Lehigh Preserve Institutional Repository

Luxembourg: World Headquarters for the Industry Copeland, Cameron 2008

Find more at https://preserve.lib.lehigh.edu/

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : WORLD HEADQUARTERS FOR THE STEEL INDUSTRY Cameron Copeland

Introduction The History of Steel in Luxembourg The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Luxem- bourg), although one of the smallest coun- Although there is evidence of ironworking tries in the world, has historically played a in Gallo-Roman times circa 500 A.D. (Edwards, disproportionate role in the formation of mod- p. 1), for all intents and purposes the steel indus- ern Europe. It was a charter member of the try’s rich history in Luxembourg took shape Economic Union, the European Union, in the late nineteenth century. Following the NATO, and the United Nations. The territory inventions of two British industrialists, Henry now called Luxembourg was a prized possession Bessemer and Sidney Gilchrist Thomas in 1855 of various powers in Europe because of its geog- and 1875 respectively, mass production of raphy and natural resources, only gaining its steel became feasible. The , independence in 1890; with a population of developed in Sheffield, England, utilized the 480,000 (2007), it boasts the world’s highest GDP patented Bessemer converter in order to mass- per capita of $87,995. (The World Factbook . . .) produce steel from pig- by removing impu- Although insignificant in size and area, Luxem- rities using compressed air which was bubbled bourg has been able to maintain its economic through the molten metal. However, the and strategic importance on the European stage. minette1 deposits in southern Luxembourg The purpose of this article is to examine remained untapped by the Bessemer process due how Luxembourg ultimately became the cor- to their high phosphorus content until the nerstone of the world’s largest steel conglomer- ate. In what follows I will provide a short his- 1 tory of the steel industry in Luxembourg along Minette sediment in the Esch and Differdange (southwestern regions of Luxembourg) was typically com- with a description of the evolution of the coun- prised of 30 percent iron ore and large concentrations of try’s steel corporations into what is today phosphorus, making it difficult to produce steel using the ArcelorMittal. original Bessemer process.

33 Figure 1 Global Crude Steel Production

Source: Chaudhary, p. 3.

Thomas-Gilchrist2 process was developed. These and Social . . . ,” p. 7) Located adjacent to the innovations led to the tremendous growth of the iron- and coal-rich terrain of the Lorraine global steel industry in the late nineteenth region, Luxembourg was the ideal place to and (as shown in Figure 1) twentieth centuries, develop steel production. Following its acces- measured by compound aggregate growth rates sion into the Zollverein3, provided (CAGR). Luxembourg with both much needed invest- The population in Luxembourg grew from ment funds and a primary outlet for its steel 211,088 in 1890 to 259,891 in 1910 and became products. more highly concentrated in the City of Luxem- ’s historic lineage may be traced bourg and the Canton of Esch; the mining back to its origins with the Forges d’Eich-Le and steel area employed 45 percent of the total Gallais and Metz et Cie in 1838 (see Table 1). The population before the First World War as com- growth of the Luxembourg steel industry, over pared with only 26 percent in 1880. (“Economic 170 years in the making, has been a story of growth and decline, merger and acquisition, 2The key to phosphorus removal in the Bessemer con- reaching its zenith in 2006 with the merger of verter was the use of a lining composed of a strong basic sub- Arcelor and Mittal Steel. The same tumul- stance (such as burned limestone) with which the phos- tuous existence is echoed in and Spain phorus could combine and be eliminated in slag. With the whose steel companies, also included in Table aid of his cousin, Percy Gilchrist, Thomas was able to 1, combined with much later to form experiment and perfect his product in 1875. (“Thomas, Sidney . . .”) Arcelor. 3The German customs union was established by the In the years immediately preceding the majority of German states in 1834 to eliminate internal cus- First World War, the steel industry in Luxem- toms barriers while upholding protectionist tariff regimes bourg went through its first phase of eco- against external parties. Luxembourg joined in nomic consolidation with the merger of 1842 and benefited from the economic ties until 1918 when the Allied powers required that Luxembourg dissolve its Fourneaux, Sarrebuck, and d’Eich companies affiliation. into Arbed in 1911. Arbed became one of the

34 Table 1 ArcelorMittal Merger Timeline

first truly vertically integrated steel companies, lowing the occupation that began in 1940. controlling ore, coke, and rolling mills. By 1913 This increase was short-lived, however, as the Luxembourg was producing more than one mil- Allied invasion and bombing campaigns deci- lion metric tons of steel annually, of which mated the German military machine in the later nearly 70 percent went directly to Germany. days of the war. Fortunately for Luxembourg’s (“Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 8) economy, the restrictions of the post-war con- Following WWI the Allies mandated that struction period following World War I were not Luxembourg withdraw from the Zollverein; and, repeated; and efforts such as the Marshall Plan in the absence of German investment, the led to a significant investment of $559 million steel industry in the region fell upon hard times. in the country and a rapid recovery. (Bailey, The inter-war period was categorized by slug- p. 205) The period following the war from gish growth in the global economy, further 1945 until 1975 saw annual steel production compounding the region’s economic and social in Luxembourg grow from less than one million hardship. Table 1 illustrates how this confluence to over six million metric tons. This dramatic of events impacted steel production. The effects increase in production was at least in part due cascaded through to the steel industry where to the rapid growth in technical productivity4 as annual output grew at a compound aggregate measured by the Federation of Luxembourg growth rate of only 2 percent and consequently Steel Industries. productivity more led to social and economic unrest during the than doubled in conjunction with the rapid period. general post-war growth from 1950 to 1974. The industry’s fortunes in Luxembourg (“Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 12) were revived briefly during the Second World War as a dramatic increase in production was 4Measured in tons per annum per worker and reflecting required in support of Germany’s war effort fol- increases in efficiency and new methods of producing steel.

35 Table 2 Luxembourg Steel Plan Expenditures

Budgetary Expenditures Made by the State under the “Steel Plan” between 1975 and 1987 Unit: million euros 1975–1982 1983–1987 1975–1987

A. Investment Aid (Ordinary capital subsidies, extraordinary capital subsidies, special interest rate reductions, and other subsidies) 70.6 63.4 134.0

B. Financial Restructuring (Convertible bond and share subscriptions, acquisition of Sidmar company shares, special and temporary aid) – 393.0 393.0

C. Social Aid (Professional re-training, re-employment benefits, early retirement, and special disability scheme) 147.1 307.6 454.7

D. Tariff Aid 9.6 1.7 11.3 Total 227.3 765.7 993.0

Source: “Economic and Social . . . ,” p. 14.

The marked growth in both raw produc- This period of economic rationalization tion and productivity during the aforemen- continued on a larger scale across all of Luxem- tioned period reversed course from 1975–1985 bourg’s steelmakers. Ultimately, in the late as the world reeled from the first and second oil 1970s Arbed was the sole surviving steelmaker crises. The steel industry in particular suf- due primarily to the direct intervention of the fered from a serious worldwide demand and sup- state. The Societe Nationale de Credit et d’In- ply imbalance as severe overproduction placed vestissement,6 a long-time national steel indus- downward pressure on prices. Beginning in try investor, increased its holdings to 42.9 1975, Luxembourg responded rapidly to the eco- percent of Arbed’s total capital in order to nomic downturn in an effort to stem any poten- stave off the company’s bankruptcy. The magni- tial job losses. Table 2 identifies the cumula- tude of the government intervention underlines tive expenditures made under the “steel plan”5 the relative importance of the industry as Lux- including investment aid, financial restructur- embourg’s principal employer. ing, and social support. The most significant aid package prioritized several new social programs A National and Regional Champion including legislation with the express purpose in the EU of providing for early retirement of steel work- ers. Despite the injection of the equivalent of Luxembourg’s rationale in maintaining a one billion euros, stemming the increase in partnership between government and private unemployment was impossible; and the num- enterprise can be described by the doctrine of 7 ber of registered unemployed increased economic nationalism. It follows that in smaller markedly from 1974 to 1984 as more than 6Founded in 1978 as a federal organization, the Soci- 14,800 steelworkers left the industry. (“Eco- ete Nationale de Credit et d’Investissement provides financ- nomic and Social . . . ,” p. 14) ing through grants, loans, credit facilities, and equity invest- ments in public and private companies located in 5The “steel plan” was a series of emergency measures Luxembourg. enacted between 1975 and 1987 in an effort to rejuvenate 7Economic nationalism refers to policies that are the ailing Luxembourg steel industry and support social guided by the idea of protecting domestic consumption, services for affected workers. labor, and business.

36 states the theory seems to hold particular appeal downturn, many nations preserve production in because they are more conscious of losing their an effort to protect jobs, economic stability, own sovereignty and thereby justify the eco- and their strategic independence. Excess nomic protection and investment in “critical” national production is thus exported at subsi- industries that provide some economic inde- dized prices, flooding neighboring markets. pendence. Arbed engendered a great deal of his- torical pride, and the political and socioeco- Consolidation Trends nomic interests of the nation were and still are intertwined with Luxembourg’s single The long-term viability of the steel indus- largest company and employer. (More than 60 try broadly defined requires significant ration- percent of the industrial workforce was tied to alization in order to remedy the challenges of steelmaking prior to WWI.) rampant overcapacity, global competitiveness, Realizing its vulnerability, Luxembourg and increasing commodity prices. In response, began to increase its economic diversity by pro- toward the end of the 1990s, following the Asian moting a service economy during the 1950s. Crisis (1997) and early into the twenty-first cen- Indeed, this vision and flexibility enabled the tury, the market reacted with a wave of regional country to successfully adapt to the changing consolidations. In order to survive, Arbed was economic landscape and turned it into a lead- driven to become a pan-European champion by ing European service provider. Yet, in the early merging with French steelmaker and 1970s, twenty years following this shift in eco- Spanish concern Aceralia in 2002. The merger nomic focus, the steel industry still accounted created the largest steelmaker in the world, with for more than 20 percent of the total added 110,000 employees and annual steel production value of Luxembourg according to STATEC.8 of 46 million tons. The pressure for further con- However, there was a dramatic decline in the solidation is evidenced by the most recent wave steel sector following the oil crisis in 1973. of mergers and acquisitions in the twenty-first The exhaustion of minette ore deposits saw century that created global companies from the last Luxembourg iron mine close in 1981. regional leaders, ArcelorMittal being the most Nevertheless, Arbed remained the country’s notable example in the steel industry. largest employer. Due to the company’s national Steel companies have been caught champion status, the economic and political between raw material price inflation, increasing support of the government provided the demand, particularly from China, and the con- resources necessary for modernization of the solidation of customers, particularly the auto- industry. These efforts paid off in the form of mobile sector. In a historically fragmented new technologies, such as the electric arc fur- industry facing fluctuating economic condi- nace, dramatic productivity gains, and quality tions, stability has been hard to maintain; con- improvements between 1974 and 1990. sequently managing costs has been one of the The importance of national sovereignty and most important issues for steelmakers. Yet, economic independence in a rapidly globaliz- competitiveness in the steel industry requires ing world has led to support for the steel indus- significant capital expenditures in technology try in many countries. However, such national and heavy equipment. Balancing these forces interests have distorted market supply and had made companies like Arcelor and Mittal suc- demand, contributing to chronic overcapacity in cessful while other companies, such as Beth- the global steel industry and volatile and unsus- lehem Steel in the United States, doomed them- tainable markets. Whereas traditional economic selves to failure as overproduction and capacity theory suggests that market forces would move issues forced them out of business. The inten- to resolve any imbalances by lowering produc- sive capital investment required in order to tion and eventually capacity in an economic compete in the steel market requires continu- ous innovation leveraged over increasing 8The Central Service for Statistics and Economic economies of scale. A dominant leader(s) needed Studies, formed in 1962 from the merger between the Gen- to emerge to stabilize the industry and drive eral Statistics Office and the Service for Economic Studies and Documentation in Luxembourg, provides economic data more effective management of material effi- to the government. ciency and innovation across the sector. 37 Figure 2 Supplier Consolidation and Raw Material Inflation

Source: Chaudhary, p. 5.

The industry has incentives to consolidate account for less than 20 percent of market from both ends of the supply chain. The market share. (By comparison the number is closer to for raw materials is controlled by oligopolies. 70 percent for automobiles.) The benefits of con- The top five coking coal suppliers and the top solidation include the ability to maintain greater three iron ore suppliers in Figure 2 control pricing power, a serious problem in the past due upwards of 50 percent of their respective mar- to the multiplicity of national protectionist ket shares. In the face of accelerating demand, interests. Additionally, as customers themselves they have been able to increase prices dramat- become more globally distributed, their steel ically since 2004. The Chinese have been one needs can be better served by a company with of the most vociferous in objecting to this a presence and capability in each customer concentration of pricing power and have even locale. Finally, the trend of moving produc- entered into the acquisition fight to protect tion to low-cost and high-growth countries can their interests, purchasing a minority stake in be most effectively navigated by global players Rio Tinto. (“China Takes . . .”) In order to main- in the industry. tain negotiating leverage, steel companies must Consolidation in the steel industry also consolidate their buying power on a global base allows firms to capture growth opportunities in or risk having their margins squeezed by sup- new markets. Facilitating new relationships in plier consolidation. geographically dispersed regions will come The top five manufacturers by tonnage more easily to a diversified steel company with in the global steel industry (shown in Table 3) a global network already in place. Additionally,

38 Table 3 The Top Six Steelmakers by Tonnage

Rank Company Production (mmt)* 1 ArcelorMittal 117.2 2 Nippon Steel 34.7 3 JFE 32 4 POSCO 30.1 5 Baosteel 22.5 6 U.S. Steel 21.2

*mmt = million metric tons. Source: “World Steel in Figures 2007,” p. 3.

major players will have access to the requisite tions have come under fire from various con- investment capital to pour into new opportu- stituencies, including labor unions, investment nities while spreading the risk across their analysts, and the investing public, for failing entire portfolios. Finally, global companies to deliver the promised financial results. No will be less subject to the influence of national matter how one evaluates the success of a interests and therefore will be better prepared merger, it is difficult to quantify non-financial to handle fluctuations in demand and prices factors. These factors can play significant but by adjusting production and employment. different roles with individual parties. As a result, there is an inherent tension between The ArcelorMittal Case purely financial and the non-financial per- spectives, with neither telling the entire story. One of the most dramatic consolidation Mittal’s actions and statements suggest that events in the steel industry occurred in 2006 its primary motivation in approaching Arcelor when Mittal Steel, controlled by Indian born was financial. However, in the case of Arcelor, , launched a hostile bid for non-financial factors had considerably greater Luxembourg-based Arcelor. It was a new breed importance. of deal that created the first truly global steel company in terms of geographic reach, port- Mittal’s Perspective folio of clients, and wide selection of value-added products. Driven primarily by opportunities of For Lakshmi Mittal and his son Aditya, the potential synergy, market power, and global merger of two industry titans made economic competitiveness, Mittal launched an initial bid sense. The deal was heralded by Mittal’s man- for the company at the beginning of January agement for several reasons, including poten- 2006, valuing the company at ˛18.6 billion. tial resource, manufacturing, and research syn- What followed was a bitter five months of nego- ergies, portfolio optimization, and international tiations that ultimately succeeded in creating expansion opportunities. According to Aditya a behemoth controlling 10 percent of the Mittal, “The merger is good for jobs and invest- world’s production (three times as much as its ment as it creates a more sustainable industry.” closest rival). In the following sections, the (as quoted in Aldrick, “Arcelor Bid . . . ,” p. 1) financial and economic motivations supporting Historically, companies have struggled in peri- Mittal’s rationale will be compared with extra- ods of economic turbulence because of compet- neous political and socioeconomic perspectives. ing interests and market fragmentation. As a Historically, the projected economic ben- global entity, ArcelorMittal should now have the efits of large merger and acquisition transac- ability to control costs more effectively and

39 improve margins by capitalizing on economies ister, Kamal Nath, hinted that a “move against of scale, ultimately diversifying its business Mittal Steel could trigger a trade war between operations. The two companies complemented the two countries.” (Thornton, p. 1) one another in terms of geographic operational Stoking national sentiment and a populist scope. Both had been products of numerous agenda was an ingenious tactic that achieved mergers, and their combination, according to several political objectives as well as financial Aditya Mittal, would deliver ˛1.6 billion in benefit for Luxembourg. It placated the elec- savings. torate by playing to European emotions, secured Research and development synergies can several important concessions, and ultimately create a significant amount of value and com- provided the government with a foreign scape- petitive advantage. According to Aditya Mittal, goat in case of the failure of the steel industry the effect of research investments combined in Luxembourg. Last but not least, the tactics between the two companies “will be leveraged employed contributed to a higher value for all over 130 (million) tons. Others will be able to shareholders. manage just 30 (million) tons per dollar.” (as The first response to Mittal’s announce- quoted in Aldrick, “Arcelor Bid . . . ,” p. 2) Main- ment of its intention to merge was grounded taining innovation in steel product lines is inte- in the economic nationalism argument. Former gral to the product’s continued applications Usinor President and Arcelor Chief Executive around the world. ArcelorMittal’s ability to con- Guy Dollé likened Arcelor to the “Airbus of centrate research in fewer locations while shar- the European Steel industry” in an attempt to ing the outcomes globally will spread the risk engender a sense of European pride. (Maidment, and ultimately provide the promised economies p. 1) Subsequently, the governments of France of scale. and Luxembourg moved quickly to dismiss The bid for Arcelor enhanced Mittal’s the merger proposal, and Dollé continued to reputation, expanding the company’s reach into voice his opinion regarding the ArcelorMittal the heart of Europe while it concurrently re- deal in a way that at times verged on xenopho- branded Mittal from a low-cost commodity bia. He questioned Mittal’s safety record and steelmaker into a world class environmen- compared its products to “cheap cologne” tally-friendly company with cutting-edge tech- against Arcelor’s high quality “perfume.” He nology and product development. With its even went so far as to call Mittal’s cash “mon- increased size, the company should be able to naie de singe” or “monkey money.” These out- stand toe-to-toe with major suppliers and cus- landish comments merely demonstrated an tomers in order to protect its bottom line. emotional rather than a rational reaction to the merger. Arcelor and the European Perspective Initially, both Arcelor management and European political forces were sharply opposed Politically, Luxembourg’s government was to the deal, and in general Europeans felt as presented with a difficult situation by the pro- though their national pride was for sale in a posed merger. Although the merger made eco- takeover orchestrated by an individual from a nomic sense, there were other factors to be con- “third world country.” There have been exam- sidered. In particular, the historical significance ples of economic nationalism effectively block- of the steel industry to Luxembourg’s econ- ing other acquisition attempts including omy meant that the loss of such an icon could Danone9 in France and CNOOC-Unocal10 in be a political disaster for Prime Minister Jean- the United States. Claude Juncker. On the other hand, Luxem- The strategy of the Luxembourg govern- bourg’s reputation carefully cultivated by the ment and Arcelor management successfully gar- government, portraying the country as an nered several important concessions. First, Lux- ideal place to locate international business head- embourg was established as the new company’s quarters, would be severely tarnished if it global headquarters. Although the true corpo- attempted to block the transaction. India has rate power remains in London where the Mittal a great sense of pride in the success of Mittal family resides, this was an important gesture Steel, so much so that India’s commerce min- both from a symbolic and an economic stand- 40 point. The decision to move the headquarters of Prior to announcing the merger, Mittal the combined company to Luxembourg placated had previously acknowledged that it was and Europeans. The move attempting to eliminate 40,000 jobs internally. also maintained important higher-level employ- Continental diplomats and management were ment opportunities in the country for the fore- justifiably concerned that if any deal were seeable future. Secondly, as the chief share- struck, ongoing restructuring at Mittal would holder with 5.6 percent of Arcelor’s shares, overflow into Arcelor. However, after repeated the government of Luxembourg had a finan- efforts at shuttle diplomacy plus several prom- cial stake in the deal. (“Forging a Steel . . .”) ises from Mittal to protect European jobs, Mit- Politicians and management grumbled that the tal was able to navigate much of the political initial offer of ˛18.6 billion from Mittal valued opposition. Ultimately, the success of the merger the company below what it was worth. The will be judged by labor unions and by govern- negotiations dragged on over several months ments to the extent that ArcelorMittal maintains until Mittal increased its offer by more than its European operations. 33 percent to ˛26.5 billion and conceded several places on the management board for Luxem- Arcelor Management Reaction bourg officials. Thus, Luxembourg’s ferocious resistance resulted in a much-enhanced deal for Although Arcelor CEO Guy Dollé attempted shareholders. to leverage political and social forces to aid in the defense of Arcelor against the merger, his Labor’s Perspective efforts were hampered by poor management. Arcelor did not mount an effective defense In order for the merger to proceed, Mittal due to several tactical errors. Significant also needed to placate apprehensive labor con- amounts of surplus cash made the company stituencies in the government in labor unions. an ideal target for acquisition in an industry These constituencies had reason to be concerned under pressure to consolidate. Additionally, for, as Aldrick notes (p. 2), “the global steel work- management had tenuous control over its own force has declined 30 percent every ten years destiny because of the significant share-dilution since the 1970s” and as many as 1,500,000 jobs or free float11 that resulted in 86 percent of have been lost. Therefore, the governments of shares being held by anonymous owners. Mittal Luxembourg, , France, and Spain were simply had to accumulate shares on the open acutely aware of the political and socioeconomic market and could do so to a certain degree with- impact of potential job losses and had a vested out Arcelor management’s knowledge. interest in the merger’s outcome. For Luxem- In a final unsuccesful attempt to hold Mit- bourg, Arcelor represented the single largest tal at bay, Arcelor management proposed two national employer. Belgium, and in particular strategic options including a massive share Wallonia, whose industrial heritage had fallen repurchase program in order to return cash to on hard times, employed over 12,000 steelwork- shareholders and the acquisition of , ers. Although France didn’t have an equity stake, a Russian Steel company valued at ˛13 billion. approximately 30 percent of the employees of Ultimately, however, the shareholders were Arcelor worked in that country; further, Spain’s appeased by the sweetened offer of Mittal worth 18 Arcelor plants were also at risk. ˛26.5 billion or ˛40.37 a share. Conclusion 9Danone is a food-product company based in Paris, France, that operates as Dannon in the United States. The company provides a variety of dairy products, bottled water, Steel has played a central role in the eco- and baby foods. In 2005, speculation of a takeover bid by nomic history of the Grand Duchy, and it tells a PepsiCo. led to the legislative intervention of the French government blocking the sale of strategic businesses. 11Free float represents the proportion of a quoted 10The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation company’s shares not held by the company or close affiliates dropped its all-cash bid of $18.5 billon for Unocal in 2005 as (e.g., directors, founding families), allowing prospective suit- a result of a broad political backlash in the United States ors to acquire control of the company without management centered around national security concerns. knowledge.

41 compelling story of Luxembourg’s ability to equals, between young and old, their operations grow from an industrial nation into a premier were complementary, sharing a common foun- international financial hub. For its size, Luxem- dation of growth by merger and acquisition in bourg is one of the most influential and afflu- disparate regions of the world. Their consum- ent countries in the European Union. Though mation stands upon proven experience and helps the Luxembourg steel industry may have waned to explain why ArcelorMittal may well succeed somewhat and has been supplanted by a service where numerous other mergers have failed. economy, the most recent merger reaffirms the Time has tested Luxembourg’s mettle, nation’s prominence and its ability to remain an necessitating leadership and dynamic trans- economic force in this sector. formation. Many challenges are yet to come; Mittal has turned the traditional paradigm while ArcelorMittal dominates the steel indus- of outward FDI from Europe and the West on its try now, its position is far from secure. China head: growing the Mittal outfit from its hum- has shown through its rapid ascendancy to be ble beginnings while acquiring assets around the an economic leviathan and a tremendous mar- globe culminating in the merger of Europe’s ket for Mittal. Yet the emergence of China as a steel champion. ArcelorMittal has certainly set steel exporter will surely challenge Mittal’s dom- the pace for an industry that Mittal envisions inance. In addition to the emergence of China, as being controlled by several global steel com- the company’s acquisition-focused growth strat- panies each with production of more than 100 egy may be a cause for concern, sapping capi- million metric tons annually. The fusion of tal and management time from the core busi- Mittal and Arcelor represents a significant nesses. One thing is for certain, however; if both milestone toward the global consolidation of the Luxembourg and ArcelorMittal are to remain steel industry in which Luxembourg continues competitive, constant innovation will be to play a meaningful role. Termed a merger of required.

42 REFERENCES

Aldrick, Philip. “Arcelor Bid Will Strengthen Europe’s Steel Geroski, Paul. “Competition Policy and National Champi- Industry, Says Mittal.” The London Telegraph. Feb- ons.” Remarks at the Austrian Institute of Economic ruary 28, 2006. Online. www.telegraph.co.uk/money/ Research. March 8, 2005. Online. www.competition- main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/02/28/cnwmittal28. commission.org.uk/our_peop/members/chair_speeches/ xml. Accessed January 5, 2008. pdf/geroski_wifo_vienna_080305.pdf. Accessed March Aldrick, Philip. “Steel Chief on His Mettle to Fight off 13, 2008. Mittal.” The London Telegraph. March 4, 2006. Greenberg, Danna and P.J. Guinan. “Mergers and Acquisi- www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/ tions in Knowledge Enterprises.” Babson Insight. 2006/03/04/ccsteel04.xml. Accessed March 17, 2008. March 19, 2008. Online. www.babsoninsight.com/ “Arbed S.A.” Online. www.fundinguniverse.com/company- contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/631. Accessed March histories/ARBED-SA-Company-History.html. 29, 2008. Accessed March 20, 2008. “Luxembourg: Independent Luxembourg.” Encyclopædia “Arcelor Annual Report 2006.” Online. www.. Britannica Online. Online. www.britannica.com/eb/ com/index.php?lang=1&page=600. Accessed March article-9108474/Luxembourg. Accessed March 16, 13, 2008. 2008. Bailey, Thomas A. The Marshall Plan Summer. Online. Maidment, Paul. “Mittal Sees beyond Arcelor.” Forbes Mag- books.google.com/books?hl=en&id=KByPwUfN_ azine. January 31, 2006. Online. www.forbes.com/ D8C&dq=the+marshall+plan+summer&printsec= 2006/01/31/mittal-arcelor-mergers_cx_pm_ frontcover&source=web&ots=WokGHGfyG3&sig 0131mittal_print.html. Accessed March 17, 2008. =se6EOw6ujVz49KfC1u6R9dkmNgs#PPP1,M1. “Mittalic Magic.” The Economist. February 14, 2008. Online. Accessed March 16, 2008. www.economist.com/people/displaystory.cfm?story_ Chaudhary, Chanakya. “Effects of Consolidation on the id=10688840. March 28, 2008. Global Steel Market: Implications of Cross Border “Mittal Set to Cut Bid If Arcelor Lifts Payout.” The Inter- M&A and Intra-company Trade.” Presentation on national Herald Tribune. March 30, 2006. Online. March 18, 2007. Online. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/29/business/steel.php. 51/57/38680802.pdf. Accessed March 18, 2008. Accessed March 20, 2008. “China Takes a Stake in Rio Tinto.” BBC News: Business. “Thomas, Sidney Gilchrist.” Encyclopædia Britannica February 1, 2008. Online. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ Online. Online. search.eb.com/eb/article-9072175. business/7221710.stm. Accessed February 1, 2008. Accessed March 17, 2008. Eckel, Edwin. Iron Ores, Their Occurrence, Valuation and Thornton, Philip. “Mandelson and India Warn the French Control. Online. books.google.com/books?id= over Mittal.” The London Independent. February 2, bocNAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Iron+ 2006. Online. findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/ Ores,+Their+Occurrence,+Valuation+and+Control. is_20060202/ai_n16055867. Accessed March 17, Accessed March 12, 2008. 2008. Edwards, K.C. “Historical Geography of the Luxembourg “Who Is Arcelor’s White Knight?” The London Telegraph. Iron and Steel Industry: Presidential Address.” Trans- May 25, 2006. Online. www.telegraph.co.uk/money/ actions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers), main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/05/26/umitt126. No. 29, 1961, pp. 1–16. xml&sSheet=/money/2006/05/26/ixcitytop.html. “Economic and Social Portrait of Luxembourg.” STATEC Accessed March 17, 2008. (Service Central de la Statistique et es Etudes The World Factbook: Luxembourg. Online. www.cia.gov. Economiques). Online. www.portrait.public.lu/en/ Accessed March 30, 2008. index.html. Accessed March 17, 2008. “World Steel in Figures 2007.” International Iron and “The European War.” The New York Times Current History. Steel Institute. Online. www.worldsteel.org/pictures/ Vol. 17, 1919. Online. books.google.com/books?hl publicationfiles/WSIF06%20Final.pdf. Accessed Feb- =en&id=m9wLAAAAYAAJ&dq=The+New+York+ ruary 25, 2008. Times+Current+History&printsec=frontcover&source =web&ots=R44YGwFG33&sig=OFRBiQ0EmLai1tT4t 7wImTHu_68#PPP8,M1. Accessed March 17, 2008. “Forging a Steel Giant: Mittal’s Bid for Arcelor.” Online. www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=view feature&language=english&id=1112. Accessed March 29, 2008.

43