DOCSLIB.ORG

Das Verhältnis Von Systematik Und Historie in Ernst Cassirers Philosophie- Und Wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Arbeiten. Untersuchungen Zum Frühen Werk

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Das Verhältnis Von Systematik Und Historie in Ernst Cassirers Philosophie- Und Wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Arbeiten. Untersuchungen Zum Frühen Werk Das Verhältnis von Systematik und Historie in Ernst Cassirers philosophie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Arbeiten. Untersuchungen zum frühen Werk Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie des Fachbereichs A: Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal Vorgelegt von Herbert Kopp-Oberstebrink aus Stuttgart Wuppertal 2014 Die Dissertation kann wie folgt zitiert werden: urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20160212-143755-3 [http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ade%3Ahbz%3A468-20160212-143755-3] Inhaltsverzeichnis Zu Gegenstand und Methode – Einleitung ........................................................................... 4 I Das Leibnizbild in den Jahren der Formation der Marburger Schule 21 Einleitung ................................................................................................................................. 21 1. Hermann Cohen und Friedrich Albert Lange: die Entstehung der „transscendentalen Methode“ aus der Kritik der Geschichte des Materialismus ............ 25 1.1 Von der „psychisch-physischen Organisation“ zum „Factum von Wissenschaften“ ..................................................................................................... 25 1.2 Streitfall Platondeutung – Philosophiegeschichtsdeutung als Medium systematischer Differenzen..................................................................................... 36 2. Natorps Leibniz und der Materialismus (1881) im Verhältnis zu Friedrich Albert Langes Leibniz-Deutung.................................................................................................. 43 2.1 Die unerkannte Lange-Rezeption Natorps in ihrer Wirkung auf die Konjunktur der Leibniz-Interpretation in der Marburger Schule .............................................................. 43 2.2 Langes ambivalentes Leibniz-Portrait – Aufhebung des Materialismus vs. „Poesie der Begriffe“.............................................................................................. 46 2.3 Natorps Leibniz als Antizipation der Kantischen Kritik ....................................... 51 3. Kant – ein Epigone Leibniz’? – Cohens Kritik der Philosophie Leibniz’ im Lichte von Natorps Antrittsvorlesung......................................................................................... 67 Exkurs 1: Paul Natorp und Friedrich Albert Lange – Hinweise auf eine unterdrückte Theoriebeziehung........................................................................................ 79 II Leibniz’ System im Kontext des Marburger Neukantianismus 82 Einleitung ................................................................................................................................. 82 1. Die Entstehung von Leibniz’ System aus dem Schulzusammenhang des Marburger Neukantianismus – die Ausgangskonstellation................................................................ 90 2. Immanente Systematik und Historie in Leibniz’ System (I): Das Verhältnis von Logik, Mathematik und Wissenschaft als Grundlage der Leibniz-Interpretation.......... 103 3. Immanente Systematik und Historie in Leibniz’ System (II): das Akademiegutachten von 1901 und die genetische Konstruktion der Grundbegriffe..... 113 4. Objektivation, Funktion, Relation — Entstehung und Grundbegriffe von Paul Natorps Entwurf zu einem System der ursprünglichen Denkfunktionen von 1900 ...... 127 5. Rekonstruktion des systematischen Zentrums von Leibniz‘ System............................ 148 1 5.1 „Grundtypus des Erkennens” und Prozessualität des Denkens............................ 150 5.2 Begriff und Urteil vs. Denkprozesse .................................................................... 154 5.3 Die Genese logischer Grundfunktionen im synthetischen Verfahren: quantitative und qualitative Prozesse ................................................................... 156 5.4 Relation und Gegenstandsproblematik................................................................. 158 5.5 Relation, Funktion und die Anschauungsproblematik ......................................... 159 5.6 Der Begriff der Substanz in der Spannung zwischen Verdinglichung und Dynamisierung – systematische und historische Aspekte.................................... 162 5.7 Der Kraftbegriff und seine Funktion in der Realitätskonstitution........................ 169 5.8 Rückblick.............................................................................................................. 177 6. Die Priorität der Systematik und ihre Folgen für die Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung in Leibniz‘ System ................................................... 179 6.1 Leibniz oder Kant? – Cassirers Umbesetzung des Originalitätstopos.................. 180 6.2 „Philosophische Geschichte”, Motivgeschichte, Wirkungsgeschichte – Modelle von Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung in Leibniz‘ System und ihre geschichtsphilosophische Basis............................................................................ 188 III „Historisches Faktum“ und Kontinuität der Geschichte – die ersten beiden Bände des Erkenntnisproblems 200 1. Von Leibniz‘ System zu Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff – lebens- und werkgeschichtliche Hinweise zu Genese und Zusammenhang der frühen Arbeiten Cassirers......................................................................................................................... 200 2. Cassirers „Studie” als Vorstufe zum Erkenntnisproblem – Rekonstruktion ihrer Gestalt und Entstehungsbedingungen ............................................................................ 207 3. „Philosophische Geschichte” und mathematische Naturwissenschaft – Hermann Cohens Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung...................................................................... 221 4. Faktum der Wissenschaften und wissenschaftlicher Prozess – Max Schelers Kritik der „transscendentalen Methode” .................................................................................. 241 5. Das „Faktum der Wissenschaft” als sich geschichtlich entwickelndes – Cassirers Antwort auf Schelers Kritik ........................................................................................... 255 6. Hegel in der Einleitung zum Erkenntnisproblem........................................................... 263 6.1 Textbefunde und –strategien in der Einleitung..................................................... 263 6.2 Systematische und historische Voraussetzungen von Cassirers Hegel- Rezeption.............................................................................................................. 265 2 6.3 Denkfunktionen, Bewusstsein und Objektivation der Natur................................ 270 6.4 Das apriori und seine Geschichte ......................................................................... 273 6.5 Hegel mit Droysen lesen – das Postulat der Kontinuität...................................... 275 6.6 Diskontinuitäten in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte vs. Kontinuität der Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung – mit Hegel und Droysen gegen Zeller und Scheler ........................................................................................................... 278 6.7 Resultate und Folgen ............................................................................................ 282 7. Der zweite Teil der Einleitung und die Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung Natorps ...... 284 7.1 Die Kontinuitätsproblematik................................................................................ 286 7.2 Kontinuität und absoluter Anfang – Natorps Programm der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung am Leitfaden einer „philosophia perennis” .... 288 8. Der Zusammenhang von Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff mit der Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems ................................................................................................. 291 9. Die Problematik des Verhältnisses der ersten Auflage der Einleitung ins Erkenntnisproblem (1906) zur zweiten (1911) .............................................................. 301 10. Cassirer als Philosophiehistoriker: Zur Rezeption des Erkenntnisproblems ................. 310 IV Ausblick: Vom Erkenntnisproblem zur Rekontextuierung – Formen der Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichtsschreibung in Cassirers Arbeiten von 1920 bis 1944. 1. Problemgeschichte, Wirkungsgeschichte, Rekontextuierung: zum Methoden- pluralismus in Cassirers später Historiographie der Philosophie und der Wissenschaften............................................................................................................... 316 2. Konstellation und Motivgeschichte – Die nachkantischen Systeme (1919) als Zäsur............................................................................................................................... 321 3. Philosophiegeschichte als offener Interpretationsprozess – die Oxforder Platon- Vorlesung (1935) ........................................................................................................... 326 4. Erkennen, Ereignis, Prozess, Werk – Dimensionen von Geschichte im Göteborger Manuskript Geschichte (1936)....................................................................................... 327 5. Das dreifache Verhältnis historischer und systematischer Rekonstruktion und die Hermeneutik von Frage und Antwort ............................................................................ 330 6. Philologie, Quellengeschichte und Textkritik als Basis historisch-systematischer Rekonstruktion .............................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Weltanschauung, Weltbild, Or Weltauffassung? Stein on the Significance of Husserl’S Way of Looking at the World
    Weltanschauung, Weltbild, or Weltauffassung? Stein on the Significance of Husserl’s Way of Looking at the World George Heffernan Online Conference: Stein’s and Husserl’s Intertwined Itineraries 1916–25: With Focus on Ideas II In Cooperation with the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists University of Paderborn May 20–21, 2021 Abstract In her doctoral dissertation, Zum Problem der Einfühlung (1916), Stein attempted to complement Husserl’s work on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity by providing a description of empathy and its key role in the mutual constitution of whole persons. Because he thought that her work anticipated certain ideas from the second part of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Husserl demurred at publishing it in his Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. He did, however, engage Stein as his private assistant, and as such she helped him edit, between 1916 and 1918, his Ideas II. In the process, Stein’s interventions may have introduced views different from and possibly foreign to Husserl’s, and the new Husserliana edition of Ideas IV/V (2021) aims to sort things out. This paper seeks to contextualize the debate about the philosophical relationship between Stein and Husserl between 1916 and 1925 by drawing on two other sets of texts: (1) Stein’s several contributions to understanding Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology from 1924 to 1937, for example, “Die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie” (1930/31); and (2) Husserl’s “Fichte Lectures” (1917/18), his “Kaizo Articles” (1922–24), and his “Reflections on Ethics from the Freiburg Years” (1916–37).
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophical Origins of Demythologizing
    CHAPTER TWO THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF DEMYTHOLOGIZING: MARBURG NEO-KANTIANISM In the history of modern philosophy, Neo-Kantianism does not occupy a particularly significant role. 1 It most often appears as a transitional movement between nineteenth-century Kantian philos­ ophy and the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. 2 As an historical phenomenon, Neo-Kantianism is sufficiently vague so that there is no clear agreement concerning the precise meaning of the term. M. Bochenski, for example, uses the term 'Neo-Kantian' to designate at least seven distinct schools of thought, including the materialist Hermann Helmholtz and the Neo-Hegelian Johannes Volkelt. 3 In its more technical, and frequent, usage however, the term is reserved for application to the two schools of Neo-Kantian­ ism in Germany at the turn of the century: the Marburg School and the Baden School. 4 The distinction between these two forms of Neo-Kantian philosophy is fundamental. While the Marburg School takes as its point of departure the exact sciences, more specifically pure mathematics and mathematical physics, the Baden School developed out of a concern with the social and historical siences. 5 1 For brief but helpful introductions to the central tenets of Neo-Kantian philosophy in the history of philosophy, see: a) W. Tudor Jones, Contemporary Thought of Germany (2 Vols.; London: Williams & Northgate Ltd., 1930), II, 30-75; b) John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (4 Vols.; Edinburgh: William Blanshard & Son, 1914); c) August Messer, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1920), pp. l00 ff. 2 The significance of the writings of Paul Natorp for Husserl and Heidegger has been recognized, but, as yet, has not been systematically explored: J.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction: Towards a Reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-03257-6 - New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism Edited by Nicolas De Warren and Andrea Staiti Excerpt More information Introduction: towards a reconsideration of Neo-Kantianism Nicolas de Warren and Andrea Staiti In the summer of 1914, T. S. Eliot arrived in Marburg from Harvard University to attend a summer course in philosophy before taking up residency at Merton College, Oxford, for a year of study with Harold Joachim, F. H. Bradley’s successor. At the University of Marburg, Eliot met Paul Natorp, who assisted him in finding affordable accommodation and lectured in his course on philosophy. The outbreak of the First World War would cut short Eliot’s stay in Marburg, but not before he had the chance to sketch a portrait of the venerable Neo-Kantian Professor. Natorp strikes a professorial pose, one arm tucked behind his back, the other slung across his waist. With elven ears and bald cranium, the philosopher appears endearing in his otherworldliness. Natorp’s face is hidden behind oval glasses, so large that they seem to constitute a hindrance rather than an aid to seeing reality. Eliot’s sketch can be seen as a visual epitome for how Neo-Kantianism appeared to a younger generation of intellectuals and philosophers who would come of age in the aftermath of a Europe laid waste through the cataclysm of the Great War. Eliot’s amusing sketch is an apt illustration for what Hans-Georg Gadamer, who wrote his PhD dissertation on Plato under Natorp in 1922, characterized as the Neo-Kantian “calm and 1 confident aloofness” engrossed in “complacent system-building.” With slightly more bite, Hannah Arendt charged Neo-Kantianism with drown- ing philosophy “in a sea of boredom,” thereby offering a softer version of the same hostility that spirited Martin Heidegger’s confrontation with 2 Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929.
    [Show full text]
  • My Own Life[1]
    My Own Life[1] Dorion Cairns I was born July 4th, 1901, in the village of Contoocook, in the town of Hopkinton, New Hampshire. My father, James George Cairns, was the pastor of the Methodist Church in Contoocook, and I was the first child of my parents. During my first three and a half years of life, my father moved from one place to another as pastor of Methodist Churches in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. My brother, Stewart Scott Cairns, currently Professor of Mathematics at the University of Illinois, was born May 8th, 1904. My father felt that there was no future for a young minister in New England, and he decided to move his family—which consisted of my mother, my brother and me—to California. He shipped all of our family goods, all of our furniture and things, to California on the very day of the San Francisco Earthquake, or “Fire,” as they like to call it in San Francisco. The California Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church at that time controlled what was called the “Utah Mission.” This was a mission to Mormon Territory, needless to say. My father, since there were so many people of longer standing in the California Conference who had no churches left owing to the earthquake, was given a church in Utah Mission, in Salt Lake City itself. It was there in 1907 that my sister Mary, who is the wife of James Wilkinson Miller, currently Professor of Philosophy at McGill University in Montreal, was born. When they wanted to transfer my father from this little church in Salt Lake City to a church or mission in Provo, Utah, my father went and looked at the set-up in Provo, and he came back, and it was the first time I had seen a grown man cry.
    [Show full text]
  • Marburg Neo-Kantianism As Philosophy of Culture
    SamanthaMatherne (Santa Cruz) Marburg Neo-Kantianism as Philosophy of Culture 1Introduction Although Ernst Cassirer is correctlyregarded as one of the foremost figures in the Neo-Kantian movement thatdominated Germanyfrom 1870 – 1920,specifying ex- actlywhat his Neo-Kantianism amountstocan be achallenge. Not onlymustwe clarify what his commitments are as amember of the so-called MarburgSchool of Neo-Kantianism, but also giventhe shift between his earlyphilosophyof mathematics and naturalscience to his later philosophyofculture, we must con- sider to what extent he remained aMarburgNeo-Kantian throughout his career. With regard to the first task, it is typical to approach the MarburgSchool, which was foundedbyHermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, by wayofacontrast with the otherdominant school of Neo-Kantianism, the Southwest or Baden School, founded by Wilhelm Windelband and carried forward by Heinrich Rick- ert and Emil Lask. The going assumption is that these two schools were ‘rivals’ in the sense that the MarburgSchool focused exclusively on developing aKantian approach to mathematical natural sciences(Naturwissenschaften), while the Southwest School privileged issues relatingtonormativity and value, hence their primary focus on the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). If one accepts this ‘scientist’ interpretation of the MarburgSchool, one is tempted to read Cas- sirer’searlywork on mathematicsand natural science as orthodoxMarburgNeo- Kantianism and to then regardhis laterwork on the philosophyofculture as a break from his predecessors, veeringcloser
    [Show full text]
  • Hermann Cohen's History and Philosophy of Science"
    "Hermann Cohen's History and Philosophy of Science" Lydia Patton Department of Philosophy McGill University, Montreal October, 2004 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree ofPh.D. © Lydia Patton 2004 Library and Bibliothèque et 1+1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de l'édition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada Your file Votre référence ISBN: 0-494-06335-1 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 0-494-06335-1 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans loan, distribute and sell th es es le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, électronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Contributions to Phenomenology in Cooperation with the Center For
    Contributions To Phenomenology In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology Volume 100 Series Editors Nicolas de Warren, Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA Ted Toadvine, Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA Editorial Board Lilian Alweiss, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USA Rudolf Bernet, Husserl Archive, KU Leuven, Belgium David Carr, Emory University, GA, USA Chan-Fai Cheung, Chinese University Hong Kong, China James Dodd, New School University, NY, USA Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University, FL, USA Alfredo Ferrarin, Università di Pisa, Italy Burt Hopkins, University of Lille, France José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University Hong Kong, China Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Korea Rosemary R.P. Lerner, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Peru Dieter Lohmar, University of Cologne, Germany William R. McKenna, Miami University, OH, USA Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, OH, USA J.N. Mohanty, Temple University, PA, USA Junichi Murata, University of Tokyo, Japan Thomas Nenon, The University of Memphis, TN, USA Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Germany Gail Soffer, Rome, Italy Anthony Steinbock, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, IL, USA Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Japan Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University, TN, USA Scope The purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published more than 80 titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembrances of Martin Heidegger in Marburg
    (Originally Published in Philosophy Today, Swnmer 1979, Pages 160-169) (© 1979 by the Messenger Press. Reprinted by Permission) REMEMBRANCES OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER IN MARBURG elisabeth hirsch According to Heidegger's own bered houses and the castle on a hill, words the years of his teaching career Marburg exuded a romantic· atmos­ he enjoyed most were those in Marburg phere. In addition, in a few minutes from 1923-1928. These were also the one was deep in nature and so Hei­ best years of the Weimar Republic. The degger could enjoy his customary af­ German mark was stabilized, the econ­ ternoon walks. If one was lucky to omy greatly improved and the cultural meet him, he would always stop for life reached a high point. Dance, music, a short talk. theater, the visual arts and poetry Today Marburg has 1;),000 students flourished as never before and created and half of them are Communists. But an atmosphere of excitement among when Heidegger was there, Marburg young people. And the immensely pro­ had only 3,000 students; their contact ductive intellectual and artistic actiY­ with thl' professors was close. Marburg ity did not fail to have an impact on was rather notorious for hE'r many the academic community. The French dueling fraternities; the students be­ writer Paul Duhamel was greatly im­ lansing to them were mostly conserva­ pressed by the German universities. In tiYes in politics. In opposition to them a lecture he delivered at Marburg Uni­ the liberal students founded the aca­ versity he remarked: "There are said demic association; if my memory is to be seven world wonders but the Ger­ correct, Heidegger attended some of man universities must be added as the its meetings.
    [Show full text]
  • Immanuel Kant and the Pragmatic Turn of Science Through the Prism of Sergei Bulgakov’S Metaphysics
    ISSN 2083-1978 2(11)/2020 e-ISSN 2391-775X http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2020.011 Natalia Danilkina Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russian Federation e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-3954-3806 Immanuel Kant and the Pragmatic Turn of Science Through the Prism of Sergei Bulgakov’s Metaphysics In 1925, giving his lectures at the University of Marburg, Martin Heidegger mentioned two distinctive features of the philosophical renewal, which took place in the second half of the 19th century. First of them was a “tendency to grant the particular sciences their independent right and at the same time to secure for philosophy its own field in relation to these sciences”.1 This led to the transformation of philosophy itself into a theory of science or a logic of the sciences. The second feature was a turn back to a “historically established philosophy, that of Kant”.2 In Russia, similar traits were observed by Sergei Bulgakov at the turn of the 20th century. In 1912, he metaphorically called the philosophical criticism the “Chinese dragon” standing in splendour on the portal of philosophical 1 Martin Heidegger, History of the concept of time. Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of History and Nature, transl. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univer- sity Press, 1992), 13. 2 Ibidem. 33 NATALIA DANILKINA academia.3 In “The Philosophy of Economics”, Bulgakov entered a dispute with his critical interlocutors Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rick- ert and Immanuel Kant. Contrary to the tendency to formalise philosophy, he advanced a metaphysical view on both, philosophy and science.
    [Show full text]
  • Professor Alan Kim's CV
    ALAN KIM Dept. of Philosophy Stony Brook University Stony Brook, NY 11794 [email protected] Appointments 2019-present Associate Professor of Philosophy, Stony Brook University 2013-2019 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stony Brook University 2011-2013 Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Dartmouth College 2008-2011 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Colgate University 2007-2008 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Hamilton College 2000-2007 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Memphis Education 1993-2001 Ph.D. in Philosophy (Dean’s Honor List), McGill University 1986-1990 B.A. in Philosophy (Departmental Honors), Haverford College 1998-2000 Fulbright Fellow, University of Heidelberg 1990-1991 Doctoral Student (East Asian Languages & Literatures), UCLA Dissertation “Original Fracture: Plato in the Philosophies of Paul Natorp and Martin Heidegger” Directors: Stephen Menn, Philip Buckley Areas of Specialization Ancient Philosophy, esp. Plato and Aristotle German Philosophy, esp. Kant, neo-Kantianism, Husserl, Heidegger Areas of Competence Existentialism, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Literature, Classical Chinese Thought, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Psychology Awards Fulbright Full Grant & seven-month renewal, Heidelberg, Germany (1998-2000) Stony Brook University AHLSS Faculty Research Award (2018) Colgate University Research Council Publication Grant (2009-10) Colgate University Research Council Discretionary Grant (2009-10) McGill University Dean’s Honor List (2001) KIM: 2/10 J.W. McConnell McGill Major Research Fellowship (1997) Gordon H. Eberts McGill Major Research Fellowship (1996) Publications Books • Selves in Dialogue: Authenticity, Autonomy, and the Socratic Art of Living. [Under contract with SUNY Press] • The Brill Companion to German Platonism. xii, 388 pp. Volume editor. Brill Publishing, Leiden, Netherlands (2019) The fourteen contributors include such leading scholars as Manfred Baum, Richard Bett, Francisco Gonzalez, André Laks, François Renaud, and Thomas Szlezák.
    [Show full text]
  • Editor's Introduction to the Neo-Kantian Reader Sebastian Luft Marquette University, [email protected]
    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of 5-1-2015 Editor's Introduction to The Neo-Kantian Reader Sebastian Luft Marquette University, [email protected] Published version. "Editor's Introduction to The eN o-Kantian Reader," in The Neo-Kantian Reader. Ed. Sebastian Luft. eN w York City, NY: Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2015: xx-xxxi. Publisher Link. © 2015 Taylor & Francis (Routledge). Used with permission. · . Editor's Introduction HE NEO-KANTlAN READER aims to make accessi ble to the English-speaking reader a Trepre sentative selection of translations of primary readings of the Neo-Kanlian tradition/ which is without a doubt the most broadly influential movement of European philosophy between approximately 1850 and 1918. 1 The Neo-Kantian Movement was inspired by the battle cry " back to Kant/' mainly to counter scie ntific positivism and weltanschaulicli materialism in the mid-nineteenth century. 80th tendencies had entered the cu ltural mainstream and seemed to suggest an abolit ion of phi losophy altogether and a general decline of culture and its va lues. ' Coming after the so-called co llapse of German Idealism and on the heels of the rampant scienlism, the Neo-Kantians wanted to revive the spirit of Kant by going back to Kant. Going back to Kant, however, meant \\going beyond " him. Going beyond the founder of the critical method was motivated by the scien tific and soci a-political developments of the present, which necessitated, in turn, an updating of Kant's original position in the light of these nove l develop~ents.
    [Show full text]
  • Heidegger's Greeks
    Heidegger’s Greeks GLENN W. MOST Martin heidegger frequently refers in his writings to the Greeks, more so perhaps than any other major philosopher since Nietzsche. These references take one or the other of two forms. On the one hand, Heidegger often names specific ancient Greek individuals whom the in- formed reader can identify without difficulty as more or less well-known, attested ancient Greek authors, to whose trans- mitted works, or at least certain parts thereof, he is alluding. This fact raises a first set of questions: which Greeks does Heidegger name by preference, and why these ones, and why not others? On the other hand, he also tends to refer to a group of nameless and non-individualized people whom he calls, simply, “the Greeks.” In some of his texts, and espe- cially in certain parts of these, such references cease to be merely scattered and punctual, and assume instead a pecu- liar density and consistency. For example, within a few pages in his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes, “Im Zeitalter der ersten und maßgebenden Entfaltung der abendländischen Philosophie bei den Griechen, durch die das Fragen nach dem Seienden als solchem im Ganzen seinen wahrhaften Anfang nahm, nannte man das Seiende fuvsi~” (“In the age of the first and authoritative develop- ment of Western philosophy among the Greeks, through which the question of what is as such as a whole had its true beginning, what is was named fusi~v ,” GA 40.15),1 or again, “Die Griechen haben nicht erst an den Naturvorgängen er- fahren, was fuvsi~ ist .
    [Show full text]