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Mursi Egypt and the Palestinian Divide Maren Koss1

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Mursi Egypt and the Palestinian Divide Maren Koss1 10. 2013 Rough Times ahead for a unity government in 2007, mistrust on both sides remained high and violent ten- Hamas sions rose between the two factions. The- Politics Under the se tensions finally led to a bloody interne- Influence of Post- cine conflict between the two, culminating in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in Mursi Egypt and the June 2007 and an all but complete shut- Palestinian Divide down of Hamas activities in the West Bank. Since that time, the Palestinian population Maren Koss1 has been suffering the consequences of the complete political and territorial split between the West Bank and the Gaza Roots and Consequences of the Ha- Strip. Several attempts for reconciliation mas-Fatah Division between Fatah and Hamas have failed and the Palestinian division has become ever Hamas and Fatah have been rivals ever more entrenched. Today, parallel gover- since Hamas was founded during the first ning structures exist in the West Bank and Intifada and became a popular organizati- Gaza and both factions separately levy ta- on within the Palestinian arena. After Ha- xes and have their own fiscal structures. mas’ unexpected victory in the 2006 Pale- Hence overcoming the Palestinian division stinian parliamentary elections differences is not only difficult in political but also in between the two factions sharpened and structural terms. tensions escalated. On the one hand, Fa- tah was not willing to fully recognize Ha- Regional Alliances and Palestinian mas’ victory and refused to transfer power Reconciliation Efforts to the Islamists, especially in the security sector. On the other hand, Israel and the In August 2013, Palestinian politicians international community did not recognize from Fatah and Hamas estimated the the Hamas government and boycotted the chances for a successful Palestinian recon- Palestinian Authority (PA) as long as Ha- ciliation in the near future as being close mas would not accept the principles of the to zero. Members of the two Palestinian Middle East Quartet: recognizing the state factions take very different positions re- of Israel, ending terror attacks and com- garding reconciliation. After the Islamists’ mitting to all prior agreements between backlash in Egypt, Fatah has seen its po- Israel and the PA. As it was impossible for sition strengthened within the Palestinian Hamas to agree to these conditions wit- arena. This became especially clear when hout losing legitimacy in the Palestinian Azzam al-Ahmad, head of Fatah’s reconci- population and in the Arab world, interna- liation delegation, recently held a speech tional financial support was halted and the threatening Hamas and warned of strong government was confronted with a severe actions against them in the Gaza Strip. financial crisis. Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) from Fatah predicted that Although Hamas and Fatah undertook se- there will be a popular uprising against Ha- veral attempts after the forming of the mas in Gaza soon, mentioning November Hamas led-Government 2006 to overcome 11, 2013, the day of death of PLO-leader their difficulties and even briefly formed Yassir Arafat, as the reference date for the 1Junior Research Fellow, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Design: eryfoto Seite 1 10. 2013 possible rebellion. These Fatah-PLC mem- some members of the current Palestinian bers referred to Mohammad Dahlan and Legislative Council from Hamas know that to the Tamarod movement as main actors chances for reconciliation in the near futu- who could be involved in that rebellion. re are very low. Mohammad Dahlan, an ex-senior Fatah official, formerly responsible for one of the Looking at the recent regional develop- PA security forces in Gaza, was accused of ments in the Middle East, in particular being behind the bloody fight against Ha- the political situation in Egypt, it becomes mas in June 2007. According to Fatah PLC clear that regional circumstances and al- members he still has an important power liances are of utmost importance for the base in Gaza. The Tamarod movement, an Palestinian reconciliation process. They anti-Islamist grassroots-movement that can function as a driving force for recon- has recently emerged in Egypt and organi- ciliation, or even become the main obsta- zed public opposition against Muhammad cle to it. When the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mursi, inspired people in Gaza and led to Muhammad Mursi was elected president the emergence of Tamarod activism there in 2012, Hamas subsequently saw itself in as well. Allegedly trained by Egyptian in- a superior power position towards Fatah, telligence and security forces, Palestinian since it is closely linked with the Egyptian Tamarod activists call for public demon- Muslim Brotherhood in ideological and po- strations against Hamas in Gaza. litical matters. Activists from the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928, Unsurprisingly, Hamas evaluates the si- helped give birth to Hamas. Muslim Brot- tuation in Gaza very differently. Although herhood activists have been operating in senior Hamas member Yahya Mousa ad- Palestine since the 1940s. Until the begin- mitted that there are Tamarod activists in ning of the first Intifada in 1987, however, the West Bank and Gaza, he seemed to the Palestinian Muslim Brothers were not be convinced that the groups will not have involved in politics. They rather engaged any influence in Gaza, because the Pale- in education and welfare projects with the stinian people support the political system goal to educate the society in an Islamic in the Gaza Strip. Yet, Mousa also ack- way. At that time, to establish an Islamic nowledged that Hamas security services state was not the aim of the Palestinian detained some of the Tamarod activists. Muslim Brotherhood activists. They rather Hamas members continuously claim that argued that the Islamic education of the there will neither be an uprising in Gaza society was to be achieved before an Is- nor a military takeover by Fatah. Still, Ha- lamic state could be established. With the mas politicians admit that the organization outbreak of the first Intifada, the stance is going through rough times. Only a few of the Muslim Brothers changed and they weeks after the overthrow of the Muslim decided to participate in the Palestinian Brotherhood in Egypt, Ismail Haniyeh, Ha- uprising. Hence, Hamas was founded as mas’ Prime Minister in Gaza, offered all a branch of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Palestinian factions, including Fatah, the The founding of Hamas contained the fol- opportunity to form a joint government lowing advantages for the Muslim Brot- that would rule Gaza until a national unity herhood: if Hamas’ political engagement government could be achieved, underli- in the Palestinian uprising was successful, ning that Hamas would be ready for dia- Hamas could be declared as a branch of logue about national reconciliation. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood. If it was not suc- Design: eryfoto Seite 2 10. 2013 cessful, the Muslim Brotherhood organiza- ly linked with them in the so called axis tion would not have been put in danger. of resistance for many years as the only When Hamas issued its Charter in 1988, Sunni actor. Damascus had hosted Hamas’ which is today rather to be understood as Political Bureau, Iran was Hamas’ most an historical document without any cur- important financier and large-scale wea- rent political implications, it announced its pons supplier since the organization was affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood al- founded, and Hamas and Hezbollah were ready in the second paragraph. closely co-operating in military and politi- cal affairs. Bearing the history of Hamas in mind, it becomes clear why Hamas was enthusia- After the uprising in Syria started, Hamas stic when President Mursi came to power. did not side with the Assad regime but Although Mursi did not meet all of Hamas’ rather tried to take a mediating position expectations, e.g. the establishment of a between Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian Free Trade Agreement between Gaza and opposition. After the conflict intensified Egypt, Hamas was able to use Rafah as a Hamas started to support the Syrian op- gateway to the Arab world. Even though position. Consequently, the relationship the Mursi-government had closed more between the Assad regime and Hamas than 200 of Hamas’ tunnels at Rafah bor- continuously deteriorated until the Hamas der, trade via the tunnels was tolerated to leadership left for Doha and Cairo in the such an extend that some pressure from first half of 2012. Iran did not agree with the Israeli-imposed blockade was relieved. Hamas’ position towards Syria and cru- The border was frequently opened to tra- cially reduced its financial support for the velers to and from Gaza. These improve- Palestinian organization. However, Iran’s ments in addition to the electoral victories financial support has never completely of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region stopped, it only remained on a very low strengthened Hamas. President Mursi in- level during this period. Instead, Hamas tensified Egyptian-Hamas relations and of- received large-scale funding and economic ficially welcomed Hamas leaders in Cairo. investment from Qatar. However, Qatar Egypt continued to play an important role does not supply Hamas with weapons and as a mediator between Hamas and Fatah, the Gulf monarchy’s new Emir Tamim bin but also between Israel and Gaza’s diffe- Hamad takes a less supportive stance to- rent political factions during and after the wards Hamas than his predecessor. Hence, 2012 Gaza war, the so called operation Hamas is in a very difficult situation at the “Pillar of Defense”. moment. It has lost its Egyptian ally and now attempts to re-establish its relation- After President Mursi’s fall, Hamas is sai- ship with Iran. Especially its military wing, ling stormy waters. The Egyptian military, the Qassam Brigades, was concerned which is hostile towards the Muslim Brot- over Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and herhood in Egypt, and its affiliates regai- the strained relations with Iran because ned power in Cairo.
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