PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT

Clouded alliance North Korea and ’s covert ties

The nature of military co-operation between North Korea and Myanmar has come under international scrutiny amid fears of nuclear proliferation activities. Bertil Lintner investigates the historical ties and extent of collaboration between the two pariah regimes.

personnel and equipment near the new capital, officials, including four government ministers. Naypyidaw, among other locations. However, al- Following the attack, the Myanmar security au- KEYKEY POINTS POINTSKEY POINTS legations that Pyongyang is providing assistance thorities initiated a huge manhunt to capture the • North Korea and Myanmar have to Myanmar’s ruling junta in installing nuclear bombers. One of them, North Korean Major Zin a history of close ties and military co- research reactors and uranium prospecting at Mo (also known as Jin Mo), was arrested after operation, which has intensified since the various sites in the north of the country appear being spotted swimming across a creek in east countries renewed relations in 2007. far-fetched. Analysis of the reports of nuclear Yangon. Two days later, two North Korean demo- assistance suggests that no substantial nuclear lition specialists, Captain Kang Min-chul and • A leaked report suggests Myanmar is PA/1350631 looking to procure conventional weapons, co-operation has occurred or is likely to for the Captain Kim Chi-o, were discovered hiding on equipment and training from Pyongyang, foreseeable future, with satellite imagery over re- a riverbank. Capt Kim was killed, but Capt Kang but reports of nuclear co-operation remain ported sites corroborating the analysis. was taken into custody. On 4 November 1983, the unconfirmed. Myanmar authorities announced North Korea Historic ties was behind the explosion and ordered its embassy • While Myanmar has shown an interest in Myanmar and North Korea have a long history closed and all diplomats out of the country within developing nuclear technology, the pursuit of close ties predating recent events by several 48 hours. All economic and commercial ties be- of a nuclear weapons capability is beyond decades. While Myanmar was ruled by a demo- tween the two countries were also terminated. the current financial and technological cratically elected government after independence The trial of the two captured North Korean capacity of the regime. from the British in 1948, relations with North Ko- agents was swift, and on 10 December 1983 they rea were formal and distant. However, when the were sentenced to death. While the badly injured This article was first available online at jir. Myanmar military seized power in 1962, the two Major Zin Mo was executed by hanging in Yan- janes.com on 17 September 2009. countries became closer. gon’s Insein prison on 6 April 1985, the death In 1966, the state-run Korean Central News sentence against Capt Kang was never carried peculation about the nature of military Agency was permitted to employ a Myanmar citi- out. It is likely he was spared in exchange for co- co-operation between North Korea and zen as its correspondent in Yangon (then known operating with the investigation. S Myanmar has abounded since the two as Rangoon and the capital of the country), and For over a decade, there appeared to be no Asian states re-established diplomatic relations in 1977 Myanmar’s ruler, General Ne Win, paid exchanges of any kind between Myanmar and in April 2007. Concerns were heightened in June an official visit to North Korea. The ruling- Ko North Korea. Yet, an apparent thaw in relations 2009 when a North Korean freighter destined rean Workers’ Party (KWP) became the first took place on 4 January 1996 when the Myan- for Myanmar was suspected of carrying military communist party to establish fraternal links with mar embassy in Bangkok officially invited North cargo in violation of UN Security Council sanc- the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), Korean chargé d’affaires Pang Song-hae to Myan- tions. Trailed by the United States Navy, the Kang which was Myanmar’s only legally permitted po- mar’s Independence Day celebrations in the Thai Nam I eventually returned to North Korea rather litical party at the time. In 1980, the BSPP even capital. The Japanese dailyYomiuri Shimbun pub- than risk inspection. US Secretary of State Hillary sent a delegation to attend the Sixth Congress of lished a news report on 14 January that year quot- Clinton told reporters at the 22 July Association of the KWP. According to Andrew Selth, author ing North Korea’s ambassador to Thailand, Ri Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit that of Burma’s North Korean gambit: challenge to re- Do-sop, as saying that Myanmar-North Korean the US had “growing concerns about military co- gional security, Myanmar and North Korea both communications “have been going on for some operation between North Korea and Myanmar, referred to their “common anti-imperialist and time and the atmosphere was very friendly”. which we take very seriously”, adding “the trans- anti-colonial struggle”. Although Myanmar still In fact, during his tenure in Bangkok in the ear- fer of nuclear technology” was a concern. maintained diplomatic relations with North Ko- ly 1990s, Ri Do-sop was instructed by Pyongyang Clinton’s comments appear partially justified. rea’s enemy South Korea, Selth states: “Relations to contact U Tin Winn, Myanmar’s ambassador Bilateral co-operation between the two countries with Pyongyang tended to be warmer than those to Thailand, to negotiate the repatriation of Capt has certainly increased since the 1990s, focusing with Seoul.” Kang Min-chul. While North Korea’s motivations on conventional military transfers. North Korean However, relations changed dramatically on in pursuing the release of Capt Kang are un- experts also appears to have been covertly assist- 9 October 1983, when North Korean agents known (particularly as he was seen as a traitor for ing Myanmar in constructing an extensive tun- detonated a powerful bomb in Yangon, killing 21 co-operating with Myanmar in the 1983 Yangon nel network as emergency shelters for military people – 18 of whom were visiting South Korean bombing investigation), several meetings took

48 jir.janes.com l Jane’s Intelligence Review l October 2009 PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT PA/1350631 Myanmar soldiers march during an Armed Forces Day ceremony in Naypyidaw on 27 March 2007. Myanmar’s concern about US airstrikes was likely to have been a major motivation behind the decision to move the capital to a more central location from the coastal site of the previous capital, Yangon.

place between the two ambassadors in Bangkok figure in the Pyongyang hierarchy, Pak went on that North Korean technicians were installing in 1993-94. Ultimately however, the negotiations to become North Korea’s ambassador to Canada surface-to-surface missiles on the Myanmar failed to achieve a repatriation agreement and in 2002, and on 13 May 2005 he met US special navy’s Myanmar-class coastal patrol boats that Capt Kang remains in prison. envoy Joseph DeTrani to discuss North Korea’s were manufactured locally. Suspicions of further return to six-party denuclearisation talks. military collaboration continued in November Military co-operation In early 2002, Myanmar expressed an inter- 2006, when the 2,900-tonne North Korean cargo As informal relations between North Korea and est in buying one or two small submarines from vessel MV Bong Hoafan (Bonghwasan) sought Myanmar were re-established, Myanmar began North Korea, either the Yugo-class midget sub- shelter from a storm and anchored in a Myanmar to express an interest in North Korean-produced marine or the Sang-o-class mini-submarine. As port. Although the Myanmar authorities declared military hardware. The Myanmar military was al- reported by Jane’s on 11 June 2003, Yangon opted that an on-board inspection had found no suspi- ready familiar with similar Chinese designs that for one Sang-o-class submarine, but was forced cious equipment, journalists and embassy staff in it had procured, but the North Korean versions to abandon the deal in late 2002. The cost of the Yangon told Jane’s they remained sceptical. The were cheaper and, unlike China, North Korea was submarine and a lack of expertise to operate it Kyodo news agency reported on 26 April 2007: willing to accept barter deals, which suited the appeared to be the reason for the cancellation. “A North Korean ship under US surveillance was cash-strapped Myanmar government. Western military sources have told Jane’s that believed to have unloaded self-propelled artillery Regional intelligence sources have told Jane’s Myanmar was still interested in acquiring a small at a Myanmar port.” that in late 1998, Myanmar took delivery of be- submarine to patrol its southeastern coastal ar- This was not the last time a North Korean ves- tween 12 and 16 North Korean 130 mm M-46 eas, where smugglers and insurgents are active. A sel would be reported running into trouble in (Type 59) field guns. This represented the first future North Korea-Myanmar submarine deal is Myanmar waters. In April 2007, only days after trade transaction between North Korea and My- therefore a possibility. the restoration of ties, the North Korean freighter anmar since 1983. Subsequently, the director of On 10 July 2003, the Far Eastern Economic Kang Nam I docked at Thilawa port near Yangon. procurement of the Myanmar Armed Forces paid Review reported: “Between 15 and 20 North Ko- Myanmar officials claimed the vessel was forced an unofficial visit to Pyongyang in June 1999, rean technicians have been spotted at the Monkey to seek shelter from a storm, although two local while a Myanmar government delegation made Point naval base near Yangon and at a Ministry Myanmar reporters working for a Japanese news another secret visit to North Korea in November of Defence guest house in the northern suburb agency were turned back and briefly detained 2000 for talks with high-ranking officials of the of the [then] capital.” It is possible that North when they went to the port to investigate. This Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces. Korean technicians were helping the Myanmar suggests there may have been more covert reasons This was followed by a visit to Yangon of a navy equip selected vessels with surface-to-sur- for the arrival of the Kang Nam I in Myanmar – high-ranking North Korean delegation from 20 face missiles. Monkey Point is the base for the an incident which heightened concerns over the to 22 June 2001, led by vice-foreign minister Pak Myanmar navy’s six Houxin-class guided mis- vessel’s attempted second known voyage to Myan- Gil-yeon. According to the Korea Times in 10 sile patrol boats, which were purchased from mar in June this year. Western intelligence sources July 2001, the visit was “to discuss co-operation China in the mid-1990s. Each of them is armed told Jane’s that there have been many other port in the defence industry with Myanmar’s Deputy with four Chinese-made C-801 Eagle Strike calls by North Korean vessels over the past three Defence Minister Khin Maung Win”. As a key anti-ship cruise missiles. Another possibility is to four years. Some of the most revealing evidence

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1. Platoon rooms (1-9) 2. Company headquarters (1-3) 3. Ammunition depots 4. Battalion headquarters 5. Battalion commander’s room 6. Storage room for 50,000 1 gallons of fuel to last 14 days 1 7. Food storage room 1 Bertil Lintner/1350651

6 3 7

2

3 4 3 1

5 1 2 2 1

1 1 1

Myanmar army diagram of an underground facility for an armoured battalion. It houses a battlion of three companies of three platoons each. Each platoon has its own tunnel entrance/exit. Although the document is labelled as a tank position map, the vehicles in the yellow rooms appear to be armoured personnel carriers. Each company has its own ammunition depot, while the non-linear shape of the connecting tunnels is designed to lessen the effects of missile or bomb attacks.

of conventional military co-operation between for two largely isolated regimes with rudimentary Myanmar’s concern about the threat of US North Korea and Myanmar surfaced when details domestic defence production industries. airstrikes or invasion, fears which it shares with of a military visit to Pyongyang were leaked by However, other areas of collaboration have also North Korea, is likely to have been a major moti- Myanmar military sources to the country’s exile been noted in recent years. In June 2006, local vation behind the ruling junta’s decision to move community. This included photos and a detailed Myanmar sources told Jane’s that Asian intelli- the capital to a mountainous location it considers report of a visit to Pyongyang in November 2008 gence agencies intercepted a message from Nay- safe. by General Thura , joint chief of staff pyidaw confirming the arrival of a group of North A key component of the growing strategic ties of the Myanmar Armed Forces, between Myanmar and North who is considered number three ‘No certified evidence has Korea appears to be North Ko- in the ruling military junta. The rea’s expertise in tunnelling, as photos show Gen Shwe Mann Pyongyang is known to have inspecting air defence systems emerged of North Korea’s dug extensive tunnels under the and missile factories, and sign- demarcation line with South ing an agreement between involvement in a nuclear Korea as part of contingency in- the two countries. The report vasion plans. mentions joint military train- programme in Myanmar’ The tunnels and under- ing programmes, air defence ground shelters built by North schemes, joint efforts in build- Korea in Myanmar are located ing tunnels and language training. Western intel- Korean tunnelling experts at the site. not only in and around Naypyidaw, but also near ligence analysts told Jane’s that they interpret the Naypyidaw is in the foothills of Myanmar’s Aungban and Taunggyi in , near the leak of information as a sign of disaffection within eastern mountains, and Yangon-based diplomats Defence Services Academy (DSA) in Pyin Oo Myanmar’s military ranks over the new ties with have long suspected that the most sensitive mili- Lwin (formerly known as Maymyo) and other Pyongyang. tary installations in the newly established admin- locations. Some are located close to new hydro- istrative capital would be relocated underground. electric power stations, and the electricity these Tunnelling expertise These are likely to include arms stores, under- generate is for the military’s above- and under- That military co-operation continues amid os- ground communications centres (with fibre optic ground installations. It is noteworthy that there is tensibly poor diplomatic relations makes sense cables) and bomb shelters. no electricity in nearby towns and villages.

50 jir.janes.com l Jane’s Intelligence Review l October 2009 PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT Bertil Lintner/1350650 The capital, Naypyidaw, includes a tunnel network for security, which North Korea appears to have aided.

Nuclear Myanmar? around 500 have returned to Myanmar with a Military transfers and tunnel construction there- bachelor’s or master’s degree, some of whom have fore continued the bilateral relationship, even studied nuclear technology. without the presence of formal diplomatic rela- Significantly, although Rosatom claimed that tions. However, following the restoration of ties the Natmauk centre would be controlled by the and amid increasing military collaboration, in- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the ternational concern over the burgeoning relation- IAEA stated on 17 May 2007 that Myanmar had ship has naturally focused on one of the possible not reported plans to build a nuclear reactor to the exports that North Korea could provide: nuclear agency, despite claims by Moscow that the facility equipment, technology and expertise. would be overseen by the nuclear watchdog. As Such concerns exist not only because of of September 2009, no plans are known to have

Pyongyang’s desire to gain hard currency and its been submitted to the IAEA. Myanmar is a sig- David Playford/IHS Janes/1350695 alleged role in the near-construction of a nuclear natory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of Comercially available satellite imagery suggests reactor in Syria, but also owing to Myanmar’s pro- 1968 (NPT) and has a safeguard agreement with that construction on Myanmar’s planned nuclear fessed desire to gain nuclear technology. So far, the the IAEA that would require the country to allow research reactor at Myaing has not begun. most public potential nuclear partner has been inspections of its nuclear facilities. Despite reports Russia. In February 2001, Russia’s Atomic Energy to the contrary, Western intelligence sources told Ministry announced plans to supply a nuclear re- Jane’s that the Russian nuclear reactor has not yet research reactor (more unconfirmed recent re- search reactor to Myanmar. For unknown reasons been delivered. Commercially available satellite ports have placed the planned reactor site at Mya- the 2001 deal failed to materialise, most likely be- imagery obtained by Jane’s corroborates this. A ing, north of Pakokku in Magwe division). cause Myanmar lacked the necessary funds for 30 km2 search around the co-ordinates of the re- Such events have been bolstered by analyses by the project. Nevertheless, a similar agreement, ported uranium processing plant at Thabeikkyin academics and analysts. For instance, a detailed likely to involve the same components to be sup- was conducted over satellite imagery from March report by Australian academic Desmond Ball plied by Russia, was reached on 15 May 2007, 2009. No such site or related facility was observed, and Thailand-based journalist Phil Thornton -ap when Russia’s atomic energy agency Rosatom an- nor any tunnelling or underground activity. peared in the Bangkok Post on 2 August, which nounced it had agreed to build a 10 MW nuclear was quoted by newspapers all over the world. research reactor at Natmank in central Myanmar. North Korea’s role However, all of this evidence remains cir- According to Rosatom, the research reactor is Despite the paucity of nuclear co-operation with cumstantial and no certified evidence – satellite to use low-enriched uranium, not plutonium as Russia, speculation about North Korea’s involve- imagery or eyewitness – has emerged of North used in North Korea’s Yongbyon complex. Ac- ment in Myanmar’s potential nuclear programme Korea’s involvement in a nuclear programme in cording to Rosatom’s press release: “The centre has increased in recent years. Yangon residents Myanmar. The initial report by Ball is based solely will comprise a 10 MW light water reactor work- have told Jane’s about the presence of North Ko- on the testimonies of two Myanmar defectors – ing on 20 per cent-enriched uranium-235, an rean technicians in Myanmar in November 2003 an accountant who used to be attached to an al- activation analysis laboratory, a medical isotope when representatives of the Daesong Economic leged nuclear programme and a Russian-trained production laboratory, silicon doping system, Group (an enterprise under the KWP’s Bureau junior officer, who claimed to have been in charge nuclear waste treatment and burial facilities.” In 39 charged with earning foreign currency for of an artillery unit guarding what he described as addition, under the 2007 agreement, between 300 Pyongyang) arrived in the city. At about the same a nuclear site in Myanmar. It is therefore impos- and 350 Myanmar students are to be trained in re- time, Yangon-based Asian diplomats told Jane’s sible to confirm the report, particularly given the lated technology at Russian institutes. This would that North Korean technicians had been spotted often unreliable testimony of defectors. supplement the approximately 1,000 to 2,000 unloading large crates and heavy construction Beyond direct assistance in any nuclear com- Myanmar nationals (most of whom are military equipment from trains at Myothit, the closest sta- plex construction, various reports have also sug- personnel) who have already been trained in Rus- tion to Natmauk, near one of the suspected sites gested North Korea has been involved in pros- sia under the initial 2001 agreement. Since then, for the installation of Myanmar’s planned nuclear pecting for uranium in Myanmar. According to

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a report compiled by Thailand-based Myanmar southeast of (at Tha Tha Na) reveals Russia’s state-run oil company, Zarubezneft, is dissidents, uranium deposits have been found the rapid construction of a large-scale mine. Al- also involved in oil and gas exploration in Myan- near Indawgyi Lake in Myanmar’s northern-most though imagery cannot readily verify the ore that mar, possibly as a concession to Russia for agree- Kachin State. The report also claims that North is being obtained, the necessary elements for re- ing to supply a nuclear reactor. Other Russian Korean mining experts have been spotted looking fining minerals of a radiological nature (extensive companies involved in exploration in Myanmar for uranium near Inle Lake in Shan State. and independent power source and ample water include Tyazhpromexport and a company from While these reports remain unconfirmed, a supply for waste dispersal) are present at this ac- the autonomous Russian republic of Kalmykia. If Myanmar government website has identified tive facility. North Korea has been aiding Myanmar in its ura- uraniumCONCLUSIONCONCLUSION ore deposits at the following five loca- However, North Korea’s involvement in ura- nium prospecting, it is likely to be either for cash tions: Magway (Magwe), Taungdwingyi (south of nium extraction is not yet definitively evident. or to further the improving relationship. North Bagan), Kyaukphygon (Mogok), Kyauksin (near None of the government-declared sites are near Korea itself has extensive uranium deposits, so Mergui, or Myeik), and Paongpyin (Mogok). Indawgyi or Inle, and Russian, not North Ko- even if Pyongyang is pursuing a uranium enrich- A sequence of DigitalGlobe satellite images rean, companies are known to be prospecting ment programme, as claimed on 4 September, it CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION CONCLUSION taken over a reported uranium mining complex for uranium in northern and central Myanmar. is unlikely to require any imports from Myanmar.

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION CONCLUSION Ostensibly, Myanmar has plenty of reasons a project. Even with the Russian-supplied re- appear overblown, with satellite imagery con- to pursue a nuclear programme and North actor and nuclear facilities, Myanmar would firming that no construction has occurred at Korea to supply one. Naypyidaw fears exter- still lack an enrichment capability to produce some suspected sites, and defector informa- nal military intervention, and may perceive a fissile material and delivery systems, while all tion proving inconclusive. Even if Myanmar deliverable nuclear weapon as an ultimate the time maintaining the facilities themselves. were to pursue a nuclear programme, it is security guarantee. Meanwhile, Pyongyang North Korea’s nuclear programme has devel- likely to be decades before it approached a continues to desire foreign currency, and the oped over decades since the 1960s, at times capability. sale of nuclear technology or expertise could with Soviet assistance, and the country is Nevertheless, whether or not nuclear be one source (the US also claimed that still struggling to develop deliverable nuclear co-operation is forthcoming, North Korean- North Korea was engaged in helping Syria devices and reliable delivery systems. So far, Myanmar relations are set to intensify. Both building a nuclear reactor before the build- Myanmar is not known to have shown any in- countries share a similar approach to exter- ing’s destruction in an Israeli air strike on 6 terest in buying delivery systems from North nal relations, particularly towards the US, and September 2007). Korea (other than basic missiles such as first- are subject to international or national sanc- Moreover, there are domestic reasons generation Scuds, known as Hwasong in tions. Although leaking photographs and a for the Myanmar military to desire a nuclear North Korea). report of Gen Shwe Mann’s visit to North Ko- capability, not least the junta’s belief in and Furthermore, international opprobrium rea suggests the Myanmar military may not desire to project the image of a strong, united may act as something of a restraining force. be wholly united behind the move to estab- nation state. The change of the country’s Myanmar is party to the nuclear non-prolifer- lish closer links with Pyongyang, the strategic name in 1989 to Myanmar was intended to ation treaty (NPT) and in 1995 entered into and practical motivations for continued co- signify a new concept of a singular unitary a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In operation remain. In particular, conventional nation state, as opposed to the diverse unity December the same year the country signed military transfers are set to ­continue, with My- of various ethnic groups previously pursued the Bangkok Treaty (the Treaty on the South- anmar seeking to procure further equipment in post-war Burma. This also helps explain east Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone), to aid its counter-insurgency campaigns near the new grandiose capital and the worship guaranteeing no use, manufacture, transfer, the country’s borders. n of medieval warrior kings (symbolised by stockpiling or testing of nuclear weapons. Al- three statues of Anawratha, Bayinnaung and though these treaties will not in themselves RELATED ARTICLES Alaungpaya in Naypyidaw) rather than inde- prevent Myanmar developing a nuclear WWW.JANES.COM pendence hero Aung San, the father of Nobel weapon (North Korea was party to the NPT, 1. Nuclear fallout – North Korea returns to Peace laureate and opposition leader Aung but withdrew in January 2003 to pursue proliferation programme San Suu Kyi, who has been under house ar- its programme), they present international rest for the past 19 years. With such change norms to the country, which would see rela- 2. Sentinel: Procurement/Myanmar and centralisation, the ruling junta believes it tions with its neighbours suffer significantly if 3. JCBRN: Production Capability/ is building a stronger state. A nuclear arsenal it pursued a nuclear programme. Moreover, Myanmar Nuclear would clearly bolster this image. Nonethe- extensive international sanctions would be less, despite these reasons, it is currently un- likely in the event that Naypyidaw sought to Author likely that recent agreements between North develop nuclear weapons, hampering Myan- Bertil Lintner is a journalist and author Korea and Myanmar have included any ad- mar’s economy. based in Thailand. He has written seven vanced nuclear co-operation. A deliverable All of these factors suggest that Myanmar’s books about Myanmar and one about nuclear arsenal remains far beyond what My- nuclear ambitions are balanced by the poten- North Korea: Great Leader, Dear Leader: anmar can currently achieve and afford. tial negative repercussions and difficulties in Demystifying North Korea under the Kim The consensus among regional intelli- producing nuclear weapons. Although a nu- clan. gence sources speaking to Jane’s is that, for clear programme would bolster Myanmar’s Search for these articles at the time being, Myanmar cannot afford such image, recent reports of nuclear co-operation www.janes.com

52 jir.janes.com l Jane’s Intelligence Review l October 2009