Epilogue: New Perspectives on Egypt's Democratization

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Epilogue: New Perspectives on Egypt’s Democratization

Introduction

This chapter explores Egypt’s democratization from fve different inter- related perspectives. First a review of the literature on democratic transition, or ‘transitology,’1 is presented which details the non-linear nature of democratization processes. Secondly, a diagnosis of Egypt’s political system after El-Sisi ascended to power is offered. It is argued here that Egypt under both Morsi and El-Sisi has taken no steps towards democracy and hence after two successive revolutions, Egypt can be defned as a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’. The third part explores how Egypt can move from a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’ into a democratic state. Six factors that might affect Egypt democratization have been analyzed: socioeconomic factors; political parties; civil society; external support; state-religious relations; the rule of law and constitutionalism; and fnally (explored more fully in Chap. 7) civil–military relations. The fourth part explores how Egypt can learn from failed and unconsolidated (unfnished) democratic models from other areas of the world. Of the successful examples—some had the support of external parties such as the EU, NATO, and the US; some had active political parties; and others had healthy civil societies. However, Egypt had none of these. The ffth part addresses how Egypt can learn from Rustow’s model for democratic transition, which elevates the role of human actors in the process of democratization and identifes four phases needed to establish a lasting

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 217 A.A.-D. Arafat, Egypt in Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56020-5 218 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION democracy. Egypt, according to Rustow’s model, seems to be nearing the most diffcult third and fourth phases, making a transition from autocracy into full-fedged democracy seem a long way off.

Theoretical Approaches

The literature presents many defnitions of ‘democracy’ and its requirements. For instance, O’Donnell and Schmitter note that there is a ‘procedural minimum’ of the necessary elements of a political democracy, which includes “secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability.”2 Democracy, according to Lipset, is political system where “constitutional opportunities for changing governing offcials” exist.3 This defnition necessitates a ‘political formula,’ and a legitimate opposition attempting to gain offce.4 For any country to move from an autocracy to fully-fedged democracy, a transitional period of varying length must be experienced. Since the third wave of democratization, numerous volumes have been published on democratic transition (transitology). In the most basic understanding, a transition is simply the interim period separating two consecutive regimes.5 In his essay, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Thomas Carothers argues that, any given country moving away from authoritarian rule is said to be transitioning towards democracy.6 Transitions from autocratic or authoritarian regimes tend to lead to one of four outcomes: regression back to autocracy, the creation of a hybrid regime (i.e., dictablanda or democradura), remaining in a state of unconsolidated democracy, or consolidation of a working democracy.7 Examples of these four possibilities can be found in the varying outcomes of the third wave of democratization. As Diamond outlined, some states in the third wave became pseudo democracies, including the Ukraine, Nigeria, and Indonesia while others such as Spain and Greece became true democratic states.8 The stages involved in a democratic transition tend to unfold in a set sequence. The frst stage involves the introduction of political openness or liberalization,9 which is then followed by democratization.10 Then there is a breakthrough where the regime collapses and a new democratic system emerges. This is followed by a period of consolidation where state institutions are reformed, elections become regularized, and civil society EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 219 grows.11 Liberalization and democratization can take place at varying times during a transition, sometimes one will lead to the other and sometimes they occur at the same time. However, a meaningful transition to democracy requires both elements to eventually occur and mature.12 O’Donnell argues that one should differentiate between the period of demise of authoritarianism and the democratic transition, i.e., a transition to democracy, followed by transitioning to a consolidated democracy.13 According to Gordon one should distinguish between controlled democratization and actual democratization because authoritarian leaders wanting to maintain their regime stability may allow limited democratization as an attempt to legitimize their continued rule.14 Andreas Schedler, who calls controlled democratization, “electoral authoritarianism,” argues that by holding elections these regimes try to create a façade of democracy to hide their authoritarian regimes.15 This was seen in Mubarak’s call for multi-party elections, which were seen as a major step forward for democratization in the Middle East. However, as Wittes writes in her article, “Hosni Mubarak: Elections or No, He’s Still Pharaoh,” this was classic electoral authoritarianism.16 It is argued that for democracy to be consolidated, i.e., made likely to endure, the freedom to elect a government must be institutionalized,17 and political actors must “obey the laws, the constitution, and mutually accepted norms of political conduct.”18 In fact, only a limited number of countries that have undergone transitions to democracy have suc- ceeded in establishing consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. Instead, many of these new regimes have ended up ‘getting stuck’ in transition, or reverting to more or less authoritarian forms of rule.19 In trying to assess the factors that allow a democracy to become consolidated, O’Donnell laid out what he called a ‘strategic perspective’. He found that consolidation required “strategically sophisticated” pro- democratic actors who can combat antidemocratic agents, and integrate neutral parties to their cause.20 A second assessment of the factors allow- ing democracy proposed by Lipset, Cutright, and others, connects a stable democracy with certain economic and social criteria, such as wealthy citizens, high literacy rates, and an urban majority. A third assessment dwells on the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among the citizens,21 and a fourth looks at certain features of social and political structure. Scholars of this fourth conception insist that confict and reconciliation are essential to democracy.22 Dahl and McClosky, among others, have argued that democratic stability doesn’t require just the 220 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION electorate at large to have a commitment to democratic values, but, more importantly, the professional politicians also need to commit.23 Finally, it should be noted that each type of democracy has its own distinctive way of consolidating itself under its own rhythm and sequence; no single path is a guarantee of future stability or viability of all types of democracy.24 To conclude, it is essential to keep in mind that democratization processes are not linear.25 The notion of a ‘transition paradigm,’ in which countries move from authoritarian rule toward democracy through a sequence of stages, has been largely rejected. Many countries have been seen to settle into a ‘gray zone’ of diverse forms of government where autocratic and democratic features are combined. Such countries are no longer seen as simply stalled on the zigzagging road to democracy.26

Egypt: Destabilized Hybrid Regime

It has been apparent for many years now that a great number of new regimes are not truly democratic, or even ‘in transition’ to democracy. Some countries are in the ‘political gray zone’ between democracy and dictatorship and are likely to remain there for a very long time.27 These uncertain or hybrid regimes (combining democratic and authoritarian elements) have been described and classifed in the literature since 1960. In the 1960s and 1970s, there existed multiparty, electoral, but undemocratic regimes.28 In the 1990s, most scholars classifed hybrid regimes as diminished subtypes of democracy making up a wide array of complicated democracy styles emerging during the third wave.29 Since then a variety of labels have been coined for these regimes by different authors: ‘façade democracies’ and ‘quasi-democracies’ (Finer); dictablandas and democraduras (O’Donnell and Schmitter)30; ‘electoral democracies’ (Diamond and Freedom House)31; ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria)32; ‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Levitsky and Way); ‘semi- authoritarianisms’ (Ottaway); ‘defective democracies’ (Merkel); ‘partial democracies’ (Epstein)33; and the ‘authoritarian-democratic hybrid’ (Alfred Stepan, and Juan Linz).34 Standardizing the fne line between democracy and non-democracy has largely been accomplished, but the boundary between authoritarian and hybrid regimes remains blurred. According to Levitsky, and Way, competitive authoritarian regimes regularly hold inclusive, competitive elections, but they often occur with the deck stacked well and truly in the regimes favor. Schedler’s concept of EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 221 electoral authoritarian regimes is similar, but many of the regimes that Schedler considers to be hybrid regimes, such as Egypt, Singapore, and Kazakhstan, are deemed full-scale authoritarian by Levitsky and Way.35 Likewise, while Zakaria considers Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia examples of liberalizing autocracies, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Senegal, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Taiwan are considered electoral autocracies by Larry Diamond.36 These examples highlight the fact that there is still signifcant debate about what constitutes a hybrid—authoritarian bound- ar y. 37 It is therefore important, moving forward, to develop a procedural defnition of a ‘hybrid regime’.38 A minimal and rather vague defnition of a hybrid regime is that it allows democratic institutions but lacks leadership accountability.39 A country without relatively free elections is defned as a non-electoral regime and is, consequently, authoritarian and not a hybrid.40 A hybrid regime can be either a result of a failure to fully transition to democracy, or a technique employed by regimes where they allow multiparty elections and a degree of liberalization to cover up their repressive ways because they are afraid of mounting pressure. Therefore, the term ‘hybrid’ can be applied to all regimes that have persisted, for about a decade, and were preceded by a period of authoritarian control, followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, and liberalization, but the absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy,41 i.e., universal suffrage; free, fair elections; more than one party; and access to various media sources.42 Thus, it is hard to argue with Gilbert and Mohseni, who insist that nondemocratic, non-authoritarian regimes be called ‘hybrids’ rather than democracies or variations on authoritarianism. First of all, this terminology without reference to authoritarianism or democracy is appropriate because it prevents conceptual confusion.43 Additionally, the term ‘hybrid’ highlights the combination of competitiveness along with possible undemocratic elements such as unfair competition.44 Egypt is an ambiguous model and there is debate over whether it should be labeled an authoritarian or hybrid regime. Linz argues that it has all the essential elements of the authoritarian type—limited pluralism, unrestrained leadership, a demobilized populace, and an ideology lack- ing regime.45 However, according to Gilbert and Mohseni, Egypt does not ft the authoritarian type political situation and is neither a hybrid regime, nor a diminished subtype of authoritarianism.46 They contend that Egypt’s complex system of repression and perpetual control along- side democratic institutions and the expansion of civil society makes it 222 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION almost, but not quite, a hybrid.47 Egypt, therefore, according to the previous defnitions, is not a fully autocratic, a fully authoritarian, or a fully hybrid regime; it is rather a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’. Now that the type of political system has been defned, the next question is—can it transition to a fully democratic system? Different scholars present viewpoints with different levels of optimism regarding successful transition. Zakaria states that, not many states have ever transitioned to become mature democracies and, if anything, have shifted towards a growing illiberalism.48Huntington argues that liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable state, meaning that there will be a shift one way or the other.49 According to Leonard Morlino, very few hybrid regimes ever make a full transition,50 but sites Mexico and Peru as examples of successful hybrid to democracy transition states and Russia or Zimbabwe as examples of hybrid to authoritarian transitions.51 This means that Egypt does have a chance, albeit small, of a full transition. So if we accept that a transition from a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’ to a democratic state is possible, the next question is—what steps does Egypt need to take? Egypt needs to pave the way for democratic transition by launching real economic reform; strengthening political parties; expanding civil society; attracting external support for democratic transition; redefning civil–military relations; redefning state-religious relations; reconsidering the rule of law and constitutionalism; and ben- efting from research into failed transitions such as Mali, Mongolia, and Greece.

Six Factors: Six Potentials

Socioeconomic Development and Democratization According to Philippe Schmitter, no single study provides a defnitive answer to the question of what conditions make democracy possible and sustainable. He has observed that, since 1974, the countries attempting democratic transitions have possessed a very wide array of variables. They have differed in levels of economic development, societal organization, geographical location, inter-nation dialogue, size, ethno-linguistic background, culture, religion, and state capacity.52 According to Huntington’s framework, democratization can be achieved if at least one of the following four main approaches is in progress: modernization, societal equality,53 mass mobilization,54 and the EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 223 elite pact.55The Modernization approach states that urbanization, high literacy rates, freedom of thought, transparent and accessible information sources, and technological advancements lead to democratization in societies.56 Lerner considers urbanization to be a factor stimulating education, which in turn accelerates media growth and eventually democratic development.57 On the other hand, Lipset suggested a positive linear relationship between levels of socioeconomic development and democratic development. He doesn’t claim it to be a prerequisite for democratization, but rather he asserts that socioeconomic development allows for ongoing democracy.58 If we look to international examples, however, we can see that economic development is not always that closely linked to democracy. It is true that improving economies affected transitions in Eastern Europe59; however, in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Philippines, regime transitions occurred during deep recessions.60 In Brazil, due to an agreement between elites, economic reform occurred in conjunction with political change.61 Furthermore, while modernization seemed to be a factor in transitions occurring in the 1980s in economically thriv- ing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Chile,62 many of the movements towards formal democracy from the 1980s onward took place in countries with low levels of economic development and other socio-economic indicators.63 These include several African countries, such as Ghana, Benin, and Senegal, and one of the poorest Asian countries, Ban-gladesh. Other very poor countries, such as East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, have moved to democratic systems as they rebuild their econo-mies and states after civil war.64 Similarly, Mali illus- trates the possibility of planting democracy in poor soil, revealing that diffcult conditions are not a barrier to transition.65 The deterioration of economic conditions and consequent public discontent has played a role in precipitating transition in some states. These include Eastern European countries, in which poor economic performance undermined the fragile legitimacy of authoritarian regimes.66 It was also the same case in Indonesia.67 Equally important, it is apparent that economic improve- ment and democratization sometimes advance simultaneously. The Indonesian economy, for instance, steadily strengthened after Suharto’s ouster, thus bolstering the democratic transition.68Przeworski and Limongi found that the less successful democratic regimes are in gen- erating economic growth, the more likely they are to break down.69 On the other hand, widespread public mobilization and threatened violence 224 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION were highly infuential in bringing about democratic change in South Africa, the Philippines, and the Ukraine.70 The process-oriented model of democratization focuses on internal dynamics, for example, Eastern European and Latin American countries experienced democratization transitions that were driven mostly from within.71 However, in Asia, Africa, and other aid-dependent countries external actors played a much stronger role in these political transformations. In many cases, such as Kenya and Nigeria, these transitions were the result both internal and external pressures and incentives, for example, diplomatic pressure and the withholding of aid.72 Schmitter posited that the relative level of ‘civilization’, (literacy, educational attainment or distinctive political culture) did not allow us to predict the future direction of a regime,73 and that any country could make the switch from some form of autocracy to some form of democracy.74 Thus, it is fairly clear that economic development per se is not necessary for democratic transition.75 And Przeworski and Limongi claim that the correla- tion between economic bouancy and democracy is only a refection on the greater stability of wealthy countries, once they have already democratized.76

Egypt’s Socioeconomic State

Overall, after 3 years of El-Sisi rule, the Egyptian economy has dete- riorated from an already dire situation. Egypt has not reached the anticipated targets for poverty reduction and according to the Human Development Index (HDI), in 2015, 26.3% of Egyptians lived below the poverty line.77 Overall debt is more than 100% of GDP.78 Infation increased from 10.1% in 2014 to 10.4% in 2015,79 and according to the World Bank, foreign exchange shortages have limited production and undermined Egypt’s competitiveness.80 In its Global Competitiveness Report, the World Economic Forum ranked Egypt 119th out of 148 countries in 2014/2015. Meanwhile, the World Bank’sDoing Business have Egypt ranked 112th out of 189 countries for “ease of doing business”.81 In May 2016, Standard & Poor’s revised its future outlook of the Egyptian economy from stable to negative, but kept its credit rating unchanged at B-.82 As for human development, Egypt has a low general level of education, with 38% of Egyptians being either illiterate or barely able to read.83 According to the 2015 HDI, Egypt adult literacy rate (ages 15 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 225 and older) is 74%.84 This creates practical problems for this illiterate group, specifcally in reading electoral lists, which is why the candidates in Egypt also use symbols in the electoral lists, printed political programs, political material, and newspapers.85 On the other hand, 31.7% of Egyptians are Internet users,86 and Egypt urbanization is about 43%.87 Consequently, Egypt ranks 108 out of 188 countries in the 2015 HDI, which puts the country in the ‘medium’ human development category.88 Egypt has a dismal record on gender equity. Egypt ranks 131 on the Gender Inequality Index out of 155 countries.89 Importantly, according to the 2014 annual report from Freedom House, Egypt’s political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 and its status declined from Partly Free to Not Free.90 These indicators highlight the fact that Egypt is not ready for democratization, although it has some potential.91 Nevertheless, Egypt’s current political situation is better than that in Mali and Mongolia when they initiated their democratic transition and the Egyptian economy is better than both those examples.

Political Parties and Democratization

The role of political parties in transition differ from one case to another. Sometimes they played a central role, while in other cases they played a minor part. For instance, the frst countries to democratize in Southern Europe and some in Latin America had relatively well-established parties that had survived and struggled against autocracy. They continued to play a key role in the consolidation process, but in Eastern Europe, Chile and Brazil this was not the case, and the role of political parties in democratization were limited.92 However, recently very substantial changes have taken place in the nature and role of parties in well-established Western democracies. According to Schmitter, in well-established Western democracies, by the 1980s citizens were less likely to become members of parties or even to identify regularly with them. Their participation in elections began to decline and so did their trust in party politicians.93 It seems that political parties will not be able to maintain the similar central role they have played in earlier processes of democratization. Nevertheless, according to Francis Fukuyama, political parties are still essential for democracy, and there is no better way of mobilizing a population.94 Therefore, despite the declining role of political parties, they remain one of the only 226 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION means of democratization,95 even if they are weak in the early years of political transitions. For example, Argentina, Romania and Serbia had very weak parties at the beginning of its transition, however, some managed to get stronger over time by learning to campaign, select suitable leaders and raise their profle and therefore win elections.96 Likewise, before undergoing democratic transition in Hungary, only the communist party was established. However, by the time of the frst election in 1990, several parties with distinct profles had emerged. This allowed for a relatively smooth transition and a more stable party system.97 In summary, political parties remain vital for organizing electoral competition at all levels of government, but they have lost a great deal in terms of followers, internal participation, programmatic coherence and credibility.98 For democratization efforts to be successful, opposition parties need to become the key focus because Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), even at their strongest, are not equipped to carry out successful campaigns for democratization.99 It is therefore time perhaps for analysis of Arab democratization to focus less on nongovernmental organizations and more on the importance of developing viable political parties.100

Egypt’s Political Parties The 2015 parliament reveals the sad state of Egypt’s political parties, with 70% of the seats taken by individuals rather than party representatives.101 Interestingly, around 80% belonged to the dissolved NDP and traditional tribes affliated to the party before the 2011 uprising. As was the case before the 2011 uprising, El-Sisi’s 2015 parliament has practically no opposition. Before the 2011 revolution, Egypt had six major political parties, 17 minor parties, and several other legally unrecognized political groups such as the MB.102 However, none had shared power with the ruling regime or even been considered a partner in the political process.103 Throughout the Mubarak regime, the only political space permit- ted was for parties such as the liberal New Wafd Party and the socialist Tagammu’ Party, whose participation in politics was seen by many as an legitimization of a single-party system in return for recognition and access to state patronage.104 Many new parties and social movements have emerged since the 2011 uprising such as the Egyptian Social Democratic Party; Al-Dostour; the Revolutionary Socialists; Tamarod EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 227

(Rebellion); the Revolutionary Path Front; the democratic left; and the Free Egyptians Party. Overall, one can divide Egypt’s parties into three broad categories, the traditional forces, the democratic forces, and the revolutionary forces. These parties suffered from some serious shortcomings. First, Egyptian parties have no sophisticated program in terms of democratization. Even democracy is not an option or priority for these parties. It is the deep-rooted inborn shortcoming that all Egyptian parties and leaders have suffered from since 1920s. Second, was their limited grassroots, which according to Carothers, makes transitioning very diffcult in post-authoritarian situations. Citizens are usually suspicious of any political parties at frst, and so building trust with a support base in a party and party structure can take many years.105 Third, Egypt’s opposition party leaders are mostly out of touch Cairo based elites who do not want to devote time and energy to building sustainable grassroots bases and party networks.106 Fourth, Egypt’s political parties were poorly organized, ideologically fuid and prone to internal division therefore remaining a large disparate group of small parties. Fifth, they suffered from the inability to develop applicable and concrete proposals to solve the country’s most glaring problems, especially the disastrous economic situation.107 Almost all liberal parties have neither clear policy programs nor even general ideas about necessary policy reforms; let alone how to practically implement them.108 Sixth, they suffered from the inability to understand the mechanisms and dynamics of the deep state. They have proven most adept at protesting and overthrowing regimes but still do not understand how the old state system or any possible alternatives actually work.109 Consequently, rather than rally behind opposition political parties when angry with the government, Egyptian feel their only option is to take their protests directly to the streets and public squares.110 However, despite their shortcomings, Egyptian political parties need to play a signifcant role in the mobilization towards democratization. Given the deterioration of the Egyptian socioeconomic situation, the bankruptcy of the Islamists and ineffectiveness of the liberals, the leftists seem like the best option. However, as long as the Islamist threat is under control, the leftists will happily accept authoritarian rule111; therefore, making it unlikely that these leftist forces will take steps to build a cohesive civil democratic movement in the near future.112 Egypt prodemocracy groups need to fnd ways to improve these minimally effective political parties, especially in terms of fnancing. However, Egyptians 228 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION are understandably hesitant to fnance political parties due to their lack of transparency and ineffectiveness.113 Secular parties in particular need more fnancial resources to maintain their existing networks and run well targeted campaigns to communicate their message to potential supporters.114 One potential solution to this issue is public funding. In fact, public funding for political parties is recognized as a core feature of most established democracies and is increasingly utilized in many transition countries. In 2002, about 104 different countries classifed by Freedom House as ‘free’ or ‘partly free’ had public funding in some form or another.115 In his study of public fnancing in Uruguay, Casas-Zamora found that subsidies enabled smaller, left-wing parties to challenge tradi- tionally dominant parties.116 Egypt, however, has had ineffective public funding for political parties since the 1970s, with the government only using public funding as a form of leverage to keep opposition parties in line.117 It is therefore the advocators of democracy should develop a neutral mechanism for funding transparent and internally democratic political parties.118 For example, public funding could be allocated based on seats won (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, and Slovenia) or votes (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovakia) or both (Romania and Poland).119 The government also should provide indirect subsidies such as broadcasting time on public television stations, free posting of campaign materials, and use of public offce space as well as direct subsidies.120 Importantly, public funding for Egypt’s political parties will also partly resolve the problem of foreign groups funding in return for infuence and will improve their reputation.121 In actuality, Egyptian opposition groups to not fare as woefully as political oppositions from some countries that faced similar issues. Egypt’s opposition is nowhere near as toothless at Romania’s during the Ceauşescu years, as shambolic as Argentina’s during the last 10 years or as fractious as Serbia’s in the late 1990s.122

Civil Society and Democratization

Despite widespread recognition of its importance, scholars have not agreed on how to defne civil society, nor the extent of its potential contributions.123 According to Stefanos Vallianatos, civil society refers to “the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affliations.”124 While Fukuyama defnes civil society as “the realm EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 229 of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions.”125 It is composed of NGOs such as political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, community development associations and other interest groups.126 One controversial issue revolves around whether political parties should be covered by these defnitions of civil society. While some scholars, such as Thomas Carothers, suggest yes, arguably most analysts would say otherwise.127 Larry Diamond refers to ten key political functions that civil society may perform. Notable among them are limiting state power; stimulating political participation; fostering democratic predispositions; supplying additional channels outside political parties for articulation and aggre- gation of interests; and training leaders.128 The question here is—how can civil society impact on the process of transition, and in particular of democratization? Monika Wohlfeld refers to some impetus civil society provides to democratic transition. She argues that it allows different groups in a society to familiarize themselves with values, processes and expectations inherent in democracies, including human rights and the rule of law.129 Similarly, according to the mass mobilization approach, civil society plays a very important role in rallying the masses against dic- tatorial regimes,130 and also paving the way for democratic transition. Nongovernmental advocacy organizations in particular are believed to have huge potential in fostering democratization.131 In some international cases of democratic transition, civil society has played a limited role. While, in other cases, it was of great importance, for instance, in countries such as Hungary and Poland, civil society had begun to develop well before their transitions commenced and were able to play important roles in negotiating the transitions. Similarly, strong civil society institutions existing in conjunction with authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines were critical for successful regime changes and for maintaining broad support for democratization.132 Similarly, trade unions and their organizational capacities were important in the development of opposition to one-party rule Zambia, Benin and Ghana and in effectively helping to remove the ruling parties in Zambia and Benin.133 By contrast, whereas some democratized Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan had modern institutions of civil society, Mongolia introduced democracy with practically none.134 Although Egypt has one of the longest histories in the Arab world of organized civil volunteering activity, beginning in the frst decades of 230 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION the twentieth century,135 it seems that Egypt civil society (CS) will not play the same roles played by its counterparts in Southern Europe, Latin America and, Eastern Europe. Egypt civil society suffers from intercon- nected failings. First, civil society in Egypt is actually dominated by illiberal forces,136 and in reality, controlled by the state.137 Second, many civil society organizations (CSOs) are poorly run affairs, often with limited fnances, weak management, limited transparency, a lack of internal democratic governance, and practically no relevant technical expertise.138 Third, the running of civil society institutions in Egypt is dictated by illiberal laws and regulations.139 Fourth, civil society institutions have fragmented along social/religious divides.140 Fifth, the large majority of civil society organizations in Egypt are charitable or services provision organizations, with the more politically-active organizations account- ing for less than 25% of the total (29,000 in 2010). At the outbreak of the revolution, there were only about 60 organizations that explicitly defended human rights and freedoms.141 Thus, their attempts at mobilizing for democratization before the and after the 2011 uprising failed. Sixth, because the government is unable or unwilling to provide social services, the religious-based CSOs in rural areas, where the poorest and most illiterate of Egypt’s population lived, offer social services with one hand and their religious-political anti-democratic discourse with the other. According to some estimates, religious associations represent more than 35% of all associations in Egypt.142 Therefore, the assumption that Egyptian civil society will lead the opposition towards democratization may be a dream, unless Egypt civil society pays attention to the following eight interconnecting factors. First, CSOs should pay attention to the question of building collaboration with political parties and other movements to promote democratic values.143 According to Gershmann, there needs to be collaboration between civil society and political parties in order to “consolidate and institutionalize” a feasible democratic system.144 Second, Egyptian civil society should network with other international and regional civil society organizations, especially those interested in democratization. It is argued that the impact of the civil society depends on its ability to create networks and associations. Successful transitions, therefore, require collaboration among CS actors.145 Third, Egyptian civil society needs to build collaboration with advocacy groups, trade unions, social movements, syndicates, labor movements, independent media people, and social associations, in order to build support groups to aid democratic EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 231 transition. Fourth, Egyptian civil society should pay more specifc attention to the freedom of association and expression, to the rights of the poor and women, and the aspirations of the youth—all of which are fundamental to civic participation.146 Fifth, for Egyptian civil society to play its role effectively, as a whole it must nurture the key attributes of auton- omy, freedom, and a protective legal framework.147 Sixth, Egyptian civil society should aspire to create an egalitarian state by guaranteeing equality and equal participation for all Egyptians without discrimination.148 Seventh, CSOs must develop a detailed plan for their role in Egypt’s future democratization which should take into account international human rights.149 Finally, CSOs should fnd a solution for foreign funding related issues. It is not just the government that is opposed to foreign funding of civil society, but the Egyptian public as well. According to a Gallop poll, 74% of Egyptians disapprove of US funding of Egyptian civil society groups.150 Additionally, the Egyptian regime has used the issue of foreign funding to discredit certain NGOs as well as civil society’s call for democratic reform in general.151 This was dramatically illus- trated in late December 2011 when a number of organizations were raided on suspicion of operating without a license152 or of receiving foreign support.153 In conclusion, effective civil society in Egypt is a cornerstone of any democracy. Civil society counterbalances the power of the state and provides necessary checks and balances that can ensure individual rights and freedoms. It also exposes abuse of power and corruption, pro- motes political participation, and allows for monitoring of electoral processes.154 However, it is vital that civil society should collaborate with other groups and movements in society in order to pave the way for democratic transition.155

External Actors and Democratic Transition

The European Union’s (EU) aid to Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s and the successful second wave of democratization made observ- ers aware of how democratic transitions can be accommodated through regional collaboration.156 Once the EU formally mandated that only long term democracies with free markets were to be admitted to the EU, most of the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe raced to 232 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION meet the conditions for entry.157 While in other formerly Soviet countries like Belarus, Armenia, and Ukraine authoritarian regimes were consolidated due to membership not even being a possibility.158 After the collapse of communism in 1990, the possibility of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU membership became an irresist- ible driver for Polish political, economic, and military reform and for ending conficts with its neighboring countries, particularly the Ukraine and Lithuania.159 The EU, with its multiple incentives, was of great (but not suffcient) importance in countries in Southern Europe democratizing.160 However, foreign aid alone will have little effect on democratization if the other prerequisites of democracy are not met. One of the most important studies on foreign democratization support found that election and civil society support were the most effective types; however, overall, democracy assistance did not account for most of the variation seen in democracy levels.161 As far as Egypt is concerned, internal dynamics were the principal drivers of regime change. External factors had no signifcant role in the downfall of the Mubarak regime or in helping Egypt navigate its frst democratic transitional period after the removal of Mubarak. However, the second democratic transition in Egypt stalled in 2012. Egypt experienced its third transitional period under the interim president Mansour. However, since the election of El-Sisi, Egypt’s democratic transition has been aborted. Egypt is in a state of unfnished revolution and aborted democratization. The key question here is—how can external players (the West and regional organizations) effectively support democratic change in Egypt? In fact, foreign democracy support in Egypt faces four challenges. The frst challenge is the weakness of regional organizations such as League of Arab States (LAS) and the African Union. They neither have the funds or unity of purpose to intervene in the name of democracy. All the LAS members are Sultanistic, authoritarian and dic- tatorial states. Thus, supporting democratization in one member state would be counter to its interests. The second challenge facing foreign democracy assistance is the politicization of ‘foreign funding’. For instance, smear campaigns against activists and government blockades of foreign funding of NGOs reveal the delicate nature of the debate on foreign assistance.162 Third, the public response to foreign democracy funding was largely unwelcoming. Unlike the Czech and Slovak transitions, where locals, governments and civil society responded largely positively to foreign democracy funding, Arab transitions are generally different.163 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 233

The Egyptian public are especially suspicious of the motives of the Western powers when these countries offer or attempt to meddle in its internal politics or its regime transformation.164 Fourth is the impact of Egypt’s geopolitical security situation on democratization, which has two aspects. First, Egypt’s strategic location and its relations with the United States and Israel, coupled with international interests in Egypt, discour- age these powers from supporting democratic transition in Egypt. As Paul Gallaher stated, the United States policy “never had democracy as its paramount goal.”165 Prior to the Arab Spring, the United States preferred stability to reform in the Middle East (Egypt was a prime example), even though stability has been achieved through political reform in many places (Indonesia and many La American countries, for example).166 Second, anti-terrorism operations in the Sinai have practically provided a permanent excuse for authoritarian rule. External factors could still play an important role in Egypt’s future democratization, but only if they are able to apply pressure to the Egyptian regime in a way that is not viewed as intrusive by the public. Western actors must be willing to offer soft, rather than hard, help to further democratization, otherwise Egyptians will question the moti- vation behind Western assistance and accuse those receiving funding as backing foreign ‘hidden agendas’. Security sector reform is one area requiring outside support which could be of the utmost importance. This reform should cover areas such as setting ethical standards for those working in the judicial system; introducing standardized police licensing exams; and improving the prison and court systems in terms of judicial, rule-of-law, and constitutional reform.167 This is an area where both the United States and the EU could support Egypt without angering the Egyptian people or the government. Successfully engaging in what the author terms ‘military diplomacy’ to convince the Egyptian military that democratization should be their long term goal and that repression will ultimately damage its interests will be diffcult, so US policymakers and diplomats will need to operate shrewdly.168 The United States needs to build on its longstanding relationships between military institutions and senior offcers of both countries. Second, for a number of reasons, the United States should pass its leadership role to the EU. Not only is the EU a direct neighbor and therefore able to potentially offer mutually- benefcial market access and mobility, it is also a more welcomed player in Middle East politics than the United States.169 France, rather than the US, could play an important role in Egypt’s democratization. Because of 234 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

Frances’ support for the intervention on July 3 and the El-Sisi regime, plus the fact that France has already supported projects on Egypt’s transitional justice, the Egyptian people would not likely object to France having a role to play in Egypt’s future democratization.170 One area in need of support where low cost assistance could be provided is Egypt’s civil societyorganizations. This should include aid to independent organizations lobbying for democracy and providing civic education, and also to media, anticorruption and human rights monitoring groups. However, at the same time, care should be taken not to harm the reputation of local organizations due to foreign donations.171 There are many initiatives already underway. For instance, German organizations set up the frst protected online space, called the Tahrir Lounge, where reformers can meet. The United Kingdom (UK) has used its Arab Partnership Fund to support programs to educate about rule of law and coalition-building. And several European players have provided help for ‘civil companies’ set up by activists to work around anti-NGO laws. Another area to target is elections, not only because they are likely to have a greater long term impact than other types of aid but also because political restructuring and constitutional reform can occur as a direct result of elections. Elections are not suffcient to create democracy, but they are obviously necessary.172 It would behoove the United States to stop its threat of cutting aid to the Egyptian military.173 Reducing or ending U.S. military and economic aid would probably be counterpro-ductive for at least two reasons. First, if Western states limited aid, it would not be seen by the Egyptian public as being in support of the principles of democracy. Instead, it would be taken as a sign of western backing for the Brotherhood174 which could be used to generate additional public support for even more repression.175 Second, a suspension of western economic aid would encour- age Egypt to turn to the East.176 Thus, a reduction of western aid is not likely to have much of an infuence on the Egyptian economy, and will result in a reduction of western infuence.177 However, this does not mean that the current Egyptian government should receive unconditional support from foreign powers. Ongoing support should be provided on the basis of democratization progress. By remaining engaged with Egypt, the international community can maintain a dialogue relating to high-level policy change with the goal of improved inclusivity.178 Achieving inclusive growth (and democracy) is linked to (1) the existence of institutions tasked with improving EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 235 transparency, voice and accountability in decision-making; (2) an expansion of the middle class; and (3) the growth of small businesses.179 To conclude, the international community is morally obliged to help Egypt avoid returning to the re-pressive ways of the Mubarak regime. The United States and other Western powers should not make it their business to actively support the opposition. However, informed by lessons from other transitions, they should approach Egypt’s new political landscape with an open mind.180

State-Religion Relations

Islam and Democracy One factor that has led to Egypt’s stalled democratic transition is the complicated relationship between Islam and politics and a lack of constitutional direction on the state-religion relationship. We can identify three different approaches which examine the relationship between Islam and democracy. The frst approach argues that Islam and democracy are incompatible181 due to democracy requiring openness, pluralism, and diversity, all of which are in direct contrast to what some scholars label the ‘undemocratic’ Islamic faith, which this approach characterizes as “intolerant of intellectual freedom and requiring of an absolute obedi- ence for authority.”182 The second approach states that Islam and democracy are compatible, but only under particular conditions. John Esposito and John Voll, in their seminal study, argue that the Islamic faith allows for the development of a democratic discourse.183 They argue that if Islamic groups are allowed to enter politics, they become an integral part of the democratic system democratization is encouraged.184 According to this approach, many Muslim dominated countries such as Bangladesh, Senegal, and Indonesia, have had mainly successful democratic systems,185 and the number of Muslims living in democratic nations is almost at 500 million.186 A third camp argues that Islam’s compatibility with democracy; comes down to the participation of Islamic groups in democratic political institutions. Vali Nasr, the prominent scholar of this approach, argues that, for the full democratization of Islamic movements, two conditions should 236 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION be met: the military should withdraw from politics; and an Islamic middle class should emerge as a result of economic liberalization.187

What is Needed for Islam to Democratize? What is needed for both democracy and religion to coexist, according to Alfred Stepan, is “institutional differentiation”,188 between religion and politics (also known as ‘twin toleration’). According to Stepan, there are multiple relations between the state, religion and society, which he labels “multiple secularisms.”189 Indonesia and Senegal embraced the twin toleration model and in doing so, embraced a new conceptual framework for democratization that is compatible with Islamic political theology.190 For instance, according to Stepan, to redress the state-religion connec- tion in their country, Indonesian Muslim leaders mention that the Koran does not talk about the need for implementing Shari’a or creating an Islamic state.191 Thus, as of publication, no Muslim-majority democracy has established shari‘a as its legal code, and none has made Islam its fundamental religion.192 Regarding public policies, India, Indonesia, and Senegal have adopted policies encouraging mutual respect and cooperation between religions, resulting in these countries embracing more religions than all of Western Europe.193 All three countries also grant state funds to various religions, particularly for schools and hospitals associated with them.194 India, Indonesia, and Senegal also embrace greater degrees of cooperation between the state and religion than France or the US195 Stepan’s main recommendation to the people of the Arab world, where many view secularism as detrimental to religion, is to study the progress that Indonesia and Senegal have made toward realign- ing religion, state, and society to ensure Islam and democracy are both served.196 Egypt, it seems, has embraced some aspects of Stepan’s model, but democracy has not come about as a result. For example, in Egypt, in addition to Islamic holidays, Coptic Christians have a paid holiday during many of their religious festivals. The problem is that Egypt has political Islam movements which are against democracy and divided secular and liberal movement, all of whom struggle to fnd common ground. Therefore, to embrace Stepan’s model, Egypt should rethink the role of Islam in politics; unify secular and liberal forces; and spread values and culture associated with democracy. EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 237

Secularism vis-à-vis Islamism Proponents of secularism often promote it as the best way to ensure a fair, tolerant and pluralistic society where one religion does not control the government.197 The secularism found most often in the Arab world is the Turkish and French model or laïcisme which is distinctly anti-religious and seeks to remove all religious expression and symbols from the public sphere.198 YoussefAl-Qaradawi states that Islamists fnd it impos- sible to separate religion and politics,199 unlike Christians who seem to embrace it. Secularism, Qaradawi argues, is an unacceptable subordina- tion of Islam and a reduction of its rightful domination of daily life.200 Views such as this reveal the greatest threat to Egypt’s democratization post 2011—the ideological differences regarding Islam in politics between Islamists and secularists; this is a debate which began in the 1920s with the establishment of the MB. Another threat was the internal ideological fractures occurring in Islamist groups and secular forces, specifcally regarding Islam’s role in politics and the appropriateness of democracy as a system for governance. For example, some fundamental- ist groups such the Salafst Call, Gamaa Al-Islamiya and Al-Jihad believe that Islam rightly deserves a central role in politics and that an Islamic state should be immediately founded and governed by Shari‘a; however the MB believed that these goals should be achieved gradually. The only two things the Islamist camp has really agreed upon is their disdain for inclusivity and liberalism that secularists and democracy are associated.201 However, while these incompatibilities between secularists and Islamists complicate the democratic transition, they do not make it impossi- ble. The disagreement between Islamists and secularists, according to Dankwart Rustow (who calls it ‘family feuding’), may actually promote democratic transition. He argues that when two side fear the other is unbeatable they resort to utilizing institutions to come to a peaceful understanding.202 The outcomes will depend on the ability of the two groups to work out their differences to allow coexistence, and of centrist forces to lessen the polarization through growth.203 However, this will only be able to happen once the regime changes perceptions on the role of Islam in politics. The future democratization in Egypt cannot be successful when a part of its political force, political Islam forces, harbors antidemocratic and religiously authoritarian tendencies and sometimes terrorist behav- ior. As a result, democratizing political Islam is an urgent necessity. 238 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

This process requires broad intellectual reforms on questions of pluralism, citizenship, freedoms, and state-religion relations.204 The government should also obligate all Islamist political parties to dissolve all their proselytizing arms. The FJP and the MB should be merged to become one entity. As should the Salafst CallAl-Nour Party. All political parties, be they secular, Islamist, should not use mosques and Islamic establish- ments for political and electoral campaigns. The government should obligate Islamist parties to not mention anything in their programs and practices, which contradict with these values. Like religious-and ideological-oriented parties in Western Europe, Islamists will probably be transformed by political engagement and governance. Their desire for reelection would hopefully have a moderating infuence on Islamist parties throughout the region.205 Furthermore, as demonstrated in the history of European political parties, political movements can begin on a non-democratic ideological basis and gradually evolve to the point of actively participating in the democratization of their policies (e.g., the Communist Party in Italy after the Second World War).206 Despite fear mongering, Islamists are not in such a strong position politically. If the political system gave the opportunity to compete freely with other political forces, it would be minor political forces. The Islamists parties could not win the majority of the parliament or the presidential seat without the non-Islamists’ votes as their supporters comprise around 30% of the total electorate; however, the absence of democracy and freedom in the country gave the Islamists an advantage since they were the only dissent- ing force that could secretly organize—because of their access to places of worship—at times when political opposition was banned.207

No Fear of Islamism Actually, the infuence and size of the following of political Islam has begun to shrink since 2011. Polls in August 2011 found that 44% of Egyptians wanted an Islamic state, 46% preferred a secular model, and 10% wanted a strong state even if it was not democratic.208 Polls con- ducted ahead of Egypt’s May 2012 presidential election revealed that an average of 35% of voters who had voted for the FJP would not vote for it in a coming election. Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) and the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) polls in Egypt show that, while more than 65% of Egyptians voted for Islamists in the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, only 25% of the survey EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 239 respondents agreed or strongly agreed that religion should have an infuence on government.209 The political developments throughout the last 8 months of Morsi’s rule suggest that the Islamists no longer enjoy over- whelming support in Egypt.

The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism and the rule of law are indispensable for democracy.210 Democracy that is not based on rule of law is fawed.211 Egypt has suffered from a failure to abide by a rule of law, as demonstrated by Morsi’s Protest Law which restricted individual and political rights. Egypt is in dire need of a rule of law to ensure political rights and civil liberties are protected; to guarantee accountability and equal treatment of all citizens; and prevent abuses by the state.212 O’Donnell suggested that the freedoms (of expression, association, movement, and the like) are usually considered necessary to the existence of a democratic regime.213 Related to the aforementioned rights is the freedom of the press, which is considered one of the most fundamental requirements for constitutional democracy. Only a truly free press can provide citizens with alternative sources of information.214 Besides civil liberties, constitutionally guaranteeing social participation allows many areas of governance to be democratic processes.215 The government is the one institution that has the capacity to protect those rights, but vigilance must be maintained as it is the most well placed and motivated to violate these rights.216 A democratic rule of law has many dimensions. The frst is its relation to the legal system which covers the application of rules that limit and punish discrimination against the minority groups such as women and foreigners.217 It requires an understanding that the constitution and the constitutional court has supremacy over all other documents and agents.218 The Second dimension of the rule of law is in relation to the state and the government. There must be powerful state institutions to enforce accountability, including cases of illegal actions by government offcials themselves.219 Additionally, state institutions must treat all citizens with the respect they deserve or face the consequences.220 Third, the rule of law is important in relation to the judicial system. The judiciary must be free of infuences from outside interests, including corpo- rate, government and private ones. Additionally, citizens should have 240 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION quick and effcient access to many different branches of the judicial system.221 A democratic rule of law should result in all people, no matter their status, having access to courts and lawyers. Also, the security forces, including the police, must respect people’s rights and not incarcerate people unnecessarily. If jailing is deemed absolutely necessary the dignity of prisoners must be a priority.222 In brief, to ensure rights are protected and equality for all, every country needs a robust rule of law enforced by a just judicial system.223 On the other hand, constitutionalism is a complicated system of checks and balances needed to stop power accumulating and make sure those in power are fair. A constitutional system requires more than simply coming up with a list of rights; a system needs to be created in which government will not violate those rights.224 While shifts of power refect- ing changing majorities is a fundamental part of democracy, constitutionalism ensures that those wielding this power are kept in check.225 Unfortunately, Egypt lacks most of the components of a constitutional system. Egypt, therefore, needs to reform both the rule of law and its constitutional system. This can really only be done by amending the 2014 constitution and other laws and regulations that restrict public liberties. For Egypt to become a true democracy, the government must draft a new constitution that is consistent with the democratic rule of law and the principles of constitutionalism.226 Egyptian politicians and citizens should make it a goal to amend certain articles of the constitution that contradict with the rule of law and the principles of constitutionalism. This has been achieved in Chile, for example, where, over a 16 year period starting in 1990, the constitution was amended 17 times, resulting the successful gradual removal of military prerogatives.227 Egypt can learn from other nations that have successfully transitioned into free democracies such as Benin and Malawi and numerous other formerly authoritarian states.228 First and foremost, Egypt should follow Benin’s lead and continue to grant more authority to the SCC in order to create a truly independent court with enough authority to uphold the constitution and Egyptians rights. Egypt should also follow Malawi’s lead who adopted the ombudsmen system to protect civil liberties, thus creating a more transparent system where accountability is an integral part.229 Ghana and Zambia are also good examples of systems of government that underwent constitutional change to prioritize accountability, EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 241 especially for the president. Jerry Rawlings, the ex-president of Ghana, is being prosecuted in criminal court for alleged abuses of power, and in Zambia, one time president Frederick Chiluba was made to face prosecution on corruption charges. Egyptians must also be prepared to hold their leaders accountable for wrong doing by demanding they abide by the constitution.230 Egypt also needs to improve its record regarding religious freedoms. The majority of Egyptians are Sunni, but its minority groups of Coptic Christians and secular Sunnis need support to protect them from Sunni Islamists.231 Some steps have been taken to address this issue, for example, in October 2011 a law was proposed which guaranteed the right to build places of worship232; however, due to Islamist pressure the law was passed by parliament only on August 30, 2016. Because Egypt is over- whelmingly Muslim (90%), and has a constitution that states that Sharia law underpins all legislation, it faces a hard road ahead in establishing fair policies regarding religious freedom.233 However, including all of Egypt’s religious minorities in in the political system is the only real way to guarantee long term stability.234 Furthermore, Ackerman has suggested that Egypt should adopt a full parliamentary system in order to avoid the situation where another seem- ingly well intentioned politician becomes a dictator. This kind of system also allows the formation of a government that provides checks on the majority party and full representation for any minority parties.235 Because every political party in Egypt wants to have a candidate run for president, the liberal movement in Egypt has become fractured, i.e., presidentialism has lead to a lack of unity and representativeness.236 To conclude, with the backing of a liberal constitution, democracy is not only bound to fail it also has dangerous repercussions including possible repression, corruption and even civil war.237 Thus, both Egypt’s people and its politicians need to commit to democracy and put systems in place to protect it. Both need to understand that the temptation to return to authoritarianism is always present and needs to be made impos- sible.238 The keys in achieving sustainable democracy are realism (power corrupts), consensual goals, and determination over the long term, especially in Egypt’s case where there is a long history of abuses, marginaliza- tion of minorities, and limited social welfare.239 242 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

Egypt and Other Failed and Unconsolidated Democratic Models

In fact, while models are sometimes useful for trying to learn broad lessons, they sometimes obscure more than they reveal. Comparative the- orists, transitologists, and democracy advocators often pick the wrong examples; they look to the most successful democracies rather than to countries with problems similar to their own that seem to have made progress. Of the successful examples—some had the support of external parties such as the EU, NATO, and the US; some had active political parties; and others had healthy civil societies. However, Egypt had none of these. So it’s important to fnd appropriate and applicable examples for Egypt to learn from. Egypt should especially learn from the incom- plete examples so as to avoid their mistakes and make up for their shortcomings. The examples that achieved partial success democratization reform could be more appropriate for the Egyptian case than the more successful examples as Egypt lacks at this critical moment some requirements to achieve comprehensive democratization. Hence, Egypt can learn a great deal from Mali, Mongolian, and Greek models.

Why Did the Mali Experience Fail? Prior to the March 2012 coup and occupation of the north by Islamic militants, Mali was seen around the world as a case of successful democratization. However, their transition, that began in 1991 and lasted for 21 years, was doomed to fail.240 Many factors were responsible for Mali’s democratization. First was the total lack of a rule of law resulting in widespread corruption. This even extended to the military being responsible for drug traffcking.241 Second, was the belief among the population that democracy just ‘did not work’ which led to the end of Touré’s administration.242 The third factor was the lack of national and social cohesion in the country, which Rustow judges to be essential for a successful transition.243 The fourth factor relates to the political and economic reforms that happened before Mali had really developed an identity and solidifed its borders.244 And fnally, Mali failed to address the relationship between state and religion, i.e., Islam’s role in politics was not clear. And this led to Islamists seizing territory in an attempt to implement Shari’a law.245 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 243

The lessons that Egypt may learn from the failed Malian democratic model is the need to (1) address corruption, (2) create a democratic rule of law, (3) ensure societal cohesion, especially in terms of minorities and marginalized groups, and (4) try and defne the role of Islam in politics. Including communities in trying to forge better cohesion in society though decentralized, nonpoliticized action groups is an area Egypt could work on.246

Mongolia: An Unconsolidated Democratic Model Mongolia is one of the very frst countries to emerge from communism and transition successfully in terms of political and civil rights and freedom of the press. It is exceptional as it lacked what were considered the ‘prerequisites’ for democracy.247 Five factors helped facilitate Mongolia transition to democracy. First, as Mongolia is relatively poor, with low geostrategic importance and a small population, foreign interests left it to its own devises,248 which helped on the path to democratization.249 The second reason is that Mongolia had no charismatic leader at the time of transition who could have potentially seized power.250 And fnally, Mongolia’s constitution does not allow for a concentration of executive power.251 Nevertheless, the Mongolia model has proven to be an unsustainable democracy.252 Mongolia has a population that does not care about the political process and authoritarianism is present but hidden from view.253 Political rights have increased in the country but at the same time civil rights and equality have taken a back seat. After examining this model Egypt should take heed of the dangers of corruption and institute a democratic rule of law in order to strike a balance between protecting political rights and civil rights.

Why Did the Greek Transition Fail? Prime Minister Karamanlis managed to transform Greece into a liberal, democratic, economically sound state in only 2 years starting in 1972.254 However, unfettered patron-client relations resulted in the rapid decline of the democratic system. The lesson that Egypt might learn from the failed Greek model is that when corruption, unchecked patron-client relationships and a failure 244 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION to impose rule of law occur, democracy is doomed to fail. If and when Egypt begins transitioning towards democracy, it should take steps to avoid falling into the populist democracy trap. By examining these models, it is clear that Egypt is still a long way from being classed as a true democracy. It has potential, but its future is unclear. Egypt’s future transition is not liable to be smooth and, thus, if it happens, it will probably take a good decade or more.255 It is encouraging to know that democracy, according to Schmitter, seems to be possible across a wide range of social, cultural and economic settings. Egypt can fnd hope in Schmitter views that it is possible to transition without having to use violence against the previous authoritarian regime,256 without huge public demonstrations to remove the regime,257 without substantial economic development,258 without the presence of an infuential middle- class,259 and without much in the way of civil society or democrats.260

A New Perspective: From the Modernization Approach to Rustow’s Model

Rustow’s model of democratization identifes one background precondi- tion and three subsequent phases which are thought to be integral to establishing long term democracy.261 Rustow stated that certain features are vital for transition to occur. National unity, some form of confict and a realization of the need for democratic rules.262 He also states that various economic and social factors may contribute, a national unity is really the only necessary factor need to start the transition.263 The second phase, according to Rustow, is the Preparatory Phase. In this phase, a country honestly faces up to its problems and comes up with solutions to them.264 The third phase is decision phase where usually a small circle of leaders is likely to play a large role. The fnal phase is the Habituation Phase,265 whereby wide ranging acceptance is developed.266 Egypt, according to Rustow’s model, seems to be nearing the end of the preparatory phase and moving into the decision phase, but it has yet to enter the third and the fourth phase which are the most diffcult for a country to complete and hence move from an autocracy into a full-fedged democracy. Can Egypt accomplish them successfully? This will depend on the factors addressed by the previous two phases. No EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 245 one doubts Egypt’s ability to mobilize and remove heads of state, but it remains to be seen if democratic transition and consolidation are possible.

Notes

1. Transitology is an approach to the study of political, economic, and social change that conceptualizes these processes as a transition with a pre-deter- mined endpoint. See for more details Gans-Morse, Jordan, Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myths of a Dominant Paradigm (Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2004: 320–349), pp. 320–321. 2. Gordon, Alissa Emily, The Collapse of the Arab Spring: Democratization and Regime Stability in Authoritarian Regimes, Master Thesis in Security Studies, Georgetown University, April 16, 2010, pp. 7–8. 3. Lipset, Seymour Martin, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy (the Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1959), pp. 69–105), p. 71. 4. Ibid. 5. Eric, Leckie, the Muslim Brotherhood, op. cit., pp. 26–27. 6. Gordon, Alissa Emily, The Collapse of the Arab Spring, op. cit., pp. 6–8. 7. Schmitter, Philippe C., Refections on Transitology & Consolidology—before and after. Available at: http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/ SPS/Profles/Schmitter/RefectiononTransitologyrev.pdf, pp. 6–16. 8. Sarıhan, Ali, Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave, op. cit., pp. 80–81. 9. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in their essay “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies”, state that liberalization can include freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of expression and right to dissent form government policies, freedom from cen- sorship, and other rights. See for more details Gordon, Alissa Emily, The Collapse of the Arab Spring, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 10. O’Donnell and Schmitter defne democratization as: “the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.” See for more details, Gordon, Alissa Emily, The Collapse of the Arab Spring, op. cit., pp. 6–8. 11. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 12. Eric, Leckie, the Muslim Brotherhood, op. cit., pp. 26–27. 246 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

13. Mainwaring, Scott, Transition to Democracy, and Democratic Consoli dation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues, Working Paper, No. 130, November 1989, p. 4. 14. Gordon, Alissa Emily, The Collapse of the Arab Spring, op. cit., p. 12. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., pp. 32–33. 17. O’Donnell, Guillermo, Illusion about Consolidation (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2: 34–51, 1996), 36. 18. Scheduler, Andreas, Measuring Democratic Consolidation, (Studies in Comparative International Development, Spring 2001, Vol. 36, No. 1: pp. 66–92), p. 71. 19. Menocal, Alina Rocha et al., Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries, background note (2), Prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy and Development, 10–12 October 2007, p. 3. 20. Scheduler, Andreas, Measuring Democratic Consolidation, op. cit., p. 77. 21. Rustow, Dankwart A., Transitions to Democracy, op. cit., pp. 337–338. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Schmitter, Philippe, Refections on Transitology & Consolidology, op. cit., pp. 15–16. 25. Menocal, Alina Rocha et al. Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., p. 3. 26. Miller Laurel E. et al., Democratization in the Arab World, op. cit., p. xvii. 27. Diamond, Larry Jay, Elections Without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2002: 21–35), p. 23. See also Gans-Morse, Jordan, Searching for Transitologists, op. cit., pp. 339–340. 28. Diamond, Larry Jay, Elections Without Democracy, op. cit., p. 23. 29. Gilbert, Leahand Mohseni, Payam, Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes, Published Online on July 28, 2011: 270–297, Available at: http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~ggoertz/ pol682qm/Gilbert_Mohseni2011.pdf, p. 274. 30. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, in their book Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, tried to come up with the contrast between a liberalized authoritarian regimes (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy(democradura). Despite their attempts to identify different hybrid forms of inferior democracy, they did not think of the qualifers as adjectives but, rather, as distinctive sub-types. See for more details Schmitter, Philippe C., Defects and Defcits in the Quality of Neo-Democracy, in Democratic Defcit: Addressing Challenges to Suitability and Consolidation around the world, edited by Bland, Gary, and Arnson, EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 247

Cynthia J., (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, January 2009: 19–35), p. 19. 31. The term ‘electoral democracies’ is also used by Freedom House with a similar meaning. See for more details Morlino, Leonard, Are There Hybrid Regimes, Or Are They just Optical Illusion (European Political Science Review (2009), 1/2: 273–296), pp. 277–278. 32. Illiberal democracies/hybrid regime according to Fareed Zakaria, are “far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.” See for more details Zakaria, Fareed, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November–December, 1997), pp. 22–43, pp.23–24. 33. Morlino, Leonard, Are There Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., pp. 273–274. See also Cheibub, José Antonio, and Vreeland, James R., Economic Development, Democratization and Democracy, Paper Presented at the 3rd International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, University of Oslo, January 12–13, 2012, p. 22. 34. Stepan, Alfred and Linz, Juan J.‚ Democratization theory, op. cit., pp. 20–22. 35. Gilbert, Leahand Mohseni, Payam, Beyond Authoritarianism, p. 274. 36. Diamond, Larry Jay, Elections Without Democracy, op. cit., p. 23. 37. Gilbert, Leah and Mohseni, Payam, Beyond Authoritarianism, op. cit., p. 274. 38. Ibid., p. 278. 39. Schmitter, Philippe C., Refection on “Transitology” op. cit., pp. 18–19. 40. Gilbert, Leah and Mohseni, Payam, Beyond Authoritarianism, op. cit., p. 281. 41. Morlino, Leonard, Are There Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., pp. 282–283. 42. Morlino, Leonard, Hybrid Regimes or Regimes in Transitions? FRIDE, Working paper, No. 70, September 2008, pp. 3–4. 43. Gilbert, Leah and Mohseni, Payam, Beyond Authoritarianism, op. cit., pp. 278–279. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Miller Laurel E. et al., Democratization, op. cit., p. 83. 48. Zakaria, Fareed, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, op. cit., pp. 23–24. 49. Krastev, Ivan, Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy‚ Volume 22, Number 2, April 2011, pp. 5–16, 8–9. 50. Morlino, Leonard, Are There Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., pp. 284–285. 51. Ibid. 248 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

52. Schmitter, Philippe C.‚ Wagemann, Claudius; and Obydenkova, Anastassia, Democratization and State Capacity, August 2005, Available at: http:// unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/clad/clad00 52201.pdf, p. 3. 53. The social equality approach states that the existence of high levels of inequality among various social groups in the country increases the like- lihood of democratization. See for more details Sarıhan, Ali, Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave, op. cit., pp. 68–69. 54. The mass mobilization approach states that the majority of society believes that they must carry out democratization and they must bring democratic values to their societies through civil resistance, uprisings or revolutions. Sarıhan, Ali, Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave, op. cit., pp. 68–69. 55. The Elite pact approach asserts that even though no mass support for democratization exists, elites spearhead democratization in their societies for relatively consistent reasons across contexts. The Elite pact approach is certainly not the case for Arab spring countries. See for more details Kirkova, Rina; and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization in Post Arab Spring Societies (International Journal of Social Science, Vol. III, No. 1, 2014, 29–40), pp. 34–35. 56. See for more details Kirkova, Rina, and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization, pp. 34–35; and Sarıhan, Ali, Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave, op. cit., pp. 68–69. 57. Arat, Zehra, Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited (Comparative Politics, October 1988, Vol. 21, No. 1: pp. 21–36), pp. 21–22. 58. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 59. Miller Laurel E. et al., Democratization, op. cit., pp. 185–186. 60. Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert, the Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997: 263–283), p. 269. 61. UNDP, The Political Economy of Transition, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 62. Fukuyama, Francis, Political Order in Egypt, the American Interest, May/June, 2011 Issue, Available at: http://www.the-american-interest. com/article.cfm?piece 953. = 63. Menocal, Alina Rocha et al. Hybrid Regimes‚ op. cit., pp. 5–6. 64. Diamond, Larry, Why Wait for Democracy? (The Wilson Quarterly, Winter, 2013), pp. 6–7. 65. Despite being extremely poor, having no previous democratic experience, and dealing with a separatist movement, in 2011 Mali was one of only nine sub-Saharan African countries that Freedom House rated EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 249

“free.” See for more details, Miller Laurel E. et al., Democratization in the Arab World, op. cit., p. 11. 66. Ibid., p. xi. 67. Ibid., p. xiii. 68. Ibid. 69. Menocal, Alina Rocha et al., Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., pp. 4–5. 70. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Schmitter, Philippe C., Intermediaries in the Consolidation of Neo- Democracies: the Role of Parties, Association and Movements, Working Paper, No. 130, Barcelona 1997, p. 3. 74. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous Democratization and Its Implications for MENA, September 2012, Available at: http://www.iri. usp.br/documentos/pos_aula_inaugural_ambidextrous_democratization. pdf, pp. 3–4. 75. Menocal, Alina Rocha et al., Hybrid Regimes, op. cit., pp. 5–6. 76. Capoccia, Giovanni and Ziblatt, Daniel, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series, No. 177, 2010, p. 7. 77. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development, UNDP, 2015, p. 225. 78. Cook, Steven A., and Sabbagh, Hasib J., Egypt’s Solvency Crisis,” Contingency Planning Memorandum, No. 20 (Council on Foreign Relations, April 2014), Available at: http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts- solvency-crisis/p32729. 79. See for more detail CIA’s World Factbook, Egypt, Available at: https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html. 80. World Bank, Egypt overview, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/ en/country/egypt/overview. 81. Smith, Ben, Egypt under Sisi, Number 7146, February 26, 2016, House of Commons, Available at: http://researchbriefngs.parliament. uk/ResearchBriefng/Summary/SN07146. 82. Egypt Daily News, May 20, 2016. 83. Erle, Jakob et al., Political Culture, op. cit., pp. 17–18. 84. UNDP, Human Development Report 2015, op. cit., p. 263. 85. Erle, Jakob et al., Political Culture, op. cit., pp. 17–18. 86. UNDP, Human Development Report 2015, op. cit., p. 263. 87. Kirkova, Rina; and Milosevska, Tanja, op. cit.‚ pp. 34–35. 88. UNDP, Human Development Report 2015, op. cit., p. 48. 89. Ibid., pp. 221, 225, and 243. 250 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

90. Puddington, Arch, Freedom in the World 2014, the Democratic Gap: Highlights from Freedom House’s Annual Report on Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Freedom House 2014, p. 8. 91. Kirkova, Rina; and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization, op. cit., pp. 34–35. 92. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous Democratization, op. cit., pp. 11–14 and UNDP, The Political Economy of Transition, op. cit., pp. 10–11. 93. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous Democratization, op. cit., p. 14. 94. Diamond, Larry et al., Discussion: Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 2014: 86–100), pp. 98–99. 95. Carothers, Thomas, Egypt’s Dismal Opposition: A Second Look, May 14, 2013, Available: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/14/egypt-s- dismal-opposition-second-look/g3cf. 96. Ibid. 97. Miller Laurel E., et al., Democratization, op. cit., p. 188. 98. Schmitter, Philippe C., Refection on “Transitology” Before and After, op. cit., pp. 10–11. 99. Langohr, Vickie, Too Much Civil Society, too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regime (Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004: 181–204), pp. 182–183. 100. Ibid. 101. Smith, Ben, Egypt under Sisi, op. cit. 102. Ammar, Dina, Public Funding of Political Parties: the Case of Egypt, in Public Funding Solutions for Political Parties in Muslim-Majority Societies, International Foundation for Electoral System: 50–62, 2009, pp. 52–53. 103. Abu-Zaid, Reem Awny, Institutionalizing the revolutionary movement: a study in the Transformations of the Egyptian public sphere, Master Thesis in Political Science, The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences, July 2012, p. 58. 104. Miller Laurel E. et al., Democratization, op. cit., pp. 91–92. 105. Carothers, Thomas, Egypt’s Dismal Opposition, op. cit. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. El-Sherif, Ashraf, Egypt’s Post-Mubarak, op. cit., pp. 35–36. 109. Ibid. 110. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous, op cit.‚ pp. 13–14. 111. El-Sherif, Ashraf, Egypt’s Post-Mubarak t, pp. 35–36. 112. Ibid. 113. International Foundation for Electoral System, Public Funding, pp. 104–108 and see also see for Argentina, Petras. James Egypt and Argentina: The Right-Left Alliance, Global Research, December 10, EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 251

2012, Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/egypt-and-argentina- the-right-left-alliance/5314891. 114. International Foundation for Electoral System, Public Funding, op. cit., pp. 107–108. 115. Ibid., p. 30. 116. Ibid., pp. 31–32. 117. Ammar, Dina, Public Funding, op. cit., pp. 59–60. 118. Ibid., p. 9. 119. Ibid., pp. 59–60. 120. Ibid., pp. 107–108. 121. El-Agati, Mohamed, Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution, FRIDE Working Paper, 2013, pp. 4–5. 122. Carothers, Thomas, Egypt’s Dismal Opposition, op. cit. 123. Schmitter, Philippe C., Some Propositions About Civil Society, op. cit., p. 2. 124. Vallianatos, Stefanos, Arab Civil Society at the Crossroad of Democratization: the Arab Spring Impact, Center for International and European Studies (CIES), and Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Neighborhood Policy Paper, February 2013, pp. 2–3. 125. Kirkova, Rina and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization, op. cit., pp. 34–35. 126. Vallianatos, Stefanos, Arab Civil Society, op. cit., pp. 2–3. 127. Wohlfeld, Monika, Challenges Facing Societies in Transitions, pp. 30–31. 128. Lodge, Tom, African Civil Society and Democratization, in “Civil Society and Democratization in Societies in Transition”, edited by Wohlfeld, Monika (Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), Malta, January 2014), p. 64. 129. Wohlfeld, Monika, Challenges Facing Societies in Transitions, op. cit., pp. 32–33 and Langohr, Vickie, Too Much Civil Society, too Little Politics, pp. 200–201. 130. Kirkova, Rina; and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization, op. cit., pp. 34–35. 131. Langohr, Vickie, Too Much Civil Society, op cit., pp. 200–201. 132. Miller Laurel E. et al. Democratization, op. cit., p. 10. 133. Lodge, Tom, African Civil Society, op. cit., pp. 77–78. 134. Gambat, Gamba, The Mass Public and Democratic Politics in Mongolia, Asian Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development, Working Paper Series, No. 29, Asian Barometer Project Offce, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica, 2004, pp. 31–32. 135. Langohr, Vickie, Too Much Civil Society, op. cit., pp. 182–183. 136. Miller Laurel E. et al, Democratization, pp. 91–92. 252 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

137. Ibid. 138. Kirkova, Rina, and Milosevska, Tanja, The Success of Democratization, op. cit., pp. 34–35. 139. By the end of 2016, the Egyptian parliament enacted a very harsh new law for Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations to the replace that of Mubarak’s Law 84 (2002) that governed NGOs since 2002. El-Sis law is more repressive than that of Mubarak’s or that suggested by Morsi in 2013. See for more details on El-Sisi NGOs law, Hassan, Khaled, Will new law restrict Egyptian NGOs’ activities? Al-Monitor, Egypt pulse, availed at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/12/egypt-law-regulate-civil-organization-activities-funding. html. Accessed on February 5, 2017. 140. Wohlfeld, Monika, Challenges Facing Societies in Transitions, op. cit., p. 38. 141. El-Agati, Mohamed, Foreign Funding, op. cit., pp. 4–5. 142. Hassan, Hamdy A., Civil Society in Egypt under Mubarak Regime (Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 2.2, Quarter II, 2011: 1–18), p. 12. 143. Wohlfeld, Monika, Challenges Facing Societies in Transitions, op. cit., pp. 36. 144. Ibid. 145. Ibid., p. 42. 146. Hobbs, Jeremy, A civil society transition, Al-Ahram Weekly, April 24, May 5, 2011. 147. Vallianatos, Stefanos, Arab Civil Society at the Crossroad of Demo cratization, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 148. Makram-Ebeid, Mona, Human rights and Egypt’s future, Al-Ahram Weekly, October 4–10, 2012. 149. Katia, Papagianni, Constitution & Religious Minorities: Safeguarding the Right of Religious Minorities Center for Humanities Dialogue, Genève, Switzerland, January 2012, pp. 3–4. 150. Nkrumah, Gamal, Benefactor or back-stabber, Abul-Naga under fre, Al-Ahram Weekly, January 9–15, 2012. 151. El-Agati, Mohamed, Foreign Funding, op. cit., p. 1. 152. See for more details Miller Laurel E., Martini Jeffrey, et al., Democrati zation, pp. 89–92; Al-Ahram, December 31, 2011; and Al-Masery Al-Youm, December 31, 2011. 153. Miller Laurel E., et al.‚ Democratization, op. cit., pp. 91–92. 154. Hobbs, Jeremy, A civil society transition, Al-Ahram Weekly, April 24–May 5, 2011. 155. Alfoneh Ali and Norton Augustus Richard A., “The Study of Civil– Military Relations and Civil-Society in the Middle East and North Africa,” in “Developments in Civil–Military relations in the Middle EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 253

East” (pp. 7–28) edited by Jensen Carsten, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, September 2008, p. 20. 156. Merkel, Wolfgang, Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe (International Politics and Society, IPG, 2, 2008: 11–29), pp. 26–27. 157. Ibid. 158. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous Democratization, op. cit., pp. 16–17. 159. Miller Laurel E., et al., Democratization, op. cit., pp. 194–195. 160. Schmitter, Philippe C., Refection on “Transitology”, op. cit., pp. 10–11. 161. Miller Laurel E.‚ et al., Democratization, op. cit., pp. 340–341. 162. Najslová, Lucia, Foreign Democracy Assistance in the Czech and Slovak Transitions: what lessons for the Arab world? Working Paper, Afa, Fride and Hivos, 2013, p. 1. 163. Ibid., p. 2. 164. Schmitter, Philippe C., Ambidextrous, op. cit., pp. 10–11. 165. Paul Gallaher, Political exclusion and violence: the Islamist Movement in Egypt, Master Thesis in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning), Naval Postgraduate School, September 2004. 166. Miller Laurel E., et al., Democratization in the Arab World, op. cit., pp. 335–336. 167. Greenfeld, Danya, A US-EU Action Plan for Supporting Demo cratization: Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, Atlantic Council, Rafk Hariri Center for the Middle East, Policy Issue, November 2011, pp. 4–5. 168. O'Connell, James, Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab States Can Beneft the West (Stanford Journal of International Law, June 2012: 341–404), pp. 399–400. 169. Najslová, Lucia, Foreign Democracy Assistance, op. cit., pp. 14–15. 170. Youngs, Richard, Funding Arab Reform, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), and Paralleli Euromediterranean Institute, Mediterranean Policy Program, Series in the Region and the Economic Crisis, Policy Brief, August, 2012, p. 3. 171. Miller Laurel E., et al, Democratization, op. cit., p. 341. 172. Ibid., pp. 340–341. 173. The United States government’s $1.3 billion in annual military aid provides the bulk of the Egyptian military’s budget for procuring fghter planes, mis- siles, and other weapons systems. See for more details, O'Connell, James, Common Interests, op. cit., pp. 399–400. 174. Ghanem, Hafez, Egypt’s Diffcult Transition, op. cit., pp. 31–32. 175. Ibid. 176. Ibid. 177. Ibid. 178. Ibid. 179. Ibid., pp. 31–32. 254 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION

180. Carothers, Thomas, Egypt’s Dismal Opposition, op. cit. 181. Kiline, Ramazan, The Pattern of Interactions between Islam and Liberalism: The Case of the Gülen movement, Available at: http://gulenconference. net/fles/London/Prcd%20-%20Kilinc,%20R.pdf, pp. 120–121. 182. Eric, Leckie, the Muslim Brotherhood, op. cit., pp. 25–26. 183. Kiline, Ramazan, The Pattern of Interactions, op. cit., pp. 121–126. 184. Ibid. 185. Diamond, Larry, Why Wait for Democracy? (The Wilson Quarterly, Winter, 2013), pp. 6–7. 186. Stepan, Alfred and Linz, Juan J., Democratization theory, op. cit., pp. 16–17. 187. Kiline, Ramazan, The Pattern of Interactions, op. cit., pp. 125–126. 188. Stepan, Alfred and Linz, Juan J., Democratization theory, op. cit., pp. 16–17. 189. Ibid. 190. Ibid., pp. 19–20. 191. Ibid. 192. Ibid. 193. Ibid. 194. Ibid. 195. Ibid. 196. Ibid. 197. Esposito, John L., Rethinking Islam and Secularism, Guiding Papers Series, Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), 2010, pp. 3–4. 198. Ibid. 199. Ibid., p. 7. 200. Ibid. 201. Ghanem, Hafez, Egypt’s Diffcult Transition, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 202. Lust, Ellen; Sultan, Gamal; and Wichmann, Jakob, After the Arab Spring: Islamism, Secularism, and Democracy (Current History, December 2012: 362–364), pp. 363–364. 203. Ibid. 204. El-Sherif, Ashraf, Egypt’s Post-Mubarak, op. cit., pp. 35–36. 205. Gerges, Fawaz A., the Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam? (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 128, No. 3, Fall 2013, pp. 389–426), pp. 402–403. 206. Balfour Rosa and Pioppi Daniela, introduction (pp. 13–21) in Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Islamist Mass Movements, External Actors and Political Change in the Arab World, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), the International Institute for Democracy EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 255

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256. Schmitter, Philippe, Refections on Transitology & Consolidology, op. cit., pp. 14–15. 257. Gambat Gamba, The Mass Public, pp. 14–15. 258. Ibid. 259. Ibid. 260. Ibid. 261. Liolos, john, Erecting New Constitutional Culture, op. cit., pp. 233–234. 262. Rustow, Dankwart A., Transition to Democracy, op. cit., pp. 362–363. 263. Liolos, John, Erecting New Constitutional Culture, op. cit., 235–236. 264. Rustow, Dankwart A., Transition to Democracy, op. cit., pp. 354–355. 265. Ibid., pp. 360–361. 266. Ibid., pp. 234–235. Glossary of Arabic Terms

akhwana the term akhwana means Brotherhoodization al-da’wa/Da'wa religious Call Al-Da’waAl-Salafeyya The Salaf Call al-amn al-markazi The Central Security Force Al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya/ Gama’a al-Islamiyya Islamic Society/group Al-Hakmiyya/Hakmiyya God’s sovereignty, as opposed to temporal sovereignty Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq wa-l Islah Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation al-jahiliya state of divine ignorance Al-Hayah Al-Shari‘a lil-Hukuk wal-Islah Shari‘a Association for Rights and Reform al-jihaz al-sirri the Special Apparatus or the Secret paramilitary Unit established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1943 Al-Salafeyya ‘ilmiyya scientifc Salafsm Al-Salafya Al-Saala liquid Salafsm, unaffliated Salafsts who normally support the Salafst Call Islamist project Al-Twahid Waljihad Monotheism and Holy War Ajjanad Miser Egypt Soldiers Group Ansar Byat al-Maqdes Supporters of Jerusalem Ansar al-Jihad Supporters of Holy War bid‘a (innovation) Caliph pan-Islamic ruler Caliphate centralized Islamic authority that dominated most Islamic state until it was abolished by Turkey in 1924

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 259 A.A.-D. Arafat, Egypt in Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56020-5 260 Glossary of Arabic Terms dawla madaniyya civil state dawla madaniyya bi marja‘iyya islamiyya civil state with an Islamic reference Fatwa religious edict or ruling Feloul remananant of the NDP, Mubarak regime loyalists, and Mubarak- era holdovers ftna sedition Gama`a al-jihad al-Islamiyya the Islamic Jihad Group Ghad Al-Thawra The Revolution's Tomorrow Party Hizb al-‘Amal al-Ishtiraki the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) Hizb al-Ahrar the Liberal Party (LP). hizb al-kanba the couch party—unaffliated mainstream Egyptians Hizbiyya partisanship Jabhat Al-Inkadh Al-Watani the National Salvation Front Jabhat al-Nusra Syrian Jihadist group belonged ideologically to al-Qaeda, it also known as the Nusra Front, (now is Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Front for the Conquest of the Levant) Jahiliyya (ignorance) jihad armed struggle jihadi radical Muslim fghter Ikhwan Brotherhood Ikhwanisiation Brotherhoodization, is a process by which Muslim Brother (MB) members enter and perhaps even dominate offcial institutions that had previously been closed to Islamists intifada uprising Kefya Enough kufar infdels kufr apostasy or polytheism Ma‘alim f al-Tariq milestones mabahes amn al-dawla State Security Investigations Services Majles Shura al-Ulamaa Council of Scholars Majles Shoura Al-Noub (Advisory/Consultative Council of Representatives) Majles al-Sha‘b People’s Assembly (PA), Egyptian lower house of parliament Majles al-Shura/Shura Council was the upper house of the formerly bicameral Parliament of Egypt. Majles Shura al-Mujahedeen Consultative Council of jihadist) maqasid al-Shari‘a broad intentions and general principles of the Shari‘a Morshid’ referring to the MB’s Supreme Guide Glossary of Arabic Terms 261

Quatbist faction is radical faction within the MB. It belonged ideologically to Sayyid Quatb and infuned the establishment of entire radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, and, ISIS, and Jabhat al-Nusra quwat al-amn al-markazi the Central Security Forces Shari‘a Islamic laws Shura consultation Sukuk Islamic Bonds Takfr the practice of excommunicating Muslims Tawhid affrmation of the oneness of God Ulama religious scholars Ummah or Omah Islamic nation or the Muslim community worldwide Wahhabiya Wahhabism, it is a puritanical religious doctrine founded by the eighteenth century evangelist Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia References

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A AKP, 19 Abbas El-Sisi, 158 ‘Alaa ‘Abdel-‘Aziz, 62 ‘Abdel-Hamid Barakat, 75 Al-Ahram Center for Political and 'Abdel Meguid Mahmud, 66, 77 Strategic Studies (ACPSS), 26, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, 120 238 Abdurrahman Wahid, 189 Al-Asala (authenticity) Party, 46 Abou Elela Mady, 96 Al-Azher, 41 Accountability, 168, 169, 174, 218, Al-Da’wa Al-Salafeyya, 11 221, 235, 239, 240 Al-Doustor (constitution) Party, 120 'Adel ‘Aff, 46 Alexandria, 63, 84, 131, 142 ‘AdelAss’ad El-Khayat, 105 Al-EtehadiyaPalace, 37, 102, 120, 136 'Adli Mansour, 124, 126, 130, 154, Al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya, 10, 34 174 Al-Gharbia, 133, 142 Administrative Court, 49 al-hakimiya, 7 Administrative Judicial Court, The, 97 Al-Karama (Dignity) Party, 120 Administrative Oversight Authority, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, 64 The, 154 Al-Nahda, 118, 125, 129, 132, 147, Afghan Taliban, 187 172 African Union, 170, 232 Al-Nahda Project, 39, 43, 45 Agency theory, 183, 184 Al-Nour Party, 14, 17, 20, 36, 41, Ahmed Fahmi, 38 42, 62, 70–73, 78, 85, 118, 119, Ahmed Gamal Al-Din, 36, 37, 102, 121, 122, 125, 126, 133, 143, 123 147, 155, 171, 238 Ahmed Hassen Al-Bor‘ai, 63 Al-Nuqrashi Pasha, 9 Ahmed Mekki, 35, 66 Al-Qaeda, 27, 70, 123, 131, 132, 182, Ahmed Shafq, 98, 159 187

Al-qazaz, 38 Bhutto, Benazir , 185 Al-Selmi document, 95 Black Bloc, The, 75 Al-Tayeb, 41, 53, 123 Bolivia, 223 Al-Twahid Waljihad (‘Monotheism Bolsa Familia, The, 167 and Holy War’), 131 Brazil, 167, 179, 200, 210, 223, 225, Al-Wafd Party, 6, 7, 9, 10, 159 255 Al-Wasat (Centre) Party, 37, 44, 96 British occupation, 6–9, 79 Al-Watan (The Homeland) party, 71 Brotherhood, 9, 17, 19, 26, 29, Amnesty International, 61, 108 35, 37, 38, 41, 44, 60, 62, 67, Amr Moussa, 120 69, 70, 73, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, Ansar al-Jihad (‘Supporters of Holy 97, 98, 101–103, 105, 108, War’), 131 109, 113, 115, 122, 123, 128, Ansar Byat al-Maqdes (‘Supporters of 130, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, Jerusalem’), 131 145–148, 154, 157, 169, 234, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, 206 245, 255 Arab Gulf States, The, 126 Brotherhood 95 Division, 35, 75, 76, Arab-Israeli confict, 170 87 Arab League, 130, 170 Brotherhoodization, 20, 34, 38 42, − Arab Nationalists, 172 50, 64, 72, 78, 91, 104, 139 Arab Socialist Party (ASP), 10 Business class, 11, 12 Arab Socialist Union (ASU), The, 8 Businesspersons, 11, 19, 44, 167 Arab Spring, 2, 23, 24, 26–28, 30, 116, 144, 177, 233, 245, 248, 251, 254 C Arab uprising, 1, 2, 110, 216 Cairo, 16, 40, 41, 62, 66, 67, 70, 75, Argentina, 168, 201, 223, 226, 229, 106, 122, 128, 131, 138, 157, 250 227 Asef Bayat, 127 Cairo Appeals Court, 67 Assam Al-Hadad, 39 Cairo Security Directorate, 99 Ataturk’s principles or Kemalism, 202 Caliphate, 7, 9, 18, 27, 41, 135, 171 ‘authoritarian-democratic hybrid’, Carnation Revolution, 192, 196 The, 220 Central bank, 43, 163 Authoritarianism, 2, 4, 19, 173, 198, Centro Democrático Social (CDS, 219, 221, 241, 243 Social Democratic Centre), The, Ayman Nour, 13 193 Ayub Khan, 182, 184 Central Security Forces (CSF), 47, 99 Chief of Army Staff (COAS), The, 184 Chile, 200, 202, 223, 225, 240 B Civil-military relations, 59, 79, Bakar, Nader, 126 89–92, 95, 101, 108, 110–112, Bangladesh, 184, 223, 235 116, 181–183, 185, 187–189, Bassem Al-Zarka, 72 191 193, 196–202, 205–207, − Benin, 223, 229, 240 INDEX 287

210, 211, 215, 216, 218, 222, 124, 126, 127, 143, 183–185, 252 187, 192, 196, 198–200, Civil society, 19, 47, 202, 217–219, 202–204, 211, 216, 242 222, 228–232, 234, 244, Court of Cassation, 35, 66 250–252 Cultural Dynamization Campaign, Civil society organizations (CSOs), The, 193 230, 234 Civil state, 18, 68, 135 Civil war, 118, 124, 127, 128, 130, D 132, 184, 203, 223, 241 Dahl, 2219 Cold War, The, 170 Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute Competitive authoritarianisms, 220 (DEDI), 28, 238 Conference Party, 120 Dankwart Rustow, 19, 237 Constituent Assembly, 4, 17, 19, 62, Dawa, 84, 133 65–67, 97, 98, 102, 119, 120, Dawla madaniyya, 68 154, 193, 194 Deep state, 38, 50, 59, 76, 79, 80, 1971 constitution, The, 15, 93, 155 138, 139, 158, 165, 173, 227 2012 constitution, The, 4, 17, 20, Defective democracies, 220 49, 62, 65, 67, 71, 91, 103, 105, De-liberalization, 4, 13, 33, 34 120, 126, 153, 155, 158 Democracy, 1–3, 5–8, 11, 14–17, 2014 constitution, The, 153–155, 22–30, 34, 42, 43, 46, 60, 171, 240 68, 80, 86, 90, 92, 93, 102, Constitutional Declaration, 4, 20, 33, 109–116, 126, 128, 134, 136, 71, 91, 95, 100, 102, 103, 117, 143–146, 148, 154, 160, 168, 119, 120, 125, 137, 138, 154, 171–173, 175, 178–181, 184, 158 185, 187, 191, 192, 195–199, Constitutionalism, 134, 144, 217, 201, 205, 206, 212, 215–220, 218, 222, 239, 240, 255 222–224, 227–229, 231–234, Continued Cash Beneft Programme 236, 238–242, 244–248, 250, (BPC), The, 167 251, 253–257 Cook, Steven, 205 Democratic Alliance, 70, 195 Coptic Christian Church, The, 4, 108 Democratic civilian control, 182, 191 Coptic Christians, 4, 69, 77, 126, 134, Democratic Control of Armed Forces 136, 236, 241 (DCAF), The, 110, 181 Coptic Church, 91, 97, 117, 122, Democratic transition, 2, 11, 15, 18, 128, 134 22, 24, 48, 92, 93, 98, 101, Coptic Pope, Tawadros II, 123 141, 153, 173, 189, 191–194, Corruption, 13, 14, 27, 163, 194, 196–198, 200, 201, 217–219, 231, 241–243 222, 223, 225, 229–233, 235, Council of the Revolution, 195 237, 245, 248 Coup, 2, 3, 7–9, 16, 18, 22, 23, 86, Democratization, 1–3, 5–10, 13, 15, 92, 100, 106–108, 110, 114, 17–22, 24–30, 33, 50, 59, 77, 288 INDEX

89, 92, 94, 117, 134, 153, 154, 197, 206, 217, 224, 227, 232, 171–173, 179, 182, 192–194, 234, 252 197, 201, 210, 212, 217, 219, Emad Al-Wakil, 99 220, 222, 224, 225, 227, Emergency State Security Courts 229–235, 237, 242–256 (ESSC), 48 Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) Endriartono Sutarto, 190 (DP), 203 Epstein, 220 Department of Defense (DoD), The, Erbakan, Necmettin, 203 189 Esposito, John, 235 Destabilized hybrid regime, 218, 220, Estado Novo (New State), 193 222 European Communities (EC), 198 Diamond, 189, 192, 208, 209, 218, European Economic 220 Community (EEC), The, 196 Diamond, Larry, 23, 221, 229 European Union (EU), 129, 193, 197–200, 202, 204, 206, 210, 217, 231, 233, 242 E External support, 217, 218, 222 Eastern Europe, 1, 3, 192, 223, 225, 230, 231, 253 East Timor, 223 F Economic Development Conference, Fatwa, 73 The, 163 Fawaz Gerges, 42 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, 170 Feloul, 4, 16, 21, 77, 79, 128 Egyptian Business Development Finer, 192, 212, 221 Association (EBDA), 44 Fiscal defcit, 162 Egyptian Center for Economic and Foreign investments, 166 Social Rights, The, 64 France, 233, 236 Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress Franco, Francisco, 206 (EDLC), The, 64 Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 10 Egyptian Federation of Independent Freedom House, 47, 177, 220, 225, Trade Unions (EFITU), 63, 64 228, 247, 248, 250 Egyptian Trade Union Federation Free Egyptians Party, The, 227 (ETUF), 63, 81 Free Offcer Movement, The, 3, 8, 24 Egypt Young Party, 7, 9 Fukuyama, 226, 228, 248 Ejaz Hussain, 183 El-Botroseya Church, 132 Electoral democracies, 220, 247 G Electoral law, 49 Gama`a al-jihad al-Islamiyya, 10 El-Nahda, 39 Gamal Mubarak, 14, 75, 173 El-Sisi, 4, 5, 21, 23, 73, 75, 76, 78, Gehad El-Haddad, 127 91, 98, 100, 102–108, 110, 118, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, 185 123–128, 132, 153, 156–162, General Augusto Pinochet, 200 164–173, 175–179, 181, 196, INDEX 289

General Authority for Investment Hybrid regime, 30, 220–222, (GAFI), The, 179 246–248 General Intelligence Service, (GIS), 99 General Mirza Aslam Beg, 185 George W. Bush, 12 I Ghad Al-Thawra (‘The Revolution’s Ibrahim Ghoniem, 40 Tomorrow’) Party, 49 Ikhwan, 33, 42 Ghana, 223, 230, 240 Ikhwanisiation, 20 Gilbert, 221, 246, 247 Illiberal democracies, 220, 247 Giza, 129, 131, 133 India, 182, 184, 185, 236 Gordon, 219, 245 Indonesia, 23, 181, 188, 189, 191, Grand Imam, 41, 107, 123, 124 212, 213, 219, 221, 223, 229, Gray zone, 220 233, 236 Greece, 192, 218, 222, 231, 243 Indonesian National Armed Forces Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 45, (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or 161, 167, 186, 191, 224 TNI), the, 188 Guidance Bureau, 19, 37, 39, 66, 137 Interior ministry, 36, 42, 46, 59, 79, Gulf Arab states, 129 91, 102, 117, 119, 122 Gulf security, 169 International Monetary Fund (IMF), the, 3, 43, 164 Islamic Caliphate, 171 H Islamic Group (IG), the, 10, 136 Habib al-’Adly, 36 Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), the, 10 Hamas, 75, 76, 99, 105, 131 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Hamdy Badin, 99, 100 (ISIS), the, 131 Hassan Al-Banna, 6, 9 Islamism, 17, 18, 23, 25–27, 29, 78, Hassan Malek, 19, 44 83, 84, 117, 145, 237, 238, 254 Hassan Shaheen, 159 Islamist extremist groups, 182 Hazem Abu Ismail, 62 Islamist parties, 15, 17, 121, 171, 238 Henry Kissinger, 2 Islamists, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 22, Hesham Ramez, 163 23, 35, 36, 39, 62, 65, 73, 90, Hisham Qandil, 34, 35 91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 106, 117, Hizb al-kanba, 4, 15, 16, 21, 77, 79, 119, 121, 126, 133, 134, 136, 118, 128, 135, 165 154, 158, 182, 187, 202, 204, Hizb Al-Tahrir (Liberation Party), 187 206, 227, 237, 238, 241, 242 Hizbiyya (partisanship), 7 Islamist Welfare Party (WP), the, 203 Homeland Security Sector (HSS), Israel, 8, 11, 22, 170, 186, 233 The, 36 Hossam El-Gheriany, 66 Human Development Index (HDI), 224 J Human Rights Watch (HRW), 48 Jihad, 7, 10, 18, 36, 69, 123 Huntington, 1–3, 7, 10, 22, 24, 25, Jihadist groups, 60, 117, 123, 131, 27, 30, 185, 189, 211, 222 132 290 INDEX

Jihadist Salafst, the, 119 Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar—LP), Joint Services Command and Staff the, 12 College (JSCSC), 157 Liberal Socialist Party (LSP), the, 10 Jordan, 12, 26, 131, 162, 165, 245, Liberation Rally (LR), 8 246 Liberia, 223 Journalists, 21, 35, 59–62, 80 Libya, 2, 14, 129, 169, 186, 253 Judicial Authority Law, the, 66 Lieutenant-Colonel Eanes, 194 Judiciary, the, 34, 59, 65–67, 77, 94, Limongi, 223, 224 119, 138, 155, 156, 174, 187, Linz, Juan, 220 204, 240 Lipset, 218, 219, 223, 245 Justice and Development Party (JDP), Luxor, 105, 136 the, 202, 204

M K Madhat Al-Hadad, 39 Kamal Al-Ganzouri, 36 Mohamed Ibrahim, 37, 131 Kamal Al-Helbawy, 154 Mohamed Mahsoub, 37 Kamel Abu Eita, 64 Mahmoud Badr, 159 Kamel, Mostafa, 6 Mahmoud Hussein, 48 Kandahar Friday, 70 Mahmoud Mekki, 66, 82 Kazakhstan, 221 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Kefya, 12, 115 MPR, (People’s Consultative Kenya, 224 Assembly), 190 Kerry, John, 164 Majles Shoura Al-Noub, 5, 260 Khairat Al-Shater, 19, 35, 98 Majles Shura al-Mujahedeen Khaled ‘Alem Al-Din, 42, 72, 78, 121 (Consultative Council of jihad- Khaled El-Azhary, 63 ists), 131 Khalil, Nagwa , 48 Malawi, 241 Khan, Yahya, 182, 184, 186 Malaysia, 191, 221 King Abdullah II, 165 Mali, 169, 222, 223, 225, 242, 248, King Farouq, 2, 5, 8 256 King Muhammad VI, 165 Marsa Matrouh, 167 Kuwait, 164, 177 MB International Organization, 39 MB’s Supreme Guide, the, 80, 125, 138 L MB’s sympathisers, 35 Latin America, 1, 2, 23, 134, 167, McClosky, 220 168, 192, 214, 215, 225, 230, Media, 16, 21, 29, 35, 38, 59, 61, 62, 255, 256 67, 75, 80, 83, 93, 94, 108, 119, League of Arab States (LAS), 232 122, 128, 130, 134, 136, 187, Legal Authority for Right and Reform, 208, 221, 223, 230, 234 42 Megawati, 190 Levitsky, 220, 221 Merkel, 220, 253 Liberalization, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10–12, Middle class, 13, 14, 28, 70, 160, 19, 22, 218, 219, 221, 236 183, 206, 210, 235, 236 INDEX 291

Middle East, the, 1, 28, 81, 83, 143, Moscow, 170 171, 179, 219, 233, 252 Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA Military, the, 4, 7–9, 11, 14–23, 38, —Armed Forces’ Movement), 39, 42, 47, 59–61, 65, 70, 71, the, 193 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 89–104, Mubarak, 3–5, 8, 11–17, 19–21, 23, 106–118, 122–124, 126–129, 35, 37–39, 42–48, 50, 59–63, 65, 132, 133, 138, 153–156, 158, 66, 68–70, 74, 76–79, 89–91, 160, 161, 163, 165, 168, 172, 93, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 108, 173, 175, 181–206, 208–210, 109, 121, 132, 136–139, 154, 213–216, 236, 242 157, 158, 160, 163, 164, 166, Military-as-government, 182, 184 168–170, 173, 206, 207, 219, Military-as-institution, 183–185 226, 232, 235 Military offcers, 10, 11, 14, 19, 80, Murad, Mohsen, 99 100, 109, 173, 185, 189, 197, Musharraf, Pervez , 182, 185 206, 207 MUSİAD, 18, 29 Military Police, the, 99 Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the, 6, Ministry of Manpower to replace 20, 66, 127, 132, 139, 157, 159, (ETUF), the, 63 160 Ministry of Religious Endowments, Muslim Brothers, 63, 137, 139, 158 133 Muslim majorities, 181 Modernization approach, the, 223, Muwaf, Murad , 99 244 Mohamed Abd Al-Salam, Nagib , 99 Mohamed Al-’Assar, 100 N Mohamed Ali Basher, 41 Nagm, Nawwara , 98 Mohamed ‘Amerh, 46 Nasr City, 100, 129 Mohamed Badi’a, 27, 80, 132, 145 Nasser, 3, 7, 8, 12, 22, 26, 47, 77, Mohamed ElBaradei, 93, 107, 130 107, 138, 157, 166, 169, 170, Mohamed El-Beltagi, 128, 132 206 Mohamed Farid Tohami, 154 Nasserist groups, 10, 11 Mohamed Hassan, 70 National Assembly, 184, 195 Mohamed Hassan, Shiekh , 42 National Coalition to Support Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, 14, 15 Legitimacy (NCSL), the, 128 Mohieddin, Mohamed, 49 National Defense Council (NDC), 95 Mohseni, 221, 246, 247 National Democratic Party (NDP), Monarchy, the, 3, 6, 8–10, 198 the, 4, 10, 12, 16, 20, 36, 38, 40, Mongolia, 222, 225, 229, 243, 251, 49, 65, 77, 79, 94, 137, 226 256 National Party, 6 Moqattam, 106 National Progressive Unionist Party Morlino, Leonard, 222 (NPUP), Al-Tagmmu, the, 10 Morocco, 165, 168 National Salvation Front (NSF), the, Morsi, 4, 17, 20, 21, 33 20, 60, 74, 117, 120 292 INDEX

National Salvation Junta (Junta de Permanent Congress of Alexandria Salvação Nacional–JSN), 194 Workers (PCAW), the, 64 National Security Council (NSC), 203 Peter Feaver, 183 National Union (NU), the, 8 Philippines, 168, 223, 224, 229 NATO, 193, 196–199, 202, 204, 205, Plattner, 2, 189, 192 217, 242 Political control, 182, 207, 208, 210 Neo-liberal economic reform, 13 Political mobilization, 12, 13, 210 New constitution, the, 49, 62, 94–96, Political parties, 6–10, 36, 106, 110, 98, 109, 120, 155, 171, 195 120, 125, 134, 155, 159, 165, New Order, 188, 212 171, 172, 187, 192–198, 209, New Wafd Party, 10, 12, 20, 62, 120, 217, 218, 222, 225–229, 231, 159, 165, 227 238, 242, 250 NGO law, 20, 34, 47, 234 Popular Trend or Al-Tayar Al-Shaabi, Nigeria, 218, 224 159 Nile Basin states, 170 Port Said, 74, 76, 79, 86 Nile River, 169, 170 Portugal, 11, 18, 92, 168, 192–194, North Sinai, 100, 118, 131 196, 197, 231 2012 November Constitutional Presidential campaign, 35, 161, 170 Declaration, the, 71 Presidential elections, 13, 15, 20, 37, 66, 67, 71, 73, 78, 90, 93, 95, 98, 99, 104, 116, 122, 135, 153, O 156, 159, 174, 193 O’Donnell, 101, 218–221, 239, 245, Presidential Guard, the, 99 246 President Obama, 107, 126 One-party system, 3, 8 Prodemocracy forces, 16, 17 Ottaway, 220 Protest law, 20, 33, 46–48, 50, 156, 166, 174, 239 Przeworski, 223, 224 P Public Prosecutor, the, 156, 204 Pakistan, 116, 182–188, 210–212, 255 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the, Q 184 Qatar, 130, 169 Partial democracies, 220 Quba Palace, 124 Partido Comunista Português, PCP, Quran, 23, 158 (Portugal’s Communist Party), Qutbism, 18, 19 the, 197 Qutbist faction, 13, 19, 34, 125, 129, Partido Popular Democrático (PPD, 135, 144 Popular Democratic Party), the, 193 People’s Assembly (Majles al-Sha‘b— R PA), 12 Rabaa, 118, 125, 128-130, 147, 172 INDEX 293

Rachid, Mohamed Rachid, 44 Shari‘a Association for Rights and Raphaël lefévre, 127 Reform (Al-Hayah Al-Shari‘a lil- Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 130, 182, 204 Hukuk wal-Islah), the, 73 Red Sea, 167 Sharia law, 7, 134, 241 Referendum, 65, 67, 70, 93, 97, 101, Shari’a (Islamic law), 18, 44 120 Sharif, Nawaz, 185 Revolutionary and secular liberal Sharm El-Sheikh, 163 forces, 14 Shehata, Ra’afat, 154 Revolutionary Socialists, the, 226 Sheikh Hassan Al-Shafa’ai, 42 Rhodesia, 221 Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Rida, Rashid, 7 162 Romania, 226, 228 Sheikh Mohamed ‘Abdel-Maqsoud, 137 Rule of law, the, 134, 166, 217, 218, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, 34 222, 229, 239, 240, 255 Sheikh Wagdi Ghanim, 73 Shia, 48 Shiites, 69, 134, 136 S Shura, 44, 49, 61, 68, 154 Sa’ad Al-Katatni, 97 Shura Council, 17, 19, 44, 46, 49, 61, Sabbahi, 120, 121 67, 72, 102, 105, 119, 120, 126 Sadat, 3, 7, 10–12, 34, 44, 63, 64, Sierra Leone, 223 123, 138, 157, 158, 163 Sinai, 36, 98–100, 105, 108, 118, Safety and Development Party, 136 131, 132, 156, 167, 170, 233 Salafsm, 6, 18, 158 Sinai Peninsula, 170 Salafst Call (SC), the, 4, 11, 14, 20, Singapore, 221 34, 37, 41, 42, 50, 51, 59, 60, Small and Medium-Enterprise sector 68–73, 76, 78, 79, 118, 119, (SMEs), 166 126, 133, 134, 136, 171–173, Sobhi, Sedqi , 75, 175 237, 238 Social Democratic Party, 47, 227 Salah ‘Abdel-Maqsoud, 35, 61 Socialist Labour Party (Hizb al-‘Amal Sami Hafez ‘Anan, 91 al-Ishtiraki—SLP), 12 Sanafr, 165 Socioeconomic factors, 217 ‘Sanhedrin’ group, 198, 199 Soft coup, 4, 101, 109, 124, 127 Saudi Arabia, 20, 107, 164, 165, 170, South Africa, 168, 221, 224 177, 178 South Korea, 223, 229 Schedler, Andreas, 219 Soviet Union, 1, 3, 12 Schmitter, 101, 218, 220, 222, 224, Spain, 11, 134, 181, 192, 197–199, 225, 244 218, 231 SEC, 49, 121 Special Apparatus, 9, 26, 144 Semi-authoritarianisms, 221 Springborg, Robert, 127, 158, 175 Senegal, 221, 223, 235, 236 State-religious relations, 23, 217, 222 Serbia, 226, 228 State Security Investigation Bureau Shahin, Mamduh , 94 (SSI), 36 294 INDEX

Stepan, Alfred, 22, 182, 208, 220, Trade Union Law, 59 236 Trade Union and Workers Services Strong Egypt Party (SEP), 120 (CTUWS), 64 Sudan, 169 Transitional government, the, 162 Suez Canal Development Project Transitional period, 4, 17, 21, 89, (SCDP), the, 163 135, 154, 218, 232 Suharto, 188, 190, 212, 223 Transitology, 217, 218, 245, 246, Sukuk, 44 250, 253, 256, 257 Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), Transparency International, 163 34, 49, 97, 127 True Path Party (TPP), the, 203 Supreme Council of the Armed Force Trump Administration, 170 (SCAF), 14, 16–19, 33, 34, 36, Turkey, 18, 29, 82, 116, 130, 182, 43, 47, 48, 65, 76, 80, 85, 89– 196, 202–206, 210, 215, 216 92, 94, 95, 97–102, 109, 110, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the, 202 124, 155, 157, 205, 214, 215 Turkish General Staff (TGS), the, 203 Supreme Guide of the Muslim TUSKON, 18, 29 Brotherhood, 100 Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC), the, 66, 156 U Supreme Presidential Election Ukraine, 218, 224, 232 Committee (SPEC), the, 98 Unemployment, 14, 33, 43, 45, 46, Syria, 14, 21, 24, 26, 27, 105, 123, 50, 64, 78, 139, 161, 167 129 United Arab Emirates (UAE), the, 107, 162, 164, 177 United Kingdom (U.K.), the, 39, 234 T United States (U.S), 25, 28, 39, 43, Tahrir Square, 16, 34, 35, 43, 66, 87, 93, 94, 107, 118, 124–126, 74–76, 81, 95, 105, 125 129, 138, 196, 200, 210, Taiwan, 221, 223, 229, 251, 256 233–235, 251, 253, 256 Takfr, 7, 18 Upper Egypt, 136, 142, 167 Tala’at Ibrahim ‘Abdallah, 66, 77, 2011 uprising, the, 10, 13, 15, 20, 23, 119 36, 40, 80, 96, 125, 138, 157, Tamarod, 46, 64, 78, 104, 105, 107, 227, 230 115, 117, 122, 125, 127, 128, Uruguay, 223, 228 139, 159, 226 Terrorist militia groups, 132 Thailand, 223 V Third wave, 1–3, 5, 10, 24–27, 30, Vali Nasr, 236 192, 198, 218, 220, 245, 248 Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), Thomas Carothers, 13, 218, 229 185 Tiran, 165 Virtue Party (VP), the, 204 Trade Union Freedoms Law, 63, 65 INDEX 295

W Yemen, 2, 14, 127 Wadi Al-Natroun jail, 65 Young secular liberal, 16, 17, 20, 60 Wahhabism, 7, 18 Younis Makhyoun, 72, 73, 85 War on Terror, 182 Youssef Al-Qaradawi, 237 Way, 29, 220, 221 Yudhoyono, 190 West, the, 23, 69, 124, 170, 232, 253 Widjajanto, 188 Widodo, Joko, 191 Z Wiranto, 190 Zakaria, 220–222, 247, 256 Wohlfeld, Monika, 229 Zia Al-Haq, 182 World Bank, 14, 164, 225, 249 Zimbabwe, 222 Zogby poll, 104, 141

Y Yasser Borhami, 41, 62, 70, 85 Yassin, Osama, 35, 75