dispatch of in Yemen is not Pakistan’s war. humanitarian assistance to Yemen. MQM’s Farooq Sattar rejected the military option for being pre-emptive in nature now. “If we give Saudis the Some legislators supported the right”, he said, “tomorrow, India too enforcing peacekeeping force. PPP’s
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Babar said that if Paksitan has to send Legislators also called for invoking troops, it can send them as Organization of Islamic Countries, peacekeepers under UN’s mandate. which include Saudi Arabia and Already, Pakistan has the largest Yemen. A legislator recalled that in representation in the peacekeeping 1997 Pakistan-hosted OIC summit force. Another legislator asked the included Crown Prince Abdullah OIC to form peacekeeping force for from Saudi Arabia and President Yemen; the 40,000 Arab League- Rafsanjani from Iran. Some said both constituted troops could be shape Pakistan and Turkey can jointly co- accordingly, one of them said. host officials of the other countries.
Diplomacy, foremost Another legislator advised the government to ask China for Many called Pakistan to play the role enforcing ceasefire through the UN’s of mediator, for which Pakistan has Security Council. Pakistan, another to stay neutral. Even the government said, may try to opt for a seat at Arab representative admitted that League. Pakistan is willing to defuse the crisis and find a political settlement. One member, however, questioned if Houthi rebels will accept Pakistan as mediator.
Legislators advised the government of several steps, some of them being the following: ceasefire in Yemen; cessation of fire in Yemen; constitution of interim, consensus government in Yemen; dispatch of humanitarian assistance to Yemen.
Many legislators advised the PM to engage in what can be termed as shuttle diplomacy, by calling ambassadors, meeting leaders of other countries, or sending his cabinet members for that purpose. One legislator, Siraj, said government should form a delegation, comprising of representatives of different sects.
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COMMENT
Crisis in Yemen: threats of another proxy war in Pakistan?
Shahzad Raza
On April 10th2015, the Pakistani KSA, should there be any threat to it, Parliament, after deliberation in joint they largely conceded there was no sittings, decided to maintain imminent danger to the territorial neutrality on civil war in Yemen. The integrity of the Kingdom or the two consensus resolution called for sacred sites. maintaining neutrality, opposing sending troops to Yemen, but Broadly, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf resolving to protect territorial (PTI), Muttahida Quami Movement integrity of the Kingdom of Saudi (MQM), and Awami National Party Arabia (KSA) (Dawn, 2015). (ANP) openly and strongly opposed the idea of sending troops to Yemen. At the start of the joint sitting, The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Defence Minister Khawaja stayed somewhat vague. The Muhammad Asif, sharing policy religious parties looked unsure on statement on Yemen crisis, revealed how to react. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) that the KSA had requested the and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), government of Pakistan to send its two main religious-political parties fighter jets (to pound bombs on the subscribing to Sunni sect of Islam, rebels) and ships (to check the also opposed dispatching troops to delivery of arms and wherewithal, Yemen. The PTI rather took pride in allegedly being supplied by Iran). In having pushed the government to the same debate, the defence insert the word “neutrality” in the minister, while laying out Pakistan’s original resolution, said to be drafted sacrifices in the war on terror, even by the Foreign Office (Express questioned as to which country came Tribune, 2015). to help Pakistan in its long war. MPs feared that by jumping into To be sure, even though Yemen quagmire, Pakistan would parliamentarians vowed to help the face another wave of sectarian
17 Comments violence. While a few of them To be sure, Pakistan is heavily rejected the perception that civil war dependent on Saudi economic in Yemen was not a Shiite-Sunni assistance. Around two million conflict, many believed the violence Pakistanis work in the KSA and UAE, would have deep repercussions for contributing over $15 billion annual Pakistan, in case it decided to take in foreign remittances. Pakistan’s sides. Parliamentarians argued both economic cooperation with Iran is Iran and the KSA were furthering not yet ideal, even though the two their strategic interests in Yemen, share strategic interests. But, more from which Pakistan should stay than that, KSA and Iran fund the away. By joining the KSA-led individuals and entities of their coalition against Houthi rebels, choices, in Pakistan. Pakistan might annoy neighbouring Iran, several lawmakers feared. Proxy war in Pakistan
After the Parliament passed that As political parties were debating the unanimous resolution, the UAE’s issue inside parliament, several minister of state for foreign affairs, religious outfits, blatantly divided on Dr Anwar Mohammad Gargash, sectarian lines, started staging street warned Pakistan of paying a heavy protests. The outfits like Ahle Sunnat price for its neutrality. Pakistan and Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) even vowed to Turkey, he said, must abandon the send their mujahedeen to fight so-called mantra of neutrality and alongside Saudi forces, if Pakistan help Arab countries quell the refused to send its troops. The outfits rebellion in Yemen (Khaleej Times, hailing from Shiite school of thought 2015). warned against accepting Saudi demands. Many saw his reference to Yemen as an epicentre of crisis for the entire For long, Pakistan has been a Muslim as exaggerating. Yet, many favourite place of both Iran and the believed Prime Minister Nawaz KSA to fight their proxy war on Sharif tried to allay the concerns of sectarian lines, to the disadvantage of Arab countries, by, for instance, the people of Pakistan. terming Houthis as “rebels” and clarifying that Pakistan was against Many seminaries in Pakistan have the illegal occupation by rebels of long been regarded as incubators of Yemen’s territory. religious extremism and
18 Comments sectarianism. They provide society with elements, which manpower to violent extremist continue to haunt the entire nation. entities belonging to Shiite, Sunni, Deobandi and other sects. Several That Islamization, led by military efforts were launched to reform the ruler General Zia, was tilting towards seminaries, but failed to yield the Sunni Islam, thereby alienating desired results owing to multiple Shiites, “who saw it as a majoritarian reasons (Witter, 2007). attempt to make the country more Sunni” (Rafiq, 2014). The campaign In early 2015, the interior affairs coincided with Iran’s Islamic ministry informed Senate, in a revolution, which revived Shia written reply, that “financial political activism across the Muslim assistance for religious or sectarian world, including Pakistan. purposes was discouraged, because it was detrimental to law and order This contrasted sharply with the and sectarian harmony in the religious and sectarian diversity of country” (Gishkori, 2015). Pakistan. From the onset, differences were set aside in favour of peaceful At the same time, Pakistani living. But since 1980s, Pakistan government admitted about over 70 experienced sectarian divide, seminaries receiving foreign funds aggravating further after 9/11, when amounting to 300 million rupees in militants turned against the state. 2013 and 2014 (Gishkori, 2015). Largely, Sunni/Deobandi militants have attacked Shia Muslims (Rafiq, A sorry beginning 2014).
Islamization of Pakistan during the Iran’s influence entire 1980s sowed the seeds of poison ivy, which has now Iran, activated by the revolution in developed into a full-grown tree. 1979, was also wary of the situation And, what all the successive in Pakistan, which, in the 1980s, was governments did was to chop off the turning into a stronghold of Saudi branches, instead of eradicating the Arabia. roots. The influx of petro-dollars and hard cash from Washington during In Pakistan, Shias boldly claimed the Soviet war plagued the Pakistani their rights and representation, believing that Iran’s Khomeini would
19 Comments support them; that their model of Afghan and Arab mujahedeen. political activism would succeed in According to one estimate, the Saudi challenging authority. Khomeini, government split the cost of that with once, sent a message to Pakistan’s the U.S., bearing cost of more $20 General Ziaul Haq, telling him if he billion (Atwan, 2006).Fundraising mistreated the Shia, “he (Khomeini) committees were formed under the would do to him what he had done to chairmanship of Prince Salman bin the Shah.” In 1979, when tens of Abdul Aziz, the governor of Riyadh thousands of Pakistan’s Shias district. Imams at mosques were travelled to Islamabad demanding encouraged to deliver fiery sermons exemption from Islamic taxes based exhorting young men to join the on Sunni law, the Pakistani fight. government had no choice but to concede. Moreover, the relations of Saudi royal family with Sharifs in Pakistan Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of date back in history. When Pakistan Iran has spent blood and ample detonated nuclear devices, in May treasure to make its influence felt all 1998, the KSA doled out Pakistan, the way to the shores of the then ruled by Nawaz Sharif, oil Mediterranean. Iran’s attempts were worth of $2 billion. A year later, resisted by Arabs, through Sunni when he was ousted in a military sectarianism (Nasr, 2014). coup, the Saudis got him and his family off the hook, providing them Saudis’s fears and hopes refuge in KSA. In 2007, Nawaz Sharif came back to Pakistan, his return To the Saudi monarchy, post- asked by King Abdullah, to revolutionary Iran represents a direct participate in elections in 2008. When adversary, both for ideological and five years later, Nawaz Sharif became strategic regions. The two have been Prime Minister for another term, the eager to wrest power in the Muslim state of economy was in tatters. Once world. again, the KSA gifted $1.5 billion in Pakistan’s kitty. Earlier, in 1980s, Pakistan became a fertile ground for the KSA to Although Iran and KSA have been safeguard its strategic interest. waging proxy fight inside countries During the Afghan War, Saudi like Pakistan for long, the recent Arabia wholeheartedly backed the nuclear deal of Iran with the west
20 Comments raises a further point of concern for investment secure was that Pakistan the Saudi Arabia. To the Kingdom, should maintain good relations with the deal will open more space to Iran. its neighbours, especially Iran and Afghanistan. And by taking side with As of now, not only the KSA demand the KSA in Yemen civil war, fighter jets and ships from Pakistan, Pakistani leadership does not want to but a large contingent of its soldiers annoy the Chinese. to participate in ground operation, whenever it is launched inside Fallout: sectarian violence Yemen. As discussed, the Pakistani Parliament had already rejected the What is pertinent to note is that demand and urged the government sectarian difference between Shiites to stay neutral. and Sunnis didn’t turn violent until 1979. Two external events, the Demanding troops could have been Islamic Revolution in Iran under understandable and normal, but Khomeini and the Soviet invasion of what perturbed many people in Afghanistan, rather set the path to power corridors was the KSA specific violence in Pakistan. demand of Sunni soldiers for Yemen. Besides, the KSA also wanted that all According to South Asian Terrorism army officers who would visit Saudi Portal, more than 5000 Pakistanis Arabia as part of training or were killed in sectarian violence since assistance program should hail from 1989. Majority of the assassinated Sunni sects (Muhammad, 2015). To were Shiites. some strategic analysts, this was a pathetic attempt to divide the After 9/11, hard-core Sunni sectarian Pakistan army on sectarian grounds. groups landed under the umbrella of al-Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban To be sure, despite all that so-called Pakistan (TTP). They unleashed an goodwill gestures and positive unchecked killing spree across attitude, the KSA never made an Pakistan, much because there has attempt to heavily invest in Pakistan. been a strong nexus between The entry of China with $46 billion of sectarian groups, Taliban, and al- investment over next few years, Qaeda (Rehman, 2012). Sectarian Pakistani government is thinking violence would be a long-term differently. One of the main challenge. conditions of Chinese to keep their
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The sectarian tension refused to die Arabia might be forced to revisit its down permanently, though there are historic ties with Pakistan. regular intervals in which it subsided only to blow after any triggering In both cases, sectarian outfits of one event. An example was witnessed in or other school of thought, with or late 2013 in the city of Rawalpindi. without backing from KSA or Iran, When the main Muharram will raise voice against Pakistan’s procession was passing outside a stance. Deobandi mosque in the city, the mosque’s cleric reportedly passed Still further, the persistence of Yemen objectionable remarks against Shiites. crisis will be detrimental for the Some mourners allegedly entered the internal security and economic mosque and set it on fire. Several stability of Pakistan. people were killed. Later on, the stalwarts of Sunni/Deobandi Conclusion religious and proscribed outfits In the given situation, for Pakistan a resorted to violence and burnt a few steady progress on long-term imambargahs (Shia mosques) in the measures is necessary, which include vicinity. The tension and peril neutralizing sectarian outfits gripped the city for weeks. In order working under different to control the situation, the nomenclatures, reforming seminary, authorities had to impose curfew. modernizing curriculum, bringing Catch-22 situation sectarian mongers and criminals to justice, striking balance in relations Pakistan seemingly is a catch-22 with Iran and KSA, persuading both situation on how to respond to the countries to find out an amicable lingering Yemen crisis. solution to Yemen crisis, etc.
If it comes openly in support of KSA, One thing Pakistani leadership can the next-door Iran will complain, do is to build a national narrative, besides possibly imperilling the that whatever is happening in Yemen much-needed Chinese investment in will never threaten territorial the country. If Pakistan, on the other integrity of the KSA. This will hand, rejects KSA’s stance on Yemen, subside the growing concerns among or even stay neutral for long, Saudi majority Sunni/Deobandi population of Pakistan, which now
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REFERENCES
Atwan, A.B. 2006. The Secret History of al-Qaeda. London: Saqi Books. Dawn. 2015. “Parliament calls for neutrality in Yemen conflict.” April 10th.
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PAPER
Madrassa reforms: the debate
Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore
Abstract
The post-Peshawar attack debate on regulating madrassas is similar to those carried out since the inception of war against terrorism in 2001. As with those attempts, this one may fail too, simply because government’s policy towards madrassas is reactive, unilateral, and mired with inconsistencies. The policy tends to draw a simplistic line between madrassa and extremism, ignoring the different shades of debates offered in this regard. The author revisits the debate on madrassas. Moreover, madrassa reforms, the paper notes, entail a broad range of issues including their registration and regulation of students and their curriculum. All these issues should be explored, but in a step-by-step approach, argues the author, and by taking madrassa administrators on board.
Madrassa reforms: The debate
Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore
In the wake of December 16th 2014 including checking foreign inflow of attack in Peshawar, the government money and students. Without any adopted 20-point National Action priority list on what needs to done Plan (NAP), aimed at countering first and how, progress on madrassa militancy and extremism from the reforms hits snag. A step-by-step country.1 One of those points relate to approach can help the government the “registration and regulation of and madrassa administrators madrassas” or Islamic seminaries, overcome bitterness and achieve which have been blamed by many for tangible outcomes. promoting violent sectarianism, extremist ideologies and insecurity in Without any priority list on Pakistan (ICG, 2005).The madrassa what needs to done first and authorities view the clause as yet how, progress on madrassa another unproductive attempt. If for reforms hits snag. nothing else, they ask the government to stop looking at all madrassas through the same lens. To be sure, the importance of streamlining madrassas is realized So far, the government and madrassa about many madrassa authorities, authorities are not on the same page one of them desiring the issue be the on madrassa reform. They need to be. government’s top priority. Madrassa reforms, a must for countering extremism in the long Unfortunately, the secretary general run, include a range of issues, of Wafaqul Madaaris al-Salfiya said,
1The National Action Plan was first Constitutional Amendment which established by the government in January established speedy trial military courts 2015 to crack down against terrorism. It for offences relating to terrorism. provides the framework for the twenty-
Madrassa reforms: The debate the government is not “persistent” on Taliban, established a new regime in its policy, adding that “whenever mid-1990s. there is a burning issue, the madrassas becomes central point of Security expert Amir Rana (2004), in discussion, but when normalcy his book on jihadi organizations in restores, the government altogether Pakistan, explored their linkages neglects the issue.”2 with madrassas. International Crisis Group (ICG), an international think- tank, has reported how madrassas The madrassa authorities recruited fighters for Afghan war and view the clause as yet another fed sectarian violence in Pakistan, too unproductive attempt. If for (ICG, 2002; ICG, 2005). Some scholars nothing else, they ask the government to stop looking at have presented empirical evidence to all madrassas through the these ends. Out of 363 madrassas in same lens. southern Punjab’s Ahmadpur sub- district, investigated academic Salem H. Ali, majority promoted The security context sectarianism (Ali, 2005). Militancy On the other hand, some studies have challenged the role of madrassas in Experts argue that militancy from militancy. American scholar madrassas didn’t emerge on its own, Christine Fair, for instance, questions but was rather exported by any direct link between madrassas extraneous forces, especially from and militancy. In any case, since 1991, late 1970 onwards. Since Afghan war she argues, madrassas’ market share and Iranian revolution, in 1979, has stayed same or declined. Yet, she Sunni madrassas in Pakistan were claims that madrassas could possibly made overtly militarized. In 1990s, produce students who are more madrassas played a critical role in likely to support militancy than waging jihad in Kashmir and fanning students in mainstream schools are sectarian fires in Pakistan; outside, in (Fair, 2008). Afghanistan, madrassa students, or
2Author’s telephonic interview with General of Wafaqul Madaaris al-Salfiya. Maulana Qari Yasin Zafar, Secretary April 13th 2015.
28 Madrassa reforms: The debate
Madrassas are often charged for Mufti Muneebur Rehman, ITMP’s indirectly backing violent means president, said that while “NAP talks (Abdullah, 2015), by having ties with about religious terrorism,” it is terrorists and providing them “silent on ethnic, linguistic and other sanctuaries (Azeem, 2015). types of terrorism”, adding that “all types of terrorism should be part of The Ittehad Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris this plan.” Pakistan (ITMP), a coalition of five wafaqs (religious educational boards) Mufti Muneeb, for instance, said the subscribing to Deobandi, Barelvi, “ITMP support the government, and Ahl-e-Hadith, Shia and Jamaat-e- action should be taken against those Islami schools of thoughts, expressed madrassas which are involved in reservations on the National Action terrorism, irrespective of their Plan’s clauses pertaining to madrassa religious affiliation.”3 Likewise, Qari reforms, arguing that linking Muhammad Haneef Jalandhari, militancy with religion is wrong. Secretary General of Wafaqul Madaris al-Arabia, said the state should “pinpoint” madrassas A madrassa official said that if involved in militancy and then take a person visits a madrassa measures.4 Allama Niaz Hussain and stays there as a student or Naqvi, Vice President Wafaqul as a guest of a student, it is Madaaris Al-Shia, said that “the difficult for the administration government should not blame all to identify them. In such madrassas for involvement in circumstances, the madrassa terrorist activities; it is necessary to should not be considered identify such institutions those have culpable for an individual’s links with any kind of militancy, and actions. we support the government in this
For one, they question the sole focus of NAP on religious-based militancy.
3Author’s telephonic interview with 4Author’s telephonic interview with Qari Mufti Muneebur Rehman, President Muhammad Haneef Jalandhary, Ittehad Tanzeemat-e-Madaaris Pakistan Secretary General of WafaqulMadaaris and President Tanzeemul Madaaris. al-Arabia (Deobandi) and Principal of April 14th 2015. Jamia Khairul Madaaris, Multan. April 14th 2015.
29 Madrassa reforms: The debate regard.”5 Maulana Yasin argued that violent activities. Madrassa they have “time and again” asked the authorities agree with the government to take action against government over taking action those involved in terrorist activities.6 against such kind of madrassas.
A madrassa official said that if a person visits a madrassa and stays Much of the controversies there as a student or as a guest of a arise between the government student, it is difficult for the and madrassa authorities over administration to identify them. In the issues as how to such circumstances, the madrassa orchestrate an operation should not be considered culpable for against involved summaries an individual’s actions. because the action is considered as an attack on Overall, madrassa authorities stress their sovereignty and for transparency in identifying independence. terrorists in madrassas. On concrete evidence of suspects, the government Much of the controversies arise should take action but the law between the government and enforcement agencies must first madrassa authorities over the issues contact the madrassa administration as how to orchestrate an operation and inform them about suspects and against involved summaries because keep intact sanctity of the seminary the action is considered as an attack by sending only a few personnel to on their sovereignty and detain them rather than raiding the independence. ITMP argue that if madrassa in full force.7 any madrassa is involved in violence, They differ on modalities, the government first should inform nonetheless. The debate draws the concerned educational board strong argument that anti-terrorism (wafaq) before the operation; policy related to madrassas in however, they differ on how to security paradigm should be focused launch operation for detention of only on those madrassas involved in suspects hiding in religious
5Author’s telephonic interview with 6Author’s interview with Qari Yasin Allama Niaz Hussain Naqvi, Vice Zafar. President of Wafaqul Madaaris Al-Shia. 7Author’s interview with Qari Haneef April 13th 2015. Jalandhary.
30 Madrassa reforms: The debate seminaries. Wafaqul Madaaris al- though. Yet, these too do not deny Arabia asserts they do not have any the role of clerics in promoting sympathy for any madrassa that is sectarianism. However, because involved in nefarious activities but madrassas do not give education of find it difficult to identify terrorists. violence, some argue, it is necessary to impose ban on those clerics who Tanzeemul Madaaris, on the other stir hate in society.9 hand, concedes that the security agencies should have complete Yet, many Deobandi madrassas authority to arrest any suspects continue having well-established hiding in any madrassas by ensuring links with sectarian groups such as credibility of madrassas to avoid Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e- maligning them. “Tanzeemul Jhangvi. Similarly, some Shia Madaaris does not impart education madrassas have affiliation with of hate and violence and if any sectarian groups like Sipah-e- institution involved in such Muhammad (ICG, 2005). activities, it is the responsibility of the government and law enforcement Because madrassas do not agencies to shut down these give education of violence, seminaries.8 some argue, it is necessary to Sectarianism impose ban on those clerics who stir hate in society. Madrassas play a primary role in furthering sectarian divides in the Scholar Christine Fair emphasizes society. Much of it has to do with the that sectarianism does not inevitably sectarian foundation of madrassas. lead to violence, which derives from Thus, even though basic curriculum externalities that propel violence remains uniform across many between religious groups depending madrassas, it is taught on different on external strategic interests and sectarian lines in different madrassas. objectives (Fair, 2012). Most madrassas have disassociated For instance, when it comes to themselves from sectarian outfits, political participation, students from
8Author’s interview with Mufti 9Author’s interview with Allama Niaz Muneebur Rehman. Naqvi.
31 Madrassa reforms: The debate madrassas naturally side with Multan, wishes that “the system of religious parties of their sects; at education in religious seminaries times, such politics erupt into should not be based on sects” but a violence, hence the oozing out of long history of sects does not allow it sectarian bloodshed. in present days. Differences of opinion, he argued opens new The principal of Jamia Salfiya debate; however, madrassa should Faisalabad, Maulana Qari Yasin avoid imparting education on Zafar says “establishment of politico- sectarian lines. religious organizations on the basis of sect is not right, and One attempt to bring all sects under overwhelmingly madrassas are one umbrella is through Ittehad against sectarian violence.” Tanzeemat Madaaris. ITMP argues that they are trying to create consensus in curriculum and system One attempt to bring all sects by promoting commonalities. under one umbrella is through Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris. ITMP argues that It is rather external political they are trying to create actors who want to tap the consensus in curriculum and existing manpower of these system by promoting madrassas to their political commonalities. ends. Madrassas, when affiliated with political and sectarian organizations, shape Madrassa administrators realize that radical ideas among their sectarianism is an alarming issue for students. them. It damages their cause of education. Many of them think that every sect should follow the proverb Radicalization of “neither leaving one’s sect nor disturbing other’s.”10 On two grounds, some madrassas are deemed to be involved in promoting Qari Muhammad Haneef Jalandhari, extremist and radical ideologies. Principal Jamia Khairul Madaaris One, the subject of “jihad” taught at
10 Author’s interview with Qari Yasin Zafar.
32 Madrassa reforms: The debate the madrassas stimulates the manpower of these madrassas to students to join jihadi outfits. Two, their political ends. Madrassas, when rigid political views set in intolerant affiliated with political and sectarian attitude among the students. organizations, shape radical ideas among their students. Teaching about jihad doesn’t necessarily translate into readying A study conducted by Pak Institute students for jihadi outfits. Madrassas for Peace Studies (PIPS), an deem teaching on jihad as obligatory Islamabad-based independent think- in Islam. tank, revealed that the political attitudes of madrassas align with the When it comes to participating in mainstream political behaviour. jihad, one madrassa administrator According to study, majority of argued that it is up to the state to madrassas have political affiliation, declare jihad. “If everyone wage thereby denying the students the jihad on his own,” he reasoned, “the ability to tolerate other views (Rana, country will plunge into anarchy.”11 2009). Many students join violent Another administrator, Lahore’s sectarian and militant outfits to fulfill Jamia Naeemia agrees. “The army of their agenda. To overcome such the state is the only institution that intolerance, reconciliation among can wage jihad with the permission politico-religious parties can be of the state.”12 Many argued that opted for. there is no need of non-state actor to wage jihad.13 Maulana Qari Hanif Registration and regulation Jalandhary recommended that the of madrassas Council of Islamic Ideology should guide the people regarding critical A key issue pertaining to madrassas aspects of jihad in present is streamlining them. Some issues circumstances.14 under this category include registration of madrassas, illegal It is rather external political actors who want to tap the existing
11Author’s interview with QariYasin 13Author’s telephonic interview with Zafar. Maulana Abdul Malik, President of 12Author’s interview with Dr.Raghib Rabita-tul-Madaaris. April 7th2015. Naeemi, Principal Jamia Naeemia. 14Author’s interview with Qari Haneef Lahore. April 12th 2015. Jalandhary.
33 Madrassa reforms: The debate construction of mosques, and entry Pakistan. Moreover, it is not that of foreign students. funds are transferred by countries alone. Often, individuals or institutions from abroad send funds to madrassas, without any proper Foreign funding checkup, it is alleged.
Seminaries in Pakistan have been Dr. Syed Muhammad Najafi, a Shia charged with furthering the agenda scholar, pointed out that according to of their foreign donors. Because such the Shia jurisprudence, 5 percent of donors espouse different sectarian the whole wealth has to be collected ideologies, the seminaries they from the (Shia) community and support too end up feeding submitted to mujtahid for distribution sectarianism in Pakistan. among Shia madrassas and the needy people in the entire world.15 The recently-announced National Action Plan (NAP) attempts to To the madrassa authorities, state overcome any gaps in financial intervention into their financial regulations. The Foreign Office in accounts is a redundant exercise. Pakistan has clearly said that funding Maulana Qari Yasin Zafar says that by private individuals and the government is well-informed organizations to private entities about foreign funding and donation. through informal channels is being Few madrassas, out of thousands, brought under tighter scrutiny to receive foreign funds.16 In any case, choke off any possibility of financing other administrators reasoned, they for terrorists and terrorist already submit their annual audit organizations” (Wasim and Syed, reports.17 2015).
According to government’s “If a foreign country send documents, during 2013-14, nearly 12 donation, it should be come countries provided up to 300 million through government channel. rupees to about 80 seminaries in
15Author’s telephonic interview with Dr. 16Author’s interview with Qari Yasin Syed Muhammad Najafi, Principal of Zafar. Jamiatul Muntazir, Islamabad. April 3rd 17Author’s interview with Qari Haneef 2015. Jalandhary.
34 Madrassa reforms: The debate
Such funds can be easily beneficiary of foreign funding” but tracked.” without any “audit system”.19
As of the individual funding, Qari Muhammad Hanif Jalandhary stated Registration that “philanthropists in Pakistan” are the major sources of income for One issue is about “irregular” madrassas. Yet, if overseas Pakistanis registration of madrassas. No proper want to donate, they should, he said. mechanism of madrassa registration A religious cleric said that foreign exists. countries extend facilities related to health, education and food on In the past, seminaries were ground of Islamic brotherhood registered as charity organizations through welfare institutions. under Societies Registration Act 1860. The registration requirement, Mufti Muneebur Rehman calls that however, was removed in 1990. The some mechanism for funding should issue rose to prominence during be charted out and distributed Musharraf’s regime in 2000s. among madrassas.18 One such way was proposed by Qari Yasin. If a Unregistered seminaries add into foreign country send donation, he security problems, it is said. said, it should be come through government channel. Such funds can At that time, madrassa authorities be easily tracked. and government agreed to initiate a plan of registration and to conduct Some of them think that the focus on audit of accounts of madrassas foreign funding of madrassas is a through independent auditor firms. play of anti-madrassa lobby. Qari However, the process dragged on, argued that if the government wants partly because of government’s lack to keep tabs on madrassas’ funds, of will. similar rule should also be applied on non-governmental organizations, As of now, a large number are which, according to Qari, are “major unregistered. The exact figure of madrassas is unknown. The figures
18Author’s interview with Mufti 19Author’s interview with Qari Yasin Muneebur Rehman. Zafar.
35 Madrassa reforms: The debate quoted by five wafaqs, boards, are of ready to cooperate with the the registered madrassas. government.”21
Only recently, in light of the National Other schools of thought also pointed Action Plan (NAP), the government out that department of education introduced a new pro-forma for should look into the registration madrassa registration. Madrassa matter as educational institutions are authorities reject the form for its looked into. “illogical questions”. Land grabbing and illegal They argue that registration should construction be a done in a proper way.20Madrassa administrators have never refused Another issue is about the illegal registration, argues Qari Muhammad construction of mosques and Haneef Jalandhary. seminars, often by grabbing someone else’s land (Shah, et al., 2015). In Karachi, some mosques and Only recently, in light of the madrassas got so much power in National Action Plan, the their communities that those government introduced a new institutes became major power pro-forma for madrassa brokers. In Islamabad, about 305 registration. Madrassa mosques/madrassas had been authorities reject the form for illegally constructed whereas 69 its “illogical questions”. madrassas/mosques had “encroached upon, on average, 100 They point towards a process the square yards each” (Asad, 2015). madrassa authority and the Challenging these mosques and government adopted in 2005. “We seminaries then become a touchy are ready to adopt that process”, Qari issue, thereby making such said, adding that if the “government constructions more or less a wants to include new clause in the permanent feature. registration law, the madrassas are
20Author’s interview with Mufti 21Author’s interview with Qari Haneef Muneebur Rehman. Jalandhary.
36 Madrassa reforms: The debate
In fact, when the government tried to Prevailing security threats have release captured land the cleric forced the government to send back occupied in the name of mosques and many foreign students to their native madrassas, seminaries countries. To enroll foreign students, administrators reacted strongly, madrassas were supposed to terming the government’s action as obtaining No-objection Certificates “anti-Islam”. (NOCs) from foreign ministry. Many countries also grew reluctant in permitting their students to educate Authorities complain that the in Pakistani seminaries. government has failed in formulating any mechanism Over the years, their number has ensuring admission of foreign dwindled significantly. students in religious seminaries. Madrassa authorities demand that the government should treat foreign students of madrassa and of other However, this is not to say that all educational institutes on equal clerics are into land grabbing. footing. Dr. Raghib Naeemi says that Instead, the major portion of clerics these days, the foreign students condemned the act of land grabbing. “seeking to get madrassa education They argue that building mosques or prefer India instead of Pakistan” madrassa at controversial land is because of “strict policy” the prohibited in Islam. government had adopted.22
Foreign students The government, in At one point of time, students from consultation with more than 64 countries including the representatives of madrassa United States, United Kingdom, boards should evolve a India, China, Russia, and strategy to enhance Afghanistan were enrolled in interaction among madrassas madrassas in Pakistan. of different sects.
22Author’s interview with Dr. Raghib Naeemi.
37 Madrassa reforms: The debate
Authorities complain that the literature, rhetoric, logic and government has failed in formulating philosophy. any mechanism ensuring admission of foreign students in religious Even though the interpretations seminaries. Qari Muhammad Haneef offered are sectarian, the curriculum Jalandhari lauded that “it is an per se doesn’t directly indicate honour for the country to host violence. foreign students, because after completion of education, foreign The government, in consultation students serve as ambassadors of with representatives of madrassa Pakistan in their respective boards should evolve a strategy to countries.” He argued that the enhance interaction among “wafaqs are ready to play their part madrassas of different sects. for addressing reservations of foreign All madrassa boards have agreed to countries.”23 include modern subjects in curriculum in addition to religious Curriculum education. They, however, demand When it comes to madrassa that the government grant madrassa curriculum, the debate revolves boards the status of other educational around two issues: curriculum is not boards issuing other degrees. Beside up to date to the requirements of this, they are jointly compiling a book modern era, and two, the text reeks on peace education; the book will 24 badly of hate material, which often bepart of madrassa curriculum. feed sectarianism and extremism. Conclusion The curriculum in madrassas, called as Dars-e-Nizami, comes with a long The government needs to come with history in the subcontinent. The main a consistent policy towards subjects in the curriculum include the madrassas. Madrassa authorities, in Quran, hadith, fiqh (Islamic spite of their differences with the jurisprudence), Arabic language, government, are ready to sort out the issue. To undertake reforms, the
23Author’s interview with Qari Haneef 24Author’s interview with Qari Yasin Jalandhary. Zafar.
38 Madrassa reforms: The debate government should chart out a At the same time, madrassa priority list of their security concerns administrators should be open to reforming themselves by from madrassa; those lost can then transforming radical ideologies with be worked upon in consultation with more tolerant and peaceful ones. madrassa administrators. The Even if deep-rooted sectarian divides process of negotiation can be greatly may take time for complete facilitated, once the government elimination, a culture of intra-faith stops leaving the impression of can produce at least some semblance painting all madrassas with the same of sectarian harmony. Madrassa brush. To be sure, not all indulge in authorities should strive to produce violence. the minds who, after graduation, offer their best services to the state and society.
39
REFERENCES
Abdullah, H. 2015. “One size may not fit all.” Dawn, March 9th.
Debating drones
Drone operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas continue to draw a wide range of debate. Even where their accuracy is less disputed, reliance on this technology is brought to notice on different grounds, like sovereignty, human rights, legal.
Strikingly, there also remains a spark of debate on the accuracy of the strikes, too. The next two papers tend to present the drone strikes from all these perspectives.
The first paper, by Asmatullah, presents a summary on the drone operations of different perspectives, including the American, the Pakistani, the human rights, and the locals. The second paper, Dr. Zeehsan’s, aims to analyse accuracy of the strikes, by relying on his own unique database.
Exploring the drone syndrome
Asmatullah Wazir
Abstract
This essay captures the different angles through which the drone operations are approached in Pakistan. The paper takes note of almost all the players involved in the program: the United States, operating the program; Pakistan, which is at the receiving end of the strikes; tribesmen, whose area have received almost all drone strikes; and human rights advocate. The timing of drone strikes is also criticized often, for derailing Pakistan’s attempt to lure militants to negotiating table.
Exploring the drone syndrome
Asmatullah Wazir
Setting the ground mostly fired in FATA at the “high- valued targets”, the top militants like As American invaded Afghanistan in al-Qaeda’s. The incoming Obama late 2001, many Taliban and al-Qaeda administration (2008) introduced the fled across the border in Pakistan, to concept of ‘signature strikes’, which its bordering tribal areas. The areas’ targets those who are concluded to be some ‘hospitable’ people and much terrorists on the basis of their ground ‘hostile’ terrain provided the behaviours (Patel, 2012). escaping militants the much-needed breathing space. Soon, from there, As to why the U.S. shifted the drone’s they launched attacks on usage from monitoring to striking, international troops in Afghanistan several explanations can be offered. It and against Pakistani state inside the was then, in 2004, when American country. intelligence started pointing towards heightened militant activity inside Hundreds of miles away, the United Pakistani tribal areas. States had been monitoring the tribal Simultaneously, the Afghan areas, using drone technology, ever government raised their complaint since the war started. In 2004, the U.S. bar against Pakistan for supporting used the same technology for killing Taliban. Reports about militants a key militant. Since then, several getting training in the area also drone attacks have been launched; trickled in national and international while many militants have been media (Abbas, 2014). killed, questions are also raised over the death of innocent civilian Yet strikingly, the first attack was casualties. wrongly claimed by Pakistani armed forces (Hudson, Owens, & Flannes, During the Bush administration 2011). The attack was meant to (2002-2008), drones operations pressurize President Musharraf into
Exploring the drone syndrome taking decisive action against Taliban as well to counter the growing threat As to why the U.S. shifted the of militants from FATA. drone’s usage from monitoring to striking, several The Taliban, on the ground, explanations can be offered. It responded brutally. They went on a was then, in 2004, when rampage, killing those tribesmen American intelligence started who, the Taliban thought, had spied pointing towards heightened for the Americans by pinpointing the militant activity inside location of Taliban fighters (Rashid, Pakistani tribal areas. 2012). A tribesman with any sort of electronic chip was often killed. Many in the U.S. administration American perspective deem drone strikes as legal and ethical. By allowing drone strikes, Drone attacks in FATA, and they argue, the U.S. president is elsewhere, remain an integral part of doing his constitutional role of the U.S.’s counter-terrorism policy. protecting the American nation from They provide a ready-made solution any imminent threat. of targeting enemies without risking personnel in the inhospitable of tribal Drone attacks alone can’t eliminate areas.1 terrorism. Physical elimination of enemy is not the decisive step in U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta combating terrorism, which requires told AFP in February 2013 that discrediting the ideas of the militants. drones are an “important part” of Extending proper rule of law such as America’s “operations against Al- thorough investigation and Qaeda, not just in Pakistan, but also prosecution is more likely to be more in Yemen, in Somalia and I think it damaging to what terrorists stand for ought to continue to be a tool we (Abbas, 2014). ought to use where necessary” (Express Tribune, 2013). The drone strikes that target hard- core terrorists can be effective, provided they are supported by
1 Author’s interview with Dr Qibla Ayaz, ex-vice chancellor of the University of Peshawar. June 3rd 2013.
46 Exploring the drone syndrome parallel public relations exercise to argued, its own forces can strike out challenge the ideas projected by militants, without evoking strong those terrorists resistance from the people (Dawn, 2010).
Drone attacks alone can’t The human rights perspective eliminate terrorism. Physical elimination of enemy is not Several human rights groups have the decisive step in combating expressed legal concerns over drone terrorism, which requires attacks. The UN’s special rapporteur discrediting the ideas of the on human rights, Ben Emmerson, has militants. said that drone strikes on Pakistani soil are a violation of the country’s sovereignty and as such illegal (The Pakistani perspective News, 2013). Similarly, according to another special rapporteur, on Pakistan opposes American drone extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary strikes in its territory, deeming them executions, drones are a major as violation of its sovereignty. challenge to the system of There is ample evidence suggesting International law (Abbas, 2014). tacit approval by Pakistani Rights bodies have called upon the authorities of the drone attacks. It United States administration to was even reported that Pakistan has ensure that the drone strikes are provided two of its airbases to the transparent, accountable, and legal. USA for drone operations (ICG, Questioning the secrecy surrounding 2013). Some officials may, too, appear the whole program, watchdogs have confused on whether or not to demanded from the U.S. Department support the drone attacks against key of Justice “the memorandum”, that militants. Yet, no formal bilateral outlines on what legal grounds agreement, allowing Americans drones carry out target killing and drones in FATA, has surfaced (LUD, “signature strike”, the behaviour 2012). hinted to be that of a terrorist. At the same time, Pakistan has also The U.S. has been asked to ensure demanded transfer of drone that proper procedures, in technology to Pakistan, so that, it is compliance with international law,
47 Exploring the drone syndrome are followed for selecting a target, deaths were those of civilians; the especially in case of signature strikes, rest were militants. and to investigate into civilian deaths and injuries (ICG, 2013). A local journalist questioned the credibility of different surveys on drone attacks in North Waziristan Rights bodies have called where the situation is “quite fluid”. upon the United States “In the absence of government writ administration to ensure that there,” he argued, “the possibility of the drone strikes are conducting credible survey is simply transparent, accountable, and possible”, further adding that “even legal. if one does take place, the results will be influenced by the fog of fear factor”. He believed that “most of surveys are either bogus or Contradictory claims conducted under the patronage of one or the other actor of this conflict, According to The Bureau of which means tilted and biased Investigative Journalism, from 2004 output.”2 to 2013, the casualties from drone strikes fell in the range of 2520 to 3621, of which 416 to 948 people were “I consider drones as a main civilians. Similarly, a recent report hurdle in the way of any published by Amnesty International, peaceful settlement as an international human rights dialogue process has always organization, revealed that most of been sabotaged under well the drone victims were non- planned agenda.” a tribal combatants. AI even reckoned that elder. some of the drone strikes in Pakistan constitute as war crime. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defence ministry too released its estimates of casualties Another local argued on similar lines, from drones: since 2008, 38% of the “Usually the sites of drone attacks are immediately cordoned off by the
2 Author’s interview with Umer Daraz, a local journalist in North Waziristan. March 2013.
48 Exploring the drone syndrome militants, and access is denied to Malik Khan Marjan Wazir, a malik everyone.”3 (tribal elder) from the troubled North Waziristan and patron of Tribal Spoilers Grand Alliance, also echoes those concerns. “I consider drones as a Pakistan has also voiced its concerns main hurdle in the way of any on the timing of some of the drone peaceful settlement as dialogue strikes, which, Pakistan argues, process has always been sabotaged spoiled the country’s efforts in under well planned agenda,” he resolving differences with the said.5 militants. The very first drone strike, in June Two recent cases in point are Wali- 2004, targeted Nek Muhammad ur-Rehman and Hakimullah Wazir, the leader of the inchoate Mehsud, two top leaders of anti- Taliban, who had, only two months Pakistan Tehrik Taliban Pakistan earlier, signed a cease-fire agreement (TTP) who were eliminated at the with Pakistan. For a while, Pakistan time, when Pakistani state was claimed the attack. Resultantly, the reaching out to them to hammer out agreement soon fell apart (Ahmed, a peace deal. According to Ziaur 2013). Rehman, who has extensively reported the conflict in FATA, Some argue that even peace building “Ample time and hectic efforts are efforts between Pakistan and needed to establish any contact with Afghanistan hits a toll from drones. such leaders. These include initiation Raza Shah, a peace building expert, of trust-building measure to create whose institution Sustainable Peace conducive environment, for kick- and Development Organization runs starting any dialogue process. But, dialogue between civil societies of with the elimination of such Pakistan and Afghanistan, agrees, leaders/commanders, all efforts go “drones are indeed playing the role in van, and the process would have of active spoiler in this whole to start from the scratch again.”4 equation between ANSA and the government of Pakistan.”
3S. Dawar’s interview with a local 5Interview with the author. January 27th tribesman W. K. Wazir. March 11th 2013. 2015. 4Author’s interview with ZiaurRehman. February 12th 2015.
49 Exploring the drone syndrome
“Unfortunately, we don’t have any Pakistan Army and increase support control over it. And having no of the Taliban be that Afghan or control means no public ownership,” Pakistani version of Taliban”. he says.6 The tribal factor
Another local argued on Some argue that the tribal of FATA similar lines, “Usually the who have the element of revenge in sites of drone attacks are their bloods always reacted to the immediately cordoned off by drone attacks for which the Pakistani the militants, and access is government took responsibility. As a denied to everyone.” reaction, the tribesmen took revenge on anything they thought represented the government. What do people say? Impact Public opinion in the FATA seems divided on the issue of drone attacks. Residents, hunted by continuous risk According to a local from of death, have developed serious Miramshah, headquarter of North levels of stress. Notable families often Waziristan, “there is sizable portion face frustration. A journalist said of population especially in North about this dilemma: Waziristan who approves of drones 7 and call them as Ababeel, out of their “Being the elders, they can’t refuse support for the strike. Yet there is a stay to TTP members on account of section of society within tribal belt, Pashtun Wali, the Pashtun code of who believes otherwise. They believe conduct; at the same time, they are that the harm inflicted by drones to wary of the fact that if, God forbid, the local population, be it they are targeted by a drone strike, psychological, social or economic it is they will have to face the met with reduce support for the
6Interview with the author. November cattle). The exegesis writers say the 2nd2013. reference of the owners of the Elephant is 7 According to the Quran (105:1-5), God to army of Abrahah Ashram, the sent Ababeel (swarms of flying creatures) Abyssinian viceroy, who led a big who pelted the owners of the Elephant expedition against Makkah to destroy the with stones and baked clay and made Ka'bah around 570 A.C. them like green crops devoured (by
50 Exploring the drone syndrome consequences from both the Conclusion government for providing shelter to the commanders and from the TTP The value of drones for intelligence who may suspect them for spying. and surveillance purposes is We are caught between the devil and undisputed. In war zones, drones can the deep sea”.8 support ground operations in significant, often decisive, ways. The mobility of tribesmen has also been restricted due to drones. Now, However, what remains debatable is they prefer to avoid gatherings such their seemingly-unilateral use as a as weddings, funerals and the jirgas, counterterrorism instrument in the tribal way of conflict resolution theaters not declared as war zones. Resultantly, people of the tribal area seem stuck between the war of technology and ideology. On the one “I consider drones as a main side are drones from the sky; on the hurdle in the way of any other side are militants on the peaceful settlement as ground. However, people do support dialogue process has always the strikes for killing militants. been sabotaged under well planned agenda,” he said. But, by not taking on board completely the sovereign state where these drone strikes are targeted, and lacking transparency over the nature of attacks, question marks will be raised every now and then.
8 S. Dawar’s interview with W. K. Wazir.
51
REFERENCES
Abbas, H. 2014. The Taliban Revival. Llandysul, Ceredigion: Yale University Press.
Express Tribune. 2013. “US needs to keep up drone war against al Qaeda in Pakistan: Panetta.” February 2nd.
Ahmed, A. 2013. The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
Patel, K. 2012. “Analysis: Obama's drones.” Daily Maverick, June 11th.
Dawn. 2010. “Zardari renews demand for US drone technology.” January 7th.
Hudson, L., C.S.Owens & M. Flannes. 2011. “Drone warfare: blow back from the new American way of war.” Middle East Policy, 18 (3): 122-132.
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2013. “Drones: myths and reality in Pakistan.” Asia Report no. 247. May 21st.
The News. 2013. “Drone report.” March 17th.
Rashid, A. 2012. Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. USA: Penguin Group.
LUD (Living Under Drones). 2012. “Death, injury and trauma to civilians from US drone practices in Pakistan.”
Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Zeeshan-ul-Hassan Usmani
Abstract
This paper studies the accuracy of the drone operations in the tribal areas. The author has developed his own unique database, after collecting the data from publicly-available news sources, government’s periodic information releases about the drone incidents, summary report on drone strikes in national parliaments, interviews of the locals in drone affected areas of FATA, think tank analyses, personal contacts with the media, law enforcement agencies, and political agents in the tribal regions. Dataset is publicly available on Pakistan Body Count (PBC) website. The paper provides a detailed data analysis on the numbers of drone strikes and fatalities in the tribal area of Pakistan, background and history of drone strikes in FATA, and reveals the most authenticate database on drone strikes in Pakistan.
Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Zeeshan-ul-Hassan Usmani
Introduction Afghanistan is very porous and not completely manned by the military. The Federally Administered Tribal When the US offensive against the Area (FATA) of Pakistan is an Taliban intensified, many Al-Qaeda autonomous region controlled by the and Taliban militants infiltrated into Federal government and is located on Pakistan through the porous border. the border with Afghanistan. This The allied forces could not follow region has a historical importance as these elements inside Pakistani many invaders passed through here territory and they kept pressurizing to reach the Indian subcontinent. the Pakistani government to do more During the Soviet invasion of operations against the militants. The Afghanistan, FATA was used as Pakistani military responded by training ground for the mujahedeen conducting operations within the fighting in Afghanistan. However, tribal areas but the US and the allied after the defeat of the Soviets the forces were not satisfied by these region became oblivious to the world efforts. To counter this problem of for some time. cross border infiltration of terrorists, the US initiated its drone strikes in FATA in 2004 to eliminate some of Critics argue that drones kill the high profile terrorists. It is not without trial and deny justice clear whether there was any deal on to the affected civilians this issue between the US and the Pakistani government but Pulitzer It was in 2001, after the attack on prize-winning journalist, Mark World Trade Centre and the ensuing Mazetti wrote that the program war on terror, that the importance of started as a result of deal between FATA was highlighted again. The Pakistan and United States (Mazetti, border between Pakistan and 2013: 108-109). The drone strikes might have achieved some of the
Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan objectives of the US, but it has raised number of people killed by it. The a number of ethical and legal issues paper also calculates how many both for Pakistan and the US. Critics victims have died on average in a argue that drones kill without trial single drone strike as well as what and deny justice to the affected percentages of attacks have hit civilians (CCC, 2012). women and children.
Brief history To counter this problem of cross border infiltration of Before analyzing the data, to find the terrorists, the US initiated its reasons for increased drone strikes in drone strikes in FATA in 2004 Pakistan, a brief overview of the war to eliminate some of the high on terror in Afghanistan and the profile terrorists. adjoining tribal areas of Pakistan will help understand the issue. The
Figure 1: Map of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
This paper analyses the frequency of attacks on World Trade Centre in drone strikes in Pakistan and the 2001 led to the US invasion of
56 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Afghanistan, and the war on terror being obliged by melmastia (a Pashtun started. When Mullah Omar turned code for hosting guests with honor), down the U.S request to hand over they shared the same experience of Arab Mujahidin after 9/11, President the struggle against the Soviets in George W. Bush declared no Afghanistan in the 1980s, which distinction between the Afghan enhanced their personal bond. Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, vowing to combat them both without The United States pressurized discretion (CCC, 2012). Operation Pakistani President Pervez Enduring Freedom started on Musharraf to apprehend members of October 7th 2001, and by November Al-Qaeda and Taliban crossing the 2001, the United States had taken border, and the Pakistan military over Mazar-e-Sharif in the north of began a ground offensive in October Afghanistan – a holy place for the 2003. A dozen gunship helicopters members of Al-Qaeda and Taliban – airlifted 2,500 commandoes into with the assistance of Uzbek fighters South Waziristan (TBIJ, 2013). This (New America Foundation, 2015). was the first time in the history of The Northern Alliance took over Pakistan that the military intervened Kabul a few days later. in the tribal areas. The mashars (tribal elders) reprimanded the army, As the allied forces tightened their emphasizing that any operation in circle, Osama bin Laden had no Waziristan would be equated to war choice but to retreat towards against Pashtuns (TBIJ, 2014). Pakistan’s border. The United States knew about his presence in Tora Bora, but the allied forces decided to rely on the Pashtun tribes to locate bin Laden and kill or apprehend him. This strategy was not successful. The Afghan Pashtuns played a double game and accepted money offered by Arabs fighters as well, to let bin Laden and his exhausted affiliates trickle into Pakistan (Serle and Ross, 2014). The Pakistani tribesmen were sympathetic towards the people crossing the border. Apart from
57 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Nek Muhammad, a militants from former mujahid in Media reports leave a expanding their Afghan Jihad, room of ambiguity on activities. surfaced as the numerical details. militant’s leader to Several times, words like Many militant leaders avenge Pakistan “many” and “several” emerged later on. military operation in are used to describe the Baitullah Mehsud was FATA in 2003. After number of people killed another important two assassination or wounded. Even if the Taliban commander in attempts on President media releases the the FATA region. The Musharraf, Pakistan’s figures of casualties United States military decided to obtained from continued to target attack Muhammad’s government sources, it terrorist networks in hometown Kalusha in takes a long time to Afghanistan and the Waziristan in March ascertain the veracity of tribal areas of Pakistan. 2004. The military the government Mehsud was also killed offensive followed a information. later on in a US drone truce between the strike. military and Nek Muhammad (Rt.com, 2014) known as The number game the Shakai peace treaty (Shah, 2013). This treaty aimed to have a ceasefire Several independent organizations between the militants and the maintain databases that document government. Nek Muhammad was casualties from the drone attacks in killed shortly after the signing of the Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to treaty in a US drone strike in June the New America Foundation, a U.S. 2004. Muhammad’s death near Wana think tank, there have been a total of in South Waziristan was the first 370 strikes from 2004 to 2013, killing known assassination in the tribal between 2,080 to 3,428 people, out of areas by use of armed drones. which 258 to 307 are marked as civilians, 1,623 to 2,787 as militants, In 2006, the government of Pakistan and 199 to 334 remain unknown signed a pact – the Waziristan Accord (New America Foundation, 2015). – with the Taliban and Waziri tribal The Bureau of Investigative elders in North Waziristan. Journalism (TBIJ) reported 383 drone However, the pact did not stop the strikes for almost the same period (2004-April 2014). TBIJ report shows
58 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
2,296 to 3,719 people were killed, in Pakistani officials refused to verify which 416 to 957 were civilians and the figures in the leaked document included 168 to 202 as children (Serle (Behn, 2013). Amnesty and Ross, 2014). International’s multiple requests to the representatives of the Pakistani The leaked Pakistani government for information about government’s report was the strikes have remained severely criticised for being unanswered (Amnesty International, not accurate and many 2013:63). In March 2013, Ben organizations presented Emmerson, UN’s special rapporteur proofs of civilian casualties. on human rights and counter The ministry’s top officials terrorism, reported that Pakistan had retracted their earlier statement, terming it “wrong confirmed the death of 400 civilians and fabricated” from the drone strikes and another 200 casualties were non-combatants TBIJ also received leaked copy of the (UN-OHCHR, 2013). Later, in Pakistani government’s document on October 2013, Pakistan’s defence drone strikes. This document ministry submitted a report to the recorded figures on drone strikes parliament, claiming that from 2008 from early 2006 to September 2013 as to 2013, the number of civilians killed reported by local political agents in drone strikes was 67. The report (FATA’s top administrative officers) acknowledged 317 strikes during that (TBIJ, 2014). Although the TBIJ stated time period. Moreover, it claimed that the casualties data in the leaked that no civilian died of the strikes government report are “broadly after 2012. This report was severely similar” to TBIJ’s own findings, as criticised for being not accurate and discussed above, the government many organizations presented proofs document did not carry any record of civilian casualties. The ministry’s for the entire year of 2007 and for top officials retracted their earlier civilian casualties after 2008 (Rt.com, statement, terming it “wrong and 2014). The document, therefore, fabricated” (Noorani, 2013). didn’t cover some strikes which got worldwide publicity, like the one that caused the death of Manana Bibi a 68 year old woman in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Shah, 2013).
59 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Data analysis obtained from government sources, it takes a long time to ascertain the The U.S. drone strikes have mostly veracity of the government targeted sites in Pakistan’s tribal information. The casualty figures are areas located on the border with confirmed later by database Afghanistan. The identity of those administrator for PBCafter killed and injured in the drone strikes interviewing the locals, government remains contested. To justify the administrators, checking out nearby drone strikes, US consider all victims health facilities or “medical-aid as guilty until proven innocent. The houses” for injured victims of drone database used for this study makes strikes, tribesmen, and political a reverse assumption that all victims agents. For, those who get injured in of the drones are innocent until a drone strike and are under proven guilty. treatment but die later on are still considered among the injured. This makes the fatality database less Later, in October 2013, accurate as it is not updated for those Pakistan’s defence ministry who die much later after the drone submitted a report to the strike was conducted. The database parliament, claiming that prepared by the administrator and from 2008 to 2013, the number used for this study, takes into account of civilians killed in drone the people who get injured in a drone strikes was 67. strike and die much later. This makes the database more comprehensive It is certainly difficult to ascertain the and is much larger in size as exact number of casualties in FATA compared to other publically because media does not have easy available datasets. access to the region and the reports of Media reports about the drone strikes the government officials also seem may be biased at times. If a drone unreliable. Media reports leave a strike kills a large number of people, room of ambiguity on numerical the media may report fewer details. Several times, words like casualties due to pressure from both “many” and “several” are used to national government and describe the number of people killed international actors involved. In or wounded. Even if the media extreme cases the reports may not releases the figures of casualties even be published. Media in
60 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Pakistan has not matured as surrounding female members of the compared to the media in the family. developed countries and is also not completely independent. On the A detailed analysis of the data of other hand, if a strike killed more drone strikes in Pakistan as provided foreign miscreants than local by the Pakistan Body Count miscreants few would conceal the (http://www.pakistanbodycount.or details of such a strike. Parsing g) was conducted which revealed through these biases is a big very interesting facts. It is fascinating challenge in collecting the exact to see how data can reveal facts numbers of casualties. It is, therefore, which otherwise would be oblivious necessary to make sure that diverse to the world. sources are explored, beyond mere reliance on media reports. Figure 2 shows the annual frequency of attacks each year for the period FATA is a male-dominated society 2004 to 2013. According to author’s and women are not allowed to database (PBC), there were 379 drone interact with outsiders. Due to this strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2013 reason the PBC database could not which killed 3,597 people and injured document a few cases, especially of 1,357 others. A single drone strike pregnant women, who were claimed the lives of 10 people on reportedly killed or injured in a average. Around 13% of the strikes drone strike. Investigating those have hit women and children. cases in the tribal region was difficult Almost 97% of the total strikes that due to cultural sensitivity and norms our database recorded occurred from
Figure 2: Annual Frequency: Number of Drone Attacks (2004 - 2013)
61 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
2008 to 2013. On average, a drone on average 720 people died in 72 strike occurred every sixth day in strikes each year. The frequency and those six years (2008-2013). In 2010 intensity decreased later on from alone, 121 drone strikes occurred, the 2011 to 2013. On average 400 people highest in any year, with a drone died in 50 strikes each year during strike every third day. Very few this period. 2010 can be termed as the attacks were launched in the first four deadliest year of drone strikes in years of the drone operation from FATA. Besides recording the highest 2004 to 2007. frequency of attacks, 2010 also witnessed the highest intensity of Figure 3 shows the frequency of casualties. More than 100o people drone strikes along with their died, with an average of 3 deaths per intensity (the size of the bubble strike in that year. The figure also represents the number of people shows that there was a large number killed in each year), for each year of injured in all the drone strikes since 2004. It can be observed that the since 2008. A large number of these drone strikes increased in frequency injured might have died after a few and intensity after 2008 days but most of the public databases about drone strikes do not count Figure 4 demonstrates the headcount those. for the dead and the injured. The death to injured ratio in this drone war has been 2.5:1. From 2008 to 2010
Figure 3: Drone Attacks: Frequency and Intensity (2004 - 2013)
62 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Figure 4: Killed vs. Injured (2004- 2013)
The effectiveness of the drone strikes Figure 6 shows the percentage can be evaluated from the different distribution of drone strikes in categories of people that were killed Islamic months. The statistics of the in these strikes. Figure 5 shows drone strikes data reveal another different categories of people killed interesting fact. The Islamic month of in drone strikes in Pakistan since Shawwal witnessed the highest 2004. Of the total people killed so far. number of drone strikes, constituting 2,604 were civilians accounting for approximately 16% of the total. The 72% of the total casualties. Only 2% of beginning of Shawwal is marked with the drone strike casualties were the biggest Islamic festival of the members of the Al-Qaeda outfit, year, Eid-ul-Fitr, in which while 15% of the targeted militants congregational prayers are offered fall in the “Taliban” category. and visits paid to each other’s houses. It could not be a mere coincidence that such high number of strikes was conducted by chance during a particular Islamic month. It was probably due to the religious festivities that there was more movement of suspected terrorists as they would come out of their hiding places and visit family and friends.
Figure 5: Drone Targets (2004- 2013)
63 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Figure 6: Percentage of Attacks by Islamic Months (2004- 2013)
Figure 7 provides the frequency of strikes, followed by February and drone strikes according to the July. The pattern seems cyclical with Gregorian calendar. The highest attacks increasing after every few number of drone strikes occurred in months. When it comes to days, September, constituting up to 12% of nearly 20% of the strikes have been the total strikes. The month of April, on Fridays as shown in Figure 8 on the other hand, has seen least below. Most of the drone strikes were
Figure 7: Frequency of Attacks by Gregorian Months (2004- 2013)
64 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan
Figure 8: Percentage of Attacks by Weekdays (2004- 2013) on Fridays indicates that the militants and after August 2012, no single might have been travelling to multiple-attack was carried out. mosques to offer prayers when they These multiple attacks claimed 21% were targeted. of the total deaths and 20% of the total injured. Out of every 10 deaths Almost 84% of the total attacks of multiple attacks, 8 were civilians; between 2004 and 2013, took place such attacks could take out two Al- from August 2008 to August 2012. Qaeda militants only. Approximately 85% of the total deaths from drone strikes were recorded in this time span. 85% of the Almost 84% of the total total civilian deaths were also attacks between 2004 and witnessed in this time period, going 2013, took place from August all the way till the end of 2013. What 2008 to August 2012. makes this period unique is the occurrence of multiple attacks on a In September 2010, a cluster of drone single day irrespective of their target strikes was carried out. In less than sites. Nearly 30% of the attacks from thirty days 24 attacks were carried Aug. 2008 to Aug. 2012 have been out with 80% of the total in North multiple ones. Interestingly, multiple Waziristan Agency. Half of cluster attacks were witnessed only during attacks were multiple attacks. In the this time period. Before August 2008
65 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan clusters attacks, 10 Taliban militants without electricity, roads and other and 138 civilians died, accounting for basic amenities of life. 5% of the total civilian deaths. . This again highlights the priority of the US A walk out for work in the government to eradicate terrorist agricultural fields may require networks in Afghanistan and navigating through twisty muddy Pakistan. The data shows that the tracks as FATA has mostly a drone strike intensified and peaked mountainous terrain. A person with a in 2010 and a year later US forces leg amputation in FATA cannot even killed OBL. The drone strikes use the regular wheel chair, go to reduced after 2011. As the top target school or hospital, or even use a toilet was eliminated, there was no need to on his own. And this makes life of an conduct multiple strikes. However amputee in FATA difficult inside the data suggested that the civilian house as well as outside it. Disability casualties were much higher as of the primary bread winner can compared to the official figures. change the course of life for an entire family, since most of the jobs in a The cost village require physical exertion.
The death and injury of civilians in The drone attacks have left the tribal the drone strikes has devastating society devastated and angry. A lot of effects on the society. Injuries of the fear is observed in the local survivors of drone attacks are very communities, which is even severe, mostly resulting in loss of highlighted by an American scholar limbs. This is not only painful for the who wrote about children getting people but it incapacitates the person hysterical from the buzzing sound of for life. The tribal society in FATA drones in FATA (Kugelman, 2012). has a joint family system. In most cases there is only one male bread Conclusion earner of the family. Injury of civilians in drone strikes This paper analysed the data about incapacitates the only bread earner in drone strikes in the tribal areas of the family. Pakistan is not the best Pakistan. The author spent a lot of place for the handicapped, time in interviewing people in the particularly the tribal areas where tribal area, government officials and people still live a traditional life media persons to come up with a unique database of drones strike
66 Demystifying the drone operations in Pakistan casualties. The drone strikes started may have joined the ranks of the in 2004 and peaked in 2010 killing terrorists, as they pay them a decent thousands of people. This paper has monthly stipend and other facilities. tried to highlight that the number of The drone strikes have also created civilians killed in the drone strikes is problems for the Pakistani much higher than what is claimed by government as the terrorists also the authorities. attack its people and installations. Pakistan is fighting the war on terror Due to these killings hatred has been on its home territory and has given a created against the US in the region. lot of sacrifices. Pakistan government Some hint that people who lost dear has condemned the drone strikes as ones and their only bread earners violation of its sovereignty.
67
REFERENCES
Amnesty International. 2013. “Will I be next? US drone strikes in Pakistan.”
APPENDIX A:
Definitions
The following terms are defined by reviewing the journalism norms practiced in the areas affected by drone strikes, and internationally agreed definitions, including the ones that are mentioned in the UN charter on human rights.
Civilian: A person not on active duty in the armed services or police or firefighting force, and also not belonging to or working for any terrorist or anti-government organization
Foreigner: Any person belonging to or owing allegiance to a foreign country. In the scope of this text, the category of terrorist supersedes the category of foreigner; a foreigner terrorist will be listed as a terrorist. Therefore, a foreigner is any non-combatant person belonging to a foreign country. It includes settlers, like Afghans (who usually have kith and kin in FATA), as well as others who crossed the border before, during or after the US Invasion of Afghanistan, or the Soviet war.
Terrorist: A person who is against a government, or a particular sect, ideology, or group, and uses terrorism in the pursuit of political aims (He/she can be a local or a foreigner.
Taliban: A person affiliated to any of Taliban's militia groups engaged in fighting in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan against the government (He/she can be associated with any sister groups like Tehreek-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), TTP-Jandullah, Jamaatul Ahrar, Ansarul Mujahidin, Haqqani group, Fedayeen al-Islam, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e- Shariat-e-Mohammadi etc)
Injured: A person with a physical damage to the body caused or aggravated by a drone strike (Injuries can be direct by blast waves and shrapnel or can be in-direct due to building collapse or stampede while rushing from the scene of the attack)
Definitions
Killed: The act of termination of life right then, or later, due to primary, secondary, or tertiary injuries caused by a drone strike
Al Qaeda: A global militant group founded by Osama Bin Laden to fight against the government for political gains
Children: In the scope of this text, persons below the age of 12 are considered children
70
BACKGROUNDER
The mystery of Jundullah
Farhan Zahid and Andrew McGregor
Abstract
This essay attempts to understand Jundullah, a militant organization, which, despite some high-profile attacks, remain enigma for analysts. For, what is striking about Jundullah, the authors of the essay note, is the group’s propensity to claims attacks, which are carried out by other groups. The article narrates the history of Jundullah by exploring the histories of the top leaders of the group. Starting off as a radical outfit by ambitious students, the group, despite several crackdowns, has evolved into a virulent anti-Shia militant outfit, eager to make mark on international scene by allying with the Islamic State. The article is based mostly on extensive media monitoring, along with some interviews for information verification purposes.
BACKGROUNDER
The mystery of Jundullah
Farhan Zahid and Andrew McGregor
Introduction tries to uncover the shred of that secrecy. Jundullah (Army of Allah), a Pakistani terrorist outfit, proclaimed Jundullah is closely tied to the wider its allegiance to the Islamic State in network of al-Qaeda core based in November 2014. Not much is shared Pakistani cities and tribal areas as as to what will be impact of this well as Sunni extremist groups, development on this broad militant which have largely pledged landscape in Pakistan. Part of the allegiance (bay’a) to al-Qaeda core.1 confusion on Jundullah emanates from the secretive nature of this Contrary to popular commentary, entity. Investigators recently found Jundullah is not related to another that some of the attacks claims made organization by the same name, the by Jundullah were wrong. Yet, Iran-based Jundullah – a Sunni security officials have traced the militant group focused on greater same group’s involvement in wide- autonomy for Sunni community in range of terrorist activities in Karachi, Iranian Sistan-Baluchistan province, since 2004. and also present in areas of Pakistani Balochistan bordering on Iran. The To understand the nature of latter’s founder Abdul Malik Regi Jundullah, it is important to revisit its was executed in Iran in 2010 and his different historical phases. This essay
1 Punjabi Taliban is a term used to previously involved in Islamist identify Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked insurgency in Indian Kashmir, sectarian groups of Pakistani origin and having a jihadis based in Pakistan, and former non-Pashtun membership in their Punjabi veterans of Afghan War (1979-89) organizations. Most of the Punjabi (Abbas, 2009). Taliban are former Kashmiri jihadis
The mystery of Jundullah brother arrested in Pakistan in 2013 The group made headlines in June (The News, 2014). 2004, when it launched its most- damaging attack, against Corps Genesis Commander of Karachi, Lieutenant General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, who The founding members of Jundullah was then tipped as General were once part of the student wing of Musharraf’s military heir. Jundullah a Pakistani Islamist political party, hit the cavalcade of General Hayat Jamaat-e-Islami (Misra and Clarke, near his official residence, killing 11 2012: 82). The group was formed in people including seven military Karachi in 2003.What eventually personnel, two off-duty policemen became Jundullah was initially and two passers-by. General Hayat comprised of no more than 20 barely survived the attack. students, some of whom have fought in Kashmir. The attack on General Ahsan was one of the early-day attacks on Pakistan. Jundullah is closely tied to the In hindsight, it appears that the wider network of al-Qaeda core country was not ready against such based in Pakistani cities and backlash. The attack, and many tribal areas as well as Sunni others in that year, realized upon the extremist groups, which have security high ups that the jihadi largely pledged allegiance community in Pakistan had revolted (bay’a) to al-Qaeda core. against the state and its policies. And that, a full-fledged law enforcement strategy was required to deal with These members resented Pakistan’s the plethora of jihadi outfits. apparent policy shift after 9/11. Readily joining the U.S.-led war against terror, Pakistan helped arrest Jundullah is tied to al-Qaeda many foreign fighters from Pakistan network based in Pakistani and launched a military operation in cities and tribal areas as well as the country’s tribal areas. Some Sunni extremist groups, which Islamists deemed the shift a sell-out, have largely pledged allegiance justifying attacks against the state of (bay’a) to al-Qaeda core. Pakistan.
74 The mystery of Jundullah
Breakaway faction? inspired by the work of Jamaat, not least its founder Maulana Maududi. Some of Jundullah’s early members Often singled out for his pioneering were once part of Jamaat’s student role, Maududi argued that the purity wing, Islami Jamiat Talaba.2 Others of Islam is threatened in the were part of Kashmir-jihadi outfits. It contemporary era, which, he termed, is pertinent to note that Jamaat itself has reverted to the stage of jahiliya, had played active role during the the pre-Islamic state of ignorance. Afghan War (1979 – 89) and later in While Jamaat has, historically, Kashmir insurgency.3 largely remained political in nature, Jundullah seems be an offshoot of Like its parent JI, the initial-days those who were disappointed by the Jundullah had an urban, middle-class slow change through democratic base in the metropolitan cities of process. Pakistan. Some were brought up in strongly religious homes. But these don’t suggest that Jamaat Incidentally, key al-Qaeda figures had any direct link with the militant like Khalid Sheikh Muhammad were outfit. The parent JI has remained even arrested from the houses of JI’s mostly a political force – albeit not members based in urban areas, like winning more than 4 seats in the 300- Rawalpindi in KSM’s case. plus legislature. Yet, it enjoys cadre- wise membership across the country. Similarly, the Jamaat-e-Islami too Jundullah, from early on, was a disliked Pakistan’s policy shift after militant outfit. 9/11. The party had already protested nationwide against Ata ur Rehman: the ring American invasion of Afghanistan. leader Given that members of the early-days Jundullah was first led by Ata ur Jundullah were once associated with Rehman aka Naeem Bukhari, a the JI, it could be argued that the student of the Statistics Department formative ideology of the group was at the University of Karachi
2One of the authors’ discussionwith a the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, senior police official in whileJI’s armed wing,Hizb-ul- Karachi.November 30th 2014. Mujahideen, was heavily involved in the 3JIbackedGulbuddinHekmatyar’sHizb-e- Indian Kashmir insurgency (SATP, 2015). Islamimovement during the war against
75 The mystery of Jundullah
(Rediff.com, 2004), where he joined friends founded Jundullah in 2003. Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, To carry out their terrorist activities, Islami Jamiat Talaba. these people received funds from Waheed brothers, who themselves were members of the Jamaat. The While Jamaat has, historically, group’s members also robbed banks largely remained political in (Taipei Times, 2004). In one such nature, Jundullah seems be an incident, seven police officers were offshoot of those who were killed (The News, 2008a). disappointed by the slow change through democratic Rehman was finally arrested in 2004, process. in response to the attack on the convoy of Karachi’s corps commander. During interrogation, Later on, he moved to Harkat-ul- he revealed the names of his Mujahideen (HuM), a Kashmiri accomplices.4 They were arrested, Islamist group based in Pakistan. In too. Their revelations, in turn, fact, it was as HuM’s member that he resulted into other arrests along with received jihadi training at a camp in recovering of cache of arms and Afghanistan in late 1990s (Chishti, ammunition. To the police, the whole 2014a). These camps were run by al- episode hinted at a wide network Qaeda. But because of its strong bond operating against the state with al-Qaeda and Taliban, which (Khurshid, 2008a).5 ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, HuM established number of jihadi As late as August 2012, one of Atta’s training camps, where al-Qaeda colleagues at Jundullah, Ahsan Aziz, would train future jihadis. Rehman also a statistics student, who had run was one of them. to the tribal areas, was killed in a drone strike.6Interestingly Jamaat’s Rehman disliked what he saw as Pakistan’s policy shift in the wake of war on terror. He along with other
4Saddam Ali, Yaseen, Mohammad ShoaibSiddiqui, Danish Inam, Naeem, and Rafiqul Islam. Najeebullah and KhurrumSaifullah. 5 Some key members of the network 6Ahsan Aziz was never arrested as he fled included Shahzad Ahmed Bajwa, to tribal areas and stayed there. He was YaqoobSaeed, Uzair Ahmed, finally killed in a drone strike in August 2012.
76 The mystery of Jundullah leaders attended his funeral prayer was the one who inculcated jihadi (Mir, 2014a). ideals in Turi’s mind.
Qasim Turi: the successor Turi’s experience in government departments helped the group gather After the arrest of Rehman, Qasim key information, required for Turi was made the leader of planning future attacks. An ex-police Jundullah (Perwaiz, 2014a). man, Turi had some know-how of the reach and capacity of Karachi’s Turi was hardly associated with the police. He knew what entails VIP group at its conception. Unlike other movements, the sensitive spots, members who were students at a security plans, and, some say, the public-sector university, Turi had composition of paramilitary forces managed to finish high school only. assisting the police.
Instead, Turi worked in the public Following the arrests of his service in various capacities in colleagues in 2004, Turi fled north, Karachi. His first such service was making all the way to the country’s reportedly with the National tribal areas, where he met al-Qaeda Database Registration Authority operatives who had come from (NADRA), the country’s national across the border in Afghanistan. identity card-issuing body. After Eager to add on to his jihadi that, he served as constable in credentials, he got to learn how to Karachi Police. Incidentally, he was manufacture a bomb and use heavy dismissed from the service and weapons. declared proclaimed offender, when he was charged with sodomizing a Turi’s police training followed by child inside the police station (The jihadi training injected ferocity in the News, 2008b).To be sure, he managed new generation of Jundullah’s to evade arrest and indictment for militants. On his return to Karachi, he this crime, which is punishable by indulged in several criminal activities death in Pakistan. including robberies (The News, 2008c). During this time, activities of It was his former classmate, Shahzad the group expanded, which had Bajwa, Jundullah’s deputy amir, who received a jolt after its founder’s asked Turi to join the group. Bajwa arrest. It is said that the group often operated at the behest of al-Qaeda
77 The mystery of Jundullah and Taliban, in Karachi (The News, attack on Rangers’ mobile van in 2008b). March 2003. The two brothers, it is alleged, treated Bajwa at Dr. He was finally arrested in January Arshad’s clinic (Dawn, 2004). 2008 in Karachi’s suburbs, after a brief shootout with police (Tanoli, A year later, when the group’s amir 2012). Ata ur Rehman and other members were arrested, the law-enforcement The Waheed brothers: agencies also arrested the Waheed medical caretakers brothers. Although tried with the main accused, the duo was cleared of Jundullah received financial and the charge of treating the militants medical support from Waheed (Dawn, 2006). brothers, who were trained as physicians (Chishti, 2014b). Escaping the clutches of the law- enforcement agencies, one of the Dr. Arshad Waheed, a kidney brothers, Arshad, fled to the tribal specialist, ran own private medical areas to join al-Qaeda. In Wana, clinic in Karachi, where he also South Waziristan, he ran a clinic to worked at the state-owned Jinnah treated wounded Taliban and al- Hospital Karachi, one of Pakistan’s Qaeda fighters, until he was killed in biggest hospitals. Dr. Akmal Waheed an American drone attack on March was a cardiac surgeon, on the other 16th 2008 (Khurshid, 2008b). hand. Both were members of Pakistan Medical Association (PMA), As of his brother Akmal, he later the country’s principal organization migrated to the United Arab for registered medical practitioners. Emirates (UAE). In April 2010, the Emirati authorities arrested him At the same time, the two were active along with five other colleagues on politically. They were member of suspicion of ties to Islamist terrorist Jamaat-e-Islami’s Karachi chapter organizations. Once again, he was and its medical wing (Chishti, 2010). again accused of providing medical treatment to wounded Islamist Covertly, they assisted Jundullah. militants (Khurshid, 2011; Imtiaz, One such support came to the 2012a). After serving a short prison group’s deputy amir, Shahzad Bajwa, sentence in the UAE, he was who received bullet wounds in an deported to Pakistan where the
78 The mystery of Jundullah authorities took him into custody in partly because of drawing assistance 2012 (Imtiaz, 2012b). from some larger group, if only to survive. Part of the group’s survival Incidentally, two their other brothers, owes to is leadership, which has Osama and Ajmal, reportedly active remained educated and tech-savvy. members of Jamaat-e-Islam, went The group has the capacity of missing at Karachi’s airport in July resurrection. 2011, after their return from the UAE. The two, it is alleged, were taken into Ever since its foundation, Jundullah custody. has maintained its distinct identity, irrespective of its affiliation with other groups. According to a Karachi-based superintendent of police, Jundullah is While the government eventually a resilient outfit, which has survived released Ajmal, it failed to respond to three major attempts of the Karachi the court’s order on Osama’s police to disrupt and dismantle the detention (Dawn, 2014a; Express group. The officer believes that in its Tribune, 2013). consecutive resurgences since 2003, the group has managed to gather 20- Break? 22 members for launching a new wave of terrorist attacks (Perwaiz, 2014a). In February 2006, Karachi’s anti- terrorist court sentenced to death Jundullah, reincarnated? 11Jundullah activists for killing 11 people in the attack on the convoy of In recent times, the group is believed the corps commander. As the group’s to have found refuge with Lashkar-e- commander Ata ur Rehman was Jhangvi, a virulently anti-Shia leaving the courtroom, he told a militant outfit. Jundullah’s current group of newsmen dramatically that ringleader, Fasihur Rehman, works the conviction will not stop them, closely with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, by saying “the death penalty is an surmounting the previous damages honour for us.” “If one Ata dies”, he inflicted by police and security forces claimed, “another will be born in this (Perwaiz, 2014a). way of jihad” (Mir, 2014b). According to security sources, Since those convictions, the group Naeem Bokhari’s faction of Lashkar- has been able to reinvigorate itself, e-Jhangvi is now working in tandem
79 The mystery of Jundullah with Jundullah.7 The Bokhari faction the attack, which killed two other is based in Karachi, with a strong people. network of operatives in mosques and madrasahs in different parts of Yet, Jundullah activists always claim the city. The group has been involved terrorist attacks in their own name, in some of the most spectacular without attributing them to any other terrorist attacks in Karachi since 2002. militant group.
Part of the group’s survival Apart from its anti-Western owes to is leadership, which stance, Jundullah appears to has remained educated and have a staunchly anti-Shia tech-savvy. The group has the agenda. Many of Jundullah capacity of resurrection. activists had overlapping membership of LeJ. The LeJ Apart from its anti-Western stance, provides a plethora of trained Jundullah appears to have a members to Jundullah, staunchly anti-Shia agenda. Many of something that partly explains Jundullah activists had overlapping its survival despite many ups membership of LeJ. The LeJ provides and downs. a plethora of trained members to Jundullah, something that partly In recent times, the group’s activities explains its survival despite many are attributed far away from Karachi, ups and downs. in the western part of Pakistan. On September 25th2014, Jundullah In October 2014, Jundullah’s cooperated with LeJ in an attempt to spokesperson Fahad Marwat assassinate in Karachi announced a wave of upcoming Superintendent of Police Farooq terrorist activities it had planned. Awan, who had earlier spearheaded several operations against Jundullah On October 23rd 2014, the group in the past (Perwaiz, 2014b; Express attempted to target Maulana Fazalur Tribune, 2014). Awan got injured in Rehman, leader of his own faction of
7Authors’ discussions with senior police officers in Karachi who requested anonymity.November 30th 2014.
80 The mystery of Jundullah
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, a key president and chief of army staff religious-political party. The failed (Pakistan Today, 2014). bombing was immediately claimed by Marwat, warning that “we will do In recent times, the group’s it again.” As to why an Islamist activities are attributed far politician would be targeted, Marwat away from Karachi, in the said that the “Maulana was targeted western part of Pakistan because of his pro-democracy views and because he has been speaking and acting against us” (Express The group also claimed Tribune, 2014). responsibility for an attack on a church in Peshawar in September Ever since its foundation, 2013, killing more than 80 Christians. In its statement, Jundullah warned of Jundullah has maintained its continuing with their attacks on distinct identity, irrespective “enemies of Islam” and “non- of its affiliation with other Muslims on Pakistani land” (Aziz, groups. According to a 2013). Karachi-based superintendent of police, Jundullah is a Riding the ISIS horse resilient outfit, which has survived three major attempts In November 2014, Jundallah’s of the Karachi police to spokesman Fahad Marwat claimed disrupt and dismantle the that the group had pledged its group. allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Islamic State, which quickly The group also disclosed plans to rose on the militant landscape of assassinate other notable figures Middle East, where it even claimed to including Bilawal Zardari, son of have established caliphate in parts of former prime minister Benazir Iraq and Syria. Marwat said that IS’s Bhutto and former president Asif Ali delegation met Jundullah’s warriors Zardari; workers and leaders of the at Saudi-Iraq border, after which the Muttahida Quami Movement pledge was announced, “They [the (MQM), a Karachi-based secular Islamic State] are our brothers, party; and Pervez Musharraf, former whatever plan they have we will support them (Mehsud and Bukhari,
81 The mystery of Jundullah
2014). Both Jundullah and the IS Islamic State’s Pakistan chapter. No share deep hatred towards Shias. other group pledging allegiance to the IS matches Jundullah’s profile. Jundullah has been linked, directly or indirectly, to al-Qaeda core. Osama Confusion Bin Laden had pledged allegiance to Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader, Compared to other groups, Mullah Omar. After Bin Laden’s Jundullah is not much disciplined death in May 2011, new al-Qaeda and large. Largely a decentralized Amir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri outfit, the group has overlapping reaffirmed his organization’s membership with other Islamist allegiance to Mullah Omar (Brown, terrorist organizations in Pakistan. 2010). These realities explain why the group is often in the news for issuing statements, found to be misleading Most likely, the group will after investigations. have to contribute into IS’s competition with Al-Qaeda, which has opened a new Jundullah may be given a chapter in the Indian more instrumental role in Subcontinent. establishing Islamic State’s Pakistan chapter. No other group pledging allegiance to Jundullah’s fresh pledge seems to the IS matches Jundullah’s end its lengthy association with al- profile. Qaeda in Pakistan and its allied groups. Quite likely, the group is ready to initiate a new era of Doubts about the active presence of terrorism in Pakistan – especially on Jundullah were raised when sectarian lines and in Karachi. Most investigators negated the group’s likely, the group will have to claim of the suicide attack on contribute into IS’s competition with Pakistan-India border at Wagah, Al-Qaeda, which has opened a new Lahore in October 2014 (Dawn, chapter in the Indian Subcontinent. 2014b). Police and intelligence sources maintain that the Pakistani Jundullah may be given a more Taliban’s Lahore operative, one instrumental role in establishing Roohullah, had carried out the attack.
82 The mystery of Jundullah
He was killed by security forces some Pashtun families who had migrated months later (Samaa TV, 2015; Dawn, to the city. Others like Ata ur Rehman 2014b; Sherazi, 2014). was from Urdu speaking community.
Earlier, in 2013, Jundullah claimed that it along with LeJ have attacked Investigators argue that the foreign hikers in the mountainous Jundullah’s strength lies in Gilgit-Baltistan region, killing nine southern metropolis of foreign climbers and their one Karachi. Terrorist operations Pakistani guide. This claim was outside Karachi do not fall negated by another claim, made by under Jundullah’s Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s jurisdiction. Junood-e-Hafsa faction (Khan and Abbot, 2013; Khan, 2013). It would be Groups like Jundullah are small, surprising, not possible, if secretive and highly un-penetrable. A Jundullah’s active present is found in parallel could be drawn from N-17 that remote and distant part. (November 17), a Marxist terrorist group that survived for 22 years in Investigators argue that Jundullah’s Greece, carrying out over a hundred strength lies in southern metropolis attacks and numerous kidnappings of Karachi. Terrorist operations before its break-up by security forces outside Karachi do not fall under in 2002. The N-17 terrorist group Jundullah’s jurisdiction. Even the never had more than 15 members in attack on the church in Peshawar is its fold at one time; its members were believed not to be Jundullah’s work. all educated, well-off and frequently- Conclusion related, thereby overcoming police penetration. Jundullah fits into a case study of a Karachi’s Jundullah has likewise radicalized group, which splintered been able to exploit its small size and off from a religious political party – sophisticated membership to survive JI, in this case. What is of equal several waves of crackdowns. The interest about Jundullah is its ethnic survival of Jundullah owes to the composition: some members like broader survival of jihadi movement Qasim Turi and Shahzad Bajwa were in Karachi and beyond. raised in Karachi in Punjabi or
83
The mystery of Jundullah
REFERENCES
Abbas, H. 2009. “Defining the Punjabi Taliban network.” CTC Sentinel, April 15th.
85 The mystery of Jundullah
Imtiaz, S. 2012b. “ATC to decide if Dr Akmal Waheed will be released on bail today.” Express Tribune, August 16th.
86 The mystery of Jundullah
Rediff.com. 2004.“Questions over Pak arrests. June 16th.
87
BACKGROUNDER
National Action Plan: Performance so far
Azam Khan and Aamir Saeed
Abstract
In April 2015, the government released performance report of the National Action Plan (NAP) the government had charted earlier to confront militancy. This essay assesses the performance on the NAP by consulting the performance report and interviewing experts. Besides taking not of the progress the government achieved in this time frame, the essay looks for areas which the government has completely ignored. Specific issues the authors delve into are: regulation of madrassas, undecided status of FATA, resumption of death sentence, curbing of hate speech, and establishment of military courts. The authors note that a lot needs to be done, to translate words into action, reminding the government that it should take effective use of the rare consensus achieved on anti-militant front
.
National Action Plan: Performance so far
Azam Khan and Aamir Saeed
The National Action Plan or NAP, coward terrorists, and on the other meant to collectively fight extremism side stands the whole nation.” In the and terrorism came in the wake of the address, the Prime Minister also brutal attack on a school in Peshawar detailed the twenty (20) points of the by militants in December 2014 National Action Plan. (Doherty and Weaver, 2014). Soon, the government started Within a week to the attack, Prime pursuing the NAP. To give legal Minister Nawaz Sharif convened an cover to the military-led courts, one all-parties conference, where leaders of the 20 points of NAP, the of all major parties agreed upon a 20- parliament passed a constitutional point plan.1 The outcome of that amendment. Moreover, the conference is hailed as the first time government, among other things, when all political parties constituted 15 committees overseeing unanimously reached a consensus to NAP’s implementation. root out terrorism and extremism from the country. A week later, on But, not everything was smooth January 2nd 2015, another all-parties about NAP. Many experts wondered conference was convened, in which many things, above all, the secrecy of the chief of army staff also the military-led courts and the participated, more so to offer his resumption of death penalty, another input in establishing military-led NAP point. As if policy courts for the trial of terrorists. disagreements were not sufficient, personal differences within the With points agreed, the Prime cabinet too hindered progress of the Minister announced on television, “A NAP.2 line has been drawn. On one side are
1 Full text of the prime minister’s speech 2 Authors’ interview with General (retd.) to the nation regarding National Action Talat Masood, a defence and security Plan can be accessed at
National Action Plan: Performance so far
To recall, Pakistan has suffered taking this document with enormously at the hands of militants seriousness. in the last 13 years. 26,385 civilians and security personnel have died To document the progress on the from the attacks since 2003. Yet, NAP, the interior ministry also successive governments failed to compiled performance report. The strategize consensus on countering report, enlisting all actions taken so militants. The Pakistan Muslim far under the NAP to counter League (Nawaz), after coming into terrorism and extremism, is power in 2013, presented the presented to the prime minister. This country’s first-ever National Internal essay assesses the NAP’s progress in Security Policy (NISP) in the National light of that report, a copy of which is Assembly on February 26th 2014. also available with the authors. Even though the NISP, first approved by the federal cabinet, was accepted “Ambitious wish list” as satisfactory document, it lacked implementation in the end (PILDAT, More than three months have lapsed, 2014). after the NAP was announced. Still, a lot needs to be done.
To give legal cover to the NAP’s twenty points, aimed at fixing military-led courts, one of the administrative bottlenecks mostly, 20 points of NAP, the make the list exhaustive and at times, parliament passed a digress from taking on militants. constitutional amendment. Moreover, the government, Security expert Imtiaz Gul, who also among other things, runs an independent think-tank, constituted 15 committees argues that the NAP sounds an overseeing NAP’s “ambitious wish list”. Except for the implementation. resumption of death penalties and establishment of military courts, he A step ahead of the NISP, National argued, “no practical measures are 3 Action Plan was announced. The initiated to implement” the plan. December 16th attack called for
3Authors’ interview with ImtiazGul, a executive director of Center for Research defense and security analyst and and Security Studies in Islamabad.
92 National Action Plan: Performance so far
immediate activation of National NAP’s twenty points, aimed Counter-Terrorism Authority at fixing administrative (NACTA), so that to materialize a bottlenecks mostly, make the joint intelligence directorate. list exhaustive and at times, digress from taking on militants Some point towards the personal differences between The plan itself came in haste, more the prime minister and like a reactive consensus against the interior minister. The two – militants’ attack on a school, rather Prime Minister Sharif and than a well thought-out plan.4 Those Nisar Ali Khan, interior who worked on the NAP complain minister – have often been in the government didn’t give them the enough time to come up with a “concrete document” against However, within four months, the terrorism and extremism. That is interior ministry seems to be why, they said, part of the focus was somewhat sidelined from the NAP. synched with the ongoing military An April 2015 performance report operation in North Waziristan and presented to the prime minister, on Khyber agencies of FATA (Khan, implementation of the NAP, doesn’t 2015). even mention the ministry of interior. Who is in charge? Some point towards the personal differences between the prime The task for implementing National minister and interior minister. The Action Plan comes under interior two – Prime Minister Sharif and ministry, responsible for internal Nisar Ali Khan, interior minister – security, under the supervision of the have often been in the news for prime minister. On the night of mutual differences.5 December 25th 2014, the prime minister, for instance, directed the Apparently, the civilian government interior minister to work on has outsourced the plan to the
4Authors’ interview with Rustam Shah 5Authors’ interview with Gen Mohmand, a former diplomat and one of (retd.)TalatMasood. the authors of the NAP.
93 National Action Plan: Performance so far military, to the determinant of satisfactory document, National civilian supremacy. Internal Security Policy (NISP) failed, because of the tussle between the The institutional crisis was civilian and military bureaucracies, summarized by a retired military which were tasked to pool their officer: information to a single-point intelligence authority.6 “At the moment, no institutional decisions are being taken to ensure Death penalties and military implementation of the action plan. At courts least, I haven’t heard or read about a cabinet, security committee or Nacta The very first point of the NAP calls (National Counter-Terrorism for “implementation of death Authority) meeting on impending sentence of those convicted in cases threats of terrorism and extremism.” of terrorism.” To undertake the point, the government lifted moratorium on Apparently, the civilian death penalty of all the condemned government has outsourced prisoners (Syed, 2015). the plan to the military, to the Since then, till April, 65 death row determinant of civilian prisoners were executed.7 supremacy. Strikingly, only 22 of the hanged men The performance report also reveals were terrorists, meaning that the that nothing practical has been done majority (43) were awarded penalty so far to activate the joint intelligence for other crimes. Even, of the 22 directorate, a key department hanged terrorists, nothing is shared envisioned streamlining intelligence on which groups those terrorists sharing among provinces and belong to. different security agencies Responding to criticism that death (Ghumman, 2015). Little is known penalties might be awarded without why. Still, it must, however, be recalled that the government’s present attempt of coming up with a
6Authors’ interview with General 7Based on the April performance report. (retd.)TalatMasood.
94 National Action Plan: Performance so far due process, the interior ministry military supervises, has been fixed wrote: for two years.
“The execution of death sentences may be carried out strictly as per the Strikingly, only 22 of the law and only where all legal options hanged men were terrorists, and avenues have been exhausted meaning that the majority (43) and mercy petitions under Article 45 were awarded penalty for of the Constitution of Islamic other crimes. Even, of the 22 Republic of Pakistan have been hanged terrorists, nothing is rejected by the president” (Syed, shared on which groups those 2015). terrorists belong to.
Besides the normal courts, the Many in the legal community military courts too have been question the rationale of setting up awarding death sentences. On April military courts. The Supreme Court 2nd 2015, according to military’s Bar Association (SCBA), for instance, media arm, the military chief challenged the Pakistan Army confirmed death sentences to six (Amendment) Act 2015, arguing that hardcore terrorists under military its operation and outcome contradict courts (ISPR, 2015).8 However, two the fundamental rights the weeks later, the country’s apex court, Constitution promises (The News, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2015). While some question the halted execution of death sentences secrecy surrounding the convictions, of all the six convicts. others wonder as to why not civil It was in line with the National courts can adopt the same secretive Action Plan that the parliament procedure the military court follows 9 passed Pakistan Army (Amendment) in convicting terrorists. Instead of Act 2015, which sets in place military- relying on military courts for speedy led courts to trial terrorists. The justice, argued Talat Masood, “the duration of these courts, which the government needs to come up with
8Those awarded death sentence are QariZahir while Abbas has been awarded identified as Noor Saeed, Haider Ali, life imprisonment. Murad Khan, Inayatullah, Israruddin and 9Authors’ interview with Gen (retd.) TalatMasood.
95 National Action Plan: Performance so far legislation to ensure protection of portraying itself to be tough against witnesses and judges.” the nefarious elements,” he says.
The report remains silent on links of While some question the these people with terrorist outfits and secrecy surrounding the when would they all be produced convictions, others wonder as before courts of law. to why not civil courts can adopt the same secretive What’s more, even the routine procedure the military court actions and arrest made by provincial follows in convicting law enforcement agencies are terrorists. presented under the performance of the government on NAP.
The report claims that 34,517 people Even though NAP envisions have been arrested since December “reforms in criminal court system to and more than 30,314 combing strengthen the anti-terrorism operations have been conducted institutions including provincial across the country to arrest terrorists CIDs (criminal investigation and militants. departments),” no practical work has been started on this front, so far.
What’s more, even the routine Regulating seminaries, actions and arrest made by provincial law enforcement terrorist network and agencies are presented under financing the performance of the government on NAP. The government has yet to task a specific ministry or department to work on “registration and regulation Imtiaz Gul, however, questions of the religious seminaries” – one of capacity of the state to investigate the key points of NAP. Firstly, the and prosecute all these people ministry of interior was mandated arrested by the security agencies. the responsibility; then, ministry of “It’s virtually impossible to religious affairs, admitted its investigate and prosecute such a minister, was directed to take the huge number of people. It is just face saving as the government has been
96 National Action Plan: Performance so far charge.10 As of now, confusion But the debate on watching remains which institute actually madrassas is more than just looks after this point. registering them. Expert Gul likens government’s sole effort in registering madrassas to “flogging What is noteworthy is that the the wrong horse”. “The real issue,” performance report on NAP he argued, “is the content the excludes any discussion on seminaries’ students are taught. the seminaries, even though some of them have come The possible backlash from religious under the intelligence radar clerics and madrassa students seem for militant ties. to be holding the government from taking any concrete action against them.11 What is noteworthy is that the performance report on NAP excludes Gul says the government has neither any discussion on the seminaries, devised a concrete plan nor allocated even though some of them have come funds to take care of the students under the intelligence radar for who may be on the roads, if some militant ties. seminaries are closed.
Earlier, intelligence reported that anti-Pakistan outfits like Tehreek-e- The government’s progress Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been report, however, fails to getting active support in Rawalpindi elaborate on the suspects, and Islamabad from religious their source of funding and seminaries, often for lodging and how are they traced. sheltering purposes (Azeem, 2014). The report identified 20 seminaries in Rawalpindi alone actively On dismantling “communication supporting militants in their network of terrorists”, the operations in the twin cities. government has been focusing, so far, mostly on registration of SIM cards, used in mobile phones for terrorism.
10Authors’ interview with Federal Interfaith Harmony Sardar Muhammad Minister for Religious Affairs and Yousuf. 11Authors’ interview with Sardar Yousuf.
97 National Action Plan: Performance so far
According to the government’s April terrorism promotion, and terrorist report, 42.84 million SIMs have been glorification. Yet, very little progress verified. But that leave more than half has been made on checking hate SIMs, of the targeted 103 million, speeches through different mediums unverified. To subscribe the of communication. remaining, the government has been pushing ahead the deadline. Ever since the launch of NAP, interior ministry and NACTA The Federal Investigation Agency have taken no action against (FIA) has registered 64 cases of any proscribed organization, money transfer through Hawala citing legal complications and Hundi, illegal means of money required lengthy process. transfer; arrested 83 people, recovered 101.7 million rupees, and registered nine cases for suspicious One of the reasons why keeping transaction. Simultaneously, the check on hate material proves State Bank of Pakistan, the country’s daunting, is because contributors to central bank, has frozen 120 accounts such publications reportedly include worth of 10.1 billion rupees. “influential” figures like former army chief General Aslam Baig, former The government’s progress report, Director General Inter-Services however, fails to elaborate on the Intelligence General Hamid Gul, suspects, their source of funding and PM’s advisor Irfan Siddiqi, and how are they traced. It is therefore columnist Aurya Maqbool Jan. unclear if those who transferred Likewise, one contributor ‘Abu money were really linked to Shams’, investigated Pak Institute for terrorism. The report is also silent on Peace Studies (PIPS), is actually the action taken against the Jamaatud Dawa’s (JuD) chief Hafiz accountholders. Muhammad Saeed; another, ‘Saadi’ is the pseudonym of Jaish-e- Hate speech, social media Muhammad’s chief Maulana Masood and glorification of terrorists Azhar (PIPS, 2013).
Owing to the fact that hate material The JuD continues to publish seven contribute in furthering militancy, periodicals including Tayyibaat, in the NAP vowed to take concrete Urdu, for women; Rozatul Atfal for measures against hate literature, children; Zarb-e-Taiba, in Urdu, for
98 National Action Plan: Performance so far younger readers; and Babul Islam in complications and required lengthy Sindhi. The Al-Amin Trust, formerly process.12 known as the banned Al-Rasheed Trust, apparently a charity For the government, loudspeaker organisation, spreads its message remains the only source of hate through daily Islam and weekly Zarb- speech. According to the e-Momin. Jaish-e-Muhammad, a government’s performance report, proscribed group publishes the police have arrested a total of 4,068 weekly Al-Qalam in Urdu and people, including 3,313 in Punjab, 192 English. Masood launched Al-Qalam in Sindh, 462 in Khyber and a monthly publication for Pakhtunkhwa, 3 in Balochistan, and children, Musalman Bachay, in 2003, 98 in Islamabad, while 955 cases have while continuing a monthly been registered across the country for publication for women under the spreading hate speech and material. same name (PIPS, 2013). The law-enforcement agencies also arrested 979 people and sealed 70 These groups and their literature shops on the same charges. provide fuel to extremism and militancy. Islamabad, the federal The police are directed to raid shops capital city, has become the best venue and confiscate the hate material even for these outfits for expressing their though they (police) are neither outrage against the government’s trained nor they have proper policies and their critics. education to identify hate material in a shop.13 “For police personnel, any book with a rifle, pistol or bomb on For the government, its cover comes under hate literature, loudspeaker remains the only and this is simply ridiculous,” said a source of hate speech. former police officer.
Ever since the launch of NAP, As for internet and social media, interior ministry and NACTA have Pakistan has still to come up with its taken no action against any cyber laws to protect users from any proscribed organization, citing legal kind of abuse and to curb promotion
12Authors’ interviews with Interior 13Authors’ interview with Tariq Pervaiz, Ministry’s joint secretary Muhammad a former police officer, head of Nacta and AsgharChaudhry and Nacta’s chief one of the authors of the NAP. coordinator Hamid Ali Khan.
99 National Action Plan: Performance so far of terrorism online. The have been openly using Facebook, government’s performance report is Twitter and many other social media silent on the issue. The government accounts besides running their announced passage of a bill websites and blogs to reach their “Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill followers and general public with 2015” from the parliament, but it still their messages. remains under consideration, despite passage of over 100 days to Numerous social media accounts of declaration of the NAP. terrorists and extremists, their websites, blogs and videos thrive A complaint cell regarding hate online. So far, the government seems material and glorification of least interested to monitor social terrorism on internet and social media and internet to curb hate media has been set up in Pakistan speech and promotion of terrorism Telecommunication Authority but its and extremism. performance and functioning remains a mystery for many (MITT, Print and electronic media often 2015). Different proscribed outfits publish the statements of terrorists
100 National Action Plan: Performance so far out of fears of attacks. On the other based on the progress on NAP so far, hand, Pakistan Electronic Media bringing in administrative and Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) has development reforms in Federally not devised any strategy to check the Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) glorification of terrorists on the seem a distant dream. media. The government’s performance Counter-terrorism force, report is also hushed on the protection of minorities and repatriation of internally displaced reforms in FATA persons. The report, however, mentions that NAP also promises establishing a around 20,024 Afghan refugees have dedicated counter-terror force, to be been deported since announcement deployed across the country, besides of the NAP, including 6,323 from ending religious extremism and KPK, 798 from Balochistan, 1 from protecting minorities. The Islamabad, 2 from Gilgit-Baltistan, government has yet to start practical and 1,200 from FATA, whereas work on these fronts – neither a new 358,288 have been registered. counter-terror force has been set up Mohmand says the government nor any concrete steps taken to should formulate a comprehensive protect minorities. strategy to deal with the Afghan Numerous stakeholders agreed that refugees instead of trying to hide its permanent peace in FATA is governance failures behind them. contingent upon cogent reforms in its On extremism, proscribed outfits and archaic legal and governance sectarianism, the government’s model.14 “It requires political will, report simply says the consultations wisdom and vision to reconcile the with the provinces are underway on tribal people and grant them the these issues. Shortly after a rights that other Pakistanis are controversy stirred on whether enjoying in other parts of the Jamaatud Dawa and Haqqani country,” Rustam Shah Mohmand, Network are banned or not, the an ex-government official, said. But
14Authors’ interview with Rustam Shah Mohmand, a former diplomat and one of the authors of the NAP.
101 National Action Plan: Performance so far interior ministry removed the list of The government’s latest performance outlawed organizations from its report on the NAP and interviews website. This raises serious questions with relevant experts and on the government’s will to government officials hint at implement the NAP. infighting in the ruling bloc, to the detriment of proper implementation of the plan. There is need to bring But based on the progress on clarity in mandate of different NAP so far, bringing in stakeholders and institutions. administrative and development reforms in For the first time, all political forces Federally Administrated are standing behind the government. Tribal Areas (FATA) seem a It should not lose this opportunity. distant dream. To curb militancy, the state should play a proactive role instead of being reactive. There are also some abstract points in the NAP too, such as that “ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to Numerous stakeholders its logical end” and that “Balochistan agreed that permanent peace government to be fully empowered in FATA is contingent upon for political reconciliation with cogent reforms in its archaic completes ownership by all legal and governance model. stakeholders.” Obviously, the government’s performance report prefers to remain silent on these Now that political forces are backing points too, among others. the fight, the state should take on board people nationwide, by Conclusion strengthening their bond with local police stations. Police, in turn, can The government is heavily reliant on help dry up financial resources of the military, which needs active terrorist by raising awareness among civilian support to justify the actions. the people about extremism, violence The ruling party needs to take and extremism (Shigri, 2015). ownership of the National Action Plan. At the same, the government needs to overcome possible diversions that
102 National Action Plan: Performance so far have been betraying its focus from government also needs to chase all implementation of the NAP. The militants without any discrimination, political crises, exemplified in the along with allocating sufficient tussle between Pakistan Tehreek-e- resources for activation of NACTA. Insaf and the ruling party, continues Revamping the criminal justice to divide the government’s focus on system to ensure speedy justice is all the NAP. Likewise, media remains the more important, not least because too much focused on the Karachi the military courts will expire after operation and Yemen crisis. two years. For long-term peace, the government should review the The state should take the militant curriculum taught in seminaries as fight to its logical end. The well as in public schools.
103 National Action Plan: Performance so far
REFERENCES
Azeem, M. 2014. “TTP getting active support from seminaries in twin cities: report.”Dawn, April 7th.
104
REGIONAL VIEW
Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Ahmad Khan
Abstract
The study aims to understand the views of different political and religious parties in Pakistan on the country’s relations with India. It also offers a brief history of Pakistan-India relations, touching upon different hostile factors and pro-peace initiatives. The author has consulted latest manifestoes of the parties, along with having interviewed representatives of some of the parties. The paper found that almost all parties in Pakistan support peace with India. Rejecting Indian claims over Kashmir, parties in Pakistan term the issue ‘dispute’, the resolution of which is necessary for smooth relations. Political parties also welcome moves to open trade with India, but several condition such openness to reciprocity by India.
Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Ahmad Khan
Introduction the issue. The UNSC passed Resolution 47, reaffirming the right of The genesis of the soured relation self-determination of Kashmiris and between India and Pakistan dates asking both the governments for a back to 1947, when the British were plebiscite to decide the fate of the leaving the subcontinent. The “threat formerly princely state of Kashmir. perceptions” between the two The issues remained unresolved, countries have “a physical setting the tone for a bitter relation manifestation in the form of dispute” between the two countries. In 1965, of princely state of Jammu and another war was fought, once again Kashmir (J&K), a central element to touching Kashmir (Siddiqa, 2004). Six Indo-Pak relation from the onset years later, in 1971, the two countries (Siddiqa, 2004). fought again; the war ended in Pakistan losing its eastern wing. Since then, Pakistan-India relation Pakistan blamed India for creating has seen periodic ups and downs, and training Mukti-Bahini’s guerrilla with three major wars being fought to fighters to fight Pakistani military settle their territorial conflicts (Rizvi, (Rehman, 2014). An entrenched 2011). security dilemma set in for Pakistan, after the war (Rizvi, 2011). Immediately after independence, the two states engaged in a war over the During this period, even when wars princely state of Kashmir, a Muslim- were not fought, the two continued to majority state, whose ruler acceded engage in hostile relations. In 1986, in favour of India.1Subsequently, the two countries were on the brink India went to the United Nations of war when Indian military started Security Council (UNSC) to resolve
1 Details can be seen at
Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties major Brass-tacks exercises near Lahore to meet Prime Minister Pakistani border, raising alarms on Nawaz Sharif. The two, discussing all the Pakistani side. 1998 saw the overt outstanding issues including water nuclearization of South Asia, The and the J&K dispute, signed Lahore next-year’s war in Kargil made the Declaration, which helped the two entire region a nuclear flashpoint. countries to further normalize the The bilateral relations also faced strained relations. Likewise, in 2001, dents at the hands of militants Pakistani military ruler General launching attacks in India. In 2001, Musharraf met Indian PM Atal Bihari after terrorists attacked Indian Vajpayee at the Agra Summit. parliament, India deployed military Although a ceasefire was announced forces along Pakistani borders. In along the Line of Control (LoC) in 2008, when militants attacked 2004, small border clashes continued Mumbai, India started pointing since then. fingers at Pakistan and threatened of surgical strikes in Pakistan (Pandit, Besides high-level talks, dialogue 2008). Regular border skirmishes too process and state visits, both have destabilizing effects on the countries also agreed upon military regional peace and stability (Hashim, and non-military Confidence 2014). Both countries are spending Building Measures (CBMs) in the billions on defences, widening the 1980s and the 1990s, to ease tension. conventional asymmetry between The military CBMs include PM-to- the two and eventually lowering the PM hotline, military-to-military nuclear thresholds of Pakistan, which hotline, declarations on non-use of seeks parity with India. force, ballistic missile flight-test pre- notification, military exercises, non- At the same time, several attempts intrusion of air space, and several have been made to normalize the other measures; the non-military relations. After the 1971 war, leaders ones include regular high-level talks, of the two states, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto relaxed-visa requirements, cricket and Indira Gandhi, signed Simla diplomacy, bus service, etc. The two Agreement, which resulted in the has also signed a major water- release of Pakistani prisoners of war distribution agreement, the Indus and captured territory in the western Water Treaty (IWT), in 1960. part of Pakistan. More than two decades later, in 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited
108 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Meanwhile, in India, the Bhartiya Both countries are spending Janata Party (BJP) won elections in billions on defences, widening 2014, coming to power after a decade. the conventional asymmetry At the height of cross-border between the two and tensions, in 2014, Prime Minister eventually lowering the Modi threatened that “this is not the nuclear thresholds of time for empty boli (talk), but for goli Pakistan, which seeks parity (bullet) by our Jawans (Indian Express, with India. 2014).” Many in Pakistan think the BJP government seems to have adopted the policy of achieving The mutual trust deficit also political objectives by threatening a hampered bilateral trade. Trade war with Pakistan. volumes did not expand because of multifaceted problems of “non-tariff barriers, poor infrastructure resulting . The survey-based study also in costly transportation, poor trade tries to encapsulate the facilitation measures, and restricted strategies, if any, the religious visa regime” (Mehta, 2012). Realizing and political parties may have the true potential of economic devised in countering the relations, the two countries are now challenges towards progressing towards more economic normalization of the bilateral interdependency. India has granted relations. Most Favourite Nation (MFN) status in 1996, whereas Pakistan has yet to do so, given heated debate on the Such statements raise fears of rise in issue (Mehta, 2012). ideological extremism. At the same time, religious and political forces Presently, attempts are being made to retain some say in deciding about bring back the previous efforts of Pakistan’s relation with India. peace process. After the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the bilateral peace This research aims to understand the talks were suspended, only to resume stance of Pakistan’s major three years later in 2011. Because of parliamentary parties on relations border clashes in 2014, the relations with India in the contemporary are, so far, in the doldrums. foreign, defence, and economic arenas. The survey-based study also
109 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties tries to encapsulate the strategies, if regional security approach any, the religious and political parties towards India? may have devised in countering the How can trade ties between India challenges towards normalization of and Pakistan be improved? What the bilateral relations. The study is the party’s stance on the explored manifestoes of the parties, following? key news reports, and carried out o Formal trade across borders interviews with party o Informal trade (smuggling, representatives. drug trafficking) o Most Favoured Nation status The study has tried to explore answers to the following questions: Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) What is the party’s view on Pak- India relations, and where does Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz India lie in the party’s policy? (PML-N) is currently the largest What constraints and political party in the parliament, opportunities exist in Pak-India having 188 elected representatives in relations, and how does the party the lower house and 26 senators in plan to use the opportunities for the upper house. A centre-right and improved relations? socially-conservative party, PML-N How does the party look at the is also the largest political entity in various security issues between the most populous province, Punjab. Pakistan and India? Issues The party also formed governments include: in 1990 and 1997. o Confidence building measures between Pakistan PML-N thinks that the country’s and India foreign policy has been facing the o Strategic stability pressing issues of “social, economic o Pakistan’s internal security and political schisms” (PML-N, What is the party’s stance on 2013). The party’s 2013 manifesto Kashmir issue and the resolution briefly expressed party’s willingness of the lingering problem? in making an independent foreign What should be Pakistan’s policy and a comprehensive national foreign policy priorities that best security strategy. The party has encapsulates the country’ vowed to bring about comprehensive reviews in national security and
110 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties foreign policy, which will also bring party, firmly believes in the economic about friendlier and better relations prosperity of the region, also with its neighbours, especially with achievable through establishing India (PML-N, 2013). cordial relations with India. The party manifesto called for PML-N presses for enhancing efforts strengthening of “regional economic to normalize relations with India, cooperation in the forums like foreseeing a peaceful resolution of all SAARC [South Asian Association for outstanding issues. Working on these Regional Cooperation] and ECO issues, the party argues, will help it [Economic Cooperation turn challenges into opportunities.2 Organization]” and supports free or preferential trade arrangements” The party has repeatedly rejected (Wasim, 2013). India’s claim over Kashmir, terming it a bilateral dispute (Wasim, 2013). In 2014, the PML-N government The party argues that the resolution offered New Delhi the Most- of J&K dispute should be “in Favoured Nation (MFN) status, consonance with the aspirations of contingent on the abolition of the people of the territory for their negative list of 1,209 items. The status inherent right of self-determination award reportedly was an attempt to (Wasim, 2013).” The party has reduce the political fallout of the endorsed all previous efforts on J&K border clashes (Khan, 2014). dispute, including the United Nations resolutions (1948), Simla PML-N believes in maintaining a Accord (1971), and Lahore strategic balance with India. It was Declaration (1999), one of the during the second tenure of PML-N signatory of which was the party’s that Pakistan detonated nuclear president, Mian Nawaz Sharif. weapons in May 1998 in response to India’s. The party prides in sticking The party supports better economic to its decision of testing the weapons, ties with its immediate neighbours, amid international pressure not to do including India.3 In fact, PML-N, so. considered as a business-friendly
2Author’s telephonic interview with 3Author’s interview with Siddiqul Siddiqul Farooq, PML-N’s official Farooq. spokesperson. March 20th2015.
111 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
PPP is the ruling party in Sindh In 2014, the PML-N province. government offered New Delhi the Most-Favoured The PPP’s 2013 manifesto vowed to Nation (MFN) status, end “Pakistan’s isolation,” by contingent on the abolition of framing “an independent and multi- negative list of 1,209 items. dimensional foreign policy,” which The status award reportedly will also focus on “better relations” was an attempt to reduce the with the country’s neighbours(PPP, political fallout of the border 2013). clashes When it comes to the eastern neighbour, India, the PPP firmly At the same time, the party looks believes in having cordial ties. All forward to future dialogues and outstanding issues with India should negotiations as important in be resolved through honest and establishing peace. The party sincere dialogue, reads the PPP supports strengthening multi-tier manifesto (PPP, 2013). military and non-military CBMS with India, as well as the people-to-people contact, cultural relationship, relaxed The PPP’s 2013 manifesto visa regime, improved trade ties.4 vowed to end “Pakistan’s isolation,” by framing “an Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) independent and multi- dimensional foreign policy,” Pakistan People’s Party enjoys which will also focus on support across Pakistan. Founded by “better relations” with the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and later led by country’s neighbours his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, and then her spouse Asif Ali Zardari, the party has come into power after PPP supports cooperation and winning general elections in 1970, engagement of South Asian 1988, 1993, and 2008. Currently, the countries, at all levels. Of special interest to the party is having security cooperation and economic
4Author’s interview with Siddiqul Farooq.
112 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties engagement in the contemporary exercise their right of self- world. The party manifesto determination under the UNSC encourages Pakistan’s enhanced resolutions. The PPP manifesto calls regional cooperation with its for “open and safe borders at the Line neighbours, by adopting an of Control to socially unite the institutional framework to promote Kashmiri people” (PPP, 2013). business and investment (PPP, 2013). Recently, however, the party’s Moving beyond South Asia, the party chairman criticized the United aims for an Asia-wide cooperation, Nations for failing to resolve the which includes countries like India Kashmir dispute, saying that and multilateral organizations like Kashmir was “an example of the SCO, ECO, SAARC and ASEAN. To failure of the United Nations” (Dawn, attain this aim, normalization of 2014). He said that “the Kashmiri relations with India is necessary. The people continue to await the party asks for a proactive policy in realization of the promise the world building trade, social and cultural made to them” (Dawn, 2014). A party ties with India, Central Asian representative, in interview to the Republics (CARs) and Gulf Countries author, also endorsed chairperson’s Cooperation (GCC) (PPP, 2013). remarks on UN inaction on its own resolution.5 The party, however, hopes for the peaceful resolution of the disputes However, the party understands with India. The party believes that if certain challenges causing friction India and China can live in a with India. To overcome them, better “tension-fee relations” amid all odds build confidence and stability in the on their border, why can’t Pakistan region.6 CBMs can help both India and India? (PPP, 2013) and Pakistan resolve their outstanding issues. To achieve peace, the party argues, dialogue with India can be opted for. The party understands that the two countries have different positions on On Kashmir, the PPP supports the the resolution on Kashmir. The party, demand of the people of Kashmir to
5Author’s telephonic interview with 6Ibid. Qamar Zaman Kaira, PPP’s party representative. April 10th 2015.
113 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties however, is hopeful that negotiation The party manifesto emphasizes on and public diplomacy can transform an independent foreign policy, these differing positions into a “aimed at protecting, protecting, solution (PPP, 2013). promoting and preserving” the supreme interest of the nation at the It was the PPP which recently highest echelon of the nations (PML- initiated the process of granting MFN Q, 2013). Taking this realism into status to India.7 During its last tenure, account, the party says, Pakistan’s from 2008 to 2013, the PPP foreign policy should be aimed at government announced granting achieving a fair relationship with MFN status to India, along with India. At the same time, the party releasing a negative list of 1,206 items puts, India should also respect the including automobile, textile and sovereignty of Pakistan at all levels pharmaceutical products. The and it should not undermine the process, however, suffered a major security of Pakistan. setback, as India refused to remove non-tariff barriers on the list Pakistan The party believes in maintaining had provided (Kiani, 2013). equality in Pak-India relation, so that “balance of power” stays in place.8 Pakistan Muslim League The party strongly believes that (Quaid-e-Azam) India’s “regional hegemonic designs” which pivot around the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e- notion of “might is right” should be Azam), PML-Q, was founded by reverted (PML-Q, 2013). former party leaders and workers of Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim The party’s stance on Pakistan’s League, after the military coup in relationship with its neighbours, 1999. After winning the 2002 especially India, is primarily focused elections, PML-Q formed central resolution of all disputes through government and provincial comprehensive and meaningful governments in Sindh, Balochistan dialogues. The party argues that and Punjab. Pakistan’s relationship with its neighbour India should be
7Ibid. 8Author’s telephonic interview with Mustafa Malik, PML (Q) Deputy Secretary Information. April 9th2015.
114 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
“exemplary,” achievable through relations can be managed and resolution of the issue of J&K. converted into opportunities – if some adequate initiatives are taken.10 Some such initiatives include a The PML-Q believes in process of regular people-to-people maintaining equality in Pak- contact, cultural exchange and India relation, so that “balance interaction of business communities of power” stays in place. The on both sides. Likewise, political and party strongly believes that religious parties across the border India’s “regional hegemonic can also be helpful. designs” which pivot around the notion of “might is right” The party also supports establishing should be reverted. full-scale Pak-India trade relations, the party’s deputy secretary information said. He asked Indian To the party, the “lingering issue of government to facilitate Pakistani J&K is a test case for normal relations traders in their access to Indian between two neighbouring markets. On the other hand, he countries” (PML-Q, 2013). Terming conditioned Pakistani willingness to Kashmir as “core issue,” the party grant MFN status to India to its sees in the issue’s resolution as lowering of non-tariff barriers on equivalent to respecting the Pakistani products.11 “aspiration and the sentiments of the oppressed people of J&K.” The party Muttahida Qaumi Movement supports peaceful resolution of the issue of J&K dispute, stressing upon (MQM) India to give the Kashmiris their right Muttahida Qaumi Movement of self-determination as enriched in (MQM) draws political support from the United Nations resolutions.9 Urdu-speakers in Sindh’s urban cities Efforts should be made, the party such as Karachi, Hyderabad, and believes, to reduce the friction in the Sukkar. bilateral relations, says the party MQM believes that the cordial representative. PML-Q believes that relationship with neighbours should constraints in improving Pak-India
9Author’s interview with Mustafa Malik. 11Ibid. 10Author’s interview with Mustafa Malik.
115 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties be the cornerstone of Pakistan’s Siachen glacier and Sir Creek water foreign policy. This way, regional strip, didn’t help in turning the cooperation will also be bilateral relation friendlier (MQM, strengthened. The party puts that the 2013). SAARC forum should made more active for further regional Tensions, however, can be lowered integration, which will help find through opportunities. The party solutions to the shared miseries wants an environment of peaceful (MQM, 2013). coexistence, based on the “live and let live” philosophy (MQM, 2013).
A party representative said When it comes to resolving Kashmir that “we should seriously issue, the party supports the wishes consider for a “No War” of Kashmiri people. For enduring peace pact between India and solution of Kashmir, the party Pakistan”. proposes, the Kashmiri leadership should be declared as “third party” in the dialogue process. In yet another With India, maintaining good party proposal, the area of Jammu relations should be the primary and Kashmir, including Azad objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy, Kashmir should be demilitarized. the party argues.12A party representative said that “we should All disputes and conflicts, the party seriously consider for a “No War” argues, should be resolved through peace pact between India and peaceful negotiations. MQM 13 Pakistan”. supports military and non-military confidence building measures The party understands that over the (CBMs), as well as the process of talks past sixty-eight years, the “primary and dialogues with India.14 The issue” of J&K dispute didn’t let to party, in fact, emphasizes on more ease out tensions between the two people-to-people contacts, relaxed countries. Similarly, all other visa regime, revival of Munabao- outstanding disputes, such as over
12Author’s telephonic interview with 13Ibid. FarooqSattar.MQM’ssenior leader and 14Author’s interview with FarooqSattar. member National Assembly.April 10th 2015.
116 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Khokhrapar rail link to Karachi, and and injustice in Pakistan. PTI gained granting MFN status to India.15 popularity in the last few years, especially in 2013 elections, when it emerged as a strong third force on the To the PTI, Pakistan’s internal national landscape. The party is politics has driven its foreign presently ruling Khyber policy; thus, wrongs on Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. foreign policy end are a result of internal political instability To the PTI, Pakistan’s internal and weak leadership. politics has driven its foreign policy; thus, wrongs on foreign policy end are a result of internal political MQM supports Pak-India instability and weak leadership. The cooperation in all fields, especially party desires of a foreign policy that economy, which, wrote the party’s encompasses Pakistan’s “national manifesto, will encourage “progress interests” to make Pakistan a “free and prosperity to one fifth and sovereign state.”(PTI, 2013) population of the world living in this region” (MQM, 2013). Trade relation With India, like other neighbouring will help improve communication, countries, the PTI foresees friendly reposting mutual trust (MQM, 2013). relations of Pakistan.
The party proposes that Pakistan The party desires for a “peaceful co- should grant India the MFN status; existence with India based on such a move, the party says, should sovereign equality, and a just be reciprocated generously, that is solution of outstanding disputes” hurdles from the other side should be (PTI, 2013). The country’s vulnerable taken care of.16 eastern borders, with India, the party says, are indeed threatening to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf sovereignty of the state. (PTI) As far as disputes with India are Founded by cricketer-turn politician concerned, the party suggests a Imran Khan, Pakistan Tehreek-e- policy which enables their peaceful Insaf (PTI) vows to fight corruption resolution. A party representative
15Ibid. 16Author’s interview with FarooqSattar.
117 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties termed Indian occupation of J&K responsible enough in ensuring its “illegitimate,” to be permanently implementation.20 revisited as per UNSC’s resolution.17 The party also supports trade The party “resolutely supports the relations with India. Pakistan should Kashmiri freedom struggle and grant India the MFN status, the party promotes resolution of the dispute on says, but at the same time, asks India the basis of their right of self- to lower trade barrier on Pakistani determination” under the mandate of products.21 UN resolutions (PTI, 2013). Moreover, the party representative Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, read its said that normalization process with manifesto, “recognized the necessity India have to be reciprocated on of maintaining and developing an parallel lines; the party, he said, will effective” deterrent capability, which not support any unilateral resolution will thwart India from any course of on Kashmir. action (PTI, 2013). The party is committed to strengthen the The party representative further country’s nuclear deterrent, which is argued that normalization with India by and large India-centric. The party is incumbent upon India coming to is also committed to rationalizing the the negotiating table, rather just size and structure of armed forces. singing the old rhetoric of blaming The growing asymmetrical nature of Pakistan of a proxy war.18 Indian conventional forces has forced Pakistan to make its nuclear The PTI recognizes the importance of deterrent more credible to persuade CBMs, military and non-military. India (PTI, 2013). The party’s central defence secretary blamed India for deliberately National Party (NP) delaying the dialogue process and negotiations.19 He suggested said National Party, a ruling party in that a roadmap of CBM process be Balochistan, is a Baloch nationalist charted, which makes India party, headed by Dr. Abdul Malik
17Author’s telephonic interview with 19Ibid. Samson Sharif, PTI’s Central Secretary 20Ibid. Defence. April 9th 2015. 21Author’s interview with Samson Sharif. 18Ibid.
118 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Baloch, the current chief minister of military levels, along with the Balochistan. supporting government-level talks. It asks India to reciprocate in the same National Party suggests an manner.23 independent foreign policy, which should encapsulate the national The party advocates engaging interest of Pakistan.22 intellectuals, too, who can play a vital role in erasing the historical The party emphasizes a foreign misperceptions found in societies on policy that develops fair ties with both sides of the border. neighbouring countries, including India. Trade could be another instrument to ease the tensions, the party Acknowledging the importance of underscored. The party’s manifesto normal relation with India, the party stated that the party will promote believes that regional progress and peace and stability across Pakistan. prosperity could only be possible in a These, the party believes, will be peaceful co-existence of the region’s greatly helped by normalizing trade people. The party discourages the relationship with India. The party security-centric mind set (NP, 2013). supports more economic integration between India and Pakistan, within On Kashmir, the NP’s Punjab the sphere of “decent capitalism.”24 president said that the people of Kashmir should be given full Pakistan Muslim League freedom to exercise their right of self- Functional (PML-F) determination under the UN resolutions. Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) draws support in the interior rural To resolve all outstanding issues, the Sindh, especially among the Hurs, party supports creating an the followers of the spiritual leader environment for Pakistan and India. Pir Pagara, the party’s head. The The party also believes in expediting CMBs through dialogues and negotiations at all diplomatic and
22Author’s telephonic interview with 23Author’s interview with AyubMalik. Ayub Malik, NP’s president for Punjab. 24Author’s interview with Ayub Malik. April 8th2015.
119 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties party presently sits on opposition Likewise, granting MFN status to benches in Sindh Assembly. India, too, will adversely affect the Pakistani farmers. The party, The party supports good relation therefore, argues that before inking with India on equal terms. The party any trade agreement with India, favours peaceful resolution of Pakistani government should award Kashmir dispute, adding though that subsidies on the local agricultural Indian intentions and military commodities (PML-F, 2013). capabilities have always been threatening to Pakistan (PML-F, Awami National Party (ANP) 2013). Awami National Party is a Pashtun The party blames India for distrust, nationalist party, popular in Khyber given, the party says, Indian Pakhtunkhwa province and Pashtun interference in Pakistan’s internal pockets in Karachi. The party is issues such as Balochistan through headed by Asfandyar Wali Khan, Afghanistan.25 grandson of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who, for his non-violent opposition The party desires of peaceful to British Raj in India, was known as resolution of all issues impairing “Frontier Gandhi.” ANP was a part peace and stability in the region. of the PPP-led coalition government from 2008 to 2013. PML-F is concerned over trade agreements between India and The party manifesto underscores the Pakistan (PML-F, 2013). Expressing importance of Pakistan’s geostrategic concerns over import of Indian location; having borders with China, commodities to Pakistan without any India, Afghanistan and Iran is a duties or regulation, the party argues “mixed blessing.” While such such a move puts local farmers at location can be advantageous to severe disadvantages. Without Pakistan, the neighbouring states are subsidies, these farmers will suffer, also exploiting Pakistan for its vested should Indian agricultural interests (ANP, 2013). commodities import into Pakistan (PML-F, 2013).
25Author’s telephonic interview with National Assembly and former speaker Ghous Bux Khan Mehar, Member Sindh Assembly. April 8th 2015.
120 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
The party does not perceive India to believes, and this gives us hope to be a threat to the Pakistan’s resolve our disputes.26 “independence and freedom of action.” One of the key elements of foreign policy, the party manifesto reads, pivots around the principle of The party argues that the “deep- “establishing friendly and peaceful rooted enmity” of India has repulsed relations with all countries efforts towards normalization of particularly with our neighbours” relationship, agreeing that similar (ANP, 2013). The party firmly feelings are found on other side of the believes that India and Pakistan can border. This situation, the party says, 27 live in peaceful environment in the is quite appalling. larger interest of their people. As a way out, the two countries should increase non-military CBMs, Expressing concerns over like people-to-people contacts, import of Indian commodities cultural exchanges, sports visits, to Pakistan without any industrial and trade cooperation, etc. duties or regulation, the PML- Fargues such a move puts On the question of maintaining local farmers at severe strategic stability, the party’s disadvantages. spokesperson reiterated party’s stance, that the party supports regional and international moves for The people of India and Pakistan, the arms control and abolition of nuclear party says, share a lot of weapons, on a universal and non- commonalities, in culture, discriminatory basis.28 civilization, history, traditions, linguistics, and other spheres of life. The party affirms its support to the There is not much difference between rightful struggle of Kashmiri people a common Indian and a common against the illegal occupation of Pakistani, the party spokesperson India. At the same time, the party supports establishment of peaceful, cooperative and better relations with
26Author’s telephonic interview with 27Ibid. Zahid Khan, ANP’s official 28Author’s telephonic interview with spokesperson. April 9th 2015. Zahid Khan.
121 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
India in all fields. All outstanding puts, it is not in the interest of states issues including J&K dispute, the to interfere in the internal politics of party says, should be resolved in a other states.29 peaceful manner and only through meaningful negotiations and open The party spokesperson also stated dialogue (ANP, 2013). that drawing trade relationship with India will not only benefit the people, The party sees terrorism as a major but also give peace a chance to challenge in attaining regional peace. prevail in the society.30 Trade The “non-state actors” are posing cooperation, besides strengthening threats to not only Pakistan but also Pakistan’s economy, will “reduce Afghanistan, Iran and India. These trade deficit to a sustainable level and violent actors, he said, should be make special efforts to boost the dealt with iron hands. country’s exports and remittances” (ANP, 2013).
The ANP’s spokesperson Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl reiterated party’s stance, that (JUI-F) the party supports regional and international moves for Jamiat-Ulema Islam (Fazl) is a religio- arms control and abolition of political party subscribing to nuclear weapons, on a Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. The universal and non- party, headed by Maulana Fazlur discriminatory basis. Rehman, enjoys support in KP and Pashtun areas of Balochistan. According to the party’s The party’s official spokesperson spokesperson, ANP has a long stresses upon better relations with struggle against militants, which, one India, saying that Pakistan always way or the other, are still being tried to improve its relations with supported by other states, as proxies. India. Similar words are echoed in Support to non-state actors has, in the the party manifesto, which reads that party’s view, deteriorated Pakistan’s “establishing friendly relations with relations with its immediate neighbouring countries will be our neighbours. Therefore, the party
29Author’s telephonic interview with 30Ibid. Zahid Khan.
122 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties priority” (JUI-F, 2013). The party fragile relationship between Pakistan spokesman asked India to reciprocate and India.32 in the same manner, to lower the trust deficit between the two states. All The party strongly believes that both disputes, including the J&K dispute, countries should surrender their should be resolved through the policies of fighting the war through process of dialogue and their proxies, and should not negotiations.31 interfere in each other’s internal issues. This way, more opportunities Geopolitical challenges are the will appear for improving relations.33 primary irritants towards improving Pak-India relations. The regional The JUI-Fblames India for situation is volatile, ever since the supporting nationalist U.S. and allied forces have planned insurgents in Balochistan and their withdrawal from Afghanistan. terrorist activities in Karachi. “Afghanistan’s peace and stability are correlated with peace and stability in Pakistan” (JUI-F, 2013). In Responding to a question on the this circumstance, Pakistan has to CBMs process, the party deal with its internal situation as well representative argued that so far, as threat emanating from its eastern CBMs have not worked in improving and western borders. the relations. Skirmishes along the Line of Control (LoC) and the The party’s spokesman argued that Working Boundary reveal the India wants to achieve status of obsolescence of existing CBMs. Right regional power, by playing an active now, the spokesman said, there is an role in geopolitics of the region. The urgent need to improve the existing party blames India for supporting model of CBMs, especially, by nationalist insurgents in Balochistan establishing hotline between prime and terrorist activities in Karachi. If ministers and resolving bilateral the Indian proxy war in Balochistan differences.34 continues, the spokesperson said, it will further deteriorate an already-
31Author’s telephonic interview with Jan 32Ibid. Achakzai, official spokesperson JUI-F. 33Author’s interview with Jan Achakzai. April 9th 2015. 34Ibid.
123 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
The party calls for peaceful such a way that balance is maintained resolution of Kashmir dispute, in the trade. As far as granting MFN supporting the UN resolutions to this status to India is concerned, the party end. Both India and Pakistan with says, it would likely be supportive of utmost seriousness should work to steps that facilitate India to get MFN resolve Kashmir issue, as Kashmiris status; however, such steps should be have become disillusioned. India, the linked with a balanced approach in spokesman said, should not equal economic and trade terms.36 disappoint Kashmiris. At the same time, the party will continue to Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) support a foreign policy that will support the Kashmiri people on JI, founded by Maulana Maududi, an diplomatic, moral and political Islamic scholar, has a well-organized fronts. political structure across Pakistan and beyond. Senator Siraj-ul-Haq is Being an energy-deficient country, the party’s present emir (leader). Pakistan needs regional energy corridors, the party says. At the same JI desires of peaceful relation with time, India too is banking on energy India, to establish peace and stability reservoirs in Central Asia. The party in the region.37 spokesman suggested that multilateral forums like SAARC, Friendly relations, Jamaat says, will ASEAN, and SCO can be used to joint benefit people on both sides. A party ventures, to meet the future demand official said that most of the of energy in the region, including of expenditures of Pakistan and India Pakistan and India.35 are made on “solidifying defences against each other” (JI, 2013). If all The party realizes that progress in disputes, including the dispute of today’s world hinges a lot on external J&K are resolved, then, he said, “our trade. That is why the party supports [Pakistan and India] defence more external trade with expending will be reduced, neighbouring countries. Pakistan can benefit from its trade with India in
35Author’s interview with Jan Achakzai. 37Author’s telephonic interview with 36Ibid. Abdul Ghaffar Aziz, JI’s Director Foreign Affairs. April 10th 2015.
124 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties increasing our spending on our health and education budgets.”38 The JI supports freedom fighters in Kashmir, and The party, therefore, will endorse all condemns Indian peace-leading efforts. involvement in Balochistan and Karachi. On disputes, JI desires their peaceful resolutions. It wants end to an environment of “warmongering, But, the unresolved status of J&K jingoism, and war hysteria.”39 dispute will stay as a hurdle for India in achieving the goal, the The party, however, understands representative said, reminding that constraints in establishing friendlier after all, the proposed route goes relations with India –one of the through Pakistan. Resolution of J&K constraints being the hostile issue will be in the interest of both the geopolitics. The security situation in countries, therefore.40 the region is not favourable, as the Americans and their allies are The party representative argued that planning to withdraw from it is “highly plausible” that the J&K Afghanistan. dispute will remain “unresolved”. The arms race in South Asia will Furthermore, the JI representative further expand, reaching an pointed out, both India and Pakistan exhausting level.41 are in a desperate mood to find new energy resources, and Central Asian The “deep-rooted” issue of Kashmir Republics (CARs) have become a should be solved, the party’s director new venture of competition among foreign affairs said. The brute force states looking for regional roles. India by Indian forces against Kashmiri is a big country with a large desire to freedom struggle has, he said, get the CAR’s energy resources; as a widened the gulf of mistrust between bigger country, India’s chances of Pakistan and India. progress are higher. JI believes that the process of CBMs will lay down the basis of creating
38Ibid. 40Author’s interview with Abdul Ghaffar 39Ibid. Aziz. 41Ibid.
125 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties trust between India and Pakistan. commitments in resolving the issue However, little has been done in (JI, 2013). solidifying the foundation stone of mutual trust between the two JI favours cordial trade relations with countries, he said. Whatever steps India. However, a one-way trade were taken in the past to ease the relations and granting MFN status to tension, are seen with suspicion from India will be considered illegal, the both sides, the member said. Perhaps, party says, if India does not lower it this is the reason, he said, why CBMs trade barriers towards Pakistan. failed in the past.42 Pakistani products are not allowed to reach large India markets, which is The party looks forward to the end of indeed appalling, he said.44 proxy wars in the subcontinent. The party supports freedom fighters in Conclusion Kashmir, and condemns Indian involvement in Balochistan and Most of the political and religious Karachi. The party’s director foreign parties in Pakistan support bringing affairs reiterated the party’s official Pak-India relations on a smooth stance, that elements active in track. The parties surveyed for this Balochistan and Khyber study support establishing normal Pakhtunkhwa enjoy Indian support. relations, achievable through Some Indian officials don’t hide their concrete and meaningful dialogue open relations with insurgents in and negotiations on all outstanding Balochistan and militants in Khyber issues. Pakhtunkhwa, he said.43 PML-Q, however, believes in JI desires of a relationship built on maintaining a balance of power with equality and justice, achievable India, whereas MQM calls for a “No through resolution of Kashmir issue. War Pact” between the two countries. The doors of mutual cooperation should be open, the party says, Parties call resolution of Kashmir adding that India should fulfil all its issue, as compulsory for establishing cordial bilateral relations. Most called for peaceful resolutions through
42Author’s interview with Abdul Ghaffar 44Author’s interview with Abdul Ghaffar Aziz. Aziz. 43Ibid.
126 Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
UN’s resolutions, reflecting the PML-N, PPP, JI and JUI-F aspirations and willingness of representatives and party manifestos Kashmiris. support a strong deterrent capability to maintain balance of power with Political parties also support the India. The ANP’s representative process of military and non-military vowed to make South Asia a nuclear- Confidence-Building Measures free zone. (CBMs), suggesting that cracks therein should be filled. Of special Political and religious parties also interest to the parties has been the support efforts for regional non-military CBMs, like regular cooperation, especially with India, people-to-people contact, cultural such as by engaging forums like exchange, interaction between the SAARC, ECO, SCO, and ASEAN. business communities, relaxed visa One of the ways this cooperation can regime, improved trade ties, and be helpful is by meeting energy needs revival of Munabao-Khokhrapar rail in the region. link. The idea of granting Most Favourite Some parties also linked internal Nation (MFN) status to India was insecurity to Indian interference. endorsed by many parties, Representatives from PML-F, JUI-F conditioning that India should and JI strongly condemned Indian remove non-tariff barriers on involvement in Pakistan’s internal Pakistani products. PML-F feared issues. They believe that India is Pakistan will lose its agricultural supporting nationalist insurgents in market; whereas JI asked India to Balochistan and Karachi. step ahead in resolving outstanding bilateral disputes with Pakistan. On the question of maintaining strategic stability with India, PTI,
127
REFERENCES
ANP (Awami National Party). 2013. “Elections manifesto 2013.” Dawn. 2014. “Kashmir dispute, a UN failure: Bilawal Bhutto.” October 12th.
Indo-Pak relations: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties
Siddiqa, A. 2004. “India-Pakistan relations: confrontation to conciliation.” Centre for Democratic Governance.July.
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Guidelines for contributors
Conflict and Peace Studies is a biannual journal published by Pak Institute for Peace Studies. The journal is aimed at dissemination of research by the Institute in its key mandated areas. It also provides a forum for those around the world undertaking research in the areas of:
Conflict and peace (Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in South Asia) Security and development Radicalization Media for peace and democracy Political violence and terrorism Counter-terrorism Economic strategic issues International relations and foreign policy
Only previously unpublished submissions will be accepted and copyright will be assigned to the publisher. Permission to use copyright material submitted to the journal will be the responsibility of the author.
Submissions must be typed, single-spaced, should not exceed 6,000 words including references, and should be accompanied by an abstract (200-300 words) and a brief introduction of the author (100-150 words). Contact details should also be provided. Before publication, proofs will be sent to authors for correction and must be returned to the editor by the given deadline.
Guidelines regarding endnotes/footnotes, headings, subheadings etc. may be followed as given in the Chicago Manual of Style.
The title of the submission may be center-aligned and all headings and sub- headings left-aligned. All headings and sub-headings, as well as the title, may be in lower case but first letter of the first word and of all other words except prepositions, articles, and coordinating conjunctions may be capitalized. Titles and subheads may not be underlined or italicized.
Citations for books may include full name of the book, city of its publication, publishing company or organization, year of publication, and the page number/s referred to. Citations for articles may include full name of the
Guidelines for contributors article, name of the journal it was published in along with its volume and issue numbers, and, the page number/s referred to. Names of the books and journals cited may be italicized but may not be in quotation marks. Names of the articles cited may be in quotation marks but may not be italicized.
Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor electronically at editor@san- pips.com.
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Note on contributors
Aamir Saeed, a journalist based in Islamabad, has written for Dawn, Thomson Reuters Foundation, The Third Pole and Responding to Climate Change, among others. He is M.Phil in Peace and Conflict Studies.
Ahmad Khan is Researcher at Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). He previously worked as Research Officer at Institute of Strategic Studies. He is also a Ph.D Scholar at Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad.
Asmatullah Khan Wazir is a researcher and development professional with expertise in forecast and analysis. He has produced extensive background papers for national and international research institutes and think tanks, on governance, militancy, terrorism, and security. His work focuses on religious extremism and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Azam Khan, a journalist based in Islamabad, writes for The Express Tribune on governance, security and human rights issues. He is Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies.
Dr. Andrew McGregor is Director of Toronto-based Aberfoyle International Security. He also worked as Research Associate of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and as director of the Jamestown Foundation’s Global Terrorism Analysis Program in Washington D.C. Dr. McGregor is also author of A Military History of Modern Egypt (Praeger Security International, 2006). He received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto’s Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations in 2000.
Dr. Farhan Zahid is an expert of counter-terrorism and Islamist violent non- state actors in Pakistan. His book Roots of Islamic Violent Activism in South Asia was published by Narratives in 2014. Dr. Zahid is Ph.D. in Counter Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium.
Dr. Zeeshan-ul-Hassan Usmani is a Fulbright Scholar and Eisenhower Fellow. His work has been mentioned in Wall Street Journal, AOL News, Wired
Note on contribution
Magazine, NPR, MIT’s Technology Review, Florida Today, and The Economist. He has authored dozens of research papers, articles, and several books.
Muhammad Ismail Khan works as Project Coordinator at PIPS, where he also edits the “Conflict and Peace Studies” journal. He has also contributed articles to leading newspapers of Pakistan. His areas of interest include security and politics of Pakistan. He did Masters in International Relations from Boston University.
Mujtaba Rathore is a professionally qualified lawyer. Author of an Urdu book on jihad, Rathore holds LLB (Hons.) Sharia & Law from International Islamic University Islamabad, Dars-e-Nizami from Jamia Nizamia Lahore and Fazil Arabi from Jamia Muhammadia Ghosia Bhera.
Shahzad Raza is a former Fulbright Fellow from the University of Maryland. He has been working as print and broadcast journalist since 1998. Currently, he hosts a daily prime-time show on Capital TV. He is also the editor of www.dailycapital.pk. His articles are regularly published in The Friday Times, Rediff.com and several other publications.
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LAST ISSUE
Abstracts
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats and constraints
Safdar Sial
This report assesses potential security, political, economic and geostrategic threats and constraints that could affect the implementation of the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor project. It notes that long-term political and economic stability in Pakistan are vital to smoothly implement the project. Secondly, while cooperation among all countries in the region, at least in terms of trade and economy, would be an ideal scenario in the emerging regional dynamics, there is a strong likelihood that persisting bilateral conflicts and an environment of mistrust will keep them polarized and part of alliances where Pakistan would certainly remain closer to China, thus having little impact on the construction of the CPEC and functioning of the Gwadar Port. Nonetheless, the prevailing environment of insecurity, militancy and violence in Pakistan can pose serious threats to the construction of the corridor although the finalized eastern alignment of the corridor will run through relatively more secure areas than those of the earlier planned western alignment.
Persecuting Pakistan’s minorities: state complicity or historic neglect?
Razeshta Sethna
This report examines the socio-political views and notable challenges faced by Pakistan’s largest minority communities – Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs – analyzing findings from a countrywide survey conducted by the Pak Institute
136 Last Issue of Peace Studies in 2014 with 327 respondents belonging to religious minorities from Pakistan’s four provinces – Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Findings reveal that discrimination against minorities–within the social and cultural mainstream, undermining economic livelihoods and political participation–is connected with overall inequality and government inattention. The report also observes that most respondents although deeply committed to their faith are able to integrate and live peacefully with other religious groups but feel threatened by the overall deteriorating security situation countrywide and the wave of extremism that threatens their existence. Because minority groups are excluded from political decision- making matters that in the long-term not only affects but further marginalizes those communities persecuted by the religious right.
The good governance model to counter extremism: an historical perspective
Ummad Mazhar
The history of South Asia provides significant insights into the purpose of religion in the governance of the state. When analyzed, this discussion can offer explanation and methodologies that may be used to counter extremism presently taking hold in the region and beyond. This paper focuses on governance principles adopted by what were known to be two of the most durable empires in the region that is currently South Asia – the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire – as a way of studying and learning from these historical attempts at curbing the spread of extremist ideologies. The emphasis, by way of historical example, is that governance models and principles followed by Muslim rulers in the sub-continent from the 10th to 16th century were based on ideologies of inclusivism. This approach allowed for the continuation of governance with the provision of security for diverse communities, without having to contend with serious threats from multi- religious, multi-ethnic populations.
From intra-sectarianism to fragile peace: the Gilgit-Baltistan model
Peer Muhammad
137 Last Issue
This paper discusses diverse factors, actors and dynamics of sectarian conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan. Certainly these factors include the state’s jihad policy during the 1980s, the fall-out of Afghan war, the Iran-Iraq war, as well as demographic changes in Gilgit-Baltistan after the construction of Korakarum Highway. The denial of constitutional and political rights to the people for almost six decades, the indifferent attitude of the local and federal administrations, misunderstanding among various sects, absence of an effective criminal justice system, ethnic divisions and lack of education and awareness, and the exploitation of the religious sentiments by different interest groups further aggravated the situation. This paper argues that despite some recent successful efforts by local religious scholars to achieve inter-sectarian harmony there, Gilgit-Baltistan will remain hostage to sectarian-oriented religious sentiments, unless the political and constitutional alienation of the people of this region is addressed through reforms at the federal level.
Understanding the Islamic State: ideology, affiliates and the Da’esh model
Farhan Zahid
The emergence of the Islamic State has not only threatened to change the map of the Middle East but also heightened security concerns of whole world. This paper focuses on the foundation of the Islamic State and its ideology since its inception under the founding Al-Qaeda chief for Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and looks at factors that have fuelled its rise through the last decade. With Al- Qaeda losing its operational strength and independence, disappointed Al- Qaeda fighters and affiliated groups and movements began looking for a new terror base when IS appeared on their radar to provide such an opportunity after parting ways with Al-Qaeda in Syria. The IS has diverse sources of funding including captured oil fields, smuggling, extortion of taxes from businesses in Mosul in Iraq, and ransom for kidnapping. The IS model could be replicated in territories where governance is weak and states are unable to counter the rise of terrorist groups.
The evolution of militant groups in Pakistan (5)
Muhammad Amir Rana
138 Last Issue
A previous backgrounder, titled “Evolution of militant groups in Pakistan (4)” published in the spring issue of this research journal focused on primarily on Shia sectarian groups. This follow-up backgrounder reviews the evolution of sectarian groups belonging to other sects, mainly the Deobandis. An effort has been made to consult and depend on primary sources, particularly literature produced by different sectarian organizations and associated groups. There are about 45 Deobandi organizations operating in Pakistan, out of which 33 are directly involved in promoting sectarian hatred. Few of them including Sipah- e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have changed the sectarian landscape of Pakistan, triggering violent trends in religious discourse. Meanwhile Sunni Tehreek and Ahle Hadith Youth Force, subscribing to Barelvi and Ahle Hadith sects respectively, have remained involved in violent activities
139
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 2
Contents
Abstracts Papers The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats and constraints Safdar Sial Persecuting Pakistan’s minorities: state complicity or historic neglect? Razeshta Sethna The good governance model to counter extremism: an historical perspective Ummad Mazhar From intra-sectarianism to fragile peace: the Gilgit-Baltistan model Peer Muhammad
Backgrounder Understanding the Islamic State: ideology, affiliates and the Da’esh model Farhan Zahid Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (v) Muhammad Amir Rana
Comment Understanding the fundamentals of a counterterrorism strategy for Pakistan Farhan Zahid Notes on Contributors
Last Issue
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1
Contents
Abstracts Papers A review of National Internal Security Policy (2013-18) Muhammad Amir Rana
2014 withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan: implications for regional security Safdar Sial & Talha Saeed Satti
Post-2014 Afghanistan: prospects for Taliban’s rise to power Farhan Zahid
FATA reforms: journey so far and the way forward Asmatullah Khan Wazir Militant economy of Karachi Zia Ur Rehman
Regional View Pak-Afghan ties: views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties Musa Javaid & Sara Meer Backgrounder Evolution of militant groups in Pakistan (4) Muhammad Amir Rana Comment Pakistan: A Society in Perpetual Turmoil Zubair Torwali Book Review ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’ by Anatol Lieven Safiya Aftab Guidelines for Contributors
141 Last Issue
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1
Contents
Abstracts Papers Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Common Security Perspective Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial
Culture of Violence versus Culture of Silence: Civil Society Responses to Extremism and Terrorism in South Asia Arshi Saleem Hashmi
Factors of Anti-Americanism in Middle East and Pakistan Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
Role of Religious Scholars in Counter-Radicalization and Deradicalization Strategies in Pakistan: The Need and the Scope Safdar Sial Regional View Pak-Iran Relations: Views of Political and Religious Parties Najam U Din and Maryam Naseer Backgrounder Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (III) Muhammad Amir Rana Comment Pakistan: A Society in Perpetual Turmoil Zubair Torwali Book Review ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’ by Anatol Lieven Safiya Aftab
Notes on Contributors
Guidelines for Contributors
142 Last Issue
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2
Comment Swat De-radicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants Muhammad Amir Rana Papers State-building in Afghanistan: Are Reforms Sustainable? Umair Riaz
The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
Modes of Radicalization and De-radicalization: Impact on Pakistan’s Security Dynamics Salma Malik
Backgrounder Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (I) VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1
Papers Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views Nida Naz
Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects Safdar Sial
Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges Farhat Akram
Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Recommendations for Future Sohail Habib Tajik
Analysis The Agenda of Religious-Political Organizations: A Discourse Analysis Muhammad Amir Rana
Report Understanding North Punjab in the Context of Pakistan Diaspora in Britain Pak Institute for Peace Studies
143 Last Issue
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 4
Report Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit Papers A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA Brian R. Kerr
Understanding FATA Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: A Global Threat Khuram Iqbal
Analysis Analyzing Suicide Attacks in Pakistan Akbar Nasir Khan
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3
Comment Folds of Radicalization Muhammad Amir Rana
Survey Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan Papers A Link between Poverty and Radicalization in Pakistan Manzar Zaidi
Religious Behaviors in Pakistan: Impact on Social Development Muhammad Azam
Pakistan’s Responses to Terrorism: A Broad Overview Wajahat Ali
Profile Hizbut Tahrir in Pakistan: Discourse and Impact Muhammad Amir Rana
144 Last Issue
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2
Survey Radicalization in Pakistan: Understanding the Phenomenon
Papers Trends and Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan Mujtaba Rathore and Abdul Basit
Jihad, Extremism and Radicalization: A Public Perspective Safdar Sial and Tanveer Anjum
Women Radicalization: An Emperical Study Saba Noor and Daniela Hussain
Litterateurs’ Response to Extremism in Pakistan Muhammad Amir Rana
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1 Militants’ Media Package Comment Mainstream Media’s Response to Radical Extremism Najam U Din Reports 1) Militants’ Media in Pakistan: Political Etymology and Professional and Craft Analyses Wajahat Masood 2) Weapons of Mass Distortion: A Closer Look at the Jihadi Media in Pakistan Wajahat Ali 3) An External View of the Vernacular Press in Pakistan Ranga Kalansooriya Dialogue Media Seminars on Militants’ Media in Pakistan and its Impact
Papers
Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies Khuram Iqbal Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses Amjad Tufail
Radicals’ Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia Muhammad Amir Rana
145 Last Issue
VOLUME 2, NUMBER 3
Papers
Financial Sources of Pakistani Militant and Religious Organizations Muhammad Amir Rana
Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the Region Safdar Sial
Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan:A Comparison Ishtiaq Ahmed
Report
Profiling the Violence in Karachi
Comment
FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy Asif Mian VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2
Taliban Insurgency: A Counterinsurgency Perspective Muhammad Amir Rana
Inequality and the Militant Threat in Pakistan Muhammad Azam and Safiya Aftab
Deradicalization: Approaches and Models Saba Noor and Shagufta Hayat
Crisis of Political Development and Human Rights Violations Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi
Tablighi Jamaat: Discourse and Challenges Muhammad Amir Rana
146 Last Issue
VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1
Debate Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization
in Pakistan: A Report
Papers Mapping the Madrasa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaris Muhammad Amir Rana
Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities Muhammad Azam
Post-9/11 Peace Narrative in Pakistan
Shabana Fayyaz
Radicalization in Sri Lanka Ranga Kalansooriya
Human Rights Reporting in Pakistani Media Safdar Sial
Case Study
Radicalization among Educated Pakistani Youth Saba Noor VOLUME 1
Comments New Approaches to the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistani Tribal Areas What has Culture to do with the Economy? Papers Radicalization & Media Muhammad Azam Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview Muhammad Amir Rana Poverty and Militancy Safiya Aftab Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan Saba Noor Exploring the Mindset of the British-Pakistani Community: The Socio- cultural and Religious Context Safdar Sial
147