Eap Monthly Bulletin Is the Initiative of the Centre for Policy Unfortunately, the Publication of the Eap Studies

Monthly #6‐8 August ‐ October 2020 https://centreforpolicystudies.org/en/EaP‐Bulletin [email protected] SUBSCRIBE: Facebook Twitter Youtube Editor’s note Dear readers, The EaP Monthly Bulletin is the initiative of the Centre for Policy Unfortunately, the publication of the EaP Studies. Its purpose is to exchange Monthly Bulletin was postponed again – information about the European first, by technical reasons, and then, just Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, to facilitate cooperation before the planned publication, by the between experts and civil society war in Nagorno‐Karabakh. institutions interested in the region, and to provide analytical products for different This issue again focuses mainly on the stakeholders. findings of our joint project with the Experts for Security and Global Affairs The Bulletin’s content is the sole Association (Romania) and the Latvian responsibility of the authors. The Institute of International Affairs, opinions expressed in external Protecting Democratic Values by Tackling contributors’ articles do not necessarily coincide with the Pandemic‐related Disinformation. opinions of our editorial board, or with the position of any public or Armen Grigoryan private institution. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by‐nc‐sa/4.0/ Contents The war in Karabakh: Some [not‐so‐politically‐correct] thoughts Editorial 3 5G, Bill Gates’ ‘desire to have people microchipped’ and other conspiracy theories: How Armenia and other countries of the region may deal with them? by Mariam Grigoryan 5 The Kremlin’s Lugar lab disinformation: Coronavirus edition by Tornike Zurabashvili 8 Struggle for information security during pandemic by Miroslava Sawiris 11 Side effects of COVID‐19: What has been done in Latvia to combat the infodemic by Aleksandra Palkova and Artūrs Bikovs 15 Civil society’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in Central‐ South‐Eastern Europe and the Caucasus by Angela Grămadă and Cătălin Gabriel Done 17 Book review: The Armenian Revolution: An Unfinished Cable by Armen Grigoryan 21 EaP Monthly Bulletin #6‐8, August ‐ October 2020 2 Editorial The war in Karabakh: Some [not‐ so‐politically‐correct] thoughts Is Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan deal with Armenia’s adversaries at the liable for the devastating military defeat and expense of Armenians were dismissed. ensuing humanitarian disaster? Yes, undoubtedly. But not for his actions during At the same time, while essentially the war, as the majority of his critics – negotiating a resolution along the same lines – especially those ousted by the 2018 but gradually with more concessions from the revolution and hoping to return to power – Armenian side required, as Ter‐Petrossian claim now. had warned – Kocharyan and Sargsyan had domestically institutionalised a nationalist Pashinyan’s lack of experience, combined ideology claiming that compromise was not with unwarranted self‐confidence – needed as the status quo in Karabakh would amounting to cocksureness – made him a sooner or later be internationally accepted. hostage to pseudo‐patriotic framing and wishful thinking, so his initial post‐revolution After the 2018 revolution, Pashinyan, already inclination to engage in substantial being in charge for the negotiations, had a negotiations on the conflict resolution gave chance to overcome the ideological legacy of way to a more hard‐line position. the Kocharyan‐Sargsyan duo. Yet, as within weeks, if not days, after the revolution ‘selling In order to better understand the situation, a Karabakh’ again became one of the principal brief review of Armenia’s modern politics topics of a massive propaganda campaign by might be needed. media, NGOs, and other structures controlled by Kocharyan, Sargsyan and their proxies, In September 1997, President Levon Ter‐ Pashinyan adopted a stance which would Petrossian stated in an essay titled War or eventually prove self‐defeating and, instead of Peace? Time to Get Serious that a compromise giving a frank explanation of the situation to on the Nagorno‐Karabakh issue, involving his constituents and pursuing a compromise mutual concessions (including the return of solution, adopted an unrealistic position. territories adjacent to Nagorno‐Karabakh and Apparently, in addition to Pashinyan’s and his held by the local Armenian forces since 1994 closest allies’ lack of experience, the as a buffer zone) and leading to a peaceful ‘technocrats’ in his cabinet – including the resolution had to be achieved as soon as minister of foreign affairs Zohrab possible, as postponing the resolution to the Mnatsakanyan and the minister of defence future would incur higher costs. Ter‐ David Tonoyan, who both had previously Petrossian was labelled ‘defeatist’ and served as deputy ministers – did not give the accused of an intention to ‘sell Karabakh’ by best advice either. nationalist propaganda, and under pressure from several top officials ultimately resigned So, as Pashinyan’s popularity has currently in February 1998. been shattered after the military defeat, and the propaganda may attach to him the labels The main winners were the prime minister of ‘defeatist’ and ‘traitor’ who lost territories, Robert Kocharyan and the minister of interior Kocharyan and Sargsyan, who had made and national security Serzh Sargsyan, who themselves and their cronies rich – while would rule the country for the next 20 years giving the country’s strategic assets to Russia, (until Sargsyan was ousted in 2018), avoiding a binding agreement on conflict establishing a regime characterised by voting resolution and leading the negotiations to a fraud, ubiquitous corruption, persecution of dead end – have been trying to destabilise the political opponents, and making the country domestic political situation, also by means of extremely dependent on Russia – politically, violent actions including the ravaging of the militarily, economically, and also government and National Assembly buildings, ideologically, with exaggerated expectations and the beating of the parliament speaker, about Russia’s moral principles and Ararat Mirzoyan. As it appears, they want to benevolence. Numerous warnings that such a ‘save the nation’ once again. posture would sometime result in Russia’s EaP Monthly Bulletin #6‐8, August ‐ October 2020 3 The picture would not be complete without Russia’s neighbourhood. mentioning that during the war Kocharyan’s and Sargsyan’s propaganda machine acted While the current ceasefire is still far from a concurrently to Russian and Azerbaijani comprehensive peace deal, and France has propaganda. Numerous insinuations by top been trying to revive the international Russian propagandists were republished in mediation, the U.S. long‐term (and seemingly Armenian, one after another, in addition to ongoing, at least under the Trump own content along the same lines, which administration) disengagement still sometimes also resembled a part of Ilham contributes to the humanitarian disaster and Aliyev’s interview with Russian RIA Novosti potentially also political chaos in Armenia. agency: ‘I often say that Pashinyan is a product of Soros. And I think everyone will Thomas de Waal of Carnegie Europe has agree with me. But Soros is no longer even a suggested that ‘there are questions as to person, this is a concept’. Characteristically, whether the Russian security deployment is Belarusian state media also blamed robust enough to guarantee that Armenians of Pashinyan and the 2018 revolution for the Karabakh can continue to live without fear in war (meanwhile, Belarus – formally their homeland’, so ‘Moscow … is likely to Armenia’s CSTO ally – supplied offensive remember its multilateral role and call for the heavy weapons to Azerbaijan, as Russia had support of the other Minsk Group co‐chairs also been doing for years). and the OSCE as a whole’. Yet, in another article published the same day, he noted: ‘the Enemies, allies and bystanders geopolitical picture is not so pretty: This is a deal brokered by two big autocratic The shortcomings of the Armenian neighbors, Russia and Turkey, that can now government’s policies notwithstanding, use it to pursue their own self‐aggrandizing Azerbaijan’s long‐term policy of instigating agendas. For them this is about troops and ethnic hatred, as well as the previous transport corridors, not people. … Russia and ceasefire violations, also were not suggesting Turkey shut Western nations out of the there was a sincere wish for finding a decision‐making process’. A warning about compromise. Turkey’s meddling and the one potential outcome may be found in a involvement of militants from the Middle East, Forbes article also published after the the use of cluster munitions and other banned ceasefire: it underscores the risk of ethnic munitions further aggravated the situation. cleansing and genocide. Then, Russia’s willingness to ditch its In this context, it is also important to mention obligations as a military ally, even though the one prevalent aspect of the coverage of events territory of Armenia proper was attacked by the international media and the statements several times, and to make an under‐the‐table issued by several international organisations deal with Turkey (thus, in accordance with and political bodies, that is, ‘neutrality’ Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s wish, undermining amounting to bothsidesism, like in case of the the OSCE Minsk Group

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