Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Images and Dilemmas in International Relations
Dustin Tingley [email protected]
Department of Government, Harvard University Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Introduction Three images of IR
I Man
I State
I System Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Man Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Man
I Motivations, dispositions, pathologies of individuals explains international affairs
I “Human nature” matters
I Quests for power/status essential because that is what individuals care about
Associated with scholars like Hobbes, Morgenthau (at times), Rosen, and Tingley Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Man
I Motivations, dispositions, pathologies of individuals explains international affairs
I “Human nature” matters
I Quests for power/status essential because that is what individuals care about
Associated with scholars like Hobbes, Morgenthau (at times), Rosen, and Tingley Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Man
I Motivations, dispositions, pathologies of individuals explains international affairs
I “Human nature” matters
I Quests for power/status essential because that is what individuals care about
Associated with scholars like Hobbes, Morgenthau (at times), Rosen, and Tingley Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Man
I Motivations, dispositions, pathologies of individuals explains international affairs
I “Human nature” matters
I Quests for power/status essential because that is what individuals care about
Associated with scholars like Hobbes, Morgenthau (at times), Rosen, and Tingley Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Hobbes: “sources of quarrel”
Hobbes’s (1588-1679) three sources of quarrel
I Glory
I Competition
I No trust in others/pre-emption of attack Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Hobbes: “sources of quarrel”
Hobbes’s (1588-1679) three sources of quarrel
I Glory
I Competition
I No trust in others/pre-emption of attack Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Hobbes: “sources of quarrel”
Hobbes’s (1588-1679) three sources of quarrel
I Glory
I Competition
I No trust in others/pre-emption of attack Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Hobbes: “sources of quarrel”
Hobbes’s (1588-1679) three sources of quarrel
I Glory
I Competition
I No trust in others/pre-emption of attack Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Limitations of Man?
Is this a compelling form of explanation of international relations?
I If human nature is a constant, how does it explain international affairs which is variable?
I Too reductionist: “human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910” (Waltz) Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Limitations of Man?
Is this a compelling form of explanation of international relations?
I If human nature is a constant, how does it explain international affairs which is variable?
I Too reductionist: “human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910” (Waltz) Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Limitations of Man?
Is this a compelling form of explanation of international relations?
I If human nature is a constant, how does it explain international affairs which is variable?
I Too reductionist: “human nature may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910” (Waltz) Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Limitations of Man?
Real foreign policy decisions are made by groups, with standard operating procedures, not individuals with individual pathologies. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Man Activity
Write about an example of where one of Hobbes’s sources of quarrel has led to quarrel internationally. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Domestic political structures (“institutions”) or ideological commitments determine foreign policies, which then drive foreign relations.
Associated with scholars like Kant, Lenin, Milner Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Domestic political structures (“institutions”) or ideological commitments determine foreign policies, which then drive foreign relations.
Associated with scholars like Kant, Lenin, Milner Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
For example, the “Democratic Peace”
I Democracies very rarely fight each other Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
For example, the “Democratic Peace”
I Democracies very rarely fight each other Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Another view of the state is that political structure changes foreign policy choices
I In democracies leaders want to get re-elected by the masses
I In autocracies leaders are kept alive by smaller sets of current elites Can lead to incentives for:
I Diversionary war
I Resource grabs to satisfy coalition keeping leader in power Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Another view of the state is that political structure changes foreign policy choices
I In democracies leaders want to get re-elected by the masses
I In autocracies leaders are kept alive by smaller sets of current elites Can lead to incentives for:
I Diversionary war
I Resource grabs to satisfy coalition keeping leader in power Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Another view of the state is that political structure changes foreign policy choices
I In democracies leaders want to get re-elected by the masses
I In autocracies leaders are kept alive by smaller sets of current elites Can lead to incentives for:
I Diversionary war
I Resource grabs to satisfy coalition keeping leader in power Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Another view of the state is that political structure changes foreign policy choices
I In democracies leaders want to get re-elected by the masses
I In autocracies leaders are kept alive by smaller sets of current elites Can lead to incentives for:
I Diversionary war
I Resource grabs to satisfy coalition keeping leader in power Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State State
Another view of the state is that political structure changes foreign policy choices
I In democracies leaders want to get re-elected by the masses
I In autocracies leaders are kept alive by smaller sets of current elites Can lead to incentives for:
I Diversionary war
I Resource grabs to satisfy coalition keeping leader in power Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State Limitations of the State
Is this a compelling form of explanation?
I How much are governments simply responding to external situations (i.e., the “system”)?
I If domestic system stays the same but war happens sometimes and not others, what explains this? Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State Limitations of the State
Is this a compelling form of explanation?
I How much are governments simply responding to external situations (i.e., the “system”)?
I If domestic system stays the same but war happens sometimes and not others, what explains this? Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
State Limitations of the State
Is this a compelling form of explanation?
I How much are governments simply responding to external situations (i.e., the “system”)?
I If domestic system stays the same but war happens sometimes and not others, what explains this? Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System The System
Anarchic system determines relations between states
I In anarchy, states are driven by self-preservation motives
I If you aren’t sovereign, you’ve got nothing Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System The System
Anarchic system determines relations between states
I In anarchy, states are driven by self-preservation motives
I If you aren’t sovereign, you’ve got nothing Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System The System
Anarchic system determines relations between states
I In anarchy, states are driven by self-preservation motives
I If you aren’t sovereign, you’ve got nothing Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System The System
Focuses on different structures of the international system: multipolar versus bipolar
Focus on alliances, systemic disruptions (e.g., another country getting nuclear weapons). Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System The System
Focuses on different structures of the international system: multipolar versus bipolar
Focus on alliances, systemic disruptions (e.g., another country getting nuclear weapons). Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
Let’s combine the view that international system is anarchic and relationships between states are zero-sum.
→ Information will be important (you want to know the other’s intentions and capabilities) but hard to get from your enemies (why would they tell you the truth?).
→ Lack of information sharing could be a cause of war. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
Let’s combine the view that international system is anarchic and relationships between states are zero-sum.
→ Information will be important (you want to know the other’s intentions and capabilities) but hard to get from your enemies (why would they tell you the truth?).
→ Lack of information sharing could be a cause of war. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
Let’s combine the view that international system is anarchic and relationships between states are zero-sum.
→ Information will be important (you want to know the other’s intentions and capabilities) but hard to get from your enemies (why would they tell you the truth?).
→ Lack of information sharing could be a cause of war. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
What does this imply about differences between multipolar and bipolar systems?
1. Less likelihood of systemic (big!) wars in bipolar world because only one spot of friction and only need information about one side versus many.
2. Only need to reassure one side. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
What does this imply about differences between multipolar and bipolar systems?
1. Less likelihood of systemic (big!) wars in bipolar world because only one spot of friction and only need information about one side versus many.
2. Only need to reassure one side. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Testable Hypotheses?
What does this imply about differences between multipolar and bipolar systems?
1. Less likelihood of systemic (big!) wars in bipolar world because only one spot of friction and only need information about one side versus many.
2. Only need to reassure one side. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
System Discussion
Use the forum we have setup to say which level of analysis you think is more compelling and why. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Security Dilemma
All states have to ensure their security.
How do states do this?
I Arms
I Information
Why are arms so important?
Why is information so important?
But, weapons (and privately held information) can make other countries LESS secure. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Security Dilemma
All states have to ensure their security.
How do states do this?
I Arms
I Information
Why are arms so important?
Why is information so important?
But, weapons (and privately held information) can make other countries LESS secure. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Security Dilemma
All states have to ensure their security.
How do states do this?
I Arms
I Information
Why are arms so important?
Why is information so important?
But, weapons (and privately held information) can make other countries LESS secure. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Security Dilemma
All states have to ensure their security.
How do states do this?
I Arms
I Information
Why are arms so important?
Why is information so important?
But, weapons (and privately held information) can make other countries LESS secure. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Security Dilemma
All states have to ensure their security.
How do states do this?
I Arms
I Information
Why are arms so important?
Why is information so important?
But, weapons (and privately held information) can make other countries LESS secure. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Military Spending Data Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Offensive versus Defensive Weapons
Some technologies lead to a defensive advantage
Some technologies lead to an offensive advantage Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Offensive versus Defensive Weapons
Some technologies lead to a defensive advantage
Some technologies lead to an offensive advantage Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Fundamental causes of security dilemma
Anarchy
Lack of trust
Ambiguity
Misperception Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Anarchy
Logic of anarchy’s role
I Defining characteristic: Lack of central authority governing interstate relations
I Consequence: Self-help system of national security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Anarchy
Logic of anarchy’s role
I Defining characteristic: Lack of central authority governing interstate relations
I Consequence: Self-help system of national security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Anarchy
Logic of anarchy’s role
I Defining characteristic: Lack of central authority governing interstate relations
I Consequence: Self-help system of national security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Lack of Trust
Importance of failures of trust
I Empathy Failures: Own concern with survival impedes recognition of other’s concern with survival
I Case: WWI defensive mobilization appears threatening to others Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Lack of Trust
Importance of failures of trust
I Empathy Failures: Own concern with survival impedes recognition of other’s concern with survival
I Case: WWI defensive mobilization appears threatening to others Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Lack of Trust
Importance of failures of trust
I Empathy Failures: Own concern with survival impedes recognition of other’s concern with survival
I Case: WWI defensive mobilization appears threatening to others Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Ambiguity
Role of ambiguity in the security dilemma
I Credibility Problems: Opponent cannot credibly express its intentions, rendering its actions ambiguous
I Offense or Defense: Often unclear if new arms serve offensive or defensive purposes
I Dual Purposes: UK Navy plans to safeguard shipping lanes also looks menacing for Japanese security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Ambiguity
Role of ambiguity in the security dilemma
I Credibility Problems: Opponent cannot credibly express its intentions, rendering its actions ambiguous
I Offense or Defense: Often unclear if new arms serve offensive or defensive purposes
I Dual Purposes: UK Navy plans to safeguard shipping lanes also looks menacing for Japanese security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Ambiguity
Role of ambiguity in the security dilemma
I Credibility Problems: Opponent cannot credibly express its intentions, rendering its actions ambiguous
I Offense or Defense: Often unclear if new arms serve offensive or defensive purposes
I Dual Purposes: UK Navy plans to safeguard shipping lanes also looks menacing for Japanese security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Ambiguity
Role of ambiguity in the security dilemma
I Credibility Problems: Opponent cannot credibly express its intentions, rendering its actions ambiguous
I Offense or Defense: Often unclear if new arms serve offensive or defensive purposes
I Dual Purposes: UK Navy plans to safeguard shipping lanes also looks menacing for Japanese security Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Misperception
Cognitive Dissonance: US failure/refusal to believe Gorbachev when he kept talking about reducing tensions. This probably kept US pressure on USSR and overall defense spending higher than necessary because US couldn’t believe a Soviet leader would actually be adopting those positions. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Misperception
Reasoning by Analogy: French expect defense-dominance of WWI persists into WWII Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
I Signed February 14, 1967
I Obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons
I Does not permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
I Signed February 14, 1967
I Obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons
I Does not permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
I Signed February 14, 1967
I Obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons
I Does not permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
I Signed February 14, 1967
I Obligates Latin American parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons
I Does not permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
New START Treaty
I Signed April 8, 2010 by the United States and Russia
I Continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
I New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired December 2009 Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
New START Treaty
I Signed April 8, 2010 by the United States and Russia
I Continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
I New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired December 2009 Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
New START Treaty
I Signed April 8, 2010 by the United States and Russia
I Continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
I New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired December 2009 Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Destined for the dilemma?
New START Treaty
I Signed April 8, 2010 by the United States and Russia
I Continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
I New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired December 2009 Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Activity
Some see defensive weapons as less likely to lead to security dilemma. Others disagree.
Will US missile defense shields make Russia and China less secure? Yes/No, and explain your decision in the forum we have setup. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Security Dilemma Activity
Some see defensive weapons as less likely to lead to security dilemma. Others disagree.
Will US missile defense shields make Russia and China less secure? Yes/No, and explain your decision in the forum we have setup. Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Conclusion Bringing it together
Competing visions of fundamental causes of international relations
I Man, state, and the system Each has limitations/advantages.
Realist systemic views highlight the security dilemma Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Conclusion Bringing it together
Competing visions of fundamental causes of international relations
I Man, state, and the system Each has limitations/advantages.
Realist systemic views highlight the security dilemma Introduction Man State System Security Dilemma Conclusion
Conclusion Bringing it together
Competing visions of fundamental causes of international relations
I Man, state, and the system Each has limitations/advantages.
Realist systemic views highlight the security dilemma Media Credits Man Jacques-Louis David - Napoléon dans son cabinet de travail (Jacques-Louis David, 1812) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_II#/media/File:Napoleon_crop.jpg Public Domain Hitler in 1937 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler Public Domain The face of Gandhi in old age—smiling, wearing glasses, and with a white sash over his right shoulder https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahatma_Gandhi#/media/File:Portrait_Gandhi.jpg Public Domain Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Chris Collins of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation) http://www.margaretthatcher.org Public Domain Picture of Helen Milner by Frank Wojciechowski in Princeton Alumni Weekly article by Mark F. Bernstein https://paw.princeton.edu/issues/2015/10/21/pages/8145/index.xml © 2016 The Trustees of Princeton University Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press, 2015. http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10627.html Princeton University Press Thomas Hobbes (National Portraint Gallery, by John Michael Wright) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/John_Michael_Wright#/media/File:Thomas_Hobbes_(portrait).jpg Public Domain President Barack Obama at a NSC Meeting in the Situation Room. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Security_Council#/media/File:NationalSecurityCouncilMeeting.jpg Public Domain Media Credits State The Capitol offers free tours to visitors. http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/the-capitol-high-res-stock-photography/175877476 Portrait of Emmanuel Kant https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Public Domain (Author's Life + 70 Years) - United States Public Domain Tag Required Picture of Vladimir Lenin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Lenin Public Domain (Author's Life + 70 Years) - United States Public Domain Tag Required Picture of Helen Milner by Frank Wojciechowski in Princeton Alumni Weekly article by Mark F. Bernstein https://paw.princeton.edu/issues/2015/10/21/pages/8145/index.xml © 2016 The Trustees of Princeton University If you don't come to democracy, democracy will come to you. http://tsak-giorgis.blogspot.com/2011/02/1.html Humans of Afghanistan by Karim Delgado https://vimeo.com/54643502 Public Domain Media Credits System earth (Andrei Marincas) http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-27784852/stock-photo-earth.html?utm_campaign=Idee%20Inc.&irgwc=1&tpl=77643- 108110&utm_source=77643&utm_medium=Affiliate Seumas Milne‘s Multipolar World. https://tendancecoatesy.wordpress.com/2014/10/31/seumas-milne-and-the-multipolar-world-clutching-at-straws/ Nuclear weapons: Is full disarmament possible? (Kamal Kishore/Reuters) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2010/0406/Nuclear-weapons-Is-full-disarmament-possible
Media Credits Security Dilemma Arming America: Attention and Inertia in US National Security Spending by James L. True (1998). http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/ARMING_AMERICA__Attention_and_Inertia_in_U_S__Nat.pdf Five M15 anti-tank land mines are stacked for destruction at a demolition site on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in this July 10, 1997 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Defense.gov_News_Photo_970710-N-2240H-004.jpg Public Domain An F-117 Nighthawk stealth strike aircraft flying over Nevada in August 2002. http://www.defense.gov/multimedia/ Public Domain “General Secretary of the CPSU CC M. Gorbachev”. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev speaking at the 20th Congress of the VLKSM. Kremlin Palace of Congresses. http://visualrian.ru/ru/site/gallery/#850809 World War I, English trench in front of Neuve-Chapelle, in 1915 (Getty). http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/world-war-i-english-trench-in-front-of-neuve-chapelle-in-news- photo/159146362