White House Staff Versus the Cabinet: Centripetal And

Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics Author(s): Alexander Wendt Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:10

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http://www.jstor.org White House StaffVersus the Cabinet: Centripetaland CentrifugalRoles

JAMES P. PFIFFNER AssociateProfessor ofPolitical Science GeorgeMason University

The firsttask of any new administrationmust be the organizationof the White House and the establishmentof the role the cabinetwill play.1If thesecentral issues are not settled,the Presidentwill have trouble pursuing any of his political or governmentalpriorities. And if thereare problemswithin or between these two centralinstitutions in an administration,much valuable time can be lost until the tensionsare settled. The early months of an administrationare particularlycrucial to a new presidentbecause theyprovide a narrowwindow of opportunityto accom- plish his goals. If thepresident does not designateearly who will be firstamong his White House staff,it is an invitationto struggle; for much is at stake. The President'sprogram will necessarilywait while the battle forwho is in charge is settled.The Carter ad- ministrationlost a lot of time while the relativepositions of Hamilton Jordanand JackWatson were established. This strugglehelped to negatesome of theother elaborate preparationsthe administrationhad undertakenduring the transition.Time was also lost and energymisspent in the Ford and the Carterpresidencies while each president experimentedwith a "spokes of the wheel" model of White House organizationand refusedto designatea chief of staff. Presidentsmust also set early ground rules for the role that cabinet members will play in the administrationand the appropriaterelationship between the White House staffand the Cabinet. It must be clear what is and is not delegated before cabinet secretariesget establishedin theirdepartments. If this is not done it will be verydifficult to call presumeddelegations back in. PresidentsNixon and Carterboth feltthat theyhad delegatedtoo much to theircabinet secretariespersonnel selection. Both administrationslater found this to be an expensivemistake when theyfinally resortedto firingand replacingseveral cabinet membersin order to regain control, Nixon afterthe 1972 election and Carter in the summerof 1979. This articlewill examineissues involvedin the organizationof the White House and its relationshipwith the Cabinet. It will pointout some lessonsthat can be learned fromrecent presidencies.

666 WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 667

Organizingthe White House Presidentschoose their White House staffsprimarily from those who have workedwith them on theircampaigns for very good reasons.Those who haveworked closelywith the new presidenton thecampaign understand best the personality and valuesof thepresident. More importantly, the president has confidencein thejudg- mentof thepeople who haveweathered the storms of campaigningwith him and, accordingto JohnEhrlichman, "The president'sconfidence is theonly qualification forworking in theWhite House."2 In addition,"you use your own campaignorgani- zationbecause people know each other"and are used to workingtogether.3 This naturalchoice of campaignaides, however, may lead to problems,because the natureof governingis substantiallydifferent from the natureof politicalcam- paigns.Bradley Patterson, with fourteen years working experience in theWhite House, arguesthat "The virtuesneeded in thecrucible of a campaign-arealmost the opposite of the preparationneeded for life within the White House."4 In a politicalcampaign issues must be simplifiedand differencesaccentuated; in theWhite House issuestake on "infiniteshades of grey." Simplification will nothelp thepresident deal withthe tough issues. In a campaignpeople are either for you or againstyou, and thelatter are seen as theenemy. But in theWhite House coalitions mustbe builtto gain supportfor the president'sprograms, and the countrymust be unitedbehind the administration.In a campaignpublicity is avidlysought; ex- posureof the candidateand his staffcontributes to makingthe maximumimpact on voters'minds. In theWhite House, however,the staffmust have that "passion foranonymity" ofwhich Louis Brownlow spoke. A highpublic profile for staff members decreasesthe President'svisibility and is no serviceto him. Pattersonasks: "Can a hard-driving,fast-moving bunch of egotists be so metamorphosedbetween November 5 andJanuary 20?" His answeris "Perhaps."5 Becauseof the typesof peoplewho are successfulin gettingappointments to theWhite House staffand because of the type of atmosphere that exists at thehighest levelsof power, the best in peopleis notalways brought out. Thereis theopportunity forgreatness, but also forthe abuse of power. In hisbook on presidentialstaffs from Rooseveltthrough Johnson, Patrick Anderson describes White House staffmembers: "Theytend to be young,highly intelligent, and unashamedly on themake. They take chances,they cut corners,and unlikemost politicians they sometimes have a little spontaneityand irreverence left in them.This accountsfor much of theircharm and mostof theirproblems."6 The combinationof personality types in thepresence of great power and pressure to achieveshort term political goals combineto makethe White House a peculiar cauldronfrought with dangeras well as opportunity."Policy differences, piled on topof personality clashes, multiplied by the time pressures, and heated by sometimes vindictivenews leaks, can add up to an incandescentplasma of high-voltage conflict."7 Withthe particular personality types likely to be in theWhite House andthe pressure filledatmosphere, organizational issues take on extraordinaryimportance. 668 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Eisenhower and Kennedy Models Contrasted The two mainmodels of White House organizationin thecontemporary presidencyare the Eisenhower and theRoosevelt-Kennedy models. Recent presidents haveseemed to wantto imitatePresident Eisenhower's system of cabinet organization butnot necessarily his White House organization.Eisenhower's participation in staff advisorysystems in the militaryled him to the conclusionthat the White House mustbe organizedmuch more formally than Truman and Roosevelthad organized theirs.While good organizationwould not guarantee good advice,according to Eisen- howerit would enhancethe likelihood of efficiency."Organization cannot make a geniusout of an incompetent.On theother hand, disorganization can scarcelyfail to resultin inefficiency."8Eisenhower insisted that as manyissues as possiblebe settled belowthe Presidential level and thatissues be presentedfor his consideration on one page memoranda. The drivingforce behind the Eisenhower White House staffsystem was Sherman Adamswho cameto dominatethe White House withan ironhand. Adams said that hisjob was "to managea staffthat would boil down,simplify and expedite the urgent businessthat had to be broughtto Eisenhower'spersonal attention and to keepas muchwork of secondaryimportance as possibleoff his desk."9He controlledwho saw thePresident, and mostcabinet officers reported to thePresident through him. He seemedto dominateWhite House policyso thoroughlythat one newspaperran a storyheadline declaring: "Adams Insists Ike is ReallyPresident."10 One ofthe useful functions Adams performed was to absorbflack when the presidentmade an unpopulardecision on a minormatter. Adams could be seen as the "abominableno man" or the one who deniedaccess to the president.This helped maintainEisenhower's image as a benevolentleader not concernedwith petty politics.11On theother hand a chiefof staffwith tight control of access to thePresident canisolate the President from diverse points of view and keep him from seeing people whom he oughtto see. Greensteinargues that this was not the case with Adams andEisenhower, though the issue was raised later with regard to theNixon presidency. WhenJohn Kennedy was electedhe was stronglyurged by his advisors to reject the Eisenhowermodel of White House organizationand to adopt a systemcloser to thatof FranklinRoosevelt. In his memorandum,"Staffing the President-Elect," RichardNeustadt described the typeof organizationKennedy might adopt: You would be yourown "chiefof staff . . . For ifyou followmy advice you will commityourself not to eachdetail öf Rooseveltianpractice . . . but to the spiritof his presidentialoperation; whereby you would oversee,coordinate, and interferewith virtually everything your staff was doing.A collégialstaff has to be managed;competition has to be audited.12 ClarkClifford also urged Kennedy to rejectthe Eisenhower model with its dom- inantchief of staff.13 In a memorandumto Kennedyhe argued:"A vigorousPresident in theDemocratic tradition of thePresidency will probablyfind it bestto act as his own chiefof staff,and to haveno highlyvisible majordomo standing between him and his staff,(and, incidently, between him and thepublic). It is importantthat all WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 669 the seniorprofessional persons on the staffshould have access to thePresident, and the staffshould consist of no morepersons than can convenientlyhave such access on a day-to-daybasis."14 Kennedyfollowed the advice of Cliffordand Neustadtand rana looselystruc- turedWhite House withseveral senior aides having access to thepresident. Although TheodoreSorensen was hisprinciple advisor, he neverbecame the keeper of thegate thatAdams was forEisenhower or Haldemanwas forNixon. Kennedy's White House Operationalso contrastedwith Eisenhower'swith respectto the delegationof au- thorityto the cabinet. LyndonJohnson continued the Kennedymodel of usinga fluid,unstructured WhiteHouse staff.While Kennedy, like Roosevelt, dominated the White House staff withhis intelligence and choice of which assignments to dole out to whom;Johnson carriedhis personal domination of White House staffmembers to extremes.Jack Valenti recallshow Johnsontreated his staff. He brutalizedthem, always tried to shovespoonfuls of humilitythrough their clenchedteeth. He nevernamed any of his aides to be chiefof staff.He kept someaides unenlightened as to histhinking even as he instructedothers in several directionsat the sametime. ... He once said: "If anyoneis going to makea big-assblunder around here, I wantit to be me and not some assistantto me who thinkshe is runningthe country." He madesure everyone knew the source oftheir power: "Now youvery important guys ought to keepone thingin mind. The folkstonight who tellyou how smartyou are and how charmingyou are don'tgive a pig'sass aboutyou personally. They think you can get to me. They also knowyou won't be aroundthis Oval Officeone secondlonger than me."15 The lackof structure inJohnson's White House andJohnson's style of dominating hisstaff led PatrickAnderson to entitlea sectionof his chapter on theJohnson White House Staff"Caligula's Court."16 The WhiteHouse underJohnson was so unstruc- turedthat when a new aide reportedfor duty and askedfor an organizationchart he was toldby an amusedcareer official who hadbeen in theWhite House forthirty years:"We don'thave any organization chart at theWhite House becausewe don't haveany organization."17

Nixon'sWhite House In contrastto theKennedy and Johnson loosely structured styles, President Nixonbegan his administrationwith a clearcut WhiteHouse organization.While staffmembers would change, the lynchpin of the organization, H.R. Haldeman,main- tainedthe same tight control over the White House. Accordingto Haldeman"You've got to establisha clearcut organizationalstructure" in orderto keepstaff rivalries and competitionfor the President's ear fromdominating the policy process. "We all knewwhere we fit.There were five of us thatwere equal, but as BryceHarlow said: therewas a firstamong equals, and it was clearlyme. Nobodyquestioned it. I never assertedit; I neverargued it. I neverhad to."18 While otherssaw Haldemanas a barrierbetween them and the presidentand 670 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

suspectedthat the White House staffwas arrogatingmuch power to itself;Haldeman saw his role as merelyacting at the directionof the President."If I told someone to do something,he knewit wasn'tme- he knewexactly what it was; it was an orderfrom the President. They knew an appealwouldn't get anywhere."19 According to thisview every President needs someone who will makethe tough decisions about protectingthe President's time and who will shieldthe president from having to make unpleasantface-to-face decisions about personnel.Haldeman characterized himself: "EveryPresident needs a son of a bitch,and I'm Nixon's.I'm hisbuffer and I'm his bastard.I get done what he wantsdone and I takethe heat insteadof him."20 One of theassets of a closestaff aide thatis almostan alterego to thepresident is thathe can weighwhat thepresident says and discountit if in hisjudgment the Presidentmade a poordecision out ofpique. Haldeman often stalled and did notim- plementpetty or vindictive orders until Nixon had cooled down.21 Nixon also counted on Haldemanto protecthis timeand shieldhim fromunnecessary demands. This was a valuableservice in thatit drewflack from dissappointed seekers of appointments fromthe Presidentto Haldeman. The reactionin thecountry to the Watergatescandals was so strongthat the nexttwo Presidentsfelt a needto distancethemselves and theiradministrations from theNixon legacy. This led Presidents Ford and Carter to begin their terms with promises of openaccess to thePresident and a spokesof thewheel structure of WhiteHouse organization.Each was forcedto admitfailure after a periodof attemptingto run the White House withouta chiefof staff.

The Ford and Carter Reactions Upon succeedingto thePresidency after Nixon's resignation, President Ford took painsto distinguishhis administrationfrom Nixon's.22 He spokeof a return to "cabinetgovernment" and an openpresidency that would not have a powerfulWhite House staffstanding between the President and his advisorsor cabinetmembers. "A Watergatewas madepossible by a strongchief of staffand ambitiousWhite House aideswho weremore powerful than members of theCabinet but who had littleor no practicalexperience in judgement.I wantedto reversethe trend.. . ."23 Thus Fordbegan his administration with nine people reporting to himand with theintention of running his White House withouta chiefof staffwho mightevoke thespecter of H.R. Haldeman.But in orderto lendsome sort of coherence to a White House staffof over 500 people,Ford designated Donald Rumsfeldto be "StaffCoordi- nator."And afterseveral months in officeeven Ford had to admitthat something akinto a chiefof staff was necessaryin orderto runthe White House. Fordexplained: "Someone,I decided,had to be responsiblefor scheduling appointments, coordinating thepaper flow, following up on decisionsI had madeand givingme statusreports on projectsand policydevelopment. I didn't like the idea of callingthis person chief of staff,but thatwas the role he would fill."24 In the Winterof 1975 Fordappointed Rumsfeld to be Secretaryof Defenseand his deputyRichard Cheney took overas Ford'schief of staff.Cheney perceived his role as chiefof staffto be to imposeorder on presidentialadvice, but to do it in a WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 671 low keymanner that kept himself out ofthe spotlight and in thebackground. Cheney viewedhimself as an honestbroker who saw to it thatall viewswere presented to thePresident. This had to be apparentto Cabinetmembers and the rest of the White House staffin orderto preventthem from trying to establishback channelsto the Presidentin orderto get theirown viewsheard. "It is importantthat the rest of the troopsfeel that we willhonestly present their position to thepresident."25 But Cheney concludedfrom his experiencein the White House thatthe Rooseveltsystem will no longerwork: "Somebodyhas to be in charge."26 At a WhiteHouse staff party Cheney was presented with a bicyclewheel mounted on a largeboard with all of thespokes of thewheel mangled and tangledexcept for one whichwas theonly thing holding the structure together. A plaquemounted on theboard read: "The spokesof the wheel: a rarefrom of management artistry as con- ceivedby Don Rumsfeldand modified by Dick Cheney."When theFord administra- tionleft office on January 20, 1977Cheney left the present on hisdesk and appended a note reading"Dear Ham, bewarethe spokesof the wheel."27 WhenJimmy Carter came to officehe did not heedCheney's warning. Carter, likeFord, was reactingto Watergateand the Nixon Presidency and promised Cabinet Governmentwith no powerfulWhite House staff."I believein Cabinetadministra- tionof our government.There will neverbe an instancewhile I am Presidentwhen themembers of theWhite House staffdominate or act in a superiorposition to the membersof our cabinet."28 Carteralso startedout with nine advisorsreporting to him,and he intended to be his own chiefof staff.This came naturallyfor Carter who pridedhimself as a good managerand who enjoyed(or was obsessedwith) the detailsof policyand management.This led to a situationin whichit was difficultin theexecutive branch to determinewho was in charge,and fromthe perspective of Congressit was not clearwho werethe key actors and decision makers in theWhite House. The situation was also aggravatedby thetransition conflict between the Watson and Jordan staffs. Valuabletime was lost in waitingfor the disputeto be resolved;and whileJordan was unquestionablythe winner, Carter refused to givehim unambiguous authority overthe White House staff. Cartertolerated the lack of anyformal chief of staffuntil July of 1979 when he finallyadmitted the obvious need and officially appointed Jordan to thepost. Later, whenJordan moved to workon the1980 campaign, Jack Watson took over the title. In retrospectboth Jack Watson and StuartEizenstat have concluded that it is impor- tantto haveone personin chargeof the White House staff.29

The Reagan White House The Reagan administrationcame to officewith the consciousintention of avoidingthe mistakes they thought that President Carter had made.One of the waysthey did thiswas thatEdwin Meese,who had run the transitionwas put in chargeof policy, the cabinet and national security. But Meesewas notthe president's onlytop staff aide. He sharedhis primacy with Michael Deaver and James Baker. Thus 672 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Reagan's White House was organized in a modifiedspokes of the wheel and chief of staffsystem.30 On November 17, 1980 Meese and Baker came to an agreementon the division of dutiesbetween them and, as befitstwo lawyers,wrote it down in a memorandum that was initialedby each. Meese would have Cabinet rank while Baker would not. Meese would coordinatethe work of the Domestic PolicyStaff and the National Secu- rityCouncil staff.Baker got the traditionaloffice of the chief of staffand control of the paperflow to the Presidentand hiringand firingauthority in the White House staff." This division of labor, though it was not immediatelyobvious, was loaded in favorof Baker. Meese would have responsibilityfor the long term Reagan agenda and Baker would dominateday to day operations.It is a predictablerule that in the White House day-to-dayfire fighting drives out longer range (six monthsor longer) planning. Baker's control of operations,paper flow, and personnelwould give him the upper hand. Michael Deaver, who was personallyclosest to the President,ran his scheduling, travel,support services,and the FirstLady's office.Deaver was not particularlyin- terestedin issues or policy,but saw himselfas the stewardof the presidentialimage and protectorof the president'stime.32 The White House organizationof dominationby Troika(or Quadrumviratewhen Clark was there) seemed to work verywell for the firstpart of the administration. The firstyear victories seemed to be engineeredquite well by the functionalseparation of duties among the threetop advisors.They all had directaccess to the President, and theycoordinated their work with daily meetings and a minimum of friction. In late 1983, however,reports began to surfacethat some of the traditionalproblems of lack of monocratichierarchy were being felt. The problemsstemmed from the factthat no one staffmember was clearlyin charge and the presidentwas not closely enough engaged in policy making and administrationto settle disputes quickly. One White House officialwho had served other presidentssaid: "I've neverworked in an organizationlike this. There is no one personto give orders,except the President.This lends itselfto jockeyingfor position and not lettinganyone else get too far ahead."33Despite these scatteredcom- plaints,the triumyejratecontinued to dominate the White House throughoutPresi- dent Reagan's firstterm. In the secondterm Baker moved out of the White House to takeover the Treasury while TreasurySecretary Donald Regan came to the White House to be chiefof staff. With Meese at the head of the JusticeDepartment, Regan proceeded to centralize controlof the White House in himself.The processwas facilitatedby the departure of firstterm Reagan advisorsMax Friedersdorfand Ed Rollins,as well as OMB Director David Stockman.The experimentwith the troikawas abandonedto revertto a system with the strongestchief of staffsince H.R. Haldeman and ShermanAdams. Regan's control over the Reagan White House might even exceed that of these two strong predecessors. WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 673

The Holy Grail of "True" CabinetGovernment Everypresident since Lyndon Johnson has come to officepromising to give his cabineta largevoice in therunning of thegovernment. President Nixon began hisadministration by givinghis department secretaries broad leeway in personneland policy,but endedup drawingtight control into the White House. PresidentFord promisedto abandonthe domination by a strongWhite House staffand guaranteed personalaccess to hiscabinet secretaries. President Carter promised true cabinet government,but in theend felt he had givenaway too muchpower to thecabinet and tried to takeit back in the summerof 1979. PresidentReagan promised cabinet govern- mentand developeda systemof cabinetcouncils that was used in innovativeways to coordinanteadministration policy.34 Thereis a majortug ofwar in everyadministration (between the cabinet secretariesand theWhite House staff)over control of administrationpolicy. There is no way to avoida strongWhite House staffin the modernpresidency; the challenge is to see thatit does not overwhelmthe legitimateprerogatives of the cabinet. The modelof CabinetGovernment that recent presidents hark back to is the Eisenhoweradministration, not thatall agreewith all aspectsof his approach;but Eisenhower'scabinet played a significantrole in his administrationwithout major conflictswith the White House. This section will examine the dynamics of the cabinet- White House interactionin recentpresidencies. It will beginfirst with an analysis of thecentrifugal forces that operate on cabinetmembers that are the constant con- cernof White House aides. Cabinetselection processes and criteria guarantee that members will not be chosen onlyfor their personal and ideologicalloyalty to the president.Other factors tend to dominatecabinet choices, such as partisanconcerns, symbolic statements, expertise, managementexperience, and clientele concerns. Thus theway members of a cabinet arechosen leads us to expectthat they will not alwayssee eyeto eyewith the White House. And once in officethere are also strongcentrifugal forces at workpulling thecabinet secretary away from the president. These forces include the cabinet secretary'sduties to thelaw and to Congress and their dependency on theircareer bureaucracies and the constituenciestheir departments represent. Firstof all, cabinet secretaries have duty to carry out the laws affecting their departments.The dutiesof cabinetsecretaries are spelled out in thelegislation that creates thedepartment and its major programs. These laws are often contradictory, and they maybe interpretedto be in conflictwith what the president wants in anygiven situation.35 Cabinetmembers are also pulledfrom the president by theirobligations to the Congress.While thePresident has a majorimpact on legislation,Congress has the finalsay on thedetails of laws; and whenthere is a legaldispute about the meaning ofa law,the issue is settledby determining "congressional intent." Congress also has the finalsay on thebudget levels for departments and programswithin them. Thereis also a naturaldivision between the interestsof the Presidentand his cabinetappointees because of the nature of their jobs. Theyare chosen to headdepart- mentsbecause they believe in theimportance of its mission.They thus have a stake 674 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

in theorganizational means to accomplishits mission,i.e., theirorganizational and jurisdictionalturf. In orderto do thierjobs well theymust defend their turf against threats,even if the threats sometimes come from the White House. In thesesquabbles the White House is partof "them"not "us." This problemcame up when theNixon administrationmoved to placeNixon loyalistsin thedepartments in orderto assureWhite House control.One of those responsiblefor the placementssaid: "For the guy to be worthcontrolling, he has to knowwhat is goingon in his department.If he knowswhat's going on there, he'sless likely to be amenableto centralcontrol."36 For a personto be able to be of use to theWhite House, he mustalso be trustedand acceptedas a defenderof the valuesrepresented by the agency and its mission. Because the White House must some- timesmake decisions affecting the division of mission with other agencies, it is some- timesseen as a threatto the agency. Sinceexecutive branch agencies depend on clientelegroups to maketheir case beforeCongress in supportof authority and appropriations, interest groups see agen- ciesas theiradvocates in thegovernment. Cabinet officers see it as partof theirduty to maintainfriendly liaison with major interests groups so thatthey can be mobilized to supportpresidential initiatives when needed. But at thesame time they feel that theyneed to keepsome distance.One Cabinetofficer put it thisway: "It maybe too stronga statementto saythat they regarded us as theiradvocate. They regarded us as theirdoor. ... I would saywe weremore the doorway in ratherthan the real advocate;if persuadedwe wouldbe theadvocate. And we certainlyimpacted them with all of our policiesso thatthey were a partof the process."37 The pointof all of thisis thatmanaging the Cabinetin the U.S. systemis a particularlythorny problem for the presidency. On the one handcabinet members owe theirallegiance to thePresident who appointedthem and who can removethem at his pleasure.But on the otherhand cabinet members have constitutional duties to thelaw and to Congressas well as dependencieson the careerbureaucracy and theirclientele groups. It mustbe stressedthat these non presidentialpulls are legiti- mateclaims on theallegiance of cabinet members. Presidents should be ableto expect loyaltyfrom their cabinet members, but to expectthe sort of rigid,literal obedience thatthe Nixon administration came to expectis askingtoo muchfrom the American separationof powerssystem and is not in thebest interests of thepresidency. Presi- dentsshould realize that they are acting in a systemof sharedpowers, not a unitary statewith an executivestructure of monocratichierarchy. The EisenhowerCabinet Model When Eisenhowerwas electedto the Presidencyhe came to officewith strongideas about the way it shouldbe organizedthat stemmed from his military experienceand previous contact with the White House. "Foryears I hadbeen in fre- quentcontact in the executiveoffice of the White House, and I had certainideas aboutthe system, or lack of system,under which it operated.With mytraining in problemsinvolving organization itwas inconceivable to methat the work of the White House couldnot be bettersystemized than had been the case in theyears I observed WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 675 it."38He was also criticalof the use to which previouspresidents put theircabinet meetings.So Eisenhowerresolved to organizehis presidencymuch moreformally than had his two immediateprecedessors. He did thisthrough his formalstaff system tightly runby ShermanAdams and throughthe use of his cabinetand the cabinetsecretariat. One aspect of Eisenhower'sability to use his cabinet effectivelywas his choice of personnel,who were mostly successfulbusiness men ("eight millionairesand a plumber").39He feltthat the interpersonalaspects of teamworkwere important:"In organizingteams, personality is equally importantwith ability. . . Leadershipis as vital in conferenceas it is in battle."40His initialconcerns with puttingtogether the rightcombination of personalitiesresulted in a cabinet with relativelylittle of the backbiting,conflicts or leaks that have markedmore recentadministrations. Eisen- hower used his cabinet by delegating as much as possible to his cabinet secretaries and by usingthe collective cabinet as a deliberative,though not a decisionmaking, body. Eisenhowerfelt that many decisions were not presidential,and he wantedas many of theseas possiblemade by cabinetmembers and not broughtinto the White House. This had theeffect of insulatingthe Presidentfrom the details of managingthe government and may have contributedto the public image that he was detached fromhis administration.Much of this was deliberateand the resultof a conscious effortto createbuffer zones around the president.41The main bufferwas, of course,Sherman Adams who carefullyscreened all businessgoing to the Oval Office,including most cabinetmembers' access to the President.He also spentmuch timetrying to get cabinet membersto settleinteragency disputes before issues went to the President."I always tried to resolvespecific differences on a varietyof problemsbefore the issue had to be submittedto the President.Sometimes several meetings were necessarybefore an agreementwas reached. But with a few exceptionsI was successful."Sometimes he would have to "point out, with emphasis,that a resourcefuldepartment head should be able to findan answerhimself without expecting the Presidentto findit forhim."42 While Eisenhowerdelegated as much as possible to his cabinet secretariesindi- vidually,he wanted to use the cabinet collectivelyas a deliberativebody. As he told his newly selectedcabinet beforehe took office,"My hope will be to make this a policy body, to bring beforeyou and for you to bring up subjects that are worthy of this body as a whole."43But the cabinet was not meant to be a decision making body, and Eisenhowerdid not take votes on issues. In factmany issues had already been decided by the time they were brought beforethe Cabinet.44 Cabinet meetingswere relativelyformal, with fixedagendas and focusseddiscus- sions and follow through. Much of the organizationof the Cabinet meetingswas due to Eisenhower'sintroduction of the Cabinet Secretariatin 1954. The function of the Cabinet Secretariat,as describedby BradleyPatterson who was a memberof it, was to circulatecabinet papers preparedby the departmentsso that they could be consideredby membersbefore the meetingsand to assure that importantmatters were included on the agenda. This was not always easy since cabinet membersdid not necessarilywant to air theirproblems in frontof the whole cabinet."The Cabinet Secretaryhad to dig, wheedle, persuadeand finesseCabinet membersto bring to the common tablewhat were clearlycommon matters,but which the departmentheads, 676 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY in theircentury-and-a-half-long tradition, would muchprefer to bringprivately to theOval Office.It was onlybecause they knew that Eisenhower wanted it thisway and no otherthat they reluctantly acceeded to the CabinetSecretary's or Sherman Adams'agenda-planning."45 The Eisenhowermodel of cabinet government is thestandard against which fu- turepresidents would measure their intentions for the presidency. Kennedy and Johnson consciouslyreacted against what theythought was a too rigidsystem. Nixon and Carter,however, both promised delegation and consultation with their cabinets, but wereunable to avoidmajor conflicts between their cabinets and WhiteHouse staffs. Reaganpromised cabinet government and instituted a system of cabinet councils, an alternativeto the Eisenhowermodel.

Kennedy and Johnson Justas PresidentKennedy rejected the Sherman Adams model of White House organization,so he also rejectedthe Eisenhower model of cabinetorganiza- tion.Both of thesemoves were urged on Kennedyby ClarkClifford early after the election.Clifford advised Kennedy to rejectthe Eisenhower model and characterized itwith a bitof overstatement: "Apparently President Eisenhower considered the Cabinet to be in thenature of a corporateBoard of Directors.Decisions would be madeby the Cabinetand he would carrythem out. This is contraryto everybasic concept of thePresidency and shouldbe junked.Cabinet meetings were attended by 30 to 40 persons,and as a resultwere sterileand timeconsuming."46 RichardNeustadt argued against the Eisenhower practice of delegation to cabinet secretaries.In an earlytransition memorandum he arguedthat Kennedy ought to en- surethat disagreements within the administration be brought to thepresidential level fordecision by appointing strong cabinet members with conflicting views on public policy."If the President-electwants both 'conservative'and 'liberal'advice on eco- nomicmanagement, for example, and wantsthe competition to comeout wherehe can see it andjudge it, he needsto choosestrong-minded competitors and he needs toput them in positions of roughly equal institutionalpower, so thatneither wins the contest at a bureaucraticlevel too fardown forthe Presidentto judge it."47 While Eisenhowerused organizationalchannels to delegateand keepdecisions out ofthe White House, Kennedy followed Neustadt's advice and drew matters into theWhite House so thathe and his staffcould be activelyinvolved in governmental decisions.48He feltthe presidency ought to be "thevital center of action in ourwhole schemeof government... thePresident must place himself in thevery thick of the fight."49 In linewith Kennedy's desire to be personallyin chargeof the government rather thanpresiding over the institutionsof government,he held fewcabinet meetings, preferringtodeal with his departmental secretaries one at a time.Kennedy felt "Cabinet meetingsare simply useless. Why shouldthe Postmaster General sit there and listen to a discussionof the problemsof Laos?"50 LyndonJohnson, like Kennedy, ran the government from the White House, relying on his WhiteHouse staff.He heldcabinet meetings more regularly than Kennedy, WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 677 but used themas briefingforums rather than as consultativemechanisms. Toward theend of his administration he relied increasingly on thoseinvolved with his national securitydecision making process, and became distrustful ofthose outside his immediate circle.As he toldPresident-elect Nixon whenthey met at theWhite House in De- cember1968: "Let me tell you, Dick, I wouldhave been a damnfool to havediscussed majordecisions with the full Cabinet present, because I knewthat if I saidsomething in themorning, you could sure as hellbet it wouldappear in theafternoon papers."51

The Nixon Administration RichardNixon began his administrationwith theintention of reversing thepersonalized White House controlof thegovernment that had developedin the Kennedy-Johnsonyears and returning to a cabinetcentered government. He intended to concentratehis efforts as presidenton foreignaffairs and delegatedomestic policy to hiscabinet. "I've alwaysthought this country could run itself domestically without a President.All you needis a competentcabinet to run thecountry at home.You "52 need a presidentfor foreign policy. . . . At a meetingof his newly designated cabinet members the day after he presented themon televisionhe extortedthem to seizecontrol of theirdepartments and not cavein to thebureaucrats. It soundedas ifhe intendedto let themrun their depart- mentswith a minimumof White House interference.53At one of thefirst cabinet meetingsin 1969 he delegatedto his Cabinetsecretaries authority to choosetheir own subordinatesbased on the criteriaof abilityfirst and loyaltysecond.54 In the beginninghe had the generalnotion that the Cabinetwould servea collégialand advisoryfunction, but soon changed to viewsecretaries primarily as managersof their departments.55 Accordingto John Ehrlichman, Nixon was eitherquite optimistic or naive.But disillusionmentsoon set in. Nixonbelieved "all thesewonderful guys would help him and all he woulddo is takethe 'big plays.'But it doesn'twork that way. The news summarycomes in and WallyHickle has been puttinghis footin his mouth.You can'tgive these guys carte blanche."56 After only a fewweeks into the administration Nixonbegan to reversehis earlier stance on delegationand giveorders to hiscabinet secretariesthrough his White House staff. The maindriving force behind Nixon's concern with his Cabinet's behavior was his reelection."As timepassed, it appearedthat whenever discretion was grantedto theSecretaries they failed to do thingsthe way Richard Nixon wantedthem done. SinceNixon was theone who hadto go backto thepeople after four years, to explain whythings had gone as theydid, he reactedto their'failures' by retainingalmost all ofthe discretion. . . . Ifhe hadto paythe political price for his Cabinet Secretaries' mistakes,then he, by God, had theright and obligationto correctthose mistakes."57 Nixon also came to view cabinetmeetings as virtuallyuseless. IfNixon was disappointedin hiscabinet, the feeling was oftenmutual. Members ofthe Cabinet often felt that they did not haveenough direct access to thePresident andthat he was overlyinsulated by his White House staff.Some of them complained, evenpublicly, of theirlack of access.They included Secretary of Transportation John 678 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Volpe, Secretaryof the InteriorWalter Hickle, and Budget DirectorMayo. According to Jeb Stuart Magruder, theywere not all wrong. From our perspectivein the White House, the cabinet officialswere useful spokesmenwhen we wanted to push a particularline- on Cambodia, on Car- swell,or whatever.From their perspective, however, it was oftena rudeawakening to haveJeb Magruder or Chuck Colson calling up and announcing,"Mr. Secre- tary,we're sendingover this speech that we'd like you to deliver."But that was how it was. Virtuallyall the cabinet membershad to accept that theylacked access to the presidentand that theirdealings would be with Haldeman and his various minions.58

Because of these factorsthere was constantfriction between Cabinet membersand the White House staff. Given these developmentsand Nixon's perceptionof them, he did threethings to deal with the unacceptablesituation: he reliedmore heavilyon his White House staff,particularly H.R. Haldeman; he juggled his Cabinet to appoint memberswith greaterloyalty to himself;and he attemptedto reorganizethe executivebranch in order to make it more responsiveto the President.After the 1972 election Nixon demandedresignations from all of his cabinet members.In his second termhe chose cabinet membersof whose loyaltyhe could be certain. In addition to personnelchanges, Nixon wanted to reorganizethe government in a major way. Based on a reportby the Ash Commission, he intendedto replace the constituencyoriented departments of Agriculture,Labor, Commerce,and Trans- portationwith fourgoal orienteddepartments: Community Development, Natural Resources,Human Resources,and Economic Affairs.59In addition,he wantedto limit access to the Presidentto five assistantsand have threecounsellors (for human resources,natural resources, and communitydevelopment) report to them. The result of thiswould be to give the White House staffeffective control over the whole government and limit the Cabinet secretariesto a ministerialrole with no directaccess to the President.By this time, however,the Watergaterevelations were beginning to break, and the plan was abandoned. PresidentNixon's earlyintentions to use his Cabinet as a collégial body and to delegatemuch of the managementof the governmentto themwhile he reservedhim- selffor the "big plays" foundered.After failures to achievehis domestic agenda and being frustratedby a Democratic Congress,he resortedto the tools of the administrativepresidency to achievehis goals.60He impoundedunprecedented amounts of funds that had been providedfor domestic programs by law.61He took militaryactions in Southeast Asia without consultingor informingCongress. He tried to undermine the Civil ServiceSystem by use of politicalclearances and theplacing of Nixon loyalists throughoutthe careerbureaucracy.62 And he triedto reorganizethe executivebranch by making its upper levels subordinateto a super-cabinetof White House aides as describedabove. Nixon and his aides saw the Executivebranch as a hierarchyakin to the military with the Presidentas Commanderin Chief; violationsof the chain of commandwere WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 679 intolerable.They saw otheropposing forces in thegovernmental system as illegiti- mate.Congressional opposition was seenas obstructionist.Cabinet officials' respon- sivenessto interestgroups and their agencies were seen as underminingthe President. While Presidentshave a rightto expectloyalty from their appointees in theex- ecutivebranch, they must also realizethat compelling pressures from clientele groups andthe career bureaucracy are inevitable, and that many of the attempts to affectgov- ernmentalpolicy by theCongress are legitimate. Presidents have the right and duty to resistthese pressures with all of thelegitimate, constitutional means at theirdis- posal (and theseare considerable);but theyought not to be so frustratedby their inevitabledefeats that they resort to illegitimatemeans to enforcetheir prerogatives. PresidentFord took office with the intention of ridding the country of the Water- gate specterand organizedhis administrationto providea sharpcontrast with the Nixonadministration. While he was not successful inrunning the White House without a chiefof staff,he was ableto returncollegiality to thecabinet. He was alwaysacces- sibleto Cabinetmembers. According to RichardCheney "Nobody ever screens out a cabinetmember. The presidentwill alwaysbe toldso and so wantsto see him."63 DespiteFord's accessibility and hisreactivation of theCabinet as a deliberativebody, hisadministration did experienceconflict between the Cabinet and his White House staff.But theproblems were not as greatas theones that plagued the Nixon or the Carterpresidencies. The Fordadministration created the EconomicPolicy Board, a Cabinetand White House staffstanding committee that operated as thecentral forum forthe administration's foreign and domesticeconomic policy. It metover 500 times duringthe Ford administration and was one of themost systematic advisory struc- turescreated in theWhite House to advisethe President in a broadarea of domestic policy.The EPB was to serveas a modelfor the Cabinet Council system developed bythe Reagan administration. Its executive secretary, Roger Porter, was brought into the Reagan administrationto help installit.64

JimmyCarter's Cabinet Government JimmyCarter's vision for his presidencywas formedin reactionagainst whathe saw as theabuses of theNixon administration.Carter would have no chief of staff,and he wouldrely heavily on his Cabinetand remainaccessible to them.In meetingswith his newly designated Cabinet members in Georgiaduring the Christmas holidaysin 1976 Cartertold themhe wantedto "restorethe Cabinetto its proper roleas thePresident's first circle of advisors" and that there would be "no all-powerful palaceguard in myWhite House, no anonymousaides, unelected, unknown to the public,and unconfirmedby theSenate, wielding vast power from the White House basement."65Carter wanted to be hisown chief of staff on theKennedy and Roosevelt modeland refusedto designatea chiefof staff.He would be the hub at thecenter of the wheel and all White House staffmembers would reportto him. His Cabinetwould also advisehim and have access to him."I believein Cabinet administrationofour government.There will neverbe an instancewhile I am Presi- dentwhen the members of the White House Staffdominate or actin a superiorposi- tionto themembers of our Cabinet."66He, as Nixonbefore him, initially intended 680 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY to delegatemuch of domesticpolicy making to his cabinet.Hamilton Jordan, his principleadvisor, said: "The problemis too manypresidents have tried to deal with all of theproblems of thecountry from the White House. The firstline of offense or defenseis the Cabinet.That's where the problems should be dealtwith, in the departmentsand agencies.You can'tdo it all fromthe White House."67 This principleof delegation was putinto effect early when Carter let his cabinet appointeeschoose their own subordinateson thetheory that they should be able to put togethertheir own managementteams. While thispleased cabinet members, it was objectedto by someof his White House staff,and particularlyby membersof Congresswho wantedto havepatronage appointments made. They had supported Carterduring the campaign and the transition and were owed some favors. But when theycalled the White House theywere told to talkto thedepartmental secretaries upon whom theyhad muchless claim. Carter'searly Cabinet meetings were useful as an introductionofthe new members to each otherand as a meansof gettinginformation out. Each secretarywould be askedto reporton thepast week and whatwould likelycome up thenext week in theirareas of responsibility. But after a yearor so ofthis type of meeting, often without an agenda,attendees began to tireof them.Hamilton Jordan felt they were a waste oftime.68 One Cabinetmember said the meetings "were tedious, boring and virtually a wasteof time."69At a Cabinetmeeting at Camp David JuanitaKreps said, "The Cabinetmeetings are fairly useless."70 The meetingswere not used for decision making, and toughproblems were discussed in smallermeetings with the President.71 The tensionand frictionbetween the CarterWhite House and Cabinetcame to a head in the springand summerof 1979 when Carterdecided that something hadto be done.The WhiteHouse stafffelt there was no disciplinein theadministra- tionand that Carter had to takecharge forcefully. The experimentwith cabinet govern- mentand spokesof the wheel organizationhad not worked. To respondto concernsabout theconduct of his administration,Carter went to Camp David in July1979 to consultwith advisorsand prominentpeople from aroundthe country. When he cameback he had decidedto nameHamilton Jordan to be chiefof staff.He told the cabinetat a meetingthat they were not working forhim but for themselves and that he was going to makesome changes. He demanded writtenresignations from each member of theCabinet. Despite objections that this would seemtoo muchlike PresidentNixon's demand for resignations in 1972, he wentforward with it and toldcabinet members to fillout evaluationforms on their immediatesubordinates to evaluatetheir loyalty to theadministration. The resigna- tionswere dutifully turned in and Carteraccepted five of them.

Reagan's CabinetCouncils RonaldReagan came to officewith a remarkablycoherent agenda and set of policypriorities. His prioritiesto significantlyincrease defense spending and cut spendingin virtuallyall domesticpolicy areas lent themselves to a narrowfocua and simpleset of valuesfor his administration.This simpleset of prioritiesserved as a litmustest and guideto actionthat was a greathelp in recruitingpersonnel for the WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 681 administration.Personal and ideologicalloyalty were the primary criteria for appointees.72 The coherenceof values led to an administrationwith much more unity than has markedrecent administrations with more disparatepolicy agendas and personnel. Reagan also came to officewith the notion that he wanted his administration to be run throughsome formof "cabinet government."Delegating significantau- thorityto the Cabinet fitwell into his styleof leadershipand was consciouslydifferent fromPresident Carter's tendency to become embroiledin thedetails of decisions. What was not intendedfor a Reagan approachto cabinetgovernment, however, was delegation to cabinet secretariesof authorityover theirbudgets or selectionof personnel. Initialbudget decisions were made by theWhite House staffand David Stockman. Except fordefense, the budgetsincluded significantcuts in most agencies,and newly designatedcabinet members were broughtinto the White House to sign offon the proposedcuts. They werecalled to a meetingwith Stockman,the President,and several White House aides and given a chance to reactto the proposed cuts,but it was diffi- cult because "they'rein the position of having to argue against the group line. And the group line is cut, cut, cut," accordingto David Stockman'saccount.73 The newly designatedsecretaries were at an added disadvantagebecause theydid not have their managementteams togetheryet and had not yet had a chance to get to know their careerexecutives. The Reagan White House felt that Carter and Nixon had lost the personnel battleto theirCabinet Secretariesand workedhard to keep tightcontrol of subcabinet appointmentsin the White House. They were successful,and the Reagan administration kept closer control of administrationpersonnel in the White House than any other recentadministration. The slowness of the appointmentsprocess resultedin manydelays in appointingthe subcabinet.This put the new secretariesat an added disadvantagein disagreeingwith the White House staffif they had wanted to. The new White House staffvery consciously and systematicallyused the transition period to impresson the administrationthe importanceof the centralagenda. In addition,the earlyagenda of the administrationwas dominatedby the economic prioritiesof the budget and tax cuts. These were engineeredby David Stockman, JamesBaker, and the LegislativeStrategy Group. Accordingto one participant:"So, the earlycabinet meetings were Stockman,on behalfof the president,and the other presidentialadvisers just laying out, 'Here's what we're going to do fellows,and I expect you to supportit'. . . . The cabinet met often . . . but just to receivetheir marchingorders and to hype each other up."74 Given thistight White House controlof the budget, personnel,and the legislativeagenda; how could theReagan systembe considered"cabinet government"? Edwin Meese explained that the "cabinet concept" intendedthat cabinet memberswould be the President'sprinciple advisors and that theywould not be undercutby other membersof the White House staff.He furtherexplained that PresidentReagan had an eighteenmember cabinet: the heads of major departmentsas well as Meese as coun- selorto the President,the directorsof OMB and CIA, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the U.S. representativeto the United Nations.75 Meese explainedthat no major administrationdecision was made withoutat least 682 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY one memberof the cabinet present,and this ensuredthat the Presidentwould have input fromthe cabinet. This is an expansiveconcept of cabinetgovernment that cor- respondedwith Reagan's expandedcabinet membership. But the tightReagan White House control of administationpolicy and its legislativeagenda was a farcry from previousattempts at "cabinetgovernment," whether Eisenhower's, Nixon's (firstterm), or Carter's. During the transitionperiod and earlydays of the administrationAlexander Haig began to suspectsigns of White House dominationof the Cabinet. When theCabinet- designatesmet on January7 Edwin Meese dominatedthe meeting,giving a primer on the president'sideas, procedures,and priorities,while Reagan sat passively.76Haig recallsthat he had "the distinctfeeling that Ed Meese and his colleagues perceived their rank in the Administrationas being superiorto that of any member of the Cabinet."77At the firstCabinet meetingMeese and Bakerwere sittingat the Cabinet tablein sharpcontrast with previouspractice. Haig wrotein his notesofthat meeting: "Governmentby Cabinet or troika?"78 The other part of PresidentReagan's approach to cabinet governmentwas the cabinetcouncil system.It was modeled on PresidentFord's experiencewith the Eco- nomic Policy Board, the firsteffective standing cabinet committeein the domestic area. Roger Porter,who had writtena book on his experiencewith the EPB was brought in fromthe TreasuryDepartment to help put togetherthe cabinet council systemand to be executivesecretary of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs.79 The creationof the Cabinet Councils was announced by the White House on February26, 1981 with fivecouncils: Economic Affairs(CCEA), Commerceand Trade (CCCT), Human Resources(CCHR), NaturalResources and Environment(CCNRE), and Food and Agriculture(CCFA).80 The followingyear the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy(CCLP) and CabinetCouncil on Managementand Administration(CCMA) were added. The purpose of the councils accordingto the White House was to act as a "means for deliberateconsideration of major policy issues which affectthe interestsof more than one departmentor agency."81 The purposeof the Cabinet Council approachwas to providea forumfor cabinet participationand deliberationon issues that cut across cabinetjurisdictions but still not include secretarieswhose jurisdictionshad nothingto do with the policiesbeing considered.It also was to provide for interactionand integrationof Cabinet views with those of the White House staffand avoid the strainsthat had markedso many earlieradministrations. The systemwould also allow second level policy issues to be dealtwith below the presidentiallevel and it would help keep the focusof the adminis- trationon the centralReagan agenda. The cabinet councils were to be the focus of a policynetwork that integrated both Cabinet and White House resourcesand input.82 The Cabinet Councils were all formallychaired by the Presidentwith a designated Cabinet levelchairman pro temporeand six to elevenmembers, with meetings open to all Cabinet members.Council activitieswere coordinatedby the Office of PolicyDevelopment and the Officeof Cabinet Affairsand were supportedby execu- tivesecretariats, and functionedwith interdepartmentalworking groups. The Councils were active to varyingdegrees, with the most active being the CCEA which met WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 683

100 timesin the first15 months,with the nextbusiest being the CCCT and CCNR which met31 timeseach. The leastactive was theCCLP which met onlythree times.83 The Presidentattended about 15% of the meetingsand the councils ofteninitiated issues to consider,not waiting for Presidentialinitiation.84 The meetingswere held in the Roosevelt Room, across fromthe Oval Office.By the fallof 1983 two of the Councils were dormant: CCNRE and CCFA, while the CCHR and CCLR were marginallyactive. The otherswere consistently active with the CCEA being extremely busy. Thus the councils were active and successfulto widely varyingdegrees. During the firstterm of the Reagan administrationthe cabinet council system worked well as a means of gettingcabinet and White House input and developing issue analysisin an orderlyway, though as has been pointed out, the councils them- selvesenjoyed varying success. Such a cabinetcouncil systementails certain prerequi- sitesfor it to accomplishits coordinatinggoals.85 First of all, therehas to be a commit- mentby the White House and the Cabinet to play by the rules; the main rule being that issues are not to be brought up to the Presidenton a bilateralbasis, but that all issues are to be "roundtabled"by discussingthem at a cabinet council meeting. Each cabinetmember's policy proposals are to be subjectedto the scrutinyand criti- cism of peers in the cabinet and White House staff. Thus the White House staffmight have to guard the Presidentfrom being lob- bied unilaterallyby a cabinetmember. Of course,this will be perceivedby the cabinet memberas the White House staffbarring cabinet membersfrom access to the president. Secondly,the Presidentmust rejectattempts by cabinetmembers to induce him to make decisionsoutside of the structure.If all membersof the cabinet have confi- dence in the integrityof the process,they will be less likelyto tryto end run it by going to the presidentprivately. This typeof processwill onlywork in an atmosphere of reasonablemutual trustwhich marked the firstterm Reagan cabinet (with the exceptionof AlexanderHaig). It is hard to imagine how it might have been able to work in otheradministrations that suffered backbiting and competitionamong cabinet membersand the White House staff. But the systemis not without its problems.Alexander Haig criticizedit because he argued that it led to dominationby the White House staff.Haig feltthat he was denied access to the Presidentby the White House staffand that the staffhad too much anonymousand unscrutinizedpower. But to me the White House was as mysteriousas a ghost ship; you heard the creak of the riggingand the groan of the timbersand sometimeseven glimpsed the crew on deck. But which of the crew had the helm? Was it Meese, was it Baker, was it someone else? It was impossible to know for sure.86

Early in Reagan's second termall of the cabinetcouncils were eliminatedexcept one on economic policy and one on domestic policy. The presidentwould thus receive policy advice primarilyfrom these two councils and the National SecurityCouncil. The two new councils would be chairedby officialsplaying two roles.James Baker would chairthe council on economicaffairs while he was TreasurySecretary, and Edwin 684 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Meese would chairthe domestic council along with carryingout his dutiesas At- torneyGeneral.

Conclusion: What Have We Learned? No one questionsthe need for an activeWhite House staffin themodern presidency.Cabinet members may complain, and certain staffers may abuse their power, but thepresident cannot operate without a staffto protecthis political interests and keepthe administration'sfocus on thecentral agenda. Stuart Eizenstat argues that departmentsand agencies are inherently incapable of coordinating themselves. "Agen- ciessimply do nottrust each other. . . . This lackof trust means that, when we have to deal withcross-cutting, conflicting, complex issues of theday that involve more thanone agency,it is verydifficult, ifnot impossible,to entrustto one agencythe responsibilityto coordinate the development of policy that affects several agencies. . . . Withouta centralized,strong, and effective White House staff,it is simplyimpossible to assurethe neutrality of the policymaking process because agencies bring their own biasesto theprocess. . . . Due processcannot occur without a strongcentralized White House staff."»7 BradleyPatterson, from his years of experience in theWhite House, argues that a strongWhite House staffis necessaryin orderto performthe followingcrucial functionsfor the President: 1. Theinterrogation/orchestration/moderator functionon crosscuttingpolicy issues. 2. The personalpolicy development function on issuesespecially sensitive of the President. 3. The ferrettask: of receivingand judging informal, anticipatory information on problemsabout which Cabinet officers are embarrassedor reluctant. 4. Selectiveintervention where policy changes or crisesmake necessary a White House monitorshipeven of operationaldetails. Patterson argues that these are func- tionsunique to a White House staffand thatno cabinetofficer would be able to performthese functions and thoseof headinga cabinetagency.88 But a strongWhite House staffis notwithout its dangers. There will inevitably be complaintsfrom the Cabinet and othersthat the White House staffis isolating the Presidentand limitingtheir access to him. This will be so eventhough it will oftenbe the President'spersonal decision not to see a cabinetmember. There will also be criticismsof the White House staffthat are intendedfor the President.Of course,the function of lightningrod is an importantone forthe staff in anyWhite House. The otherdanger is thatthe President may come to dependtoo heavilyon hisstaff and limit his sources of information. This may have happened in theJohnson and Nixon presidencieswhen the wagons were circled because of theVietnam War and Watergate,respectively. Bowman Cutter argues that a presidentshould keep his staffoff balance by not letting them get too confidentof their positions in theWhite House.89But this can be carriedto extremesas it sometimeswas by Presidents Franklin Rooseveltand LyndonJohnson. Thereis alsoa developingconsensus that in theWhite House staffsomeone must unequivocallybe in charge.In thewords of one Kennedyaide: "Everybodybelieves WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 685 in democracyuntil he gets to the White House and thenyou begin to believein dic- tatorship,because it's so hard to get thingsdone."90 On this issue was have the in- formedopinions of H.R. Haldeman, RichardCheney, and Jack Watson. Each of them has concludedthat if the Presidentdoes not designatesomeone to controlthe rivalries and competitionfor the President'sear, chaos will result. The Reagan experience, with its troikaof differentiatedjurisdictions, has broughtinto questionwhether there must be one personin charge,but during the firstterm there were complaintsfrom within the administrationabout the lack of clear leadership. It is stillpossible that a Presidentmay be electedwith the skillsand intelligence of a FranklinRoosevelt or a John Kennedywho can act as the hub of the wheel and be his own chiefof staff.But experiencein the Ford, Carter,and Reagan presidencies has broughtinto question whetherwe can returnto the less formaldays of the 1930s or even 1960s. The consequencesof failingto pull it off(Ford and Carter) are apparent and presenta serious risk for any presidentwho tries it. But the presidentmust be carefulin choosing his chief of staffand other top White House aides. It may be usefulto considerMichael Medved's set of lessons for White House assistantsthat he gleaned fromhis studyof Presidents'chief aides over the past century: 1. A Presidentshould selectas his principalaide a man whose goals and experience involvemore than the serviceof a single politician. 2. Presidentialassistants must do everythingin theirpower to escape publicity. 3. Emotional dependenceby a Presidenton his top aide should be avoided as far as possible. 4. The emergenceof a centralfigure on the staff-whether he is called White House Secretary,Staff Coordinator, Assistant President, or Chief of Staff- is necessary for the efficientfunctioning of the White House.91 With respectto the cabinet,presidential experience over the past severaldecades has taughtus some lessons. We know that therewill inevitablybe conflictsbetween the Cabinet and the White House staff;it is inherentin their differingfunctions. The trickis to make the interfaceinto a dynamictension ratherthan lettingit de- generateinto a destructivehostility. This can be done by a recognitionon each side of the legitimatefunctions of the other side. It is particularlyimportant the White House recognizethat the legitimate,constitutional roles of Cabinet membersalong with profoundpolitical pressures give themperspectives not alwaysin line with those of the White House. As the Carter Presidencytaught us, legitimatepressures must be used to extractloyalty and coherencefrom the cabinet.But as the Nixon Presidency demonstrates,expecting a rigid disciplineand subordinationto the White House is both unrealisticand harmful. One lesson learnedis thatit is helpfulto move quicklywith the major priorities of the administration.One of Nixon's top policy aides argued: Everythingdepends on what you do in programformulation during the first six or sevenmonths. I havewatched three presidencies and I am increasinglycon- vincedofthat. Time goes by so fast.During the firstsix monthsor so, the White House staffis not hatedby the cabinet,there is a periodof friendshipand cooper- 686 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

ation and excitement.There is some animal energygoing foryou in those first six to eightmonths, especially if people perceivethings in the same light. If that exists and so long as that exists you can get a lot done. You only have a year at the most for new initiatives,a time when you can establishsome programs as your own, in contrastto what has gone on before.After that, afterpriorities are set, and aftera presidentfinds he doesn't have to talk with cabinetmembers, that'swhen the problemsset in, and the White House aides close offaccess to cabinet membersand others.92

There are certainthings a newly elected Presidentcan do in order to establish cordialrelations between the Cabinet and White House staff.They have to do with personnel,early actions and meetings,and organizationalstructures. With respect to personnelthe President-electcan recruitcabinet members who can get along with each other and will not be threatenedby the White House staff.Eisenhower con- sciouslytried to do thisand largelysucceeded. In most presidencies,however, cabinet choices are based upon a complex of factors,and personal compatibilityis oftena minor consideration. But the Presidentdoes have some control over the agenda of the initialdays of his transitionand administration.One of the lessons learned is that it helps to set the ground rules early.Bowman Cutter who playedan importantrole in the Carter administration,argues that the Presidentshould have a "set speech" to give to every new Cabinet member.This speech should spell out the role that Cabinet members are expectedto playwith respectto the White House staff,OMB, and anyimportant issues the administrationis expected to be faced with. He argues that this is hard because afterthe election victoryeveryone is in a state of euphoria and any critical thinkingabout organizationis apt to be lost. Lack of clarityof role and jurisdiction leads to turfbattles that are wastefuland divisive.93John Ehrlichman argues that the ground rules must be set beforethe cabinet membersgets settledin the new post, because tryingto get power back once it is perceivedto be delegatedis "like pulling teeth." It is also crucial that the Presidentsit in on the meetingspersonally to let the cabinetmembers know it is coming fromhim and not merelythe White House staff.94 The Reagan administrationlearned this lesson well and clearlyset out the expec- tationsof the White House for Cabinet memberswith respectto budget and personnel matters.This was one of the reasonsthat the Reagan administrationwas less troubledby the Cabinet conflictsthan some other recentadministrations. On the otherhand the communicationmight be handled in a less intimidatingmanner than the meetingsof new cabinet memberswith the Reagan White House. Early Cabinet meetingsare also importantso thatmembers get acquaintedwith each other and take each other'smeasure. These meetingsare usefulfor distributing information,letting people know what the partyline is, and fordeveloping a team spirit.They are particularlyimportant for keeping the focus on the centralagenda and encouragingnew cabinetmembers to keep the White House perspectivein mind. Thus it is useful to have cabinet meetingsoften early in the administration.Later WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 687 it is harderto keep people's attention,and theyfeel theyhave too many important things to do to listen to issues of secondaryimportance. The thirdthing new administrationscan do is to set up some kind of structure to facilitatethe implementationof the President'sagenda without causing a riftbe- tween cabinet and White House staff.There are severalprecedents here. The first is the Eisenhowermodel of using cabinet meetingsas deliberativesessions, but few Presidentssince then havebeen successfulto the extentthat he was in this. A second approach,also establishedby Eisenhower,is the establishmentof a Cabinet Secretariat that ensuresthat all issues are staffedout with input fromany departmentthat has a legitimatestake in the issue. The secretariatcan also be used to ensure that any presidentialdecisions are implemented. The cabinetcouncil systemis an alternativestructure for managing relations and tryingto preventa gap fromgrowing between the Cabinet and the staff.With Ford's Economic PolicyBoard as a model the Reagan administrationhas made such a system work reasonablywell, though in only some issue areas. It is, however,possible that some Presidentwill be elected who has the charisma,intelligence, and judgement to ignore all of these organizationalapproaches. Until that time, however,we can still learn a lot fromthe lessons of recentpresidencies.95

Notes 1. The authorwould like to thankAlana Northrop for comments on an earlierversion of this article and Colin Campbellfor permission to quote fromhis forthcomingbook: In Searchof Executive Harmony. 2. Interviewwith John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, New Mexico, June3, 1983. 3. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,California, May 25, 1983. 4. Commenton "PresidentialManagement" by RichardE. Neustadtin Improvingthe Accountability andPerformance ofGovernment edited by BruceL.R. Smithand James D. Carroll(Washington: Brookings,1982), p. 109. 5. "The BuckStill Stops at 1600Pennsylvania Avenue," The Washingtonian(December 1980), p. 205. 6. PatrickAnderson, The Presidenfs Men (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,Anchor Books, 1969), p. 469. 7. BradleyPatterson, "The Buck StillStops at 1600 PennsylvaniaAvenue," The Washingtonian(De- cember1980), p. 206. 8. Eisenhower,The WhiteHouse Years:Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 114. 9. ShermanAdams, Firsthand Report (New York: PopularLibrary, 1961), p. 57. 10. Fred I. Greenstein,The Hidden-HandPresidency (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 139. 11. Fred I. Greenstein,The Hidden-HandPresidency (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 147. 12. Memorandumon StaffingThe President-Elect, Prepared by RichardE. Neustadt,October 30, 1960, p. 3-4. See also AttachmentA, Roosevelt'sApproach to Staffingthe White House. 13. Interviewwith Clark Clifford,Washington, D.C. July15, 1983. 14. Clark Clifford,Memorandum on Transition,November 9, 1960, KennedyLibrary. 15. JackValenti, "Life's Never the sameAfter the White House PowerTrip," WashingtonPost Na- tionalWeekly Edition (March 19, 1984), p. 21. 16. PatrickAnderson, The President'sMen (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 299. 17. Quoted by FrancisRourke, "The Presidencyand the Bureaucracy:Strategic Alternatives," in ThePresidency and the Political System edited by MichaelNelson (Washington:CQ Press,1984), p. 347. 18. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,May 25, 1983. 688 I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIES QUARTERLY

19. Interviewwith H.R. Haldeman,Los Angeles,May 25, 1983. 20. Quoted in RichardPious, The AmericanPresidency (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 244. 21. MichaelMedved, The ShadowPresidents (New York: TimesBooks, 1979),p. 320. See also Wil- liam Safire,Before the Fall (New York: BalantineBooks, 1977), p. 366. 22. See the analysisof R. GordonHoxie, "Staffingthe Fordand CarterPresidencies: in BradleyD. Nash, et al, Organizingand Staffingthe Presidency (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency,1980), p. 44. 23. GeraldR. Ford,A Timeto Heal (New York: Harperand Row and Reader'sDigest Association, 1979), p. 147. 24. Ibid. 25. Quotedby Stephen Wayne, The Legislative Presidency (New York: Harperand Row, 1978),p. 52. 26. Interviewwith RichardCheney, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1983. 27. Interviewwith RichardCheney, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1983. 28. Dom Bonafede,"Carter White House is Heavy on Functions,Light on Frills,'*National Journal (February12, 1977), p. 234. 29. Interviewwith Jack Watson, Atlanta,June 17, 1983; and interviewwith Stuart Eizenstat July 15, 1983, Washington,D.C. 30. See thediscussion by Colin Campbell,In Searchof Executive Harmony (forthcoming) Chapter 4. 31. LawrenceBarrett, Gambling With History (New York: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 76-77). 32. For discussionsof Deaver's role,see "Making Reagan be Reagan" TimeMagazine (August 27, 1984), p. 21. See also The Washingtonian(October 1984), p. 156. 33. "The New WhiteHouse Buzzword-Burnout" Los AngelesTimes (December 19, 1983), p. 1,8. 34. For an overviewof the developmentof the U.S. cabinetfrom the beginningof the Republic and an annotatedbibliography see R. GordonHoxie, "The Cabinetin theAmerican Presidency, 1789-1984,"Presidential Studies Quarterly (Spring 1984), p. 209. See also, Hoxie, ed., The White House:Organization and Operations(New York: Centerfor the Studyof the Presidency,1971). 35. For examplesof laws affectingcabinet officers and ways in which theycan give contradictory mandatessee BradleyPatterson, The President'sCabinet (Washington: ASPA, 1976), p. 9-15. 36. Quoted by Hugh Heclo, A Governmentof Strangers(Washington: Brookings, 1979), p. 97. 37. Quoted by Roger PorterPresidential Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 13. 38. Quotedin Louis W. Koenig TheChief Executive (New York: Harcourt,Brace and World, 1969), p. 167). 39. "WashingtonWire," TheNew Republic(December 15, 1952), p. 3. Quoted in Hess, Organizing the Presidency,p. 61. 40. Quotedin FredI. Greenstein,The Hidden-Hand Presidency (New York: BasicBooks, 1982), p. 119. 41. See StephenHess, Organizingthe Presidency (Washington: Brookings, 1976, p. 65. 42. ShermanAdams, Firsthand Report (New York: PopularLibrary, 1961), p. 57. 43. Quotedin FredI. Greenstein,The Hidden-Hand Presidency (New York: BasicBooks, 1982), p. 106. 44. Greenstein,p. 115. 45. BradleyPaterson, The President'sCabinet (Washington: ASPA, 1976.), p. 108. 46. "Memorandumon Transition"(November 9, 1960), p. 6. 47. Memorandumon "Organizingthe Transition: A tentativeCheck-List for The Weeks Between Electionand Inaugural"prepared by RichardE. Neustat,p. 11. KennedyLibrary. 48. Interviewwith TheodoreSorensen, March 25, 1985, New York City. 49. ArthurSchlesinger, Jr., A ThousandDays (New York: Fawcett,1967), p. 117. 50. ArthurSchlesinger, Jr., A ThousandDays, p. 632. 51. RN: The Memoirsof RichardNixon (New York: Grosset& Dunlap, 1978), p. 357. 52. RowlandEvans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak,Nixon in the White House (New York: RandomHouse, 1971Ï. o. 11. 53. JohnEhrlichman, Witness to Power(New York: Simon and Schuster,1982), p. 88. 54. Evans and Novak, Nixon in theWhite House, p. 66. WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 689

55. Ehrlichman,Witness to Power, pp. 110-111. 56. Interviewwith John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, New Mexico, June3, 1983. 57. JohnEhrlichman, Witness to Power (New York: Simonand Schuster,1982), firstquote, p. 112; second,p. 88. 58. JebStuart Magruder, An AmericanLife: One Man'sRoad toWatergate (Atheneum, 1974), p. 102. 59. See HaroldSeidman, Politics, Position, and Power (New York:Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 114. 60. See RichardNathan, The AdministrativePresidency (New York: Wiley, 1983). 61. For a detailedanalysis of theimpoundment issue see, James P. Pfiffher,The President, the Budget, andCongress: Impoundment and the1974 BudgetAct (Boulder,Colorado: WestviewPress, 1979). 62. See Violationsand Abuses of Merit Principles in FederalEmployment, Hearings before the Subcom- mitteeon Manpowerand Civil Serviceof the House Committeeon PostOffice and Civil Service, 94th Congress,1st Session(April 10, 1975). 63. Quotedby Stephen Wayne, The Legislative Presidency (New York: Harperand Row, 1978),p. 54. 64. For an analysisof theEconomic Policy Board see Roger Porter,Presidential Decision Making: The EconomicPolicy Board (Cambridge University Press, 1980). 65. JosephCalif ano, GoverningAmerica (New York: Simon and Schuster,1981), pp. 26-27. 66. Dom Bonafede,"Carter White House is Heavyon Functions,Light on Frills,"National Journal (February12, 1977), p. 234. 67. Dom Bonafede,"No One Triesto Roll OverJordan in theWhite House," NationalJournal (April 16, 1977), p. 584. 68. RobertShogun, Promises to Keep (New York: Crowell, 1977) p. 192. 69. Quoted in ThomasCronin, The State of the Presidency (New York: LittleBrown, 1980), p. 272. 70. Quoted byJoseph Calif ano, GoverningAmerica (New York: Simonand Schuster,1981), p. 410. 71. Ibid., p. 404. 72. See Hugh Heclo, "One ExecutiveBranch or Many?" in AnthonyKing, Both Ends of the Avenue (Washington:ΑΕΙ, 1984). 73. Stockmanquoted by WilliamGreider, "The Educationof David Stockman,"The Atlantic(De- cember1981), p. 33. 74. Quoted by Colin Campbell,In Searchof Executive Harmony (forthcoming) Chapter 3, p. 17. 75. Interviewwith Edwin Meese,July 2, 1985. 76. AlexanderHaig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 76. 77. Haig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 77. 78. Haig, Caveat(New York: Macmillan,1984), p. 82. 79. PresidentialDecision Making (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1980). See also Chester Newland,"The ReaganPresidency," Public Administration Review ÍTanuarv/Februarv 1983). ο. 6. 80. Thisdiscussion of the cabinet council system is basedon ChesterNewland' s analysisin "Executive OfficePolicy Apparatus: Enforcing the Reagan Agenda," The Reagan Presidency and the Governing ofAmerica, edited by Lester M. Salamonand Michael S. Lund (Washington:The UrbanInstitute, 1985), p. 135. 81. Officeof Planningand Evaluation,Executive Office of thePresident, Strategic Evaluation Memo- randum#18, Cabinet Councils and Domestic Affairs Management: An Evaluation(Washington, The WhiteHouse, June 8, 1982), p. 9. Quoted by ChesterNewland in "ExecutiveOffice Policy Ap- paratus,"p. 153. 82. See Newland,"The Reagan Presidency,"Public Administration Review (January /February 1983), p. 10. 83. Newland, "ExecutiveOffice Policy Apparatus," p. 128. 84. Newland, "ExecutiveOffice Policy Apparatus," p. 157-159. 85. This sectionis basedon theanalysis of Colin Campbell,In Searchof Executive Harmony Chapter 3, pp. 21-25, (forthcoming). 86. Haig, Caveat,pp. 85, 94. 690 I PRESIDENTIALSTUDIES QUARTERLY

87. Commenton "PresidentialManagement" in Improvingthe Accountability andPerformance ofGovern- ment,edited by BruceL.R. Smithand JamesD. Carroll(Washington: Brookings, 1982), pp. 100-101. 88. "Commentspresented at thePanel of White House Staff/Cabinet Relationships" at theAmerican PoliticalScience Association Meeting, New York City, (September4, 1981), p. 9. 89. Interviewwith Bowman Cutter,July 26, 1983. 90. Quoted by ThomasCronin, The State of the Presidency (New York: LittleBrown, 1980), p. 223. 91. MichaelMedved, The ShadowPresidents (New York: Times Books, 1979), p. 352. 92. Quotedby ThomasCronin, The State of the Presidency (New York: LittleBrown, 1980), p. 264. 93. Interviewwith Bowman Cutter,Washmgton, D.C., July26, 1983. 94. Interviewwith John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, New Mexico,June 3, 1983. 95. Forthe views of principal Reagan counsellors see Edwin Meese III, "The InstitutionalPresidency: A View fromthe White House," Presidential Studies Quarterly, XIII, 2, Spring1983, pp. 191-197; and Donald T. Regan,"The ReaganPresidency in respective,"Presidential Studies Quarterly, XVI, 3, Summer1986, pp. 414-420.