Bicameral Agenda Control: Examining the Effects of Procedural Tools on Congressional Policy Outcomes, 1883-1937 Jamie L. Carson Anthony Madonna Associate Professor Assistant Professor University of Georgia University of Georgia
[email protected] [email protected] Jason M. Roberts Associate Professor University of North Carolina
[email protected] June 6, 2011∗ ∗Paper prepared for the 2011 Congress and History Conference in Providence, RI. The authors would like to thank Michael S. Lynch and Keith T. Poole for making data available. 1 Abstract One of the key differences between the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate is their differing agenda control mechanisms. In the House, since the late nineteenth century, a simple majority of those present and voting has been able to adopt special rules that can dictate which bills are considered, when they are considered, how long the debate will carry on, and what, if any, amendments will be offered to the bill. By contrast, the Senate has no equivalent majority agenda control mechanism. In this paper, we begin to assess the effects of differing agenda setting institutions on coalition size and policy outcomes across the two chambers. Using a combination of case study and systematic evidence, we show that the development of special rules in the House served to reduce the size of legislative coalitions, increase chamber efficiency, and restrict overall amending activity relative to the Senate. Introduction In October of 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company|one of the largest banks in the United States|was forced to shut its doors. Within days, stock prices plummeted by nearly 50 percent leading to a financial panic that worsened during the winter of 1907.