Nem, Nem, Soha" (No, No, Never), Study
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Aniko Kovacs-Bertrand. Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Der publizistische Kampf gegen den Friedensvertrag von Trianon (1918-1931). Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997. 293 pp. DM 98.00, cloth, ISBN 978-3-486-56289-7. Reviewed by John C. Swanson Published on HABSBURG (January, 1998) Discussing the Treaty of Trianon may have more than half of its population. The treaty also been avoided during Hungary's communist peri‐ made one-third of the Magyars into citizens of for‐ od, but the dismemberment of Hungary has re‐ eign states. Hungary would get some of this terri‐ turned as a subject of conversation. Jozsef Antall, tory back in the two Vienna Awards of 1938 and the late prime minister of Hungary, said that Tri‐ 1940, but would lose it again in 1947. anon is something one should always think about Aniko Kovacs-Bertrand has written a fascinat‐ but never talk about, but people are talking. In an ing study of the Hungarians' journalistic struggle interview with Nepszava on 10 November 1997, after World War I against their peace treaty. There Sandor Kavassy, an Independent Smallholder are numerous studies of Hungary between the deputy who is now deputy speaker of the parlia‐ wars, but not of Hungarian revisionism and of ment, argued that the 1920 Trianon peace treaty propaganda against Trianon. Kovacs-Bertrand has should be amended. He said "ethnic borders and filled this lacuna. She also lets us see a more nu‐ political borders must be brought into harmony anced picture of what Trianon meant during the sooner or later."[1] Not only has Trianon returned interwar years. as a topic of political discussion, but it is once Her story is a story of propaganda: "the influ‐ again becoming a topic of historical analysis. encing of the public for or against something" (p. The word "Trianon" is well known to histori‐ 12). Kovacs-Bertrand points out that "propaganda" ans of interwar east central Europe, as is the fa‐ is not only a difficult concept to define but also to mous saying "nem, nem, soha" (no, no, never), study. Other examinations of propaganda often which refers to the Hungarians' attitude toward focus on particular persons or on questions tied to their peace treaty. According to the Treaty of Tri‐ a specific event, whereas she examines an at‐ anon, which was signed on 4 June 1920 between tempt to change the way people viewed a country the Allied Powers and Hungary, Hungary lost ap‐ that had a more long-term impact. proximately seventy percent of its territory and H-Net Reviews According to Kovacs-Bertrand, propaganda propaganda were implemented has been clearly became the central issue in Hungary. It was the explained, which helps the reader make connec‐ most important societal and political expression tions to other events in Europe. of the Hungarian policy of revisionism. Propagan‐ The frst chapter, which is based solely on sec‐ da also became the "reflection of the development ondary material, is a picture of the nationality of the way Hungarians saw themselves after Tri‐ question in the Kingdom of Hungary during the anon" (p. 13). She sees propaganda as an expres‐ nineteenth century. Kovacs-Bertrand points out sion of international politics, Hungarian domestic that even in the discussions over the Compromise politics, and Hungarian national identity. of 1867 Hungarian politicians could not come to a Her study begins in 1918 and ends in 1931. consensus on the nationality question. There was The frst date is obvious (the end of the war), the much debate in the nineteenth century regarding second is also clear for historians of Hungary. In the Magyars' relations to the other nationalities 1931 the period of consolidation ended when Ist‐ under their rule. According to the 1880 census the van Bethlen resigned after serving ten years as Magyars made up only 41.2 percent of the popula‐ prime minister. After Gyula Gombos became tion of the Kingdom of Hungary. prime minister in 1932, Hungary followed very Kovacs-Bertrand looks at the image of Hun‐ different policies. gary on the eve of World War I. Whereas the A rich collection of documents has aided Ko‐ French and Germans were critical of Hungary at vacs-Bertrand's work. She has used the fles of the the end of the nineteenth century, the British pub‐ Sajto es Kulturalis Osztaly (the department of lic had a certain liking for Hungary. But by the press and culture) in the foreign ministry, which early twentieth century, the positive picture of until now had not been examined. She looked at Hungary in Britain had been destroyed. The work everything connected to the press, including the of the two journalists, Henry Wickham Steed and reports from various embassies about their rela‐ Robert William Seton-Watson, helped change the tions to the press. Kovacs-Bertrand admits that image of Hungary in the minds of the British. His‐ not all fles were available, and some were in bad torians of the region are well aware that Seton- condition. She also analyzed the documents of the Watson's negative attitude toward Hungary great‐ Tarsadalmi Szervezetek Kozpontja (central office ly influenced the British Foreign Office. Seton- of societal organizations), and many other Watson's Racial Problems in Hungary[2] became brochures, books, and press releases. the handbook for the British delegation at the In the introduction, Kovacs-Bertrand explains Paris peace conference. that her study is divided into fve sections, but Chapter Two looks at the situation at the end there are seven chapters, many of them with nu‐ of the war. After their defeat in the war, the Hun‐ merous sub-chapters. It is not clear how these sec‐ garians realized that they had also failed in the tions and chapters are connected. If one looks field of propaganda. It was decided that the press only at her chapters, the study is a very clear sto‐ would now take on a more important role in or‐ ry. She begins with "prehistory" (the nineteenth der to improve the image of Hungary abroad. century) and chronologically works her way to During the regime of Mihaly Karolyi, the Orsza‐ 1931. gos Propaganda Bizottsag (National Committee The story of the journalistic struggle of propa‐ on Propaganda) was created and began distribut‐ ganda against the treaty of Trianon closely paral‐ ing leaflets and other printed matter in many lan‐ lels the international politics of east central Eu‐ guages. The goal was to create foreign support for rope. The context in which the various stages of Oszkar Jaszi's plan of a federal Hungary. Karolyi 2 H-Net Reviews also sent journalists abroad in order to influence domestic propaganda also came more under the foreign opinion. direction of the government. Foreign propaganda After the war, propaganda was created not fell clearly under the leadership of the Foreign only by official organs, but also by various patriot‐ Ministry. The "gravaminale" propaganda ic organizations, the most important being TEVEL, (brochures and the press) of the earlier period the league for the protection of the territorial uni‐ was continued. ty of Hungary. More right-wing extremist organi‐ In Chapter Six, Kovacs-Bertrand explains that zations such as MOVE and EME were also in‐ by 1923 Hungarian politicians became more prag‐ volved in influencing people against Trianon. matic and realized that they had to "live with the Many of their publications appeared in foreign realities," especially if they were going to receive languages, especially in English and French. the international credit which they so desperately In Chapter Three, Kovacs-Bertrand analyzes needed. During a meeting in March 1923 of vari‐ Hungary's role at the peace conference. Albert Ap‐ ous politicians, including Bethlen, the prime min‐ ponyi, the head of the Hungarian delegation, ister, and Kalman Kanya, the foreign minister, it made an impact at Paris because of his ability to was concluded that "gravaminale" propaganda give his famous speech of 16 January 1920 in had failed and the next course was to spread "eco‐ three languages. But despite everyone's hope, nomic" propaganda. many Hungarian politicians knew that they had "Economic" propaganda was to create a posi‐ little chance of influencing the other delegates at tive picture of Hungary: Hungary as a the conference. Therefore, during the conference Rechtsstaat, which had successfully rehabilitated the Hungarians undertook action in order to in‐ its economy and rebuilt its political system. "Eco‐ fluence the foreign public. Various Hungarian nomic" propaganda was also supposed to empha‐ politicians made contact with politicians in size Hungary's attachment to Europe and only in‐ Britain, France, and Switzerland. Yet the peace directly criticize the peace treaty. After 1923 the treaty was signed at the Palais Trianon on 4 June question of revisions was avoided, at least official‐ 1920, and the dismemberment of Hungary be‐ ly. But nobody forgot. Kovacs-Bertrand points out came official. that at this time the Hungarians adopted the Chapter Four looks at the situation between French saying "always think about it, sometimes the signing of the treaty and its ratification. After speak about it," a variant of which Jozsef Antall the signing, Hungarian propaganda remained di‐ recently repeated. rect, that is mainly in brochures and the press. In her fnal chapter, Kovacs-Bertrand looks at This direct method of propaganda was called the changes in Hungarian politics and Hungarian "gravaminale" propaganda, the recipients of propaganda after 1927. Hungary was able to which were the League of Nations and the west break out of its diplomatic isolation with the con‐ European politicians and journalists. There were clusion of the friendship treaty with Italy, 4 April also attempts at this time with indirect propagan‐ 1927.