AN OVERVIEW OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROJECTS IN THE

Peter Zwaneveld, Isabel Wilmink TNO Inro Ben Immers TNO Inro and K.U. Leuven, Department of Civil Engineering Emst Malipaard Grontmij Dick Heyse Rijkswaterstaat, Projectbureau Incident Management

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past years the Dutch government has implemented Incident Management (IM) projects on several locations on the Dutch motorway network. Incident Management projects aim among others to reduce the delay caused by incidents. These incidents can involve, for instance, accidents, stalled vehicles and spilled loads.

This paper provides an overview of the activities with respect to IM in the Netherlands over the past decade. The discussion of these activities is based upon the following four stages. These stages are identified for presentational and educational purposes. Chronologically, the stages overlap. 1. The ‘orientation’ stage. This stage started at the end of the 1980’s with an orientation on international IM activities. It ended in 1995 with the publication of an Incident Management Manual by the Dutch Ministry of Traffic and Transportation. 2. The ‘pilot projects’ stage. This stage started in 1994 and ended in 1997. Within this stage several IM measures were tested on motorways around , Rotterdam, and Amsterdam. 3. The ‘organisation’ stage. This stage started during the previous stage and ended in January 1997 with the foundation of an organisation, called ‘Projectbureau Incident Management’. Several emergency services are represented within this organisation, like police, transport authorities, motorway operators and insurance companies. 4. The ‘implementation’ stage. This stage, started in 1997, consists of the nation- wide introduction of IM measures. Initially, two measures are selected, one for passenger cars and one for trucks. Each stage is described in a separate section.

The projects described in this paper were performed over the last years by several individuals and companies. The reader is referred to the references for a list of projects and involved companies. The study to provide this overview of IM activities and to assess possible future activities was conducted as part of the ‘Program Incident

289 Management’ by TNO Inro from January 1997 until March 1998. This project was supervised by Rijkswaterstaat, Projectbureau Incident Management.

This paper is organised as follows. First, a general overview of IM is presented. This overview includes a definition of IM,a modelling of the incident handling process, and the main effects of IM measures. Subsequently, IM activities in each stage are described. Finally, future steps and conclusions with respect to IM activities in the Netherlands are presented.

2. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: DEFINITION, MODELING AND EFFECTS

2.1 Definition

Incident Management (IM) is the total package of measures geared to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall process of handling of incidents. This includes optimisation of traffic safety situations at the incident location, rapid and efficient handling of incidents, and, subsequently, minimisation of traffic delays for other road users. Given the complex nature of incident handling, the amount of possible measures to improve the overall handling of incidents is enormous.

2.2 Modelling

The handling of an incident can be described based upon the duration of an incident. This serves to show where problems arise in the clearing of incidents and is useful for determining what measures are needed. The duration is defined as the period of time in which traffic flow is disrupted due to an incident. The following phases (or time periods) are identified: Phase 1: detection time (Tl); the time elapsed between the occurrence and the detection of the incident; Phase 2 warning time (T2); the time required to alert all necessary emergency services; Phase 3: arrival or driving time (T3); the length of time required by the emergency service alerted to reach the location of the incident; Phase 4: operation or action time (T4); the length of time required to move ‘damaged’ vehicles onto the hard shoulder. Lanes are freed for normal traffic use; Phase 5 : normalisation time (T5); the time required to take the damaged vehicles from the hard shoulder to a location out of sight of road users; Phase 6: flow recovery time (T6); the time elapsed between the moment that the incident has been fully removed and the disappearance of the tailback. Figure 1 is a graphical illustration of these different time phases of the handling of an incident.

Examples of possible measures to improve incident handling are (including relevant phase): advanced traffic monitoring systems to identify incidents (phase 1); centrally located tow truck stand-by (phase 3); infrastructure such as tow-away sites or ‘safe havens’ for stranded or crashed vehicles, see Figure 2 for an illustration (phase 6);

290 An overview of IM measures and an assessment of these measures can be found in Koehne et al. (1991) and Zwaneveld et al. (1998).

2.3 Effects and efforts

IM measures may have effects in different phases of the incident handling process. These effects can be regarded as objectives of JM measures. The following effects are identified 1) safety of emergency service personnel; 2) safety of (injured) people involved in the incident (quality of aid); 3) safety of other road users; 4) speed (duration) of assistance; 5) consequences for legal matters (question of guilt); 5) informing general public.

IM measures can involve efforts in the following areas: a) organisational; b) technical; c) communicative; d) legal.

In general, IM measures may have several effects and can require efforts in more than one category. The next paragraph describes the four stages of the IM activities in the Netherlands.

3. THE ‘ORIENTATION’ STAGE

The ‘orientation’ stage started at the end of the 1980s. Among the first activities was an orientation on IM activities in the U.S.A and other countries. The initiative to start these actions came from the fact that not only the total number of queues increased, but also the portion of queues caused by incidents. At present, about 20% of all queues are caused by incidents. In 1989, a project-group was formed to investigate the possibilities to apply IM in the Netherlands. Based upon quick scan results obtained in the U.S.A, it became clear that IM is a relatively cheap way to reduce congestion on the roads. The project-group identified several promising measures which were assessed with respect to costs and benefits with the use of the previously mentioned subdivision in phases (see Figure 1) and a simulation model. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of IM activities was determined. The goal was to reduce incident related time losses due to congestion from the present share of 20% to 10%. Thus, generally speaking, IM measures have to cut congestion caused by incidents by half.

This stage ended in January 1995 with the publication of a ‘Manual Incident Management’ by the Dutch Ministry of Traffic and Transportation, see Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (1995).

4. THE ‘PILOT PROJECTS’ STAGE

The ‘pilot projects’ stage started in 1993 and ended in 1997. During this stage, many promising IM measures from the orientation stage were tested at specific locations in

29 1 the Netherlands. In total 7 pilots were conducted. In this paper, 6 pilots are briefly described. At the moment of writing, no information was available on the 7" pilot. Many of these pilots were. conducted near the city of Utrecht, see Figure 3. All pilots were applied at sites which suffer frequently from congested traffic.

4.1 Pilot 1: centrally located tow truck

During this pilot, a dedicated tow truck was located at junction 'Oudenrijn', located to the south-east of Utrecht. The pilot was undertaken from August 30" 1993 up to April 29" 1994. When an incident occurred, the tow truck was immediately called for by the emergency room. The truck was allowed to use the shoulder lane of the motorway to approach the incident location. Furthermore, the crew of the truck was permitted to handle minor incidents, i.e. no injured people involved, themselves. Before the crew were allowed to remove vehicles from the road, several pictures had to be taken from the incident and the position of the vehicles had to be marked using chalk. The crew of the truck obtained training from the police.

The original procedure for incident handling in the Netherlands was that after an incident was detected, the police was directed to the incident location. Following that, the police must assess the situation and request for an tow truck if this is required. After this request, a tow truck departs to the incident location. Clearly, the measures in this pilot speed up this procedure.

The major findings were: the average response time (TI+T2+T3, cf. Figure 1) for the first emergency service to arrive decreased from 8.4 min to 4.7 min; 0 the average response time of the tow truck decreased from 31.3 min to 13.0 min; 0 in 20% of investigated cases, the tow truck was called while in fact it was not required; 0 clear procedures between emergency services and training of personnel were considered to be crucial; an one-man crew in the tow truck was cost-efficient; the measures had most effect when already applied well in advance of peak periods. Incidents that occur just prior to the major peak cause severe congestion; frequent re-informing of involved personnel of h? measures is needed. Otherwise personnel tend to forget the measures.

The reader is referred to Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (1994) for more details.

4.2 Pilot 2: contract with local tow truck companies

This pilot was conducted on motorways in the neighbourhood of Utrecht, from May znd1 994 up to July 29" 1994. The pilot involved contracts with local tow truck companies which were called for immediately by the emergency room, like in the first pilot. The tow truck companies would, during the pilot, pay for the costs involved with unnecessary trips to an incident location. Tow truck companies were allowed to use the shoulder of the motorway. Furthermore, clear procedures were agreed upon among police, tow truck companies and roadway authorities.

292 The major findings were: the average response time for the tow truck company (Tl+T2+T3) reduced from 22.1 min to 6.1 min. This reduction could be completely accounted to the speed of warning of the company. The travel time for the tow truck company to reach the incident location remained more or less the same, despite the use of the shoulder. The evaluation report states that the tow truck personnel were very motivated to make the pilot to a success. Therefore, observed gains could be less in normal circumstances; a tow truck company was called for by mistake in 3 1% of the cases; 0 this pilot was much cheaper than pilot 1, while total effects were alike; again, re-informing personnel, clear procedures and pre-peak application of the measure were stressed as important points.

The reader is referred to Grontmij (1995a) for more details,

4.3 Pilot 3: doubling peak period police patrols and GPS navigation and support

This pilot was conducted on motorways in the neighbourhood of Utrecht from April 31d 1995 up to July 30th1 995. The pilot was conducted in morning peak periods only. During the pilot, the number of police patrols (KLPD, i.e. Dutch national police) was doubled from 5 to 10 in the area. Each patrol car was manned by two persons and was equipped with the satellite navigation system GPS (Global Positioning System). This system is intended to help the emergency room to select the police patrol closest to an incident location.

The major findings were: the average time to reach an incident location (T3) decreased from 8.6 min to 6.6 min due to the doubling of police patrols. This reduction was less than expected. The warning time (T2) of police patrols increased due to the GPS system with 2 min. An increase of 1 min travel time for the police to an incident location could be accounted to the (misuse of the) GPS system; during the pilots police patrols reported 28% of all incidents instead of 16% normally; unnecessary calls for a tow truck reduced from 18 to only 1; technical and user-acceptance problems arose with the GPS system. A longer introduction period is likely to be required for the system; total cost of the pilot hardly matched the overall societal benefits due to time savings; again, pre-peak application of the measure was considered to be useful.

The reader is referred to Grontmij (1995b) for more details.

4.4 Pilot 4: response to incidents by a Touring Club Road Service patrols (ANWB)

293 This pilot was conducted on motorways in the neighbourhood of Utrecht from August 1" 1995 up to December 31'' 1995 during morning and evening peaks. The pilot involved the handling of minor incidents, i.e. no injured people involved, by the Touring Club Road Services (in Dutch: ANWB Wegenwacht). A procedure was designed for the police emergency room to immediately contact the emergency room of the Touring Club. Furthermore, personnel of Touring Club patrols followed a training on incident handling provided by the police.

The major findings were: no benefits with respect to the travel time of Touring Club Road Services patrols were identified; the procedure for the police emergency room to contact the emergency room of the Touring Club was considered to be too complex and time consuming; a information provided by road users via cellular phones was poor; 0 communication among emergency services was considered to be the major bottleneck; again, clear procedures and pre-peak application of the measures were stressed as important points.

The reader is referred to Grontmij (1996) for more details.

4.5 Pilot 5: contract with local tow truck companies and response by Touring Club Road Services patrols.

This pilot was conducted at the junction Valburg-Ewijk (near AmhemNijmegen) from March 16" 1996 up to June 28" 1996. The pilot involved contracts with local tow truck companies. The emergency room requested the services of these tow truck companies or a Touring Club service patrol immediately when they expected that they could be useful. Tow truck or Touring Club personnel were allowed to handle minor incidents by themselves. Involved personnel received clear procedures and a short training on incident handling. Finally, the communication between national police (KLPD) and regional police services was improved. Dedicated communication equipment was installed at both police organisations for this purpose.

The major findings were: based upon qualitative estimations, an overall time reduction of 15 minutes was considered to be feasible. Too few quantitative measurements were available to present precise figures; * given the many pilots applied in the recent period, the emergency room was sometimes confused about the best actions. Uniform nation-wide regulations were desired; the Public Prosecutor allowed the handling of minor incidents by tow truck or Touring Club personnel. However, permanent supervision by the Public Prosecutor was being conducted; well-established communication among emergency services was considered to be vital.

The reader is referred to Grontmij (1997) for more details.

294 4.6 Pilot 6: centrally located tow trucks and improved co-operation among rescue services

This last pilot was conducted at motorways around the city of Rotterdam from October 1’‘ 1995 up to April 3dh 1996. During this pilot two centrally located tow trucks were available during morning and evening peaks. Furthermore, the emergency room called for the necessary emergency services immediately when indications existed that they could be useful. The tow trucks were provided by the police. Additional costs were covered by roadway authorities (Rijkswaterstaat). Roadway authorities also contracted specialised f m s for the cleaning of the road and guaranteed requested closure of certain lanes with the use of Variable Message Signs (VMS) within 3 min. Closure of lanes is performed by a regional traffic management centre, which was opened prior to this pilot.

The major findings were: the total duration of congestion was reduced by 30 to 35%; more attention was geared towards reducing congestion due to incidents and legal matters (the question of guilt); official responsibilities of Touring Club patrols in incident handling procedures was not desired; tow truck companies are frequently inadequately equipped for incidents involving trucks.

Several aspect of this pilot are still applied. The regional traffic management centre in Rotterdam is still operational and two centrally located tow truck are still available during morning and evening peaks.

The reader is referred to VislWust & Partners (1996) for more details.

4.7 Conclusions from the pilots

Several conclusions can be drawn from these 6 pilots. With respect to the choice of measures, a centrally located tow truck or contracts with local tow truck companies in combination with immediate calling of the service of a tow truck is very useful with respect to reducing the overall duration of incident handling (T2+ ...+T 5). Contracts with local tow truck companies are much cheaper than a centrally located tow truck.

Pre-peak application of IM measures is very useful. This follows from the observation that incidents that occur just prior to the major peak, can cause severe congestion. Furthermore, good communication, co-operation and clear working procedures (i.e. organisational aspects) among emergency services are very important for IM.L ast but not least, combined training programs for personnel of several emergency services are considered to be very useful.

5. THE ‘ORGANISATION’ STAGE

The ‘organisation’ stage consists of organisational activities to support the future implementation of IM to become an integrated part of Dynamic Traffic Management

295 in the Netherlands. This more or less formal stage can be considered a logical continuation of the conclusion that organisational and communicational aspects were considered to be crucial for IM.The following aspects are worth mentioning: 0 the McKinsey report ‘Tailback free traffic management’ identified JM as a promising solution to reduce non-recurrent congestion, see McKinsey & Company (1995). The publication of this report stimulated the nation-wide introduction of IM; in 1996, a commission called BOEM was founded with the aim to exchange information among emergency services (e.g. fire brigade, police, roadway authorities and medical services) and to improve efficiency and effectiveness of on the spot incident handling. This commission focuses among others on developing manuals and education programs on IM, 0 in 1996, an EU-project was initiated by DGXLU on ‘EVcident RESPonse with ON- line innovative SEnsing (Inresponse)’, see In-Response (1996). This project focuses on IT solutions for incident prediction, detection, verification and response. Experiences from the Dutch pilots prove to be very important for the work in this project and vice versa; a national ‘Projectbureau Incident Management (PM)’ was founded in January 1997. This central organisation initiates and co-ordinates the nation-wide introduction of IM. Within PIM, roadway authorities (Rijkswaterstaat) and national police (KLPD) collaborate.

Prior to the nation-wide introduction of IM in the Netherlands, a study was performed on the best locations for M in the Netherlands, see TNO Inro and Grontmij (1997).

6. THE ‘IMPLEMENTATION’ STAGE

Based upon experiences with the previously described pilots, PIM decided to introduce the IM measure of contracts with local tow truck companies. In fact, two measures were identified. Both measures have the form of contracts and agreements between local tow truck companies, police and (regional) roadway authorities. The two measures are: nation-wide freight truck regulation, see Projectbureau Incident Management (1997a). e nation-wide passenger car regulation, see Projectbureau Incident Management (1997b).

Implementation of both measures is based upon the establishment of a regional platform in which many emergency services participate, namely regional and national police, regional roadway authorities, regional fire brigades, and representatives of insurance companies, the national road safety institute and others. The project leader of IM who is also responsible for the PIM organisation also participates in these regional platforms. Furthermore, two central reporting centres are established one centre (CMV) for reporting incidents with freight trucks and one centre (CMI) for reporting incidents invoIving passenger cars. Both centres are allowed to ask the support of a local tow truck company. A list of these companies including their equipment is available in the centre. Roadway authorities guarantee payment to the tow truck company. Furthermore, extensive instructions and procedures are designed

296 for emergency service personnel. These procedures have the form of checklists. Checklists for both measures are combined into one easy-to-read brochure. Leaflets to inform the road users are made and distributed via gasoline stations. The freight truck regulation also includes the possibility to call in the assistance of an expert to go to the incident location and the forming of a command post, called Unified Command Approach, at the location of an incident.

At the moment of writing, both measures are introduced. Problems with the introduction involve legal matters and organisational aspects due the number of organisations involved in IM. However, both measures should be introduced in a major part of the Netherlands within a few months.

7. FUTURESTEPS

Although the implementation of the previously mentioned IM measures is still being implemented, future steps are being prepared. Important items in order to choose the most appropriate actions are: an overview of recent IM activities and results of these activities; an overview and assessment of possible IM measures which could be implemented next; commitment among (regional) emergency services with respect to IM.F or most of these emergency services, IM is only one of many topics which require their attention; an easy-to-use and reliable evaluation method to assess the effects of IM activities. Evaluation is one option to prove the benefits of IM in practice and to keep everybody interested in IM.E valuation is also essential to determine whether the previously mentioned overall goal of IM is met; development of an IM game for training purposes.

The project in which the above mentioned overviews were put together also resulted in this paper. This project also involved a Multi Criteria Analyses of the many IM measures that can be applied, see Zwaneveld et 'al. (1998). An assessment of evaluation methods was performed in a related study by Wilmink et al. (1998). Commitment among emergency agencies together with an in-depth orientation into IM in the U.S.A. were the main objectives of a recent trip of representatives of emergency services and others to the U.S.A.

Intended future activities with respect to IM include the organisation of several workshops with representatives of local emergency services. In these workshops, the present handling of incidents will be evaluated and future improvements in incident handling will be discussed. Possible IM measures will be assessed using Multi Criteria Analyses. Finally, attention will be devoted to evaluation of IM measures.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Based upon the described experiences with IM, the conclusions are: well established communication and clear organisational responsibilities among emergency services are most important for IM. In fact, they represent a

297 prerequisite to effectively apply IM.T echnical aspects of IM are considered to impose less constraints on IM; a IM started with the objective to reduce delay for road users ,due to incidents. At present, safety of victims and emergency service personnel is considered to be of at least equal importance; evaluation of IM measures is an important aspect of IM in general. Effective methods to evaluate IM measures have to be implemented; commitment and consultation of emergency service representatives are required to enhance the quality of incident handling procedures. A further elaboration on these conclusions can be found in Immers et al. (1998).

REFERENCES

Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (1994) Evaluatie pilot bergingsvoertuig Oudenrijn (Eng: Evaluation Pilot tow truck at Oudenrijn), Concept, 21/12/1994, in Dutch.

Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (1995) Handleiding Incident Management (Eng: Manual Incident Management), Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Rotterdam, Nederland. in Dutch.

Grontmij (1995a) Evaluatie tweede pilot Incident Management: lokale berger (Eng: Evaluation of second pilot Incident Management local tow truck companies), , Grontmij, afdeling Ruimtelijke Inrichting, in Dutch.

Grontmij (1995b) Evaluatie derde pilot Incident Management: dubbele inzet KLPD- patrouille en GPS-plaatsbepaling (Eng: Evaluation third pilot Incident Management: doubling police patrols and GPS navigation), Zeist, Grontmij, afdeling Ruimtelijke Inrichting, in Dutch.

Grontmij (1996) Incident Management 4e pilot - Inzet ANWB Wegenwacht (Eng: Incident Management 4'h pilot: Touring Club Road Services), Zeist, Grontmij, afdeling Ruimtelijke Inrichting, in Dutch.

Grontmij (1997) Evaluatie Incident Management Valburg-Ewijk (Eng: Evaluation Incident Management Valburg-Ewijk), De Bilt, Grontmij, afdeling Ruimtelijke Inrichking, in Dutch.

Immers, L.H., Malipaard E.J., and Heyse, D.H.H. (1998) Incident Management in the Netherlands - organisation, communication, and technology, Delft, De Bilt, , unpublished manuscript.

In-Response (1996) Task Report on Incident Prediction - Functional Specifications, Deliverable 4.1, EU DGXIII, TR1030.

Koehne, J., F.L. Mannering, & M.E. Hallenbeck (1991) Framework for developing incident management systems, Washington State Transportation Center, August 1991.

McKinsey & Company (1995) Filearm wegbeheer (Eng: Tailback free traffic management), Ministerie van Verkeer en Vervoer, The Hague, in Dutch.

298 Projectbureau Incident Management (1997a) Vrachtautoberging - Plan van Aanpak, Werkdocument (Eng: Freight truck regulation - Plan of Action), Leusden, in Dutch.

Projectbureau Incident Management (1997b) Plan van Aanpak invoering Personenautoregeling (decentrale berger), Werkdocument (Eng: Plan of Action introduction passenger car regulation), Leusden, in Dutch.

TNO Inro and Grontmij (1997) Potentiele locaties voor Incident Management (Eng: Possible location for Incident Management), RWS-AVV, D e l m e Bilt, in Dutch.

Vis/Wust & Partners (1996) Evaluatie Incident Management Ruit Rotterdam Eindrapport (Eng: Evaluation Incident Management Ringroad of Rotterdam Final report), 13 September 1996, in Dutch.

Wilmink, LR., Zwaneveld P.J., and Immers, L.H. (1998) De evaluatie van Incident Management maatregelen - Inventarisatie en voorstellen voor verbetering (Eng: Evaluation of Incident Management measures - overview and suggestions for improvements), Delft, TNO report InroNVG 1998, in Dutch.

Zwaneveld, P.J., Wilmink, I.R., and Immers, L.H. (1998) Incident Management maatregelen; inventarisatie en beoordeling met behulp van een Multi Criteria Analyse (Eng: Incident Management measures; overview and assessment with the use of Multi Criteria Analyses), TNO report InroNVG 1998, in Dutch.

299 7-4 -- T5

I i I Tailback builds up .A Tailback dissolves I r - I I

I I Response time Y I I I I I I Duration of congestion Y w I 1 Figure 1: Phases in the total duration of an incident, with addition explanation.

stEanded vehicle in

Figure 2 'Safe haven' for stranded or crashed vehicles

300 Figure 3: Motorways around Utrecht, the Netherlands

301 302