Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics by the Universities of Aachen ∙ Gießen ∙ Göttingen Kassel ∙ Marburg ∙ Siegen ISSN 1867-3678 No. 31-2017 Samuel de Haas, Daniel Herold and Jan Thomas Schäfer Entry deterrence due to brand proliferation: Empirical evidence from the German interurban bus industry This paper can be downloaded from http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg School of Business and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg Tel: +49-6421-2823091, Fax: +49-6421-2823088, e-mail:
[email protected] Entry deterrence due to brand proliferation: Empirical evidence from the German interurban bus industry Samuel de Haas∗y Daniel Herold ∗ Jan Thomas Sch¨afer∗. July 27, 2018 Abstract In 2016, the largest operator in the German interurban bus industry, Flixbus, acquired its major rival, Postbus. We study the effects of that takeover using route-level data covering more than 6,000 routes. We find that Flixbus, on average, provided a lower fre- quency of bus rides and slightly decreased prices after the takeover. This indicates that Flixbus pursued a strategy of preemption: to decrease residual demand for Postbus, Flixbus offered a high number of bus rides. After the takeover, Flixbus decreased the supply of transportation services and lowered the prices to compensate the consumers for the resulting increase in inconvenience costs.1 JEL codes: L11, L41, L92, K21, K23 Keywords: Competition, Takeover, Interurban Bus Services, Brand Proliferation, Entry Deterrence ∗Chair for Industrial Organization, Regulation and Antitrust, Department of Economics, Justus-Liebig- University Giessen. Licher Strasse 62, 35394 Giessen, Germany yCorresponding author, e-mail:
[email protected].