An Analysis of Online Public Discourse on Iran's Involvement in the Syrian

#DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF ONLINE PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON IRAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

LiekeSchut

ABSTRACT

ThisstudyanalyzesPersianTweetsandInstagrampostsaboutIran’sinvolvement inSyriainordertounderstandhowIraniandiscursivelyarguefororagainsttheir country’spartakinginthisconflict.Bycarefullycircumventingrestrictionsonfree speechposedbytheIraniangovernmentthroughsocialmedia,thisstudyreveals apolarizedpublicdebatethatentailsvariousonlinesocietalgroups,suchasthe “Barandazan”andagroupofconservativeactivists.Theanalysisexposesargu- mentativestrategiesanddelegitimizationsbasedonpresentationsoftheotheras evilandchangingdiscursivepowerrelations.Assuch,itcontributestotheunder- standingofonlinecommunitiesandpracticesaspartoftheIranianwebingeneral andtheonlinepublicdebateonIran’sinvolvementinSyriainparticular.

INTRODUCTION

The Iranian involvement in the conflict in Syria has caused a lively public debate in Iran.1 Media reports exposed that since the start of the conflict in 2011, the Iranian government has been supporting Bashar al-Assad with financial, logistic, and technical aid, in addition to sending military personnel and advising the Syrian army.2 The attitude of the Iranian population towards the involvement is crucial since even the Iranian regime is not omnipotent and is influenced by public mood and temperament. Research of public opinion reveals some Iranians support their country’s partaking in the conflict, while others are skeptical. A poll conducted in 2016 suggests that 80% of Iranians “approve of the role

1 See for example the following news articles: Jay Newton-Small, “The Surprising debate in Iran about Syria’s chemical Attacks,” Time, September 9, 2013. Or: Middle East Eye, “As Iranian Deaths Rise, Debate Opens at Home,” October 27, 2015. Or Farnaz Fassihi, “Syria Looms as Second Thought Over Iranian Unrest,” The Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2018. 2 Edward Wastnidge, “Iran and Syria: An Enduring Axis,” MiddleEastPolicy, vol. 14, no 2, 2017, pp. 148-159. 64 L. SCHUT their country is playing in Syria”.3 Nevertheless, how or why Iranians legitimize — or delegitimize — their approval seems to be unexplored. An analysis of the discourse expressed in this public debate will expose the arguments and legitimization strategies used in Iranian public opinion on this foreign policy matter. Public discourse in Iran is, however, difficult to access and research.4 Discourse in ‘normal’ media such as newspapers tends to express only opinions tolerated by the government, causing a biased analysis. Furthermore, it is very difficult for researchers of political discourse to conduct research on the streets, because of social control by the state.5 Luckily, an unrestricted and lively public debate openly takes place on social media platforms.6 Social media is a relatively new phenomenon, yet it is used by more than half of the Iranian adult population.7 The online nature of these platforms allows people to hide their identity and avoid restrictions posed by a repressive state. Besides, the searchability and quantity of social media posts provide a tool for the analysis of discourse on specific topics such as Iran’s involvement in Syria.8 Social media platforms are thus a very apt and innovative tool for research into public discourse in a country where the expression of opinions is often repressed. In this study I aim to expose the Iranian public debate on Iran’s involvement in Syria that takes place on two online platforms: Twitter and Instagram. The objective is to understand how Iranians argue for and legitimize their opinion on Iran’s involvement in Syria on social media by analyzing their posts and illuminating ideology and power dynamics within them. To achieve this, I carry out a critical discourse analysis of Tweets and Insta- a hashtag used for categorizing posts on ,جنگ_سوریه# gram posts containing the hashtag topic of the War in Syria. I use posts posted during the period of April 8-14, 2018, a timeframe chosen based on a Google Trends search.9 Also responses to one particular tweet that

3 Ebrahim Mohseni, Nancy Gallagher, and Clay Ramsay, IranianAttitudesinAdvanceoftheParlia- mentaryElections:Economics,Politics,andForeignAffairs, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, January 2016, p. 25. http://www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/Iranian%20Attitudes%20in%20 Advance%20of%20the%20Parliamentary%20Elections%20-%20020116%20-%20FINAL%20-%20sm.pdf (accessed on 11.12.18). A similar poll frames Iranian support of the conflict as either “support of groups fighting” The Islamic State (ISIS) (89% in favor), or as helping Bashar al-Assad by sending military personnel (65% in favor): Ebrahim Mohseni, Nancy Gallagher & Clay Ramsay, “The Ramifications of Rouhani’s Re-election: a public opinion study,” Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2017. http://www.cissm.umd.edu/ sites/default/files/CISSM%20full%20Iran%20PO%20report%20-%20072717-Final2.pdf (accessed 11.12.18). 4 Karim Sadjatpour, “How relevant is the Iranian street?”TheWashingtonQuarterly, vol. 30, no 1, 2006-07, pp. 151-162. 5 Paola Rivetti, “Methodology Matters in Iran: Researching Social Movements in Authoritarian Contexts,” AnthropologyoftheMiddleEast,vol. 12, no. 1, 2017, pp. 71-82. Orkideh Behrouzan, “Remaking the Craft: Reflections on Pedagogy, Ethnography, and Anthropology in Iran,” AmericanAnthropologist, vol. 120, no. 1, 2018, pp. 144-147. 6 Majid Khosravinik and Mahrou Zia, “Critical Discourse Analysis and Social Media Communication,” JournalofLanguageandPolitics, vol. 13, no 4, 2014, pp. 755-780. 7 See for example: We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2018.AnnualReport2018. https://wearesocial.com/ blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018 (accessed on 5-12-2018). 8 See for example: Zeitzoff, Kelly, & Lotan, “Using Social Media to Measure Foreign Policy Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis of the Israeli-Iranian Confrontation (2012-13),” JournalofPeaceResearch, vol. 52, no 3, 2015, pp. 368-383. 9 Google Trends is a search engine provided by Google that shows you trends in what people search for in google. A search shows statistics per week of the frequency specific words were searched. As such, I #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 65

Figure 1: A poll posted by @BanooReyhan on April 11, 2018. contained a poll10 addressing Iran’s involvement in the war in Syria were taken into account. In total, I collected 192 tweets and 228 Instagram posts. This study opens a window into the effects of public debate on government policy and how the usage of social media circumvents the restrictions posed by the absence of freedom of speech in Iran. In the light of censorship and political repression it is important to study online activism as the online nature of it renders it relatively untouched by state policies and influence. Operating outside of the official governmentally approved realm of politics, a description of the online public discussion reflects a more complex and heterogenous entirety of Iranian opinions and discursive arguments. Especially put against more traditional forms of activism that often operate ‘under the radar’, online activism — both the opposition and the supporters of Iran’s involvement in Syria — effectively exposes this complexity. Moreover, an analysis of the popular debate on Iran’s involvement in Syria will improve our understanding of Iran’s foreign policy and the underlying social dynamics that influence this policy. The very fact that the Iranian government tries to cover up parts of this discussion through censorship, testifies the government deems these (oppositional) opinions threatening to their efforts in policy making. Some authors stress the importance of public opinion to the formation of foreign policy in Iran. David Thaler (2010) for example contends Iranian politicians “shape foreign policy to serve domestic objectives”11 and identified specific weeks during which interests in the Syrian conflict peaked. Searches that contained the .showed a peak in the week of 8-14 April 2018 ”سوریه“ and ”جنگ“ words 10 @BanooReyhan poses the following question: “In the case of the war in Syria, do you agree to give financial, psychological, or military support to Bashar al-Assad and the shrine of Hazrat-e Zeynab against America and criminal Israel?” 11 David Thaler, “Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iran’s Leadership Dynamics,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2010, p. 76. 66 L. SCHUT

Paola Rivetti (2017) argues that voices of political dissent influence the decision making processes of the Iranian state through both formal and informal channels.12 Domestic and foreign policy should thus not be studied separately from each other and an improved understanding of domestic public opinion is thus crucial to understanding Iran’s political objectives in Syria. Finally, this study finds societal relevance in countering stereotypical presumptions about Iranian political ideology and international stigmatization of the Iranian regime. An objective analysis of the societal debate on Iran’s involvement will help understand how Iran can support Bashar al-Assad and his government, a political choice many people deem unjust that has been the object of international criticism. It is important to mention that the outcome of this research is not necessarily repre- sentative of the whole Iranian population, nor of all Iranians participating in the online debate, as certain social groups cannot be represented by only a couple of individuals.13 It is, in fact, impossible to study all posts that constitute to the popular debate on all social media platforms where this debate is expressed, due to the quantity of posts. Furthermore, online public debate is very changeable and it is likely a similar study conducted during a different time frame would have different results. This study thus only reflects the online debate on Iran’s involvement in Syria as it was during a specific time frame: a ‘snapshot’ of the debate through a limited number of posts. Besides, the censorship policy of the Iranian government to restrict internet access and limit free speech online, also limits this study. 14 This policy forces activist social media users to hide their identity. It is often impossible to know who the ‘person’ in charge of an account really is and whether he/she is actually Iranian. Moreover, there are many online actors that produce discourse, such as accounts under the control of organizations or even armies of bots.15 One of the ways this study aims to circumvent the identity problem is by focusing on Persian posts only. However, these posts could still have been written by anyone that speaks Persian or knows how to use google translate, and thus pose a problem. Researchers have done many interesting studies into Iran’s role in Syria since the start of the conflict in 2011. Most of these studies address politics on interstate level, state policy, or official state discourse or have tried to understand the reasons behind the start and the internationalization of the conflict in Syria. For example, a study of Dina Esfandiari and Ariane Tabatabai (2015) addresses Iran’s policy towards ISIS and Shahram Akbarzadeh (2015) addresses Iran’s response to the conflict in Syria with attention to political discourse produced by state officials. Generally studies of Iranian foreign policy matters and political discourse mainly discuss the official government discourse. So far, no one researched discourse on the Syrian conflict produced by ‘normal’ Iranian. This leaves us with an incom- plete understanding of the conflict and of Iranian public opinion on this topic.

12 Paola Rivetti, “Political Activism in Iran: Strategies for Survival, Possibilities for Resistance and Authoritarianism,” Democratization, 2017. 13 Page,etal., 2014, pp. 82-83. 14 Babak Rahimi, “Cyberdissent: the Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” MERIAJournal, vol. 7, no 3, 2003, pp. 101-115; Anderson, 2013; Article 19, 2012. Islamic Republic of Iran: Computer Crimes Law. https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf (Accessed on 5-12-18). 15 Zeitzoff, etal., 2015, p. 368. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 67

One of the ways researchers of Iranian public opinion sometimes approach Iranian public mood and temperament is through the internet. The internet is generally considered a safe space for the expression of opinions and political interactions.16 In this light, researchers have mainly given prevalence to the Iranian web as a site for political activism and as a medium of communication and formation of communities. In the aftermath of the 2009 elections, researchers often framed the internet as a tool for democratization and ascribed a major role to social media, Twitter especially, in the Green Revolution by dub- bing it a “Twitter Revolution”.17 More recent research, however, downplays the role of social media in the protests and stresses the diversity of the Iranian web. Ali Honari, for example, contends the stereotype of the activist Iranian blogger that is often presented in Western media, is not repre- sentative of Iranian internet users. According to him this stereotype led to “a tendency in the existing literature to neglect or ignore various areas of interest to Iranian users and to overlook indirectly political issues and concerns of the Iranian web.”18 He argues different societal groups use different platforms: Religious users are more likely to use Cloob.com, one of the easily accessible ‘national’ social media, whereas political activists use blocked sites such as Facebook.19 In order to incorporate this diversity into this study, I have chosen to use two social media platforms, in stead of a single one. Research shows conservative factions are not well represented on Twitter.20 To this end, I have chosen to also use Instagram, a social media that is used by a large and more diverse group of Iranians, but has not been used much within academic research yet. A simple Google search on the phrase “modafe’an-e haram” a term used for the Iranian and Afghani troops employed in Syria, reveals many Instagram accounts of people that describe themselves as such exist. The presence of conservative factions of Iranian society on this platform make it complementary for collecting data for this particular study. The emergence of social media was a game changer for online research. New modali- ties, such as the hashtag, and “big-data” approaches21 to the great amount of micro-posts that can now openly and easily be found online, make discourse more searchable and consequently provide researchers with new practical tools for finding the particularities they are looking for.22 Research of political discourse online uses a variety of platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and blogs and a standard approach to has yet to be

16 Sara Beth Elson, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan, S. R. Bohandy, and Alireza Nader, UsingSocial MediatoGaugeIranianPublicOpinionandMoodAfterthe2009Election, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012; Rahimi, 2013. 17 See for example: Sasha Segan, “Learning from Iran’s Twitter Revolution,” PCMagazine, vol. 28, no 8, 2009, p. 42. 18 Honari, Ali, “Online social research in Iran: a need to offer a bigger picture,” CyberOrient, vol. 9, iss 2, 2015. 19 Honari, 2015; For more information on the development and the complexity of the Iranian web, see: Akhavan, 2013. 20 Marchant, etal., 2016. 21 See for example: Sara Beth Elson, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan, S. R. Bohandy, and Alireza Nader, UsingSocialMediatoGaugeIranianPublicOpinionandMoodAfterthe2009Election, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012; Rahimi, 2013. 22 Zappavigna, 2012. p. 1. 68 L. SCHUT developed.23 Sara Beth Elson (2012)24 uses a big data approach to analyze online public opinion in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections. James Marchant etal.(2016)25 analyzed the content of the ‘Iranian Twittersphere’ during the 2016 legislative elections in order to map out communities and network structures, using a qualitative approach to the analysis of content, aided by network maps drawn on basis of quantitative metrics.26 Others have implemented a critical discourse analysis. Majid Khosravinik and Mahrou Zia (2014), for example, analyzed a Facebook page called ‘Persian Gulf’. Based on an analysis of referential strategies in the posts in this group, they claim the character of Persian nationalism is changing. The combined effort of the authors provides a blueprint of approaches to discourse on social media. In this study, I use critical discourse analysis. As part of this approach, I first describe the context of the conflict in Syria and Iran’s involvement; politically and ‘on the ground’. Since the (macro-)context sets the stage within critical discourse analysis for the analysis of discourse, it is essential to contextualize prior to delving deeper into the data. To this end, describe how and why Iran is militarily and politically involved in Syria and address the relationship between Iran and Syria. Furthermore, I will address the framing and legitimization of Iran’s involvement in official state discourse to provide the discursive context. Then I analyze the data through discursive strategies. I will structure the analysis by theme. First, I will address imagined group identities through the referential and predi- cation strategies employed, illuminating online ideological groups, such as religious conservatives and a group that opposes the Iranian government. Then, I will analyze topics that are frequently discussed within the data though the argumentation strategies employed and through extra layers of related context and literature, effectively exposing how people argue for and against Iran’s involvement.27 The conclusions I draw reflect on the analysis and discusses the results. The tweets and Instagram posts were collected by using screenshots and saving them on the researcher’s computer. A word document was then organized according to topics addressed and hashtags used. Extracts from this word document will be shown in the analysis. The data I collected is in Persian and has to be translated into English. This activity also influences the neutrality of the information, as it causes implications for how the data can be analyzed and represented.28 On top of that, posts often contain a form of colloquial Persian. The usage of unstandardized forms of language problematizes the usage of traditional dictionaries and makes some of my interpretations disputable.

23 See for example: Khoshravinik, etal., 2014, pp. 755-756. 24 Elson etal., 2012. 25 James Marchant, Amin Sabeti, Kyle Bowen, John Kelly, Rebekah Heacock Jones, #IranVotes: PoliticalDiscourseonIranianTwitterDuringthe2016ParliamentaryElections, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2016. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27377992/ IranVotes_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed 5-12-18). 26 Idem. 27 For more information on Critical Discourse Analysis, I have mirrored both: Lama Altoaimy, “Driving Change on Twitter: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Analysis of the Twitter Debates on the Saudi Ban on Women Driving,” SocialSciences, vol. 7, no. 5, 2018, pp. 81-95. And Wodak and Meyer, 2001. Or: Antonio Reyes, “Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions,” Discourse&Society, vol. 22, no. 6, 2011, pp. 781-807. 28 Page, etal., 2014, pp. 85-87. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 69

Finally, there is the issue of consent. The question is whether users of social media consent with their posts being used in this research. Due to the number of users contributing to the corpus of this research, it is impossible to acquire consent from all. However, users of social media implicitly consent with their posts being read by anyone because they ‘share’ their posts openly with anyone that wants to read them. Due to the choice to make their posts public, I assume consent is given.

IRAN AND THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA

The Syrian civil war (2011-present) is the longest lasting war of the 21st century, starting with protests in Syria against Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria. Inspired by the Arab spring that started late 2010, protesters demanded the ousting of Assad, yet were put down violently by the army. The Free Syrian Army was formed by defectors from the army and protestors against the government.29 Gradually, the conflict got worse and rebel groups became more prominent. Reports started coming out on extremist rebel groups and the infiltration of foreign fighters among their ranks. The opposition was fragmented and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was not able to control the extremist groups, like Jabhat al- Nusra and Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham.30 Affiliates of Iraqi Al-Qaeda used the chaos of the conflict to cross to Syria and proclaimed a Caliphate, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), sometimes also referred to as Daesh.31 ISIS was able to capture and control a considerable part of Syria and Iraq, and implemented a strict jihadist ideology. The atrocities committed by ISIS in Syria, such as beheadings and slavery, caused global disgust and fear.32 Even though ISIS had lost most of its territories by the end of 2017, and victory over ISIS has been declared,33 in Syria the war continues. The emergence of ISIS played a major role in the development and internationalization of the conflict, as it drew foreign powers directly into battle and attracted attention from the international public. Even though some argue water scarcity as a result of climate change lies at the heart of the war,34 the internationalization of the conflict is often understood to be the primary cause for the intensity of the war. In fact, the conflict developed characteristics of an international proxy war, due to interests of other states in the outcome of the conflict as a product of global and regional power rivalries. Some Arab states financed, armed, and supported the rebel forces. Israel, the Gulf states and the US used the conflict as an opportunity

29 Al-Jazeera, Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning,” April 24, 2018. https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html (accessed 12.12.18). 30 Muriel Asseburg, Heiko Wimmen, “Civil War in Syria: External Actors and Interests as Drivers of Conflict,” StiftungWissenshaftundPolitikComments, vol. 43, 2012, pp. 1-7. 31 Noah Tesch, EncyclopediaBrittanica, “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” Britannica Online Academic Edition, 2014. 32 Rachel Elbaum, “What is ISIS? What You Need To Know About Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” NBC News, April 18, 2018. 33 Alex Lockie, “ISIS Has Been Militarily Defeated In Iraq And Syria,” Business Insider, November 21, 2017. 34 See for example: Peter Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change and Conflict in Syria,” WCAS, vol. 6, no 3, 2014, pp. 331-340. 70 L. SCHUT to damage Iran’s regional power. For instance, Israel bombs pro-government targets and the Gulf states are participating in the coalition led by the US. In contrast, Iran strives to keep Assad in power and Russia uses Syria as its power base in the Middle East, pre- venting the US from gaining regional control.35 In Iraq, the government and some Shi’a militias support Assad, but Sunni and jihadist groups support the rebels. In Lebanon, Hezbollah supports Assad, whereas Sunni politicians support the rebels. Turkey is mainly concerned with the Kurdish question, and fears that powerful Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, might trigger conflict inside Turkey’s own borders.36 Due to this complexity of interests and involvement of foreign powers in the conflict, its duration and gravity surged. Chemical attacks played a similar internationalizing role in the conflict, as they globally caused strong reactions. Assad used chemical weapons against his own people on multiple occasions. On the 3rd of April 2018, the Human Rights Watch reported that up until that point 85 chemical weapon attacks had taken place on Syrian soil. A day later a particularly horrible chemical strike happened in Khan Sheikhoun, killing almost a 100 people. In response, the US, France and Britain launched a precision strike against some of Syria’s chemical weapon production sites.37 The attacks internationalized the conflict by drawing in foreign military intervention. Another factor in the internationalization of the conflict was ‘spill-over’ effects. Millions of Syrians are displaced and have gone to neighboring countries to seek refuge. Some of these countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, can hardly handle the number of refugees, causing further instability and conflict in the region.38 In addition, terrorist attacks took place in different parts of the world, like Turkey, Iran, and Europe spreading the Islamic group’s actions further. 39 These spillover effects are important as they drew in foreign power into the conflict and influence public opinion in the affected countries. The conflict is a zero-sum game for the foreign powers involved, which no one can afford to lose.40 It seems that the future of Syria will be decided outside of its own borders and the end of the war does not appear near. One of the countries that has a significant role in the war is Iran. When the Arab spring started in 2011, Iran backed Assad. Iran initially clandestinely provided tactical support for Assad to counter the protests. Later on, Iran secretly sent members of the IRGC into Syria with an advisory role, training recruits and collecting intelligence. Additionally, the two countries signed bilateral agreements on trade, the construction of a new army base, and the construction of a gas pipeline. Iran also provides financial aid, oil, weapons and

35 Wastnidge, 2017, pp. 151-153. 36 Asseburg and Wimmen, 2012, pp. 2-4. 37 Yuta Kawashima and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2018,” Arms Control Association. Last updated June 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity. 38 Abisaab Balsari, Hamill, and Leaning, “Syrian Refugee Crisis: When Aid Is Not Enough,” The Lancet, vol. 385, no 9972, 2015, pp. 942-943. 39 See for example: Charles R. Lister, TheSyrianJihad:Al-Qaeda,theIslamicStateandtheEvolution ofanInsurgency, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. 40 See for example: Krishnadev Calamur, “The Syrian War is Actually Many Wars,” The Atlantic, April 13, 2018. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 71 intelligence.41 With all support taken into consideration, Iran’s annual government spending to support Assad was estimated by the UN to be six billion US dollars in 2015.42 The Iranian Qods-force, a special forces unit of the IRGC led by general Qasem Suleimani, is responsible for Iran’s mission in Syria. The Qods force sent many of its members into Syria, mostly in an advisory role. These forces comprise of volunteers and specialists, drawn by the narrative of fighting terrorism and protecting the Shi’a holy shrines. ‘Hajji’ Suleimani is often portrayed as the mastermind behind Iran’s strategy in the region. He is incredibly popular in Iran, as he is held responsible for the victory over ISIS and blocking the US’s stratagem in the Middle East on multiple occasions.43 An article from the New Yorker from 2013 refers to him as “the Shadow Commander […] who has been reshaping the Middle East”.44 He is often portrayed as a mysterious man that is secretly in control of all developments in the Middle East.45 Apart from the Qods forces and the regular army, there are other militias in Syria that are controlled by Iran. Afghan fighters recruited among Afghan refugees in Iran constitute the Fatemiyon brigade, and Pakistani fighters the Zaynabiyun brigade. Estimates of the number of Iran-backed fighters in Syria vary. In 2016 the Israeli intelligence services estimated Iran commanded about 25,000 fighters.46 There are many reasons for Iran’s investments in Syria. First of all, Syria and Bashar al-Assad are of vital importance to Iran’s regional security. Scholars argue Syria functions as a route to provide arms to Hezbollah. Hezbollah plays a major role in Iran’s defense or retaliation system in case of an Israeli or US attack on Iran, because Iran uses Hezbollah as a forward base against Israel, that can draw away fighting from Iranian territory and enable a direct attack on Israel’s borders.47 For this reason, Israel aims to prevent an Iranian presence in Lebanon and Syria and opts for the ousting of Assad. Iran fears that in case Bashar al-Assad is ousted, a Sunni-led government formed by the Sunni opposition groups backed by Iran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia will take its place. Such a government would not allow Iranian arm transports into Hezbollah territories.48 Losing Assad would thus mean a loss of defensive and offensive capabilities and a decline in regional power for Iran and is therefore seen as an existential threat by Iran’s leaders. Secondly, shared traits ensured Iran’s alliance with Syria’s survival for decades and are still a driving force behind the partnership between Iran and Syria. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution (1979) the new Iranian government found an ally in the Baath regime in Syria. During the Iran-Iraq war, Syria was the only Arab country that provided military

41 Wastnidge, 2017, pp. 152 & 154-155. 42 The Iran Primer, “Part two: Iran in Syria Timeline,” April 12, 2018. http://iranprimer.usip.org/ blog/2018/apr/10/iran-syria-2-timeline (accessed 12.12.18). دلیل شکستهای“ :or .آذر ISNA news agency, ۱, ۱۳۹۶ ”«درباره چهره کرمانی «حاجقاسم“ :See for example 43 .دی ISNA News Agency, ۳ ۱۳۹۶ ” آمریکا در منطقه سردار ایرانی است/ آمریکاییها از 2003 به دنبال ترور سلیمانی بودند 44 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander” TheNewYorker, September 30, 2013. 45 Filkins, 2013. 46 The Iran Primer, “Syria Timeline”, 2018. 47 Wastnidge, p. 152. 48 Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s strategy for saving Assad,” TheMiddleEastJournal, Vol. 69, No 2, 2015, pp. 222-236. 72 L. SCHUT aid and diplomatic support to Iran.49 Even though roles seem to be reversed now, the alliance endured. The durability can be explained by three factors: shared regional political aims, such as a strong Hezbollah to ‘check’ Israeli aggression; an ideology of resistance against the US and Israel, resulting in a “common front against US interests”;50 and third, the defensive nature of the alliance.51 Thirdly, Iran’s leadership have linked Syria’s security directly to Iran’s security through the fight against radical jihadist or “takfiri” groups like ISIS. These groups pose a real threat to Iran in the regime’s eyes because ISIS and the Al-Qaeda related Al-Nusra express extreme anti-Shi’a sentiments.52 When these groups expanded in Syria and moved eastwards towards Iraq, Iran sought to protect its own territories and pre-empt potential spillover.53 The threat posed by takfiri groups is thus a vital argument for Iran’s involvement in the conflict. Lastly, Iraq and Syria are home to holy Shi’a Shrines, all connected to the story of ‘Ali and his descendants, such as Karbala and Najaf in Iraq. In Syria, home to around 50 holy Shi’a shrines, the shrine of Zeynab close to Damascus is the most famous.54 Takfiri groups threatened to destroy these shrines. The protection of these shrines as Shia heritage is presented as a religious responsibility by Iran’s official state ideology. In this state ideology, Iran is portrayed as the leader of the true Islam, Shi’ism. The shrines are an important aspect of this narrative, as soldiers employed in Syria are referred to as the ‘defenders of the shrines’ or ‘modafe’an-e haram’.55 The shrines thus provide an impetus for Iran’s involvement in the conflict. These many reasons thus testify to the complexity of the context of the debate this study addresses: a tragic conflict, heavily influenced by foreign powers. In fact, the conflict is characterized by a multitude of fronts that have each committed atrocities. Also the presence of ISIS is key in this conflict as it drew in foreign countries into the conflict and caused global fear. Iran has many reasons to be one of the foreign powers heavily invested in Syria, such as maintaining its regional influence and domestic security, causing Iran to be a key player in the conflict. The Iranian government uses various narratives to legitimize its involvement that relate to these reasons. There are for example many conspiratorial factors in Iranian state discourse. Iranian leaders, such as Ayatollah Khamenei, framed the conflict in Syria as a Zionist conspiracy to promote sectarian conflict and increase Israeli and US dominance over the Middle East, revenging Assad’s prolonged resistance to Israel.56 This framework connects the conflict in Syria to a narrative of global conflict. In fact, most of Iran’s leaders

49 Terrill, 2015. 50 Wastnidge, 2017. 51 Jubin Goodarzi, “Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment,” OrtadoguEtütleri, vol. 4, no 2, 2013, p. 35. 52 Dina Esfandiary, Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s ISIS Policy,” InternationalAffairs, vol. 91, no 1, 2015, pp. 1-15. 53 Terrill, 2015. 54 The Iran Primer, “Part two: Shiite Holy Sites in Syria,” June 3, 2013. 55 Wastnidge, 2017, p 149. 56 See for example “Leader’s Speech at Inauguration of Islamic Awakening and Ulama Conference,” Khamenei.ir, April 29, 2013. http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1772/Leader-s-Speech-at-Inauguration-of-Islamic- Awakening-and-Ulama (accessed 12.12.18). #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 73 have an anti-imperialist worldview. From their perspective, the world has a systemic imbalance, which powerful countries led by the US try to maintain by keeping powerless countries powerless, poor, and oppressed. Iran renders itself the protector of the oppressed and draws from its Muslim identity to emphasize this position. Based on this framework, Iran ultimately wants to position itself as leader of the oppressed Muslim community (Umma).57 The role of Israel and the US is significant in the view of the Iranian government on the conflict. In their eyes, the US and Israel have the same objective: regional dominance. Israel and the Palestinian cause are major factors in Iranian state ideology. In fact, they use the conflict and their support for the Palestinians to legitimate their claims to leadership of the global Umma.58 This enmity against Israel is so saturated in Iranian state ideology that during the Iran-Iraq war, the catchphrase “the path to Jerusalem is through Karbala” was constructed. This catchphrase reveals Iran’s ulterior goal: Jeru- salem. Due to the way in which the Iranian government frames the conflict as a Zionist conspiracy, it seems the path to Jerusalem is now through Damascus. In the eyes of the Iranian government, the conflict in Syria, anti-imperialism and resistance against Israel are interwoven. Another way the Iranian government frames its involvement in Syria, in which the intent for global Muslim leadership is reflected, is through portraying it as a holy war in defense of Islam. This is evident in the nickname of the soldiers: “the Defenders of the Shrine”, denoting their heroic efforts in defending the true faith, Shi’a Islam, against the takfiri unbelievers of Daesh.59 More importantly, in media reports, the Iranian and Afghani soldiers that died in Syria and Iraq are elevated into the status of martyrdom, or shahedatin Persian. The depiction of these martyrs is often accompanied by references to the battle of Karbala, a site of major significance in Shi’a religious beliefs, as it is the place where Hussein was killed.60 The concept of martyrdom has a long history in Iran and is connected to Iranian Shi’ism. The concept derives from the martyr deaths of Ali and Hussein, two key personalities in the formation of Shi’a Islam. The concept became politicized during the lead up to the Iranian revolution of 1979 and further transformed during the Iran-Iraq war, which was framed as a religious war. All Iranian soldiers that died in the war were labeled martyrs.61 The reuse of the label of martyrdom reveals how the Iranian government views the conflict in Syria. For them, it is essentially a religious conflict, fought against the enemies of true Islam. This state narrative of religion, oppression, and conspiracy is the discursive context of the popular debate on Iran’s involvement in Syria.

57 Akbarzadeh, 2015, pp. 48-49. 58 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, and Parisa Roshan, IsraelandIranaDangerousRivalry, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011. 59 See for example: Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran, once silent about its casualties in Syria and Iraq, now glorifies them,” New York Times, July 9, 2016. 60 Bill Rolston, “When Everywhere Is Karbala: Murals, Martyrdom and Propaganda in Iran,” Memory Studies, 2017, pp. 1-21. 61 Ravinder Kaur, “Sacralising Bodies On Martyrdom, Government and Accident in Iran 1,” Journalof theRoyalAsiaticSociety, vol. 20, no. 4, 2010, pp. 441-460; Christoph Reuter, MylifeisaWeapon:aModern HistoryofSuicideBombing, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 74 L. SCHUT

OF GOOD AND EVIL: AN ANALYSIS OF TWEETS AND INSTAGRAM POSTS

Now I turn to the analysis of tweets and Instagram posts by users on the war in Syria by both proponents and opponents of Iran’s involvement. I found Twitter mainly contained tweets that were opposed to Iran’s involvement in Syria. Only a limited amount of tweets expressed an opinion in favor of Iran’s involvement in Syria. This result is in line with what other researchersfound about conservatives voices being pushed out of the Iranian twitter spheres.62 Factors such as the timeframe chosen could, however, also have an influence on who is actively posting and thus change the content of the tweets.

WHO ARE THE BARANDAZAN?

The in-group referential hashtag that is used most frequently within the corpus is The frequency of this hashtag indicates that there .#براندازم barandazam or the equivalent# is a sizable group of people on Twitter that identify with this term. However, currently, there is no research available that either describes or analyzes this online ideological group. Barandaz comes from the verb barandakhtan, which means “to abolish, to overthrow; subvert”. Grammatically the hashtag consists of barandaz+ am.This hashtag can be translated in two ways, either as “I am a subverter”, or “I will knock down”, denoting the fact that the user of this hashtag is a supporter of a radical social or political revolution to overthrow the established order. This is colloquial Persian. The word barandaz is not used as a noun in formal Persian. However, in colloquial Persian in the context of social media the word can also be interpreted as a noun. This is remarkable, as it demonstrates the elevation of colloquial Persian in an online context to the realm of politics.

#براندازم به نظر میرسه مدافعین حرم فقط در مقابل کودکان تروریست و زنان و مردان حمید (1) تروریست بی دفاع از حرم دفاع می کردن # براندازم آقا کجا؟؟!! شیطان بزرگ داره میاد تو حرم HamidZamani1663@ نرووووووووووووووو !!!!!!...... #جنگ_سوریه# اسد_حيوان# دوما# براندازم It seems that the defenders of the shrine have only defended the shrine against terrorist children and defenseless terrorist men and women. sir where??!! The greater evil64 is coming into the shrine, don’t gooooooooo….!!!! #douma #animal_assad #Syrian_war #barandazam

62 Marchant, etal., 2016. 63 https://twitter.com/HamidZamani16/status/983965347949801473 64 This is a reference to the US, denoting Iran’s view of the US as inherently evil. Arnon Groiss, “Iran’s Global War Curriculum,” GeopoliticalAffairs, vol. 4, no 42, 2007, pp. 10-11. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 75

از# سوریه شدن# ایران نترسید!!! عرشیام (2) مگر نمیبینید که موضوع کاملا عکس است! اپوزسیون سوریه میجنگد تا سوریه arshiamastaneh 65@ ایرانی دوم نشود و ج.ا دیگری در آنجا ظهور نکند# !!جنگ_سوریه# اسد_حيوان# دوما# براندازم Do not be afraid of Iran becoming Syria! Like you do not see its exactly the opposite! The Syrian opposition is fighting so that Syria does not become a second Iran and so that the Islamic Republic does not appear in there again! #barandazam #Douma #animal_assad #Syrian_war

اميدوارم قسمت خودتو و هر چي اخوند مفت خور و اصلاح طلب ماله كش شاهزاده خانمي كه (3) هست بشه كه جوار حرم حضرتتون شهيد بشين و ملتي نجات پيدا كنه# !براندازم# هميشه ناشناس ماند حرم_به_یه_ورمRoshanaeii 66 #AnimalAssad@ I hope that your own part and everyone that is a bribe-eating mullah or reformist money-taker will become a martyr near your dear shrine and that the nation will be saved! #barandazam #AnimalAssad #haram_ be_on_one_side of_my_ass67

The examples above demonstrate the common usage of #barandazam. It is almost always positioned at the end of the tweet, indicating its function as a marker. In this case, the hashtag does not signify the topic of the tweets, as none of the examples are tweets about being a barandaz.The hashtag functions as a link between tweets of like-minded people, enabling them to find each other’s tweets and be found. This function is strength- ened by linguistic elements within the hashtag. By writing “I am” (barandaz-am) the producer of the tweet marks itself as part of that group. As such, it can be understood as being a tool in community bonding. The hashtag is often accompanied by other hashtags, such as #animalassad or #iran- regimechange. These recurring combinations indicate the ideology that Barandazan68 share. They are against Iran’s policy of supporting Assad, and generally do not support the Iranian government. All tweets in the examples above express this usage of the hashtag #barandazam and exemplify the political ideology these Barandazan adhere to. In Tweet (1) @Hamidzamani16 criticizes the defenders of the shrine for killing innocent people and children instead of fighting terrorists. The combination of the hashtags at the end of the tweet express the user’s bond with the Barandazan and its opposition to Assad and his chemical attack on the city of Douma.69 This tweet expresses a fear that the US might attack in response to Iran’s involvement in Syria and demonizes the defenders of the shrine by overtly incriminating them for killing innocent people. Tweet (2) is an ironic response to the concern that Iran will turn into a war zone similar to Syria. The user

65 https://twitter.com/arshiamastaneh/status/983813856685383681 66 https://twitter.com/Roshanaeii/status/984240498968858624 67 The hashtag #haram_be_on_one_side_of_my_ass will be elaborated on later in this study. 68 Plural form of barandaz. 69 A chemical attack on a city named Douma took place on April 7th, 2018. Sarin gas, a nerve agent, was used in the attack, killing at least 70 people. 76 L. SCHUT criticizes Iran’s actions in Syria through the use of irony. The combination of the hashtag #barandazam and the criticism against the Iranian government again indicates Barandazan are fierce opponents of the Iranian government, Iran’s involvement in Syria, and Assad. In (3) @Roshanaeii expresses a desire for what he/she refers to as bribe-taking mullahs and reformists to become martyrs in Syria, as Iran would be better off without them. Again, the hashtag #barandazam is used as an in-group marker, whereas out-groups are referred to very negatively. In fact, this tweet manifests hostility towards reformists and the religious class, who are “bribe-eaters” and “money-takers”, and ridicules the notions of martyrdom and the shrine. The use #barandazam thus reveals the existence of an online ideological group that is opposed to the Iranian regime and its involvement in Syria. They tend to reference negatively to the regime, and the people connected to that regime, such as mullahs and the reformists, who constitute their ‘other’. This online group of Barandazan corresponds with an offline political group. In the literature on the offline Iranian political landscape, the playing field is often characterized by the existence of multiple ideological groups or factions. Most authors distinguish between the left, or the reformists, and the right, or the conservatives.70 There is, however, also a faction that operates outside the system of the vilayet-e faqih, a group opposed to the system itself that aspires the downfall of the regime. They are referred to as the gheir-e khodi(not one of us) in literature, as opposed to the khodi(one of us), who are part of and operate within the power structures of vilayet-efaqih. However, apart from shared opposition to the state, the gheir-ekhodi are fragmented and consist of many of ideological groups.71 This group of people that call themselves barandaz is probably the online equivalent of the offline gheir-ekhodi, as both groups are opposed to the entirety of the system of vilayet-efaqih.

CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISTS OR ARZESHI

Opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria refer to supporters of this cause as Arzeshi. Arzeshi is a reference to a group of Iranian conservative activists that is active online and means ‘valued’. It is not clear who coined the term, but within the Iranian web spheres, Arzeshi is used more frequently than the ‘normal’ word for conservative, mohafezeh-kar. Apart from one report titled “Unmasking the Arzeshi”, 72 there is no academic literature available on this group. The intention of this report was to counter the Iranian government’s claims that the Arzeshi are a unified block of activists, great in number and supposedly even paid by the government. According to the report, both Barandazan and Arzeshi use this term to refer to the group of hardliners engaged in online communities.73

70 Thaler, David E., et al., “Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics,” RAND Corporation, 2010, pp. 37-39. Also see Mehdi Moslem, FactionalPoliticsinPost-Khomeini Iran, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002. 71 Thaler, David E., etal., 2010, pp. 52-53. 72 Small Media, 2014, Unmasking the Arzeshi: Iran’s Conservative Cyber Activists and the 2013 PresidentialElection.http://unmaskthearzeshi.com/#home (accessed on 12.12.18). 73 Idem. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 77

The Arzeshi are supporters of the Supreme Leader and the ideals of the 1979 revolution play a major role in their ideology. They also adhere to a hardline interpretation of Islam. However, the online community is far from unified. The 75 Twitter-users that were tracked revealed that the ten most followed accounts did not follow each other. These top accounts also post only on important religious holidays and did not unite around a single candidate during the 2013 presidential elections.74 These findings suggest the Arzeshi community is very fragmented. Due to a limited number of Tweets found posted by this ideological group, it is hard to draw many conclusions on this group on Twitter. The faction does not use the hashtag #modafe’an-e_haram, nor its equivalent in Farsi script. Neither does the corpus contain any tweet that contains an in-group reference using the word arzeshi, contrary to what the Small Media report states about the term being used by both groups. The absence of in-group referencing indicates that people ideologically close to the supreme leader do not refer to themselves as Arzeshi. The word Arzeshi, in fact, has a negative connotation. This negativity is manifested arar, is the onomatopoeia of the braying of a ,عرعر in the spelling of the word, In Persian to suggest utterances (عرزشی is purposely misspelled (as (ارزشی) donkey. The word arzeshi produced by this group are similar to the hee-hawing of an ass: utter nonsense. The reference thus belittles this group as being of low social status and even illiterate.

خیلی احمقید که هنوز نفهمیدید که مردم ایران (بجز مزدوارن رهبر) حتی Barbod (4) حاضر نیستن پهن بار خامنهای و عرزشیها کنن لطفا اسم مردم ایران و نام Barbodparsi75@ ایران به زبون کثیفتون نیارید مثل رهبرتون بگید طرفداران نظام ج.ا شما باعث ننگ ایران و ایرانی هستید You are very stupid that you still have not understood that the people of Iran (except for the mercenaries of the supreme leader) do not even want to load dung on Khamenei76 and the arzeshi. Please do not take the name of the people of Iran or the name Iran on your dirty tongue Like your supreme leader say supporters of the system of the Islamic Republic You are the cause of shame for Iran and the Iranians

ای بابا روز شد باز این ارزشی ها رای نیاوردن Reza Behshahri (5) @behshahrireza77 Oh man, it’s the next day now and these arzeshis still have not gotten any votes

74 Marchant, etal., 2016. 75 https://twitter.com/Barbodparsi/status/984245372057980928 76 The metaphor is very negative, referring to Khamenei as if he is an animal. 77 https://twitter.com/behshahrireza/status/984410073689673728 78 L. SCHUT

بعنوان سند نگه داری کنید چون عرازش و کشتزارها بدقول هستند. Rafael @hadi4wd78 (6) Save this in a file because these arzeshis and keshtezarha79 are unreliable.

واقعا نمیفهمین شماها یا خودتونو به نفهمی میزنین ی ادم چقد میتونه احمق ِدخترآتش (7) باشه اخه این حجم نفهمی فقط در یک عرعرزشی میتونه باشه dokhtarAtaash80@ Do you really not understand or are you trying not to understand How can a person be this stupid This level of stupidity and can only be found in the braying of an arzeshi

Tweets (4) to (7) contain expressions of the word arzeshi. All these tweets are produced by opponents of the Arzeshi and belittle and discredit Arzeshi. Tweet (4) refers to the supreme leader and the arzeshi as if they were animals, and openly demonizes them for being stupid. This user also clearly distances himself from the supreme leader, by repeatedly using the possessive pronoun -tun,or your, in combination with the word rahbar, or supreme leader. His usage of possessive pronouns establishes an in- and an out-group, that links Khamenei with the Arzeshias one group. In Tweet (5) the user is responding to a tweet posted by Reyhan Banoo (8) in which she commented on the results of her poll. She claims the majority voted “no” because fake accounts and Iranians that live abroad influenced the voting. In the morning, when the “real Iranians” wake up, the results will change in favor of the “yes”-camp. In this context Tweet (5) is belittling her by making fun of these claims, adding to the negative connotation of the word arzeshi.

اولا مودب باشید دوما من نیازی نمیبینم قسم بخورم اما اگر بابت حذف Reyhan Banoo (8) نظرسنجی منظورتون هست که من هیچوقت حذفش نمیکنم ، الان نصفه BanooReyhan@ 81 شبه و فقط شما فیکهای خارج نشین به دلیل اختلاف ساعت رای دادید .apr 12 فردا که مردم واقعی ایران رای بدن نتیجه عوض میشه و قیافه شما دیدنی First of all, you should be polite. I do not see a reason why I should swear, but if you mean deleting the poll, I will never delete it. It’s midnight now and only you fake people that live abroad are voting now to protest, tomorrow the real people of Iran will vote and the outcome will be different and your expression will be something to look at

Negative references to the Arzeshi often frame them as stupid or foolish. We can often find the word Arzeshi and a variant of the word nafahm, which could be translated as stupid or not-understanding, in the same sentence or close to each other. Tweets (4)

78 https://twitter.com/hadi4wd/status/984298140512727040 79 This term can literally be translated as field-lady, and is very negative. I will elaborate on this term later on. 80 https://twitter.com/dokhtarAtaash/status/984231483954122754 81 https://twitter.com/BanooReyhan/status/984232103276662784 #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 79 and (7) are examples of this. The frequent appearance of this combination suggests that the opponents consider the ‘Arzeshi’ non-intelligent and openly produce prejudiced discourse as part of a strategy to delegitimize this group’s arguments. Moreover, the in-group seems to have a feeling of intellectual dominance over the out-group, who they deem foolish, as their words are like the ‘braying of a donkey’. The negative connotation of the word ‘Arzeshi’ in combination with the fact that the reference is only employed by Barandazansuggests it would be biased to use this reference for the online group of conservative activists. In fact, this group of conservatives is fragmented in reality. Their tweets did however, reveal some shared traits.

این روغنفکرا مگه مخالف دخالت نظامی توی سوریه نبودند! الان چی ریحانه عسگری (9) شده واسه حمله آمریکا دارن دم تکون میدن! الحق که سگ صاحبش رو Reihaneasgari82@ میشناسه.# اسرائیل _سقطت# جنگ_سوریه Like these oil-minds were not opposed to military intervention in Syria! What happened that they started wiggling their tail in the face of an American attack. Forsooth, a dog recognizes its owner. #Down_with_Israel #Syrian_war

ما همیشه از مظلوم حمایت میکنیم و در جبهه های واقعی هستیم برای ملیحہ طلائی ِفدایی امام (10) همین در مجازی شاید کم بنظر میرسیم و ِمخالفان مظلومان هم در جبهه حسینم83 های مجازی میجنگن برای همین بیشتر بنظر میرسن اسر پر_ائیل# talaeemalihe@ We always defend the oppressed and are present on real fronts that’s why we may seem small in the virtual world and the opponents of the oppressed fight on virtual fronts that’s why they seem with more #israel_par

The conservatives are proponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria, this becomes apparent in (9) and (10). In (9) @Reihaneasgari plays with the word Rowshanfekr, meaning open-minded or intellectual, a word build out of rowshan, which means illuminated, and fekr, which means ‘thought,’ or ‘mind’. The meaning of rowshanfekr is historically asso- ciated with the European enlightenment and opposition to the state. In post-revolutionary Iran, still mainly oppositional and liberal thinkers are called rowshanfekr.84 @Reihaneasgari humorously changes rowshanfekrinto rowqanfekr, which means ‘oil-mind’, to belittle the oppositional group, the muddy and opaque texture of oil being quite the opposite of roshan. Furthermore, she refers to the opponents of Iran’s presence in Syria as dogs that are owned by the US, through which she criticizes them for conspiring with the enemy. In Tweet (10) the user responds to the low percentage of people that voted “yes” on Reyhan Banoo’s poll. She makes a distinction between “we”, who protect the oppressed and fight real battles, and “they”, the opponents of the oppressed, who only fight online. This narrative of oppression is similar to official state discourse, which was discussed in the previous

82 https://twitter.com/Reihaneasgari/status/984119583148789760 83 https://twitter.com/talaeemalihe/status/984267757238865920 84 Negin Nabavi, IntellectualTrendsinTwentieth-CenturyIranACriticalSurvey, Gainesville: UPF, 2003. 80 L. SCHUT chapter. Besides, the employment of a we vs they division indicates @talamalihe considers herself part of an in-group of conservative activists. In both tweets, out-group references are employed and negative qualities are attributed to the opponents of the involvement in Syria, though which it becomes apparent (9) and (10) favor involvement. The way these two tweets depict the out-group and the enemies, taps into what Lakoff (1991) calls “the fairy tale of the just war”.85 This is a concept based on the idea that people narrate and frame conflicts as having “a villain, a victim, and a hero.” This framework is a strategic device which portrays the issue that needs legitimization as an altruistic objective, in this case by portraying the involvement of Iran in Syria as a heroic act against an evil oppressor in order to save the oppressed.86 The in-group becomes a hero, fighting against a villain, the US and Israel, and helping the oppressed is a strategy for legitimizing Iran’s involvement in Syria. Tweets (9) and (10) also reveal two hashtags that function as markers for political beliefs. Tweets produced by conservative activists are often characterized by the hashtags #Israel_par and/or #Israel-e_saghat. Even tweets that are not on topic of Israel often contain these hashtags, signifying their use as a mechanism for community bonding. The hashtags refer to the notion that Israel is a criminal state and that it should be brought down or even destroyed. As previously discussed, this is a key notion in Iranian state ideology, used to legitimize Iran’s claim on Islamic world leadership. .(سقط) ’The hashtag #Israel-e_saghat finds its origin in the Arabic word for ‘to die The word has a very negative connotation in Persian. The hashtag can be translated as ‘Israel to hell’ ‘Israel be crumbled’ or ‘Israel aborted’. The hashtag #Israel_par can be defined in multiple, paradoxical ways. In a figurative sense, it refers to a game played ,(پریدن)with children to teach them new words. Par can be the imperative of paridan which means to fly or to jump. In the game, one is supposed to point to people, animals, or objects, and say its name followed by “par”. If the object in question has the ability to fly, the child is applauded. If the object does not have this ability, the child will be tickled as a rebuke. Israel does not have the ability to fly, and reprimands should follow. Liter- ally, #Israel_par could also be interpreted literally as “Israelparzadraft”, or “Israel flew away”, referring to Israel’s destruction. There is thus a paradox that Israel simultaneously is unable to fly and flew away. In short, this hashtag illuminates how a children’s game, the very essence of colloquial culture, becomes of higher relevance through its usage in the context of international politics. The repetition of the hashtag is crucial. The effect of this discursive strategy of repetition is both dramatizing as well as continuously establishing Israel as the out-group/enemy.87 The repetition in combination with the reference to an educating children’s game aimed at teaching words even renders the explication of the hashtag as a form of brainwashing. The hashtag’s brainwashing potential is related to the Foucaultian concept of normaliza- tion through disciplinary power, which is force implemented by the powerful on their

85 G. Lakoff, “Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the Gulf,” Peace Research, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 25-32. 86 Reyes, 2011, p. 787. 87 Ioannis D. Evrigenis, “Prologue,” in FearofEnemiesandCollectiveAction, pp. xi-xx, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 81 subordinates for conditioning society.88 Israel’s inability to fly causes punishment. As such, a disciplinary force is repeatedly implemented to normalize the idea of Israel’s destruction. The frequency of these hashtags not only reveals conservatives’ anti-Israel sentiments but also signifies the significance of these sentiments in their worldview. I have addressed the significance of Israel to both Iran’s state ideology and Iran’s regional foreign policy shortly in the previous chapter. In the state ideology, Israel is an enemy of Iran and Islam.89 These tweets resonate the government’s stance toward Israel. In fact, the usage of hashtags about Israel in tweets on topic of the conflict in Syria suggests that the conservative activists consider the conflict in Syria and the conflict with Israel to be two sides of the same coin that cannot be seen apart from each other. The conservative activists link the conflict in Syria to a regional or even global narrative of conflict, with Israel as its instigator. the war in Syria and the conflict with Israel are both part of the same greater struggle.

DEFENDERS OF ISIS

In the collected Tweets there are certain hashtags to which competing meanings are attributed. The proponents and opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria are involved in a conflict over the interpretation of certain phrases. One of such phrases is modafe’an-eharam and the playful variation based upon this phrase.The proponents of Iran’s involvement in which could be translated as “defenders ,مدافعان_داعش# Syria initially used the hashtag of ISIS”, to imply that by opposing Iran’s campaign in Syria, people defend ISIS. After some time, however, this hashtag became appropriated by the opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria. This group now uses it to insinuate the modafe’an-eharam are terrorists themselves. In the examples below these competing interpretations are articulated.

بازتاب نظرسنجی تاریخی #ریحان_بانو در اتاق_خبر شبکه منوتو و رأی يار دبستانی (11) ٪۹۱ کاربران توییتر به گزینه #حرم_به_یه_ورم علیرغم میل این کشتزار_بانو YaarDabestaani@ @BanooReyhan #سوریه #مدافعان_داعش apr.90 12 The reflection on #Reyhan_banoo’s historical poll on Manoto tv-channel. And the votes of 91% of Twitter users are for #haram_to_one_side_of_my_ass despite the hunger of this keshtezar-lady. #Syria #Defenders_of_ISIS

چه جالبه.همونایی که داعش از روی دستشون کپی برداری میکنه هشتگ متسه وناب فدص (12) #مدافعان_داعش میزنن Sadafbanooo@ 12 Apr.91 It’s so interesting that the same people that copy ISIS, use the hashtag #Defenders_of_ISIS

88 Michel Foucault, DisciplineandPunish:TheBirthofaPrison, New York: Pantheon Books, 1977. 89 David Menashri, “Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict,” IsraelAffairs, vol. 12, no 1, 2006, pp. 107-122. 90 https://twitter.com/YaarDabestaani/status/984553459948105728 91 https://twitter.com/Sadafbanooo/status/984551522699800576 82 L. SCHUT

وحشی ترین، کثیف ترین و پست ترین نوع #مدافعان_داعش اونایی ان حسین بصیر (13) که، نه جلوی همسر و فرزند شهید، بلکه مادر شهید مدافع حرم رو hoseinbasir@ میگیرن میگن، بچه ات چقدر گرفت آخه بیشرف، واقعا به چقدر راضی Apr.92 12 شدی این حرف رو به یه مادر بزنی؟ The most uncivilized, dirty, and despicable kind of #defenders_ of_ISIS are those that not in front of the wife and children of the martyr, but in front of the mother of the martyred defender of the shrine say “How much did your child get” O disgrace,93 how satisfying is it for you to say something like that to a mother?

بگذارید #مدافعان_داعش این چند صباح آخر را راحت باشند @ محمد صدارت (14) هدفشان سرگرم کردن ما به فرعیات آن هم در زمان ترس و لرزش mohammadsedarat آمریکا و اسرائیل است فعلا باید حواسمان به #سوریه و آزادی #قدس apr.94 12 باشد و بعد از #نابودی_اسراییل به #داعش_وطنی خواهیم پرداخت #اسرائيل_سقطت #اسرائيل_پر Allow the #Defenders_of_ISIS to be at ease these last couple of mornings. It is their goal to occupy us with their affiliates, who are the US and Israel, even in times of fear and trembling. For now, we have to focus on Syria and the freedom of Jerusalem, and after the destruction of Israel we shall deal with #ISIS_of_the_homeland. #Israel_to_hell #Israel_por

Tweets (11) and (12) express views that oppose Iran’s involvement, whereas (13) and (14) express views in support of it. In Tweet (12) the supporters of Iran’s involvement in Syria are compared to ISIS, based on comparable extremist religious ideologies and employment of methods of terrorization. Tweet (11) is a snare to Reyhan Banoo (poll & 8), whose poll was addressed by London-based tv-channel Manoto earlier that day. She refers to Reyhan Banoo as a keshtezar-lady, which literally means field-lady. This term was coined on Twitter and is used to refer to female ‘Arzeshi’ by their political opponents. The word is a reference to the Qur’an, Sura 2, verse 223.95 In this verse, women are referred to as field owned by men, that they may ‘cultivate’ when and however they wish. religious ,(کشته زار) women are upbraided that when they adhere to Islam, they are giving up their rights over their bodies and assent that their husbands can ‘take’ them when and however they want.

92 https://twitter.com/hoseinbasir/status/984519963003244544 = (without = بی) + ( ,honor, nobility, dignity = شرف) .This is a polite but yet very powerful insult 93 dishonor; lack of nobility, integrity. 94 https://twitter.com/mohammadsedarat/status/984389459453075456 95 2:223 “Your wives are a place of sowing of seed for you, so come to your place of cultivation however you wish and put forth [righteousness] for yourselves. And fear Allah and know that you will meet Him. And give good tidings to the believers.” Sahih International, TheQur’an:EnglishMeanings, Jeddah: Abul-Qasim Publishing House, 1997. ”زنان شما كشتزار شما هستند پس از هر جا [و هر گونه] كه خواهيد به كشتزار خود [در]آييد و آنها را براى خودتان مقدم داريد و از خدا پروا كنيد و بدانيد كه او را ديدار خواهيد كرد و مؤمنان را [به اين ديدار] مژده ده (۲۲۳)!“ سوره ۲: البقرة - جزء ۲ - ترجمه فولادوند #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 83

‘keshtezar-lady’ thus ridicules and belittles ‘Arzeshi’-women. Moreover, tweet (11) reveals usage of the hashtag #Defenders_of_ISIS in a context of negativity towards the conservatives and proponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria on Twitter. In tweets (13) and (14) the supporters of Iran’s military campaign in Syria use the hashtag #Defenders_of_ISIS to refer to those who oppose the campaign. In (13) the #Defenders_of_ISIS is accompanied by a few very negative attributions. The tweet is linked to a video of a mother of a martyr talking about how people ask her how much money she got for her child’s death. The user is aiming to delegitimize the opponents of the campaign by demonizing them, arguing they are despicable, ignoble people that would ask the mother of a martyred soldier how much she got for his death as if money was the main incentive for her. Tweet (14) argues the #Defenders_of_ISIS, are just trying to distract “us”, and that “we” should focus on Syria and the destruction of Israel instead, as they will deal with the ISIS of the homeland afterward. She equates the opposition to ISIS. Tweets (13) and (14) are examples the argument that if you’re not with us, you are against us and with our enemy, ISIS. By not supporting Assad and Iran’s military campaign in its fight against ISIS, conservatives argue people de facto support ISIS. In short, tweet (11) to (14) exhibit how the meaning of a phrase can be changed in a conflict between two ideological groups and the animosity between them. The phrase is also exemplary of reasoning and ways of legitimization for both groups, as it expresses the arguments both groups use: the supporters of Iran’s involvement argue not fighting is de facto defending ISIS. The opponents, on the other hand, argue that the defenders of the shrine are in fact ideologically very similar to ISIS and should thus not be supported. The role ISIS plays in this discourse is significant. ISIS’s power in Syria decreased quite drastically recently and in 2018 ISIS was ‘defeated’.96 Even though the threat ISIS poses has not completely disappeared, the fact that ISIS no longer controls any territories could potentially take away one of the main incentives and legitimizations for foreign intervention in Syria. However, these tweets prove ISIS continues to play a role in the legitimization of Iran’s involvement in Syria. In fact, these tweets reveal how both groups use ISIS in their arguments to delegitimize their political opponents.

The Failing State

A major topic within the opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria is the state’s inability to protect its own people. Sometimes, the criticism is directed at state supporters and sometimes to the Iranian state. The Tweets addressed below that refer to an earthquake that hit the border area of Iran and Iraq in November 2017 are exemplary for this topic, but the sentiment also incorporates a more general feeling of neglect. Poverty, for example, and the government’s inability to redress this problem is also significant within this context.

96 See for example: Wilson Center, “ISIS was defeated in Syria. Was that the end for the Islamists?” Newsweek, March 1, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/isis-was-defeated-syria-end-islamists-767165 84 L. SCHUT

Figure 2: @Taghi_khakandaz: “Why haven’t we had a poll up until now that asked: Dear fellow-arzeshi, are you willing to protect the people of Kermanshah that are hit by an earthquake?” @Mahsaaaan: “What kind of bad things are you saying? What does it matter to us that the people in Kermanshah are dying, important is the shrine of Zeynab”

In figure 2, @Taghi_KhakAndaz in response to Reyhan Banoo ironically wonders why there has not been a poll yet that inquired whether the “dear fellow-Arzeshi” are willing to protect the people of Kermanshah. The people of Kermanshah recently had to endure a heavy (7.3 on Richter) earthquake that hit the border area between Iran and Iraq at the end of 2017 and killed over 400 people.97 During the aftermath of the quake, the Iranian government was criticized by some news outlets for its slow reaction to the disaster98 and for building cheap and unstable houses,99 as 70% of the collapsed buildings were built or renovated in the last five years prior to the earthquake.100 @Taghi_KhakAndaz implies that the shrine and Bashar al-Assad are more important to the ‘Arzeshi’ than the Iranians that were victims of the earthquake. @Mahsaaaan sarcastically responds those people are not important, but Zeynab’s shrine is. These tweets criticize the conservatives for not protecting their own people but protecting a shrine instead. The implicit premise of this argument is that if Iranians are in need, they should be helped prior to foreign buildings or people. These tweets thus reveal the existence of a nationalist sentiment among Iranians who oppose the involvement. More importantly, some Iranians seem to be uncon- vinced that the Iranian government is doing everything in its power to help its citizens.

97 Saeid Jafari, “Earthquake Response Shows Iran’s Nationalism – and Mistrust of Authorities,” Al-Monitor–IranPulse, November 27, 2017. 98 Hafezi, Parisa, “Iran Quake Survivors Complain of Slow Aid Effort, Battle Freezing Cold,” Reuters, Novermber 14, 2017. 99 Al-Monitor – Iran Pulse, “Iranian Media Blames Ahmedinejad For Quake Deaths,” November 14, 2017. 100 Ostadtaghizadeh, Abbas, Mona Khaleghy Rad, Hamidreza Aghababaeian, Mehdi Zare, and Farnaz Kamranzad, EarthquakeinWesternIran:RenovationKills, PLoS Currents, 2018. http://currents.plos.org/ disasters/index.html%3Fp=41101.html (accessed 11.12.18). #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 85

Figure 3: @mohmd_mozafari: “For the first time you said something honest and made a good confession, defense of Bashar al-Assad.” @AAS: “That’s right. Because the front of IR is about 300 to 400 km away from the shrine. The goal of the presence is Syria: Not the safety of Iraq or Syria or the entire region. Protection of the terrorists of Hassan Nasrallah. Destruction of Israel. The well-being of IR. Not well-being of the Shia. Do not destroy the name of the Shia and Imam Ali against Islam.”

The next two tweets (figure 3) address the ‘real’ reasons for Iran’s involvement. @mohmd_mozafari sarcastically replies to Banoo Reyhan, stating she finally spoke the truth by saying that Iran is defending Assad in Syria and not the shrines. He believes Iran is not truly there for religious reasons, as Iranian state discourse propagates, but for defending their regional power base through Assad instead. By referring to the official state narrative for Iran’s involvement as untruthful, he criticizes the government for lying to its people. A similar sentiment is expressed in the second tweet in figure 3. @AAS39583855 argues the Islamic Republic could never really be defending the shrine, as the front is 300 km away from the shrine. According to him, Iran is, in fact, defending the terrorism of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and trying to destroy Israel. The connection with Israel and Hezbollah is often made within scholarly literature on Iran’s involvement in Syria. Hezbollah and the Iranian government share an anti-Israeli ideology.101 Iranian leadership views Israel as a major threat to Iran, causing extensive Iranian presence in

101 Al-Agha, Joseph, TheShiftsinHizbullah’sIdeology:ReligiousIdeology,PoliticalIdeology,and PoliticalProgram, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, pp. 128-131. 86 L. SCHUT

Lebanon to aid Hezbollah, an ally against Israel. Iran supports Hezbollah with money and arms, and IRGC personnel provides training to the militia. Iran is interested in keeping open the supply routes to Hezbollah, which run through Syria, because of Hezbollah’s strategic position as a forward base against Israel102 These tweets reveal a sentiment of distrust towards the Iranian state and its official narrative of Iran’s involvement. They delegitimize the state produced discourse through rational arguments, which reveal the selfish interests of the Iranian state in Syria. In these efforts, they depict the Iranian state and the proponents of involvement in Syria as selfish, dishonest, and untrustworthy. Furthermore, these tweets suggest that many Iranians view the conflict in Syria and Iran’s involvement from a realist point of view. It is implied that the realist103-inspired foreign policy is morally unjust.

اسد_حیوان# / Animal Assad#

Bashar al-Assad’s significance in the Syrian war resonates in the tweets. In some previous examples, such as (1) and (2), his name already came up. The hashtag #Animal_ refers to the inhumanity or severity of the crimes اسد_حیوان# Assad or its Persian equivalent Assad committed. #Animal_assad does not only occur in Persian tweets but is used globally.

دفاع از رژیم #اسد_حیوان و کشتار و آوارگی میلیون ها نفر از مردم ناپلئون کبیر (15) سوریه به بهانه مضحک دفاع از حرم #حرم_به_یه_ورم# napoleonb@ Animal_Assad # براندازم rave 104 12 apr. Defense of the regime of #animal_assad and the killing and displacement of millions of Syrians with the ridiculous excuse of defending the shrine #haram_to_one_side_of_my_ass #Animal_Assad #barandazam

بیشتر از اینکه منتظر پیام یار باشم، منتظر حمله ترامپ یه Fenta (16) اسد# Fenta_prime@ 105 .. هستم .apr 12 Animal_Assad #AnimalAssad# اسد_انیمال# I am waiting for Trump to attack Assad, more than I am waiting for a message from my lover. #AnimalAssad #Animal_assad #Animal_Assad

102 Abbas William Samii, “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship,” MiddleEastJournal,vol. 62, no. 1, 2008, pp. 32-53. Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” TheWashingtonQuarterly, vol. 36, no 4, 2013, pp. 79-93. 103 According to the realist school of thought in international relations, states are always competing with each other over power. In that sense, power politics form the basis of all international conflict, instead of cultural values, ideology, or religion. Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, International Relations: The Basics, London: Routledge, 2007. 104 https://twitter.com/napoleonbrave/status/984350504808603648 105 https://twitter.com/Fenta_prime/status/984491940099092480 #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 87

به نظرم هشتگ #Animal_Assad اشتباهی طراحی شده. توی عمرم ZaHrA SaDeGhIaN (17) حیوانات زیادی رو دیدم اما هیچ کدوم حتی یک هزارم #بشار_اسد و zahra_sadeghian@ 106 داردسته جنایتکارش به هم نوعان خودشون ظلم نکردند. جدا برای توصیف .apr 12 جنایات #سوریه نباید اسم حیوانات رو خراب کنیم #حرم_به_یه_ورم In my opinion, the hashtag #Animal_assad was designed wrongly. I have seen a lot of animals in my life, but none of them even committed 1/1000 of Assad’s crimes against his own kind. For describing the crimes in Syria we should not ruin the name of animals. #the_shrine_be_on_one_side_of_my_ass

Tweet (15) expresses the belief that defending the shrine is a ridiculous excuse for protecting a regime that kills millions of people. Tweet (17) similarly expresses a very negative attitude towards Assad and stresses the fact that he has committed many crimes. Both users emphasize these crimes were committed against Assad’s own people, which enhances the maliciousness of his crimes. Tweet (16) cynically expresses that he wants Trump to attack Assad. This statement combined with the hashtag #animal_assad he uses repeatedly in different forms expresses his hatred towards Assad. These three tweets reveal how the hashtag #animal_assad is used to express a negative opinion about Assad and his regime. Furthermore, the hashtag is insightful in why people are opposed to Iran’s involvement in Syria. The hashtag reveals that opponents of involvement strongly disapprove of Assad because of the crimes he has committed against his own people. It is important to note the absence of tweets in which Assad is presented positively. This suggests that his persona does not play a major role in the legitimization of Iran’s presence in Syria in the online popular debate. The questionability of support for Assad is reflected in Iran’s government’s officials’ statements on Iran’s Syria policy. Some of these officials seem to avoid talking of Assad when addressing Iran’s Syria policy and instead frame the involvement as “saving innocent lives” and “defeating terror”.107 Others, however, such as the supreme leader, do actively use Assad’s persona in bolstering support for Iran’s involvement in Iran.108 This plurality in explications of Iran’s Syria policy suggests that some Iranian officials are pressured by widespread popular believe that Assad is ‘an animal’, forcing some to reframe their justifications of Iran’s support of the Syrian regime.

“The shrine be on one side of my ass”

Another topic in the discourse of opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria revolves haram_be_ye_varam). Literally, this means “may the#) حرم_به_یه_ورم# around the hashtag

106 https://twitter.com/zahra_sadeghian/status/984347151986823169 107 See for example: Stuart Winer, “Iranian Security Official: We’ll Remain in Syria as Long as We’re Asked To,” The Times of Israel, January 22, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-security-official- well-remain-in-syria-as-long-as-were-asked-to/ (accessed January 30, 2019). Or: Mazen Eyon, “Iranian Officials: Iran Determined to Support Syria Against Terrorism,” SANA, April 23, 2015. https://sana.sy/en/?p=37347 (accessed January 30, 2019). 108 See for example: “Khamenei Says Iran’s Duty to Defend Syria’s Assad,” The New Arab, March 2, 2018. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/1/khamenei-says-irans-duty-to-defend-syrias-assad (accessed January 30, 2019). 88 L. SCHUT shrine be on one side of my ass”, and denotes disregard and indifference to the shrine and distrust for the official government’s legitimization of its involvement in Syria. The hashtag is a humorous play on words, as the word for ‘shrine’ (haram) rhymes with the word for ‘side of my ass’ (varam). In Tweet (18) @SonOfAHitch aggressively ridicules the Arzeshi and Basij. @SonOfAHiitch sarcastically asserts there will never be a better opportunity for them to become martyrs. Through his usage of #haram_be_ye_varam, he both clarifies his sarcasm and strengthens the persuasiveness of his tweet. Iranian soldiers that die in Syria are labeled as martyrs by the state.109 The concept of martyrdom became a central notion in state- building processes and state ideology in Iran after the 1979 revolution, and consequently the practice of labeling people as martyrs became slightly contradictory and institutionalized.110 @SonOfAHitch ridicules the institutionalized notion of martyrdom, by mocking Arzeshi that believe dying while protecting a shrine would give them extra credits in the afterlife. He accentuates the absurdity in his opponents’ ideology and consequently turns the honor- able notion of martyrdom into a foolish belief. In tweet (15) @napoleonbrave states defense of the shrine is a ridiculous excuse for killing defenseless people and protection of a war criminal, followed by the hashtag #haram_ be_ye_varam. This example clearly reveals the meaning this hashtag conveys. The shrine is a ridiculous excuse that @napoleanbrave does not care about, and the government does not really care about either. The hashtag #haram_be_ye_varam reveals some Iranians are not con- vinced of the religious argument the government uses for legitimizing its activities in Syria.

برادران ارزشی و بسیجی شانس یک بار در خونه ی آدم رو میزنه. شاید تا آخر سان آو ِا هیچ (18) عمر شما دیگه هیچ وقت موقعیتی پیش نیاد که بتونین در مقابل آمریکا، SonOfAHiitch 111@ اسرائیل و عربستان یک جا بجنگین و به درجه ی رفیع شهادت نائل بشین، اون هم تازه در خاک پاک حرم! پس بشتابید تا دیر نشده #حرم_به_یه_ورم #جنگ_سوریه Arzeshi and Basiji brother, chance befalls each person once. Maybe the moment will never happen to you again that you can become a high-level shahid112 fighting in one place against America, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. And that even on the clean soil of the shrine! So hurry up before it is too late #may_the_ shrine_be_on_one_side_of_my_ass #Syrian_war.

“Hashtag-game”

The hashtag #hamle_plastiki, or #plastic_attack came into existence on the 14th of April after US airstrikes on various strategic sites in Syria in response to a chemical attack

109 Roxanne Varzi, WarringSouls :Youth,Media,andMartyrdominPost-revolutionIran, Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 110 Kaur, 2010. 111 https://twitter.com/SonOfAHiitch/status/984141374609031169 112 Shahid means “witness” in Arabic, but in Islamic doctrine refers to “martyr”, or someone who is killed in the name of Islam. Matthieu Guidère, HistoricalDictionaryofIslamicFundamentalism, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2012. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 89 on Douma earlier that week that killed many people. 113 The hashtag #plastic_attack refers to the idea that the attacks were fake, since “plastiki” means “fake” in colloquial Persian. Initially, the hashtag criticized the US attacks for being ineffective because the damage was marginal and Assad’s power did not decrease. After some time, however, opponents of Iran’s involvement in Syria ‘stole’ the hashtag and started using it as well.

وقتی از ِضعف کیفی و ناهماهنگی جبهه انقلاب در توییتر حرف میزنیم الل هروح (19) یعنی بجای ترند کردن مواضع مهم امروز رهبر انقلاب در برابر حمله Ruhollah 14 apr.114_@ آمریکا با عنوان # ِجنایت نظامی و روشن کردن ابعاد آن، دوستان مان بی توجه به آن دنبال هشتگ بازی با! #حمله_پلاستیکی هستند When we talk about the bad quality and the inconsistency of the front of the revolution on Twitter, we mean this: Instead of making the important topics of today trending,115 such as the supreme leader of the revolution that called the US’s attack a war crime and exposing its dimensions, our friends are only focusing on playing with hashtags about it! #plastic_attack

Tweet (19) proclaims the ‘revolutionaries’ are playing with the hashtag #plastic_ attack. @_Ruhollah is not happy with his “friends’” focus on the “hashtag-game,”116 referring to the competition over the meaning of hashtags, yet another colloquial expression that gets a higher relevance through its usage in this political context. He urges his friends to focus on what is really important instead. The criticism of the inconsistency and bad quality of ‘the front of the revolution’ that is expressed in this tweet presupposes an important issue: there is a unified revolutionary ‘front’ that intends to reveal and manifest ‘important topics’ online. This presumption taps into a phenomenon which is known as the ‘jang-enarm’ or soft war. This is a term denoting a war which is not fought with ‘hard’ means, such as guns and bombs, but is fought with soft means, over soft power instead. Soft power denotes the use of persuasion and attraction with the aim of shaping preferences in order to achieve foreign policy objectives.117 Jang-enarm also refers to digital warfare and cyber conflict. Through the IRGC, the Iranian state has a cyber warfare division that receives about US$76 million a year. One researcher even estimated Iran’s cyber force to consist of 2,400 to 3,600 people. The severity of the cyber warfare and the cyber threat posed on Iran became evident when a ‘worm’ in the Iranian nuclear program was discovered in 2011.118 In 2009 the Iranian government developed a new internet strategy: jang-enarm. This strategy’s key element is the fight against attacks on what the government perceives as Iranian values, particularly by exposing enemy tactics of cultural invasion and production

113 See for example: “World Reacts To US Led Missile Strikes On Syria,” Arab News, April 14, 2018. 114 https://twitter.com/_Ruhollah/status/985188237210775552 115 Trending topics: This is a term used on social media to denote popular topics, topics that are a trend. 116 “hashtag-bazi”: -baziis added to a word in colloquial Persian to denote a game. 117 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” ForeignPolicy, issue 80, 1990, pp. 153-171. 118 Jeffrey Carr, InsideCyberWarfare:MappingtheCyberUnderworld, Sebastopol: O’Reily Media, 2012. 90 L. SCHUT of media content. In a 2009 speech delivered by supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the soft war was first mentioned. Afterwards, the term started to reverberate in both official and state discourse, as well as in discourse produced by individual state supporters on websites unconnected to the state. Importantly, the state incorporated ‘normal’ media into this strategy as well.119 The soft war is not a war waged by the state only. ‘Normal’ Iranians are incited to join the offensive against the enemy by exposing and combating the ways in which enemies aim to fight Iran’s soft power. The analysis of posts on social media proves how invested some individuals, or “soft-warriors,”120 are in waging this war. In fact, @_Ruhollah probably actively participates in this jang-enarm. His reference to the ‘front’ is a reference to the army of cyber warriors. This ‘front’ should be involved in making important topics trending, or in other words, spreading ideology, as it facilitates the circulation of information and discourse on topics that they deem important. Even though tweet (19) was the only tweet that hinted to the existence of these ‘soft-warriors’, his references suggests the presence of state actors on Twitter involved in the production of tweets.

INSTAGRAM POSTS

-is very dif جنگ_سوریه# The content of posts on Instagram containing the hashtag ferent from content posted on Twitter. On 24 September 2018, there were a total of 17,299 posts created with that hashtag. As mentioned, this research will only use posts created in the week of 8-14 April 2018. On Instagram, there is a high amount of posts with exactly the same content. Some posts are uploaded many times in a row, by different accounts. Figure 5 shows posts that occur multiple times in a short time. The posts in this example were all posted on the same day. There is more than one explanation for this recurring phenomenon. In the example, these particular posts are made in a similar artistic style. Most of them use the same type of yellow letters and have more or less the same structure. It is thus very likely that they were made by a single person. It could be that one person has multiple accounts. However, another option is that the post was initially posted by one of the accounts, but was copied by others. The practice of reposting is mainly found among conservative users of Instagram. Reposting enhances the reach and impact of posts and can be interpreted as a tactic of spreading a certain ideology. The practice of reposting can thus be connected to the jang-e narm. ,(جنگ_نرم#)On Instagram there are 39.6k posts containing the hashtag #jang-e_narm -This indicates the rel .جنگ_سوریه# more than double the amount of posts with the hashtag evance of the concept of jang-enarm on Instagram that the scope of this study sadly does not allow me to address.

119 Akhavan, 2013. 120 Ali Hajizadeh, “Analysis: Univeiling Iranian Pro-Government Trolls and Cyber-Warriors,” Al-Arabiya, January 17, 2018. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 91

Figure 5: Screenshot of posts uploaded shortly after each other.

The Instagram posts collected are generally related to events. They are informational and do not necessarily contain comments or opinions. For example, on the 14th of April, many posts are informational about the attacks from earlier that night on Assad’s bases. In the run-up to this event, such posts announced the closing of the airspace for passenger flights and spread quotes of threats Trump made to Syria. Especially such quotes were very prevalent. Some posts in figure 5 are examples of these informational posts. 92 L. SCHUT

Figure 6: “America: With our allies we will attack Syria Figure 7: “Syria in the end of time – They will not within the next 24 hours — The third world war — Russia: last longer than 9 months in Sham – Is this abnormal We will counter with all our allies and all our power” sequence [of events] coincidental?”

Eschatology

The notion of the end of time comes up in a few posts. It only resonates with a very limited number of users. However, it is an interesting idea to take into account and a relevant concept within the Iranian context, because the Iranian political system, the vilayet-efaqih, is partly based on eschatological beliefs.121 Shia eschatology encompasses the belief that an infallible Imam or the Mahdi, who is the only one with the legitimate right to political leadership, is in occultation and that he will return. The moment of his return is prompted by a period of war and corruption and heralds a period of prosperity and the end of time.122 Eschatological hope is considered a way to face evil or bad happenings in the world and to endure individual suffering. It can function as a relief of despair caused by violent wars, such as the one in Syria.123

121 Afshin Shahi, “Paradoxes of Iranian Messianic Politics,” DigestofMiddleEastStudies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2012, pp. 108-125. 122 Abbas Amanat, ApocalipticIslamandIranianShi’ism, London and New York: I.B. Tauris &Co, 2009. 123 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology,” TheHarvard TheologicalReview, vol. 77, no. 2, 1984, pp. 119-139. #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 93

In figure 7 the end of time is announced. The post included 8 other pictures, each with an argument for why the end of time is near, using quotes from Imam Ali and other religious figures and likening them to the situation in Syria. @Roshana_ir understands developments in Syria to match the signs of the coming of the apocalypse. Her argument is two-sided: first, the threat her hypothetical future poses legitimizes action to counter the threat, such as involvement in the war. Second, her argument functions as a relief mechanism, as she prophesizes the horrors of war will soon be over. Other themes reveal similar discursive strategies of hypothetical futures, such as some posts that announce a third world war. Examples can be found in figures 5 and 6. Figure 6 suggests that US attacks would cause a military reaction from Russia, resulting in a third world war. Again, the warning for a hypothetical threat legitimizes action in response to this threat: involvement in Syria is needed to contain the threat. Related to these warnings, Instagram posts often aim to expose the harsh reality in Syria. Similar posts exist on Twitter as well, but are more frequent on Instagram, probably because the visuality of Instagram increases the impact of posts.124 Some posts related to these horrors by expressing a strong pacifist sentiment. Others address crimes committed by Assad or ISIS. Depending on the person held responsible for the horrors, the arguments these posts make vary. However, all premise the war has a perpetrator that should be fought against. Figure 8 depicts a disturbing image of a man in an orange suit that has his eyes pinched out and his throat slit with a knife by someone dressed in black. The text added to the image argues that those who do not support the revolutionary guard have no idea about how many lives the guard sacrificed in order for them to be protected from ISIS. The post shows people what would have happened to them if the IRGC had not have saved them and thus legitimizes IRGC involvement in Syria. This post is an example of one of the arguments used by supporters of this involvement: Iran has to fight against ISIS in Syria to protect Iran from ISIS reaching its borders, and the IRGC is sacrificing itself for the Iranians, even its own critics. This taps into the fairytale of the just war again. The hero, the IRGC, is fighting a villain, ISIS, in order to protect the innocents. By framing the war as an act of altruism this posts and posts similar to this one legitimize Iran’s involvement in Syria. Figure 8 is exemplary of the usage of shocking images in posts on Iran’s involvement in Syria.

Apart from depictions of ISIS as the evil enemy, the US is similarly attributed negative qualities that render it unjust. A recurring theme is the US’s ‘real’ regional policy or strategy for the Middle East. These posts often aim to expose US policy objectives, countering a narrative of US well-doing in the region by revealing the selfish objective of the US’s involvement. The image in figure 9 depicts president Trump with a duckface combined with a text describing Trump’s main goal in the region. The post expresses that the reason for the bombing of strategic sites on government territory was diverting attention from the US’s main objective: moving the US embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, a move with symbolic and strategic significance. This counters the US’s official claim that the attacks were done in response to Assad’s chemical attacks. This narrative frames the actions of the US and the US itself as unjust. In this post, the US is framed as an untrustworthy enemy to argue it’s involvement in Syria is unjust, and simultaneously legitimizing resistance against the enemy in Syria.

124 Leastadius, 2017. 94 L. SCHUT

Figure 8: Those that use the hashtag #I’m_not_a_Revolu- Figure 9: “Primary goal of Trump’s circus in the tionary_ Guard, do not know anything about how ISIS region – deviation of public thought from the transfer knifes did not reach their necks because of the lives of of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.” how many Revolutionary Guards? “The goal of #US #England and #France of the latest actions in #Syria and the game of cat and mouse with #Russia is the distraction of public thought from the issue of the transfer of the US embassy.

Historical relations

One argument used by the supporters of Iran’s involvement in Syria is based on Iran’s and Syria’s historical relationship. During the Iran-Iraq war, also called the ‘imposed war’, Syria was the only Arab country that supported Iran. After the war, the relationship between the two countries remained one of cooperation and support. Figure 10 depicts an example of a post that refers to this relationship. The two upper images show the historical relationship during the Iran-Iraq war. The upper left image is probably taken at the beginning of the war and shows a weapon and two soldiers. The text enclosed describes the weapon as the missile donated by Hafez al-Assad. The upper left image depicts Imam Khamenei and Hafez Assad. The two pictures on the bottom are taken more recently. The left one is a picture of general Suleimani. On the right is a picture of Bashar Assad talking to a soldier. All four images refer to the relationship between Syria and Iran and depict the quality of this relation. The combination of the two upper and two #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 95

Figure 10: ”Syria the only political and military supporter of Iran in the imposed war. Defense of the advisors of Iran of Syria in the global sedition.” Bachemosbatm: “One of the reasons for at least advisory Iranian defense of Syria: compensation of Hafez Assad’s defense of Iran in the imposed war.” bottom images, combined with the texts, also frames the relationship as a reciprocal one and highlights continuation. The argument presented is that Syria helped Iran then, so Iran helps Syria now. The user who posted the image repeats the argument in the description. According to @Bachemosbatm, Iran should give at least advisory support to Syria because of the support given by Bashar’s father Hafez during the Iran-Iraq war, an argument that relies on the concept of loyalty, which is often seen as compatible with morality.125 By depicting Iran’s involvement as an issue of loyalty, the user employs a strong emotive argument.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to research Iranian online political discourse on the war in Syria and Iran’s involvement in this conflict. Its objective was to examine the ways in which Iranian Twitter and Instagram users discursively argue for or against Iran’s involvement

125 Bernard Gert, “Loyalty and Morality,” pp. 3-21 in: Levinson, Sanford, Parker, Joel, and Woodruff, Paul, Loyalty, New York: New York University Press, 2013. 96 L. SCHUT in Syria. To this end, I employed a Critical Discourse Analysis to a corpus of tweets and in the week of 8-14th April 2018. I exposed how #جنگ_سوریه Instagram posts containing Iranian social media users discursively argue by analyzing discursive strategies and infusing multiple layers of context. Even though the results of this study reflect only a fraction of the online Iranian popular debate, I contribute to current literature on Iran’s involvement in Syria and internet and politics in Iran by opening a window into online discursive practices and social dynamics in the context of Iran’s military and diplomatic support for Bashar al-Assad and his government in the Syrian civil war. The discursive practices revealed a polarized political debate in which insults are exchanged and political opponents belittled. The predominant arguments in the posts produced by proponents and opponents of Iran’s involvement were often based on a narrative of the enemy as evil or untrustworthy in order to either justify or un-justify Iran’s involvement in Syria. Posts in favor of Iran’s involvement seemed to be following the state’s ‘worldview’, depicting a nexus of ISIS, Israel, and the US as the enemy. Opponents of involvement, however, depicted Bashar al-Assad and the Iranian state as the enemy. Moreover, the producers of tweets and Instagram posts often expressed a realist worldview and distrust of governments in general and the Iranian government specifically, which formed the basis of many arguments. Finally, also fear or the threat of possible, unfavorable futures were used as a call to action and to legitimize Iran’s involvement. The focus on online debates revealed new trends in the political landscape. This study, for example, identified a group of activists that operate outside of the formal system, the Barandazan. More importantly, the debate and the production of ideology within this debate on social media proved different from traditional media because of the language used: this research revealed many examples of colloquial language elevated to the domain of politics. In fact, colloquial language is instrumental in the production of ideology in a high amount of posts, for example in posts containing #Israel_par or #may_the_shrine_be_ on_one_side_of_my_ass. This means that the language of politics has changed in the context of social media. This change influences power dynamics in Iranian political debates and consequently politics, as fluency in political language is a requisite for participating in formal politics. Through social media, politics become more accessible for people who traditionally are excluded from political debates due to the inability to speak the formal language of power elites. Users seem to think of social media as a tool in spreading their ideas. This is not only eminent in posts that express the intent to assist in the jang-enarm, but also others that adhere to oppositional ideologies have understood the importance of fighting a ‘soft war’ against political opponents online. The constant battle over the meaning of various phrases, such as #defenders_of_ISIS, reveals a power struggle over discourse that illuminates efforts of Barandazan to frustrate the production of ideology by the supporters of the state. Social media enables especially the Barandazan to participate and hold power over ‘meaning’ in the debate on Twitter and to promulgate their discourse whereas in real life this group is excluded from politics. These findings suggest the online debate is transforming domestic politics through changing power dynamics in political discourse. Lastly, I offer a few suggestions for further research. One of the issues that remains underexplored is the effect of the online public debate on Iran’s government policy. It is, #DEFENDERS_OF_ISIS 97 for example, relevant to further study how online activism has influenced the course of the Iranian intervention in Syria. Furthermore, it is necessary to explore more ‘Iranian’ social media platforms, such as Balatarin.com, a platform with solely Persian content where people share news articles and comment on them, to see how political discourse on those platforms differs from international social media platforms and get a more complete impression of online Iranian political discourse.

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