WHY DO CITIZENS PROTEST IN NEW DEMOCRACIES?:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROTEST POTENTIAL
IN MEXICO, SOUTH AFRICA, AND SOUTH KOREA
by
YOUNG-CHOUL KIM, B.S., M.A.
A DISSERTATION
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
Chairperson of the Committee
" < • • "• ^ \
Accepted
Dean of the Graduate School
December, 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT vi
LIST OF TABLES viii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
CHAPTER
L INTRODUCTION 1
Organization of the Study and Summary 6
IL THE LITERATURE 9
Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 10
Concept of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 12 Perspectives of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 19
Socio-Psychological Perspective 21
Rational Choice Perspective 26
Cultural Change Perspective 30
The Other Perspective 34
Summary 35
m. CASE STUDIES 39
Mexico 40
Historical Background 40
Democratization 42
Summary and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 44 South Africa 48 Historical Background 48
Democratization 50
Summary and Unconventional Forms of
Political Participation 52
South Korea 55
Historical Background 55
Democratization 60
Summary and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation 62 Summary 64 IV. VARIABLES, DATA, AND METHOD 75
Introduction 75
Hypotheses 77
Indicators and Variables 78
The Dependent Variable: Unconventional Forms of
Political Participation 78
The Independent Variables 80
Baseline 80
Cognitive Skills 82
Value Changes 83
Dissatisfaction 84
The Control Variable and Dummy Variables 87
Data Source 89
Method 91
Summary 92
ni V. BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VARIABLES 95
Variations of Dependent and Independent Variables 96
Bivariate Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variables 99 Associations Between Variables in the Three New Democracies 100
Correlations Between Independent Variables 101
Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable 102 Associations Between Variables In Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea 104
Corre lations Between Independent Variables 104
Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable 105
VI. DETERMINANTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 112
Intra-Differences in the Three New Democracies 112
Baseline 115
Cognitive Skills 116
Dissatisfaction 117
Value Change 118
Dummies 118
Summary of Intra-Differences 119
Differences by the Process of Democratization 121
Inter-State Differences 123
IV Mexico 124
South Africa 125
SouthKorea 126
Summary of Inter-State Model Differences 126
Summary 130
VL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 139
Closing Thoughts 144
REFERENCES 146 ABSTRACT
This study focuses on individual level explanations of unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and
South Korea. The purpose of the study is to examine four most discussed approaches on protest: (1) Baseline, (2) Cognitive Skills, (3) Dissatisfaction, and (4) Value
Change approaches. Various determinants from these four approaches at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation. First, the Baseline approach hypothesizes that younger, male, and more educated individuals with higher incomes are more likely to participate in protest activities.
Second, the Cognitive Skills approach assumes that as individuals are more cognitively mobilized, they are more likely to engage in protest activities. Third, the
Dissatisfaction approach hypothesizes that individuals' dissatisfaction on their govemments and their material well-being and life increases the likelihood of participation in protest activities. Finally, the Value Change approach assumes that individuals' new values such as postmaterialist concerns promote their participation in protest activities. To test those four approaches nine predictor variables are raised.
The data set employed in this study is derived from the first, second, and third
World Values Surveys in 1981-82, 1990-93, and 1995-97 for the three new democracies. In order to test these main hypotheses and sub-hypotheses, this study conducts OLS regression analyses pooled data set of three countries as well as data set of each country.
The results of the study define that there exist not only intra-differences, but also inter-state differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest
VI potential in the three new democracies. For example. Cognitive Skills approach's explanatory power is stronger than that of Dissatisfaction approach in the three new democracies. Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear to have relatively strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. However,
Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in the three new democracies. In addition, among the four approaches. Cognitive Skills approach appears to have the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest potential in Mexico and South Africa. The second powerfiil approach in the two nations is Baseline factors. In contrast, the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest potential in South Korea is made by Baseline factors and followed by
Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches.
In addition, the results of the study also find that there exist differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies by the process of democratization. Value Change approach's explanatory power to protest potential had increased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies, whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches' explanatory power to protest potential had decreased in that times.
vn LIST OF TABLES
3-1: Comparative Cross-National Socio-Economic Indicators in Mexico, South Africa, and SouthKorea 67
3-2: World Values Surveys and Inauguration of Democracy in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea 68
3-3: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in Mexico (%) 69
3-4: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Africa (%) 71
3-5: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Korea (%) 73
4-1: World Values Surveys in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea 94
5-1: Variations of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation (%) 108
5-2: Statistics of Independent Variables 109
5-3: Associations Between Variables In The Three New Democracies 110
5-4: Associations Between Variables in Mexico, South Africa, and SouthKorea Ill 6-1: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in the Three New Democracies 132
6-2: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in the Three New Democracies (R-square Change) 133
6-3: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in Mexico 134
6-4: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in South Africa 135
6-5: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in South Korea 136
6-6: Multiple Regression of Protest Potential in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea (R-square Change) 137 6-7: Resuhs of Multiple Regression Analyses 138
vni LIST OF FIGURES
2-1: Conceptual Diagram of the Dimensionality of Unconventional Political Behavior 38
3-1: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in Mexico 70
3-2: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Africa 72
3-3: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Korea 74
IX CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It was already clear by the early 1970s that mass unconventional political participation - doing things that went well beyond voting and canvassing for political parties - was spreading out and becoming part of the political resources of many ordinary people. (Marsh 1990, p. xv)
This is a study of imconventional forms of political participation in new democracies - Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. One important objective of this research will be to investigate the sources of unconventional forms of political participation. Specifically, this study tests four plausible approaches/models concerning the sources of unconventional forms of political participation, that have been developed in the Western democracies: Dissatisfaction, Cognitive Skills (or Resource Mobilization),
Value Change, and Baseline approaches. In this way, it will be possible to define which approach is more applicable in one country as well as in the new democracies. In addition, this study investigates the role of each approach in protest action at different stages of democratization: pre-democratic fransition and post-democratic transition.
Through a cross-temporal comparison of these two critical periods, we are able to analyze which approach is a crucial factor in determining protest action in the new democracies.
The notion of political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic country because democracy refers to rule by the people. Because social goals in a democracy should be "defined and carried out through discussion, popular interest, and involvement in politics," democracy requires "an active citizemy" (Dahon 2000, p.
927). Democracy should be a celebration of an involved public. Public participation. sometimes, "bursts beyond the bounds of conventional politics to include demonstrations, protests, and other forms of unconventional activity" (Dalton 1988, p. 67). Therefore, we have two kinds of political participation: conventional and unconventional forms.
Unconventional forms of political participation (peaceful political protest) usually exclude violent forms of protest such as sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing, revolutions, kidnapping, and war (March 1977). Like conventional forms of participation, unconventional forms of political participation are
"an essential part of the democratic process" (Dalton 1988, p. 67).
Much scholarship had focused on conventional forms of political participation like voting or violent forms of protest like revolution, riots, and guerrilla war. However, since the waves of political protest swept Western Europe and North America (civil rights demonstrations, anti-war demonstrations, enviroimiental protests, etc.) in the late
1960s, the unconventional forms of political participation were more carefiilly analyzed.
Thus, today unconventional forms of political participation are mainly measured through five forms of actions- signing petition, attending demonstration, joining boycott, joining unofficial strike, and occupying buildings or factories (Barnes et al, 1979).
Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political participation basically in two ways. The first looks at differences between states, while the second looks within states. The former approach favors the identification of system-level characteristics, usually labeled institutional, to account for variation of unconventional participation from one state to the next. Data analysis, then, is on aggregates, and the dependent variable is the cross-national level of unconventional participation behavior from coimtry to country.
In contrast, when the interest is within states, researchers tend to seek individual- level characteristics. The researchers begin with a research question: Why do citizens protest? The data analysis, then, is on surveys, and the dependent variable conceived of as the likelihood that an individual would participate in unconventional forms of political participation.
Extensive prior research of individual-level on unconventional forms of political participation is usually based on three general perspectives: socio-psychological, rational choice, and cultural change perspectives. From the three general perspectives and another so-called a baseline model or social structure model there exist four plausible approaches/models concerning the sources of unconventional forms of political participation: dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value change, and baseline approaches.
These approaches provide various indicators for explaining unconventional forms of political participation. Various determinants from these four approaches at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation. First, the dissatisfaction approach hypothesizes that an increase in political cynicism causes people to engage for more protest action. Second, the cognitive skills approach assumes that the higher political sophistication individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. Third, the value change approach assumes that if postmaterialist values increase, then the degree of protest action tends to increase. Finally, the baseline approach hypothesizes that younger, male, and more educated individuals with higher incomes are more likely to participate in protest activities.
Research on unconventional participation has been confined largely to liberal or
'old' democracies. A vacuum exists in the analysis of authoritarian and semi- authoritarian regimes. Do we find similar trends or patterns of unconventional forms of political participation in societies with different types of state structures, especially new democracies? Unconventional forms of political participation are a regular feature of democratic politics in new democracies as well as in advanced democracies. Since the early 1980s, a democratic transformation has occurred in politics of new democracies from Eastern Europe to Latin America. Authoritarian regimes, ranging from military dictatorships to one-party hegemonic regimes, have been replaced by democracies. The deepening of democracy in these new democracies, in turn, has opened up new spaces for participation, including unconventional forms of political participation. By most accounts, unconventional forms of political participation have now become a regular feature of politics in new democracies, as citizens voice their discontent about everything from the failure of democratic reform or economic policies to enviroimiental protection.
Although recent scholarship on politics of new democracies has recognized the significance of imconventional forms of political participation, the research on the topic has, to date, been surprisingly limited. A rich case study literature has developed, but many of these studies examine a single social movement and lack a comparative focus.
Moreover, this research has focused on only one country, and has tested only a limited number of hypotheses about the determinants of unconventional participation (e.g.,
Candache and Kulisheck 1998).
In order to fill the gap in research on unconventional forms of political
participation in new democracies, we test competing approaches of unconventional forms
of political participation in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea in three time periods,
1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98. By extending the analysis to a greater number of countries
and time periods than those examined in previous studies, we seek to develop a richer
understanding of what motivates citizens in new democracies to engage in
unconventional forms of political participation.
Inauguration of democracy in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea was almost
simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s although these coimtries have experienced
diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development. Furthermore, the three new
democracies in different geographical regions have commonly experienced massive protests by citizeruy in the 1980s, which replaced authoritarian with democratic regimes.
Demonstrations by the mass publics were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracy in the three new democracies in the 1980s. In addition, elite-challenging imconventional forms of political participation in these countries have continued during the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s.
Could these four approaches - dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value change, and baseline - developed in the Western democracies be applicable for describing unconventional forms of political participation in the 'new' democracies? The purpose of this study is to test the applicability of the four approaches for explaining unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies. In this way, this study shows which approaches are most applicable to explain imconventional forms of political participation in one country as well as the new democracies. Therefore, because this study tests the applicability of the four approaches for explaining unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies, it will help confirm or falsify current approaches of unconventional forms of political participation.
This study analyzes the data relating to unconventional forms of political participation from the first, second, and third waves of the World Values Surveys conducted in 1981-82, 1990, and 1995-96 in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea.
These three countries are the only new democracies in which all three World Values
Surveys were conducted. The first wave of the World Values Surveys had been conducted before these countries began their democratic transition. The second wave of the World Values Surveys had conducted just before inauguration of democracy in
Mexico and South Africa and after inauguration of democracy in South Korea. The third waves of the World Values Surveys were conducted during the democratization period in these countries.
Organization of the Study and Summarv
A vast literature on both unconventional forms of political participation and democratization guides this study of unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies. This literature is the subject of Chapters II and III. Chapter II opens with a discussion of unconventional forms of political participation and how the concept might be explained. It then moves on to review the argument of various approaches to unconventional forms of political participation. Chapter III examines the case studies of the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. It is a general description of the democratization process and unconventional forms of political participation in the countries. Chapter IV explores research design. It describes data, variables, and methodology. It opens with a general description of the operationalization of variables. It then moves on to describe the datasets employed for this study. How various determinants from these approaches at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation is a subject of
Chapter IV. The next section of the Chapter describes how the data are analyzed. Micro or individual-level analyses of the relationship between various explanatory variables and unconventional forms of political participation of citizenry are the subject of Chapter V and VI. Chapter V shows first descriptive information on variables utilized in the study and then bivariate relationships between the independent variables and dependent variable (protest potential). Chapter VI presents the results of multivariate analysis of protest potential in the new democracies. The final chapter summarizes this study and considers possible future directions for new and related research.
This study will demonstrate that unconventional forms of political participation by citizenry were a key factor confributing to the inauguration of democracies in the three new democracies in 1980s. The elite-challenging forms of participation in the new democracies have stimulated sustainable democratic reforms or liberalization on the economy during their democratic consolidation periods in the 1990s. This study also shows that unconventional forms of political participation become a regular feature of politics even in the new democracies.
In addition, this study will confirm that the previous approaches concerning unconventional forms of political participation do apply even in new democracies.
However, thus far it may appear that the variations of unconventional forms of political participation are somewhat different in terms of different countries and time periods.
Finally, this study is expected to show that despite the divergent political cultures,
institutions, and historical backgrounds among the new democracies, there seem to be
some striking commonalities in terms of factors that prompt their citizens to engage in
unconventional forms of political participation. CHAPTER II
THE LITERATURE
Certain social experiences lead people to form very different views of the political system and their own place within it. Social structure and different learning experiences place constraints upon the kinds of judgments people make. Mental skills combine with basic values to provide people with a basis for political judgment. The nature of these judgments cause people to make choices about their political involvement, - to favor inaction, conventional political activities, protest methods or perhaps even both. (Marsh 1990, p. 9)
Chapter II presents a review of the relevant scholarly literature on unconventional forms of political participation. This chapter opens with a discussion of various forms of unconventional political behavior. This section shows the conceptual diagram of unconventional political behavior from least and most extreme and how the concept of unconventional forms of political participation (peacefiil political protest), the dependent variable of this study, might be operationalized and measured. The next section of Chapter II concentrates on the theoretical background of unconventional forms of political participation. This section consists of three general perspectives and a baseline model to explain unconventional forms of political participation of the mass publics. This section explains not only the assumptions and arguments, but also the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective.
This section also discusses various approaches to unconventional forms of political participation that are based on the four perspectives. Thus, this section provides a theoretical background of this study. Unconventional Forms of Political Participation
The nature of citizen behavior in the advanced industrial democracies has shifted in fiindamentalway s during the latter half of the 20th century. The past several decades have also seen a dramatic process of social and political modernization in much of the developing world. The democratization wave of the past decade has transformed the political systems and the citizenry in the new democracies of central and Eastern Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere. In addition, the global wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s transformed the role of the citizenry in many of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin
America and South Africa. These new events provide distinctive opportunities to test our theories about the nature of citizen behavior including unconventional forms of political participation, expand the boundaries of knowledge, and develop new theories.
By political participation is meant those actions that citizens of a democratic country will engage in to influence political events and policy. Such actions are of two kinds: conventional and unconventional forms of political participation.
Conventional forms of political participation occur largely within the context of party politics with its meetings, campaigns, canvassing, and dealings with fiinctionaries and officials. It also includes those actions that citizens more rarely take individually to influence officials through the proper channels. Conventional forms of political participation are the kind of political behavior that political scientists call 'elite- directed' participation - the legitimate pathways of citizen involvement in politics that are sanctioned and encouraged by the elites and by the rules of a democratic regime
(Marsh 1990, p. 1).
10 Unconventional forms of political behavior, the main topic of this study, are different from conventional forms of political behavior (Marsh 1990, p. 1). Citizen participation occasionally bursts beyond the bounds of conventional politics to include demonstrations, protests, and other forms of unconventional activities.
Although protesters often go beyond the normal channels of democratic politics, they are nevertheless an essential part of the democratic process. The protests that accompanied the civil rights demonstrations in the United States during the 1960s, the environmental protests of the past decades in Western Europe, and the people-power protests that brought democracy to East Asia and Eastern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s illustrate how the mass public can force political systems to respond, change, and grow.
By the early 1960s unconventional forms of political participation were not extensively studied by political scientists because there was so little protest. In this period unconventional forms of political participation were thought of as a predemocratic form of political action. It was a non-legitimate class of political behaviors that belonged to a previous age before the electoral emancipation of the masses and universal franchise ostensibly made mass protest unnecessary. However,
"the waves of unconventional forms of political participation that swept" the Western democracies in the late 1950s and 1960s "startled scholars as well as politicians"
(Barnes et al., 1979, p. 13). In this period the Western democracies had faced new phenomenon of the sudden rise in unconventional forms of politics as well as the decline in levels of trust in government and increasing political sophistication.
Scholars were eventually called upon to explain "the new phenomenon of the sudden
11 rise" in unconventional forms of political participation in the Western democracies
(Barnes et al., 1979, p. 13).
Concept of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation
As a research topic for political scientists, the concept of political protest or unconventional forms of political participation have been gradually changed. In the early 1960s studies that included political protest tended to make no conceptual distinction between protest and insurrection. Things as innocuous as lawfiil demonstrations were viewed by political scientists only as some weaker form of riot.
A good example of this is Almond and Verba's classical study. The Civic Culture
(1963). Respondents to their surveys were asked to say what they might do to oppose an unjust law. Those respondents who replied that they might join demonstrations, protest meetings, and boycotts were coded together with those who said they would resort to riot, rebellion, and internal war.
In the early 1970s, however, scholars sought to separate peaceful political protest activities from other unorthodox political behaviors. For instance, a group of researchers at Yale University (Taylor and Hudson 1972) built an aggregate data profile of political behavior in 136 countries and coded three kinds of unorthodox political behavior: protest demonstrations, riots, and armed attacks. The definitions offered for each category are:
A protest demonstration is a non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime, government, or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, intended policy, or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action, (p. 66)
A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people. 'Violent' implies the use of physical force, which is usually evinced
12 by the destruction of property, the wounding or killing of people of the authorities, the use of riot control equipment and by the rioters use of various weapons, (p. 67)
An armed attack is an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group, (p. 67)
Indeed, in the Western democracies, the growth of the New Left and the rise of
orderly protest movements like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament encouraged
the view of peaceful protest as a democratic but elite-challenging form of behavior.
In America, the Civil Rights Movement and direct action against the war in Vietnam
also appeared to fit a model of a widening political action repertory in a democratic
system. It was clear that the question was essentially one of legitimacy. To what
extent can political protest be viewed as a legitimate form of political behavior in the
same way as conventional political behavior is seen as legitimate? An important
distinction between peaceful political protest activities and unorthodox political
behavior must be drawn between legitimacy and legality. Many forms of political
protest that are not lawful may nevertheless enjoy a degree of legitimacy. In a
democracy there can be a certain nobility in going to jail for one's beliefs. It can bring some longer-term dividends of political effectiveness too. In new democracies such as South Africa and South Korea, for instance, during the pre-democratization period many political leaders, students, and laborers went to jail for their protests against authoritarian govemments. Their protests against authoritarian governments were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracy. In addition, many great democratic reforms of the past had their origins in extra-parliamentary movements whose behavior frequently transgressed the law in the name of superior moral force (March 1977).
13 Political protest was legitimately a topic of interest of equal significance when placed alongside conventional forms of political behavior. Yet, like any other emotive word in popular usage, "protest" has been wom almost featureless and is rendered unsuitable as an object for scientific calibration. Therefore, Marsh (1977, p.
41) used "unorthodox political behavior" instead of "political protest." According to
Marsh, unorthodox political behavior is more accurate since it immediately implies a distinction between unorthodox and orthodox political behavior. This distinction rests on the presence or absence of normative rules which positively sanction and facilitate the conduct of orthodox politics but which are absent in the case of unorthodox politics. More precisely, there are actual rules and laws that facilitate the conduct of elections and the representation of interests in orthodox party politics, but there are none that encourage the regular occurrence of street protest, demonstrations, boycotts, rent strikes, political strikes, the occupation of administrative premises, and so on.
There is, however, a great number of laws that restrict or forbid their use.
This key legalistic divide may be found implicit in definitions employed by other researchers. Kaase (1972, p. 184) speaks of "unconventional political behavior that can be defined as behavior that does not correspond to the legal and customary regime norms regulating political participation." Likewise, Muller (1972, p. 932) holds "unconventional political behavior" to be that which "deviates from regime norms," but he correctly excludes essentially private deviations from norms relating to the use of bribery, the theft of materials, or political espionage. Muller (1972, p. 934) also adds a variable dimension in that "unconventional activities can be classified according to whether or not they possess combinations of properties which are more
14 or less stressful to the regime," and he proposed a hierarchy of stress factors in the coalescence of three variables:
1. the extent of deviation from regime norms
2. the extent that behavior is organized
3. the use or non-use of violence.
And Marsh (1977) added:
4. the numbers mobilized.
Muller's conceptualization is useful in that he suggests a progressive departure from the orthodox pathways of political redress towards the use (alternatively or additionally) of unorthodox methods, which need not immediately involve actual law- breaking (Muller 1979).
Von Eschen, Kirk, and Pinard (1969, p. 313) coined the appealing phrase
"disorderly politics" juxtaposed to "routine politics" to describe the distinction made above between the politics of voting and representation and the politics of protest.
Unfortunately perhaps, what they describe as "routine politics" is in many places conducted in a distinctly disorderly manner and their own thesis goes on to demonstrate convincingly that "disorderly politics requires and has an organizational substructure just as does routine politics," and so, despite appearances, is often rather an orderly or even a routine process. (Von Eschen et al., 1969, p. 313).
Many researchers (Cohen 1971; Macfariane 1971; Van den Haag 1972) often use the terms "direct action" and "civil disobedience" interchangeably with a generalized notion of protest behavior when these terms really describe rather specialized forms of protest. Discussion of these terms has a strong appeal for political philosophers and social theorists who are interested in the many facets of
15 people's relationship with the state. According to Cohen (1971, p. 41), "civil
disobedience is a deliberate unlawful protest" which can be an important factor in
unorthodox political behavior. He also added "most protest is not civil disobedience
because civil disobedience necessarily involves some deliberate infraction of the law"
(Cohen 1971, p. 41).
Macfariane (1971, p. 13) also makes a good case for the use of the term
"political disobedience" to describe protest. He provides a legally oriented definition:
Political disobedience embraces the performance of many acts prohibited by the state or the law, or as the non-performance of any act required by the State or the law, with the purpose of securing changes in the actions, policies, or laws of the State, (p. 13)
Marsh (1977) developed a model of this participation mode. As Figure 2-1 shows, he ordered the various forms of protest behavior along a continuum from least to most extreme. It is a kind of conceptual diagram and the dimension they form, to the concepts discussed above.
According to McAllister's explanation (McAllister 1992, pp. 63-69), the first threshold indicates a transitional phase between conventional and unconventional politics. Signing petitions, painting slogans on walls, and participating in lawful demonstrations are unorthodox political activities but are still within the bounds of accepted democratic norms. That is, these three techniques may be used in pursuit of both forms of behavior, although demonstration is more usually an unorthodox technique. The second threshold is illustrated by boycotts which marks a fairly unequivocal entry into political unorthodoxy and the first step of direct action.
McAllister (1992, pp. 63) emphasizes the importance of the second threshold because it marks "the change to techniques that involve only semilegal." Unofficial strikes
16 and rent strikes mark a third threshold position. Activities at this level or beyond involve illegal but nonviolent acts. Activities in the third threshold mark an entry into political disobedience and civil disobedience, especially in the case of rent strikes.
Finally, the fourth threshold includes unlawful demonstrations, occupations, and damage to property. Activities at this level are "violent activities such as personal injury or physical damage for political ends" (McAllister 1992, p. 68). Therefore, they exceed what is accepted or tolerable in a democracy. These activities are in the province of political crime. For the relationship among the different thresholds,
Dalton (1996, p. 73) explains that "research shows that unconventional political action is cumulative." Thus, "individuals active at any one threshold also generally participate in milder forms of protest" (Dalton 1996, p. 73).
Historically, protest has been related with social conflict and more violent, extreme types of social disturbance (revolution, rebellion, revolt) like the French
Revolution in 1789. Since the 1970s, when there was a rise of peaceful political protests in Europe and North America, research has emphasized the difference between violent and non-violent, as well as conventional and unconventional forms of political participation (Barnes et al., 1979).
This study focuses on unconventional forms of political participation - the dependent variable of this study. The concept that means "peaceful political protest" includes signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. The concept, however, excludes political crime - sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing, kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on.
17 Signing a petition, which has never been considered as an unconventional form of action by Inglehart (1997), and attending demonstrations are unorthodox political activities, but these are still in the boundaries of democratic norms (Marsh
1977). Boycotts that would fall under the criteria of semi-legal need different techniques of direct action than the two previously mentioned ones. Thus, boycotts would also mobilize different participants from other forms. Unofficial strikes and peaceful occupation of land or factory, which are still non-violent but usually illegal, also are the most demanding from participants and challenging for target. Although it could be assumed that there exist differences between participation in all these forms of unconventional action, these five different types of political action are considered as unconventional forms of political participation in this study. Therefore, this study uses the same definition of unconventional forms of political participation provided by World Values Surveys.
The following section concentrates on the theoretical background of unconventional forms of political participation. This section looks over three general perspectives and a baseline model to explain unconventional forms of political participation by the mass publics. This section explains not only the assumptions and arguments but also the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective to understand unconventional forms of political participation. Therefore, this section is devoted to arguments of testable theories, previous research, and design of independent variables, which form a set of possible determinants for describing unconventional forms of political participation with specific emphasis on important characters for the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea.
18 Perspectives of Unconventional Forms of Political Participation
Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political participation basically in two ways in terms of the usage of different units of analyses.
The first looks at differences between nations, while the second looks within nations.
The former approach favors the identification of system-level characteristics, usually labeled institutional, to account for variation of unconventional forms of political participation from one nation to the next. Data analysis, then, is on aggregates, and the dependent variable is the level of unconventional forms of political participation from country to country (e.g.. Verba et al., 1978; Glass et al., 1984; Grofman and
Lijphart et al., 1986; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Dalton 1988).
This system-level approach is useful for sorting out cross-national differences.
However, it is less useful in accounting for differences within a nation because the institutional factors identified are mostly constants for any one country. For instance, the electoral system of a nation generally applies to all citizens equally. Therefore, when the interest is within nations, researchers tend to seek individual-level characteristics, usually called socio-psychological. The data analysis, then, is on surveys, and the dependent variable conceived of as the likelihood that an individual would participate in unconventional forms of political activities. A common example is the effect of socioeconomic status on unconventional forms of political participation. The literature on this approach is large and long standing (Campbell et al., 1960; Lipset 1960; Marsh 1977, 1990; Verba et al., 1978; Bames et al., 1979;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In spite of these differences, both the state and individual-level approaches contribute importantly to an understanding of unconventional forms of political participation.
19 Extensive research on unconventional forms of political participation at the individual level has suggested various approaches. Before this study tackles the problems of measuring unconventional forms of political participation in three new democracies and examining the results, it is necessary to introduce each four general perspectives to understand unconventional forms of political participation by citizenry.
Why do citizens protest? Every protester has an individual explanation for his or her action. Some people are stimulated by a commitment to an issue or ideology.
Other protesters are motivated by a general opposition to the govemment and political system and search for opportunities to display their feelings. Still others are caught up in the excitement and sense of comradeship that protests produce or simply accompany a friend to be where the action is. Social scientists have tried to systematize these individual motivations to explain the general sources of protest activity.
In order to study individual differences in protest, three general perspectives have been most common: socio-psychological perspective (dissatisfaction approach), rational choice perspective (cognitive skills or resource mobilization approach), cultural change perspective (value change approach). In addition to these three, there exists another useful perspective called a baseline model or social structure model.
The first two perspectives have opposite views on protests. From these three general perspectives and a baseline model various approaches are provided to explain unconventional forms of political participation.
20 Socio-Psychological Perspective
The socio-psychological perspective stresses the influence of personal resources, attitudes, and institutional structures in explaining patterns of action (e.g.
Verba et al., 1978, 1995). A dissatisfaction approach is based on this perspective.
This approach maintains that protest is primarily based on feelings of frustration and political alienation. Dalton (1996) provides an explanation on the origin of the approach:
Analysts since Aristotle have seen personal dissatisfaction and striving for better conditions as the root cause of political violence. For Aristotle, the principal causes of revolution were the aspirations for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it or the aspirations of oligarchs for greater inequality than they had. Much later, Tocqueville linked the violence of the 1789 French Revolution to unfulfilled aspirations expanding more rapidly than objective conditions, thereby increasing dissatisfaction and the pressure for change. Karl Marx also similarly posited personal dissatisfaction and the competition between the haves and have-nots as the driving force of history and the ultimate source of political revolt, (p. 77)
The dissatisfaction approach purports to explain what drives people to commit acts of violence, especially political violence. In the 1930s frustration-aggression theory formalized centuries of tradition and folk psychology. According to its formulators, the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, conversely, the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression.
James C. Davies (1962, p. 6) draws upon "the psychological model of frustration-aggression" to explain the emergence of widespread political protest.
Specifically, he argues that political violence is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. It is the J-curve of Davies. Failure to meet these rising expectations leads to widespread frustration, laying the groundwork for political
21 violence. Davies (1962, pp. 5-8) suggests several stages in the emergence of collective violence and political protest from the wellspring of individual anger. First, social, economic, or political reverses lead to widely shared frustration. Second, this frustration manifests itself in widespread increases in interpersonal aggression. Third, the people's anger focuses on the govemment, apparently because of the efforts of dissident leaders and their ideologies. Finally, interpersonal violence declines while their frustration decreases.
About the same time Davies measured system frustration and searched for specific historical instance of political violence and revolution that fit his general theory, Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend (1972, pp. 136-83) undertook to apply a similar hypothesis to cross-national variations in domestic political instability. Specifically, they identified political instability as a form of aggressive behavior. Like Davies, the
Feierabends (1972) specify a number of factors that intervene between systemic frustration and overt political instability. For example, "constructive reform might buy off discontent, the regime might successfully repressor deflect potential dissent, or people may vent their anger in interpersonal rather than regime-targeted political protest" (p. 163). Nevertheless, they conclude that in "the relative absence of these qualifying conditions, aggressive behavior in the form of political instability is predicted to be the consequence of systemic frustration" (Feierabend and Feierabend
1966, p. 180). Rather than identify a few historical instances that appear to fit their hypothesis, the Feierabands (1972) collected aggregate data on socioeconomic conditions, political repressiveness, and political instability in 84 countries between the years 1948 and 1962.
22 Both of these early efforts by Davies and Feierabands suffer from common shortcomings. Frustration-aggression theory is ultimately a hypothesis about individual states of mind and consequent behavior. Yet, both Davies and Feierabands characterize and measure frustration in terms of aggregate quantitative indicators of prosperity. Their approach obscures the problem of how individual frustrations add up to collective political violence. Furthermore, neither approach successfully sorts out the relative contribution of intervening factors like leadership or the regime's coercive capability in determining the actual levels of political protest.
In his book. Why Men Rebel (1970), Ted Robert Gurr culminated decades of investigation into the psychological origins of political protest and lay the groundwork for 20 years of subsequent research and debate. Despite its complexity, the psychology of frustration-aggressionremain s at the heart of Gurr's explanatory model. Gurr (1970) writes that "the primary source of the human capacity for political protest appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism" (p. 12).
Frustration does not necessarily lead to protest, and protest for some men may be motivated by expectations of gain. The anger induced by frustration, however, is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities.
If frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely.
Frustration arises mainly from the expectation of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation develops from the actor's perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people think they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.
23 According to Gumey and Tiemey (1982, pp. 34-39), several characteristics of this idea deserve emphasis on the article. First, despite Gurr's tendency to speak in terms of collectivities, relative deprivation remains rooted in individual perceptions and self-assessments. Second, since relative deprivation depends on self-assessments rather than objective conditions, absolutely deprived people may experience relatively low level of relative deprivation if they fatalistically expect little from their lives.
Alternatively, people who appear well-off may still experience intense relative deprivation if their expectations significantly exceed their capabilities. Third, both expectations and capabilities represent an aggregate assessment on the part of individuals. We all possess many different values and aspirations.
If we can compare aggregated value expectations with an assessment of aggregate capabilities, then feelings of relative deprivation emerge in three basic ways.
First, in decremental deprivation, expectations remain constant, but capabilities decline over time. Second, a gap develops when capabilities remain constant, but expectations increase rapidly because people either acquire new values or expect to improve their position with respect to old ones. Finally, expectations may increase at the same time that capabilities decline, producing progressive deprivation (Grofman and Muller 1973, pp. 517-18).
The dissatisfaction approach was widely employed in the social movement literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The approach was useful to interpret the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s. It also carried over the study of student activism and new social movements in advanced industrial democracies. The dissatisfaction approach explained that students protested because they were radicalized by their lack of social influence or their economic marginality. Certainly,
24 many individuals participated in new social movements in order to express dissatisfaction with specific policy problems or to criticize general social norms.
Scholars also applied this model to explain the formation of women's groups in reaction to sexual discrimination and the creation of environmental groups in reaction to the excesses of capitalist economies (Dalton and Kuechler 1990, chapter 1).
However, despite the value of the dissatisfaction approach in explaining some patterns of political protest, empirical evidence has provided uncertain support for the approach. For example, Muller's research showed that the relationship between dissatisfaction and protest for political activists in the last 1960s was weak (Muller
1972). Muller's more extensive analyses in the 1970s also failed to produce more convincing support for the dissatisfaction approach (Muller 1979). Additionally,
Political Action (1979) edited by Bames and Kaase, found that the dissatisfaction approach exerted only a marginal impact on the propensity to engage in protests.
Gumey and Tiemey's critical research on the relative deprivation literature also concluded that the "dissatisfaction approach is itself affected by too many serious conceptual, theoretical, and empirical weaknesses to be useful in accounting for the emergence and development of social movements" (Gumey and Tiemey 1982, p. 33).
Additionally, Bames and Kaase argued that "the operationalization of dissatisfaction approach is complicated by the subjective nature of human expectations, and hence of deprivation" (Bames and Kaase et al., 1979, p. 16). They stated that "fhistration does not lead inevitably to aggression," and "many personality, cultural, and situational variables intervene, so that fhistration should be expected to lead to aggression only under particular conditions" (Bames and Kaase et al., 1979, p. 16).
25 In sum, the dissatisfaction approach implies that political dissatisfaction and alienation should be major predictors of protest. Indirectly, this approach suggests that unconventional forms of political participation should be more common among lower-status individuals, minorities, and other groups who have reasons to feel deprived or dissatisfied.
Rational Choice Perspective
The second and opposite view to socio-psychological perspective is rational choice perspective. This perspective framed decisions to participate in unconventional behavior from simple cost-benefit terms, best represented in Olson's
The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
The rational choice perspective starts with relatively restricted characterization of rationality and has three major features (Downs 1957). First, it is based on a concept of utility maximization. Individual actors always seek to maximize utility as reward of their activities. Second, individual actors are rational. Finally, to pursue the maximizing action, individuals must possess perfect information about the comparable costs and benefits of alternative choices.
According to Dalton (2000), the rational choice perspective of political protest provides a major alternative to the deprived actor theories. Rather than trying to explain outbreaks of political protest by isolating the frustrations that presumably drive people to desperate acts, the rational actor approach views individual participation in radical political activity as a product of a conscious calculation of costs and benefits. By recognizing the particular relevance of the free rider problem to the question of revolutionary participation, this approach offers an important
26 explanation for the relative infrequency of such events. Public goods cannot be
selectively allocated, that is, when the new order comes, all members of the society
will equally enjoy its presumed benefits. In short, if anyone in a community receives
a public good, everyone must receive it. Therefore, they will "rationally choose to
become free riders on other people's sacrifices" (Dalton 2000, p. 927).
The rational choice perspective of political protest starts with a few simple
assumptions about a value-maximizing egoist. On the basis of these assumptions the theory specifies the conditions under which such an individual would participate in political protest, possibly including violence. It concludes that most potential revolutionaries will forgo violent action unless induced to participate by selective rewards and punishments. Incipient revolutionary movements find it difficult to assemble the resources required for such selective incentives; consequently, most successful at explaining why radical collective action fails to occur. Indeed, the radical choice approach may suggest some interesting research problems rather than actually explain violent action (Olson 1971; Duch and Taylor 1993).
A cognitive skills (resource mobilization) approach is based on this perspective. The cognitive skills approach provides alternative suggestions of who resorts to protest behavior. This approach implies that protest activity should be higher among the better educated and politically sophisticated, those who have the political skills and resources to engage in these demanding forms of activity. One also might view involvement in other social groups as providing resources and experience that encourage activities across other participation modes (Verba et al.,
1995). In addition, a belief that protest will be effective should significantly increase the likelihood that individuals will participate.
27 The cognitive skills (or resource mobilization) approach (Tilly 1975) does not view protest and collective action as an outburst by a frustrated public. Instead, protest is another political resource (like voting, campaign activity, or communal activity) that individuals may use in pursuing their goals. Unconventional forms of political participation are seen as a normal part of the political process as competing groups vie for political power.
This approach begins with an assumption that people choose political actions differently, because they think and feel about politics differently. By 'think' and
'feel' is meant the distinction that psychologists make between the cognitive aspects of mental life and the affective or evaluative aspects: the distinction between people's knowledge and understanding of political matters on the one hand and their political values, desires and feelings-for-and-against on the other. Both are important in determining the way people choose their preferred means of political action.
The cognitive skills approach focuses on the qualitative increase in the political sophistication of the mass public. With the increase in education, as well as, a diffusion of greater quantities of political information through the media, especially the electronic media, the political resources and cognitive skills of large segments of national population have significantly increased. With this new level of sophistication, the mass publics no longer need social cues or party identification to make their voting decisions. Cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990) means that some people rely less on parties or social groups for information, therefore, those attachments are weakening. This mobilization also means that people that usually do not participate can be reached more effectively and brought into the political process.
Inglehart (1977) says that cognitive skills or mobilization refers to rising political
28 sophistication, knowledge, and awareness among individuals in society. This usually accompanies urbanization, increased media, and increased associational contact.
The cognitive skills approach also holds that the increasing levels of political sophistication and information are leading one to a more active citizens role (Inglehart
1977; Shively 1979; Dalton 1984). When citizens are more cognitively mobilized (as measured by such things as frequency of political discussion or perceived degree of influence over others), they tend to participate more. Further, to the extent people experience politicization from partisan or interest group attachments, they seem more likely to participate in political activities (Verba et al., 1978; Powell 1986).
In the Western European context, the attachments of ideological extremes and religious organizations seem especially important (Rose and Urwin 1969;
Klingemann and Inglehart 1975). Those having an understanding of political matters at an ideological level could function consistently in political life. In particular, an understanding that included an appreciation of the main Left-Right, Liberal-
Conservative dimension of democratic politics was the essential equipment of any recruit to political activity.
Some scholars are interested in the political orientations of protesters.
Unconventional forms of political participation are often seen as a tool for liberals and progressives who want to challenge the political establishment and who feel the need to go beyond conventional forms of political participation to have their views heard.
At the same time, protest activity has broadened across the political spectrum, and protest may no longer be the primary domain of the Left. For every pro-choice protest in North America there is a counter-mobilization among conservatives. Thus,
29 we should consider whether or not there remains a political bias in the use of unconventional forms of political participation.
Dalton (2002), especially, defines that LeftTRight position an important determinant of protest. He argues that "although protest politics has spread throughout the political process and is used by groups on the Left and Right, the willingness to engage in protest activities remains more common among Leftists" and protest politics is still disproportionately the domain of the Left" in advanced industrial democracies (p. 69). This study tests the argument by Dalton about the relationship between Left/Right position and protest activities.
In sum, socio-psychological perspective (dissatisfaction approach) and rational choice perspectives (cognitive skills approach) offer radically different answers to the question of why people protest. The former focuses on the fhistration that ultimately drives people to violent acts. The other, in contrast, portrays people as carefully calculating the costs and benefits of alternative actions and selecting the one that offers the greatest promise of reward. While these two approaches may explain particular violent actions or the decision to join a political protest by focusing on the individual, the phenomenon of revolutionary transformation involves something more.
The unit of analysis becomes a whole society, and groups, cultural, and stmctural theories may better explain the origins of cultural crisis, stmctural strain, and revolutionary transformation.
Cultural Change Perspective
The last general explanation of protest is termed a cultural change perspective.
One of the most powerful social science concepts to emerge in political behavior
30 research - and one central to the study of citizen attitudes and behavior - is the concept of political culture. The value change approach is one aspect of cultural change perspective. The approach is concerned with people's basic political values - those needs and goals they think society should aim to achieve before all others.
Values provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behaviors of the public.
Values signify a preference for certain personal and social goals, as well as the methods to obtain these goals. One individual may place a high priority on freedom, equality, and social harmony - and favor policies that strengthen these values. Others may stress independence, social recognition, and ambition in guiding their actions
(Dalton 2002, chapter 5).
Contemporary focus on cultural change relies on the value change argument,
Ronald Inglehart, a pioneer in this endeavor, has developed the most systematic attempt to describe and explain the process of value change for advanced indusfrial societies. Inglehart's theory of value change based on two premises (Inglehart 1977,
1981, 1990; Abramson and Inglehart 1995). First, basic value priorities are determined by a scarcity hypothesis. Individuals "place the greatest value on those things that are in relatively short supply" (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). That is, when some valued object is difficult to obtain, its worth is magnified. If the supply increases to match the demand, then the object is taken for granted and attention shifts to other objects that are still scarce.
The second premise of Inglehart's value change approach is a socialization hypothesis. "To a large extent, one's value priorities reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years," (Ingehart 1981, p. 881). An individual's basic value priorities are thus initially formed early in life in reaction to the conditions of
31 this formative period. These formative conditions include both the immediate situation in one's own family and the broader political and economic conditions of a society. Once these values develop, they tend to endure in the face of later changes in social conditions (Dalton 2002, pp. 79-80).
Inglehart applied the logic of Maslow's value hierarchy to political issues
(Maslow 1954). Many political issues, such as economic security, law and order, and national defense, tap underlying sustenance and safety needs. Inglehart describes these goals as material values. In a time of depression or civil unrest, for example, security and sustenance needs undoubtedly receive great attention. If a society can make significant progress in addressing these goals, then attention can shift toward higher-order values. These higher-order goals are reflected in issues such as individual freedom, self-expression, and especially, participation. Inglehart labels these goals as postmaterial values (Inglehart 1981).
According to Inglehart (1977), the postwar generations had grown up relatively free of the urgent problems of physical and economic security that had beset their parents. To them, the class-based economism of Westem party systems seemed increasingly redundant (Inglehart 1977). There grew up among the younger generations significantly larger and larger minorities of people who placed these higher order goals before those of security and economic growth. They did so, at least, in terms of the political goals they thought their country should aim for.
Inglehart called them Postmaterialists. They, it seems, were in the vanguard of the new politics. The growth of political protest actions in the 1960s was traceable to their efforts to introduce new political goals onto the national agenda.
Postmaterialists demanded things like racial and sexual equality, environmental
32 improvement and, more than anything, new democratic forms of political participation. Accordingly Inglehart (1977) argues that "[a] postmaterialist view was by definition elite-challenging and the means to demand such goals led naturally to protest methods" (p. 7).
For Inglehart this material/postmaterial continuum provides a general framework for understanding the primary value changes occurring in advanced industrial democracies. Other researchers note the broad nature of value change and describe the process as a transition from "Old Politics" values of economic growth, security, and traditional lifestyles to "New Politics" values of individual freedoms, social equality, and the quality of life (Baker et al., 1981; Flanagan 1982, 1987:
Dalton and Kuechler 1990).
Dalton (2002) defines that "the major challengers to Inglehart's theory of value change have come in two areas" (p. 81). First, several studies question whether socioeconomic conditions are linked to citizen values as Inglehart predicts. For example, Clarke and Dutt (1991) demonstrate that Inglehart's simple value index is closely related to the ebb and flow of economic conditions instead of consistently reflecting the conditions of earlier formative environments. Duch and Taylor (1993) similarly raise questions about whether or not formative conditions are the key determinants of values.
A second critique asks if advanced industrial societies are changing only along the single material/postmaterial dimension. Flanagan (1982, 1987) argued that citizen values are shifting along at least two dimensions. One dimension involves a shift from material to noneconomic values; a second dimension involves a shift from authoritarian to libertarian values. Dalton (2002) also argues that "undoubtedly
33 Inglehart's framework oversimplifies the process of value change, since societies are changing in multiple ways that tap different parts of people's value systems" (p. 82).
The Other Perspective
In addition to these three general perspectives of political protest behavior, several personal characteristics might stimulate unconventional forms of political participation. Research has shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of political protest among the young. Gender also might influence unconventional forms of political participation (Schlozman et al., 1994). The confrontational style of protest politics may involve a disproportionate number of men, although there is evidence that this pattern is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee and Rinehart 1995).
This approach is often called a 'baseline model' or 'social stmcture model.'
Political sociology has long established that people's age, gender, income, occupation, education, religion, marital status, and so on have a profound effect on their political behavior. If it were to be found that political behavior was randomly distributed among all kinds and classes of people, there would be no social background model after all. Then, all the explanation of political behavior would have to be sought in people's minds. Only beliefs, feelings, values and attitudes and their responses to specific events would account for their behavior. This, however, is unlikely.
This approach, borrowed from Verba and Nie's study of political participation in America, refers to the social location of political participation (Verba and Nie
1972). What social characteristics such as age, gender, income, education, religion, occupational class, and so on tend to be associated with higher or lower rates of political participation? Verba and Nie (1972) define that higher social and economic
34 status eases the entry of the more advantaged members of society into regular political involvement. Those who have a higher social and economic status share a social identity with existing political elites. Most important, they, rather than manual or agricultural workers, have the education and training that lower the costs of learning the basic skills of politics. They also have different expectations of the political system. Furthermore, middle-class values stress individual competence. For them the search for political redress places a premium on individual action. In contrast, manual or agricultural workers tend to look to existing organizations like political parties and labor unions for a collective expression of political ambitions (Marsh 1990).
In general, the finding from previous research is that older, male, middle-class, married, more educated, and more income are more likely to participate. This is valid at least for conventional political involvement. Is it also valid for unconventional political participation, political protest? Scholars (Abramson and Inglehart 1986,
1987, 1992; Lee 1997) argue that people's socioeconomic status except "age" have a similar effect on their unconventional political participation as well as conventional participation. Previous research shows that young people, rather than older people, are more likely to participate in protest activities (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1984, 1996).
The demands upon time and energy imposed by demonstrations, occupations, and so on are most easily met by the young. More than that, young people are said naturally to be given to elite-challenging behavior.
Summarv
The global wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s transformed the role of citizenry in many of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin
35 America, and South Africa. These new events provide opportunities to test our theories about the nature of citizen behavior including unconventional forms of political participation, expand the boundaries of knowledge, and develop new theories.
As a research topic for political scientists, the concept of political protest has been gradually changed. Since the 1970s, while there was a rise of peaceful political protests in Europe and North America, the researchers have emphasized the difference between violent, and non-violent, as well as conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. The definition of unconventional forms of political participation (peaceful political protest) is wide, including several forms of protest behavior. In this study, unconventional forms of political participation - the dependent variable - includes the legal challenging, semi-legal action, and semi or illegal challenging action such as signing petitions, attending demonstrations, joining consumer boycotts, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings and factories.
However, this concept excludes political crime such as sabotage, warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing, kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on.
Scholars have come at explaining unconventional forms of political participation basically in two ways in terms of the usage of different units of analyses: individual level and system level. In order to study individual differences in political protest behavior, three general perspectives have been suggested - socio- psychological, rational choice, and cultural change perspectives. In addition to these three general perspectives, there exists another perspective called a baseline model or social structure model. From the three general perspectives and the baseline model there exist four plausible approaches/models concerning the sources of unconventional forms of political participation: dissatisfaction, cognitive skills, value
36 change, and baseline approaches. How various determinants from these approaches at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation is a subject of Chapter IV.
37 2 « a •£« c •S S3 « w c « •!* JS? CO O a
t» c C/3 C , , o O !1> a ^ kH •4-> P3 S s o c>C c J3 Da i Vi o Un l _o U Occ u u CQ demo n *C^S o .^J
CLo, ^i^ en ca > c ri o o s—» (cU > o c o o c & D x: <^ g o o ^^ o o CN o es >^ o C o o c Vi io n S tos w Q !/] s od e o S c ,3 (Tl o o <+-( Ui o 00 ^ C/3 s rt C ^ C3 _) o 1 ^-m. 00 u CN C3 S •* u x> Q -o 13 o a ^K^i r-- 3 o ^—1 o do X C J^''*-3 ' c o M o intere s tics : U ntiona ] i S CS 1 lob b (N onv e O o 38 CHAPTER III CASE STUDIES Chapter III presents a general description of the historical background, democratization process, and unconventional political participation in the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Inauguration of democracy in the three states was almost simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s although these states have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development. Figure 3-1 and Table 3-1 show inauguration of democracy and cross- national socio-economic indicators of the three new democracies. The three new democracies in different geographical regions had commonly achieved rapid economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, GNP per capita had increased around 81 percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South Africa, and over 400 percent in South Korea during the time period. The changes in the material- technological environment cause changing political attitudes of the citizenty that, in time, erode the basis of authoritarian power in the three new democracies. The three new democracies have commonly experienced massive protests by citizenry during the democratic transition period of the 1980s, that replaced authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes. Demonstrations by the mass publics were a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracy in the three new democracies. In addition, elite-challenging unconventional forms of political participation in these states have continued during the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s. This chapter discusses first historical background, second 39 democratization process, and finally political participation in the three new democracies. Mexico Historical Background Mexico is a Latin American country marked by extensive poverty and highly concentrated wealth that shares a 2,000-mile border with the United States (Lipset 1998a). The site of advanced Amerindian civilizafions, Mexico came under Spanish mle for three centuries before achieving independence early in the 19th centuty. Mexico's revolution - passing through phases of liberal uprising (1910-1913) to bloody civil war (1913-1917) and religious war (1926-1929), and then to gradual consolidation of power in the mid-1920s by groups from the northern states of Sonora and Coahuila - ultimately claimed more than a million lives, or more than 10 percent of the population. The revolution destroyed or severely weakened established political actors: the Catholic Church, large landowners, the official party, army, and foreign interests. It brought important new powers into politics: labor unions, peasant groups, and a new middle class (Lipset 1998a, p. 131). Mexico's president serves a single six-year term and cannot be reelected. With uninterrupted presidencies since 1934, Mexican politics has taken on a distinctive six-year term. The peaceful successions make for stable expectations about behavior, policy adjustments, circulation of members of the elite through electoral and appointed posts, and renewal of public hopes for the future. Mexico is formally a federal system, with thirty-one states, a federal district, and more than 2,400 municipalities. The sexennial calendar is densely packed with elections of 40 governors, state assemblies, city mayors, and city councils. These elections provide for significant mmover among the elite and policy adjustment throughout the countty (Banks etal., 1996, pp. 616-19). Mexico was one of the party-government systems until the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its majority in the lower house in 1997 and presidential election in 2000. Since its founding in 1929, the PRI has historically dominated the country by means of its corporatist, authoritarian structure which is maintained through co-optation, patronage, cormption, and repression. The formal business of govemment has taken place mostly in secret and with little legal foundation (Karamycky et al., 1999, p. 315). The PRI can be divided roughly into two factions at the elite level of party activists (Lipset 1998a). One "favors the status quo" and the other "promotes liberalization and reform" (p. 133). The status quo faction, called dinos (dinosaurs), is based largely in organized labor, peasant organizations, and public employee unions. The reform faction, called renos (renovators), is a more heterogeneous group whose leadership comes predominantly from urban, middle-class groups, especially young professionals. An important debate within the PRI concerns the question of relative weight to give to the organized groups of the party, where the dinos hold sway, and to the local level organizations, where the renos have tried to organize support. At stake is control over the PRI's nominations to elected office, as well as other aspects of the party's programs and practices. Another debate concerns how fast to reform the national polity and economy, with "the renos generally pushing for rapid reform and the dinos resisting" (p. 133). 41 The breakthrough of 1994 brought a new agenda to national politics in Mexico. The PRI and Ernesto Zedillo won in the comparatively honest elections of August 1994. Winning candidate Zedillo, who inherited the age-old tragedy of widespread poverty and economic inequality of wealth and income, "confronted the daunting task of consolidating the economic reforms begun in the 1980s and creating conditions for sustainable growth" (Lipset 1998a, p. 134). The Zedillo govemment also "faced growing pressures and dislocations caused in part by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which took effect in Januaty 1994" (Lipset 1998a, p. 134). A devaluation of thepe^o in late 1994 by the Zedillo govemment threw Mexico into economic turmoil, friggeringth e worst recession in over half a centuty (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). The govemment announced an unconvincing economic plan and followed this with a devaluation unaccompanied by such necessary measures as wage and price controls. Investors, already nervous about instability and Zedillo's inexperience, hurried to protect their interests. Billions of dollars fled the country in a matter of weeks, and Mexico was again plunged into crisis. The impact of the devaluation was felt throughout other so-called emerging markets, as investors sought refuge in safer havens. Mexico entered "a period of economic austerity and slow growth" (p. 577). Democratization Inauguration of democracy in Mexico began in 1994. "The overriding issue in Mexico's August 1994 election was the credibility of the electoral process" (Lipset 1998b, p. 134). The PRI regime had opened the electoral system to opposition parties in the late 1970s. In the midst of economic crisis in the early 1980s, however, the 42 regime essentially shut down the electoral route through deliberate fraud. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, enormous pressure had built up to reopen the electoral option. Although the Salinas govemment had made some progress toward democratic reform, the important breakthrough came in the last year of Salinas's term in the wake of traumatic political protest and violence - first a peasant insurgency in the southernmost state of Chiapas in early 1994 and then, in March, the assassination of the PRI's presidential candidate, Luis Donald Colosio, in Tijuana (Banks et al., pp. 616-619). The violence and resulting public anxiety propelled the presidency and reform elements in the govemment to ally with reform in the PRI and principal opposition parties to produce a negotiated transition. Such a transition was possible because the govemment retained enough power to set the terms of negotiation for electoral reform, taking opposition demands into account (Lipset 1998a, p. 134). In 1996, opposition parties of the left and right won important municipal elections in three states. Post-electoral conflicts took place in several regions. In the southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Chiapas - where many of Mexico's indigenous people live - political violence continued to be a fact of life. But the elections left the PRI govemment just two of Mexico's 12 largest cities (Karatnycky et al., 1999). In April 1996, the main political parties, with the exception of the National Action Party (PAN), agreed on reforms aimed at bringing about more fair elections. The reforms introduced direct elections for the mayoralty of Mexico City and abolished govemment control of the Federal Electoral Commission. The govemment pledged to increase public financingo f political parties and to guarantee them fairer access to television during elections. But unilateral changes by the president and the 43 PRI limited the scope of the law, and the main opposition parties voted against it in November 1996 (Karataycky et al., 1999). The climate in which Mexicans went to the polls several times in 1997 and 1998 was substantially improved from past elections. For the first time, in 1997, voters chose the mayor of Mexico City and elected the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) opposition leader Cardenas rather than having the municipal chief appointed by the president. That year, an opposition coalition composed of the PRD, PAN, and two other parties not only took control over the lower house of Congress following July elections, but also reached a consensus whereby the presidency of 61 house committees were allocated on an equitable basis. By year-end, the PAN held six governorships (Karatnycky et al., 1999). Finally, Vicente Fox who was the presidential candidate of an opposition party, the National Action Party (PAN), was elected in June 2000 by popular vote. Fox took office as president in December 2000 in the country's first transfer of power to the opposition since the PRJ was founded in 1929. Summarv and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation From the previous description of the historical background and democratization process in Mexico, several features found are important for understanding the nature of political protests in the country. First, for a long time, there have existed severe social and racial cleavages between rich landowner (caudillos) and poor local farmers (campesinou), and between white immigrants and their descendants (mestizos) and indigenous people (Amerindian) with African 44 immigrants in Mexico. These cleavages have played an important role in the nation (Wiarda and Kline 1985; Almond et al., 2000, chapter 14; Hauss 2000, chapter 16). Secondly, the Mexican political system is traditionally permeated with patron- client relationships, so-called clientelism, in which the 'patrons' - persons having higher political stature - provide benefits such as protection, support in political struggles with rivals, and chances for upward political or economic mobility to their 'clients' - persons having lesser political status (Almond et al., 2000, chapter 14). In exchange, the 'clients' provide loyalty, deference, and usefiil services like voter mobilization, political control, and problem solving to their patrons within the official party or governmental bureaucracy. "The chains of patron-client relationships are interwoven, because patrons do not want to limit themselves to one client, and clients avoid pinning all their hopes on a single patron" (Cornelius 2000, p. 486). Clientelism, the exchange of favors among people of different status or degrees of power, extends from the very top of the political system to the most remote and poverty-stricken villages (Purcell and Purcell 1980). It is a form of participation in the sense that "many people, even poorest, are able to interact with public officials and get something out of the political system" (p. 207). This kind of participation emphasizes how limited resources, such as access to health care, can be distributed in a way that provides maximum political payoff This informal system is "a fiindamental reason why many Mexicans continue to vote for the PRI" (p. 207). Lastly, despite the strong and controlling role of the PRI in Mexico's political history, the countty also has a fradition of civic organizations that operate at community and local levels with considerable independence from politics (Kesselman et al., 2000, chapter 9). Local village improvement societies, religious organizations, 45 sports clubs, and parents' organizations are widespread. Although many of their activities are not explicitly political, they have political implications in that they encourage individuals to work together to find interests (Grindle 2000, p. 416). Other organizational experiences are more explicitly political. The student movement of 1968 provided evidence that civic society in Mexico had the potential to contest the power of the state. The emergence of independent unionism in the 1970s was another "indication of renewed willingness to question the right of the state to stifle the voices of dissent and the emergency of demands for greater equity and participation" (Grindle2000, p. 416). The economic crisis of 1982 combined with the civic tradition to heighten demands for assistance from the govemment. In urban areas, citizen groups demanded land rights in squatter settlements, as well as housing, infrastmcture, and urban services, as rights of citizenship rather than as a reward for loyalty to the PRI in terms of various protest activities. In mral areas, peasant organizations also demanded greater independence from govemment and the leaders of the PRI in the 1980s. Additionally, "a variety of groups organized around middle-class and urban issues in the 1990s" (Grindle 2000, p. 418). Traditionally, "most political participation in Mexico has been of two broad types: (1) ritualistic, regime-supportive activities (for example, voting, attending campaign rallies), and (2) petitioning or contacting of public officials, to influence the allocation of some public good or service" (Cornelius 2000, p. 476). People participated in PRI campaign rallies mostly because attending might have a specific material payoff (a free meal, a raffle ticket, or a T-shirt), or because failure to do so could have personal economic costs. For example, union members who failed to 46 attend such rallies could expect to lose a day's pay. As they went to the polls, Mexicans knew that they were not selecting those who would govern but merely ratifying the choice of candidates made earlier by the PRI govemment hierarchy. Some voted in response to pressures from local power brokers (caciques) and PRI sector representatives. And some, especially in mral areas, freely sold their votes in return for handouts from local officials (Comelius 2000, pp. 476-77). As elections have become moments of genuine political confrontation in many parts of Mexico, however, the ritualistic quality of voting and participation in campaign activities has diminished. Mexico today is in the midst of an explosion in political participation, as evidenced not only by the virtually nonstop protests of citizens' movements of all types, but also by a dramatic rise in turnout in federal and state elections. The tumout of registered voters rose from 49 percent in the 1988 presidential election, to 78 percent in the 1994 presidential election - a 28 percentage point increase, in six years. Some 96 percent of Mexico's voting-age population was registered to vote in 1994 (Comelius 2000). According to World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98, protest potential in Mexico has increased during the democratic transition phase of the 1980s, but slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation phase of the early 1990s (Figure 3-2). It is a little different with advanced or 'old' democracies where unconventional forms of political participation have continually increased during the 1980s-1990s. For example, the participants of 'signing a petition' in Mexico have increased from 9.5 percent to 34.7 percent in the 1980s, and slightly decreased from 34.7 to 30.4 in the early 1990s. The other forms of unconventional participation except 'joining boycotts' show the same changing trend. It shows that the protest in 47 Mexico has severely increased during the democratic transition period, but slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation period. The participants of 'joining boycotts' have increased during the consolidation period as well as transition period. The reason behind the consumer boycotts increase is probably related to economic development in Mexico, where the protest against multinational corporations has increased lately. In sum, from these arguments related to the historical background, democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation in Mexico, this study finally expects that Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction Approaches are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches in Mexico. South Africa Historical Background South Africa, a former white-ruled republic, is situated on Africa's southem tip. Race had long polarized South Africa's 40 million people (30 million black, 5 million white, 3.4 million "colored" people, and 1 million Asians), and the countty was known for its system of apartheid, a form of racial segregation and minority mle (Lipset 1998b). South Africa's experience with imperialism was different from that in the rest of Africa for two reasons. First, it was colonized two centuries earlier. Second, it had by far the largest White population on the continent, which was well established before the European powers began their "scramble for Africa" late in the nineteenth centuty (Hauss 2000, p. 438). 48 The Cape of Good Hope, Africa's southernmost shoreline, was colonized by the Dutch in 1652. After conquering the indigenous Khoi and San people, the Dutch penetrated into the interior. The Dutch descent proclaimed their attachment to their new continent by labeling themselves Afrikaners. In 1806 Great Britain formally established a colony at the Cape, and in 1820 the first British settlers landed on its shores. The Dutch settlers (the Boers) clashed repeatedly with the authoritarian colonial mlers and trekked north to found their own republics. The Boers resisted British encroachments, but were defeated in the Boer War (1899-1902). A white-only national convention convened in 1909, and "white mle was gradually consolidated" (Lipset 1998b, p. 159). When four white-mled states agreed to form a union under British colonial mle, whites (13 percent of the population) had enjoyed regular competitive elections since 1910. Like other British colonies, "they adopted the Westminster parliamentaty system, and until the 1990s whites enjoyed the trappings of pluralist democracy" (Lipset 1998b, p. 157). The resuhing Union of South Africa had operated under a policy of apartheid, the separate development of the races, until the 1990s brought an end to apartheid politically and ushered in black majority rule (Hauss 2000, p. 439). The colored (mixed race) and Asian minorities (together 11 percent of the population) were granted a vote for separate and subordinate parliaments only in 1984; black Africans (79 percent of the population) were denied the franchise until 1994 (Banks et al., 1996). The "political aspirations of blacks has hinged on inclusion in common representative institutions since 1912" (Lipset 1998b, p. 159). Their vehicle was the South African Native National Congress, launched in 1912 to defend land rights and to press for political rights. Eight years later the group became the African National 49 Congress (ANC), the chief organization of the African nationalist movement for the rest of the centuty (Deegan 2001). The methods and goals of the ANC initially were moderate (Hauss 2000, p. 449). Its leadership was an African intelligentsia educated in the Christian liberal tradition brought by British missionaries. For the next three decades the moral appeal was the ANC's primaty weapon. The ANC elite did not seek the overthrow of the union but incorporation within its democratic institutions. However, the ANC moderates were ignored because the British Crovm was concemed with developing the British Westminster model of democracy among the white settlers (Lipset 1998b). The failure of ANC moderation was discredited among young African intellectuals by the 1940s. Control of the ANC's Youth League passed to militant nationalists such as Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela (both later to become presidents of the ANC). These nationalists were convinced that white goodwill was a scarce or fictional commodity. Their goal was not incorporation into the white-mled policy but national liberations; their preferred method was mass mobilization. After the 1948 election, their argument became compelling to the older generation of ANC leaders (Lipset 1998b). Democratization After more than forty years of coerced racial segregation, "the leaders of the apartheid regime began to realize that the price they had to pay to maintain apartheid was becoming unacceptably high" (Deegan 2001, p. 81). The continued repression of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and other political organizations, as well as the 50 detention or exile of their leaders by the South African apartheid govemment, caused increasing international criticism and disinvestment, and an escalating economic crisis. Political liberalization could not take place in the context of a continued ban on these organizations (Karamycky et al., 1999). By 1990 apartheid, and economic sanctions imposed by most Westem govemments in reaction to it, had weakened South Africa's economy. Reform and repression had failed to produce a compliant majority leadership willing to negotiate on the govemment's terms (Lipset 1998b)'. In Febmaty 1990 South Africa's white govemment, headed by Frederik W. de Klerk, had signaled its intention to negotiate a democracy with the hitherto outlawed black nationalist opposition. Additionally, all black political movements and apartheid laws were to be banned with a view to finding a political solution to the impasse that had built up in South Africa (Lipset 1998b). In 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together 26 political parties of all persuasions from far right to far left and lengthy deliberations began about the way forward and the nature of a new constitution (Deegan 2001). Throughout 1991, the ANC and the NP attempted to find common ground for the South African transition. The NP wanted a grand consensus on democratic mle through power sharing, while the ANC wanted majority mle through a popular mandate from the population, settled through a constiment assembly and not the govemment's multiparty conference. Compromise was found in CODESA. The agreement led to the first free elections in South Africa in 1994 (Banks et al., 1996, pp. 868-71). 51 In 1992, de Klerk held a referendum of white voters to test their sentiments about his reforms and was rewarded with a 68.6 percent 'yes' vote. There was a 'yes' majority in evety voting region except for Pietersburg, in the traditionally conservative and Afrikaner-dominated region (Fox, 1991, p. 88). The first democratic election held in South Africa took place on 27 and 28 April 1994. November registration took place and all permanent residents of the countty were permitted to vote, regardless of citizenship. The election marked South Africa's transition from a state govemed by apartheid and minority mle to one based on the democratic principle of majoritarianism and one person, one vote. As expected, the ANC won a comfortable majority necessaty to dominate drafting of the permanent constimtion. The NP achieved the 20 percent necessaty, according to the agreed constitutional formula, for de Klerk to become one of two executive vice presidents; Thabo Mbeki of the ANC was the other. It also won control of one of the nine provinces created by the constitutional settlement. In short, the main contenders won enough votes to ensure their commitment to the new order. On May 9, 1994 the National Assembly elected Nelson Mandela president unanimously. That power would be transferred peaceably was unthinkable even as late as the 1980s (Deegan 2001). Summarv and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation A few distinctive features from historical background and democratization process in South Africa certainly are important for understanding the nature of political protest in the countty. One of the distinguishing features of South African politics is the multidimensionality and intensity of political conflict (Esterhuyse 2000; 52 Lange 2000; Gibson and Gouws 2003). South Africa is one of the most culturally heterogeneous countries in the world, with the 'simple' divisions over race being vastly complicated by linguistic, ethnic, and ideological differences. Many transitional regimes are rent by strong divisions, but South Africa is typically considered to be a 'deeply divided' society. One of the most vexing problems facing regimes attempting democratic transformations is political intolerance as a cmcial attribute of the political cultures of polities (Almond and Verba 1965). The system of apartheid contributed mightily to the uneven development of a democratic political culture in South Africa. Indeed, a principal heritage of apartheid is the unequal evolution of South Africa's political culture. As Esterhuyse (2000) notes, "[a]partheid left its mark on three fundamental dimensions of the South Africa political system: its values systems, its stmcture, and its political culture" (p. 148). de Lange (2000) agrees: "a lingering 'apartheid memoty' continues to restrict the development of trast and allegiance in the new political dispensation and its institutions" (p. 29). Political consciousness developed disproportionately among South Africa's four main racial communities - Africans, whites. Colored South Africans, and South Africans of Asian origin - with some acquiring the attitudes and skills necessaty to playing the role of a citizen in a democratic countty, but with others picking up few of the attributes of democratic citizens. Most South Africans (the non-white or 'black' majority) were never taught the values necessaty to participate in democratic politics - political efficacy, for instance, is as unequally distributed in contemporaty South Africa as is housing - so it would not be surprising to find that vast inequalities in democratic values characterize the countty, especially in the early days of the transition (Gibson and Gouws, 2003, p. 43). 53 Thus, nowhere is the problem of political intolerance more pressing than in South Africa. South Africa began its attempt at democratization in the early 1990s, with the capstone of the initiation stage being the free elections of April 1994 that brought Nelson Mandela and the ANC to power. By the end of the centuty, virtually all of the institutional components of democratic govemment had been installed in South Africa, including a strong constitutions, and effective and representative parliamentaty, and an independent and powerful judiciaty. What has been slower to develop are the cultural components of democracy, and especially political tolerance. The lack of tolerance among South Africans may well be the most serious threat to consolidating democracy in the countty. The other distinctive feature of the South African democratic transition was the influence of popular protests (mobilization) (Cobbett and Cohen 1988; Marx 1997). When foreign pressure in the form of disinvestments and isolation could not dismantle the apartheid regime and the armed stmggle met with the limited success, large-scale protest of people occurred in many different sectors of the society: in the labor arena through the union, in the education sectors of the society, in the urban areas through the civic organizations that imposed rent and services boycotts, and in the mral area (Cobbett and Cohen 1988). Not only was popular protest important in pressuring the white minority govemment to engage in negotiations, but the mass public also constrained the decisions of the ANC negotiators in many important ways. "Even though the final transition in South Africa was negotiated by elites, pressure from below in terms of popular protest helped to bring those elites to the negotiating table in the first place" (Marx 1997, p. 491). Thus, the South African transition cannot be understood solely in terms of "pact-making" among elites (Marx 1997, p. 54 491). Ordinaty South Africans played an important role in the transition and in politics before and after the transition. Thus, political protest of the mass public is one of considerable factors for the future of the South African democracy. According to World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-8, unconventional forms of political participation in South Africa has increased during the democratic transition phase of the 1980s, but decreased during the democratic consolidation phase of the eariy 1990s (Table and Figure 3-3). For example, the participants of 'attending a demonstration' in South Africa have increased from 7.7 percent to 14.6 percent in the 1980s, and decreased from 14.6 to 10.9 in the early 1990s. The other forms of unconventional participation show the same changing trend. It shows that the protest in South Africa has severely increased during the democratic transition period, but has decreased during the democratic consolidation period. In sum, from these arguments related to the historical background, democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation in South Africa, this smdy finally expects that Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches in South Africa. South Korea Historical Background South Korea, officially known as the Republic of Korea, is an independent East Asian countty established in 1948. The countty is a "model of an authoritarian system that sponsored economic growth and development, thereby setting the stage for a transition to democracy in the late 1980s" (Lipset 1998b, p. 163). 55 The last native Korean dynasty. Chosen, was eventually overthrown in 1910 after more than five centuries of authoritarian mle based on Confucianism. From 1910 to 1945 the Japanese mled the countty in a colonial manner. Korea was liberated in 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allied powers, but, almost as soon as that occurred, it was divided and a vicious intemal war broke out. In 1948 Rhee Syngman was elected the first president of South Korea by its unicameral National Assembly. His govemment initially attempted to establish a constitutional democracy but soon became increasingly authoritarian. The country was then one of the poorest in the world; it obviously lacked a sizeable middle-class to ensure political stability (Ahn and Jaung 1999). In 1960 Rhee Syngman and his followers rigged the presidential election for his third term. This act led to massive smdent demonstrations against the dictatorship, which brought down the govemment. The parliamentaty govemment of Chang Myon followed Rhee Syngman's "govemment considered the most democratic govemment in South Korea's histoty" (Lipset 1998b, p. 164). At that time the govemment had to face the challenge of economic reconstmction and of development under constant threats from the North. The civilian mlers of the 1950s did not rise to that challenge. This led to a militaty coup in May 1961, staged by General Park Chung-Hee, who was to lay the foundation of the "Korean miracle" by adopting an export-led economic growth strategy (Karatnycky et al., 1999, p. 266). Park Chung-Hee mled South Korea with an iron fist, tuming it into a garrison state. His rationale for such repressive mle was two fold: the need to counter the constant threat from the communist regime in the North and the argument that South Korea, with a per capita gross national product of $87 in 1961, could not afford the 56 luxuty of democracy. Park Chung-Hee attempted to win the support of students, intellectuals, and champions of human rights who strongly opposed his dictatorship. He believed that when the per capita GNP reached $2,000, a transition from authoritarianism to democracy would be possible (Oh 1999). The Park Chung-Hee regime "sought legitimacy on the basis of economic and social development while denying political competition, participation, and civil and political liberties for the people" (Lipset 1998b, p. 164). In the presidential election of 1971 Park Chung-Hee was almost defeated by the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, who received 46 percent of the popular vote. The next year Park Chung-Hee instimted the so-called Yushin (revitalizing reform) Constitution by which, in the name of national security, all opposition political parties and democracy movements were disbanded. The Park Chung-Hee regime not only had achieved a rapid economic growth, but also confronted democratic protests by students, labors, and intellectuals in the 1970s. In 1979 Park Chung-Hee was eventually assassinated by his own security chief over disagreements about how to cope with increasing disorder and demands for democracy in South Korea. After the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, general Chun Doo Hwan, security chief in the capital city of Seoul, carried out a coup in December 1979 that overthrew the caretaker govemment and established a militaty regime. Chun Doo Hwan's regime became the most repressive in modem Korean histoty, in large part because of its ruthless suppression of the 1980 Kwangju uprising (Bedeski 1994). Although there was widespread opposition to his regime, Chun Doo Hwan's govemment lasted until 1987. 57 Before 1987, economic development in South Korea was based on an authoritarian approach that was fostered by the militaty leaders who had led the countty for over two decades. The regime's goals were implemented by a highly efficient bureaucracy in which cormption was limited; there was little interference from the civil society, so that the state was autonomous. 'Miraculous' economic successes justified developmental authoritarianism (O'Donnell 1973; Kim, B. 1998). The economic development led to rapid social change. The proportion of white-collar workers increased from 4.8 percent in 1965 to 17.1 percent in 1985, while the working class increased between 1965 and 1983 from 32.1 percent to 49.5 percent. Surveys indicated that more than 70 percent of South Koreans identified themselves as middle-class in the late 1980s (Ahn and Jaung 1999). In the process, society became more pluralistic but also more contentious (Kim, S. 2000). There were rising popular demands for political participation and social equality, which made the continuation of authoritarian mle increasingly costly. Nonetheless, although the middle class and the working class wanted more democracy, the authoritarian regime was maintained for some years, thus rendering the stmcture of the state seriously "unbalanced" (Ahn and Jaung 1999, p. 145). The polity was, in fact, in severe political crisis as a result of its economic development. There were mounting popular distmst of political institutions and increasing regional conflicts over the distribution of wealth and the sharing of key power positions. Anti-regime movements and civil disobedience reached a peak at the end of June 1987; the two most prominent opposition politicians, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, mobilized the masses in close collaboration with street demonstrators. The situation seemed to be leading to a bloody civil war. At that point, however, the mling 58 coalition lost its cool, and split between softliners and hardliners (Huntington 1991; Shin 1999). This provided the opportunity for a democratic transition to occur, as President Chun Doo Hwan came to accept the major demands of the opposition. It did take a long time for socio-economic development in Korea to bring about democracy, seemingly because of the existence of a "bureaucratic- authoritarian" stmcture that was able to control economic development (O'Donnell 1973). Meanwhile, as the size and complexity of the economy increased, the private sector and other social groups became more vocal about the negative aspects of the state-centered development policy: these criticisms produced pressures for more liberalization (McDonald 1992). Yet the political opening only occurred with the dramatic people's uprising in 1987 that finally led the then presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo, through his '29 June Declaration,' to initiate the transition to democracy. The economic miracle, however, was a mixed blessing (Kim, B. 1998; Oh 1999). Rapid economic development also promoted a Korean sense of identity and national pride and accelerated the development of a strong civil society better able to sustain democratic political institutions. Yet these changes had uneven and ambivalent effects on the culture and society of South Korea. Social mobility increased, but social cohesiveness and moral standards among individuals and groups were steadily eroded. In spite of the rapid modemization process, the majority of the Korean people continued to feel unable to exercise control over society: self-criticism and pessimism coexisted with a dynamic, highly mobilized, and materialistic society strongly motivated to seek higher standards in quality of life and economic performance (Shin 1999; Kim, S. 2000). 59 Thus, until the mid-1980s. South Korea's political dilemma was essentially characterized by the fact that political change lagged well behind economic development. Society was controlled by a top political elite and by govemmental institutions which were, on the whole, highly efficient and successful, but authoritarian, coercive, and largely illegitimate. Features of radicalism - such as the prevalence of an extremist political rhetoric and violent political actions - were common. Opposition politicians and other advocates of democracy tenaciously fought for participation and social justice; student demonstrations regularly clashed with the police; labor disputes were rampant. Thus the society appeared brittle and chaotic to outside observers: only in 1987 did South Korea enter an era of significant political transformation and adopt democratic pattems of behavior (Shin 1999; Kim, S. 2000). Democratization South Korea's democratic transition began in 1987, when violent student-led protests rocked the countty after Chun Doo Hwan picked another army general, Roh Tae Woo, as his successor. Roh called for direct presidential elections in December 1987, and beat the countty's best-known dissidents, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung (Banks et al., 1996; Karatnycky et al., 1999). Kim Young Sam merged his party with the mling party to form the goveming Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990, and won the presidential election to become the first civilian president since 1961. Kim Young Sam curbed the intemal surveillance powers of the security services, shook up the militaty hierarchy, and 60 launched an anti-corruption campaign. But this popularity waned as the reforms slowed (Banks et al., 1996; Karatnycky et al., 1999). The process of democratization that began in 1987 made South Korean society more open, diverse, and decentralized than it had ever been before. The mass media were freed from govemment restrictions, thousands of political prisoners were released from prison, and long-suppressed labor unions were permitted to organize for better wages and improved working conditions. But the process also triggered explosions of long-suppressed issues. Social order deteriorated and crime increased. Economic discipline was less rigorous. As a result the balance of payments began to shift from surplus to deficit, and the rate of economic growth and development slowed (Lipset 1998b; Oh 1999). In 1997, an economic slowdown caused eight highly leveraged cahebol, to collapse under heavy debts and triggered a banking crisis. For decades the govemment had directed bank lending to chaebols in order to develop strategic industries, and the chaebols funneled cash back to the mling party. But this politicized lending ultimately encouraged the chaebols to diversify haphazardly and pursue market share rather than profit. In November 1997, as corporations bought dollars in anticipation of higher overseas borrowing costs, the value of the won plummeted, and the countty came within weeks of a private-sector debt default (Karatnycky et al., 1999; Kim, B. 1998). Kim Dae Jung ran a strong campaign in the 1997 presidential election that sought to refute his portrayal by past militaty govemments as a radical who would be soft on Communist North Korea. As the campaign continued, on December 3, the govemment agreed to a $57 billion dollar Intemational Monetaty Fund-led bailout 61 conditioned on corporate reform and an end to lifetime labor guarantees. As popular anger mounted over the countty's worst economic crisis in decades, Kim Dae Jung won the December 18, 1997 election with 40.4 percent of the vote (Kim, B. 1998). Kim Dae Jung took office on Febmaty 25, 1998. His challenges included dealing with an opposition-dominated National Assembly, making his alliance with Kim Jong Pil's ULD work, reforming the chaebols, breaking the entrenched alliance between govemment and big business, and convincing his labor allies to accept layoffs. In negotiations that began while he was president-elect, Kim Dae Jung opened financial markets to foreigners, ordered the chaebols to adopt intemational accounting standards, and persuaded trade unions to accept new labor laws that ended a tradition of lifetime employment in retum for improved social benefits and further corporate reforms. The govemment also restmctured some $150 billion in private- sector foreign debt (Karatnycky et al., 1999). Summarv and Unconventional Forms of Political Participation From the historical background and democratization process in South Korea, a few feamres are found that are certainly important for understanding the namre of political protest in the countty. First, the importance of economic development for democratization should not be overlooked in South Korea. Economic development brought about changes in the state-society relationship, which, in effect, empowered the civil society to gain autonomy vis-a-vis the state (Oh 1999; Kim, S. 2000). Successful economic development built the pre-democratic forces that eventually pushed the existing regime towards more democracy. Progress in the economic sphere gave the society the energy, so to speak, to achieve success and to move to a 62 new era of political openness, although such a social transformation does not of course guarantee political consolidation and instimtionalization. There cannot be a comprehensive right of the working class to organize and form associations with other subordinate classes without the grov^h of the "civil society": it is economic development that fosters the growth of the civil society, through with both the middle and working classes improve their ability and skills to organize, communicate their interests, and participate in alliance (Ruschemeyer et al., 1992, p 81). This development counterbalances the power of a strong state and enlarges, perhaps in a more stable way than otherwise, a political space for negotiated pacts for democratization among opposing actors. The role of civil society in South Korea has gradually changed from protest against political authoritarianism to policy advocacy (Kim, S. 2000). Its purpose was to challenge, oppose, affect, monitor, check, and control the state by articulating and promoting new visions and developing and presenting new policy prescriptions. The second distinctive feature, as a weakness in the process of democratization, is the relative underdevelopment of the political parties (Ahn and Jaung 1999). The parties were never institutionalized; instead, they were organized and operated around political personalities with similar political ideologies and little commitment to the programs and policies set forth by the parties themselves. Party organizations were dissolved when their leaders lost an election or resigned from politics, in part because campaign financing depended heavily on the party leader's ability to bring in money, rather than on contributions from party members. In addition, since the parties were organized on the basis of personalities and regional 63 ties, they did not really represent the views of voters. Therefore, Koreans usually have a pessimistic view on the role of political parties (Ahn and Jaung 1999). World Value Surveys data in 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-8 show that unconventional forms of political participation in South Korea have increased during the democratic transition phase of the 1980s, but slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation phase of the early 1990s as similar as did Mexico. For example, the participants of 'signing a petition' in South Korea have severely increased from 19.9 percent to 42 percent in the 1980s, and slightly decreased from 42 to 39.8 in the early 1990s (Table and Figure 3-4). The other forms of unconventional participation except 'joining boycotts' show the same changing trend. It shows that the protest in South Korea had severely increased during the democratic transition period, but had slightly decreased during the democratic consolidation period. The participants of 'joining boycotts' have increased during the consolidation period as well as transition period. The reason behind the consumer boycotts increase is probably related to economic difficulty in South Korea in the 1990s. In sum, from these arguments related to the historical background, democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation, this study finally expects that Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches are more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea. Summarv This chapter discusses the historical background, democratization process, and unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies - Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The three new democracies have commonly 64 experienced massive protests by citizenty during the democratic transition period of the 1980s. Elite-challenging unconventional forms of political participation in these states have continued during the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s (Table 3-2 through 3-4). For example, the participants of 'joining a boycott' have severely increased from 1.3 to 6.9 percent (Mexico), 9.4 to 15.3 percent (South Africa), and 2.3 to 11.3 percent (South Korea) in the 1980s. In addition, the participants of 'joining a boycott' have continuously increased from 6.9 to 9.5 percent (Mexico) and 11.3 to 16 percent (South Korea) in the 1990s. Although the participants of'joining a boycott' in South Africa have slightly decreased from 15.3 to 12.3 percent, the participants of 'joining a boycott' in 1995-97 are far more than that in the 1981 in the nation. The other forms of unconventional participation show a similar changing trend. It explains that the protest in South Korea had severely increased during the democratic transition period in the 1980s and continued during the democratic consolidation period in the 1990s. Although inauguration of democracy in the three states was almost simultaneous, these states have experienced diverse cultural heritages and vatying stages of development. From these differences on the three nations, this study finally expects that Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches are more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea whereas Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches are more applicable than Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches in Mexico and South Africa. The following chapter explores research design. It describes variables, data, and method of the study. It opens with a general description of the operationalization of variables. It then moves on to describe the datasets employed for this smdy. How 65 various determinants at individual level are hypothesized to affect unconventional forms of political participation is a subject of Chapter IV. The next section of the Chapter describes how the data are analyzed. 66 zatio n 56.9 % 64.9 % 72.0 % 78.9 % 81.9 % Urban i 7.0 % 5.0 % 4.0 % 2.0 % 2.0 % Illiterac y o 162 0 234 0 545 0 970 0 891 0 GDP / capit a •S (US$ ) 3 O 00 Sout h Kore a so iri r^ CN 04 -o Civi l a Libertie s C3 >o Tl- CN (N CN Jv U Righ t ^cs Politica l ^ 3 ca O rS" 00 b-. atio n z 48.1 % S* 48.3 % 49.1 % 50.4 % 49.5 % Urbani z a> ? o UH '•« •*^ ^ o 18.0 % 15.0 % 25.0 % 22.0 % 20.0 % Z Illiterac y k (^ en •*..V» m> O iri 171 0 201 0 316 0 242 0 317 0 GDP / epo capit a (US$ ) u (K 'i) t.M u CI Sout h Afric a Vs* UH so >o ^ CN CN S >-. Civi l ^ rtl Libertie s a o -*^ CL, c ^ o o in m Vl - -- W Righ t Politica l m O&. o ^ "u o 9> 00 w atio n th 73.0 % 66.3 % 69.6 % 73.4 % 74.2 % Urbani z o g^ in >< CN "3 t«< 1 , sr 8.9 % 10.5 % 10.4 % 18.0 % 11.0 % Illiterac y §^ ert i I ly X! 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'•'••:: OS oo o 80 - 00 I •:::.^^.«.....™ OS ro 1 's^O OS 124 1 95 - ;,. ' ro m 1—H ^5 "".'•'" rik e Vi OS iiji?*"%,. < < < o r '^M 2: 2 Z OS Joi n 00 soM OS so ^ ro o 80 - 00 -1 - III SC> 48. 6 ro 124 4 uta 95-9 7 ;-! _ n d 1—< 1 O tratio n ^oa'/" ro •<4- 11 9 90-9 1 CO Att e *?•••• o 00 m so CN 00 Demon s 1 so so ro _s 00 » -<^ m r- 3 Ik^^ "1 35. 5 o ad 124 6 95-9 7 a. cot t OS ta ro 49. 7 116 1 90-9 1 nBo y t * "3 oo OS Jo i oo ro 1 ^m OS 'S:''/•,,:], \ o %K •* 't r- o 00 sO CL, Os so fsj c-^ CN O 95 - Tl- io n o oo 16. 2 121 0 13 90-9 1 g n Peti t 3 1—H O 00 00 f»- •^ ro 1 OS SO o oW-) CN oo - 'SsiPm r~ o o :s 3 (30 on e > c 2 D c> -o 3 •'• s in C^ 1 ro 7- 3 ta Sout h Kore a H 73 "Have Done" or "Might Do" 100 Sign a petition Join boycott Attend Join strike Occupy building Demonstration @1981 11990 D1995-96 Figure 3-3: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation in South Korea 74 CHAPTER IV VARIABLES, DATA, AND METHOD This chapter describes the study data, variables, and methodology. Following a short introduction, the chapter opens with a general description of the data sets employed for the study. It moves on to describe the individual-level indicators for explaining unconventional forms of political participation and hypotheses of the study. The next section briefly describes how the data are analyzed. The chapter closes with a very brief description of the technique, pooled or cumulated survey analysis. Introduction Three new democracies in different regions, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea, are the setting for this study. These three countries are not as different in the process of democratization as many have supposed ahhough they are very different in cultural heritages, history, and regions. Indeed, they are often grouped together as new democracies because inauguration of democracy in the countries was almost simultaneous in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, inauguration of democracy in Mexico began in 1994 when it had comparatively honest elections. Then, in the 1997 congressional elections, the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its majority in the lower house for the first time since the party was founded in 1929. Finally, Vicente Fox who was the presidential candidate of an opposite party, the National Action Party (PAN), was elected in June 2000 by popular vote. Fox took office as president in December 2000 in the country's first transfer of power to the opposition since 1929. 75 Similarly, inauguration of democracy in South Africa also began in 1994 when every race streamed to the polls to register their choices in the first all-race election ever conducted in the country. The voting in the country's first democratic election was the culmination of a long and brutal struggle by the majority of South Africans to share in their own governance. The opening of the political process to all the citizens of the country marked the end of authoritarian rule in South Africa by the white minority. As expected, the African National Congress (ANC), the chief organization of the African nationalist movement since 1920, won a comfortable majority. On May 9, 1994, the National Assembly elected Nelson Mandela president unanimously. That power would be transferred peaceably was unthinkable even as late as the 1980s. One the other hand, inauguration of democracy in South Korea began in 1987. Anti-regime movements and civil disobedience reached a peak at the end of June 1987, when president Chun Doo Hwan announced a campaign pledge: his successor, Roh Tae Woo, would be elected by popular vote in a free election under a democratic constitution. The consequent constitutional amendment, approved by the National Assembly on October 1987, changed the method of election from indirect to popular vote, balanced the executive and legislative powers, and provided for decentralization of govemment. Thus, the political opening occurred with the dramatic people's uprising in 1987 finally led to initiate the fransitiont o democracy. Then, the parliamentary elections of 1988 brought an unexpected setback to the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly. Finally, in 1992 Kim Young Sam, the DLP candidate, was elected president; he was inaugurated in early 1993 for a five-year term and was the first non- military officer to win the presidency since 1960. Furthermore, as popular anger 76 mounted over the country's worst economic crisis in decades, Kim Dae Jung, who was the presidential candidate of an opposite party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), won the December 18, 1997, election. He took office as president in February in the country's first transfer of power to the opposition. This study is at the micro-level of analysis through survey data. World Values Surveys. This analysis uses a pooled cross-sectional design for each country, which pools three surveys from 1981, 1990-91, and 1995-98. The individual level data allow for multivariate analyses such as regression (OLS). Hypotheses The purpose of this study is to test the four approaches (Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, Value Changes, and Dissatisfaction approaches) for explaining unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies. In this way, this study shows which approaches are most applicable to explain unconventional forms of political participation in one country as well as the new democracies. This study also investigates whether the determinants of unconventional forms of political participation differ between the pre-democracy period and post-democracy period. The data are collapsed into two sets for this purpose. For example, the pre-democracy data set includes the first and second World Values Surveys in Mexico and South Africa and the first World Values Surveys in South Korea. In contrast, the post- democracy data set includes the second and third World Values Surveys in South Korea and the third World Values Surveys in Mexico and South Africa. 77 The six sub-hypotheses to be tested at the individual level in this study are: 1. Baseline approach: Hypothesis 1-1: The higher socio-economic status individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. Hypothesis 1-2: The older individuals are, the less likely they will engage in protest behavior. Hypothesis 1-3: Women are less likely to participate in protest behavior than are men. 2. Cognitive Skills approach: Hypothesis 2: The higher personal and political sophistication individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. 3. Value Change approach: Hypothesis 3: Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behavior than materialists. 4. Dissatisfaction approach: Hypothesis 4: The higher political dissatisfaction and alienation individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. Indicators and Variables The Dependent Variable: Unconventional Forms of Political Participation This study focuses on unconventional forms of political participation - the dependent variable of this study. The concept means "peaceful political protest" that includes signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawfiil demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories (March 1977, 1990; Dalton 1988, 1996, 2002). Although it could be assumed that there exist differences 78 between all these forms of unconventional action, this study considers these five different types of political action as unconventional forms of political participation as World Values Surveys did. The World Values Surveys' data allow an evaluation of public attitudes toward unconventional forms of political participation. The unconventional forms of political participation items in the 1981-84, 1990, and 1995-97 World Values Surveys propose a series of protest activities ranging from mild forms to more extreme forms. The unconventional forms of political participation are, by ascending order of involvement, "Signing a petition"; "Joining in boycotts"; "Attending lawfiil demonsfrations"; "Joining unofficial sfrikes"; and "Occupying buildings or factories." It is assumed that these five items reflect people's basic attitudes toward political protest action. Respondents were asked to answer whether they did or might do each of these things. They were given a choice of responses from 1 to 3: (1) "have done"; (2) "might do"; and (3) "would never do." Tables 3-2 and Figures 3-2 through 3-4 show comparative, cross-national, percentages of unconventional forms of political participation in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. Referring to the Tables and Figures, there appear to be no noteworthy cross-national differences in unconventional forms of political participation among these three countries. Respondents are more likely to engage in the milder and lawful forms of protest action (e.g., signing a petition), whereas they rarely participate in the more illegitimate and militant types of protest. It is, however, interesting to note that the percentages of unconventional forms of political participation are commonly increased in the 1980s, but decreased in the 1990s, especially for the most extreme forms of protest. 79 The replies that people gave to these survey questions created quite a lot of information: three categories by five different forms of political participation. These are too cumbersome to examine effectively. However, there is a very handy way of summarizing them without losing too much information (Marsh 1990, pp. 20-21). First of all, we collapsed respondents' replies to each item into only two categories: 'yes' or 'no' on the simple basis of whether or not they ever do each item. That is, the answer of (2) "might do" is included in the answer (1) "have done". Because of the low frequencies often found for those who have done a particular protest behavior, protest potential is often more a measure of a propensity to protest than an actual protest experience (Lee 2003). Secondly, using simple additive procedures, we created the protest potential scale that is composed of these five items. Each item is given an equal weight in the scale. The scale of the dependent variable is thus constructed by standardizing, equally weighing, and combining these five items. The range of the scale is from 0 (would never do any of the five items) to 5 (have done or might do all five items). The Independent Variables Baseline Protest activities are obviously much more difficult forms of political participation than simply voting or attending a meeting. Thus, an engagement in protest activities requires higher levels of political interest and commitment than are found in the average citizen. Therefore, one might expect to find that education and social class are important factors in the formation of attitudes toward unconventional fonms of political participation (Inglehart 1977; Dalton 1988, 2002). At the same time. 80 one might also expect that the young male groups tend to be more inclined to indulge themselves in the pursuit of protest activities than their older female counterparts (Dalton 1988, 2002; Schlozman, Bums, and Verba 1994). One possible explanation might be that youths and males have more physical energy and leisure time for the pursuit of causes, are more vulnerable to the ideological sources of motivation associated with protest, are more prone to risk taking, and have less to lose although there is evidence that this pattem is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee and Rinehart 1995). Research has shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of political protest among the young (Marsh 1977; Bames et al. 1979). From these arguments this study chooses three measurements to test the hypothesis of socio-economic status approach. Age. Respondents were asked to give their age at the time of the survey. Gender. Respondents were asked to identify themselves as male or female. The gender variable is rescaled from 0 (male) to 1 (female) for interpretative purposes. Income. Respondents were asked to identify their family income. The income variable is scaled from 1 (lowest income level) to 10 (highest income level). Education. The education level of respondents was measured based on their response to the following two questions: "What is the highest education level that you have attended?" and "At what age did you or will you complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?" While, the former question was employed for the first wave of World Value Surveys in the three new democracies, and the second wave in Mexico, the latter question was for the second wave in South Africa and South Korea, and third wave in all three nations. The higher the score, the higher education. 81 Cognitive Skills The cognitive skills approach also holds that the increasing levels of political sophistication and information are leading one to a more active citizens role (Inglehart 1977; Shively 1979; Dalton 1984). When citizens are more cognitively mobilized (as measured by such things as frequency of political discussion or perceived degree of influence over others), they tend to participate more. Indeed, the frequency of political discussion has long been thought to presage strong political cognitions and participatory orientation (Almond and Verba 1965; Hagner and Pierce 1982; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Further, to the extent people experience politicization from partisan or interest group attachments, they seem more likely to participate in political activities (Verba et al. 1978; Powell 1986). In addition, scholars (Rose and Urwin 1969; Klingemann and Ingleahrt 1975; Lewis-Beck 1983; Dalton 2002) define that the attachments of ideological extremes and religious organizations are important for people's political behavior. Those having an understanding of political matters at an ideological level could function consistently in political life. In particular, an understanding that included an appreciation of the main Left-Right or Liberal- Conservative dimension of democratic politics was the essential equipment of any recruit of political activity. Strong evidence from survey research tends to support this view. Dalton, especially, defines that Left/Right position is an important determinant of unconventional forms of political participation. Dalton (2002, p. 69) argues that "although protest politics has spread throughout the political process and is used by groups on the Left and Right, the willingness to engage in these activities 82 remains more common among leftists" and "protest politics is still disproportionately the domain of the Left" in advanced industrial democracies. From these arguments this study chooses two different measurements to test the hypothesis of cognitive skills approach. Left-Right self-placement. A self-placement scale was used to measure respondents' political orientation. Respondents were asked the following question: "In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" The possible responses ranged from (1) Left to (10) Right on the 10-point scale. Psychological Involvement in Politics. The level of psychological involvement in politics of respondents was measured based on their response to the following two questions: "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,occasionall y or never?" and "How interested would you say you are in politics?" Using additive procedures, the scale of psychological involvement in politics is created. The scale is composed of these two items. The possible responses for this variable are (1) "not at all"; (2) "not very"; (3) somewhat; and (4) "very." Thus, the higher score, the higher psychological involvement in politics. Value Changes According to value change approach, values provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behaviors of the public. Values signify a preference for certain personal and social goals, as well as the methods to obtain these goals. One individual may place a high priority on freedom,equality , and social harmony - and 83 favor policies that strengthen these values. Others may stress independence, social recognition, and ambition in guiding their actions. Thus, many personal and political decisions involve a choice between several valued goals. Value systems should include the salient goals that guide human behavior. Inglehart (1977), especially, emphasized the shifts from materialist values to postmaterialist values as a characteristic of advanced indusfrial societies, and empirical studies define that the new values of postmaterialist or libertarian lead to the growth of unconventional forms of political participation. Materialist-Postmaterialist self-placement. This study employs Inglehart's materialist-postmaterialist value scale (4-item index), because the 12-item index was not available for the first wave of World Values Surveys. This index is based on the respondent's first and second choice in the original four-item materialist- postmaterialist values battery. If both materialist items are given high priority, the score is "1"; if both postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is "3." If the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result is treated as missing data. The materialist-postmaterialist value change variable is scaled from 1 (materialist) to 3 (postmaterialist). Dissatisfaction The dissatisfaction approach implies that political dissatisfaction and alienation should be major predictors of protest. Scholars have proposed various indicators of relative deprivation in empirical research. As used in the literature, relative deprivation is a very abstract concept, which could have many dimensions and any number of attitudinal and behavioral referents, including cognitions, beliefs. 84 and attitudes with past, present, and future time orientations. In contrast with theoretical treatments, operationalization of the concept in research tends to be narrow and unidimensional, with researchers adhering to a "one concept-one indicator" strategy (Gumey and Tiemey 1982, p. 40). Muller (1972) employs "welfare gratification-deprivation" as an operational indicator of relative deprivation (p. 936). It is based on four categories of value concerns that are selected as referents for the measures of relative deprivation: career satisfaction, economic well-being, satisfactoriness of living conditions, and children's welfare. His empirical research shows that there is only a weak relationship between dissafisfaction and protest for political activists in the last 1960s (Muller 1972). Norris's indicator of relative deprivation is somewhat similar with Muller's in a sense that both employ citizens' attitudes toward govemment policies. Indeed, Norris (1999) uses policy dissatisfaction as an indicator of relative deprivation: policy dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of participation in protest activities. Bames and Kaase (1979) employ "personal dissatisfaction" (p. 399) and "political dissatisfaction" (p. 410) as the operational indicators of relative deprivation. For the measurements of personal dissatisfaction they use people's material dissatisfaction and life dissatisfaction. On the other hand, for the indicators of political dissatisfaction they measure people's evaluation of govemment performance and policy dissatisfaction. Their empirical research shows that there are relatively weak relationships between dissatisfaction and protest for political activists in the advanced industrial democracies: Netherlands, Britain, United States, Germany, and Austria (Bames and Kaase 1979). 85 Dalton (2002) employs "political satisfaction" (satisfaction with the govemment's performance) as an indicator of relative deprivation. He states that the relative deprivation approach "implies that political dissatisfaction and alienation should be major predictors of protesf (p. 66). The results of his empirical analyses of unconventional forms of political participation in the advanced industrial democracies show that "dissatisfied citizens are only slightly more willing to protest than those who are satisfied with the govemment's performance" (Dalton 2002, p. 67). Yet, Dahon (2002) concludes that "unconventional political activity should be more common among lower-status individuals, minorities, and other groups who have reasons to feel deprived or dissatisfied" (p. 66). From these arguments above this study chooses two different measurements to test the hypothesis of relative deprivation approach. Personal Dissatisfaction. This variable consists of the respondents' satisfaction level in material and life which was measured based on their response to the following two questions: "how satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?" And "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" Using additive procedures, the scale of personal dissatisfaction is created. The possible responses for the variable are from (1) "satisfied" to (10) "dissatisfied." Thus, the higher score, the higher personal dissatisfaction. Political Dissatisfaction. This variable is based on respondents' confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies. The respondents confidence level in political systems and institutions was measured based on their response to the following questions: "... could you tell me how much confidence you have in the [legal system, police, govemment, political parties, and parliament]: is it a 86 great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" The scale is composed of these five items. The possible responses ranged from (1) 'great deal' to (4) 'not at all'. On the other hand, the satisfaction in govemment of respondents was measured based on their response to the following question: "How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs?" Respondents were given a choice of responses from (1) very satisfied to (4) very dissatisfied. Using simple additive procedures for the two variables - respondents' confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies, the scale of political dissatisfaction is created. Thus, the higher score, the higher political dissatisfaction. The Control Variable and Dummy Variables There have existed severe social and racial cleavages between rich landovwier (caudillos) and poor local farmers (campesinou), and between white immigrants and their descendants (mestizos) and indigenous people (Amerindian) with African immigrants in Mexico (Wiarda and Kline 1985; Almond et al. 2000, chapter 14; Hauss 2000, chapter 16). These cleavages have played an important role in the nation. Similarly, South Africa is one of the most culturally heterogeneous counfries in the world with the divisions over race. South Africa is typically considered to be a deeply divided society by race. Therefore, for the analyses of these two countries - Mexico and South Africa, this study includes race of respondents as a control variable. The first, second, and third World Values Surveys ask the same series of questions year after year in these three new democracies. Hence, the individual data sets for the different years and for the different countries have been pooled. Pooling 87 repeated surveys facilitates the study of change or trends in individual-level relationship (Firebaugh 1997). Hence, the OLS regression analyses allow us to track not only change in the dependent variable over time, but also difference in the dependent variable among the countries. In order to exploit this feature of pooled data sets 'year' and 'country' dummy variables are added to the data sets indicating the year and country of each survey. Consequently, a significant coefficient on any or all of these 'year' dummy variables indicates significant change occurred in the dependent variable for the specific data set indicated by the dummy. For instance, if a 1990 dummy is significant, significant change occurred in the dependent variable since the first wave of World Value Surveys included in the pooled data set. The sign of the dummy coefficient identified the direction of change on the dependent variable. However, the 'year' dummy independent variables must not be interested as causal variables: "time per se is not causal" (Firebaugh 1997, p. 64). A significant coefficient on the 'country' dummy variables also indicates whether there is a statistically significant difference in the dependent variables of these three new democracies. Ethnic Groups. Respondents were asked to identify themselves. The possible responses are originally "White" (01), "Black" (02), "Medium brown skin (Moreno)" (03), "Yellow skinned (Amarillo)" (04), "Light brown skin (Moreno dare)" (05), "Indian skin (Moreno obscure)" (06), and "Undocumented code" (08) in Mexico and "White" (01), "Black" (02), "Asian" (03), and "Colored (mixed white and black)" (04) in South Africa. However, this study dichotomizes the values as "White" (1) and "Non-white" (2) because non-White people in these two countries share relatively similar attitudes on politics (Hauss 2000, chapter 15 and 16). 88 'Year' dummy. The wave code of the World Values Surveys is included as control variables. For exEimple, before pooling the 1981 survey a 1981 dummy variable sets to a value of one (1) and dummy variables set to the value zero (0) for 1990 and 1996 surveys, and so on. 'Country' dummy. The country code of respondents is included as a control variable. Data Source The data set employed in this study is derived from the first, second, and third waves of World Values Surveys in 1981-82; 1990-1993; and 1995-1997. World Values Surveys were coordinated, assembled, and documented by Inglehart. The surveys were conducted to compare cross-national values and norms on a wide variety of topics and monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. World Values Surveys included 22 independent counfries for the 1981-84 surveys, 42 independent countries for the 1990-93 surveys, and 53 independent counfries for the 1995-97 surveys. In all, 64 independent counfries have been surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation. These counfries include almost 80 percent of the world's population. However, only three new democracies (Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea) were covered by all the three waves of World Values Surveys. The first wave of World Values Surveys was conducted in Mexico in 1981 and South Africa in 1982, and South Korea in 1982. The second wave of World Values Surveys were conducted in Mexico in May-June 1990, South Africa in October-November 1990, and South Korea in June-July 1990. The third wave of World Values Surveys were also 89 conducted in Mexico in Fall 1995-Spring 1996, South Africa in Spring 1996, and South Korea in Spring 1996 (Table 4-1). Therefore, the first wave of the World Values Surveys had been conducted before these three countries began their democratic transition. The second wave of the World Values Surveys had been conducted just before inauguration of democracy in Mexico and South Africa and just after inauguration of democracy in South Korea. In contrast, the third waves of the World Values Surveys were conducted during the democratization period in these nations. The World Values Surveys project explores the hypothesis that mass belief systems are changing in ways that have important economic, political and social consequences. Thus, broad topics covered were work, personal finances, the economy, politics, allocation of resources, contemporary social issues, technology and its impact on society, and traditional values. Respondents' opinions of various forms of political action, the most important aims for their countries, and confidence in various civil and govemmental institutions were also solicited. In addition, demographic information includes family income, number of people residing in the home, size of locality, home ownership, region of residence, occupation of the head of household, and the respondent's age, gender, occupation, income, education, religion, political party and union membership, and left-right political self-placement. In each of the counfries surveyed, approximately 1,000 persons aged 18 and over in mass publics were interviewed. All interviews were carried out face-to-face at homes in each country. 90 Method Descriptive analysis is first at the individual level by comparing the levels of the several indicators of unconventional forms of political participation in the new democracies. The survey data allow for correlation and regression on the dependent variable, unconventional forms of political participation, at the individual level. Here, OLS regression seems the most appropriate statistical technique. Therefore, in order to see the causal relations between explanatory variables and unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies, this study constmcts OLS regression analyses for the three nations for three different points of data. This study also investigates if the determinants of unconventional forms of political participation differ between the pre-democracy period and post-democracy period. For this purpose the data are collapsed into two sets. Indeed, some scholars (e.g., Inglehart 1979; Bames and Kaase 1979; Flanagan 1984; Lee 1993; Opp 2000; Flanagan and Lee 2000, Lee and Norris 2000, etc.) conduct two-step models for understanding protest activities, whereas the others (e.g., Dalton 1988; Norris 1999; Canche and Kulisheck 2002; Kim 2002, etc.) use one-step models to test various approaches/models conceming the sources of protest activities. This study follows the latter. Thus in this study, we take an empirically grounded first step toward analyzing or identifying the range of possible ways in which protest action has changed in new democracies and the different factors responsible for instigating those change. Accordingly, the subject of Chapter V is the description of bivariate relationships between independent variables and unconventional forms of political 91 participation. The subject of Chapter VI is the results of OLS regression analyses to explain unconventional forms of political participation in the new democracies. Summary This study encompasses a series of individual levels of analysis. This study intends to investigate the determinants of unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies. The determinants are from the four approaches - base-line, cognitive skills, value change and relative deprivation. Therefore, to test these four approaches, this study has four individual level hypotheses: Hl-1: The higher socio-economic status individuals have, the more likely they will protest. HI-2: The older individuals are the less likely they will participate in protest. HI-3: Women are less likely to participate in protest than are men. H2: The higher political sophistication individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. H3: Postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behavior than materialists. H4: The higher personal and political dissatisfaction and alienation individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. In addition to testing these six sub-hypotheses, this study also investigates if the determinants of unconventional forms of political participation differ between the pre- democracy period and post-democracy period by analyzing two groups of data sets separately. 92 The predicted functional equation for the empirical test is: Y/ (Protest Potential) = a + |31 "^ (Age) + p2 * (Gender) + (33* (Income) + p4 * (Education) + ^5* (Left-Right Self-Placement) + ^6* (Psychological Involvement in PoHtics) + p7 * (Materialist-Postmaterialist Value) + pS * (Personal Dissatisfaction) + P9 * (Political Dissatisfaction) + + piO * (Ethnic Groups) -I- ei. The following chapter presents descriptive information on variables utilized in the study and bivariate relationship between independent variables and dependent variable of unconventional forms of political participation in the new democracies. 93 Z 124 9 151 0 293 5 Th e Thir d Wav o f Worl d Value s Surve y Yea r Fal l 1995 - Sprin g 199 6 Sprin g 199 6 Sprin g 199 6 2 125 1 153 1 273 6 ta o 3 o 00 -o 3 Th e Secon d Wav o f Worl d Value s Surve y 199 0 199 0 ta Yea r ca" Octobe r - June-Jul y o May-Jun e Novembe r 199 0 3 O (73 o" 2 97 0 U 183 7 159 6 '>< u 3 00 Th e Firs t Wav o f Worl d Value s Surve y 198 1 198 1 198 1 VI Yea r Hi 13 > o Mexic o Sout h Kore a Sout h Afric a 94 CHAPTER V BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VARIABLES This chapter and the following chapter examine how well or how poorly the four approaches (Baseline, Cognitive Skill, Dissatisfaction (RD), and Value Change approaches) explain protest potential in the three new democracies: Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Therefore, this chapter opens with an examination of variations of the dependent and independent variables over the three waves of the World Values Surveys. The main section of the chapter examines the bivariate relationships between all of the independent variables and dependent variable. The bivariate relationships between the variables will be investigated to examine both the direction and sfrength. The study basically expects that the determinants based on the four approaches are related to protest behaviors of the mass public in the new democracies. Baseline approach would expect sfrong positive associations between the dependent variable (unconventional forms of political participation: UFPP) and Income and Education and negative associations between the dependent variable and Age and Gender (male = 0; female = 1). Cognitive Skills approach also would expect sfrong positive association between the dependent variable and Psychological Involvement in Politics (PI) and negative association between the dependent variable and Left-Right Self- Placement (LR). Dissatisfaction (RD) approach also would expect strong positive associations between the dependent variable and Political Dissatisfaction (PODS) and Personal Dissatisfaction (PEDS). Value Change approach would expect strong positive association between the dependent variable and materialist-postmaterialist 95 value (M-PM). Thus, this chapter and the following chapter will test those relationships between the variables. Variations of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive information, including means and standard deviations, of the dependent variable, UFPP, in the new democracies is summarized in Table 5-1. The average number of UFPP in the three new democracies is 1.94. It means that people in the three new democracies had engaged or were willing to engage in almost two different types of protest activities in the 1980s and 1990s. The Table also shows that the average numbers of UFPP are different by times. For example, the average number of UFPP in post-democracy period (2.22) is higher than the average number of UFPP in the pre-democracy period (1.75) in the three new democracies. It explains that people had more participated or were more willing to participate in protest behavior in the post-democracy period than in the pre-democracy period. Indeed, the three new democracies had commonly experienced massive protests by citizenry in the 1980s, democratic transition period, which contributed to replace authoritarian with democratic regimes. And, elite-challenging protest for continuing political reform and economic liberalization in those countries have increased in the 1990s, democratic consolidation period. The average numbers of UFPP are also different by nations. The average of UFPP in South Korea (2.33) is higher than the averages of UFPP in Mexico (1.94) and South Africa (1.80). It denotes that South Koreans had more engaged or were more willing to engage in protest behavior than Mexicans and South Africans in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the average number of UFPP had increased in Mexico 96 (1.75 to 2.48) and South Korea (1.47 to 2.52) in the 1980s and 1990s, but changed little in South Africa (1.81 to 1.79) in that period. It explains that protest potential had increased in Mexico and South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, where as it had not increased in South Africa in that period. Although inauguration of democracy in the three new democracies was almost simultaneous in the late 1980s or early 1990s, these countries have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development. In addition, there exist differences of socio-economic background in the three new democracies (Table 3-1). South Korea, especially, is far ahead from the other two countries on the process of economic development (e.g. GNP per capita, literacy rate, urbanization rate, and so on). Therefore, from those differences this study expects that there exist inter-state differences on the people's attitudes toward protest behavior in the three new democracies. The reason why protest potential did not increase in South Africa in the 1990s may probably be related to development of political tolerance in the county. Since South Africa had the first all-race democratic election in April 1994 and a new president. Nelson Mandela, in May 1994, the political tolerance has developed among South Africans, especially non-White. These political developments might have made South Africans resfrain themselves from protesting against the new democratic govemment in the late 1990s (Deegan 2001, chapter 5). From the variations of the dependent variable by times and nations, this study expects that the direction and/or strength of the relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables would be different between the three nations as well as between the pre-democracy period and the post-democracy period. 97 Table 5-2 exhibits the average numbers of the independent variables are different by times. The average numbers of Income (4.45 to 5.99), Education (4.48 to 4.55), Psychological Involvement in Politics (2.26 to 2.66), and Political Dissatisfaction (2.31 to 2.82) had slightly increased in the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. It means that people's income and education had increased in the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. Contrarily, people's confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies had decreased in the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, individuals were more interested in politics and more willing to participate in political discussion in the post- democracy period than in the pre-democracy period. Therefore, the variations of the independent variables' average numbers (e.g. Psychological Involvement in Politics and Political Dissatisfaction) by times exhibit that the expectation and concem toward the new democratic govemments had gradually increased since inauguration of democracy in the three new democracies. The average numbers of Left-Right Self-Placement (6.20 to 5.69), Personal Dissatisfaction (5.83 to 5.28), and Materialist-Postmaterialist Value (1.75 to 1.69) had slightly decreased in the new democracies since their inauguration of democracy. It means that the individuals in the new democracies were more Left rather than Right, more materialists rather than postmaterialists, and more satisfied in material and life in the 1980s than in the 1990s. It explains that the rates of materialists in the new democracies had increased in the 1980s and 1990s in spite of their rapid economic development (e.g., income and education) in that period. It is somewhat different with the trends of materialists/postmaterialists value change in advanced indusfrial democracies. According to Inglehart's studies (1987), the rates of postmaterialists in 98 the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France had commonly increased in the 1970s through 1990s. The reason behind the rates of postmaterialists had not increased in the three new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s is probably related to the stage of economic development in the countries. Because Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea are newly developing countries and still pose a highly traditional and authoritarian culture, their value changes might be different with those in the advanced industrial democracies (for value changes in non-Westem democracies see Flanagan 1991; Flanagan and Richardson 1980; Flanagan and Lee 2000). The average numbers of the independent variables are also somewhat different by nations. For example, Mexicans are less satisfied in their political institutions and govemment policies and more willing to participate in politics than South Africans and South Koreans. In contrast. South Africans are less satisfied in their material and life than Mexicans and South Koreans. Although inauguration of democracy was almost simultaneous in the three new democracies, diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of political and economic development in the countries lead to inter state differences on people' attitudes and values toward politics and ideology. From the variations of the independent variable by times and nations, this study expects that the direction and/or sfrength of the relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables would be different between these three nations as well as between the pre-democracy period and the post-democracy period. Bivariate Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variable In this section, bivariate analysis of all of the independent variables and the dependent variable are presented. The Pearson's correlations are computed and 99 presented for all of the variables involved in the analysis. The underlying purpose for which the bivariate relationships are analyzed is to provide a picture of association between the variables. The observed Pearson's correlations should be useful in gaining insight into the nature of association between the independent variables as well as the dependent variable and independent variables. Here we are looking at the independent variables to establish the way in which the dependent variable is statistically associated and also to make us aware of interactions among a large set of attitudinal variables in the next chapter. On the other hand, entering other variables into the multivariate regression equation might render spurious the significant coefficients reported in this chapter. Table 5-3 reports the findings for the three new democracies (All) and two different time periods (Pre and Post). Table 5-4 also reports the findings for each of three nations: Mexico (ME), South Africa (SA), and South Korea (SK). Each of the Tables displays correlations between the independent variables as well as between the independent variables and the dependent variables (the bottom line on the each of the Tables). Therefore, first, a short discussion of the results of bivariate analysis involving the independent variables will be presented. Discussion of the results of the bivariate analysis involving the independent variables and dependent variable follows. The interpretation of these bivariate analyses primarily focus on correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Associations Between Variables in the Three New Democracies Table 5-3 reports the correlation matrix for the eleven variables in the three new democracies and two different time periods. 100 Correlations Between Independent Variables All those correlations between the independent variables in the Table 5-3 are ranging from .383 to .001 for (All), from .397 to .005 for (Pre), and from .335 to .002 for (Post). Of the 45 correlations between the independent variables, 34 for (All), 34 for (Pre), and 31 for (Post) are statistically significant (p < .05). Ideally, these independent variables would not be related to each other, in order to maximize their contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. Any high correlations (r > +1- .80) among the independent variables were not expected (Shannon and Davenport 2001). Using this criterion, this study is safe in that the highest correlation is .397. These correlations between the independent variables generally exhibit that women are less psychologically involved in politics and are more likely to be materialists rather than postmaterialists. Older people are more likely to be Right and materialists rather than Left and postmaterialists and are more likely to have confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies. The higher socio-economic status individuals by income and education are more likely to be postmaterialists. White people in Mexico and South Africa are more likely to have confidence in political institutions and satisfaction in govemment policies and are more likely to have satisfaction in material well-being and life. Individuals who are more Right rather than Left, are more likely to be materialists rather than postmaterialists. Postmaterialists are more psychologically involved in politics. Table 5-3 also reports that there is the relative weakness of the correlations among independent variables because no correlations among the independent variables are observed to exceed .40. The strongest statistically significant 101 relationships are observed between EG and Income [.335** for (Pre) and .334** for (Post)] and between Education and Income [.397** for (Pre)]. Therefore, the study would include all of the independent variables to multivariate regression equation presented in the following chapter. In general, if there exists a very strong correlation among independent variables, we cannot include all of the independent variables to multivariate regression equation together (Shannon and Davenport 2001). Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable Table 5-3, especially (All), displays all zero-order correlations except Income are statistically significant at the .01 level (the bottom line on the Table), suggesting that there are statistically significant associations between the independent variables and UFPP in the three new democracies. Moreover, all correlations report the expected direction. The strongest of these is between PI and UFPP, reported as .388**. This correlation indicates that people who are more psychologically involved in politics tend to engage more in protest behavior as this study would expect. The second strongest relationship is with M-PM, reported as .191**. This correlation indicates that postmaterialists are more likely to participate in protest than materialists. Again, this is what the study would expect. The correlation between LR and UFPP is reported as -.189**, indicating that Left are more likely to participate in protest than Right. This is also what the study would expect. The correlation between Age and UFPP is reported as -.163**, indicating that older people are less likely to engage in protest. The correlations between UFPP and Gender (r = -.096**), Education (r = .082**), EG (r = .045**), PODS (r = .056**), and PEDS (r = .055**) are rather very weak, but still statistically significant. 102 Table 5-3, especially (Pre), also displays there are statistically significant associations between all of the independent variables and UFPP during the pre- democracy period in the three new democracies. Moreover, all correlations report the expected direction. The strongest of these is between PI and UFPP, reported as .409**. The second strongest relationship is with LR, reported as -.284**. The correlations between UFPP and M-PM and Age are reported as .180** and -.155**. In addition, the correlations between UFPP and Income (r = .023*), EG (r = .037**), PODS (r = .071**), PEDS (r = .083**), and Education (r = .098**) are relatively rather weak, but still statistically significant at the .05 level. Table 5-3, especially (Post) also displays all zero-order correlations between the independent variables and UFPP are statistically significant during the post- democracy period in the three new democracies. The strongest of these is between PI and UFPP, reported as .334** again. The second strongest relationship is with M-PM, reported as .226**. The correlation between UFPP and PEDS and Gender are reported as .224** and -.205**. In addition, the correlafions between UFPP and Income (r = -.097**), Education (r = .056**), EG (r = .064**), LR (r = -.064**), and PODS (r = .031**) are relatively weak, but still statistically significant at the .01 level. From the Table 5-3 we find that the directions of correlations between UFPP and Income and Education are inconsistent by the times. For example. Income and Education, respectively, is a statistically significant and positive correlation with UFPP (r = .023* and .179**) in the pre-democracy period, but negative (r = -.097** and -.056**) in the post-democracy period. It means that the higher socio-economic status individuals had, the more likely they engaged in protest behavior in the pre- 103 democracy period, but the less likely they engage in protest behaviors the post- democracy period. In sum, the resuhs of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variable and independent variables exhibit that a significant relationship exists between UFPP and Age, Gender, Education, EG, LR, PI, M-PM, PODS, and PEDS. All correlations except Income and Education report the expected direction regardless of different stages of democratization in the three new democracies. The most significant relationship exists between PI and UFPP regardless of times. M-PM is the next sfrongest one. However, correlations between UFPP and EG and UFPP and PODS are relatively weak. Associations Between Variables In Mexico. South Africa, and South Korea Correlations Between Independent Variables Table 5-4 exhibits the association between the independent variables in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. All those correlations among independent variables are ranging from -.382 to .007 for (ME), from .353 to .004 for (SA), from .294 to .007 (SK). It means that there is the relative weakness of the correlations among independent variables because no correlations among the independent variables are observed to exceed .40. If we find a sfrong correlation between two independent variables, we need to exclude one of the independent variables. Therefore, the study would include all of the independent variables to multivariate regression equation to predict protest potential in each of the three new democracies. 104 Correlation Between the Independent Variables and Dependent Variable Table 5-4 also shows the association between the independent variables and UFPP in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea (the bottom line on the table). The results of the bivariate analyses between the independent variables and dependent variable show that a significant relationship commonly exists between UFPP and Age, Education, EG, LR, PI, M-PM, and PEDS in all three nations. All correlations between UFPP and Age, Education, LR, PI, and M-MP are the expected direction in all three nations. The most significant relationship exists between PI and UFPP in all three nations. M-PM is the next sfrongest. Age, EG, and PEDS are commonly rather weak, but still statistically significant in all three nations. Nevertheless, there are a few unexpected findings from the bivariate analyses of the three new democracies. First, the direction of correlations between UFPP and EG are inconsistent in Mexico and South Africa. For example, EG has a statistically significant positive correlation with UFPP in South Africa (r = .082**), whereas the variable has a negative correlation with UFPP in Mexico (r = -.098**). The results of EG exhibit that White are less likely to participate in protest behavior than are non- White in South Africa, but more likely to participate in protest than non-White in Mexico. Why is that White in Mexico are more likely to participate in protest than non-White? This raises an intriguing question. Our data analysis suggests that we may have a measurement problem. There fraditionally existed severe cleavages between rich landowner and poor local farmers in Mexico. The cleavages, however, changed during the indusfrialization process to conflict between elites (church, military, oligarch), middle class (skilled workers), and unorganized peasants. Thus, the politically significant cleavages in Mexico are perhaps based on different social 105 class, occupation, or residence rather than ethnicity (Camp 1993). Furthermore, the fact that white is less than 10 percent of the whole population in Mexico suggests that the present study has not successfully measured that dimension of social cleavage. Secondly, the directions of correlations between UFPP and PEDS are not consistent by the nations. Indeed, PEDS, respectively, is a statistically significant and positive direction with UFPP in Mexico (.092**) and South Africa (.085**), but negative direction with UFPP in South Korea (-.062**). The results of PEDS reveal that individuals who are more satisfied in their material well-being and life, are less likely to engage in protest behavior in Mexico and South Africa, but more likely to engage in protest behavior in South Korea. Thus, the results of PEDS in Mexico and South Africa confirm the dissatisfaction approach. Thirdly, the correlations between UFPP and Income are inconsistent by the nations: statistically significant and positive in South Korea (.195**); statistically significant, but negative in South Africa (-.034**); statistically in significant in Mexico (.007). The results of Income exhibit that the rich, compared to their poor counterparts, are more likely in South Korea, but less likely in South Africa to engage in protest behavior. Income does not even matter to protest potential in Mexico. Accordingly, the results of Income for South Korea support the deprivation argument on 'poor-radical revolutionaries' rather than 'baseline approach.' Finally, Gender and PODS are also inconsistent by the nations. The correlation between UFPP and Gender is not statistically significant in South Korea (-.014), where as the correlations between these two variables are statistically significant in Mexico (-.130**) and South Africa (-.134**). The resuh of Gender confirms what Lee and Rinehart (1995) showed for South Korea, as there is evidence 106 of changing with a narrowing of gender roles in South Korea. In confrast, the correlations between UFPP and PODS are not statistically significant in Mexico (-.025) and South Africa (-.011), where as the correlation between the two variables is statistically significant in South Korea (.225**). The following chapter explores multivariate regression analyses between the independent variables and dependent variable of UFPP in the new democracies. 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Dev. 13.78 14.18 12.99 12.91 14.97 12.69 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Maximum 10 10 10 10 10 10 Income Mean ^ 5.14 4.45 5.99 4,25 6.29 4.17 Std. Dev. 2.86 2.37 3.16 2.20 2.92 2.70 Minimum 1 1 I 1 I 1 Maximum 9 9 9 9 9 9 Education ^._ Mean '" *' 4.51 4.48 4.55" 4.21 4.48 4.84 Std. Dev. 1.88 1.95 L77 1.78 1.92 1.68 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Left-Right self- Maximum 10 10 10 10 10 10 placement Mean 1 5.95 6.20 5.69 5.29 5.48 5.98 Std. Dev. 2.53 2.57 2.46 2.52 2.55 2.36 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Psychological Maximum 4 4 4 4 4 4 Involvement in Politics Mean J 2.59 2.26 2.66 2.84 2.54 2.37 Std. Dev. .96 .76 .75 .94 1.01 .77 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Political Maximum 4 4 4 4 4 4 Dissatisfaction „ Mean ^J^ 2.54 2.82 2.31 2.84 2.33 2.63 Std. Dev. .96 .86 .81 .94 1.01 .77 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Personal Maximum 10 10 10 10 10 10 Dissatisfaction ;_ Mean .,_ r 5.12 5.83 5.28 4.02 5.71 5.43 Std. Dev. 2.72 2.16 2.11 2.38 2.95 2.14 Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 Maximum 3 3 3 3 M-PM Value Mean 1.72^ r 1.75 1.69 1.88 1.66 1.63 Std. 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II C /•—s 4H 0 < kH C F ent i vn O l-H c ^*-^ » > uJ CL Ag e UFP P PED S POD S M-P M Incom e vol v neo n otes : Educatio n u Pears o 2 D 111 CHAPTER VI DETERMINANTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION This chapter examines how well or how poorly the four approaches predict protest potential in the three new democracies using nine multivariate regression analyses. With this purpose six sub-hypotheses were raised and are now tested through statistical analyses of multivariate regression analyses. The chapter consists of three parts of analyses. The first part focuses on intra-differences of the individual level determinants of UFPP in the three new democracies. This part is based on a multivariate regression analysis of the three new democracies included in the three waves of World Values Surveys. The second part focuses on the differences of determinants' contributing to the prediction of UFPP by the process of democratization. The comparisons of two muhivariate regression analyses of the pre- democracy period and the post-democracy period are the subject of this part. The last part tests the inter-state differences of determinants' contributing to the prediction of UFPP by the comparing three multivariate regression analyses of Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Intra-Differences in the Three New Democracies Table 6-1, especially (All), summarizes information pertaining to the overall relationship (R) between the independent variables and the dependent variable, the amount of variance explained by these independent variables (R^), and the results of the significance used to test the regression model (F Change). 112 The overall relationship between the thirteen predictable variables and UFPP is reported as .446. When the multiple correlation (R) is squared, the study finds that 21.8 percent of the variances in UFPP can be explained using these independent variables. The adjusted R^ is .216, which is not that much different from the study's sample R^ of .218. The adjusted R^ is an estimate that exists in the population. When the adjusted R^ is close to the R^ reported for the sample, the fit between the sample and population is good. When the adjusted R^ differs substantially from the R^ reported in the sample, the fit is worse. The adjustment is made primarily on the basis of the ratio of sample size to number of independent variable. In the situation, this study has 8996 cases and 13 predictors, or a ratio of 692 subjects per predictors. An acceptable rule of thumb is to have approximately 15 subjects per predictor (Shannon and Davenport 2001). Therefore, the model fit is good. The results of the F-test reveal a statistically significant F value of 192.145 (p < .001). The value of Durbin-Watson statistic is also reported as 1.772. This statistic describes the serial correlation among residuals. This test value will range from 0 to 4, with value close to 0 indicating a positive correlation among residuals and those close to 4 identifying a negative relationship. Values between 1.5 and 2.5 are expected (Shannon and Davenport 2001). The study's value of 1.772 falls in this range so the study should not worry about the residuals being correlated. Table 6-1, especially (All), summarizes the information pertaining to the regression coefficients. This information is necessary for making predictions about the dependent variable. Whereas the unstandardized coefficients (b) are dependent upon the scales used to measure each independent variable and can rarely be compared directly, the standardized coefficients (P) are based on the same scale. 113 Comparisons can be made to assess the relative contributions of each independent variable. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age, Gender, Income, LR, and dummySO are negative, indicating that these independent variables are negatively related to the dependent variable, UFPP. In contrast, the unstandardized coefficients (b) of Education, PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, dummy 90, dummyME, and dummySK are positive, indicating that these independent variables are positively related to the dependent variable, UFPP. Thus, those except Income are what the study would expect. Twelve of the thirteen t-tests are statistically significant (p < .05). Only the t- test for Income is not statistically significance. It shows that all of the eight significant associations between the independent variables and the dependent variable found in bivariate analysis (Pearson's r) presented in the previous chapter (Table 5-3) are still significant in multivariate regression analysis of the three new democracies (Table 6-1). These t-tests basically performed to determine whether the obtained unstandardized coefficients (b) differ from zero, as a coefficient of zero would indicate the lack of relationship. Based on the results of these t-tests, the study reveals that the variables Age, Gender, Education, LR PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, and four dummy variables are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP, but the contributions of Income are no more than the study would expect. A possible explanation for this anomaly will be discussed below. The following are the results of step-by-step analyses of previously raised sub-hypotheses. 114 Baseline The first set of independent variables refers to socio-economic background of participants, which has been perhaps the most analyzed character of political participation research (Verba et al. 1995). The first hypothesis (Age) for the baseline approach is that the older individuals are, the less likely they will engage in protest behavior. Age (t-value = -15.652) is contributing significantly to the predicfion of UFPP. The second hypothesis (Gender) for the approach is that women are less likely to participate in protest behavior than are men. Gender (t-value = -5.773) is also contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP. This confirms previous researches showed by Butts (1997) in Europe, Norris (2002) in the world general. Consequently, the Age and Gender variables contribute to explain UFPP in new democracies. The third hypothesis (Income) for the approach is that the higher income individuals are, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. The findings show that the contributions of Income (t-value = -1.094) are no more than the study would expect. The last hypothesis (Education) for the approach that the more education individuals are, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. Education (t-value = 1.772) is a little contributing to the prediction of UFPP. The P weights in the equation indicate the amount of variation associated with each of the predictor factors, controlling for all the others. The greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in the three new democracies are made by Age (P = - .153). In short. Age contributes to predict UFPP in the three new democracies. Education also has a little explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. However, like the results from bivariate analysis presented the previous 115 chapter (Table 5-3), Income still fails to predict protest potential in the three new democracies. It exhibits that individuals' protest potential are not very different by their socio-economic status in the three new democracies during the democratization process. One explanation for the unexpected findings of Income might be a measurement error of survey research. When respondents are asked about their income level, they would usually identify themselves to middle-class or high-class regardless of their real family income, especially in the less developed nations. We might have this kind of error in all or some of the three new democracies. For example, 39.3 percent of respondents in South Africa identify themselves to high family income (8 through 10 categories), whereas only 8.1 percent of respondents in Mexico identify themselves to high family income (data not shown). Therefore, Income distributions of the three new democracies are severely different. Consequently, the relationships between Income and UFPP are inconsistent by nations as well as times (Table 6-7). For example. Income always fails to predict protest potential in Mexico regardless of the times, whereas the variable is statistically significant in South Africa, yet in the reverse relationship. Cognitive Skills The second set of independent variables is related with Cognitive Skills approach based on the Rational Choice perspective. The first hypothesis for the approach is that the willingness to engage in protest behavior remains more common among Leftists rather than Rightists in the new democracies. The second hypothesis for the Cognitive Skills approach is that individuals, who are more interested in 116 politics or see politics as something important, are more likely to engage in protest behavior. The findings support these two sub-hypotheses for the Cognitive skills approach. The multivariate regression analysis indicates that LR (t-value = -9.956) is contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the new democracies. This confirms what Dalton (2002) showed for Westem democracies. Dalton (2002, p. 69) argues that "protest politics is still disproportionately the dominate of the Left in Westem democracies." PI (t-value = 27.262) is also contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the new democracies, as what we expect from the literature (Bums et al. 2001; Verba et al. 1995; and Norris 2002). Furthermore, according to the P weights of LR and PI, the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in the three new democracies are made by PI (P = .273). Dissatisfaction The third set of independent variables is related with Dissatisfaction (RD) approach based on the Socio-Psychological perspective. This approach assumes that the political and economic dissatisfaction and alienation are major predictors of protest (White 1981; Sigelman and Feldman 1983; and DiFanceisco and Gitelman 1984). Hence, the first hypothesis for the Dissatisfaction approach is that the higher political dissatisfaction individuals have, the more likely they will engage in protest behavior. As PODS (t value = 5.281) is contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP, the hypothesis is proven to be statistically significant. Thus, the results of PODS confirm what Mishler and Rose (2001) and Tarrow (2000) showed. The second hypothesis for the Dissatisfaction (RD) approach is that the more dissatisfied in material well-being and life are, the more likely they will engage in protest 117 behavior. The results of PEDS (t value = 5.844) reveal that the variable contributes to the prediction of UFPP. Thus, the resuh of PEDS also confirms what Lau and Sears (1981) and Feldman (1982) showed. The p weights of PODS (p = .051) and PEDS (P = .057) reveals that these two independent variables contribute to predicting protest potential in the three new democracies. Thus, it can be said that the dissatisfaction approach on protest behavior could be used for predicting protest potential in the three new democracies. Yet, it is very weak. Value Change The next variable refers to Value Change approach based on the Cultural Change perspective. The approach assumes that postmaterialists are more likely to engage in protest behavior than materialists. The result of M-MP shows that the variable (t-value = 14.709) is also contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies. This finding seems consistent with the existing findings in the Westem democracies. According to the P weights of M-PM, the contributions made by M-PM (P = .143) to predicting protest potential in the three new democracies are relatively great. In short, based on the findings, it can be said that the Value Change approach on protest behavior could be successflilly used for predicting protest potential in the three new democracies. Dummies The last set of variables refers to year and country dummy variables. The study assumes that people' protest potential are different by times and nations. The findings show that of all the dummies - dummy80, dummy90, dummyME, and 118 dummySK (t-value = -31.022, 1.840, 4.674, and 11.951) - are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies. The findings support the assumption that the means of protest potential are different by nations and times. For example, when other variables are controlled for, the mean of protest potential in the three new democracies is the largest in 1990 (the second World Values Surveys) and smallest in 1995 (the third World Values Surveys). In addition, when other variables are controlled for, the mean of protest potential is the largest in South Korea and smallest in South Africa. Summarv of Intra-Differences The results of the regression analysis in the three new democracies reveal that Age, Gender, Education, LR, PI, PODS, PEDS, and M-PM are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies. Therefore, the resuhs support the sub-hypotheses from baseline, cognitive skills, dissatisfaction, and value change approaches and confirm what previous researches showed for Westem democracies. The findings also show that of all the independent variables, PI (p = .273) emerges as the strongest predictor of UFPP. When other variables are controlled for. Age (P = -.153) and M-PM (p = .143) are also relatively strong predictors of UFPP. To see which approach works better to explain protest potential in the three new democracies the study investigates changes in R^ (see Table 6-2). As Table 6-2, especially (All), shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline factors (Age, Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory power in relation to protest potential in the three new democracies. The Baseline 119 factors alone explain only 3.8 percent (R = .195) of the variance in UFPP. When Cognitive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount of variation considerably increases to 16.3 percent (R = .404). Adding Dissatisfaction factors (PODS and PEDS) into the protest potential equation increases very little the amount of explained variation to 17.2 percent (R = .416). In addition, when Value Change factor (M-PM) is added to the equation, the total amount of variation increases to 19.6 percent (R = .443). In sum, Cognitive Skills approach based on Rational Choice perspective predicts protest potential much better than does dissatisfaction approach in the three new democracies. Additionally, Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear to have relatively strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. However, Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in the three new democracies. The results show that dissatisfied citizens are only slightly more willing to protest than those who are satisfied with the govemment performance and their life. Furthermore, the pattem of other predictors, especially baseline factors, tends to undercut the dissatisfaction approach. For example, the willingness to protest is more common among males and the better educated than among women and the less educated. Thus, protest in new democracies is not simply an outlet for the alienated and deprived; just the opposite often appears. The general pattem of protest activity in new democracies is better described by the Cognitive Skills approach. Protesters are individuals who have the interest and ability to participate in political activities of all forms, including protest. The clearest evidence of this is the strong tendency for the better educated to engaged in protest in all three nations. Therefore, the results 120 confirm what Dalton (2002) showed for advanced industrial democracies, as "protest activity is better described by the resource model rather than dissatisfaction model" (p. 67). That is, this study exhibits that the trends or pattems of unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies are as similar as are advance industrial democracies. Differences by the Process of Democratization The differences of the determinants' contributions to the prediction of UFPP by the process of democratization in the three new democracies are tested through comparing two multivariate regression analyses of the pre-democracy and the post- democracy in the three new democracies. The resuhs of the two regression analyses of pre-democracy period (Pre) and post-democracy period (Post) in the new democracies shows that Age, Gender, LR PI, PEDS, and M-PM are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the three new democracies regardless of times. Therefore, the findings fromth e two multivariate regression analyses support the sub-hypotheses from the four approaches. There, however, exists some inconsistence of the variables by the times. For example. Education and PODS are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in the pre-democracy period, but the contributions of the variables are no more than the study would expect in the post-democracy period. That is, the contributions of Education and PODS to the prediction of UFPP had decreased during democratization process in the three new democracies. In addition. Income is contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP both in the pre-democracy period and the post- democracy period. However, the signs of Income have changed by the times. 121 The findings also show that of all the independent variables, PI (p = .279 in pre-democracy period and P = .250 in post-democracy period) emerges as the strongest predictor of UFPP in the pre-democracy period as well as in the post- democracy period. When other variables are controlled for, LR (P = .146) emerges as the second most important predictor of UFPP in the pre-democracy period. Age (P = .203) also emerges as the second most important predictor of UFPP in the post- democracy period. Thus, there exist differences of the determinants' contributions to the prediction of UFPP by the process of democratization in the three new democracies although the results of the three multivariate regression analyses generally support all of the four approaches. To see which model works better to explain protest potential in the pre- democracy period and in the post-democracy period the study examines changes in R^ (Table 6-2). As Table 6-2, especially (Pre-Democracy and Post-Democracy periods), shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline factors (Age, Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory power in relation to protest potential regardless of times. The Baseline factors alone explain only 8.5 percent (R = .292) of the variance in UFPP in the pre-democracy period and only 6.8 percent (R = .261) of the variance in UFPP in the post-democracy period. When Cognitive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount of variation considerably increases from 8.5 to 21.4 percent (R = .463) in the pre- democracy period and from 6.8 to 15.1 percent (R = .390) in the post-democracy period. Adding Dissatisfaction factors (PODS and PEDS) into the protest potential equation hardly changes the amount of explained variation from 21.4 to 22.8 percent (R = .475) in the pre-democracy period and from 15.1 to 15.4 percent (R = .394) in 122 the post-democracy period. In addition, when Value Change factor (M-PM) is added to the equation, the total amount of variation increases from 22.8 to 27.6 percent (R = .513) in the pre-democracy period and from 15.4 to 18.5 percent (R = .430) in the post-democracy period. In sum. Baseline factors, Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches' explanatory power to protest potential had decreased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies. In contrast, the explanatory power of Value Change approach had slightly increased in the 1980s and 1990s in the three new democracies. The reason behind that is probably related to economic development in the new democracies in that period. The three new democracies in different geographical regions had commonly achieved rapid economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, GNP per capita had increased around 81 percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South Africa, and over 400 percent in South Korea during the time period (Table 3-1). The changes in the material-technological environment cause changing values of the citizenry that, in time, change the political attitudes toward protest activities in the three new democracies. Nevertheless, the materialists-postmaterialists value changes in the three new democracies are slight. Inter-State Differences The inter-state differences of determinants on UFPP in the new democracies are tested through comparing multivariate regression analyses of the three new democracies. Comparison of this part is based on multivariate regression analyses of Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Each nation has three multivariate regression analyses; All, Pre-Democracy, and Post-Democracy. 123 Mexico Table 6-3, especially (All), summarizes information pertaining to the overall relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable in Mexico. The overall relationship between the twelve predictable variables and UFPP is reported as .487 in Mexico. The study finds that 23.5 percent of the variance in UFPP can be explained using these independent variables. Table 6-3, especially (All), also summarizes the information pertaining to the regression coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age, Gender, Income, LR, PODS, and EG are negative. In contrast, those of Education, PI, PEDS, M-PM, dummy90, and dummy95 are positive. The resuhs of the t-tests reveal that Age, Gender, Education, LR, PI, PEDS, M-PM, and two dummy variables are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP, but the contributions of Income, PODS, and EG are no more than the study would expect. Unlike South Africa (see Table 6-4), EG is not statistically significant to predict protest potential in Mexico. There traditionally existed severe cleavages between rich landowner and poor local farmers in Mexico. The cleavages changed during the industrialization process to conflict between elites (church, military, oligarch), middle class (skilled workers), and unorganized peasants. Thus, the cleavages in Mexico are based on different social class, occupation, or residence rather than ethnicity (Camp 1993). The p weights of the variables (All) reveal that the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in Mexico are made by PI (P = .239) followed by LR (p = -.114), dummy95 (p = .107), and Education (p = .104). 124 South Africa Table 6-4, especially (All), summarizes the resuhs of multivariate regression analyses for South Africa. The overall relationship between the twelve predictable variables included four dummy variables and UFPP is reported as .467 in South Africa. This study finds that 21.8 percent of the variance in UFPP can be explained using these independent variables. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age, Gender, Income, Education, LR, dummy80, and dummy95 are negative. In contrast, the unstandardized coefficients (b) of PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, and EG are positive. The results of Income and Education reveal that the higher socio-economic status individuals have, the less likely they will engage in protest behavior in South Africa. Therefore, the South African case supports deprivation approach's argument about 'poor-radical revolutionaries' rather than 'baseline approach's assumption about Income. Additionally, as a control variable, EG (t-value = 9.395) is also statistically significant in South Africa and is in the hypothesized directions. It means that non- Whites are more likely to participate in protest behavior than are Whites. The result of EG confirms what previous researches showed for South Africa (Deegan 2001; Gibson and Gouws 2003). The resuhs of the t-tests exhibit that the Age, Gender, Income, Education, LR, PI, PODS, PEDS, M-PM, EG, and two dummy variables are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP. According to the p weights of the variables (All), the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in South Africa are made by PI (p = .322) followed by EG (P = .138), and Age (P = -.126). 125 South Korea Table 6-5, especially (All), summarizes information pertaining to the overall relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The overall relationship between the twelve predictable variables and UFPP is reported as .471 in South Korea. The study finds that 22.2 percent of the variance in UFPP can be explained using these independent variables. Table 6-5, especially (All), also summarizes the information pertaining to the regression coefficients. The unstandardized coefficients (b) of Age and LR are negative. In contrast, the unstandardized coefficients (b) of Gender, Income, Education, PI, PODS, PEDS, and M-PM are positive. The results of the t-tests shows that Age, Income, Education, LR, PI, PODS, M-PM, dummySO, and dummy95 are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP, but the confributions of Gender and PEDS are no more than the study would expect. Thus, the resuh of Gender confirms what Lee and Rinehart (1995) showed for South Korea, as there is evidence of changing with a narrowing of gender roles in South Korea. The P weights of the variables (All) reveals that the greatest contributions to predicting protest potential in South Korea are made by Age (P = -.257) followed by PI (P = .194), dummy80 (p = -.165), and M-PM (P = .127). Summarv of Inter-State Model Differences The resuhs of the three regression analyses (All) in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea shows that Age, Education, LR, PI, and M-PM are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP regardless nations. However, Gender and PEDS fail to contribute significantly to the prediction of UFPP in South Korea, 126 whereas they are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in Mexico and South Africa. Similarly, PODS and Income are not statistically significant variables for predicting UFPP in Mexico, whereas those variables are contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP in South Africa and South Korea. The findings of the three regression analyses (All) in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea also show that of all the independent variables, PI (P = .239 in Mexico; coefficient b = .547** and p = .322 in South Africa) emerges as the strongest predictor of UFPP in Mexico and South Africa, whereas Age (P = -.257) emerges as the strongest predictor of UFPP in South Korea. Indeed, when other variables are controlled for, PI (p = .194), LR (P = -.114), and EG (p = .138) emerge as the second most important predictor of UFPP in Korea, Mexico, and South Africa, respectively. Thus, there exist differences of the determinants' contributions to the prediction of UFPP by nations ahhough the resuhs of the three regression analyses generally support all of the four approaches. To see which model works better to explain protest potential in each of the three new democracies the study examines changes in R^ (Table 6-6). As Table 6-6 shows, in terms of the percentage of variation explained. Baseline factors (Age, Gender, Income, and Education) appears to have little explanatory power in relation to protest potential in Mexico and South Africa, but considerably explanatory power in South Korea. The Baseline factors alone explain only 4.3 percent (R = .210) and 5.0 percent (R = .224) of the variance in UFPP in Mexico and in South Africa. In contrast, the factors alone explain 10.7 percent (R = .328) in South Korea. In addition, when Cognhive Skills factors (LR and PI) are added to the equation, the total amount of variation considerably increases from 4.3 to 18.5 percent (R = .432) in Mexico, 127 from 5.0 to 17.9 percent (R = .425) in South Africa, from 10.7 to 16.8 percent (R = .412) in South Korea. However, adding Dissatisfaction factors (PODS and PEDS) into the protest potential equation fail to increase considerably the amount of explained variation in the three new democracies. When Value Change factor (M- PM) is added to the equation, the total amount of variation increases a little from 18.5 to 19.5 percent (R = .421) in Mexico and from 18.9 to 19.7 percent (R = .444) in South Africa, but increases considerably from 18.9 to 22.4 percent (R = .473) in South Korea. In sum. Baseline factors' and Value Change approach's explanatory power to protest potential is a little in Mexico and South Africa, but considerable in South Korea. In addition. Cognitive Skills approach's explanatory power to protest potential is commonly considerable in the three new democracies. However, Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in all of the three new democracies. Therefore, the resuhs of the study are not what we expected. Based on a vast literature on both protest and democratization in the three new democracies, this study expected that Cognhive Skills and Value Change approaches would be more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea whereas Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches are more applicable than Cognhive Skills and Value Change approaches in Mexico and South Africa. Unlike the expectation of this study Cognitive Skills approach predicts protest potential well in Mexico and South Africa as well as South Korea. Although the three new democracies have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of 128 development, protesters in the countries are individuals who have the interest and ability to engage in political activhies of all forms, including protest. It confirms what Dahon (2002) showed for advanced industrial democracies, as protest activity is better described by the Cognitive Skills model rather than Dissatisfaction model. One possible reason behind sharing similar trends or pattems of unconventional forms of political participation in the three new democracies is related that the three countries have commonly experienced democratic transhion and consolidation processes in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, unlike the expectation of this study. Baseline factors predict protest potential well in Korea, but not very well in Mexico, and South Africa. In general, personal characteristics might stimulate unconventional action. Dalton's research hafs shown a strong tendency toward higher levels of protest among the young (Dalton 2002). Gender also might influence unconventional pohtical participation (Schlozman et al., 1994). The confrontational style of protest polhics may involve a disproportionate number of men, although there is evidence that this pattem is changing with a narrowing of gender roles (Lee and Rinehart 1995). One reason behind limitation of Baseline factors to predict protest potential in Mexico and South Africa is possibly related to a measurement error of survey research, especially Income variable. Income always fails to predict protest potential in Mexico regardless of the times. In addhion, Income is statistically significant in South Africa, yet in the reverse relationship with protest potential. 129 Summarv Table 6-7 shows a summary of significances and directions of the relationships between the independent variables and UFPP in all cases. Age, PI, and M-PM are always contributing significantly to the prediction of UFPP regardless of times as well as nations. Although Table 6-7 shows that some of the independent variables fail to contribute to the prediction of UFPP in some cases, the resuhs of the regression analyses generally support all of the four approaches on UFPP. However, there exist not only intra-differences, but also inter-state differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. For example, Cognhive Skills approach based Rational Choice perspective predicts protest potential much better than does dissatisfaction approach in the three new democracies (Table 6-2). Additionally, Baseline factors and Value Change approach appear to have relatively strong explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. However, Dissatisfaction approach's explanatory power to protest potential is very limited in the three new democracies. Furthermore, among the four approaches, Cognitive Skills approach appears to have the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest potential in Mexico and South Africa (Table 6-6). The second powerful approach in the two nations is Baseline factors. In contrast, the strongest explanatory power in relation to protest potential in South Korea is made by Baseline factors and followed by Cognhive Skills and Value Change approaches. This study also finds that there exist differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential by the process of democratization. For 130 example, Value Change approaches explanatory power to protest potential had increased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies, whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches' explanatory power to protest potential had considerably decreased in that times (Table 6-2). The following chapter summarizes this study and considers possible future directions for new and related research. 131 CNI 5 ON r*^ *^ ^ ^ NO •51- •* o 00 m t~. 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The unconventional forms of political participation, which refers to peaceful political protest, differs from not only conventional forms of political participation like voting and campaign activism, but also political crime (sabotage, guerrilla warfare, hijacking, assassination, bombing, kidnapping, riot, armed attack, revolutions, and so on. The concept traditionally consists of five types of action: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstration, joining unofficial strike, and occupying buildings or factories. The purpose of the study was to test four most discussed approaches on protest (Baseline, Cognitive Skills, Dissatisfaction, and Value Change approaches), using cases of the three new democracies. Dissatisfaction (RD) approach supports the irrational psychological arguments behind decisions to protest and sees protestors as poor, frustrated, alienated from politics and radically minded. On the other hand. Cognitive Skills (or Resource Mobilization) approach, which is a part of rational choice perspective, assumes that more affluent and educated people would more likely join protest activities. The wider theoretical reasoning emphasizes here the participant, who is rational, conducts costs-benefits calculations, and whose decisions also depend on motivation and mobilization. Former empirical studies about individual level political participation (both conventional and unconventional ones) have mostly used variables deduced from 139 baseline factors and concenfrated on analyses of protesters' demographic and socio economic background. Their results have emphasized the importance of age, gender, income, education, ethnicity and so on. Additionally, the Value Change approach, which is part of the cultural change perspective, argues that values provide the standards that guide the attitudes and behaviors of the public. People's new values such as postmaterialist concerns promote citizens participation in protest behavior. The study expected that there would exist not only intra and inter-state differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies, but also differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential by the process of democratization. In order to test those four approaches nine predictor variables are raised. All of the variables referred to relevant theoretical arguments. The data for the study are based on the first, second, and third World Values Surveys in 1981-82, 1990-93, and 1995-97 for the three new democracies. This analysis uses a pooled cross-sectional design for each country, which pools three surveys. The individual level data allow for multivariate analyses such as regression (OLS). Thus, the major stimulus behind this study was the wish to contribute the statistical comparative studies of protest by introducing integrated model of variables and implementing the analyses in a context which has not been done before in the new democracies. The results of the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses generally support all of the hypotheses of the study. The results also define that there exist not only intra-differences, but also inter-state differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to protest potential in the three new democracies. In addition, the results reveal that there exist differences on the four approaches' explanatory power to 140 protest potential by the process of democratization. Therefore, the results of the bivariate and multivariate regression analyses can be summarized like followings: First, Cognitive Skills approach's explanatory power is stronger than that of Dissatisfaction approach in all three new democracies. That is, Cognitive Skills approach based on rational choice perspective predicts protest potential much better than does dissatisfaction approach based on socio-psychological perspective in new democracies. The results show that dissatisfied citizens in new democracies are only slightly more willing to protest than those who are satisfied with the govemment performance and their life. Furthermore, the pattem of other predictors, especially baseline factors, tends to undercut the dissatisfaction approach. For example, the willingness to protest is more common among males and the better educated than among women and the less educated. Thus, protest in new democracies is not simply an outlet for the alienated and deprived, just the opposite often appears. The general pattem of protest activity in new democracies is then better described by the Cognitive Skills approach. It explains that protesters in new democracies are individuals who have the interest and ability to participate in political activities of all forms, including protest. The clearest evidence of this is the strong tendency for the better educated to engaged in protest in Mexico and South Korea. Therefore, the results confirm what Dalton (2002) showed for advanced industrial democracies, as "protest activity is better described by the resource model rather than dissatisfaction model" (p. 67). Accordingly this study exhibits that the trends or pattems of unconventional forms of political participation in new democracies are as similar as are advance industrial democracies. 141 Secondly, Baseline factors and Value Change approach's explanatory power to protest potential is considerable in South Korea, but a little in Mexico and South Africa. Based on a vast literature on both protest and democratization in the three new democracies, this study expected that Cognitive Skills and Value Change approaches would be more applicable than Baseline factors and Dissatisfaction approaches in South Korea whereas the latte would be than the former in Mexico and South Africa. Unlike the expectation of this study Cognitive Skills approach predicts protest potential well in Mexico and South Africa as well as South Korea. Although the three new democracies have experienced diverse cultural heritages and varying stages of development, protesters in the nations are individuals who have the interest and ability to engage in political activities of all forms, including protest. One possible reason behind sharing similar trends or pattems of protest among the three new democracies is related to democratization process in the nations. Inauguration of democracy in the three nations was almost simultaneous. That is, the three new democracies have commonly experienced democratic transition and consolidation processes in the 1980s and 1990s. Protest by citizenry was a key factor contributing to the inauguration of democracies in the three new democracies in 1980s. The elite- challenging forms of participation in the nations have stimulated sustainable democratic reforms or liberalization on the economy during their democratic consolidation periods in the 1990s. Unconventional forms of political participation become a regular feature of politics for the individuals who have the interest and ability to participate in political activities. 142 In addition, unlike the expectation of this study. Baseline factors predict protest potential well in Korea, but not very well in Mexico, and South Africa. Especially, socio-economic factors, especially Income, fail to predict protest potential in Mexico and have the reverse relationship with protest potential in South Africa. One reason behind limitation of socio-economic factors to predict protest potential in Mexico and South Africa is possibly related to a measurement error of survey research as we discussed on previous chapter. Especially, Income distributions of the three new democracies are severely different. Consequently, Income always fails to predict protest potential in Mexico regardless of the times. Income is statistically significant in South Africa, yet in the reverse relationship with protest potential. Finally, Value Change approach's explanatory power to protest potential had slightly increased during the process of democratization in the three new democracies, whereas Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, and Dissatisfaction approaches' explanatory power to protest potential had commonly decreased a little in that times. The reason behind increasing explanatory power by Value Change approach is probably related to economic development in the new democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. The three new democracies in different geographical regions had commonly achieved rapid economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, GNP per capita had increased around 81 percent in Mexico, 85 percent in South Africa, and over 400 percent in South Korea during the time period. The changes in the material-technological environment in the new democracies cause changing values of the citizenry that, in time, change the political attitudes toward protest activities in the three new democracies although the materialists-postmaterialists value changes in the three new democracies are slight during the time period. 143 Closing Thoughts The purpose of this study has been to examine the determinants of political protest in Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. The findings suggest that Age, Psychological Involvement in Politics, and M-PM value change have a consistent effect on protest. We also find an effect for Gender, Income, Education, Left-Right Self-Placement, Political Dissatisfaction, Personal Dissatisfaction, and Ethnic Groups, although the impact of these variables was not consistent in all cases. Nevertheless, this study naturally calls to be continued and considers possible future directions for related research. One implication of the findings has to do with using a combined or two-step model to study protest potential in new democracies. Future researchers might therefore benefit from using a single "eclectic" model that combines features from the Baseline factors. Cognitive Skills, Dissatisfaction, and Value Change approaches. Indeed, value change, for instance, may be an intervening variable in the baseline factors and protest linkage: socio-economic factors affect values, which in tum leads to cognitive mobilization and the likelihood of protest. 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