Wellington's Supply System during tk Pcninsular War, 1809-1 8 14. Tina M. McLauchh History Department McGill University, Md Augusî 1997 A thesis submitted to the Facule of Graduate Studia and Research in partial fulnllment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Copyright O 1997 by Tina M. McLauchlan. National Library BiMiaWque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services senfices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wellington OttawaON KtAON4 OtlawaON K1AW Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licefice non exclusive Licence dowing the exclusive pemettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du danada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seii reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microforni, vendre des copies de cette @se SOUS paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège thèse- thesis nor substantial extracts from it Ni la thèse ni des extraits scibstantiels may be printed or otheniise de celle-ci ne doivent être @primés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits SMson permission. autorisation. Much of the sufeess of the Allied Peninsular Amy was due to the effectiveness of Wellington's supply systan. The ability of Welhgton to keep his army supplied presented him with an enormous advantage over the French This paper examines the role logistics played in deciding the ouiforne of the war in the Penionila as weli as detailing the needs of the t~oops.The primary focus of this paper is the procurement, transport, and payment of supplies for the use of the Allied Amy during the Penuwlar War. Wellington's ability to consistently defeat Fmch forces despite a substantid numerical disadvantage preseE3 the thesis that the efficiency of Wehgtonyslogistical system impacted the strategic situation to a signiscant degree. While superior logistics alone cannot win a war, their absence can lead to defeat, as the French learned to their detriment, Une grande partie du succès de l'année aiiiee de la Peninsule fut due à l'efficacité du système d'approvisionnement de Wellington La capacité de Wellington de ravitailler son armée lui conféra un avantage important sut les Français. Dans cette thèse est etudié le rôle joué par la logistique en ce qui wnceme I'issu de la guerre dans la Peninsde ainsi que les besoins des soldats. Le thème principal de cette thèse est l'acquisition, le transport et le paiement des provisions de toutes natures pour l'usage de l'armée alliée pendant la guerre de la Peninsule. Le fait que Wellington pût vaincre régulièrement les forces Françaises en dépit d'un désavantage numénqiie considérable soutient la thèse que l'efficacité du système logistique de Wellington affecta d'une manière significative la situation stratégique. Même si la seule supériorité logistique ne saurait gagner une guerre, son absence peut entrainer la défaite, comme trouvèrent les Français à leur détriment. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE iii A. IMPORTANCE OF SUPPLY B-STRATEGIC DILEMMA A OVERALL B- COMMISSARIAT A ANGLO-PORTUGUESE B- SPANISH C. SURVEY OF WAR CHAPïER IV: SUPPLIES A. GENERAL REQCTIREMENTS OF THE TROOPS BI SOURCES OF SLJPPLY CHAPTER V: TRANSPORT A BY WATER B. BY LAND CHAPTER VI: PAYMENT A EXPENSES B. RESOClRCES CHAPTER VII= CONCLUSION A. EVALUATION ENDNOTES A- INTRODUCTION B. SOURCES PREFACE The Peninsular War, fou@ predominantly in Portugal aad Spain, was consided a sideshow to the main conflict in Eump. As a ocamdory theatrc of war, however, the Peninsula was important in forcing the French to witever-increasing hnt-Iine troops in an effort to paci@ this rebellious region. The troopi mtto the Peninsula would become sorely missed once Napoleon launched his invasion of Russia in 1812. The inability of the French to capitalize on their vast numerial superiority kd a a pmcted war of attrition where incmasing numbers fell to the British, the guerrillas, or to starvation. Much has ben written about tbe Nspoieonic period in gened, and the Peninsular War in particular. While Wellington's strategy and tactics, as well as those of his adversaries, have been meticulously disected, the more fitodamencll topic of logistics has been largeiy ignored- An amry would cease to exist if it had no supplies. The gathering of those supplies dictates, to a great extent, the type of strategic options open to the commanding general. This paper is a study of the effect the method of supply has on the type of strategy available. 1 would like to acknowledge îhc assistance and support of the rnany people who were involved in the completion of this papcr, apecially my advisor, Professor Hereward Senior of McGiU University. His iremendous paticoce as we struggled to find a new thesis topic was invaluable. Though this thesis took a long the to corne together, his advice and suggestions of sources made the task much mort m-ble. 1 would also like to acknowledge the great assistance rendered by the staffs of McLem Library, McGill University, Montreal; the British Library, London; the Manuscript Room of &e British Library, London; the Public Record Office, Kew, and the Insitute of Historical Rescarch, University of London. 1 would like to thank my fnends, Karl Hele, Fleur Woodward, and Meirion Todd for their generous assistance in proofreadhg my tbesis. 1 would especially like to thank Mary McDaid, the Graduate History Coordinator at McGill University, for al1 of ber assistance and encouragement. 1 would also like to acknowIedge my debt of gratitude to the late Professor Robert Vogel of McGill University, without whose guidance and inspiration 1 would neva have found the sheer enjoymcnt that can be found in history. He will always be missed. Last, but not Ieast, 1 would Iike to thank my mother, Shirley McLaucblan, for always believing that 1could do this. iii CsAPTER 1 :INTRODUCTION Wellington's suppIy system greatiy afliected his suarccess against the French duhg the Peninsular War. It was his abitity ta keep his troops supptied that enableci him to implement the strategy and tactics he desirecl. Supply is central to any m*t.ry campaign y& its importance is rarely mentioned in the studies of thor campaip. The mahod of supply not only affects the etnciency of the umy but often the strategy and tactics employed. Ifm anny is to be effective, it must have the mcaas available to feed and suppiy its troops. Wahout an efficient mpply system, ui army is unrble to pafomi to the besî of its ability- While not as excitig to examine as battles, strategy, and tactics, supply is just as important, ifnot more sa One tends to forget to ask about what goes on behiad the scenes of war-the less glamorous but stiU essential elernent of supply. Wtale batues are the most obvious sign of success in the field, it is oftm what goes on off the fields of battle that plays the decisive role. Success undenïably cornes with victory on the field but those victories are made possible by the work done off the fidd by the supporthg organizations. The mark of a truly great commander is his ability to integmte the two areas of expertise. Wehgton was one commander who exceiled at the art of supply. Many great commanders left the supply of their army in the han& of others. Weliington prefmed to have control. No general considered in the nnt rank of bawefïeld cornmanden had planned logistics as carefùiiy as Wellington M. He inherited a system of supply and only changed the outward forms slightly. The end rdt, however, was Merent fiom anythuig seen before. His staffwas moulded by his dominant penonality and their ties to their civilian organizations back in Britain were relaxeci. There were also less ngid boundanes between individual respomïbilities. Money was sent to Weilington instead of individual depariments. He asmeci totd responsibiiity. This was an enormous personal risk He was Iegally responsible and, iflerliunent disagreed with his decisioas, he wuid have lost his personal fortune.' The tect tbat WeIiington was willing to risk his personal fortune shows the depth of his beiiefin his dhate success. In this examination of WeUiogion's supply system, severai important areas wüi be considered. The administrative stnrcn~emiiy not be the fht thuig one thioks of when contemplatuig logistics but &out an undastanding of the bierarchy involved, it becomes Wtuaüy impossible to decipher the individual roles played by the characters co~l~erned.To fhther this understanding, both the ovdstructure and that of the commissariat WUbe examineci. The next item for consideration is the size of the army involved. It is necessary to get some idea of the numbers More the deof operations an be understood. Likewise, a nirvey of the conflict is also essential hce, without a lmowledge of troop rnovements, there would seem to be no need for transport. Ah,the scale of operations gives an idea of the distmces hvohred in transporthg the suppiies- Next in importance are the supplies thernselves. W~thoutthem, there would be no amy. The basic requirements will be considered here. After supplies coms transport. Transport involves both getting the supplies to the Penuisula as wel as getting them to the troops once on land. The most important elemem, however, is the payment of di of tlie above. Wathout money, there can be no troops, fwd, or transport. As aiways, the resources aever seem to match the necessary expeoses. Finally, a consideration of the French system is wcessary. Mer d, what better system is there to measure agauist the success, or fdure, of We1hgton7s system? The French system is generally held up to be the ideal in this pend.