Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics Author(s): Alexander Wendt Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. http://www.jstor.org White House StaffVersus the Cabinet: Centripetaland CentrifugalRoles JAMES P. PFIFFNER AssociateProfessor ofPolitical Science GeorgeMason University The firsttask of any new administrationmust be the organizationof the White House and the establishmentof the role the cabinetwill play.1If thesecentral issues are not settled,the Presidentwill have trouble pursuing any of his political or governmentalpriorities. And if thereare problemswithin or between these two centralinstitutions in an administration,much valuable time can be lost until the tensionsare settled. The early months of an administrationare particularlycrucial to a new presidentbecause theyprovide a narrowwindow of opportunityto accom- plish his goals. If thepresident does not designateearly who will be firstamong his White House staff,it is an invitationto struggle; for much is at stake. The President'sprogram will necessarilywait while the battle forwho is in charge is settled.The Carter ad- ministrationlost a lot of time while the relativepositions of Hamilton Jordanand JackWatson were established. This strugglehelped to negatesome of theother elaborate preparationsthe administrationhad undertakenduring the transition.Time was also lost and energymisspent in the Ford and the Carterpresidencies while each president experimentedwith a "spokes of the wheel" model of White House organizationand refusedto designatea chief of staff. Presidentsmust also set early ground rules for the role that cabinet members will play in the administrationand the appropriaterelationship between the White House staffand the Cabinet. It must be clear what is and is not delegated before cabinet secretariesget establishedin theirdepartments. If this is not done it will be verydifficult to call presumeddelegations back in. PresidentsNixon and Carterboth feltthat theyhad delegatedtoo much to theircabinet secretariespersonnel selection. Both administrationslater found this to be an expensivemistake when theyfinally resortedto firingand replacingseveral cabinet membersin order to regain control, Nixon afterthe 1972 election and Carter in the summerof 1979. This articlewill examineissues involvedin the organizationof the White House and its relationshipwith the Cabinet. It will pointout some lessonsthat can be learned fromrecent presidencies. 666 WHITE HOUSE STAFF VERSUS THE CABINET | 667 Organizingthe White House Presidentschoose their White House staffsprimarily from those who have workedwith them on theircampaigns for very good reasons.Those who haveworked closelywith the new presidenton thecampaign understand best the personality and valuesof thepresident. More importantly, the president has confidencein thejudg- mentof thepeople who haveweathered the stormsof campaigningwith him and, accordingto JohnEhrlichman, "The president'sconfidence is theonly qualification forworking in theWhite House."2 In addition,"you use your own campaignorgani- zationbecause people know each other"and are used to workingtogether.3 This naturalchoice of campaignaides, however, may lead to problems,because the natureof governingis substantiallydifferent from the natureof politicalcam- paigns.Bradley Patterson, with fourteen years working experience in theWhite House, arguesthat "The virtuesneeded in thecrucible of a campaign-arealmost the opposite of the preparationneeded for life within the White House."4 In a politicalcampaign issues must be simplifiedand differencesaccentuated; in theWhite House issuestake on "infiniteshades of grey." Simplification will nothelp thepresident deal withthe tough issues. In a campaignpeople are either for you or againstyou, and thelatter are seen as theenemy. But in theWhite House coalitions mustbe builtto gain supportfor the president'sprograms, and the countrymust be unitedbehind the administration.In a campaignpublicity is avidlysought; ex- posureof the candidateand his staffcontributes to makingthe maximumimpact on voters'minds. In the White House, however,the staffmust have that "passion foranonymity" ofwhich Louis Brownlow spoke. A highpublic profile for staff members decreasesthe President'svisibility and is no serviceto him. Pattersonasks: "Can a hard-driving,fast-moving bunch of egotists be so metamorphosedbetween November 5 andJanuary 20?" His answeris "Perhaps."5 Becauseof the typesof peoplewho are successfulin gettingappointments to theWhite House staffand because of the type of atmosphere that exists at thehighest levelsof power, the best in peopleis notalways brought out. Thereis theopportunity forgreatness, but also forthe abuse of power. In hisbook on presidentialstaffs from Rooseveltthrough Johnson, Patrick Anderson describes White House staffmembers: "Theytend to be young,highly intelligent, and unashamedly on themake. They take chances,they cut corners,and unlikemost politicians they sometimes have a little spontaneityand irreverence left in them.This accountsfor much of theircharm and mostof theirproblems."6 The combinationof personality types in thepresence of great power and pressure to achieveshort term political goals combineto makethe White House a peculiar cauldronfrought with dangeras well as opportunity."Policy differences, piled on topof personality clashes, multiplied by the time pressures, and heated by sometimes vindictivenews leaks, can add up to an incandescentplasma of high-voltage conflict."7 Withthe particular personality types likely to be in theWhite House andthe pressure filledatmosphere, organizational issues take on extraordinaryimportance. 668 I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Eisenhower and Kennedy Models Contrasted The two mainmodels of White House organizationin thecontemporary presidencyare the Eisenhower and theRoosevelt-Kennedy models. Recent presidents haveseemed to wantto imitatePresident Eisenhower's system of cabinet organization butnot necessarily his White House organization.Eisenhower's participation in staff advisorysystems in the militaryled him to the conclusionthat the White House mustbe organizedmuch more formally than Truman and Roosevelthad organized theirs.While good organizationwould not guarantee good advice,according to Eisen- howerit would enhancethe likelihood of efficiency."Organization cannot make a geniusout of an incompetent.On theother hand, disorganization can scarcelyfail to resultin inefficiency."8Eisenhower insisted that as manyissues as possiblebe settled belowthe Presidential level and thatissues be presentedfor his consideration on one page memoranda. The drivingforce behind the Eisenhower White House staffsystem was Sherman Adamswho cameto dominatethe White House withan ironhand. Adams said that hisjob was "to managea staffthat would boil down,simplify and expedite the urgent businessthat had to be broughtto Eisenhower'spersonal attention and to keepas muchwork of secondaryimportance as possibleoff his desk."9He controlledwho saw thePresident, and mostcabinet officers reported to thePresident through him. He seemedto dominateWhite House policyso thoroughlythat one newspaperran a storyheadline declaring: "Adams Insists Ike is ReallyPresident."10 One ofthe useful functions Adams performed was to absorbflack when the presi- dentmade an unpopulardecision on a minormatter. Adams could be seen as the "abominableno man" or the one who deniedaccess to the president.This helped maintainEisenhower's image as a benevolentleader not concernedwith petty poli- tics.11On theother hand a chiefof staffwith tight control of access to thePresident canisolate the President from diverse points of view and keep him from seeing people whom he oughtto see. Greensteinargues that this was not the case with Adams andEisenhower, though the issue was raised later with regard to theNixon presidency. WhenJohn Kennedy was electedhe was stronglyurged by his advisors to reject the Eisenhowermodel of White House organizationand to adopt a systemcloser to thatof FranklinRoosevelt. In his memorandum,"Staffing the President-Elect," RichardNeustadt described the typeof organizationKennedy might adopt: You would be yourown "chiefof staff . For ifyou followmy advice you will commityourself not to eachdetail öf Rooseveltianpractice . but to the spiritof his presidentialoperation; whereby you would oversee,coordinate, and interferewith virtually everything your staff was doing.A collégialstaff has to be managed;competition has to be audited.12 ClarkClifford also urged Kennedy to rejectthe Eisenhower model with its dom- inantchief of staff.13 In a memorandumto Kennedyhe argued:"A vigorousPresident in theDemocratic tradition of thePresidency will probablyfind it bestto act as his own chiefof staff,and to haveno highlyvisible majordomo