“Pushing Their Necks Out”: Ultra, the Black Watch, and Command Relations, May-Sur-Orne, Normandy, 5 August 1944
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Canadian Military History Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 3 2006 “Pushing Their Necks Out”: Ultra, The Black Watch, and Command Relations, May-sur-Orne, Normandy, 5 August 1944 David R. O'Keefe John Abbott College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation O'Keefe, David R. "“Pushing Their Necks Out”: Ultra, The Black Watch, and Command Relations, May-sur- Orne, Normandy, 5 August 1944." Canadian Military History 15, 1 (2006) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. O'Keefe: “Pushing Their Necks Out” “Pushing Their Necks Out” Ultra, The Black Watch, and Command Relations May-sur-Orne, Normandy, 5 August 1944 David R. O’Keefe n 1974 Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham far included everything from security regulations Ishocked the world when he revealed in his semi- for the handling of messages, to classified in- autobiographical work, The Ultra Secret, that the house accounts of the impact of ULTRA on Allies had been breaking high-grade German commands, to high-level policy papers and ciphers throughout the greater portion of the distribution lists to name but a few. In addition Second World War in an effort commonly referred to the ULTRA material, formerly classified to as ULTRA.1 His disclosure sparked a tempest Intelligence summaries (produced at each as historians anticipated that his admission level of command from Eisenhower’s Supreme would lead to a major revision of Second World Headquarters down to brigade level) were also War historiography. At first, what promised to be declassified during this period providing the a new vista for historical research soon turned historian with two mutually supporting sources into a quagmire. When the British Government to layer upon the existing corpus of material.3 As selectively released files pertaining to ULTRA, a result, new insight and further understanding only messages sent to commands in the field can be achieved concerning intentions, orders, were originally released whereas the supporting decisions and operations that may have been documents necessary to properly assess and regarded, at that time or since, as peculiar, interpret the impact of ULTRA in general, and questionable or ill-conceived. The impact of these on Army Group, Army and Corps commanders new releases on the historiography of Canada’s and their subordinates in the field in particular, role in the Second World War can be witnessed were retained. As a result, the reassessment of in part by re-examining the costly and seemingly this aspect of military history met a similar fate questionable advance by the Black Watch (Royal to that of British armour at the foot of Verrières- Highland Regiment) of Canada on May-sur-Orne Bourgébus ridge during Operation Goodwood – during the afternoon of 5 August 1944. very good initial progress followed by confusion and lack of consolidation resulting in the The first attempt by the Black Watch to by- perception that ULTRA was nothing more than pass May-sur-Orne on the morning of 25 July a highly overrated white elephant. Two decades during Operation Spring ended in disaster as later, Government Communication Headquarters 300 of 315 men were lost attempting to capture (GCHQ) in the UK wisely reviewed their policy and the town of Fontenay-le-Marmion on the reverse began a protracted release of millions of pages of slope of Verrières Ridge. In fact, during their first material to coincide with the 50th anniversary of week of fighting in Normandy, the 1st Battalion the end of the Second World War. Included were of the Black Watch sustained heavy casualties materials that shed new light on the production that included one commanding officer, his battle and dissemination of ULTRA (at Bletchley Park) adjutant, all the rifle company commanders, their and its employment by the consumer, Allied High second-in-commands and the majority of senior Command, in the field.2 The releases have thus NCOs.4 When Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Mitchell © Canadian Military History, Volume 15, Number 1, Winter 2006, pp.33-44. 33 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3 Senior officers of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada: Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Michell (left - photographed as a major) took command of the battalion following its destruction on 25 July 1944 during the advance up Verrières Ridge. Major Tom Anyon (centre) assumed command of “A” Company while Major Ronnie Bennett took over “D” Company. On 5 August Mitchell emerged from the second battle of May-sur-Orne unscathed but Anyon and Bennett were both killed. (Black Watch Archives) took command of the remnants of the battalion scale defensive actions with the dual purpose of the day after Spring, only two of the six remaining strengthening unit cohesion and acclimatizing officers had any battle experience.5 This was reinforcements to life in the Normandy further reduced when Lieutenant George Buch bridgehead. It was here that reinforcements was wounded a few hours after Mitchell arrived, (some with only 6-8 weeks of total service) came leaving only Captain Ronnie Bennett as the lone under shell and sniper fire for the first time.9 The senior Black Watch officer to see combat.6 As a first of these actions occurred during the night of result, Mitchell faced the task of rebuilding and 4-5 August when the Black Watch relieved units of retraining four Black Watch rifle companies that the Fusilier Mont-Royal in the St. André-St.Martin suffered 95 percent casualties on 25 July, and area and conducted routine patrolling in the area restoring the confidence of a well-trained but south of the village.10 At 1030 hours, however, the inexperienced infantry battalion.7 According to routine nature of the day was interrupted when a Brigaider W.J. “Bill” Megill, commander of 5th Liaison Officer (LO) from Major-General Charles Canadian Infantry Brigade, a battalion operating Foulkes’ 2nd Canadian Infantry Division brought under normal circumstances could suffer 10 instructions for 5th Brigade to prevent any enemy percent casualties per month and keep fighting, withdrawal or movement from their front.11 The 20 percent casualties would require one month abrupt change of plans stemmed from confirmed of re-training while 30 percent a full two months, reports that German units facing the British 53rd and so on.8 Despite assurances that the Black Infantry Division west of the Orne River had Watch would be afforded the necessary time to withdrawn, leaving Foulkes to wonder if the same absorb reinforcements and retrain, the afternoon had occurred on his front.12 Patrols conducted of 5 August witnessed the newly re-composed rifle during the night did not support this however, and companies advancing down the road to May-sur- Foulkes was informed by his LO that the “enemy Orne, a mere ten days after being destroyed in was still on 5th Brigade’s front.”13 Undaunted, the fields east of the village. a second LO arrived at Megill’s headquarters roughly 90 minutes later bringing orders from Originally, Megill planned to ease Mitchell’s Foulkes to commence “active probing” and follow battalion into the line south of the twin towns up any sign of enemy withdrawal.14 In response, of St. André and St. Martin in a series of small- Megill drew up a patrol programme that called 34 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss1/3 2 O'Keefe: “Pushing Their Necks Out” for the Black Watch to launch a company-sized and a bolder Brigade-level operation adopted. fighting patrol to to capture the “chateau” area southwest of St. André. If opposition proved In the new three-phased plan, Mitchell’s slight, a second company would pass through battalion would advance down the St. André/ to the area northeast of May-sur-Orne and probe May-sur-Orne road and capture May-sur-Orne in the outskirts of town.15 Finally, at last light, a phase I, followed by the Régiment de Maisonneuve reconnaissance patrol would move south from St. who would pass through and assault Fontenay- Martin to reconnoitre the “factory” and if lightly le-Marmion in phase II. If this proved successful, held, a fighting patrol would occupy the structure the Calgary Highlanders would move through and its environs. 16 Fontenay-le-Marmion and advance, if possible, as far as Bretteville-sur-Laize in the final phase.18 The leading patrols were about to sortie Support for the Black Watch consisted of artillery when Foulkes arrived in person at Black Watch “on call,” but tank, anti-tank and heavy machine headquarters just after 1400 hours and informed gun support was not allocated for their phase both Mitchell and Megill that the “enemy (was) of the advance. It is unclear whether Foulkes withdrawing his depleted forces” and that the withheld all but artillery support due to the Black Watch “MUST keep contact” and “hold” lack of available armour, or whether he chose to the enemy in place so that “a larger plan may be reserve it for it for the later phases.19 Either way, successfully accomplished.”17 As a result, the the Black Watch would advance to May-sur-Orne limited unit-size patrol programme was set aside without the benefit of direct fire support. A Canadian soldier walks through the ruins of May-sur-Orne, 9 August 1944. 35 Photo by Ken Bell, Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 114507 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006 3 Canadian Military History, Vol.