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Myanmar's Post-Election Landscape

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Myanmar's Post-Election Landscape Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°118 Jakarta/Brussels, 7 March 2011 Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape increased. Restrictions on technical assistance from inter- I. OVERVIEW national financial institutions should also be removed. These bodies should be encouraged to work on pressing concerns The November 2010 elections in Myanmar were not free such as poverty alleviation, social and economic policy and fair and the country has not escaped authoritarian rule. reform, education, and capacity building. Restrictions that Predictably, in such a tightly controlled poll, the regime’s hold back the United Nations Development Programme own Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) (UNDP) and other UN agencies should be lifted. Broad- won a landslide victory leaving the military elite still in based economic sanctions such as those imposed by the control. Together with the quarter of legislative seats re- U.S. on imports and the EU’s denial of trade privileges served for soldiers, this means there will be little political should also go. space for opposition members in parliament. The new government that has been formed, and which will assume A new approach urgently needs to be adopted, one that power in the coming weeks, also reflects the continued provides much greater support for Myanmar’s people and dominance of the old order with the president and one of for the socio-economic reforms that are essential for im- the two vice presidents drawn from its ranks and a num- proving their lives, while convincing the leadership that a ber of cabinet ministers recycled. renormalisation of relations with the West is possible if they embark on a process of significant political reform. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that noth- In its reporting over recent years, Crisis Group has set out ing has changed. The top two leaders of the former mili- some of the elements of such an approach: structured re- tary regime have stepped aside, and a new generation has gional and international engagement; a normalisation of aid taken over. A new constitution has come into force, which relations; opportunities to promote reform and greater open- fundamentally reshapes the political landscape, albeit in a ness at a key moment of political transition; and giving way that ensures the continued influence of the military. greater priority to peaceful resolution of the ethnic issue. A number of technocrats have been brought into the cabi- net, and at the local level ethnic groups now have at least some say in the governance of their affairs. II. THE NOVEMBER 2010 ELECTIONS These changes are unlikely to translate into dramatic re- forms in the short term, but they provide a new govern- The first elections in Myanmar since 1990 were held on 7 November 2010.1 The pre-election playing field was tilted ance context, improving the prospects for incremental re- 2 form. This moment of relative change in a situation that heavily in favour of the USDP. The vote was peaceful, and in most places few polling irregularities were reported has been deadlocked for twenty years provides a chance 3 for the international community to encourage the govern- on the day. The election was marred by what appears to ment to move in the direction of greater openness and re- form. But this opportunity can only be seized if the West changes its failed policies of sanctions and isolation. These 1 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°144, Burma/Myanmar: After policies are counterproductive: they have a negative im- the Crackdown, 31 January 2008; Asia Report N°161, Burma/ pact on the population and on the prospects for dialogue Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations, 20 and reconciliation – and by reinforcing the siege mentality October 2008; Asia Report N°174, Myanmar: Towards the Elec- of Myanmar’s leadership, they undermine the chances that tions, 20 August 2009; Asia Report N°177, China’s Myanmar the new generation of leaders will break with the isola- Dilemma, 14 September 2009; Asia Briefing N°105, The Myan- mar Elections, 27 May 2010; Asia Briefing N°112, China’s tionist and authoritarian direction of the previous regime. Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Ethnic Politics and Economics, 21 September 2010. Improved policies must start with the recognition that 2 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°105, The Myanmar Elec- sanctions have had counterproductive effects and caused tions, 27 May 2010; and “Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s Elec- ordinary people to suffer, and have impeded the country’s tion Landscape”, Transnational Institute, October 2010. development. To redress this, restrictions on development 3 “Preliminary findings report”, 8 November 2010, issued by an assistance should be immediately lifted and levels of aid independent and politically neutral local association based in Myanmar. The report was based on observations by 175 volun- Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°118, 7 March 2011 Page 2 have been a massive manipulation of the vote count, as demanded that other candidates sign off on the amended well as other irregularities. The military government-backed results.8 USDP won a huge majority of the seats – 80 per cent of lower house elected seats and 77 per cent of upper house In addition, the first-past-the-post system gave a signifi- elected seats (complete results are provided in Appendix cant inherent advantage to the USDP. This party obtained B). With the 25 per cent bloc of reserved military seats 58 per cent of the total votes cast for all assemblies (na- factored in, the USDP still has a majority of almost 60 per tional and regional), which translated into 77 per cent of cent in both houses (detailed statistics are provided in the seats. The second-largest party, the National Unity Party Appendix C). (NUP), got 23 per cent of the vote, but this translated into only 5 per cent of the seats.9 (This is similar to what hap- pened in the 1990 elections, when the National League 1. Manipulation of the vote count for Democracy’s (NLD) 60 per cent of the vote gave them The most obvious manipulation occurred with so-called 81 per cent of the seats, compared with the NUP’s 21 per “advance votes” – votes cast in advance of election day cent of the votes and 2 per cent of the seats.) by those who for various reasons (defined in law) were unable to vote on the day. Despite comments shortly be- On one rather crude measure of popularity – the average fore polling day by the chairman of the election commis- number of votes per candidate – the National Democratic sion that the number of advance votes was “small”,4 Cri- Force (NDF) came second after the USDP, with 20,000 sis Group analysis of the official results shows that there votes per candidate, as compared to over 30,000 for the were around 6 million advance ballots, representing some USDP. This does not take into account distortions in the 10 per cent of all votes cast.5 Advance votes were collected vote count and advance votes, and therefore underestimates in a non-transparent way, with allegations of serious ir- the real popularity of the party. The NDF was formed by regularities. The distribution of advance votes among can- some senior NLD leaders who disagreed with that party’s didates varies markedly from the distribution of votes on decision to boycott the election. polling day, giving further credence to such allegations.6 Ethnic parties fared relatively well in most of the seven Manipulation of advance votes alone cannot account for ethnic state assemblies. The USDP together with the mili- the USDP landslide. These votes only changed the out- tary bloc forms a majority in all these assemblies, but other come of contests in 64 seats (out of 1,154), almost all in parties form significant minority blocs. This gives opposi- favour of the USDP.7 There were also allegedly other tion parties in many states potentially important legislative blatant forms of manipulation. Candidates reported that in powers, such as the ability to call special sessions of the some unmonitored polling stations, the votes went over- legislatures, and the right to initiate and block impeach- whelmingly to the USDP. In a couple of cases, it has been ment proceedings against regional public office holders. claimed that the authorities simply changed the results to ensure that certain high-profile USDP candidates won, and 2. Reactions to the results The massive landslide of the USDP, together with the bla- tant way in which some of the results were manipulated, further undermined elections that already lacked credibil- ity. This will inevitably have an impact on the legitimacy teer observers in many different parts of the country who had of the new government, domestically and internationally. been trained in international standards on election observation methodologies. 4 At a briefing on 18 September in Naypyidaw for diplomats and the media, the chairman of the election commission stated in reply to a question that: “The numbers of those casting ad- vance votes are compiled by the township Election Commis- 8 The vote count took place in each polling station at the close sion. The categories include those under hospitalisation, those of voting, in the presence of candidates or their representatives; in detention, military personnel on duty and training and those however, given the large number of polling stations (in some abroad. These numbers are small”. constituencies, one per 500 voters), it was difficult for most 5 The total electorate is about 30 million, but voters cast three candidates to have representatives in all of them. Crisis Group separate ballots – one each for the upper house, the lower house interviews, December 2010 and January 2011.
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