Common Security in North Korea: Quest for a New Paradigm in Inter
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COMMON SECURITY IN NORTH KOREA Quest for a New Paradigm in Inter-Korean Relations Mel Gurtov How should one appraise the security situation in East Asia since the end of the Cold War? Which set of standards should the ana- lyst use? How should “security” be understood? What is the appropriate criterion for regional security: stable security relationships among all coun- tries or the satisfaction of the security interests of a select few? Depending on considerations such as these, it is possible to present East Asia’s security in either highly optimistic or pessimistic terms. Few observers today doubt that by any standard, East Asia is more politically stable and economically better off than was ever the case during the Cold War. But there the consen- sus ends, with analysts divided over the security implications of China’s am- bitions, Japan’s “hedging bets,” American primacy, the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (and of the “ASEAN way”), region- wide economic and environmental stresses, and, of course, the Korea dead- lock. This article explores the Korean situation—in particular, policies toward North Korea—from the standpoint of common security rather than power politics. The central concept behind common, or cooperative, security is preventing threats from arising rather than, as in collective security, assem- bling force to counter threats. Though collective security may serve as a backstop to common-security policies, the accent is on preventive steps such Mel Gurtov is Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, and Editor-in-Chief of Asian Per- spective. Asian Survey , 42:3, pp. 397–418. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2002 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 397 398 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2002 as transparency of military establishments and confidence- and security- building measures (CBMs and CSBMs). 1 Though there are plenty of reasons to look at North Korea as a strategic challenge—a state whose conventional and mass-destruction war capabilities pose potential threats to South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.—my study views the “challenge” of North Korea differ- ently. It is a weak state with legitimate security needs. To the extent that North Korea’s neighbors and the U.S. creatively address those needs, rather than contend with North Korea exclusively as a “rogue state,” they will con- tribute immensely to improving the security of Northeast Asia and avoiding another round of dangerous confrontation. President Kim Dae Jung’s en- gagement or “sunshine” policy toward the North is a prime example of com- mon-security thinking in action. Economic factors, CBMs, and threat- reduction diplomacy assume primary importance in a common-security ap- proach, whereas strategies of deterrence and containment, to which the U.S. is wedded, are secondary. In the mid-1990s, opportunities were taken to implement a common-secur- ity agenda with North Korea. When the confrontation between the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the latter’s sus- pected nuclear weapons program ended in October 1994 with the signing of an Agreed Framework, a victory seemed to have been scored for preventive diplomacy and common security. The agreement not only averted a poten- tially catastrophic conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it also provided a road map of security-enhancing measures for North Korea including energy assis- tance, a freeze on its nuclear-weapons program, and eventual full diplomatic relations with the U.S. Though the Agreed Framework remains in place and the June 2000 summit meeting of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il retains enormous symbolic importance, a breakthrough in the Korean Cold War is not at hand. To the contrary, events since September 11, 2001, seem to be working against the prospects for strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula. This article will argue, however, that it is not too late to reinvigorate the Agreed Framework and even go beyond it in order to promote common se- curity on the Korean Peninsula. In the first three sections of the article, I examine the policies of the two principal outside actors in Korean affairs, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the U.S. My intention is to identify PRC and U.S. interests, indicate points of policy convergence and diver- gence, and most importantly highlight the crucial role that positive U.S.- China relations plays (and can play) in promoting common security on the Korean Peninsula. The latter half of the article explores North Korean con- 1.For discussion within the context of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), see Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992). MEL GURTOV 399 cerns and ways in which the international community may, through assis- tance programs, improve the security picture. China’s Two-Koreas Policy Historically, Chinese influence in Korea has manifested itself in two patterns: The general parallel between the rises and falls of Korean dynasties and Chi- nese dynastic rule and, secondly, the keen interest of Chinese leaders in Ko- rean security, especially because of China’s rivalries with Japan and, in the last century, the U.S. 2 Though a tributary state of China, Korea was fully autonomous; its contacts with China were largely a matter of ritual based on acceptance of a superior civilization, thus quite different from the relationship of recurrent conflict that developed by the 19th century between Korea and Japan.3 Chinese-Korean historical relations have left their imprint on the pre- sent. China’s key national-security objective on the Korean Peninsula is to have a friendly, stable Korea on its doorstep; this means having a Korea that is not the setting for a major war, is receptive to the PRC’s influence, and does not become a springboard for the extension of Japanese military or eco- nomic power. Since the PRC established relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1992, Beijing has had to promote “peace and stability” in Korea while carry- ing out a difficult balancing act: engaging the South while sustaining the North.4 PRC leaders have made economic partnership with South Korea a high priority, consistently backed the concept of a nuclear-free Korea, and supported Korean unification through peaceful means such as the Four-Party Talks (U.S.-PRC-DPRK-ROK) that began in 1997 but have been in limbo since 1999. 5 China, along with Russia, persuaded the DPRK to accept dual Korean membership in the U.N. in 1991 and supported the 1992 North-South 2.Han-Kyo Kim, “Korean Unification in Historical Perspective,” in Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War , ed. Young Whan Kihl (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 17–28. 3.See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 90–103. 4.A good recent statement of the Chinese view, from a military think tank (the China Insti- tute for International Strategic Studies), is Zhang Jinbao, “Changes in the Situation on the Ko- rean Peninsula and Their Impacts on the Strategic Pattern in Northeast Asia,” International Strategic Studies , no. 1 (2001), pp. 35–44. 5.On PRC interests and objectives in Korea, see Tian Zhongqing, “China-ROK Relations in the New Asian-Pacific Context,” Korean Journal of International Studies 25:1 (1994), pp. 65–74; Ilpyong J. Kim and Hong Pyo Lee, eds., Korea and China in a New World: Beyond Normalization (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1993); Qingguo Jia, “China Policy Perspective toward the Korean Peninsula,” KNDU [Korea National Defense University] Review 5:2 (December 2000), pp. 103–19; and Samuel S. Kim, “The Future of China and Sino-ROK Relations” in The Future of China and Northeast Asia , eds. Melvin Gurtov and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1997), pp. 259–91. 400 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 2002 Korea accords on denuclearization of the peninsula, CBMs, and economic and people-to-people exchanges. During the nuclear crisis of 1993–94, China consistently urged resolution of the issue through dialogue and advised Pyongyang to avoid provoking a war; Beijing, however, refused to play a mediator’s role that might have put it in the position of imposing a solution on its longtime ally. Chinese leaders have been sensitive to North Korea’s stubborn adherence to its own foreign-policy and development paths. They have made their pref- erences known—for instance, Beijing has counseled North Korea to pursue economic reforms along Chinese lines as a matter of socialism’s survival— but have avoided attempts to enforce their influence or allow disagreements with Pyongyang to become public. Beijing has always regarded North Korea as an essential security buffer, an interest that fits China’s “new security con- cept,” which emphasizes friendly relations with bordering states and a multi- polar response to “hegemonism.” These PRC policies seem clearly to be driven by a consistent set of pur- poses: to sustain Chinese influence in a divided but peaceful Korea for as long as the North can survive and to position China to continue to have influ- ence over Korean affairs after unification, presumably when the North passes under Seoul’s authority. Korean unification may pose problems for Chinese interests, however, depending on how unification comes about and (see be- low) on the state of PRC-U.S.