The Modern Brazilian Steel Industry
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THE MODERN BRAZILIAN STEEL INDUSTRY By Professor Celso Lafer* *Minister of Foreign Relations Notwithstanding the importance of pioneer initiatives by the first generation of Brazilian industrialists, the foundation and growth of the modern steel industry in Brazil was made, in great part, by the state. Steel symbolized industrialization which, for many decades, was synonymous with progress. The government realized, correctly, that having vast reserves of iron ore, Brazil could aspire to a significant steel industry. And it acted on this belief, creating the industry during the Getúlio Vargas administration and promoting its growth during the decades of 1960 and 1970. The predominantly state model that was necessary at the industry’s inception had some success cases. Without the government’s action in the 1930s and 1940s, Brazil would probably not have developed a robust steel-producing base. During the following decades Brazil positioned itself among the main producers and exporters of steel in the world. The state model came to an end, as happened in other sectors, when the government management crisis brought to the surface unsustainable inefficiencies and weaknesses of the productive segment. During the 1990s the steel sector experienced a great transformation. In three years, between 1991 and 1993, all of the state steel industry was privatized through public bidding, and massive investment began to modernize it. In 1998 alone more funds were invested than the sum of monies invested during the 5-year period 1989-1994. In total, between 1994 and 2000, the new steel mill owners invested US$ 10.2 billion in modernization, upgrading, cost reduction and environmental protection works. I will not dwell on details, but I believe it is important to establish some data that demonstrate the transformation the Brazilian steel industry underwent: - After the consolidation process, of the 34 steel companies that existed in the 1980s, only 12 remain; português (p. 7) español (p. 37) Coleção Temas Brasileiros - A Indústria do Aço < p. 68 > - Inefficient installations were systematically closed; - Approximately 60 percent of the workforce were dismissed – which on the one hand reveals the social cost of that transformation, but on the other shows the high levels of productivity gained. Some results of this transformation are worth mentioning in this analysis. The first of them is that, according to independent international analysts, the Brazilian industry became one of those with the lowest production costs in the world. Another interesting fact is that, since investment was made essentially in modernization and productivity growth, production capacity itself increased very modestly: from 28 million tons in 1989 to 30 million tons in 2000. That, combined with the increase in domestic demand, especially since the Real Plan, created an important inversion in the destination of domestic steel production. Domestic sales became dominant, where sales to the external market had been the rule. Between 60 and 65 percent of the Brazilian steel production is currently targeted to the domestic industrial market. Finally, it is important to note that as a consequence of the distribution of product between domestic and external markets and in part as strategy for gaining entry into global markets, the Brazilian steel industry changed its mix of export products. Semi-manufactured goods became prevalent in the sector’s list of export products, at more than 70 percent in volume, while finished products declined in the export roll (having been largely redirected to the domestic market). Total Brazilian exports, by value, show finished products still in the leading position, but the semi-, last year, amounted to 45 percent of that value. In exports to the U.S., the share of semi-manufactured, as will be seen later, reaches a volume close to 80 percent. We should keep this number in mind, as it will prove important in examining how Brazil is affected by American protectionist measures. This is the status of Brazilian steel at the turn of the millenium: a privatized industry, modern and highly competitive in global terms. Brazil is the eighth largest producer of steel in the world (with production at approximately 28 million tons) and the fifth largest exporter. The numbers for both production and exports have been stable for the last few years, but the trend towards growth in exports of semi-finished goods to large markets, such as the U.S. and the European Union, is strengthening. In that there is a strategic wager on the high level of competitiveness of the Brazilian product and in the growing demand for semi-manufactured goods by the American steel industry, which, in its slow and tumultuous restructuring process, is following a model that requires some mills to abandon the steel-making phase of production – in which they are notoriously inefficient – and, using imported semi- finished, concentrate on value-added product lines. Brazil’s confidence on this trend is such that some Brazilian companies are acquiring mills in the U.S. to operate essentially with semi-manufactured product imported from Brazil. These are the brave steps of an industry in the process of globalization. The Brazilian steel sector “ did its homework” and prepared for global competition, but the same cannot be said of all other big producers of steel. The international steel market is in turmoil. At the root of this crisis are various factors, some structural, others situational. Among the first type of problem is an excess of installed capacity. It is estimated that installed capacity in the whole world is between 1 and 1.1 billion tons, with a current production that, in the year 2000, reached < p. 69 > approximately 850 million tons. If examined separately we will see that the world’s production capacity presents quite distinct situations from country to country. There are those, as Brazil, that have restructured their industries completely in the last ten years and that are competitive. The European Union restructured their industry in depth – by privatizing, mergers and acquisitions, closing old mills and installing a high degree of technological innovation. Today, it is accountable for almost 20 percent of world production. And, it is still working to achieve even more ambitious consolidation goals, as seen in the announced merger of Usinor, Arbed and Aceralia, to form the largest steel company in the world, with a production volume of 45 million tons. Among the structural problems there are those specific to the American steel industry. Despite producing approximately 100 million tons of steel per year, the United States consumes more than it produces and is the main import market for the world. The entry of imported steel into the US market has been marked, in the last three decades, by all manner of obstacles riding on protectionist waves. In the 1980s there were the so-called “ voluntary restraint agreements” , through which exporting countries, Brazil included therein, selfimposed limits on their sales to the American market. In the 1990s, antidumping and countervailing duties, imposed in a highly questionable manner, restricted the access of foreign steel – a situation that persists to this date. There is such a large number of antidumping and countervailing duties imposed by trade protection agencies in the United States that in the year 2001 there was virtually no country in the world that did not have some product subject to a tariff there. It is estimated that 44 percent of all steel products imported by the U.S. last year from non-NAFTA countries were subject to antidumping or countervailing duties against alleged subsidies. The apparent contradiction between the need to import on one side, and the systematic imposition of impediments to imports on the other, lies in the struggle between the more dynamic sectors of the American economy and the political clout of its more traditional steel sector. It is this sector — represented by the integrated mills – that has not been restructured, lost its competitiveness, and continues to resist change, but which is always able to push through Congress and the Executive measure after protectionist measure. The sector’s political mobilization power derives from the industry’s physical concentration in a small number of states and in the strong union participation in these resistance efforts, with important electoral implications. It would be untruthful to say that the American steel industry, as a whole, has not restructured. It is estimated that approximately 50 percent of American steel production, nowadays, is made in so-called “ mini-mills” , modern and efficient. In another segment, that of the re-rollers, which work with imported semimanufactureds (including those from Brazil), there are also high productivity rates. The greatest protectionist resistance, however, comes from the less dynamic segment which is structurally incapable of competing. To this collection of structural elements (excessive installed capacity combined with the continued operation of mills which are outdated in management or technology) a series of conjuncture factors were added in the last few years, which aggravated tensions between production, consumption and trade. The Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998, coupled with the long economic stagnation in The modern Brazilian steel industry Coleção Temas Brasileiros - A Indústria do Aço < p. 70 > Japan, were decisive. The crisis’ impact, in reducing consumption, generated an excess of production that was quickly dumped in the main markets for the products, that is, in Europe and especially in the United States. Data tables for imports of steel into the United States show sharp spikes in those years (1997 and 1998), with massive entry of Russian, Korean and Japanese steel products, for example, at a moment in which the American economy showed signs of vitality and capacity to absorb it. But, if that was the case for the economy as a whole, it was not necessarily so for the less competitive segment of the American steel industry.