Issue No. 1325 27 July 2018 // USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

Feature Report

“The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010- 2016”. By Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly. Published by the Association and Fissile Materials Working Group; July 2018 https://www.armscontrol.org/events/2018-07/nuclear%C2%A0security-summit-process-state- global-nuclear-security-architecture The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process significantly strengthened the global nuclear security architecture and brought high-level political attention to the risk posed by nuclear terrorism. The NSS pioneered the use of regular and voluntary nuclear security commitment-making by states and groups of states, leading to the creation of an effective new tool for continuously improving the nuclear security regime. While the NSS process ended in 2016, the threat posed by nuclear terrorism remains and the nuclear security regime must continue to evolve to address it.

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Issue No. 1320 22 June 2018

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS  U.S. STRATCOM to Take Over Responsibility for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (Space News) Defense Secretary ordered a change in the management of NC3 out of concern that it did not have a cohesive governance structure.  Trump Officials Weigh Limits on Uranium, Invoking National Security ( Post) The is seeking to reduce the number of nuclear warheads worldwide, so there is little need for uranium imports for U.S. nuclear weapons.  France Makes Progress on Refitting Submarine for M51 Missiles (Defense News) The government’s Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission is assembling and fitting the nuclear warhead on the missile on Ile Longue.  Air Force Gets First Real Look at Future ICBM Designs (Space News) Boeing and Northrop Grumman discussed proposed ideas with the Air Force last month as the service faces a 2019 deadline to specify requirements for the GBSD ground-based strategic deterrent.  Tactical Launches into Development with Pentagon Policy Bill (Defense News) The Trump administration is poised to get congressional authorization to start building a controversial new submarine-launched low-yield, nuclear weapon.

US COUNTER-WMD  Congress Demands Space-Based Weapons and Sensors No Matter What (The Drive) The latest draft defense spending bill orders to develop these systems even if its own experts oppose them.  L-3 Tapped for Aircraft for Imagery during Missile Defense Tests (UPI) L-3 Communications received a $73 million contract modification for aircraft that are part of the High Altitude Observatory systems used to collect imagery and data during tests of the ballistic missile defense system.  Drug to Treat Smallpox Approved by F.D.A., a Move against Bioterrorism (New York Times) The antiviral pill, tecovirimat, also known as Tpoxx, has never been tested in humans with smallpox because the disease was declared eradicated in 1980, three years after the last known case.

US ARMS CONTROL  Wants US to Make ‘Bold Move’ towards Peace before Denuclearization, Source Says (CNN) The establishment of a legally binding peace treaty would require the approval of two-thirds of the US Senate.  Trump Says U.S. Ready to Make a ‘Real Deal’ on ’s Nuclear Program (Reuters) U.S. President on Tuesday kept open the possibility of negotiating an agreement to denuclearize Iran, two days after he rattled his saber at the nation on Twitter.  There are 14,500 Nuclear Weapons in the World: Here are the Countries that Have Them (CNBC) While the exact number of nukes in each country's arsenal is closely guarded, below is a breakdown of how many weapons exist, according to estimates from the Arms Control Association and Federation of

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American Scientists.

COMMENTARY  The US and Have Plenty of Areas for Cooperation. Let’s Get to Work. (Defense One) U.S. President Donald Trump is hellbent on engagement with Russia, so engagement is going to continue to occur. The question is at what level and on what topics that engagement will be.  Deterrence, 2018-Style (Air Force Magazine) The principles of deterrence have not changed: Enemies must know that attacking the US will cost them more than they can stand.  The Sobering Reasons Congress Must Step Up on Arms Control () As Americans try to make sense of President Trump’s disturbing meeting with Mr. Putin, some history may help put our current troubled relationship with Russia in perspective.  The US Must Build ’s First Nuclear Reactors (Defense One) For all the attention on Iran’s atomic ambitions and the U.S. withdrawal from a deal meant to hold them in check, there is another nuclear story unfolding in the Middle East.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Space News (Alexandria, Va.) U.S. STRATCOM to Take Over Responsibility for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications By Sandra Erwin July 23, 2018 Defense Secretary Jim Mattis ordered a change in the management of NC3 out of concern that it did not have a cohesive governance structure. WASHINGTON — After a months-long review, the Pentagon has decided that U.S. Strategic Command should be solely in charge of the classified communications system that keeps the president connected to military forces during a nuclear event. The review was prompted by concerns that the nation’s nuclear command, control and communications systems, or NC3, was not under a single chain of command. Officials also have warned that the technology is outdated and that there is no clear plan to modernize it. “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has appointed the commander of U.S. Strategic Command to be the NC3 enterprise lead, with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration,” U.S. STRATCOM spokeswoman Maj. Meghan Liemburg- Archer said on Monday in an email to SpaceNews. The office of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment will handle resources and acquisition for NC3. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis ordered the review out of concern that NC3 did not have a cohesive governance structure. The commander of U.S. Strategic Command Gen. John Hyten told SpaceNews in March that he was spending a lot of time dealing with the future of NC3. CNN reported on Friday that Hyten revealed during a recent speech at the naval base in Kings Bay, Georgia, that he would be taking charge of NC3 operations and systems. Hyten said in that speech that Mattis wanted a single officer responsible for NC3, as opposed to the “committee-like” structure that has existed so far. Air Force Global Strike Command manages the Air Force’s portion of NC3. The Air Force is responsible for about 70 percent of the 62 air, space and ground systems that make up the NC3 and collectively provide secure, survivable and resilient communications for the president to issue nuclear orders. The Pentagon’s released in February raised alarms about the state of the NC3 system. Networks that were on the cutting edge in the 1970s are now “subject to challenges from both aging system components and new, growing threats,” the NPR said. “Of particular concern are expanding threats in space and cyber space.” The NC3 includes warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems. The NPR said many of these systems use technology that has not been modernized in almost three decades. Ensuring the security of satellites that support classified nuclear communications and missile warning is a concern because they are also used by the military in day-to-day operations. Some are specific to the nuclear mission, but most support both nuclear and conventional missions.

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In the interview with SpaceNews, Hyten noted that NC3 is “very resilient against threats, and I’m very confident it can handle anything today. But not 10 years from now.” When nuclear weapons systems now in development become operational — like the the B-21 bomber, a new long-range cruise missile, a new ICBM and the Columbia-class submarines — they will have modern technology and eill have to plug into the NC3 architecture. This will require a major update of NC3. Hyten said Mattis came to STRATCOM headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska last September. “We probably spent half a day talking NC3.” https://spacenews.com/u-s-stratcom-to-take-over-responsibility-for-nuclear-command-control- and-communications/ Return to top

The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) Trump Officials Weigh Limits on Uranium, Invoking National Security By Steven Mufson July 18, 2018 Commerce Secretary took a first step to expanding the trade war to uranium Wednesday, saying he would launch an investigation into whether quotas should be used to restrict imports in the name of national security. But utilities with nuclear plants fear such actions would raise the cost of electricity and nuclear experts said the military already has stockpiles big enough to last for decades. “Our production of uranium necessary for military and electric power has dropped from 49 percent of our consumption to 5 percent,” Ross said in a statement. That change took place over 30 years, he said. Much of the imported uranium comes from friendly nations. In 2017, Canada and Australia provided more than half of U.S. uranium consumption, according to the Commerce Department. Russia provided 16 percent. Ross announced the investigation six months after a petition by two uranium mining companies, Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, seeking quotas under Section 232 of the 1962 trade law that deals with national security. The companies want the Trump administration to cordon off 25 percent of the U.S. uranium market for U.S. companies. The commerce secretary noted that three U.S. companies with mining operations have been idled in recent years. The two mining companies that filed the petition had laid off more than half their workforce over two years and said mines couldn’t be reopened quickly if needed. Independent nuclear experts said that the U.S. military can rely on large stockpiles. The United States has 574.5 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials. A 2015 Energy Department study on security of supply said “new sources of fuel for naval reactors will be needed in approximately 2060.” The United States is seeking to reduce the number of nuclear warheads worldwide, so there is little need for uranium imports for U.S. nuclear weapons. “The national security argument is ridiculous,” said Edwin Lyman, a expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “Ill-advised policies such as bolstering the floundering nuclear

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 // industry by declaring it a national security asset is just taking us in the wrong direction as far as having a sensible energy policy.” The United States would also be undercutting the argument it uses with countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia that want to control their own nuclear fuel cycles, Lyman said. The two uranium mining companies said some needs could be as little as 10 years away. “I know it sounds like a long time but these projects can take decades, at least 10 years to get up and running,” John Cash, vice president regulatory affairs at Ur-Energy, said in an interview. He and Paul Goranson, chief operating officer of Energy Fuels, said there are restrictions on the military use of uranium from foreign companies even if they are located in the United States. Both Ur-Energy and Energy Fuels are the sole parts of holding companies in Canada, but their operations, more than half their boards and all their employees are in the United States. Industry analysts note that uranium prices are very low because of low demand. Ever since the Fukushima earthquake, Japanese nuclear plants have been largely idle. Germany closed several plants and plans to close the rest. The U.S. nuclear fleet, the world’s largest, is aging and having trouble competing with natural gas. Earlier, as part of the Megatons to Megawatts program, the United States imported highly enriched uranium from deactivated Russian weapons and downblended them for use in U.S. commercial reactors. Utilities have benefited from the low demand and low prices. The Nuclear Energy Institute also said it was opposed to any moves to limit imports. “We sympathize with the plight of uranium suppliers,” NEI President Maria Korsnick said in a statement. “However, NEI does not support the implementation of quotas as described in the petition. Potential remedies could put even more generating units at risk for premature closure, which would further soften the market for uranium.” Recently, uranium mining companies worldwide have been closing operations. The Canadian firm Cameco shut its McArthur River Mine and Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom announced that it would cut output. Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy said in a statement that U.S. production this year would drop by nearly half. Such cutbacks have “been the defining — and frustrating — characteristic of the uranium market over the past few years,” Energy Fuels CEO Mark Chalmers told shareholders in a letter earlier this year, according to an investor publication StreetWise Reports. While Chalmers said production cuts would boost prices, “the recovery has thus far eluded us.” In much of the world, uranium mining is done by state-owned companies better able to weather a period of losses. Some backers of U.S. uranium mining praised Ross’s investigation. Sen. John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), whose home state has uranium deposits, applauded Ross and said “For years, Russia, Kazakhstan, and have undermined America’s uranium producers. We shouldn’t rely on foreign regimes to supply America with uranium.” Energy Fuels has been active in Washington. In a separate lobbying campaign, the company sought to scale back Bears Ears National Monument, saying such action would give it easier access to the area’s uranium deposits and help it operate a nearby processing mill, according to documents obtained by . The company hired a team of lobbyists at Faegre Baker Daniels — earlier led by Andrew Wheeler, who is now acting administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

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Interior Secretary and top Utah Republicans have said repeatedly questions of mining or drilling played no role in President Trump’s announcement that he was cutting the site by more than 1.1 million acres, or 85 percent. Ross on Wednesday said he had sent a letter to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, informing him of the investigation. Ross has up to 270 days to make recommendations to President Trump, who would have 90 more days to act on the secretary’s recommendation. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/18/trump-officials-weigh-limits-uranium- invoking-national-security/?utm_term=.c985e0c02892 Return to top

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) France Makes Progress on Refitting Submarine for M51 Missiles By Pierre Tran July 23, 2018 PARIS — The ballistic missile submarine Téméraire has been taken to Ile Longue, the French naval base for nuclear boats, marking a key step in a major refit of the sub, shipbuilder Naval Group said in a July 23 statement. That move, which comes “after 20 months of work,” marked “a significant step in the the last modernization and adaptation of nuclear ballistic submarines for the M51 missile,” the company said. The submarine was towed Friday from dock 8 at Brest to the highly secure base on Ile Longue, a small peninsula in Brittany, northern France, where the French Navy maintains its fleet of four ballistic missile boats. The overhaul and refit required the hull to be split open and new silos installed for the M51 missile, which is longer and wider than the outgoing M45 weapon. Work will continue some three or four months on the Téméraire on Ile Longue, with the boat expected to sail for a further nine years after returning to service. “The adaptation to the new missiles is of primary importance,” said Maximilian Porter, program director at the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, regional paper France Ouest Entreprise reported. Combat and navigation systems were also updated. Téméraire is the third ballistic missile submarine to be refitted for the M51 weapon, following the Vigilant and Triomphant. That program of refits has taken some 10 years. The fourth ballistic missile boat, Terrible, was delivered equipped for the M51. Naval Group was prime contractor on the major overhaul and refit, which takes some two years and four million hours of work on each boat. Airbus Defense & Space is contractor for the M51 missile, which is assembled at its nearby Guenvénez plant and delivered to the Ile Longue base, where the atomic warheads are fitted. The government’s Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission is assembling and fitting the nuclear warhead on the missile on Ile Longue. Each of the Triomphant-class submarines carry 16 M51 missiles, which can carry up to six independent warheads.

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Studies are being conducted for a third-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine and future versions of the M51. The M51.3 version is due to enter service around 2025. Under the newly adopted 2019-2025 defense budget law, the government has earmarked €25 billion (U.S. $29 billion) for work on the nuclear deterrent, including seaborne and airborne weapons. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/07/23/france-makes-progress-on-refitting- submarine-for-m51-missiles/ Return to top

Space News (Alexandria, Va.) Air Force Gets First Real Look at Future ICBM Designs By Sandra Erwin July 22, 2018 Boeing and Northrop Grumman discussed proposed ideas with the Air Force last month as the service faces a 2019 deadline to specify requirements for the GBSD ground-based strategic deterrent. WASHINGTON — Boeing and Northrop Grumman have presented design options to the U.S. Air Force for a new intercontinental ballistic missile. The companies are pitted in a head-to-head competition to build hundreds of ICBMs that will replace decades-old Minuteman 3 missiles. Both firms discussed their proposed ideas with Air Force leaders last month as the service faces a 2019 deadline to specify requirements and map out a procurement strategy for the ground-based strategic deterrent, or GBSD. The companies submitted what is known as “trade studies” to help the Air Force draft program requirements before it releases a final “request for proposals” possibly a year from now. “We offered the Air Force cost and performance trades for a deterrent that will address emerging and future threats,” Frank McCall, vice president of Boeing Strategic Deterrence Systems, said on Friday in a news release. Carol Erikson, Northrop Grumman vice president for the GBSD program, confirmed in an email to SpaceNews that the company also submitted trade studies. “Last month, the Northrop Grumman team presented the Air Force with recommendations for defining the GBSD requirements,” Erikson said. “This key program milestone was the culmination of years of analysis aimed at helping the Air Force finalize its GBSD design.” McCall said the Air Force as this stage of the program is looking for “opportunities for cost savings” and the studies submitted by the industry will help to set priorities. Later this year the Air Force is scheduled to begin a “system functional review” that is required in major weapon acquisitions to ensure that goals set for the program can be met within the projected budget and schedule An estimated $80 billion program, the GBSD is considered a “must win.” Either Boeing or Northrop Grumman, if selected, will own the U.S. strategic missile franchise for decades to come. The stakes also are high for engine suppliers. Each missile is powered by three solid-propellant rocket motors, and only two companies in the United States are able to produce these large rocket motors: Aerojet Rocketdyne and Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems (formerly Orbital ATK). Aerojet has warned the Air Force and Congress that it needs at least one third of GBSD solid rocket motors production work to remain a viable supplier.

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GBSD is seen as a major test for the Defense Department, which has not designed a new ICBM since the early days of the Cold War. The Minuteman was conceived in the late 1950s and first deployed in the early 1960s. The Minuteman 3 was introduced in 1970. It has been modernized over time, and the Air Force concluded it needs to start replacing aging missiles in the 2020s for safety reasons and to ensure it has a modern system to counter Russia’s nuclear threat. The current ICBM force consists of 450 Minuteman 3 missiles located at bases in Wyoming, Montana and North Dakota. The Air Force said it plans to acquire more than 650 missiles under the GBSD program. After a three-way competition, the Air Force in August 2017 awarded a $349 million contract to Boeing and a $328 million contract to Northrop Grumman to mature the designs. If all goes as planned, competitors will present preliminary design reviews to the Air Force in 2020. https://spacenews.com/air-force-gets-first-real-look-at-future-icbm-designs/ Return to top

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Launches into Development with Pentagon Policy Bill By Joe Gould July 24, 2018 WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is poised to get congressional authorization to start building a controversial new submarine-launched low-yield, nuclear weapon. The Senate and House came together Monday on a $716 billion defense authorization report that authorizes $65 million to develop the weapon, aimed at deterring Russia, according to the bicameral compromise conference report. The requirement for the weapon — likely to be a submarine-launched Trident II D5 with a W76-2 warhead — is part of the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. The report for the sweeping 2019 National Defense Authorization Act is expected to come to a vote in the House this week and the Senate next week. The annual must-pass bill covers military hardware, personnel and a wide swath of hot-button national security issues. In a win for opponents of the new weapon, Congress would retain a requirement for an act of Congress to develop or modify nuclear warheads going forward, per the Senate version of the NDAA. That language bars the secretary of energy from starting the engineering and development phase, or any subsequent phase, of a low-yield nuclear weapon unless specifically authorized by Congress. House negotiators backed off their chamber’s language, which would have nullified the requirement, enshrined in the 2004 NDAA. It’s the latest move in a mostly partisan battle that saw the Senate Appropriations Committee approve a Pentagon spending bill with language to order more study before the weapon can be developed. The fate of the larger bill was unclear as of Tuesday. Congressional Republicans and the Pentagon are advocating for the systems to deter Russia from using its own arsenal of low-yield nuclear weapons. Still, many Democrats and nonproliferation advocates see it as lowering the threshold for a nuclear war.

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More broadly, the compromise conference report includes a sense of Congress that expresses support for the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review—and meets the president’s budget with $142.2 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons activities and defense nuclear nonproliferation program, according to a House Republican summary. The bill would also increased authorized funding to accelerate two key Air Force nuclear modernization programs: the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and the Long Range Standoff cruise missile. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/24/tactical-nuclear-weapon-launches-into- development-with-pentagon-policy-bill/ Return to top

US COUNTER-WMD

The Drive (New York, N.Y.) Congress Demands Space-Based Missile Defense Weapons and Sensors No Matter What By Joseph Trevithick July 25, 2018 The latest draft defense spending bill orders the Pentagon to develop these systems even if its own experts oppose them. U.S. lawmakers from the House and Senate have agreed on a final version of the approximately $716 billion defense spending bill for the 2019 fiscal year, which requires the U.S. military begin work on developing new warning satellites to spot incoming ballistic missiles and weapons to blow them up from space. The draft law requires the Missile Defense Agency to pursue these programs even if it argues against them in an up-coming ballistic missile defense strategy review, which might be setting the Pentagon up for a battle with Congress, but might also highlight the opinions of certain senior U.S. military leaders. Legislators announced they had agreed on a single version of the law, formally known as the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, on July 23, 2018. The House expects to put the measure to a vote by the end of the month and then send it to the Senate in August 2018. If it passes both chambers, then it would go to President Donald Trump to become law. Near the end of Subtitle E, the portion of the bill that covers dedicated missile defense efforts, are two separate sections, 1660C and 1660D. Their language is relatively sparse since they only serve to modify two portions of the previous National Defense Authorization Act for the 2018 fiscal cycle. The impact of these changes, however, is anything but minor. In both cases, the draft law removes the following phrase “If consistent with the direction or recommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that commenced in 2017” from the existing law. This means the Pentagon is no longer allowed to wait until that report is ready to decide whether or not to begin working on putting sensors and weapons in space to defend against ballistic missile threats. In addition, the wording in the draft bill would prevent the Missile Defense Agency, which will be in charge of these projects, from halting this work even if the review recommends abandoning the space-based systems.

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Legislators look set to establish a fixed and aggressive schedule for these developments, as well. The sensors need to be deployed no later than the end of 2022, according to another change to the existing sections. Based on the existing language in the defense spending bill for the 2018 fiscal year, the lawmakers want to the Missile Defense Agency to come up with a plan to finish development of the space- based weapons to destroy incoming missiles within a decade and potentially start testing a prototype system in 2022, which would be when the sensors are supposed to go online. The space-based weapons will be “regionally focused.” That is to say, it will be positioned to respond to threats from only one specific part of the world, such as the area around Iran or North Korea. They will also be configured to destroy hostile missiles during their vulnerable boost phase right at the beginning of their flight. It's worth noting that the U.S. military is already pursuing aerial boost phase intercept concepts, using either solid-state lasers mounted on high-flying drones and a physical kinetic weapon, as well. The goal for the space-based system is to achieve “an operational capability at the earliest practicable date,” according to the defense budget law for fiscal year 2018. Beyond offering an additional layer of defense, any boost phase intercept system also provides an additional deterrent quality, since it threatens to drop portions of the missile right back down on the country that launched it. Depending on the missile's payload, this could include radioactive material from a nuclear warhead or chemical or biological agents. Even though we don’t know what the conclusions of the up-coming Ballistic Missile Defense Review might be, it seems easy to see how this language could put the U.S. military in a bind. Lawmakers are essentially telling it to disregard its own expert advice on space-based systems, no matter what it is. Even if the final report recommends pursuing some combination of sensors and weapons, the Missile Defense Agency won't be able to act on those suggestions rather than following Congress’ direction. At most, it could try to follow both sets of guidance simultaneously. The change in the language reflects the clearly growing anxiety among legislators about the potential for ballistic missile attacks against the United States from various countries, especially North Korea. There was a flurry of North Korean developments in 2017, especially the debut of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile, which could potentially carry a nuclear warhead to the continental United States. This helped in no small way to push lawmakers to increase spending on ballistic missile defense that year and include the provisions for additional systems, such as the space-based systems, in the fiscal year 2018 defense budget bill in the first place. There’s a lot of evidence to suggest Congress and the Pentagon may actually be thinking along similar lines when it comes to missile defense in space. The two sides were in alignment on the growing importance of the ballistic missile defense shield in 2017, even if the Pentagon was reticent to divert additional resources to it from existing priorities, at least initially. This attitude has steadily changed. “There are not enough ships, there are not enough islands in the Pacific that radars can answer all of your sensor questions,” U.S. Air Force John Hyten, in charge of U.S. Strategic Command, explained to reporters at a missile defense-related event the Association of the U.S. Army hosted in February 2018. “[The U.S. military is] going to have to go to space.” Hyten spoke specifically about the need to speed up development and fielding of the Midcourse Tracking Sensor, which will be able to track threats in the cold vacuum of space. At present, U.S. military surface- and space-based sensors primarily spot and track missiles during launch and again when the warheads they carry begin to come down at the other end of their flight trajectory.

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One of the existing sensors, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), may have some limited “cold body tracking” functionality, but not to the desired level. Really, the biggest limiting factors are the logistics and costs associated with deploying enough radars, which can have a relatively narrow field of view, and satellites to provide persistent coverage. Without a more robust capability, though, there is an ever more dangerous gap in the stream of information where traditional ballistic missiles have a perfect opportunity to deploy decoys or other countermeasures to throw off defenders. The existing combination of systems also has no effective means of monitoring the travel of hypersonic vehicles while they are briefly in space or as they careen through the upper atmosphere. You can read about these issues and the Midcourse Tracking Sensor in more detail here. At the same time, this clear need to have advanced anti-ballistic missile sensors in space, and improving U.S. military capabilities in space broadly, has revived discussions about putting actual weapons of some sort up there, too. In March 2018, Michael Griffin, the present Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, highlighted various possible weapons that could be well suited for space-based missile defense applications, especially various types of directed energy weapons, at the 2018 Directed Energy Summit, which private firm Booz Allen Hamilton hosted. "I’m going to be very welcoming of other approaches that may not have had a lot of focus in recent years or recent decades,” Griffin said. “I would urge us to keep a lot of arrows in our quiver as we go forward figuring out how we’re going to translate directed energy technologies into warfighting systems that are going to defend this country and our allies.” Still, even if space-based defenses supporters in Congress and Pentagon find themselves in agreement, it is unlikely that there will be unanimous support for these projects throughout the legislature or the public at large. Ballistic missile defenses are already a controversial and often misunderstood topic, as we at The War Zone have previously examined in detail. Space-based weapons, whether they are advanced directed energy weapons or physical interceptors, have historically proven to be complex, expensive, and unreliable. Griffin probably knows this as well as anyone, having been a member of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. This program became derisively known as “Star Wars” and was associated with a host of technologies experts decried at the time as impractical, exorbitantly expensive, or both. The interception portion included space-based lasers, particle beams, railguns, and finally, an elaborate orbital weapon system known as “Brilliant Pebbles.” This final concept involved relatively small satellite-based kinetic interceptors that would be scattered throughout orbital space and activated as necessary. By 1990, the plan was to build 4,600 individual interceptors at a total cost of $55 billion – equal to more than $95 billion today. This didn’t include the funds necessary to support the “Brilliant Eyes” sensors that would have supported the complete system. In 1993, President Bill Clinton canceled the program and renamed the Strategic Defense Initiative as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the predecessor to today’s Missile Defense Agency. A quarter of a century later, the U.S. military seems to be ready to give this another shot and Congress seems eager to push it along. Technology has advanced considerably since the U.S. government scrapped Brilliant Pebbles, including with regards to solid-state lasers, high-power microwaves, and railguns. Regardless, it's still unclear if there are any systems, and the sensors necessary to cue them in space, that have reached a place where space-based missile defense is feasible at a price that is

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 // practical. There’s also the question about whether the United States could deploy them, even with a limited regional focus, at a cost that doesn’t threaten to eat away at other defense spending priorities. It will be hard to get ever around the reality that it is and is likely to remain cheaper and simpler for any potential opponent to just build more missiles than it is to devise ways to intercept them. There will almost certainly be concerns about the militarization of space broadly, as well, especially since many of the weapons in question could potentially engage other types of targets beyond ballistic missiles. At present, the Outer Space Treaty bans signatories, including the United States, from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but has no such stipulations about conventional systems. The U.S. government has blocked subsequent efforts at the United Nations to fully outlaw the deployment of any space-based weapon. “There is a lot of [skepticism] about the technical feasibility and the cost, and those are valid concerns, those aren’t unrealistic concerns. We should always be worried about that,” General Hyten said in said in February 2018 at the Association of the U.S. Army event. “It has caused the department to continue to look at it and say: ’We are not quite ready, we need to study it a little more.’ But I think we are ready now.” With the language in the latest draft defense spending bill, Congress seems determined to find out as soon as possible. http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22380/congress-demands-space-based-missile-defense- weapons-and-sensors-no-matter-what Return to top

UPI (Washington, D.C.) L-3 Tapped for Aircraft for Imagery during Missile Defense Tests By Stephen Carlson July 23, 2018 July 23 (UPI) -- L-3 Communications Integrated Systems was awarded $73.2 million for work on systems used to collect data during tests of the ballistic missile defense system. The contract modification, announced Friday by the Department of Defense, authorizes L-3 to obtain three used aircraft for the High Altitude Observatory, or HALO, systems used to collect imagery during tests of the ballistic missile defense system. The three aircraft will be used by the Missile Defense Agency to collect electro-optic and infrared data for testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The program is expected to run until June 2021. The HALO is top-mounted on Gulfstream-IIB aircraft. The aircraft are capable of flying at up to 45,000 feet, allowing them the ability to observe high-altitude intercept tests. The Missile Defense Agency is responsible for defense of the United States, it's territories and its allies from ballistic missile threats. The system coordinates a network of land-based and ship-based missile interceptors along with radars and satellites to detect and destroy enemy ballistic missiles. The modification increases the maximum amount for the program from $564.2 million to $637.4 million.

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Work on the contract will be performed in Tulsa ,Okla., with fiscal 2018 research, development, test and evaluation funds obligated based on individual task orders, including the procurement of the three aircraft themselves, the Pentagon said. https://www.upi.com/L-3-tapped-for-aircraft-for-imagery-during-missile-defense- tests/9991532349485/ Return to top

The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) Drug to Treat Smallpox Approved by F.D.A., a Move against Bioterrorism By Donald G. McNeil Jr. July 13, 2018 The Food and Drug Administration on Friday approved the first drug intended to treat smallpox — a move that could halt a lethal pandemic if the virus were to be released as a terrorist bioweapon or through a laboratory accident. The antiviral pill, tecovirimat, also known as Tpoxx, has never been tested in humans with smallpox because the disease was declared eradicated in 1980, three years after the last known case. But it was very effective at protecting animals deliberately infected with monkeypox and rabbitpox, two related diseases that can be lethal. It also caused no severe side effects when safety-tested in 359 healthy human volunteers, the F.D.A. said. “This new treatment affords us an additional option should smallpox ever be used as a bioweapon,” said Dr. Scott Gottlieb, the F.D.A.’s commissioner. Having a drug that usually cures smallpox is an important medical breakthrough, according to several medical experts not associated with the F.D.A. or the company making the drug. F.D.A. approval is “definitely a good thing,” said Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Research on tecovirimat — originally designated ST-246 — began at the institute after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Dr. Fauci said. The research accompanied efforts to stretch the national stockpile of smallpox vaccine by safely diluting it. “It all started back then, but developing a licensed product took until today,” he added. The F.D.A. approval of the drug went to Siga Technologies of Corvallis, Ore., a private company that developed the medicine under a federal biomedical defense contract. Although circulating smallpox has been eradicated, two known stores of the virus exist in laboratory freezers — one in Russia and one at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Bioterrorism experts fear that other stocks may exist; for example, in 2014 several forgotten vials containing smallpox were found at the National Institutes of Health. More worrisome, experts say, is the possibility that a terrorist lab or even a sophisticated amateur could use modern gene-editing techniques to rebuild the virus and then unleash it, deliberately or accidentally, on an unprepared world. Because routine smallpox vaccination stopped after 1980, almost everyone under the age of 40 is unprotected. The disease kills almost a third of people who get it, and is even more lethal to babies.

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Finding a medicine was vital because — unlike, for example, measles or whooping cough vaccine — smallpox vaccine is too dangerous to give everyone, said Dr. Peter J. Hotez, former president of the Sabin Vaccine Institute and dean of the National School of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine. The vaccine is now routinely given only to some members of the military, lab workers and others likely to come in contact with the virus in a bioterrorism event. It cannot be given to pregnant women, or to anyone with H.I.V., under cancer treatment or with any other immunosuppressive condition; nor can the vaccine be given to anyone with eczema or several other skin diseases, Dr. Hotez said. So a medicine like tecovirimat would be useful for treating anyone infected in the first wave of any release of the virus, as well as the millions of Americans who cannot be vaccinated. Dr. William Schaffner, a professor of preventive medicine at Vanderbilt University Medical School, noted tecovirimat also could be useful for treating monkeypox, which infects humans and has been increasing rapidly in Africa since smallpox vaccination ended. Monkeypox sometimes travels internationally; in 2003, there was an outbreak of 47 confirmed and suspected cases in the United States. According to the C.D.C., the virus arrived in a shipment of 800 small mammals from Ghana, including African giant pouched rats and rope squirrels intended for the pet trade. They infected prairie dogs at an Illinois pet warehouse; the prairie dogs in turn infected children who bought them as pets. Despite its fearsome reputation, smallpox actually spreads slowly compared with more common diseases like measles or chickenpox, Dr. Schaffner said. Symptoms like fever, exhaustion and headache typically begin 10 to 14 days after infection. These are followed by a rash of small bumps that become pus-filled sores, which can cause permanent scarring. In severe cases, the infection causes loss of large areas of skin and bleeding. The virus can also reach the brain, leading to encephalitis, and can cause blindness by blistering the eyeballs. When tecovirimat was tested in humans, the most common side effects it caused were headache, nausea and abdominal pain, the F.D.A. said. Results of testing by Siga Technologies were published in the New England Journal of Medicine on July 5. The F.D.A. gave Siga several valuable incentives toward its application for approval, including fast- track and priority review designations. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/health/smallpox-drug-fda-bioterrorism.html Return to top

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US ARMS CONTROL

CNN (Atlanta, Ga.) North Korea Wants US to Make ‘Bold Move’ Towards Peace before Denuclearization, Source Says By Will Ripley, Kevin Liptak and Joshua Berlinger July 23, 2018 Washington (CNN) — Continued negotiations between the United States and North Korea hinge on Washington's willingness to make a "bold move" and agree to a peace treaty with Pyongyang, according to an official with close knowledge of North Korea's position on the matter. If the US is unwilling to replace the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War with a permanent peace that would ensure the survival of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's regime, Pyongyang will likely not proceed further with denuclearization talks, the source said. The establishment of a legally binding peace treaty would require the approval of two-thirds of the US Senate. North Korea is putting pressure on the administration of US President Donald Trump to begin lifting sanctions, according to the official, believing they have done "so much" by freezing nuclear and missile testing, destroying one of their nuclear sites, and facilitating the upcoming repatriation of US service members' war remains. For his part however, Trump has privately expressed frustration over the perceived lack of progress in the talks, according to a US official, though he regarded the testing freeze as a positive sign. Trump pushed back against that suggestion Monday, tweeting that he is "very happy" with the progress with North Korea, noting a lack of rocket launches and nuclear tests in recent months. Both Trump and his secretary of state, , have been urging patience since Trump held an historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in last month. Pyongyang and Washington have technically been at war since 1950, and their relationship has been defined by decades of mistrust and failed agreements. Trump's meeting with Kim was the first time sitting leaders of the two countries have ever met. "We have no rush for speed ... We have no time limit. We have no speed limit. We have -- we're just going through the process. But the relationships are very good," Trump said last week. Singapore and sanctions One of the agreements at the Singapore meeting was to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," a notoriously vague phrase that experts say is viewed differently by Washington and Pyongyang. Pyongyang also committed to returning the remains of US soldiers killed during the Korean War. A US official told CNN that Washington is expecting the return of the first group of remains on July 27, the anniversary of the signing of the armistice which paused the Korean War and established the demilitarized zone that divides the two Koreas to this day. Critics of the Singapore deal claim the document lacks specifics and does not tie North Korea to a firm timetable on denuclearization or giving up its current nuclear weapons.

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Both Pompeo and Trump have argued there is no daylight between the two governments' positions on Pyongyang's nukes. "It's really pretty straightforward ... Chairman Kim made a promise. Chairman Kim told not only President Trump, but (South Korean) President Moon that he was prepared to denuclearize," Pompeo said Friday. "The scope and scale of that is agreed to. The North Koreans understand what that means. There's no mistake about what the scope of denuclearization looks like," said Pompeo. Trump and Kim also agreed to the "building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula," including the providing of "security guarantees" to North Korea. Pyongyang has frequently expressed concern that without a nuclear deterrent it could face attempted regime change or other military action by the US, particularly while the two countries are technically at war. Ending the Korean War was also a key element of the Panmunjom Declaration agreed earlier this year by Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Family reunions in question? North Korea's ongoing negotiations with Seoul have also run into a hurdle this month, with the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Saturday demanding repatriate a group of North Korean restaurant workers thought to have defected across the border. In May, the women's manager at the restaurant where they worked claimed he tricked them into doing so on behalf of South Korea's spy agency, the National Intelligence Service (NIS). NIS did not respond to CNN's requests for comment on the claim. KCNA said the failure to return the women to North Korea could impede efforts to improve North- South relations, including next month's planned reunion of families separate by the Korean War. UN special rapporteur on human rights North Korea, Tomás Ojea Quintana, said earlier this month that if the women had been taken to South Korea unwillingly "that is considered the crime." "They should be allowed to make decisions (on whether to return) without any interference," he added. KCNA, blaming the former government of impeached President Park Geun-hye for the incident, said the women had been "forcibly separated ... from their beloved families in wanton violation of their rights." "Their repatriation is a pending issue which brooks no further delay," the news agency added. "It is ridiculous to trumpet about the 'pain of separated families' while keeping the new 'separated families' deliberately created due to the inhumane act of the former conservative regime and while shunning the strong appeal of the (restaurant workers' families)." CNN's Nicole Gaouette, Barbara Starr, Paula Hancocks and James Griffiths contributed to this report https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/23/politics/trump-north-korea-frustration-intl/index.html Return to top

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Reuters (New York, N.Y.) Trump Says U.S. Ready to Make a ‘Real Deal’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program Author Not Attributed July 24, 2018 KANSAS CITY, Mo. (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday kept open the possibility of negotiating an agreement to denuclearize Iran, two days after he rattled his saber at the nation on Twitter. “We’ll see what happens, but we’re ready to make a real deal, not the deal that was done by the previous administration, which was a disaster,” he said during a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Iran on Monday dismissed Trump’s angry warning that Tehran risked dire consequences “the like of which few throughout history have suffered before” if it made threats against the United States. Trump’s defense secretary, Jim Mattis, declined to directly answer a question about whether he was concerned that Trump’s rhetoric might ratchet up tensions in the region, increasing the chances of miscalculation. But Mattis, speaking at a news conference in , listed his many concerns about Iranian actions in the Middle East, including Tehran’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in ’s civil war and for Houthi militants fighting the internationally recognized government in . “It’s time for Iran to shape up and show responsibility as a responsible nation. It cannot continue to show irresponsibility as a revolutionary organization that is intent on exporting terrorism, exporting disruption, across the region,” said Mattis, a retired Marine general. “So I think the president was making very clear that they’re on the wrong track.” Reporting by Steve Holland in Kansas City, Alexandria Sage in Palo Alto, California and Phil Stewart in Washington; Writing by by Lisa Lambert and Phil Stewart; Editing by Jonathan Oatis and James Dalgleish https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-trump/trump-says-u-s-ready-to-make-a-real- deal-on-irans-nuclear-program-idUSKBN1KE2I7 Return to top

CNBC (City, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.) There are 14,500 Nuclear Weapons in the World: Here are the Countries that Have Them By Amanda Macias July 24, 2018 It has been a little over a week since the two leaders of the world's nuclear club met behind closed doors in the Finnish capital of Helsinki. Both U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President , who own the lion's share of the world's nukes, said ahead of their first formal discussion that they would address the proliferation of nuclear weapons. "If we can do something to substantially reduce them, I mean, ideally get rid of them, maybe that's a dream, but certainly it's a subject that I'll be bringing up with him," Trump said before the meeting.

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"The proliferation is a tremendous, I mean, to me, it's the biggest problem in the world, nuclear weapons, biggest problem in the world." Similarly, the Russian leader said the two countries had a "responsibility for maintaining international security," citing their respective nuclear weapons arsenals. "It is crucial that we fine-tune the stability and global security and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction," Putin said during a joint news conference with Trump. However, it is unclear what Trump and Putin discussed in regard to their nuclear weapons stockpiles. One option Trump may have presented to the Russian leader is a new nuclear weapons agreement. The New START treaty, which is the current nuke agreement, is slated to expire in 2021. Meanwhile, there are about 14,500 nuclear weapons in the world and nine nations that possess them, according to a recent analysis. Russia and the United States account for approximately 13,350 of them. While the exact number of nukes in each country's arsenal is closely guarded, below is a breakdown of how many weapons exist, according to estimates from the Arms Control Association and Federation of American Scientists. North Korea Total nuclear weapons: ~10 to 20 Total nuclear tests: ~6 First tested: October 2006 Most recent test: September 2017 Total nuclear weapons: ~80 Total nuclear tests: 0 First tested: No confirmed tests Most recent test: No confirmed tests India Total nuclear weapons: ~120 to 130 Total nuclear tests: ~3 First tested: May 1974 Most recent test: May 1998 Pakistan Total nuclear weapons: ~130 to 140 Total nuclear tests: ~2 First tested: May 1998 Most recent test: May 1998 United Kingdom Total nuclear weapons: ~215

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Total nuclear tests: ~45 First tested: October 1952 Most recent test: November 1991 Total nuclear weapons: ~270 Total nuclear tests: ~45 First tested: October 1964 Most recent test: July 1996 France Total nuclear weapons: ~300 Total nuclear tests: ~210 First tested: February 1960 Most recent test: January 1996 United States Total nuclear weapons: ~ 6,550 Total nuclear tests: ~ 1,030 First tested: July 1945 Most recent test: September 1992 Russia Total nuclear weapons: ~6,800 Total nuclear tests: ~ 715 First tested: August 1949 Most recent test: October 1990 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/23/us-and-russia-control-most-of-the-worlds-nuclear- weapons.html Return to top

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COMMENTARY

Defense One (Washington, D.C.) The US and Russia Have Plenty of Areas for Cooperation. Let’s Get to Work. By Debra Decker July 24, 2018 We might start by taking Putin’s suggestion to create a bi-national advisory council to help guide engagement. U.S. President Donald Trump is hellbent on engagement with Russia, so engagement is going to continue to occur. The question is at what level and on what topics that engagement will be. This is a hard sell to most Americans, whose views of Russian President Vladimir Putin are highly unfavorable. Even Capitol Hill Republicans are shunning him. Anyone who has actually read the intelligence brief on Putin’s interference in U.S. elections distrusts him. But as President Trump rightly noted in the press conference following the Helsinki summit July 16, the countries do have shared interests. Trump promised that “representatives from our national security councils will meet to follow up on all of the issues we addressed.” But who? Neither Trump’s heavy-handed National Security Advisor nor some of the staff new to the National Security Council and diplomacy are the best choices for leading this work. President Putin — surprised? — has a better suggestion: seek positive “points of contact” for U.S.-Russian engagement, as he called them (at least in the English translation), assisted by “an expert council that would include political scientists, prominent diplomats and former military experts from both countries.” Such experts would know the history of Russian-U.S. engagement—the duplicity but also how the two countries can work positively together. A full-fledged initiative on all fronts such as the Obama-era U.S.-Russia Presidential Bilateral Commission for broad-based bilateral government discussions – suspended after Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine – would not be appropriate. However, both presidents and the public can agree some areas desperately need joint work. In the run-up to Trump’s proposed autumn meeting with Putin at the White House, progress can be made in one area much deserving of joint efforts – the nuclear one. In their Helsinki meeting, Trump called nuclear proliferation “one of the most critical challenges facing humanity.” Putin called it crucial to “fine-tune the dialogue on strategic stability and global security and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Trump can take the lead in this area of security and potentially show that he truly not only does “think big” but also can translate that into good deals. The process will be important, as will be getting the right people in the room. Here are a few ideas for ways President Trump can help advance those good deals he wants. Nuclear Arms Control Issue: Some existing nuclear agreements need attention as they languish or face alleged violations. Reducing stockpiles and new nuclear development can save money for both countries while preserving deterrence.

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Approach: The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that limits U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons can be extended, as Putin (and others) have suggested. Ways to resolve alleged violations and improve the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty can be discussed. For existing agreements, government representatives could hold discussions that include mediators which both sides have approved – and perhaps include other key countries such as China in select discussions. Issue: Short-range/low-yield nuclear weapons may present some of the highest risks; some contend they may be more likely to be used and cross the threshold to use of larger nukes. Both Russia and the U.S. are further considering how and whether to invest in this area. Approach: Discussions on tactical nuclear weapons can be started. Given Russian military reliance on such arms, new talks like these should include a broad range of participants. An expert joint study group of retired military personnel and political theorists could examine an array of possible approaches, some of which have already been studied including at military colleges and universities. Looking back at history for lessons for today’s wicked problems can help, too, as Harvard’s Applied History Project is doing. Issue: More than simply reducing classes of weapons, we need to work toward eliminating nuclear weapons. Presidents from Harry Truman, the only user of nuclear weapons, to Ronald Reagan and recognized the need for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Early attempts to work towards that were unsuccessful largely because the U.S. could not agree internally and the Soviets distrusted proposed approaches. Approach: Trump needs to be aspirational, as he has been on the other side of the world, where he seeks a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Joint discussions with the Russians on a range of world disarmament issues should be pursued via several joint public-private initiatives, with political scientists, experienced diplomats and military and weapons specialists engaged in discussion. Little success is likely to be found in the short term, given current world political conditions. However, getting some younger military officers together with equally young scientists and political thinkers – and equipping them with knowledge of early year attempts—could help forge ties so the next generation can make progress on these larger issues. Several groups might even tackle some of the same problems to develop alternatives. Topic areas could include identifying:  Conditions under which the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could be acceptable to nuclear-weapon-states and how to get to a norm of no first use  The support needed to sustain multilateral interest in verification for disarmament (including the public-private International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and in the UN General Assembly First Committee) in order to make for most meaningful efforts  In the short term, a few points for U.S.-Russian consensus at the Nonproliferation Treaty 2020 review conference  More broadly, areas the two countries should prioritize in disarmament discussions based on what they see as most important for reducing nuclear risks and what is achievable. In that sense, the U.S. may not need to prioritize ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – as the norm of non-testing is almost universally in effect, and efforts around the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and in the Conference on Disarmament could evolve with new rules.

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Ultimately though, the result should be joint Russian-U.S. positions on selected issues (with dissenting notes allowed) and include ways the two countries could help persuade their allies on these issues (e.g., what could be sufficient to replace the nuclear umbrella?). Iran and North Korea Issue: Iran’s development of nuclear weapons was supposedly stymied, or at least delayed, by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Israel recently released some documents it stole, in a raid worthy of a major motion picture, showing Iran’s intent to maintain technical knowledge for future nuclear developments – although some point out that at least Iran is still abiding by the terms of the JCPOA. The U.S. has withdrawn from that agreement, which causes some complications, including for businesses. The UN Secretary General, in his recent June report on Iranian actions, reported Iranian compliance with the JCPOA based on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection work. It is unclear if the Israeli documents will affect further IAEA assessments as the IAEA report notes ongoing assessments. The JCPOA is only one part of the UN Security Council resolution affecting Iran. The Secretary General’s report noted some concerns about Iran’s compliance with other parts of the resolution, e.g., missile-related transfers, that might or might not have occurred before the resolution went into effect in 2015. Approach: Russia has supported the JCPOA. America has larger expectations of Iran’s behavior, including in the region, which is a complicated morass of interests. Putin and Trump noted some good collaboration in Syria and discussed pursuing more. That might be the path for further discussions in the region, of which Iran is but one piece. Professional, official channels should be used to continue/expand military and selected intelligence discussions and coordination of humanitarian efforts. But some topics such as longer term visions for the region would benefit from new approaches to discussions, such as by including knowledgeable recent refugees/expats (and let many of them be women) and/or the next generation of innovative thinkers (who were all women in a recent IAEA contest). Issue: North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty, permitted under treaty terms, and its subsequent nuclear and missile testing, deemed a threat to international security by the UN Security Council, have continued to trouble members of the international community (, South Korea and the United States most of all, with China and Russia also somewhat concerned). Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held direct talks June 12 in Singapore and issued a joint statement. However, progress toward denuclearization and better relations appear mixed. North Korean trust of the U.S. is low, especially when the U.S. has been slow to deliver on past Korean agreements and withdraws from current ones, like the JCPOA and Paris climate accords. Approach: Russia may share just 11 miles of a border with North Korea, but has a potential interest in helping forge an agreement that works to bring peace to the peninsula, something Putin sounded willing to do. China wants a stable Korea on its border and to ensure that has already backed some harder calls for good behavior from North Korea, where sanctions were appearing to have some effect. North Korea’s Kim recognizes autocrats stay in power longer – and Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping likely have more sway with Kim than an American president. North Korea is one area where official dialogue needs to be the primary focus. Nuclear Security Issue: Former President Obama launched a series of four summits to focus on nuclear security. Unlike proliferation issues affecting state development/diversion of fissile material, nuclear security generally worries about non-state actors obtaining and using fissile material or sabotaging nuclear sites. With relations being contentious, Russia did not participate in the last – the 2016 – summit, which primarily addressed civilian stocks of material. Follow-on work from the summit

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 // series was entrusted to five international institutions. Much was accomplished but much remains to be done, as noted in a recent report from the Fissile Materials Working Group and Arms Control Association. The amount of plutonium and highly enriched uranium available, not just in civilian but also in military stocks, is high and may not be well protected – including in the United States, where a national lab recently lost a small amount. Russia’s continued progress on nuclear security is also a question. Meanwhile, Russia is chagrined at the U.S. abandoning its part of the two countries’ agreement to dispose of surplus plutonium stocks, which the U.S. deemed too costly to continue. Approach: The good news here is that Russia and the U.S. have recently successfully worked together against nuclear terrorism, including lobbying enough countries for the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to go into effect. This is significant because it establishes international legal requirements for material protections against diversion and sabotage. The two countries can further work together to develop an agenda for the 2020 IAEA ministerial meeting on security, which should include an agreement to have a regular review and reporting process for that treaty’s implementation, instructions for more cohesive IAEA guidance and peer-review missions (right now, despite the overlaps between safety and security, there are separate safety and security best practices and review missions). A Track 1.5 group can discuss recommendations from the summit process and which ones the two countries should prioritize, including how to get support from significant other stakeholders and organizations, as well as the need for broader IAEA reforms. Ways to expand cooperation at the working level can be explored directly as Russia and the U.S. co-chair the Global Initiative Against Nuclear Terrorism. New Areas for Cooperation Issue: Nuclear attribution. If you think relations are rocky now, consider how things would slide if a nuclear or radiological event occurred, and one country accused the other of purposely or inadvertently losing control of its dangerous materials. The IAEA has established some good forensics practices, but there are few political mechanisms for agreeing on attribution outside the IAEA safeguards process. In the chemical-weapons area, where we have a Chemical Weapons Convention, we have seen the attribution challenges in Syria. We have also seen the diplomatic fallout as a nerve agent poisoning case has continued to plague a small British community, with questions about the formal attribution process. Approach: The U.S. and Russia can establish a joint study group of scientists and policy experts to explore the political and scientific lessons learned from past inspections for alleged violations under international conventions and safeguards agreements. The group could also review new attribution approaches, such as the French one for chemical attribution, and recommend process steps that go further than existing IAEA guidance. Issue: New challenges are emerging from the broader uses of outer space to the cybersecurity of nuclear weapons and of facilities, with the Department of Homeland Security revealing new information on Russian cyber intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure, including nuclear power plants. Disruptive technologies such as additive manufacturing challenge traditional export control mechanisms for controlling proliferation while cryptocurrencies challenge controls over the financing of illicit transfers. Approach: Establishing joint expert groups of to consider some of these challenging areas would help in moving us toward developing agreed norms of behavior that could help avoid future deadly conflicts. Other countries are already moving forward fast in some areas, such as space issues and anti-satellite weaponry. Discussions including former military officials, experts and diplomats are needed, with NTI being a good example of one taking the lead in the area of weapon cybersecurity.

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The American public supported U.S. talks with North Korea and is somewhat undecided over the Iran nuclear agreement. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which had great success, was started by Democrats and Republicans working across the aisle; after the mid-term elections, perhaps they will be able to do so again. At least in the nuclear area, where the dangers are evident and growing, one hopes the rhetoric and divisions can be pushed aside and good work can begin between two battling parties and countries. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-and-russia-have-plenty-areas-cooperation-lets- get-work/149996/?oref=d-river Return to top

Air Force Magazine (Arlington, Va.) Deterrence, 2018-Style By Adam J. Hebert July 2018 EDITORIAL | The US will respond at a time, place, and in a domain of its choosing American space and cyberspace capabilities are enticing targets to those who wish the US harm. As the clear world leader in space-based capabilities, which permeate almost every aspect of military and civilian life, the US needs to defend space and prevent its satellites from being these inviting targets. Highly contested and secretive cyberspace is critical to modern warfare and advanced economies, but has no dominant power. The US is in need of better cyber defenses and forensics. In this new era of great power competition, Russia and China aren’t looking to take on American strengths, they are looking for vulnerabilities. For thousands of years, “militaries have vied for dominance on land and sea,” Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan recently noted, and war has now been waged in the air for more than a century. “Today we are at the dawn of a new era, facing the reality of war’s changing character,” Shanahan said May 4 as US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) was elevated to a unified combatant command. “Cyberspace and outer space” have emerged as contested domains, “equal in importance with land, sea and air.” CYBERCOM’s promotion to full unified command status reflects the rapidly increasing importance of the newer combat domains. CYBERCOM previously reported to US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which itself assumed the duties of the old US Space Command in 2002. The reprioritizations may continue. Defense leaders are still debating whether space again needs a dedicated unified command of its own, and if the military should split off a space corps separate from the traditional Air Force. These new combat domains pose new questions, such as:  How would the US respond if an enemy decides to attack military satellites on orbit?  What is the proper response to a cyber attack that shuts down the national electric grid?  What if an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack frys the nation’s electronics but doesn’t directly kill anybody?

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Enemies “can counter the advantage the United States has built,” Air Force Gen. John Hyten, STRATCOM commander, said last September at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference (ASC17). They can do it “in nukes, space, cyber, electronic warfare … so they’re going down that path, and they haven’t hidden it,” he noted. “At the end of the decade, they’re going to be a long way there.” The principles of deterrence have not changed: Enemies must know that attacking the US will cost them more than they can stand. They must understand the US has credible responses—and the will to use them. It is important to think broadly. “If you just think about space and you just think about cyber, you’re not thinking about what is motivating our adversaries to go that way,” Hyten added. As the dominant player in space, the US clearly has the most to lose from war in orbit. So war that extends into space must be avoided. Part of the deterrence will come by making clear enemies can’t get away with certain types of attacks. China understands if it were to sink a Navy ship in the international waters of the , the US response won’t necessarily be a naval response in that sea. Similarly, Russia knows if it shoots down an Air Force transport in international airspace over the Baltic Sea, the US won’t necessarily respond with airpower over the Baltic. The same credible ambiguity is needed in space and cyberspace. The National Security Strategy released at the end of 2017 sends a powerful message that is only now getting the attention it deserves. Many countries believe “the ability to attack space assets offers an asymmetric advantage and as a result, are pursuing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons,” the strategy reads. But then comes the kicker: “Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, and domain of our choosing.” This is exactly the right message: credible ambiguity. Enemies also hide behind opacity. Russia, China, and other adversaries try to exploit indecisiveness by denying the actions they take (such as the initial invasion of Ukraine) or doing things that fall just short of what might force a nation to respond (such as building artificial islands in international waters). Cyber warfare is notoriously difficult to trace. Malicious actors “use cyberattacks for extortion, information warfare, disinformation, and more [with] a troubling degree of deniability,” the National Security Strategy observes. “When faced with the opportunity to take action against malicious actors in cyberspace, the United States will be risk-informed, but not risk-averse” in considering its options. These options should not be limited to cyberspace. A powerful deterrent will make sure enemies understand an attack in space or cyberspace could bring a response beyond space or cyberspace. This should now be coming into focus. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2018/July%202018/Deterrence-2018- Style.aspx Return to top

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

The Hill (Washington, D.C.) The Sobering Reasons Congress Must Step Up on Arms Control By Martin B. Malin July 19, 2018 President Putin remarked in Helsinki this week that there is “no solid reason” for the “tense atmosphere” between the United States and Russia. Most Americans would disagree. Republicans and Democrats alike resent Russian interference in U.S. elections — by itself a very solid reason for strained relations. Russia’s invasion and annexation of parts of Ukraine and its fueling of the and refugee crisis present additional challenges to US and global interests. As Americans try to make sense of President Trump’s disturbing meeting with Mr. Putin, some history may help put our current troubled relationship with Russia in perspective. This year marks the 35th anniversary of the “Able Archer” nuclear scare. “Able Archer 83” was the name of a large-scale military exercise, meant to simulate for NATO defense officials how to conduct wartime nuclear operations. Though perhaps less well known, “Able Archer,” like previous crises in Berlin, Cuba and the Middle East, brought the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. The early 1980s was a period of extreme Cold War tension. Soviet military intelligence, the GRU (the very same), had embarked on a massive effort to understand U.S. nuclear intentions. The United States routinely probed Soviet airspace and early-warning systems. In March 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. Soviet leaders believed “Star Wars” would undermine the Soviet nuclear deterrent and with it strategic stability. In September 1983, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean passenger jet that had strayed into its airspace, claiming it was a spy plane, and killing all 269 people on board. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration readied the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In October, the United States invaded Grenada. Under the circumstances, it is not hard to imagine how Soviet leaders would have mistaken “Able Archer” for the beginnings of a real nuclear attack. They ordered an alert of Soviet nuclear weapons to preempt a U.S. attack. Moscow’s alert was not an exercise. Millions would have died if cooler heads in both countries had not prevailed. The 1983 war scare shook President Reagan, and helped give rise to much more intensive arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Though adversaries, U.S. and Russian leaders understood that arms control would provide enhanced transparency and predictability in the relationship. By late 1987, the United States and Soviet Union had concluded the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe. Negotiations also eventually yielded a series of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). Today, Russia is not the military peer that the Soviet Union was, and the two countries are not perched at the brink of war. But our differences remain deeply felt, and the grave risks posed by our nuclear arsenals persist. Indeed, threats to U.S.-Russian strategic stability are once again growing. The United States and Russia are modernizing their respective nuclear arsenals and introducing new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. The INF Treaty is on its last legs, amid reported Russian violations and Russian allegations of U.S. violations. New START, the most recent offspring of the verified arms reduction agreements begun in the 1980s, is set to expire in just two-and-a-half years. New arms control talks are nowhere on the horizon.

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

The past seriousness with which these problems were addressed is entirely absent. The distraction of President Trump’s sorry conduct in Helsinki pushes the opportunity for arms negotiations with Russia even further out of reach. Congress is asserting itself by passing additional sanctions to hold Russia accountable for its meddling in U.S. elections. Now it needs to step up its work on arms control — not despite the current tensions with Russia, but because of them. Even as the political fallout from the Trump- Putin summit settles, Congress should take the following steps. First, Congress should push the administration to extend New START immediately. Both countries have adhered to New START. Its verification procedures, which have worked well, provide reassurance and prevent misperception and miscalculation. The treaty has enjoyed bipartisan support. We should not let relations with Russia worsen before initiating the extension of this treaty. Second, Congress should encourage the Trump administration, through hearings and oversight, to constructively address violations that threaten the INF Treaty’s future. For example, if Russia is willing to destroy its treaty-violating missiles, or modify them so they no longer can fly to prohibited ranges, the United States should be willing to add verifiable features to its European missile defense launchers to make clear they cannot also launch prohibited cruise missiles. The collapse of the INF Treaty, and the re-introduction of intermediate-range missile in Europe, would in no way advance U.S. security interests, or the security of our NATO allies. Third, the Senate should revive and focus the work of the National Security Working Group to advise and consult with the administration on arms control measures under consideration, and to inform Congress of the administration’s plans. Democrats and Republicans in the group may not agree on every proposal, but they must agree to wall off partisan politics from efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. This group can play an influential role in guiding and monitoring the pursuit of arms control by the executive branch. The logic of deterrence is powerful but not infallible. Looking back at the nuclear crises of the Cold War, the inescapable fact is that sheer luck played too big of a role in preventing disaster. Nuclear weapons are complicated machines, operated and maintained by imperfect human beings, within complex organizations. Information for those who must decide whether to use these weapons is always incomplete. Miscalculation and accidents involving nuclear weapons have been far more common than most people realize. It will take a serious and coordinated effort by Congress and the administration to begin to address today’s nuclear risks effectively, and cooperatively, with Russia even as we hold Russia accountable for its interference in our elections. http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/397774-the-sobering-reasons-congress-must-step- up-on-arms-control Return to top

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

Defense One (Washington, D.C.) The US Must Build Saudi Arabia’s First Nuclear Reactors By Sagatom Saha July 20, 2018 Riyadh will get its atomic energy. The question is who gets the construction contracts — and the influence that goes with them. For all the attention on Iran’s atomic ambitions and the U.S. withdrawal from a deal meant to hold them in check, there is another nuclear story unfolding in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia intends to award the contracts to build its first two nuclear reactors next year, en route to building 16 of them by 2040. It is a matter of national security that the United States re-establish its leading position in the global nuclear trade by successfully pursuing this and similar projects. Riyadh’s nuclear ambition is not a one-off story; it represents a larger revival of nuclear power generation. Nuclear may be declining in the developed world, but it is poised for growth in the world’s emerging economies for environmental and technological reasons. The Trump administration should capitalize on these trends to fulfill its promise to revitalize America’s domestic nuclear industry while reducing risk of ceding influence to China and Russia. While Saudi Arabia did not explicitly enshrine nuclear in its 2015 Paris commitments like other countries, it has the ninth-highest ambient air pollution. More broadly, warming in the Middle East is expected to exceed twice the world average, making the region uninhabitable by mid-century. New designs like the nearly-commercial small modular reactor, or SMR, can also expand nuclear’s global reach. Many developing nations cannot use nuclear power because today’s 1,000-megawatt reactors are too large for smaller grids. But 50-megawatt SMR modules could fit right in. Even the Saudi grid, with 66 gigawatts of generating capacity, could benefit from SMRs, which could more easily replace fossil-fuel plants aging out of service. Because SMRs are compact, uniform, and factory-made, financing and construction costs would be less than gigawatt-scale designs. SMRs should also assuage safety concerns: they have simpler safety systems and can be buried for additional security, a critical consideration in the Gulf. Although SMRs are not yet ready for commercial sale in Saudi Arabia, the technology is expected to deployable in the 2020s, well within the Kingdom’s overall nuclear plans. While the idea of a Saudi Arabia with any nuclear capability may seem dangerous, it is also inevitable. The Kingdom has already received bids from companies based in the United States, but also in France, China, Russia, and South Korea, demonstrating a global willingness to supply nuclear technology. If the United States does not build them, another country will step in. But the U.S. nuclear industry has been in decline for a generation. Past administrations have been able to impose legally required, rigorous nonproliferation commitments from importing nations because they craved U.S. operational and regulatory experience. Despite America’s previous market leadership and strong safety and security record, its nuclear firms are no longer a clear choice. China’s and Russia’s growing role in the global nuclear trade should worry U.S. policymakers. Moscow has a demonstrated history of leveraging energy dependencies, exploiting its dominance in the European natural gas market for political concessions. China, too, could gain similar leverage by subverting America’s security guarantees. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has already made predatory investments to trap countries into indebtedness. Each reactor exported could serve as an anchor for geopolitical leverage over its sixty- to eighty-year lifespan.

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

These emerging market dynamics will hurt international nuclear security. Both China and Russia are known for lax standards on nuclear security, poor track records on safety, and a general willingness to turn a blind eye toward partners who violate international norms — a special consideration for Saudi Arabia. To Washington’s credit, Trump administration officials have been working diligently to secure the Saudi contract for an American firm. Energy Secretary has been regularly meeting with Saudi officials to negotiate a 123 Agreement, which would create the legal framework under which U.S. nuclear materials technology may be transferred. However, Riyadh has insisted upon the right to enrich its own uranium, which could potentially become weapons-grade fuel. Adding to the fire, Crown Prince said that his country would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran were to develop one. It is unclear whether the United States can insist upon renunciation of uranium enrichment and still secure the Saudi contract, given that other suppliers are unlikely to impose such requirements. U.S. nuclear experience and know-how are in decline, in part, because regulatory expansion has increased the cost of nuclear while that of natural gas has fallen amid the shale revolution. In a recent essay in The Washington Quarterly, Laura Holgate, former ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and I identified five strategies America can adopt to revitalize its nuclear industry: simplifying federal bureaucracy around commercial nuclear trade, advancing regulatory reform to expedite advanced reactor approval, lowering borrowing costs for domestic suppliers competing abroad, rebuilding the domestic nuclear workforce, and investing in innovation. The Trump administration should use whatever influence it has with Saudi Arabia—particularly goodwill accrued from stepping away from the JCPOA—to secure reactor projects while pursuing these policies. Some country will supply the Kingdom with nuclear technology, but America is most likely to prevent Saudi Arabia from pursuing weapons and can do so without prohibiting enrichment, a measure that would make Riyadh more likely to pursue weapons development in secret. The United States should instead seek Saudi adherence to the Additional Protocol in a 123 Agreement, which would grant IAEA access to Saudi nuclear sites and materials to guard against illicit activities. By investing in innovative designs like SMRs and expediting their approval through proper regulatory channels, the United States can further work toward alleviating proliferation, safety, and security concerns by design. The Trump administration shouldn’t miss out on the opportunity that Saudi nuclear plans represent. The White House has already pledged to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, and Riyadh’s energy strategy is a major step in that direction. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-must-build-saudi-arabias-first-nuclear- reactors/149914/ Return to top

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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1325 //

ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic. The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."

DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

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