Repercussions Still Smoldering After Brazil Fire: How Not to Get Burned

REPERCUSSIONS STILL SMOLDERING AFTER BRAZIL FIRE: HOW NOT TO GET BURNED The evening of January 27, 2013, started out like any other for 242 people in Santa Maria, Brazil. They went to the Kiss Nightclub to see and hear a popular musical group. Unfortunately, those same 241 people lost their lives in one of the deadliest fires of its kind in more than a decade. For many in the U.S., this fire was all too similar to one that occurred on February 20, 2003, nearly 10 years earlier, at the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, RI in which 100 people lost their lives. In both instances, fire spread rapidly throughout the facility due to the flammable soundproofing foam installed on the ceiling. This foam not only propagated the fire spread, but contributed to the production of toxic black smoke, which not only impaired vision, but contributed to the death toll due to the presence of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, cyanide, and other products of combustion making breathing difficult, if not impossible. In both cases, the club was filled beyond capacity, and the fire was started by pyrotechnics, and exits were either not available, inoperable, or just not present, resulting in the crowds attempting to evacuate the building from only the main exit. Both clubs were not equipped with automatic sprinklers or a fire alarm system. In the instance of the Station Nightclub fire, the building was believed to be exempt from sprinkler system requirements. However, an occupancy change occurred when the building was converted to a nightclub, thereby requiring the installation of a sprinkler system. This was missed by the building inspectors. The Kiss Nightclub was issued a permit for operation and the permit was based on two emergency exits. This information was proved to be false, though it was approved by the fire department. A state-run investigation on the authorities supervising the nightclub, as well as the fire department, occurred as a result. These two fires were not the only ones of their kind. On November 28, 1942, while the United States was involved in WWII, a fire broke out at the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub in Boston, MA. A total of 492 people, 32 more than the allowed capacity of the building, died in the fire, which actually is only the second highest, single-building fire fatality in the US. The Iroquois Theatre fire of 1903 in Chicago resulted in 602 deaths. The Cocoanut Grove fire started as a result of a worker using a match to find a lightbulb socket. He thought the match was extinguished, but it ignited some synthetic palm trees which quickly spread. Combustible coatings on the walls and floor aided in the fires rapid progression throughout the building. The main exit which occupants tried to use was a single revolving door which got stuck due to the number of people trying to use it, jamming it. Other exits were blocked/bolted shut to prevent patrons from not paying, or opened inwards, preventing their use due to the number of people trying to get out. Similarly, windows were boarded shut and could not be broken to use as an emergency exit. The owner of the nightclub was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Within a year, life safety code changes were made to require the installation of additional side doors to a revolving door, the installation of exit signs, banning combustible/flammable coatings and decorations, and many others. Code changes are inevitable when a catastrophic event, such as a nightclub fire occurs. In addition, the safety of other structures and venues is reevaluated, especially if a major event is scheduled. This is the case currently in Brazil as the 2014 World Cup is less than a year away, and the Summer Olympics are planned for Rio de Janeiro in 2016. Fires, and the potential for numerous fire related deaths, are not restricted to nightclubs, however. Warehouse distribution centers, high-rise buildings, schools, hotels, and industrial complexes are all subject to fire loss. Some of these fires can be attributed to faulty electrical wiring, welding sparks landing on combustible surfaces, disgruntled employees (arson), and even terrorism. The building and fire codes and standards that are currently enforced in the United States and Canada, as well as the balance of the world, all have a “root” in a large-loss fire incident. The fire protection professional is adept at understanding these codes and standards. The objective of this presentation is to assist the facility manager in what the fire protection professional does and how he can assist that same manager in ensuring a structure that is in conformance with the latest in life safety requirements. This objective is a four part objective and will be accomplished as follows: 1. Identifying the hazards 2. Understanding the impact of codes and standards on the hazards 3. Selecting the proper life safety system 4. Verification First and foremost, though, it is important to understand the difference between a code and a standard. A code is something that mandates what must be done. It is written and/or adopted as law. The primary code development body in the US is the International Code Council (ICC) and in Canada it is the National Research Council Canada (NRC-CNRC). Standards are guidelines on how to implement the mandate. Often, standards are referenced by the code and as such, become part of it, though by itself, a standard is not intended to be law, only a guideline. The most widely recognized fire protection and life safety standard development body, globally, is the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). When identifying a hazard, it is necessary to look at more than just what is being located in a structure. This is an important part, but by no means the only part. The fire protection professional must review the occupancy of the building, which in itself requires a multi-faceted review. What is the building being used for? In the instance of the Station Nightclub fire, the building was supposed to be sprinklered when it was converted to a nightclub as it changed its occupancy. This was not “caught” by anyone, including the fire inspector, until after the fire, unfortunately. Who is going to be in the building and what special processes may occur? This could create any number of hazards all within one space. A standard ordinary hazard occupancy may have a higher hazard process occurring within the space. Each occupancy has its own unique issues and multiple occupancies can occur within the same building. The less severe the occupancy classification, the lower the fire risk. What is to be stored in the building and how is it to be stored? This is also a many faceted issue as the fire protection professional must review the product or products and classify them as to commodity and also determine how they are to be stored – on floors, in racks, on shelves, etc., and any special features of storage, i.e., solid shelving, gondola shelving, etc. In addition to the storage, it is necessary to review the building construction – combustible, limited combustible or non-combustible? How high is the roof deck/bottom of truss/beams? How are beams/joists spaced? All of these factors will have an impact on the hazard to be protected. Another thing the fire protection professional must review is the external exposures. What are the risks associated with the property? Does it abut a major thoroughfare on which hazardous materials are transported? Is within close proximity to a wooded area or an adjacent non-protected building? Once the hazard is identified, it is necessary to interpret the codes and standards as they relate to that particular hazard. A term commonly referred to in the life safety industry is Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). This is the individual or group of individuals that has the final say on how the code is to be interpreted and implemented for any given situation. It is often possible that more than one AHJ will be on a particular project, each having a different interpretation. The fire protection professional will be critical in working with the AHJ(s) to ensure that all differing views are agreed to prior to design and construction. .

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