EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION INTRODUCTION This chapter explores Egypt’s democratization from fve different inter- related perspectives. First a review of the literature on democratic transi- tion, or ‘transitology,’1 is presented which details the non-linear nature of democratization processes. Secondly, a diagnosis of Egypt’s political system after El-Sisi ascended to power is offered. It is argued here that Egypt under both Morsi and El-Sisi has taken no steps towards democ- racy and hence after two successive revolutions, Egypt can be defned as a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’. The third part explores how Egypt can move from a ‘destabilized hybrid regime’ into a democratic state. Six factors that might affect Egypt democratization have been analyzed: socioeconomic factors; political parties; civil society; external support; state-religious relations; the rule of law and constitutionalism; and fnally (explored more fully in Chap. 7) civil–military relations. The fourth part explores how Egypt can learn from failed and unconsolidated (unfn- ished) democratic models from other areas of the world. Of the suc- cessful examples—some had the support of external parties such as the EU, NATO, and the US; some had active political parties; and others had healthy civil societies. However, Egypt had none of these. The ffth part addresses how Egypt can learn from Rustow’s model for demo- cratic transition, which elevates the role of human actors in the process of democratization and identifes four phases needed to establish a lasting © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 217 A.A.-D. Arafat, Egypt in Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56020-5 218 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION democracy. Egypt, according to Rustow’s model, seems to be near- ing the most diffcult third and fourth phases, making a transition from autocracy into full-fedged democracy seem a long way off. THEORETICAL APPROACHES The literature presents many defnitions of ‘democracy’ and its require- ments. For instance, O’Donnell and Schmitter note that there is a ‘pro- cedural minimum’ of the necessary elements of a political democracy, which includes “secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elec- tions, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability.”2 Democracy, according to Lipset, is political system where “constitutional opportunities for changing governing off- cials” exist.3 This defnition necessitates a ‘political formula,’ and a legit- imate opposition attempting to gain offce.4 For any country to move from an autocracy to fully-fedged democracy, a transitional period of varying length must be experienced. Since the third wave of democrati- zation, numerous volumes have been published on democratic transition (transitology). In the most basic understanding, a transition is simply the interim period separating two consecutive regimes.5 In his essay, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Thomas Carothers argues that, any given country moving away from authoritarian rule is said to be transi- tioning towards democracy.6 Transitions from autocratic or authoritarian regimes tend to lead to one of four outcomes: regression back to autoc- racy, the creation of a hybrid regime (i.e., dictablanda or democradura), remaining in a state of unconsolidated democracy, or consolidation of a working democracy.7 Examples of these four possibilities can be found in the varying outcomes of the third wave of democratization. As Diamond outlined, some states in the third wave became pseudo democracies, including the Ukraine, Nigeria, and Indonesia while others such as Spain and Greece became true democratic states.8 The stages involved in a democratic transition tend to unfold in a set sequence. The frst stage involves the introduction of political openness or liberalization,9 which is then followed by democratization.10 Then there is a breakthrough where the regime collapses and a new democratic system emerges. This is followed by a period of consolidation where state institutions are reformed, elections become regularized, and civil society EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION 219 grows.11 Liberalization and democratization can take place at varying times during a transition, sometimes one will lead to the other and some- times they occur at the same time. However, a meaningful transition to democracy requires both elements to eventually occur and mature.12 O’Donnell argues that one should differentiate between the period of demise of authoritarianism and the democratic transition, i.e., a transi- tion to democracy, followed by transitioning to a consolidated democ- racy.13 According to Gordon one should distinguish between controlled democratization and actual democratization because authoritarian lead- ers wanting to maintain their regime stability may allow limited democ- ratization as an attempt to legitimize their continued rule.14 Andreas Schedler, who calls controlled democratization, “electoral authoritari- anism,” argues that by holding elections these regimes try to create a façade of democracy to hide their authoritarian regimes.15 This was seen in Mubarak’s call for multi-party elections, which were seen as a major step forward for democratization in the Middle East. However, as Wittes writes in her article, “Hosni Mubarak: Elections or No, He’s Still Pharaoh,” this was classic electoral authoritarianism.16 It is argued that for democracy to be consolidated, i.e., made likely to endure, the freedom to elect a government must be institutionalized,17 and political actors must “obey the laws, the constitution, and mutually accepted norms of political conduct.”18 In fact, only a limited number of countries that have undergone transitions to democracy have suc- ceeded in establishing consolidated and functioning democratic regimes. Instead, many of these new regimes have ended up ‘getting stuck’ in transition, or reverting to more or less authoritarian forms of rule.19 In trying to assess the factors that allow a democracy to become con- solidated, O’Donnell laid out what he called a ‘strategic perspective’. He found that consolidation required “strategically sophisticated” pro- democratic actors who can combat antidemocratic agents, and integrate neutral parties to their cause.20 A second assessment of the factors allow- ing democracy proposed by Lipset, Cutright, and others, connects a sta- ble democracy with certain economic and social criteria, such as wealthy citizens, high literacy rates, and an urban majority. A third assessment dwells on the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among the citizens,21 and a fourth looks at certain features of social and politi- cal structure. Scholars of this fourth conception insist that confict and reconciliation are essential to democracy.22 Dahl and McClosky, among others, have argued that democratic stability doesn’t require just the 220 EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIZATION electorate at large to have a commitment to democratic values, but, more importantly, the professional politicians also need to commit.23 Finally, it should be noted that each type of democracy has its own distinctive way of consolidating itself under its own rhythm and sequence; no single path is a guarantee of future stability or viability of all types of democracy.24 To conclude, it is essential to keep in mind that democratization pro- cesses are not linear.25 The notion of a ‘transition paradigm,’ in which countries move from authoritarian rule toward democracy through a sequence of stages, has been largely rejected. Many countries have been seen to settle into a ‘gray zone’ of diverse forms of government where autocratic and democratic features are combined. Such countries are no longer seen as simply stalled on the zigzagging road to democracy.26 EGYPT: DESTABILIZED HYBRID REGIME It has been apparent for many years now that a great number of new regimes are not truly democratic, or even ‘in transition’ to democracy. Some countries are in the ‘political gray zone’ between democracy and dictatorship and are likely to remain there for a very long time.27 These uncertain or hybrid regimes (combining democratic and authoritar- ian elements) have been described and classifed in the literature since 1960. In the 1960s and 1970s, there existed multiparty, electoral, but undemocratic regimes.28 In the 1990s, most scholars classifed hybrid regimes as diminished subtypes of democracy making up a wide array of complicated democracy styles emerging during the third wave.29 Since then a variety of labels have been coined for these regimes by dif- ferent authors: ‘façade democracies’ and ‘quasi-democracies’ (Finer); dictablandas and democraduras (O’Donnell and Schmitter)30; ‘electoral democracies’ (Diamond and Freedom House)31; ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria)32; ‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Levitsky and Way); ‘semi- authoritarianisms’ (Ottaway); ‘defective democracies’ (Merkel); ‘par- tial democracies’ (Epstein)33; and the ‘authoritarian-democratic hybrid’ (Alfred Stepan, and Juan Linz).34 Standardizing the fne line between democracy and non-democracy has largely been accomplished, but the boundary between authoritarian and hybrid regimes remains blurred. According to Levitsky, and Way, competitive authoritarian regimes regu- larly hold inclusive, competitive elections, but they often occur with the deck stacked well and truly in the regimes favor. Schedler’s concept of EPILOGUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON