66-1602

GOZE, Haluk Necdet, 1929- MODERNISM AND TRADITIONALISM IN THE 1790-1922. The American University, Ph.D., 1964 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan ® Copyright by Haluk Necdet Goze»* 1967 MODERNISM AND TRADITIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMfrjRE 179Q-l£2k

by tf’.’j» vNecdet G6ze

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

Signatures of Committee: Chairman:

Date: On*? 'tv. Graduate Dean

Dates eyK04j H. I4& V l,BRARY AUG o *KASK»CT3HD.c

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tiu TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE PREFACE ...... v CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND...... 10 The Origins of the Turkish People 10 The Seljuk T u r k s ...... 11 The Rise of the ...... 13 The Decline of the Ottoman Empire ...... 15 Ottoman Institutions ...... 16 III. REFORMS OF SELIM III AND THE FAILURE OF THE MODERNISTS...... 31 Early efforts at reform ...... 31 The Reforms of Sultan Selim ...... 37 The Reform of Sultan I ...... 41 Social and Economic Problems • 46 IV. THE RESHID REFORMS AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MODERNISTS AND TRADITIONALIST 1839-1876 ...... '...... 60 The 1839 Reshid Pasha Reforms and the Temporary Victory of the Modernists .... 60 The Role of the Ottoman Diplomatic Envoys ••••• 68 ill CHAPTER PAGE The Struggle between Modernists and Traditionalists during the Period 1839-1876 ...... 71 Economic and Social Problems ...... 75 Rise of Nationalism ...... 80 The Role of the Ottoman P r e s s ...... 84 V. THE YOUNG OTTOMANS AND THE . CONSTITUTION OF 1876 ...... 97 The Modernists form the Young Ottoman S o c i e t y ...... 97 The Re-emergence of the Modernists and the Midhat Pasha Constitution of 1876 . . Ill VI. THE PERIOD OF ABSOLUTISM UNDER SULTAN ABDUL HAMID I I ...... 128 VII. THE ROLE OF THE MODERNISTS AND TRADITION­ ALISTS IN OTTOMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT .... 146 Introduction ..•••..•••••••.. 146 ...... 147 Pan-Islamism ...... 150 Pan-Turanism...... 153 Turkism ...... 159 The Ideology of the Young T u r k s ...... 160 VIII. THE FAILURE OF THE MODERNIST LEADERSHIP IN THE 1908 ...... 165 iv CHAPTER PAGE IX. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ...... 183 CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 196 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 200 APPENDIX A. Chronology of Important Events 1789-1923 229 APPENDIX B. Ottoman ...... 237 APPENDIX C. Structure of the Ottoman Government • • 239 APPENDIX D. The Ottoman Foreign Office ...•••• 241 APPENDIX E. Ethnic Background of Ottoman Vezirs (1323-1920) ...... 242 APPENDIX F. Principal Ottoman Political Parties • . 243 APPENDIX G. The Turkish National P a c t ...... 245 APPENDIX H. Dramatis Personae ...... 247 APPENDIX I. Glossary ...... 262 PREFACE

The author of this study, on the struggle between the modernists and traditionalists in the course of Turkish history, wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to the members of his Doctoral Dissertation Committee: Dr. Kerim K. Key, Chairman; Dr. Mary E. Bradshaw; Dr. Harry N. Howard; Dr. Abdul Aziz Said; and Dr. W. W. Cleiand for their direction, advice, encouragement, and helpful criti­ cism. He also wishes to thank Mrs. Virginia E. MacHale for typing the manuscript in conformity to University regulations and format. The author, however, is solely responsible for interpretations and errors. Since this is not a study on linguistics or litera­ ture, but involves an historical interpretation of Ottoman history, the accepted standard Western forms and spelling will be used instead of the Turkish spelling. Thus, Abdul Hamid will be preferred to Abdulhamit, except when sources are quoted, or in the case of bibliographies. Whenever necessary for clarity, the different spellings or names will be given in a footnote the first time the term appears; such as, in the case of Seljuk (Saljuq in , and Selcuk in Turkish), The Young Ottomans (Gene Osman- lilar), and New Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlilar)• While foreign terms, such as tarikat or vakanuvis will be underlined; mufti, ulema, and Sheikh ul-Islam, terms which are in common usage in English, will not be underlined. Clarity and simplicity of rendition will be the determining factor in the spelling of foreign words. CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze critically Ottoman institutions and the reform movements in order to discover the cause for their failure* It is believed that an analysis of the significance of the modernist- traditionalist struggle in the Ottoman Empire may give the reader a clue to the causes of the decline of the Empire. Developments involving Ottoman institutions and the Ottoman reform movement affected the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire. The student of International Rela­ tions, therefore, should be concerned with these develop­ ments in order to better understand the history of the Ottoman Empire in the last century of its existence. Although there are many works on the Ottoman Empire, especially on the period of decline, recent research and revisionist interpretations have opened new possibilities for additional renditions. However, there is no specific single work which attempts to trace the struggle between the forces of modernism and traditionalism in the course of the Ottoman Empire.1 This writer has attempted to present an interpretation of the period of decline seen from the viewpoint of a struggle within Ottoman society between these two major forces. By modernism this writer means the body of methods and the tendencies in the field of government and adminis­ tration which seek to adapt institutions to the changing needs of the times. The teachings of Christ and Muhammad nearly two thousand years ago were essentially modern in concept, since these great truths are timeless. At the same time, the materialism of our present century, while new in some aspects, has existed in one form or another in the past. Modernism in Islam means the tendency which applies modern critical methods to the study of the Quran and religion, and places less emphasis on historic dogma and creeds. The Ottoman modernist leaders favored innova­ tion; whereas, the traditionalist elements tended to resist change. By traditionalism in the Ottoman Empire is meant the doctrines or practices of those who follow or accept tradition, as opposed to modernism, liberalism, or change. 2 The Ulema were not always obstructionists and played an important role in the development of a great 3 Empire. The , once an effective military organization, had declined by the end of the seventeenth century. In the past, the alliance of the janissaries and the ulema often had a salutory effect, in that they acted as a balancing force against the tyranny of the Sultan. But this alliance between the ulema and the janissaries against the liberal Selim III, during the end of the eighteenth century, retarded modernization. The terms "modernism,” "democracy," and "liberalism" are not always synonymous. Some of the Young Turks, such as Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha, favored progress and modernism in the armed forces and government administration, but they were not democratic in their ideals. Thus, these terms must be used with care, and defined clearly, to prevent misunder­ standing. Semantics become important in the interpreta­ tion of institutions of varied cultures. This study is not so much a history of the Ottoman reform movement, as it is an attempt to interpret Ottoman history. Special reference will be made to the struggle between the forces of modernism and progress, on the one hand, and the deadweight of traditionalism and the forces of retrogression on the other, which appears to have existed throughout the course of the history of the Turkish people. This, of course, is also true to varying degrees in the history of other empires and nations. After examining the major sources of Ottoman history, this writer has concluded that, in addition to overwhelming external pressures, the failure of the Otto­ man leadership to modernize their institutions effectively 4 further exacerbated the struggle. This was especially true after the eighteenth century. It is the contention of this writer that the failure of the Ottoman reform movement and, in fact, even the more recent political crisis which developed after the 1957 national elections are due mainly to the unresolved struggle between the small modernist and reformist elites and the more numerous traditionalist elements. A difficult task facing the present Turkish leadership is the integration of the urban and rural population into a modern, united, and dynamic society. While the struggle between modernism and tradi­ tionalism will be examined throughout the course of Otto­ man history, the main emphasis will be placed on the period since the abortive reform movement of Sultan Selim III at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. «This study will then analyze events to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War in 1918. However, the final chapter will relate past events to present-day developments. The first chapter is a general introduction. In Chapter II, the writer will attempt to highlight signifi­ cant developments which help explain the causes for the rise of the Ottoman Empire as well as the reasons for its ultimate decline. Chapter III will attempt to show how the reforms of Sultan Selim III failed because of the powerful alliance of the traditionalist ulema and the janissaries, and also because of the weakness of the modernist element which, at this time, had no clear-cut ideology. In Chapter IV, an effort will be made to explain the causes of the temporary victory of the modernists in 1839 led by Grand Vezir Reshid Pasha, and the realignment of forces within the Empire following the revolt of Muhammad Ali of Egypt. Some attention will also be given here to external pressures which affected internal developments. The struggle between modernists and traditionalists during the Tanzimat period, roughly covering the years 1839-1876, will also be discussed in this chapter, based on recent revisionist interpretations. Perhaps Chapter V is one of the most important parts of this study, since it deals with the modernists who formed the secret Young Ottoman Society during 1865- 1867. More recent interpretations about this formative period in Turkish political dynamics will also be pre­ sented. The re-emergence of the modernists in 1876 as a center of power, after an eclipse of more than a genera­ tion, and the period of Midhat Pasha's constitutional government (1876-1877) will receive attention in this chapter. While some recent studies have thrown new light on the origin of the Young Ottomans and the First Consti­ tutional Period, Midhat Pasha's achievements deserve greater attention by both Turkish and other historians. The position of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in Turkish history has been controversial. However, as in the case of Metternich, Abdul Hamid has received more sympathetic treatment in recent years, and may be rehabilitated by future revisionist historians. Nonetheless, Chapter VI, which deals with the Period of Absolutism under Sultan Abdul Hamid II, will show that repressive measures re­ sulted in the modernists going underground. It will also be shown that the terms "modernist” and "traditionalists" must be used with caution when applied to Pan-Islamism, Islamic reformers, and even to the newly emerging Young Turks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Chapter VII is primarily descriptive and tries to show the role of modernists and traditionalists in Ottoman political thought. In order to follow a methodical system Ottoman political thought is analyzed under such headings as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism, and Turkism. A brief discussion of the vague and ill-defined ideology of the Young Turks is also presented. Chapter VIII discusses the reasons for the failure of the modernist leadership in creating an effective par­ liamentary government following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, a period about which much more research is needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn. Chapter IX attempts to present general conclusions and tries to show how the unresolved modernist- traditionalist struggle has remained a most vital continu­ ing factor affecting the general direction and development of Turkish society and culture even today. It also attempts to explain 's foreign policy orientation and the desire of the Turkish leadership to be associated with Western Europe and the West in general, rather than with Russia or the East. In addition to a critical bibliography of the more important materials useful for an understanding of the subject under study, a selected bibliography is presented.5 The bibliography is purposely concise and does not include works which are not directly pertinent to this study. There is also a brief appendix. 8 CHAPTER I— FOOTNOTES

So far there is no single work on the Ottoman Empire dealing with the struggle between modernism and traditionalism. Most students of Turkish history will agree that the most outstanding work on Turkish history is Bernard Lewis , The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1961). Alsousefulcontributions by the same author are "The Impact of the French Revolu­ tion on Turkey,” Journal of World History. I, July, 1953; and his most recent work .""The Mlcfdle East and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1§&4)• See also the two important contributions of Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkiyenin Siyasl Hayatinda Batilllasma Hareketleri (: Vedigun Matbaasi, 19&o) (Westernization Move­ ments in the Political Life of Turkey) and Islamcillk Cereyani (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962) (i?he Islamic Movement)• 2 Ulema = »ulama, learned men of Islam, interpreters of the Quran. See glossary for more detailed definition. 3 = Yeniceri. The role of the Janissaries in Turkish history is discussed briefly in Chapters II and III of this study. A good study on the origins, role, and final abolition of the Janissaries is Howard A. Reed, The Destruction of the Janissaries (Princeton: Princeton University, unpublished Ph. 15. dissertation, 1951). For the decree abolishing the Janissary Corps see "Yenicerl Ocagini ilga eden Ferman,” Topkapi Sarayi Arsivi, No. E. 5528. 4 Among the main sources of Ottoman history are the historical chronicles prepared by the vakanuvls (official court historiographers) which cover the period 1591-1876. These include Naima Tarlhl and Ceydet Tarihi. The works of Turkish historians such as I. ri. Uzuncarsili, Enver Ziya Karal, Halil Inalcik, M. Fuad Koprulu and Haluk Y. Sehsuvaroglu and political scientists such as Tarik Z. Tunaya and Kemal H. Karpat have added new information and interpretations. The numerous publications of the Turkish Historical Society (Turk Tarih Kurumu)and other learned societies are essentialsources. ftirkish historical journals, such as the Belleten and Tarih Vesikalari con­ tain articles based on archival materials. Partial or full reproduction of archival materials and official docu­ ments are now available to students of Turkish history. See bibliography for references to publications on archival materials. Bibliographical information is available from the following: Enver Koray, Turlcive Tarih Yavinlari Biblio- grafvaal (: Milli Egitim Vekaleti Basimevi, 19^5) (Bibliography of Turkish Historical Works), R. Etting- hausen, A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Books and Periodicals in Western Languages Dealing wlin ^He Near and Middle East TWashlngton: Midale East Institute, 1954), and i. D. Pearson, Index Islamlcus Supplement 1956-1960 (Cambridge: University Press, 1^62). See also selected . bibliography. CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Origins of the Turkish People Turkish historians trace the origin of the Turkish people and Turkish institutions to the Sumerian and Hittite civilizations as well as to Turan, the legendary home of the Turks in Central Asia.1 This study deals primarily with modern times and, especially, the period 1790 to 1922 in Ottoman history. However, a brief survey of the past history of the Turkish people is presented here in order to highlight the role of the Turks in history. The original home of the Turks was in Central Asia. 2 The Turks appeared in at the beginning of the eleventh century, although Turkish confederacies had played a role in the invasions of Western Asia and Eastern 3 Europe during the last days of the Roman Empire. The term "Turk" appeared in Chinese records as far back as the sixth century A. D. These records refer to a people called the Tu-kiu, who are a steppe people in Central Asia. The Turks came into contact with Islam during the eighth 4 century A. D. The Turks adopted Islam and were soon to become the great champions of that faith. The Turkish tribes entered Persia by the ninth century and, soon 11 thereafter, they entered the service of the Abbasid at . In due course, the Turkish military leaders became the real rulers of the Islamic Caliphate. In the following pages a few words will be said about the Seljuk (Saljuq) Turks and the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum with Its capital In (Iconlum).

The Selluk Turks The Seljuk Turks of Konya (1070-1300) were able to gain control of most of Asia Minor, but failed to form a centralized empire. However, their constant wars with the Byzantine Empire and their spiritual allegiance .to the Abbasid Caliphate affected the development of Seljuk Insti­ tutions.^ Many of the Seljuk Sultans were leaders of ability, but they were never absolute In their control. However, as the temporal head of the realm, they held a most important position, and their military and religious hierarchies effectively controlled the Seljuk Islamic community. The Sultans at first looked to Baghdad for their spiritual inspiration, but the decline of the Cali­ phate reduced the significance of this influence with time. However, Islam remained the basis of the Seljuk community. The so-called "Establishment" during the Seljuk period will be described briefly below: The important Seljuk institutions included the military-divilian-religious hierarchy, which in Islamic society were very closely 12 related. In addition to the orthodox Sunni ulema, the newly emerging tar Heat (secret religious orders),0 the Ghazi, 7 and other feudal and tribal military war lords, 8 9 there were the Akhis (medieval Islamic craft guilds), and, of course, the masses of the people, roughly divided by most writers into the urban or the rural population.10 Another important element in the political dynamics of the Sultanate of Konya was the tribal groups, many of whom kept coming in small numbers from Central Asia. In discussing the Seljuk "Establishment” certain points appear to need special emphasis.11 The Seljuk Turks were able to create a solid base in Konya. The institutions of the Sultanate, the Sunni ulema, the mili­ tary organization of the Ghazis, and the Akhis were pillars of strength in Seljuk society. However, these institutions, as well as the Seljuk leadership, needed a vital force which could unite and inspire them into creating a dynamic socifety. This force was found in the Futuwwa (futuwet) tradition, often described very inade- quately as Islamic chivalry. 12 While in Konya, the conservative, traditional ulema played an important stabilizing role for the "Establish- ment," the safety valve of the "frontier” 13 made it pos­ sible for more radical elements, adventurers, and heretical groups to find a place in the activities of the realm. The impact of the "frontier" on both Seljuk (and later Ottoman) as well as on Byzantine history is significant. The Christian Akritai (frontier or march-warriors) 14 met the Muslim Ghazis at the frontier where Dar-ul-Harb and Dar-ul-Islam18 formed the "thin red line" of w a r . ^ How­ ever, in the early days of Islam, the Islamic religion was in theory, if not always in fact, a most tolerant faith; and there were long periods of peace along the frontier, where cultural exchange, trade intermarriage, and other peaceful relations took place. The degree of influence of Byzantine ideas on Seljuk and Ottoman institutions is a controversial subject on which historians differ, but there is no doubt that Turkish institutions were influenced to some degree by Persian, Arab, as well as Byzantine ideas. Professor Paul Wittek in his admirable work on the rise of the Ottoman Turks, the successors of the Seljuks, shows how the dynamic Turkish people were able to launch a great empire based on the Ghazi tradition. 17

The Rise of the Ottoman Turks The Ottoman Empire, which lasted from about 1300 to 1922, went through a period of expansion, followed by a brief period of consolidation, and reached its zenith in the sixteenth century during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent•18 The control of Anatolia was won by the Muslim Turks in two major steps. First, under the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, the initial invasion of Muslim Turks took place against Byzantium during the eleventh century, which was thrown back by the Byzantines to the old "cultural fron- tier." 19 Then there was an intermediate period of some­ what chaotic conditions resulting from early Mongolian invasions of the areas controlled by the Seljuks with a Mongolian victory in 1243. This caused the decline of the Seljuks of Rum. The second invasion of the Balkans by the Turks was in the thirteenth century led by the Ottoman Ghazi leaders, who were able to establish a stable monarchy which later conquered in 1453 and built a great empire. The Ottoman Turks had first to gain primacy in Anatolia over the other Turkish principalities; such as, the Karaman and Menteshe Turks. Having achieved this by 1400, the Ottoman Turks, who had already penetrated into the Balkans as early as 1345, were free to extend their gains in Europe. Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453, and the Turks reached the gates of in 1683. 20 During the period of Ottoman expansion, the border­ lands were in constant strife; but there were periods of peace and non-military contacts across the borders. It is true that the Turks had first appeared as a military class from Central Asia and had served as mercenaries in Persia and later in the Abbasid Caliphate. But they gradually acquired administrative functions, since many a military leader in the service of some Persian or Arab Muslim monarch rose in revolt and took over the control of the area once under the rule of the deposed Caliph or Sultan. The Ghazi communities in Asia Minor included the Karaman, ' Aydin, Menteshe, and several others. The Ottomans alone were able to establish a stable government and finally overcame all these feudal principalities and formed a relatively centralized state. The early Turkish community, sometimes described as a civilization on horseback, enjoyed a primitive type of democracy. The best fighter and horse­ man became the leader. The military officers consulted with their staff before major decisions were made, and the early Sultans participated in battle and were closer to the people. Later, with the pomp and ceremony of a great empire, authority was delegated to the grand veziers. 21

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire The seeds of decay were already discernible in the lifetime of the great Law Giver (Kanunu Sultan Suleyman). Most authorities date the beginnings of the decline of the Empire from the Treaty of Carlowitz 1699. The decline that started at that time was accelerated after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja in 1774, and the once great Ottoman Empire came to be known as the "Sick Man" of Europe in the nineteenth century. 22 The decline of the Ottoman Empire was caused by both external and internal factors. Most authorities are in agreement that the Ottoman frontiers became over-extended and difficult to defend. The rise of other great empires (such as, the Habsburg and Russian Empires) threatened the Ottomans at a time when Ottoman institutions were in a state of decline and its leadership poor. The shifting of trade routes at the end of the sixteenth century also reduced the commercial importance of the Levant. Many of the Ottoman institutions, which had served the Empire well in the past had become outmoded and the poor leadership of the later Sultans failed to modernize them. The Ottoman Turks also failed to partici­ pate in the industrial revolution, and even reforms in the Army were too late and not effectively carried out. 23 But the most important factor which shook the foundations of the Ottoman Empire was the rise of separatist and nation­ alist movements among the Christian subject peoples of the Empire following the French Revolution. 24

Ottoman Institutions The problem of modernism and traditionalism became an issue in the Ottoman Empire after the eighteenth cen­ tury. This study is concerned primarily with the period after 1790, but a brief description of a few institutions will be presented here in the hope that it will be useful for the understanding of later developments. Professor Albert H. Lybyer divided Ottoman institu­ tions into the "Ruling Institution" and the "Muslim Insti- tution." 25 In the early days of the Ottoman Empire, the "Ruling Institution" included the civil and military officials, or the bureaucracy and the Janissaries, who, in theory, were the slaves of the Sultan. The personnel of the "Ruling Institution" were Christians. Free-born Muslims, at first, were not included in the "Ruling Insti­ tution" which prevented the growth of a hereditary aris­ tocracy of officials. The "Muslim Institution" included the ulema, muftis, the Sheikh ul-Islam and was open to all free-born Muslims. The Provincial Administration was also made up of members of the Sultans personal "slaves." Both the "Ruling Institution" and the "Muslim Institution" were represented in-the Sultan's Divan (privy council). The Palace Schools, 26 the Evkaf (Religious Founda- tions) 27 and the Capitulations 28 are not going to be dis­ cussed in any detail in this study, although reference will be made to these institutions in the general discussion in following chapters. Instead, this study will concentrate on the system since its role was important in the period of Ottoman decline. 29 Also, a discussion on nationalist and separatist movements and the Ottoman re­ action to these new forces will be discussed since it is pertinent to the subject of modernism and traditionalism in the Ottoman Empire. The Millet system was an institu­ tion developed by the creative and liberal leadership of the early Ottoman Turks. Millet is a term used to de­ scribe the religio-national groupings in Muslim countries. When Mehmed II the Conqueror won control of Constantinople (Istanbul), based on the theoretical tolerance of Islam, he allowed the non-Muslim peoples to be governed by their own religious hierarchy. There were some thirteen millets in the Ottoman Empire: (1) Greek Orthodox, (2) Latin, (3) Armenian Gregorian, (4) Armenian Catholic, (5) Syrian Catholic, (6) Chaldean Catholic, (7) Syrian Jacobite, (8) Protestant, (9) Greek Melchite, (10) Jewish, (11) Bulgarian Orthodox, (12) Maronite, (13) Nestorian. In addition, there were Vlachs, Serbs, Coptic Orthodox, and Coptic Catholic listed by some authorities. The Millet system existed before the Ottoman Empire, and is an ancient de­ vice for government of minorities of different religion. According to an authority, The Millet system is a provision for the government of subject minorities whose religious faith differs from that of the governing institutions of the state, and who are, therefore, limited in their citizenship by virtue of the fact that the laws of personal status are based upon religious sanctions.30 This authority further states that such subjects of the Ottoman Empire were classified according to their creed or rite, and certain phases of their civil 19 administration were committed directly to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical organization of the sect, under the oversight of the Head of the Millet, who is usually the ranking member of the hierarchy (Patriarch, Chief Rabbi, etc.) and who is directly responsible to the State for the admin­ istration of such subjects.31 While the Millet system was an effective institu­ tion for the government of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, after the French Revolution, the rise of separatist and nationalist movements operated within the framework of the Millet system which became an instrument in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. In connection with the non-Turkish and non-Muslim population of the Empire, it should be noted that these communities, especially the non-Muslim, lived separately from the Muslim segment of society. Little is known of the economic conditions of these people, but apparently they did well in a rather static society of the medieval and early modern period. Most of the merchant and crafts­ man guilds were at first open to Christians. Later, there was some segregation. In any case, the non-Muslim minori­ ties were not an economically strong or dangerous group to the Empire until later on when, in the period of decline of the Ottoman Empire, especially after the French Revolu­ tion, we see that most of the trade and industry was in the hands of the non-Muslim subjects. These minorities were protected and encouraged by the Great Powers, who, 20 if they could not control the Empire, wished to get the lion's share when the partition of the "Sick Man" of Europe was to take place. The rise of nationalism among the people of the Ottoman Empire, to be discussed more fully in Chapter IV, started in the Balkans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The ideas of the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution inspired the peoples of the Balkans to revolt against their Turkish rulers. The Slavs, Rumanians, and, later, other subject peoples of the Empire struggled for independence. 32 The first to revolt were the Serbs (1804-1817) followed by the Greeks. The Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) resulted in the emergence of modern . 33 The rise of nationalism among the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire has been treated at length by both Western and Armenian historians, as well as Turkish writers, 34 and this subject is outside the scope of this study. However, a few words will be said about the Armenian millet which numbered between one and a half and three millions during the middle of the nineteenth century. The majority were Gregorian Chris­ tians (members of the Apostolic Church of Armenia), al­ though there were some Catholic and Protestant Armenians. The Armenians rose to high administrative positions in the Ottoman Government, as had many of the other non-Muslim 21 elements, especially the Greeks. Many of the Armenians, as well as the Greeks and Jews In the Empire, were engaged In trade, commerce and, In the case of the Armenians, also In agricultural pursuits. During the middle of. the nineteenth century, the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were affected by the rise of nationalist sentiments, often encouraged by the Great Powers. Ottoman oppressive measures against the non- Turkish elements in the Empire after the middle of the nineteenth century, including the Armenians, discredited the Ottoman Government in Europe. The Turkish authorities stressed the fact that the Armenians organized secret revolutionary societies and conspired against the Empire. 35 Most European and Western sources, however, condemned the i Ottoman leadership for the massacres of Armenians during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 36 On the other hand, in recent years some writers have tried to present a less emotional and clearer picture of the causes which led to these unfortunate happenings•37 The tentative conclusions drawn by this student, based on the limited examination of existing sources, is presented here. It appears to the present writer that in the early days of the Ottomans, the Ghazi tradition of a civilization on horseback was most effective because of 22 its religious fervor and Its political dynamism. Its economy was simple and based primarily on booty. Life was frugal and generally democratic in the primitive sense of democracy. However, once the original momentum of the Turkish advance bogged down, with the acquisition of new territories inhabited by non-Muslims, the institutions of such a complex society soon began to decay. It was diffi­ cult for the Islamic State to assimilate the non-Muslim peoples, and the formation of a loosely controlled federa­ tion was not feasible. In the next chapter, it will be seen that Sultan Selim III (1790-1807) attempted to halt the decline through reforms, especially in the military and technologi­ cal field, but he was not successful because of trie corrupt leadership of the Janissaries and the reactionary attitudes of the ulema. Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839) was able to abolish the Janissaries in 1826 and organized a conscript army. This was followed by the Tanzimat (beneficial re­ forms) of Reshid Pasha in 1839, which aimed at the crea­ tion of a more centralized system of government. But these reforms and those of 1856, 1876, and 1908 were not success­ ful; and the Ottoman Empire continued to decline until the defeat of the Central Powers in , of which the Empire of the Ottomans was an ally, ended the long rule of the Osmanlis. Over the ashes of the Empire, the Turkish 23 people, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturic, were able to build a modern Turkish Republic. One thing appears clear: in periods of growth and advance of the Ottoman Empire, inno­ vation, liberalism, and progress are the order of t’■*» d?v; while we will see that in the period of decline, reaction rears its ugly head. Efforts by the more liberal elements to introduce reform, we will see in the following chapters, were frustrated by the traditionalists and also by foreign intervention. 24 CHAPTER II— FOOTNOTES

In 1931 the newly organized Turk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society) published the"“¥urk Tarlhinin Ana Hatlarl (The Basic Outline of Turkish History). while allowing Turkish historians to trace the origins of the Turks to Central Asia, Ataturk also tried to balance these interpretations by stressing the views of historians who discussed the importance of the Sumerian and Hittite con­ tributions to Turkish history* See Bernard Lewi&, "History- Writing and National Revival in Turkey," Middle Eastern Affairs* June-July, 1953; K* Key, "Trends in Turkish Historiography," Report on Current Research on the Middle East (Washington: Middle East Institute, 19*57); and ziya Enver Karal, "Historiography in Turkey Today," Middle Eastern Affairs, October, 1959* See also A. Z. V, togan, Tarihde’ Usui (Tstanbul: 1950) (Methodology in History) a most usefulstudy on Turkish historiography. 2 Anatolia: Asia Minor, Anadolu in Turkish. 3 Bernard Lewis, "Turkey," The Middle East (London: Europa Publication, 1959), pp. 313-llTT 4 The date of the conversion of the Turks to Islam is not clear. See K. W. Morgan (ed.), Islam (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), p. 258; and Robert ftevereux, "al- Kashqhari and early Turkish Islam," Muslim World, April 2, 1959. 5Seljuk, Saljuq (in Arabic), Selcuk (in Turkish) is the name given to family of Ghuzz Turkoman tribes (Oguz in Turkish) which derived its name from Seljuk; chief of a small tribe of the Hoei-He, which gained possession of Bokhara in the ninth century A. D. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Seljuks appeared in Western Asia and founded a group of dynasties in Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Asia Minor. The Main Seljuk empires included (1) the Seluks of Isfahan and Baghdad, (2) Kerman, (3) Aleppo, (4) Damascus, (5) Iconium (Konya) or Asia Minor (Anatolia). See Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. XX, 1955, pp. 308-10. See also Claude iahen, "Le Malik-nameh et l'histoire des origines Seljukides," Orlens, Vol. I, No. 1, 1949; Tamara Talbot Rice, The Seljuks oi Asia Minor (London: Thames and Hudson, i95&) and ClaucTe Cahen, "*The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period," cited in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), Historians and the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 59-^8. 25 Tar Heat, Arab word meaning "road,*1 way, path, which has acquired two successive technical meanings in Muslim mysticism: (1) a method of moral psychology for the practical guidance of individuals who had a mystical call, (2) the whole system of rites for spiritual training laid down for communal life in various Muslim religious orders. See Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (London: Luzac, 1961), p. 573. 7Ghazi, Gazi in Turlcish. Victor in the Jihad (Holy War)• See Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: Luzac, 1958) for a discussion on the Ghazi tradi- tion.

Q After 1400, the emergence of the Janissaries as a regular army gave the Ottoman Empire a war-machine that made the great military victories possible. The Janis­ saries were closely related to the Dervish orders. For the history of Turkish military organizations see: Sermet Muhtar Alus, Yeniceriler ve eski Turk Ordusu (Istanbul: Halit Kutuphanesi, 19^3) T7he Janissaries and the Old Turkish Army); Necati Tacan, Tanzimat ve Ordu (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940) (the Tanzimat and the Army); Ahmet Cevat, Tarlhi Askerl Osmani (Istanbul: Kurk&mbar Matbaasi, 1880) (history of the Ottoman Army). g Akhls (AhIs in Turkish), a futuwwa corporation or brotherhood of artisans and merchants. See Bernard Lewis, "The Islamic Guilds," Economic History Review. VIII, 1937; Louis Mossignon, "Le Corps de Metiers et la cit^ Islamique," Revue International de Socioloqie. XXVII, 1920. ^The problem of the city versus the desert in Arab history and the city versus the rural areas in the Islamic World and Ottoman Empire are discussed in Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (Oxford University Press, 1950), Vol. I, part 1, and 1957, Vol. I, part 2. For the role of the city in Ottoman history, especially Istanbul see: E. C. Komurcuyan, Istanbul Tarlhi (Istanbul: Kurtulus Basimevi, 1952) (History of Istanbul In the 17U» Century); Ahmet Refik Altinay, 16nci Asirda Istanbul Havatl (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1935) (Life in Instanbul duringthe 16tb Century); and Bernard Lewis, Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire (Norman"? University o£ Oklahoma Press, T55T77” ^The "Establishment" is a new term used in England today to describe English society and the ruling elite. This usage has become rather general and is used for other 26 societies and can apply to Turkish society as well. In the Ottoman Empire, the establishment consisted of the Ruling Institutions and the Muslim Institutions. A brief characterization would include the "Men of the Book" (Men of Religion or the Ulema^, the "Men of the Pen" (Government administrators or Palace and other bureaucrats), and "Men of the Sword," (the Armed Forces, the Janissaries and later the Nizami Cedid or New Army)• 12The futuwwa has been defined as "the aggregate of all those virtues which distinguish the chivalrous young man, especially nobility of manner and generosity." G. G. Arnakis, "Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. XII, No. 4, October, T§5'3T~p".~?3T:------13The role of the frontier in Turkish history is a subject on which little has been written. Some reference is made to it in G. G. Arnakis, loc. cit.. and in Wittek, loc. cit. In describing Ottoman society, as well as Byzantine society for that matter, one should distinguish between the so-called "cultural frontier" or borderlands and the hinterland. An examination of the existing litera­ ture will show that the borderlands were warlike and booty constituted the principal economic basis of life. Peace­ ful contacts also existed in the borderlands. Thus, more peaceful institutions were developing in the hinterland, which tended to be more conservative. In fact, there were not only cultural but even racial contrasts between the frontier and the hinterland. Thus, the frontier peoples, more warlike, generally radical, less conserva­ tive, peopled by discontented elements, renegades, and heretics tended to be faithful to their own chiefs and were independent in nature, resenting interference and taxation of the urban hinterland government. 14Akrltai or acritae, Byzantine border troops or "March" lords who faced the Turkish Ghazis. For a brief study on Byzantine history see Norman H. Baynes, The Byzantine Empire (London: Oxford University Press, 1925). &ee also Fuad Koprulu, "Bizans muesseselerinin Osmanli muesseselerine tesiri hakkinda bazi mulahazalar," Turk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarlhi Mecmuasi, VoL I, 1931. (Some observations on the influence o£ Byzantine institutions on Ottoman institutions.) 15Dar-ul-Harb and Dar-ul-Islam, the abode of war and the abode of peace. See Hajid khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, T?57T7 16The thin red line is a term about war. See James Jones, The Thin Red Line (New York: Harper's, 1962). 17Paul Wlttek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: Luzac, i958). 18 Most Turkish sources use 1299-1922 for the dates of the Ottoman Empire. Tarlh. a* three volume history for Turkish schools uses these dates. Other writers use 1288- 1922 or 1290-1922. 19For the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent see: A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913): s. F. Gucuvener. Kanuni Sultan Sulevman (Istanbul Anadolu Turk Kitabevi, 1^54) (Sultan Suleyman the Law-maker)• 20For the conquest of Constantinople see: Ziya Sakir, Fatih Istanbulu Nasil Aldi? (Istanbul: Anadolu Turk Kitabevi, 1942) {How Mehmed II conquered Istanbul); Ali Saim Ulgen, Fatih Devrinde Istanbul 1453-1481 (Istanbul Curahuriyet Matbaasi, 1939) (Istanbul during the times of Sultan Mehmen II); E. Jacobs, "Mehemmed II," Orlens. Vol. II (1949), pp. 6-30; Mehmed Fuad Koprulu, Les OriqTnes de 1'Empire Ottoman (: E. de Boccard, 1935). 21Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1$6T7, pp. 35-^6. See also Mehmed Pasha, Nasaih ul-vuzera ve 1-umera, Turkish text, with introduction by W. L. Wright, Jr., Ottoman Statecraft: the Book of Counsel for Vezlrs and Governors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935); and Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turklvenln Slvasi Havatlnda Batllilasma Hareketleri (Istanbul: Yedloun Matbaasi. 1^60. pp. 11-13 IWesternization Movements in the Political Life of Turkey). 22See J. A. Morriott, The Eastern Question (London: Oxford University, 1940), for the story of the "sick man" of Europe. This statement is attributed to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia made in 1853. It should be noted, however, that despite weakness of Ottoman leaders and institutions, the Turkish people had not lost their dynamism. The heroic stand of Osman Pasha at Plevne in 1878, the devo­ tion of the Turkish soldiers at Gallipoli in 1915, and the achievements of the Turkish War for Independence (1919- 1922) indicated the the Turkish people had not lost their original vitality. H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 193l) points out 28 that Turkey's participation in the First World War tied down several million Allied troops and prolonged the war. The decline of the Ottoman Empire is discussed in Yusuf Akcura, Osman11 Imparatorluounun daailma devri (Istanbul: Aksam Matbaasi, 1934) (The Period of the beeline of the Ottoman Empire). 23See the following works for a discussion on the failure of Ottoman reforms: K. Key, "The Ottoman Intellec­ tuals and the Young Turk Reformation of 1908" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, The American University, Washington, D. C., 1950); Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East (New York: Knopf, 1959), Chapters 18 and 19; Bernard Lewis, op. cit., Chapter II. ^4For a discussion of the separatist and nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire see: Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19^3), L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1959); George W. Hoffman, The Balkyis in Transition (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 19&3; and George Antonius. The Arab Awakening (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1946. *JLybyer,25 o£. cit. ^®For the Ottoman Palace Schools see: Barnette Miller, The of Muhammad the Conqueror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941). ^Evkaf (Awqaf) in Arabic, or Religious Foundations. See M. Fuad Koprulu, l'Istitution du Vakouf (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 193b); Osman ‘Erqin, Turk Tarihinde Evkaf (Istanbul: Turkiye Matbaasi, 1937) (The Evkaf in Turkish History); Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London: Oxford University Press, T957), Vol"I T , Part 2, Chapter XII; and see also article 154 of the Constitution of the Second Turkish Republic. At present, the Evkaf is tinder the Office of Religious Affairs. An English translation of the text of the Constitution, is available in the Middle East Journal, Spring 1962, with an explantory note by K, key. 28For a study of the capitulations see Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime in Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Tress', I9'37 V. 1 See Alford Carleton, The Millet System (unpub­ lished Ph.D. dissertation, Kennedy School of1 Missions, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1937). 30Ibid., pp. 6-7. 31Ibid., p. 7. 32See Robert W. Seton-Watson, Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London: Constable and do., 1917); T?er3Tnand Schevill and W. M. Geweher, The History of the Balkan Peninsula (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933*77 and HalilInalcik, Tanzimat ye Bulqar Meselesi (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 1943) C^he Tanzimat and the Bulgarian Problem). 33George Finlay, A History of Greece (London: Oxford University Press,“ l677); George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution (Edinburgh and London, 1861); E.S. frorster. A &Mort riistory of Greece (London: Methuen, 1946); ancT d. M. Woodhouse, fhe (Sreek War of Independence (London: Hutchinson's University Library ,"“T95i). 34For the history of the Armenians see: Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955); A. 0. Sarkisian, History of the Armenian Question to 1885 (Urbana: University of TTlinois Press, 1938); J.“"V. Mryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (London, 19l6): and~"£sat Uras, Tarihte Ermenller ve firmeni Meselesi (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950) (The Armenians in Mistory and the Armenian Problem). 35For a Turkish view of the Armenian question see: Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 17-18, 33-40, 140-141. See also Tarlh (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1933), Vol. Ill, Chapter V: Ermenl vakasina ait eyrak (Istanbul: Topkapi Palace Archives No. &• 4^02, l69o) (Documents on the Armenian question); Turco-Armenlan Question, the Turkish Point of View (Constantinople, 1919)• 36For European and Western views critical of the Ottoman Turks see: E. M. Bliss, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities (Philadelphia: J. H. Moore and Co., 1896); Marcel Leart, La Question Armenienne (Paris: A. Challamel, 1913); Arnold 77 Toynbee, freabment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (London: J. Causton and Sons, Ltd., 1*9X6). 30 37For recent views on the Armenian question see: William Yale, The Near East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), Chapter VIII; Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East (New York: Knopf, 1959), pp. 331, 365-366; Roderic H. Davison, op. cit.. pp. 120-126; Bernard Lewis, op. cit., pp. 61-62, 212, §50. It should be noted that while Sultan Abdul Hamid II and reactionary leaders op­ pressed the Armenians and other subject peoples, Midhat Pasha and the Young Ottomans favored equality for all Ottomans under the new Ottomanism they advocated. Later Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha and some of the Young Turks stressed Turkism, but other Young Turks led by Prince Sabahaddin favored equal treatment for non-Muslims in the Empire• CHAPTER III

REFORMS OF SULTAN SELIM III AND THE FAILURE OF THE MODERNISTS

Early efforts at reform Recent Turkish scholarship has stressed the period of reforms prior to the Tanzimat of 1839. A brief dis­ cussion of this period will be presented before taking up the reforms of Sellm III, which will be followed by the achievements of Sultan Mahmud II, in order to show to what extent the modernist failed or succeeded in their struggle against the anti-reform traditionalist elements.^ According to Professor Bernard Lewis, the Ottoman 2 Empire was a non-despotic absolute monarchy. The Ottoman monarchy gave the people of the Empire effective leader­ ship and good government during the period of expansion, but later became tyrannical and ineffectual during the period of decline. It is also stressed that while the Ottoman Empire was, in fact, ruled by the , it should not be forgotten that, in theory, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic State and, therefore, ultimate sovereignty of the Islamic community resided with God, and 4 not with the Sultan Caliph. Professor Tunaya reminds us that "the State did not represent the political entity of the nation or its citizens. Since the citizen was not 32 an organ of the State, his role was passive, and he did not participate in the administration of the State."^ Tunaya also points out that the term umma (ummet)6 de­ scribes the Ottoman society better than the term nation. In such a theocratic State, the source of all authority and power is derived from a non-rational, divine, miracu­ lous source (religion) rather than from a rational basis. In this type of State, the role of the ulema was important. In the early days of Islam, the ulema were enlightened, and the Sultans were effective defenders of the Faith. But during the period of decline, all this changed— as will be seen. The lower ulema, fanatical and ignorant at this time,were close to the superstitious and ignorant masses of the population. A number of Ottoman statesmen and thinkers sug­ gested that certain actions be taken to stop the decline. Many of these were not modernists but traditionalists. Their remedies for stopping the decline was to return to 7 the early Islamic traditions. While efforts were made to meet the weakening of the Empire through the strengthening of the Islamic com­ munity, the efforts of the traditionalist failed. Thus, after the eighteenth century, the Ottoman leadership was faced with the following choice: either the Ottoman Empire would be modernized or it would be annihilated by 33 o Europe. The problem, then, was to what extent should the Empire adopt Institutions from the West. Thus, the degree of Westernization and modernization became an issue. The ulema were forced to agree that, while in the more impor­ tant realm such as spiritual matters, the Sharia and Islamic principles still remained paramountj in the less important material field (urf) certain ideas and institu­ tions of the West could be adopted in order to meet the threat from Europe with its own instruments. This atti- 9 tude made it possible to attempt reforms in the Army. The period of partial reform of institutions (1718- 1726) will be examined briefly here.^® Prior to this period, the Ottoman leadership, while anxious to learn from the West, refused to accept the superiority of Europe. At this time, they still clung to the concept of the superiority of the Islamic State in all matters; but the majestic isolation of the past no longer obtained; and Europe constantly and successfully attached the frontiers of Islam. This was a great shock to the Islamic leader­ ship, who could not understand why what they considered inferior nations and civilizations defeated them at the frontiers. Their only explanation was that the Islamic community did not live up to the standards of early Islam. In discussing the important formative period of partial institutional reforms of 1718-1726, we should 34 examine some of the sub-periods which recent Turkish scholarship has divided this larger era into. This was a period of new ideas, upheavals, and closer contact with Europe, which itself was in a transitional period of the Age of Enlightenment, leading ultimately to the French Revolution and the dawn of a modern age. During this period, the new elements favoring change, mostly enlight­ ened Grand Vezirs and higher echelon bureaucrats who clashed with the Janissaries and ulema. It will be shown that events led to the final partial victory of the forces of modernism in.the next century. The famous Lale Devri (Era of Tulips), 1718-1730, and the Patrona Halil reactionary rebellion of 1830-1831 will be mentioned briefly.11 Up to this period, Ottoman leadership could afford to ignore Europe. The majestic isolation was ending because of the weakness of the Otto­ man Empire and the dynamic and aggressive nature of Europe. Now, for the first time, a fear of Europe, but also a curiosity about European customs and manners, appeared in Constantinople. Although the first manifestations were somewhat superficial and involved the building of eigh­ teenth century rococo style palaces, French gardens with beautiful tulips, but also more fundamental concepts, were being introduced at this time; such as, Ibrahim Muteferrika’s first printing press 12 and reforms in the 35 Army suggested by Count de Bonneval* 13 Even the frivolous extravagances of the Palace at this time were not alto­ gether harmful since they Inspired Interest In European fashions and manners and, indirectly, tended to promote interest in European institutions* This led to what is known as the period of Muslim co-existence with Christen­ dom, replacing the grand isolation of the Porte. During this time, traditional resistance to innova­ tion was seen in the desperate reactionary rebellion of Patrona Halil in Instanbul in 1730—1731* Popular resent­ ment against the extravagance of the Court for its Europeanized manners was fanned by the ulema on the occa­ sion of military defeats in 1730; and Sultan Ahmed ill was forced to abdicate; and the grand Vezir and other leaders favoring innovation were executed. This was a temporary victory of the traditionalists ulema in alliance with the Janissaries* Continued Ottoman defeats forced the Ottomans to admit, at least in the tech­ nical and material field, their deplorable inferiority to Europe. Once this concept became acceptable to the leader­ ship, the next step was to sell the idea that, in order to maintain the spiritual superiority of Islam, copying Europe's methods in the lesser realms of life was permis­ sible* This led to Army reforms to meet the European threat* 36 It was during the early eighteenth century that the earlier contacts with Europe and interest in things European by a small segment of the leadership became more common, not only in military matters but also in other fields; such as, medicine, astronomy, and other fields. Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha (1718-1730) is considered chiefly responsible for the early attempts at reform. European officers were invited to train and advise the Army and Porte at this time. Also, the Porte assigned envoys to European capitals to study Western ways and re­ port about them. The most famous among these was Yirmisekiz Mehmet Chelebi (Mehmet Sait Efendi) and his sons, who were sent to Paris. Translations of European works, especially plays, took place; and Europeans, who had been interested in the Ottoman Empire since as early as the sixteenth century, began a more concentrated rela- tionship with the Ottoman Empire. 14 The modernist reformers in the Palace claimed that, once the Army was modernized, the Empire would regain its former greatness. Some enlightened Islamic leaders (such as, Abdullah Molla) complained about the inadequacies of Ottoman administrative personnel, tryanny of officials, and the extravagance of the Palace,1^ while an able Janissary leader, Koca Sekbanbashi, countered the thesis of traditionalists that Ottoman defeats were due to the adoption of European manners in the Palace and the intro­ duction of European reforms in the Army.16 To counter these more enlightened views were the more fanatical leaders of the Ulema and Janissaries, who blamed all the ills in the Empire on the Nizami Djedid (Nizami Cedid) or the new order of the Army. 17

The Reforms of Sultan Selim III Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) turned to the French for advice in organizing the Nizami Cedid. He sent a special envoy to Europe, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, in 1791, to study the military systems of European states. In 1791, the Sultan requested twenty-two military, civil, and religious leaders to set forth their views on the causes of the weakness of the Empire and asked for suggestions for reform. They presented their reports in the form of layiha (memorials) similar to the French cahlers of 1787. 18 While all agreed that military reforms were necessary, they differed about the methods to be used to achieve this. 19 The Sultan who favored the creation of a new modern Army along European lines found support in these proposals. Despite strong opposition in the Empire, in­ cluding opposition in the Palace against the Nizami Cedid, the Sultan decided to go ahead in 1792. This effort to create a new Army formed a new social element, a class of 38 young military officers familiar with some aspects of European civilization. The reforms of the new Army can be viewed either in its narrow technical aspects and progress took place in the modernization of at least part of the Army, or one can consider the Nizami Cedid reforms in a wider sense. Selim III, no doubt, envisaged the reforms in a wider sense, according to Professor Karal and other Turkish historians who are authorities on this period, which involved three main aims: (1) The ultimate abolition of the Janissaries, (2) the breaking up of the influence of the ulema, and (3) the gradual Westernization of other Ottoman institu­ tions.2® Professor Tunaya points out that Selim III was forced by circumstances to adopt a policy of dualism. Instead of abolishing the Janissaries, he created a new Army which was to exist side by side with the old. In­ stead of closing the Medrese Quranic schools, he opened new military and technical schools which would exist along with the schools of the old order. While most of the country continued in the old ways, the Palace began intro- ducing new ways of doing things. 21 Also, in the field of foreign affairs, Ottoman envoys were sent to Europe. Thus, another window was opened to the West. 22 Unfortunately, continued defeats-y the reign of terror in France that followed the French Revolution, and Napolean's attack on Egypt created tensions in Ottoman French relations. Also, the more conservative governments in Europe at the dawn of the nineteenth century conspired against the reformist Sultan Selim III. 23 Separatist rebellions in the Balkans and reactionary rebellions in Anatolia threatened the reform party. The feudal anarchy in the provinces was fanned by the ulema, mostly by the lower fanatical group of the ulema, who blamed all the troubles of the Empire on the Nizami Cedid. The hesitant and indecisive leadership of the reform party led to what is known as the Kabakci Mustafa rebe?lion in May 1807. 24 The Janissaries defeated the Nizami Cedid Army sent to quell them. The Sultan tried to appease the reactionaries by dissolving the Nizami Cedid. But it was too late. The alliance of the ulema and Janissaries which had frustrated the reforms of Sultan Selim XII also resulted in his deposi­ tion and final death. Mustafa, a weak prince was proclaimed Sultan, but the real rulers of the land were the members of the reactionary party consisting of the Chief Mufti, anti-reform officials, and Janissaries. These groups op­ posed social and military change. However, despite the temporary victory of the re­ actionaries, the reform movement though young and weak survived. While most of the modernists were killed or 40 neutralized in one way or another, Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha, the military Commander of Silistria, one of the few re- maining partisans of reform, retained power. 25 The period between the failure of Sultan Selim's reforms and the Tanzimat of 1839 will be examined briefly. 26 The most important event during this period was a victory of the modernists, who made a comeback, and a major defeat of the traditionalists, when the Janissaries were abolished in 1826 with the help of the higher ulema. The ulema, having lost their one-time ally, the Janissaries, were never able to regain their former power. One Turkish scholar, quoting Namik Kemal and the views of the Young Ottomans of the second half of the nineteenth century, states that the check and balance against the Sultan and Palace bureaucracy's possible tyranny was removed when the alliance of the ulema and the Janissaries was ended and the Janissary war machine was no longer there to bolster the ulema in any fights against the Palace. 27 The whole story of the relationship of the Janis­ saries with the ulema needs more study. First, the Janissaries were not all corrupt and anti-reform, although the majority were a disreputable group by the end of the eighteenth century. The same thing was true of the ulema. Many of the ulema were part of the bureaucracy and tended to go along with the new order of things, but it was the 41 more energetic among them who, fearful of their past pre­ rogatives tended to favor reaction. Professor Mardin's recent studies indicate that much more research is needed before one can make definitive statements on this subject, but existing evidence, so far, shows that the ulema were in decline during this period and tended to be reactionary and obstructionist. - -

The Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II The important events between the overthrow of Selim III in 1807 and the 1839 Tanzimat consists of the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) who was able to outsmart the traditionalists, reintroduce reforms, and abolish the Janissaries. A brief survey of events that took place will be presented to show the alignment of the traditionalist and modernists forces and certain shifts that took place in this transitional period. Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha, a Janissary leader, who participated in the Janissary revolt against the Nizami Cedid as early as 1795, later was won over by the modern­ ists and became an advocate of reform himself. His head­ quarters in Ruschuk became the rallying point of the surviving reformers after the 1807 reactionary take-over. In 1808 Bayraktar marched on the capital to restore Selim III to power, but Sultan Mustafa IV had Selim murdered. Mustafa was deposed and his brother Mahmud was brought to 42 the throne. It was unfortunate that Grand Vezir Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha was killed soon thereafter in another Janissary revolt during November 1808. But the reforms he had initiated continued, since Sultan Mahud watched this opportunity to resume the reforms. Sultan Mahmud was not a liberal monarch, but he was what may be referred to as an absolute monarch who wished to strengthen his throne and his Empire. His ideal was the absolute monarch of past centuries; such as, Peter the Great, Joseph II of , Louis XIV, and Frederick the Great. He did not favor or understand constitutional or parliamentary forms of government. At the beginning of Sultan Mahmud II*s reign, what is known as the Senedi Ittifak (Pledge of Agreement) was promulgated in 1808. 28 This was a most important document and resulted from the cooperation of the Sultan and the Palace bureaucracy (including some of the ulema). It was the Palace bureaucracy and the reformist Janissary Bayraktar who had brought Mahmud to power. The Sultan was careful not to frighten conservative elements and concen- trated at first on curbing the ayan (local dynasties or feudal lords) in the provinces. The Senedi Ittifak which aimed at curbing the feudal lords and ending the existing anarchy in the Empire is considered by Turkish historians as a most important document (sometimes referred to as the

% father of the Tanzimat)• It may be of interest to note that Bayraktar himself was of the ayan or derebeyis (the new provincial elite). An Imperial Assembly was called and the provincial lords were gathered in the capital where their cooperation was obtained for the streamlining of the Ottoman Government, including reforms in the Army, While the rights and privileges of the derebeyis, ayan, and were confirmed, in reality a firmer control of the feudal elite was established by the Palace. was Grand Vezir at this time (1808) and had the support of the bureaucrats, including some anti— Janissary ulema. The Senedi Ittifak is rightly considered the first step in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. An important fact to be noted about the absolute monarch Mahmud II was that he was a benevolent despot or enlightened ruler. After the 1807 reactionary rebellion, the country was ruled mainly by the powerful Grand Vezirs, but soon Mahmud II was able to shift the locus of power from the Vezirs to his own hands. ’Ie pretended to be pious and obtained some help from the higher ulema. The Janissary excesses had been so great that they lost popularity in the country, and Mahmud II was able to get the ulema to support a fetva (which the Sheikh-ul-Islam issued abolishing the Janissaries in 1826). This temporary cooperation of the Palace and the ulema made further 44 reforms possible. But it was a major error in strategy on the part of the ulema, because the military support of the Janissary was essential for the maintenance of their position of power in Ottoman society. The stages in the control and final destruction of the Janissaries developed as follows. At first, Mahmud II allowed the continuation of the Janissary Corps, but cer­ tain changes and reforms were attempted. He also created a new Army, which was nothing but the revival of Selim Ill's Nizami Cedid. But in order to appease traditionalist and conservative elements, he did not use the terminology of the former reformers but named the new Army the Asakiri Mansurei Muhammedlye (victorious soldiers of the Prophet Muhammad). Later, after the abolition of the Janissaries, the term Nizami Cedid was again used. Thus, the Hatti Sherif of May 28, 1826, established this new corps, but the Janissaries were not abolished. The Sultan claimed that he was seeking ~to restore the practices of the golden era of Islam. However, when on June 15, 1826, the Janis­ saries revolted again, this was for the last time. The great massacre of the Janissaries by the new Army is re­ ferred to by the reformers as the Vaka-1 Hayriye (The Auspicious Event)• In addition to the military reforms, Mahmud II introduced other^reforms, including educational changes, although they were concerned mainly with military and allied schools; but in 1838, he started primary schools (rushdiye schools). These reforms in the non-military schools were very limited, however, and had to wait for the Tanzimat period. Some reforms were also introduced in Government and administration. Languages began to be taught in the Government offices and translations made of European works, in a small way. Attempts at centraliza­ tion of Government and abolition of feudalism were only partially successful. Mahmud II was interested in de­ veloping a more effective bureaucracy and foreign service. Unfortunately, defeat at the hands of the Russians in 1828 and his troubles with Muhammad All of Egypt, an unruly vassal, frustrated his efforts to strengthen the Empire. However, Mahmud II attempted, with some success, after the 1826 abolition of the Janissaries, to modernize the insti­ tutions of the Empire to the time of his death in 1839. His astuteness was shown when, unlike Selim III, he realized that the political dynamics of the Empire required gradu­ alism but, at the same time, that the new order could not be established before the old order had been destroyed. The central repository of power was the Janissary Corps. He broke the alliance of the Ulema and the Janissary Corps. However, the times were such that he had to continue the dualism on Ottoman society in other fields; such as, in education, Islamic law and administration. Mahmud II's efforts facilitated the work of the modernists during the next stage of Ottoman development. His greatest achieve­ ment was his gaining control over the rebellious pashas and local notables (ayans) and bringing the provinces under control of the Central Government. He was not a liberal. He did not know foreign languages, but his policies resulted in restoring the balance of power to the modernist and wrenching power out of the hands of the victorious traditionalist of 1807. It took him a long time; he had to work carefully; his aims were not always motivated by unselfish or liberal motives; but the end product of all his activities was the restoration of the balance of power between traditionalists and modernists. He weakened the traditionalists enough by breaking the Ulema-Janissary alliance, and this made possible the emergence of the modernists in 1839. Unfortunately, in the next chapter, it will be shown how extreme external and internal pressures frustrated most of the efforts of the modernists, although some progress was made in the modernization of the Ottoman State. 29

Social and Economic Problems A few words about the economic structure of the Ottoman Empire and developments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be in order, since modernists 47 elements were Involved In some economic activity or at least had some ideas about economic problems. However, it will be seen that in the Ottoman Empire political rather than economic problems concerned the leadership and even the young Turks had no clear-cut economic policies. How­ ever, the economic changes that took place in the Ottoman Empire affected the course of Ottoman history and, there­ fore, a brief digest of economic developments will be presented here. 30 Several new Turkish historians, whose works are listed in the selected bibliography, have recently de­ veloped the thesis that the Ottoman Empire was not only self-sufficient, but even able to export some commodities, especially textiles, during the eighteenth century. 31 In the early nineteenth century, the industrially growing British and French and other European nations began cornering the Ottoman domestic market by dumping their newly manufactured goods at reasonable prices, thus creating a situation which resulted in a death blow to the Ottoman industry. Apparently, Ottoman industry, which was a combination of small crafts and cottage industry type, was quite effective in meeting the needs of the Ottoman peoples. According to these writers, the small manu­ facturers of cotton goods, beautiful silk products, different kinds of handicraft work made of wood, metal, 48 and precious materials were quite thrifty and doing well. This employed a relatively large number of craftsmen, journeymen, and semi-skilled workers. As a result of the arrival of European goods, which were available cheaper, and since the Ottoman leadership failed at this time to introduce protective measures against foreign goods, a serious economic depression took place in Ottoman urban areas. Many of the artisans were jobless, many of the well-to-do manufacturers were bankrupt and, thus, a new class of importers, mostly of Levantine origin, arose. While it is true that many of the artisans in the seven­ teenth and eighteenth centuries included the non-Muslim minorities, nevertheless, there were many Turkish-Muslim Ottomans engaged in industry and manufacturing. It was during the early nineteenth century that this major change took place; and as the leaders and workers of the old Ottoman crafts declined, they left for the rural areas and engaged in agriculture, or they joined the bureaucracy and the Army. Xt was at this time that European businessmen began to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire; and taking advantage of the capitulations, they soon won many economic concessions later in the nineteenth century, which resulted in the economic strangulation and control of the Empire by the European Great Powers. The dis­ appearance of the Turkish-Muslim commercial and artisan 49 classes, who might have been the nucleus of a liberal modernist middle class is considered an unfortunate de- velopment by Turkish historians. 32 According to recent Turkish scholarship, research in economic history has shown that Ottoman industry was relatively developed and sufficient to meet the needs of Ottoman society in the eighteenth century. This industry was, of course, small in scale, and of the crafts and cot­ tage industry type. The industry consisted of small es­ tablishments of a few workers, often the whole family unit participating in the manufacturing. In fact, although unlike the European medieval guilds in some respects, there existed an Ottoman type of guild system. As we have seen in the last chapter, in the Ottoman Empire guilds developed principally from the Society of Chivalry (Futuvvet). The merger of the Futuvvet with the tarikat (religious sects) created the guilds. In fact, the basis of the Ottoman Empire's economic organization, up to the Tanzimat of 1839, was the above-mentioned guilds. These guilds were economic institutions organized by craftsmen and workers belonging to the same craft, but they were greatly influenced by Islamic religious considerations. In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman textile in­ dustry, which included the manuf act raring of cotton and silk goods, were highly successful in meeting the domestic 50 demands of the Empire, and small quantities were even ex­ ported. An analysis of Ottoman trade with England and France is available in the Tanzimat study prepared by a Turkish historical commission will show that in the year 1788 France imported 2.3 million livres worth of white cotton goods from the Ottoman Empire. Despite tariff barriers and heavy custom duties on Ottoman goods imposed by France in 1789, France imported 187,000 livres worth of Ottoman silk manufactures. It is also worth noting that French cotton textiles imported into the Ottoman Empire at this time were quite insignificant. Other manufactured cotton textile goods exported by France to the Ottoman Empire totaled some 42,000 livres, while no muslin was exported during the period 1788-1789. During the same period, France sent the Ottoman Empire only 42,000 livres worth of cotton cloth. Although France sent the Ottoman Empire silk goods valued at 400,000 livres, this was an insignificant portion of the total silk exports of France which totaled 26 million livres in value. 33 During this period, the Ottoman Empire also ex­ ported cotton thread. There was a manufacturing community, at this time in the Empire, which employed as many as four thousand workers in the manufacturing of cotton thread. Both adult males as well as children were employed, work­ ing in twenty-four different dye-works where they dyed the 51 cotton thread. Women were employed to wrap up and wind the cotton thread. Exports of these commodities to Germany and Austria totaled roughly 250,000 kilos of cotton thread a year, and the factories in German and Austrian manufacturing cities used Ottoman materials. 34 Although it is true that at this time there was some activity in textile and thread manufacturing, it was already in decline compared to the past. In fact, more and more, the needs of the Empire were beginning to be provided from abroad; for, although the Ottoman industry had not declined, it had not developed; and with the in­ creased population pressures and rising demands, it no longer was adequate to meet the needs of the Empire. Professor Sarc also points out, in his work on the Tanzimat, that while manufacturing made great progress in Europe at this time, Europeans were unable for some time to establish branches of their factories in the Ottoman Empire and, therefore, began to export their goods into the Ottoman markets. As Ottomans began increasingly to desire purchasing these imported European goods, the Empire was flooded with European manufactured commodities including: woolen goods, hardware items, sugar, paper, watches, and several types of manufactured goods and machinery. Thus, the Empire imports consisted of these types 52 of goods, and during 1788-1789 that Ottoman Empire im­ ported 3.6 million livres worth of French staple materials, and 8.4 million livres worth of manufactured goods. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire's primary exports con­ sisted of raw materials, especially raw cotton and wool. Thus in conclusion, Sarc points out that at the end of the 4 eighteenth century, Ottoman industry and manufacturing had failed to make advances, but the real decline had not set in as yet. The old Ottoman industry survived during the Napoleonic wars, and its final death came about 1815-1820; for, while the Industrial Revolution had started earlier, it was only in the period after 1815 that the new capital­ ism began having an impact oh non-European areas. In any case, according to Professor Sarc, Ottoman industry found itself in serious difficulties and a depression affected Ottoman society during 1825-1830. The backbone of Ottoman industry was the textile industry, especially the cotton manufacturing. The crushing competition of the Manchester factories in the Turkish markets is given as the reason for the collapse of Ottoman cotton manufacturing. The famous Turkish cotton factories became bankrupt, partly because of disagreement and rivalries among its directors, but mainly because of the effective competition of English commodities. In a period of ten years, the whole 53 manufacturing community disappeared as the unemployed craftsmen left for rural areas or changed their occupation. Details about this remarkable change are difficult to obtain, and so far the work of a Turkish Professor Mardin on the subject is still in its early stages of research. At this time, all Ottoman cotton goods exports ended and, instead, large quantities of all types of manu­ factured goods began to be imported from abroad. In 1828, cotton goods of all types imported from England reached the value of English pounds 465,000, and in 1831, it rose to the staggering total of English pounds 40,000,000. Imports of English cotton textiles in English pounds rose from fcl0,834 in 1828 to il05,615 in 1831, which indicates how fast the English captured the Ottoman market. 35 What had happened in the period between the end of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries was the rise of industrial powers in Europe at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in rapid disintegration and decline. The failure of the Ottoman leadership to stop this decline in the political and military fields was also reflected in the failure to develop an effective economic policy. It is interesting to note, however, tnat the Ottoman cotton industry was not completely dead even though the industry was ruined in the urban areas; it was carried on a smaller scale in some of the cities and rural areas. Also, the 1

54 internal market in Anatolia continued to be more or less self-sufficient due to lack of transportation, the British and other goods being sold primarily in the big cities. Xt was later, after the mid—nineteenth century, that the foreign interests were able to create a monopoly in the i Ottoman markets. 55 CHAPTER XII - FOOTNOTES

The period discussed is the 17tb and 18tt centuries. See Enver Ziya Karal, Tanzimat tan Ewel Garplllasma Hareketleri (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1^40) (Westerni­ zation movements prior to the Tanzimat of 1839). 2 Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire and Islam,” The Listner, October 2, 1952, quoted in Tunaya, Batilllasma. p T T Professor Tunaya also quotes Huseyin Nail Kulaaii, Esas Teskllat Hukuk Derslerl (Istanbul University, 1955), p. 272 (Public Law Lessons) on this subject. It is stressed that in the 16tb century Zenbilli Ali Cemali Efendi was an enlightened Sheikh-ul-Islam, whereas later the ulema be­ came both ignorant and fanatical reactionaires• 3 For a study of the Ottoman dynasty see: A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), Ismail Hakki Uzuncarslli, Osmanli Devletlnin Saray Teskilati (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, i§4S J (The Organization of the Palace in the Ottoman State). 4 For theories on the Islamic State see E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge University Press, 1958). 5 Free summary translation from Tunaya, op. cit•, p. 8. 6Ummat al-Islam, community of Muslims, founded by Muhammad. " I'fc is not exactly the Muslim nation nor the Muslim people, but is rather the Islamic community. 7 Among writers who deplored the weakness of the empire and counseled a return to the early principles of Islam are such nasihatnamecls as Kochi . See Tunaya, op. cit., pp. 54—56• See also Koci Bey Risalesi (Istanbul: fiatbaa-i Ebuzziya, 1885-1886) or a more recent edition known as Ali Kemali Aksut baskisl of Koci Bev published in 1939. These Involve the famous memorandum of Kochi Bey (also spelled Kocu Bey) to Murad IV in 1630. Another interesting thinker*s works are now available in English, see of Truth by Katib Chelebi or Hajji Kalfa, Haci Halifa, trans. with introduction and notes by G. L. Lewis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957). See also Ottoman Statecraft: Book of Counsels for and Governors (Nasa'ih ul-vuzera ve• i-umera) of Sari Mehmeci Pasha the Defterdar (trans. intro., and notes by Walter L. Wright) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935). The 56 sivasetnamecis were Ottoman envoys to Europe who wrote about conditions in Europe and how the Ottoman foreign policy could be strengthened, and in what respects Europe was stronger. They advocated feforms. These siyaset- naaecis wrote during the period of decline in the i&ib century• The older nasihatnamecis tended to praise the past, insisted that the Multan should be ad11 (just), that he should appoint good veziers, that officialdom should be faithful to Islamic ethics, that leaders should delegate authority and respect the ulema. 8Tunaya, op. cit., p. 19. ^See Halil Inalcik, "Osmanli Hukukuna Girls," Ankara Unlversltesi Siyasal Bilqiler Fakultesi Derqlsl. June 19^8, for Muslim Law in the Ottoman Empire• ^The best work on the period prior to the Tanzimat and the Tanzimat era itself is the recent contribution of Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarlhi (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 1947), Volumes V and VI. 3'1For the Age of Tulips see Ahmed Refik Altinay, Lale Deyrl (Istanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1932) and Albert Vandal, Une Ambassade Francaise en Orient (Paris: Plon, 1887). For the Patrona Halil rebellion see Munir Aktepe, Patrona Isyani (Istanbul, 1958). The real leaders of the reactionaries were Ayasofya vaizi Ispirizade and Istanbul Kadisi Zulali Hasan Efendi, both of the ulema class. 12 Ibrahim Muteferrika, was of Hungarian origin; he adopted Islam, and was the first owner of a printinghouse that published a: book in Turkey in 1729. This was made possible when Sheikh-ul—Islam Abdullah Efendi issued a fetva authorizing publication of books other than on religious subjects. The Quran could not be published. See Selim Nuzhet Gercek, Turk Matbaaci1iq1: Muteferrika Matbaasi (Istanbul: Devlet taatbaasi, 1939) (^Turkish Printing and Publishing. 13 For a recent study on the Count de Bonneval see Heinrich Benedikt, Per Pascha-Graf Alexander von Bonneval 1675-1747 (Graz-Koln: hermann Boblaus Nachf, 1959). dount de Bonneval who adopted Islam was known as Kumbaraci Ahmet Pasha. He was a friend of Francophile Said Efendi, who had accompanied his famous father, Yirmisekiz Chelebi Mehmet Efendi to Paris. 14 It was during this time that the Turks became more 57 interested in Europe, and also Europeans in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim 111 started sending envoys to European capitals, translations of European literature and plays took place, and Europeans began writing about the customs of the Ottomans. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence, Chapter 111. 15See Karal, Nizami Cedide dair layihalar (reprint from Tarih Vesikalarl. Vol. II, No. 6, Vol. VlUil, Nos. 11- 12, 1943}. (Reports regarding the Nizami Cedid). See also Ihsan Sungu, "Mahmut II*n Izzet Molla ve Asakiri Mansure Hakkinda bir Hatti," Tarih Vesikalarl, Vol..I, No. 3. See also Tunaya, op. cit., p. 5$ for a discussion of the views of Akif Efendi and Izzet Molla. Akif Efendi believed that every century produced a hero to save the Islamic community and that Mahmud II was one of these heroes. Despite Izzet Molla*s clinging to traditional views, he agreed that reforms were permissible in the army to defeat the unbelievers. ^Koca Sekbanbashi, was a progressive minded Janis­ sary. See Koca Sekbanbasi Risalesi (Ankara: Adliye Bekilligi yayinlarl, 1935)• He supported Selim III. He was opposed by such reactionaries as Kabakci Mustafa and the ulema (Sheikh-ul—Islam Ata Efendi). See Ahmet Refik Altinay, Kabakci Mustafa (Istanbul, 1959), and I. H. Uzuncarsili, "Kabakci Mustafa isyanina dair yazilmis bir tarihce," Belletfen, Vol. 6, Nos. 23-24, July-October, 1942 (a short history of the Kabakci Mustafa rebellion). 17For the Nizami Cedid (the new order, which really applied to the army only, so that in time it has come to mean the *'new army") see Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi: Nizam—i Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri. 1789—1856 (Ankara: i. T. K. Basimevi, 1947, Vol. V) Ottoman History: the Nizam-i Djedid and the Tanzimat Period, 1789-1856). See also by the same author Selim III*un Hatt-i Humayunlari: Nizami Cedid 1789-1807 (Ankara: T. T. K. basimevi, 1946) tSelim Til’s royal decrees and the New Order). ■^Enver Ziya Karal, "Nizami Cedide dair layihalar," Tarih Vesikalari. Vol. II, No. 6, Vol. Ill, Nos. 11-12, 1943. See also H. N. Orkun, Turk Hukuk Tarihi - arastlrmalarve veslkalar (Ankaura: Adliye Vekilligi, 1953) tHistory of rfurkisk Law - investigations and documents)• 19Some of the reports cautioned against hasty adop­ tion of Western institutions and methods. While most of the writers reluctamtly agreed that military reforms based on Western methods were necessary, they strongly opposed 58 other aspects of Westernization. This is why Selim III had to apply the so-called MNew Order" primarily to the Armed Forces. 20 Tunaya, op. cit.. p. 22. 21Ibid.. p. 23. 22See Chapter IV of this study for the activities of the Ottoman diplomatic envoys. 23 B. Lewis, The Emergence. pp. 39 and 163, points out that the Great Powers worried lest a reformed Ottoman Empire become too strong and, therefore, favored frustrating the aims of the reformers. 24 For the Kabakci Mustafa rebellion see Ahmet Refik Altinay, Kabakci Mustafa (Istanbul, 1935). 25 For Bayraktar Mustfafa Pasha (also known as Alemdar) see I. H. Uzuncarsili, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (Istanbul, 1942); and A. F. Miller. Mustafa ftastia bayraktar. Tarihi Cevdet. etc. Excellent brief discussion in Bernard Lewis, The femerqence. pp. 73-75. 2®For the period 1807 to 1839, which is roughly the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), see Karal, Osmanli Tarihi. op. cit.. Vol. V, and Ahmed Lutfi, Tarihi Lufcfi (chronicles of theEmpire by the Imperial Historiographer, covering the period 1825-1868); for earlier period see Tarihi Cevdet. Mahmud II failed to weaken the ulema. He created new nizamiye schools alongside the old medrese Quranic schools. He established the Nizamiye Courts next to the Sharia courts. Thus, Turkish historians have criticized his re­ forms as being dualistic and that he tried to make sure that they conformed to Islamic requirements. Despite his great caution not to antagonize the ulema, traditionalist circles referred to him as the "Gavur Padisah" (Infidel King). 27 This thesis of S. Mardin, which is developed in The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. seems somewhat far fetched, b u t T s Worth noting. ^®Sen«gdi Ittifak (Pledge of Agreement) of 1808 is a most important document in Ottoman history since it aimed at ending feudalism. Not much has been written about this document. Mahmud appeared to be appeasing the feudal lords by calling them together to consult with them, but the real purpose was to centralize power in his own hands; 59 see Selcuk Ozcelik, "Senedi Ittifak," Istanbul Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Mecmuasl. Vol. 24, Nos. 1-4, 1959, and Karal. Osmanli Tarihi. op. cit.. Vol. V., p. 936. 29The period of Mahmud II needs more study. If it were not for failures in the field of foreign affairs, Mahmud might have received better treatment at the hands of historians. ■^Recent studies on Ottoman economic history include Afet Inan, Apercu General sur 1 ♦hlstoire economlque Turc- Ottoman (Istanbul: f. ¥•K., 1941); iiya Karamursal, Osmanli Devletlnln kurulusundan XIX uncu asrln yarisina kadar mail tarlhineHoir bakis (Istanbul: Aksam Basimevi, T55ST Purvey of bitoman Financial History from the found­ ing of the Ottoman State to the Middle of the 19tb century). See also the economic chapters in Tanzimat. a study pre­ pared by the Historical Society in 1940. 31For information on 18U» century textile imports see Omer Celal Sarc, "Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz," in Tanzimat, March, 1940, pp. 2-4. 32For decline of Ottoman industry see articles by S. Mardin in Forum. 1956; and Sarc, "Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz," in Tanzimat. 33Trade with France is discussed in Paul Masson, Hlstoire du Commerce Francaise dams le Levant au XVIII eme SlecleTParis, l$il)• 34Sarc, "Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz," and Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, "Tanzimat Oevrinde Osmanli Devletinin Harici Ticauret Siyaseti," in Tanzimat (Foreign Trade Policies of the Ottoman State during the Tanzimat). 35Sarc, "Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz," ££• cit.. p. 3. CHAPTER IV

THE RESHID PASHA REFORMS AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MODERNISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS 1839-1876

The 1839 Reshid Pasha Reforms and the Temporary Victory o# the Modernists The Tanzimat (regulation) is the name given to the program of reforms introduced by Grand Vezir Mustafa Reshid Pasha in 1839.1 Reshid Pasha who had served as Ottoman Ambassador to France was among the new Palace bureaucracy who favored reforms to save the Empire. The Hatti Humayun of Gulhane (The Imperial Rescript of Gulhane) was pro­ claimed by Reshid Pasha in the Gulhane Court. The Rescript was a charter whereby Sultan Abdul Medjid abdicated a por­ tion of his authority in favor of the Meclisi Ahkami Adliye (Council of Judicial Ordinances), which henceforth would have the power to make laws, subject to the Sultan's 2 approval. Among the main provisions were: No one was to be punished without a public trial, Muslims and non- Muslims were to receive equal treatment before the law, and legislation was to be introduced to end the traffic in favors and appointments, which was listed as one of the chief causes of the decline of the Empire. According to the official Turkish history, Tarih. the Tan&imat reforms are summarized as follows: The equality of all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects was assured before the law; the protection of the life, dignity, honor, and goods of all subjects, Muslims and non-Muslims; prohibition of executing or sentencing a person or confiscating his goods except by due process of law; the levy on uniform taxes according to the material ability to pay; and remuneration of all officials, in­ cluding civil servants, by salary; prohibiting of bribery by strict laws.3 It will be noted that freedom of the press is not mentioned. The Imperial Rescript was not a Constitution but was a charter based on the French "Declaration des Droits de l'Home et du Citoyen." The Tanzimat aimed at certain administrative and social reforms based primarily on the French concept of administration and on ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, and did not meet the requirements of a Muslim State. These reforms had been introduced not only to save the Empire but to satisfy and placate the Great Powers, who used the ill-treatment of non-Muslim minorities as a pre­ text to further their own aims. Also, the Tanzimat pro­ nouncement of equal treatment for the non-Muslim population was directed, in part, at winning over the large non- Muslim elements in the Empire. But separatist and nation­ alist feelings among the non-Muslims, encouraged by the European Powers, especially Russia, was so advanced that it is doubtful if those promises had any effect. When Sadriazam Mustafa Reshid Pasha announced the Gulhane Hatti on November 3, 1839, he sent a copy to each 62 of the foreign diplomatic missions stating that a new political order was being introduced. Although the prin­ ciples announced by the Tanzimat reformers were vague and limited in their scope, they are considered important by most Turkish historians, who, while criticizing the document's limitations, believed that it laid the founda­ tion for the ultimate creation of a modern State. Ac­ cording to Professor Tunaya, this document had certain reformist features and was the most Western-oriented rescript produced so far, and that it has been character­ ized as the "Bill of Rights" of the Turkish people, or the 4 "Turkish Social Contract" by Turkish historians. The Tanzimat reforms were introduced by an enlightened group of Ottomans, who faced with foreign pressures and threats tried to meet the challenge through a new approach. Thus, the Ottoman State, with this document, officially recog­ nized the superiority of the West. Therefore, all Otto­ mans, including the creators of the Tanzimat, felt a kind of inferiority toward the West.^ One should not consider the Tanzimat as an isolated movement or the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane (Rescript of Gulhane) as a document which ap­ peared suddenly in 1839. It was rather part of the natural development of events traceable to the previous century, in part arising from the crisis in the affairs of the Ottoman State. The Tanzimat was the natural outgrowth of the system started during the reign of Mahmud II and was to be the inspiration for future reform efforts. At the same time, the Tanzimat reflected a certain type of mentality, which politicians of a later period disparag­ ingly characterized as "Tanzimat kafasi," or "Tanzimat mentality."® However, the course set by the Tanzimat reformers tended to develop a pluralistic method which became a permanent part of Ottoman thinking. The Tanzimat was characterized by the following: (1) timidity, (2) conservatism, (3) dualism, but at the same time by (4) a generally Western orientation. These characteristics will also be noticed in the first and second Ottoman Constitu­ tional periods, even though the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks struggled against the Tanzimat mentality of inferiority vis-a-vis Europe: duality in the develop­ ment of old and new constitutions, and the failure to break with the past and adopt drastic measures to save the Empire• Another aspect to note here is the belief of the Tanzimat reformers that all would be well after making a few pious statements. The symbol of the Gulhane Hatti became the basis of a myth that within a few decades the economic and political position of the Empire would im­ prove, since this would be a natural outgrowth of this benevolent document. Many Ottoman leaders believed that 64 progress was possible only through Islam. They believed that the Sharia was the Constitution of the Islamic State. They, however, admitted that new laws were necessary to meet some of the special conditions that existed in the modern world. Also, the life, honor, safety, and pros­ perity of the individual should be safeguarded. Military and tax reforms should be introduced. But these reforms would be granted by a benevolent Sultan and were not the "Natural Right" of the people. These ideas of the Tanzimat Fermani were introduced by the pro-Western party or modernists, and their policy was adopted by Sultan Abdul Medjid (1839-1861), and Reshid Pasha's disciples Ali and Fuad Pashas in the second part of the Tanzimat period. Sultan Abdul Medjid, a well-meaning but weak Sultan, himself pointed out that the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane was a document which involved a century and a half of develop­ ment before it reached its final form and that it was in conformity with the Sharia. Reshid Pasha also stated that the Rescript arose from the needs of the times which neces­ sitated a new political order within the framework of Islam. This approach indicates that the ulema were still a power and had to be appeased. The Tanzimat Fermani was a document the principles of which were difficult to apply during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire, at this time, did not have the machinery or personnel to carry out the announced reforms. Howevery even if they had found the personnel and had devised a method to introduce effective reforms, they were faced with three major obstacles. First, the ulema and reactionary elements obstructed ef­ forts at modernization. Secondly, the non-Muslim minori­ ties inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution and nationalism were not interested in an improved status with an Islamic Empire, but preferred to struggle for the furtherance of their particularistic aims and ultimate independence. Thirdly, the constant interference of the Great Powers in the domestic affairs of the Empire made the successful development of any reform difficult. Also, some writers have questioned the sincerity of the Ottoman leadership regarding equality for all. The Tanzimat Fermani, as has been previously men­ tioned, was not a declaration of the Rights of Man, but the generous and humanitarian gift of the Sultan to his people. Equality was to be derived not from the Natural 7 Law but from the sufferings of the Ottoman Empire. This plurality or duality in the method to be followed resulted in a duality also in the aims of the State. An equality had to be established in an Empire of diverse religious and ethnical nationalities, and this gave rise to the term "Toprak kardesleri,” (Brotherhood of the land or country). 66 Turks, Greeks, Slavs, Armenians were all brothers of the same soil or country. All Ottomans were the children of one great Parent, the Sultan-Caliph. Alongside a Muslim community, there was to be a cosmopolitan community (or plural society), and this gave rise to the concept of the O Ottoman Fatherland and Ottomanism. Thus, the Tanzimat gave the Ottoman Empire a dual aim which led to dual insti­ tutions, and the Ottoman future depended on two concepts, often contradictory in nature. This was not a real federa­ tion of nationalities; it was an Islamic State with both old traditional institutions and new ones copied from the West. It included a Muslim population living under cer­ tain laws and concepts alongside a non-Muslim population which remained largely segregated and which had few aspira­ tions in common with the Muslim peoples. As Professor Tunaya points out, ”the Ottoman-Turkish leadership be­ lieved that all that was good in life was Islamic and g Ottoman.” But whereas this was acceptable to the Muslims, it did not necessarily make sense to the non- Muslim elements. Also, while it was admitted that a con­ flict of interest between Islamic ideals and the new Ottomanism existed, this was not considered a serious matter since the Tanzimat was built around conflicting ideas and institutions, and its main purpose was to reconcile these contradictions and through a system of 67 pluralism make progress possible despite the many contra­ dictions that existed in the Empire. According to Professor Tunaya, the principles of equality were envisaged as follows: (1) Ottoman official­ dom admitted their inferiority to the West, (2) the Empire had a federal structure, but (3) the most important fact was that the Empire was Muslim. However, the existence of non-Muslims in the Empire required the harmonious co­ existence of the two communities by a concept known as Ittihadi Anasir (Union of nationalisties) which became an ideal of the early Tanzimat reformers. They believed that the ruling elite Muslims and the subject peoples should cooperate for the good of the Ottoman State. In addition to the parallel religious rites (such as, Islam, Chris­ tianity, Judaism), there would be a parallel love of the Fatherland by all religious and ethnic groups. Thus, as we will see later, the concept of the Ottoman State, the Fatherland, and Ottomanism were to be developed by the Young Ottomans. In assessing the Tanzimat period, one can say that it was a modest victory for the modernists, but a victory of a rather conservative group who continued to cling to the traditional ways of the past and sought legitimacy for their new ideas by stressing that all their reforms were in full accord with the Sharia. They claimed that the Gulhane Rescript actually strengthened the Sharia and the Muslim way of life in injecting new strength into the Islamic community. They did not reject the old, but intro­ duced the new. What they were trying to do was to keep most of the old and, at the same time, introduce some of the new European ideas on a parallel basis, even if some of these ideas were contradictory. The Janissaries had been abolished. The ulema had lost their former predomi­ nant position in the Ottoman "Establishment," but the religious reactionaries and traditionalist forces were still able to exert continued pressure on Ottoman public decisions for many years to come and were thus able to frustrate the efforts of the modernists, as will be seen.^

The Role of the Ottoman Diplomatic Envoys A few words about the Ottoman diplomatic envoys may be in order here, since they had an important influence on the reform movements. Despite the decline of the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the beginnings of a modernist movement became discernible at this time, not only because of the inception of reforms in the Armed Forces, but also because of the increased con­ tacts of the Ottomans with Europe. This necessitated the establishment of a foreign office and foreign office per­ sonnel. The Ottoman envoys sent to Europe to observe developments and report to the Porte started as early as 69 1720. When these diplomats returned to Constantinople, they recommended reforms to strengthen the Empire. These envoys became, in a way, the first exponents for reform and modernizationr The Ottoman State, which followed a policy of isola­ tion from Europe during the zenith of its power, did not send permanent envoys and had no permanent diplomatic posts abroad. The expected foreign envoys to come to the feet of the Sultan. It was during the period of decline, after the death of Suleyman the Magnifi­ cent (d. 1566), that special diplomatic missions to Europe and other areas began. Envoys with the rank of Minister or Ambassador were sent to Paris, Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, as well as to Asian countries, such as, Iran (Persia). These envoys wrote special reports and memo­ randa which have become important sources for Ottoman diplomatic history. Among the more famous are the Fransa Sefaretnamesi (1720) of Yirmisekiz Chelebi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1732), whose reports from Paris have been published.11 Another well-known report is Ingilltere Sefaretnames^ (1792) of Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first Ottoman Minister to the Court of St. James. 12 It will be remembered that the author of the Tanzimat. Reshid Pasha, had been Minister to Paris and London. It was in the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) 70 that missions were sent to the principal capitals of Europe. However, these missions were short lived, as a reaction set resulting from European encouragement of rebellions among the Balkan peoples, and the permanent diplomatic representatives were recalled. Until the time of Mahmud II (1808-1839), foreign affairs were handled on a low level by the Rema-ul-Kuttap (Chief of the foreign correspondence); but following the 1839 reforms and the introduction of more centralized administration, a new organization for the Ministries was established. 13 Thus, even before the Tanzimat, in 1835, the Umuru Dahiliye Nezareti (Ministry of Interior) and the Umuru Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was organized. The new official in charge of foreign affairs was raised to the rank of Vezir (Minister) with a corresponding military rank of Musir (General or Marshal). Thus, most of the Ottoman Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs were given the title of Pasha. 14 It should be noted here, in passing, that, in addi­ tion to the Muhammad Ali revolt in Egypt (1832), the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with Russia (1833), and the need for British support against the Russians, it became obvious to the Ottoman Government that the establishment of diplomatic posts, at least in the principal capitals of Europe, was a necessity. Also, the European Powers, who were in search of raw materials and markets, became more interested in in- creased contacts with the Ottoman Empire* 15 In the following pages, the rise of the Young Otto­ mans and their struggle against the Grand Vezirs and the Sultan will be discussed. It will also be shown how the Young Ottomans became critical of the Tanzimat reformers whom they considered imitators of the West who admitted the superiority of Europe and failed to strengthen Ottoman- Islaraic institutions, which they claimed was essential for the survival of the Ottoman State.^

The Struggle between Modernists and Traditionalists during the Tanzimat Period 18i§-187& The Tanzimat proper was initiated and developed. under Sultan Abdul Medjid (1839-1861). Its great leader wasGrand Vezir Reshid Pasha. After 1861, when Abdul Aziz came to the throne, one can say that it was the end of the Tanzimat period proper, although in its broader sense the Tanzimat continued into the year 1876 or even 1878. 17 In this section, an attempt will be made to trace the developments during the period 1839 to1876 in order to examine the strength and activities of the modernists and traditionalists during the formative years of the New Ottomans. During this period, we see the leadership of the Tanzimat shift from the hands of Reshid Pasha into those of his disciples and successors Ali and Fuad Pashas. 72 It was also a period when nationalist and separatist move­ ments developed further; and certain new institutions, such / as, the Conseil d'Etat were established and became a bridge between the Tanzimat and the Constitutional period of 1876. Also, an important development during this period was the Rescript of 1856. A few words on economic and financial problems will also be presented to help clarify the picture. Reshid Pasha, who had struggled against tradition­ alist elements with only limited success, was finally un­ seated as Grand Vezir in 1852, by an alliance of reactionary ulemas and obstructionist rival bureaucrats. By 1854, a new phase in the Tanzimat is to be noted under the leader­ ship of Ali and Fuad Pashas, who were forced by new events resulting from the Crimean War (1854-1856) to consider additional reforms. The Meclisi Ali-i Tanzimat (High Council of Reform) was organized under the Grand Council of Justice to handle legal matters. To appease the European Powers, on May 7, 1855, a firman was issued abolishing the poll tax levied on non-Muslims; and military service, which was an honor confined to Muslims alone, was now open to all subjects of the Sultan. However, the non-Mus-liras were generally unwilling to serve in the Armed Forces and, therefore, they were allowed to pay bedel (exemption tax in lieu of military service). Thus, we see that most 73 reforms were usually cancelled out by the nature of Otto­ man society, and basic problems were not solved. The fault here lies not only with the Ottoman officials who introduced the new regulations, but the non-Muslim nation­ alities who failed in their duties to the State. This was understandable because of the traditional position of the dhlmmis (protect people, Christians and Jews) in the Islamic State and the institution of the millets, which had resulted in segregating the diverse ethnic and re­ ligious elements which formed the Empire. On February 18, 1856, a new reform charter, the Hatti Humayun (Imperial Rescript), was promulgated by Sultan Abdul Medjid, as the price of admittance of the Ottoman Empire into the Concerte of Europe. At this time, many of the intellectuals and bureaucrats copied European ways superficially and were quite anxious to be accepted by the West. They were to be criticized later for this attitude by the Young Ottomans, who from the vantage point of hindsight charged that Ottoman confidence in Europe was unjustified, since the European Powers continued to work against the best interests of the Ottoman Empire. As for the Hatti Humayun of 1856, it reaffirmed the principles of the 1839 Tanzimat, once again abolished tax farming and other abuses, and restated more clearly the new concept of the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law. 18 74 While Reshid Pasha was Grand Vezir twice for short periods before his death in 1858, he had no hand in pre­ paring the 1856 reforms, since his former disciples, now his rivals, were in power. Thus, Ali Pasha (d. 1871) and Fuad Pasha (d. 1869) were the new bureaucratic leaders of the Palace who were at the helm of the Government. They, like Reshid Pasha, were products of the Foreign Office, and held various high offices, including that of the office of Grand Vezir. 19 They both knew French. They were both full of admiration for the West, but they neither clearly understood progressive ideas nor did they have the oppor­ tunity to carry out effective reforms. The Sultan remained despotic and ineffectual. The Tanzimat leaders tried to introduce administrative reforms, but they never tried to establish constitutional government. It will be seen in the next chapter, how the Young Ottomans, not satisfied with Tanzimat reforms, insisted and obtained a Constitu­ tion, even though it was for a short time. Most European works are critical of the results of the Tanzimat. Many Turkish historians have also been critical of the reformers. However, one can say that during the thirty-seven years of the Tanzimat (1839-1876) or, at least, during the earlier phase of the Tanzimat to 1861, a certain degree of progress was made. Legislation was passed, provinces were reorganized, and some important 75 gains were made in the field of education. It is true that these legal and administrative reforms were never fully or effectively applied, but it should not be forgotten that the Tanzimat reformers operated under severe external and internal pressures. 20 The period of 1861-1876, under the rule of Sultan Abdul Aziz, will be discussed further in the next chapter. This was a period of Palace extravagances and European economic penetration. A brief discussion of the financial problems of the Empire will be given below to set the stage for a discussion of the rise of the Young Ottomans and the Constitutional movement. 21

Economic and social problems The economic and financial situation during the late Tanzimat period, and especially after the Crimean War (1854-1856), is worth noting here, since the financial crisis, the inept policies of the Porte, and foreign inter­ vention in the administration of the financial institutions of the Empire all increased unrest among the small but rising middle class (mostly bureaucrats), intellectuals, and literati known broadly as the Young Ottomans. Their attacks on Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha and their policies increased and even the Sultan became a target of their criticism. Since they considered Ali and Fuad Pashas as 76 the architects of the Tanzimat mentality, they also at­ tacked the Tanzimat reforms as inadequate. The Ottoman "Establishment*1 at this time consisted of the Porte, the Palace bureaucracy, the military estab­ lishment (which at this time was not actively involved in politics), and the rising middle class, consisting not so much of business groups and traders as discontented or unemployed bureaucrats, the literati. and some of the more enlightened ulema. The commercial groups were still mostly in the hands of the non-Muslim minorities, and industry was small and was slowly coming under control of foreign concession holders as a result of the capitula­ tions and later the public debt administration. The peasantry, which formed the largest segment of the popula­ tion, was at the bottom of the social scale. There were still tribal elements and nomadic and semi-nomadic groups in the more remote areas. In addition, the large non- Muslim population, largely segregated from Muslim life, was now strongly inspired by ideas of nationalism and separatism. The Young Ottomans, seeing the strong and modern governments in Europe, and realizing the weakness of the Ottoman structure, were trying to urge the Ottoman leadership to modernize the State to meet the requirements of the times, not merely by the introduction of Tanzimat type reforms, but by the creation of a constitution and the establishment of parliamentary government. While the economic conditions in the Empire were not good, there is little evidence to show that it was any worse than in the beginning of the century. It is true that Turkish cottage type of industry, which existed at the end of the eighteenth and very early nineteenth cen­ turies, had become bankrupt as a result of cheap manufac­ tured materials that were being dumped into the Empire from France and England and other European countries, but the economy of the Empire was generally sound, with suf­ ficient mineral and agricultural resources and adequate manpower. The weakness was in planning, in the inability to halt foreign intervention, foreign debts due to long wars, and an ineffective tax system. The crisis was, there­ fore, more of a financial and administrative nature rather than an economic one. To meet these problems, the re­ formers of 1856 tried to introduce a new tax system, but they failed as did the 1839 reformers, since the system adopted was of indifferent value, but even this tax system was never applied successfully in practice. 22 As early as the first year after the Crimean War, but surely by the time of the Congress of Berlin (1878), it was obvious even to the Ottoman bureaucracy that the financial affairs of the State were going from bad to 78 worse. The system of foreign concessions and the capitu­ lations gave the Great Powers economic and financial con­ trol of the Empire. The Young Ottomans were naturally critical of the Palace bureaucracy for allowing this state of affairs and, therefore, called for legal reforms and a constitutional system which they hoped would result in more efficient public administration and, thus, save the Empire from foreign control. During the Crimean War, the Ottoman Government issued ?. public loan abroad. Further loans followed. By 1875 the Empire was in a financial crisis and could not meet the interest payments in full. This aroused the anxiety of the creditor nations and, thus, the Ottoman Government was forced to accept the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881. The Young Ottomans considered this a blow to their pride. Turkish historians have been critical of the Public Debt Administration. They claimed that the Public Debt Administration, by collecting all the revenues of the country, had limited its independence. 23 European and American sources, however, while admitting the fact that the Public Debt Administration infringed on Ottoman sovereignty and hurt Ottoman pride, claimed that, despite all its faults, the Public Debt Administration did attempt to work out a compromise system, it helped in the development of the country with foreign capital, as well 79 as salvaging the investment of European Powers involved. It has also been pointed out that the capitulations, the concessions, and the Public Debt Administration aided in the development and modernization of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish historians stress the fact that, even if this is true, the foreign concession holders exploited the resources of the Empire for their own interests with little regard for the welfare of the Ottomans and, even if they con­ tributed to production, they took the lion's share. Even if some Turkish writers agree that it would have taken the Ottoman Government a long time to construct the railroads and run them or to develop the mines and industries, nevertheless they conclude by stating that foreign domina­ tion of the economy of the Empire had a bad effect on the morale of the country and limited its freedom of action. Thus, it is important to note that problems of economic development, the capitulations, and foreign concessions became one of the major gripes of the Young Ottomans against the Porte. This was also the main criticism of the Young Turks against the Sultan's policies at the dawn of the twentieth century. Along with economic and financial control of the Empire, the European Powers began encouraging the non- Muslim nationalities against the Empire. The combination of foreign political and economic interference was met by 80 the Sultan's Ineffectual policies of procrastination, ob­ structionism, and ineffectual resistance to Europe, as well as repressive measures against the restive ethnic and religious minorities.

Rise of Nationalism A few words on the rise of nationalism and separa­ tism may be useful at this point. Nationalism in the Balkans and the Near East developed a little later than in most of Europe. The impact of the ideas of the French Revolution reached the Balkans at the end of the eighteenth century. Likewise Napoleon's Egyptian expedition of 1798 is often considered as the beginnings of nationalism in the Middle East.24 In the Near East, nationalism and liberalism gen­ erally go hand in hand. Also, although some of the nation­ alist and separatist movements in the area were spontaneous, it is generally known that the Christian subjects of the Porte were often encouraged by the Great Powers in their separatist sentiments. The Christian and especially the Slavic elements in the Empire were encouraged by both the Habsburgs and Russia, while Greece received encouragement primarily from Russia and Great Britain. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire coincided with the period of expansion and strength of its neighbors. This made it possible for the rise of new States in the 81 Balkans under the sponsorship of the Great Powers. As has already been touched upon briefly in Chapter II, separa­ tist movements threatened the integrity of the Empire at this time. The Serbs waged a successful struggle for autonomy (1804-1817), followed by the Greek struggle for independence (1821-1829). Rumania began to develop into a separate nation after 1861, and Bulgarian efforts which started in the 1880*s ended in independence in 1908. The rise of nationalism among the Balkan Christian subjects of the Sultan and the consequent separatist move­ ments aroused the concern of the Ottoman leaders, who tried a combination of limited reforms and repressive measures to save the Empire. The problems they faced were insur­ mountable and involved the virile nascent force of nation­ alism. Also, the administrative machinery and personnel of the Ottoman Empire were unable to cope with the complex internal problems facing it at this time. At the same time, Great Power interference and intrigues made their task even more difficult. After the First World War, Turkey lost most of its control over the Balkans, and the number of Slavs left in Turkey were insignificant. Following the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) and the exchange of population with Greece in 1923, the number of Greeks in Turkey were reduced sub­ stantially. The Jewish community in Turkey is small and 82 consists primarily of Sephardic Jews who found refuge in the Ottoman Bmpire from the Spanish Inquisition. They have remained outside political movements and, conse­ quently, have generally enjoyed good relations with the Turks• The Armenian millet enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in the Ottoman Empire since the Armenian com­ munity was represented by the Armenian Patriarch. The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were engaged in trade, commerce and some followed agricultural pursuits. Some Armenians also rose to high administrative positions in the Ottoman Government. During the middle of the nine­ teenth century, the position of the Armenians in the Empire was affected by the rise of nationalist sentiments among them. Some of the Great Powers used these aspira­ tions of the Armenian element in the Empire to further their own interests. This ultimately led to tensions be­ tween the Ottoman Government and the Armenian community. During the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, there was some unrest among the Kurdish tribesmen who were concentrated mostly in the eastern and southeastern Anatolian provinces and in the Mosul region. Although Muslims, like their Turkish brothers, they spoke Kurdish dialects of their own. The Kurds were less affected by nationalist sentiments than 83 the non-Muslim elements of the Empire, but some of their leaders joined the Young Turk Movement• At the same time, some Kurdish tribes continued fighting each other as well as attempting to resist the central government. In re­ cent years, however, the Kurds have been largely assimi­ lated and do not constitute a problem in Turkey any longer. The Arab nationalist movement also dates from the nineteenth century. The origin of Arab nationalism is usually traced to the rise of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, and the national awakening in Syria in the I860's. Since most Arabs were Muslims, they enjoyed a privileged place in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, throughout the four hundred years in which the Arab world formed part of the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs preserved their common culture, language, and literature. They also influenced Turkish institu­ tions and Turkish thought to a considerable degree. The Turks had adopted Islam from the Arabs, and Arabic language and culture had a profound influence on Turkish intellec­ tual and religious life. The Arab national movement, at first, was identical with the Ottoman reform movement, despite some opposition against Turkish misrule. The Arabs favored a decentralized administration for the Empire which would allow their com­ munities greater local autonomy. They did not want to break away from the Ottoman Empire until after 1913 when 84 Enver Pasha's Pan Turkist policies relegated the Arabs to a lesser position. 25 Until recent times, it was only on rare occasions that one would find any reference to the rise of nation­ alism among the Muslim-Turks of the Ottoman Empire. Western scholars emphasized the rise of nationalism among the non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects of the Empire. This was often referred to as the "Eastern Question" or "La Question d'Orient" and the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire was called "The Sick Man of Europe." How­ ever, little attention, if any at all, was devoted to the significant development of the concept of nationalism among the Muslim-Turks in the Empire. Turkish historians, also, neglected this important development, because they still thought of themselves as Ottomans instead of Turks. In recent years, however, Turkish historians have traced the origins of Turkish nationalism to the Ottoman period, and the newer books on Turkey appearing in the West are also slowly taking this factor into consideration. In a subsequent chapter, it will be seen how nationalism af­ fected the Turks in the Empire as much as it did the non- Turkish subject peoples.

The Role of the Ottoman Press The institution of the press is considered a pillar of democracy in the Western World and has been an important 85 instrument for moulding public opinion. The press in many countries has championed liberal and nationalistic causes. The Turkish press, which dates from 1831, has played a most significant role in the development of Turkish politi- cal and intellectual thought. 26 Despite rigid censorship, the Turkish press became the effective mouthpiece of the Young Ottomans and their successors, the Young Turks. A few papers remained outside the political struggle and some publications became the organs of the reactionary elements in the Empire. However, the largest segment of the Turkish press developed as a patriotic instrument which was feared by the despotic Sultans. Even more important, it was a school which trained future political and intel­ lectual leaders. The Turkish newspapers of the Ottoman Period are important sources for historical research, especially for the Young Turk Movement. 27 A limiting factor is the fact that these newspapers represented the views of a small group belonging to the middle and upper strata of society. At this time, the press did not reach the masses of the population. The literacy rate was low and newspaper cir­ culation was small. Most of the newspapers published in the Empire appeared in Istanbul and were not always rep­ resentative of the country as a whole. Another charac­ teristic of the press during this period was the fact that 86 many papers were published abroad in Paris, London, and Geneva because of censorship and restrictive measures at home. The press was relatively free in Cairo where the control of the Sultan was weak. The first Turkish paper, the Takvimi Vakayi ap­ peared in 1831. It was an official newspaper. At first, there was no press law as such, but permission to publish newspapers had to be obtained from the Government Printing Office according to a regulation of 1840. The famous re­ forms of 1839 and 1856 made no reference to freedom of the press. The first regular Press Directorate was organized in 1862, and the first important press regulation was issued in 1864. A semi-official paper, the Ceridei Havadis appeared in 1840, published by an Englishman named William Churchill. This was followed in 1859/60 by a non­ official newspaper, the Tercumani Ahval published by Agah Efendi. Ibrahim Shinasi also worked on this paper for a short time. Although some sources refer to Tercumani Ahval as the first non-official newspaper, 28 the first privately owned newspaper in the modern sense appeared in 1861, when Shinasi began publishing the famous Tasviri Efkar. This paper is significant because in its columns Turkish intel­ lectuals (such as, Namik Kemal and other patriots) began voicing their criticism of the Sublime Porte and called for reforms and a positive policy to save the Empire. As conditions in the Empire went from bad to worse, the Young Ottomans increased their agitation for reforms and action. This led to the introduction of administra­ tive measures by Ali Pasa in 1867 which completely muzzled the press. Shinasi's Tasviri Efkar and Ali Suavi's Muhbir and other Young Ottoman papers were suspended. Many of these Young Ottomans, including Namilc Keraal, Ziya Pasa, Ali Suavi, and Agah Efendi, left for Europe where they published articles attacking Ali Pasa and later the Sultan himself. In 1868 the Young Ottomans began publishing Hurriyet abroad to keep the resistance against the Sultan alive in the minds of the people at home. After Ali Pasa's death in 1871 many of the Young Ottomans began to return to Istanbul. But soon after their return, their relentless attacks against the Porte's failure to stop the interference of the Great Powers in the affairs of the Empire resulted in new restrictive measures. Among the most effective critics of the Porte was the great patriotic poet Namik Kemal himself. After 1871 the number of papers increased, and a group of humorous papers appeared which attacked the policies of the Porte in a most effective manner. As a result, many of these papers were suspended during 1872- 1873, since humor and ridicule are weapons feared by tyrants. In 1875-1876 additional restrictive measures were introduced by Mahmut Nedim Pasa. At first, censor­ ship applied mainly to humorous papers, but soon it af­ fected all publications. During the First Constitutional Period of 1876-1877, censorship ended for a short time, and the press enjoyed complete freedom. The great Midhat Pasa became the champion of liberty, and there was real hope for democratic developments in the Empire. Unfor­ tunately, Sultan Abdul Hamid II soon dissolved Parliament and banished Midhat Pasa, and a period of reaction fol­ lowed. There was no freedom of the press from 1878 to 1908. Press censorship was so severe during this period that even the Government's official gazette was suspended for a time. The Press Regulations of 1864 were still in effect theoretically, but the Porte ignored it and papers were suspended at the slightest provocation. As censor­ ship became unbearable at home, the Young Ottomans again began publishing abroad. The attacks on the Sultan and his policies increased after 1894. At this time, such papers as Mizanci Murat Bey’s Hizan, Ahmet Riza’s Mesveret, Prince Sabahaddin's Terakki and Osmanli were published in Europe and intro­ duced into Turkey clandestinely. On July 25, 1908, Turkish newspapers appeared for the first time in thirty years without being under the control of the censor. During the rest of 1908, many papers including a number of humorous ones appeared. At first these papers were content to limit their criticism to the former censors and the reactionary officials of the old regime, but it was not long before they were involved in party strife and factional rivalries. The lack of proper press controls and directives and a responsible editorial policy resulted in a chaotic situation which forced the authorities in 1909 to take some temporary measures. A new press law was introduced at this time. In 1912 the press law was further tightened, and by 1913 censorship again began to remove all vestiges of freedom of the press. Most of the newspapers of this period were owned by amateurs and were short lived. Only a few of the better papers had a circulation of 50,000. The rest varied between 1,000 and 5,000. A great majority of these papers were published in Istanbul although there were a few papers which appeared in the provinces. After 1908, the various political factions had their own newspapers. Tanin and Tasviri Efkar supported the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). 29 Other papers of a chauvinistic nature included such names as Sunqu, Bomba and Tufek. Among the opposition to the CUP were such papers as Osmanli. Servetifunun. Ikdam, Yeni Gazete and Serbesti. The pro-Islamic, Pan-Islaraic and fanatical elements had their papers which were also suspended from time to time after 1909. These included such papers as Volkan banned in 1909 and Beyan-ul-Hak. The non-Turkish minorities published their own newspapers in their own languages. In 1908 there were two hundred newspapers being|published in Turkey; many of them were short lived. The total number of newspapers and periodicals published in the Empire rose to 353 in 1909. By 1913 this number was reduced to ninety-two. The Turkish press was to play a major role in the development of modern Turkey during the first and second Turkish Republican periods of 1923- 1960 and I960-.30 91 CHAPTER IV— FOOTNOTES

The Tanzimat period has been given as 1839-1878, 1838-1876, and 1839-1861. The last dates are perhaps what one may terra the Tanzimat period proper, since the spirit of the Tanzimat had ended with the death of Sultan Abdul Medjid in 1861. The text of the Gulhane Hatti Humayun (Imperial Rescript of Gulhane) also known as bhe franzlmat Fermani (Imperial decree of the Tanzimat) is available in 6ustur *(Laws). Vol. I, pp. 4-7. Other Ottoman laws are also available in Dustur (Istanbul, 1871-1928). After 1928, see Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette). See also, Karal, Osmanli Tarihl. Vol. V, p. 263 for the Tanzimat text, and Gozubuyuk and Kili, Turk Anayasa Metinleri (Ankara: Ajans- Turk Matbaasi, 1957), pp. 3-5 (tfext of Turkish Constitu­ tions and other basic documents). The following are use­ ful for non-Turkish readers: E. Engelhardt, La Turoule et le Tanzimat (Paris: Cottilon, 1882) Vol. 1, pp. 257-261; *57 Aristarchi, Legislation ottomane, 1873-1885; and G. Younq, Corps de Droit Ottoman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905-1906) , 7 voTsl 2Meclisi Vala-i Akham-i Adliye (High Court for Judi­ cial Ordinances), see Lewis, The Emergence, pp. 97, 179-180. 3Tarih, Vol. Ill, p. 259. 4Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V, p. 197; Resat Kaynar, Mustafa Resit Pasa ve Tanzimat (Ankara, 1954), p. 176; Tunaya, Garpliiasma, p. 32. 3The problem of Ottoman inferiority toward the West is discussed in Tunaya, o£. cit., p. 32. ^The view on the Tanzimat mentality is discussed in S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, pp. 155- 168; and Tunaya, 0 £. cit., p. *8• 7 The concept that refomms were introduced not so much because of the liberalism of the leadership, but rather because the Ottoman Empire was suffering great mis­ fortunes at this time is presented in Tunaya, o£. cit., pp. 37, 60. p Osmalilik (Ottomanism)• See Roderic H. Davison, Reform in' ibe Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1963), pT 8. g See Tunaya, 0£. cit., p. 33. 92 Among useful works on the Tanzimat period are Halil Inalicik, "Tanzimat ve Fransa," Tarlh Veslkalarl. April 1942 (France and the Tanzimat); and t*rank Edgar Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942)• ^There are twenty—six sefaretnames which are pub­ lished and fifteen that remain unpublished* The earliest is Vlyana Sefaretnamesi (1655) by . See Elaine D* Smith. The Origins and Development of the Turkish Foreign Service (unpublished graduate research project .S9o, The American University, July 15, 1958) for a use­ ful pioneer study on this field. •^Cevdet Tarihl. Vol. VI, 2nd edition, pp. 377-385. 13For the new Ottoman Ministries see Lewis, The Emergence. pp. 365-367; Abdurrahman Seref, Tarlh-i f)evlet-i Osmaniye (Istanbul: Karabet, 1887-1888) 2 vols; A. Gorvine and L. L. Barber, Organization and Functions of the Turkish Ministries (Ankara: A jans-furk Matbaasi, 195*77. 14Pasha, a high rank in the Ottoman military and civil hierarchy. 15For details on 19U> century diplomatic history, see J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). 16The leaders of the Tanzimat have been critized as pluralist, compromisers, and imitators. While this was true to a certain extent, this type of criticism is rather harsh. The Young Ottomans, especially Namik Kemal was very critical of the Tanzimat. See Tunaya, 0£. cit.. pp. 63- 64; and Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 121. The Young Ottomans accused the new bureaucratic elite of being tyrannous and critized the shortcomings of the Sultan but not the institution of the Sultanate. See especially chapter I in Roderic H. Davison, ^ojs. cit., which gives an excellent summary of the period from 1839 t.o 1856. 17The most important source for the Tanzimat period is a study by the Turkish Historical Society, Tanzimat (Istanbul: T. T. K. Basimevi, 1940). The Gulhane Matti (Rescript of 1839) is available in Birinci Tertip "Dustur. Vol. I, pp. 4-7 (Laws). See also Ahmet Rasim.Isribdattan Hakimiveti MilliyeYe (Istanbul, 1924), Vol. 1, pp. 233- 237 J (From Absolutism to National Sovereignty). Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, op. cit., Vol. V., p. 263; and 93 Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat (Paris: Cotillon, 1882) also discuss this perTod and have the text of the Rescript. The Tanzimat proper is 1839-1861 or 1876, but some writers actually use the term for the period from 1839 to 1908. 18The Islahat Fermani, or Rescript of February 18, 1856 is available in Birinci Tertip Dustur, Vol. I, p. 7; see also Enver Ziya Karalt Osmanll Tarlhi, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 266; Tanzimat (Istanbul: tf. f. K., 1*540), p. 56; Gozubuyuk & Kill. Turk Anayasa Metinleri. op. cit., pp. 7- 12; and Englehardt, La Turquie eTE le Tanzimat, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 263-270. 19For a study of the Turkish Foreign Service see Elaine D. Smith, The Orlgines and Development of the Turkish Foreign Service, o£. cih. The Foreign Service personnel as well as the personnel in the Translation Office were in closer contact with Europe and Western ideas. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 115-116 for a discussion on this subject. 20Tunaya, 0£. cit., pp. 31-40 stresses the fact that the Tanzimat reformers were Ottoman leaders who had been in contact with Europe and were aware of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and realized that certain minimum reforms were necessary to modernize the structure of the Ottoman State, especially as foreign pressures and military defeats made it necessary to take action. Reshid Pasha tried to obtain British support against Russia and tried to appease Ottoman Christian subjects by granting them equality in the Empire. For text of treaties and other documents see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1^56) Vol. I and Vol. II. For example, the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane of 1839 is available in English translation in Vol. I, pp. 113-116. See also Frank E. Bailey, 0 £. cit. 21The period between 1861 and 1876 has received some attention in recent years. First of all Professor Roderic H. Davison of George Washington University is reading the proofs of his book which should be out late in the summer of 1963. It is based on his doctoral dissertation. See R. H. Davison, "Reform in the Ottoman Empire"(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1942). Another important contribution is Robert Devereux, The First Otto­ man Constitution Period (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, T5^3), chapter I has a good summary of developments from 1839 to 1876. Edouard Englehardt. op. cit.. is still useful 94 after all these years. Much of the Turkish histories on this period are based on Engelhardt. 22For the economic history of this period see: 0. C. Sarc, Tanzimat ve Sanayimlz (Istanbul, 1940) (The Tanzimat and our Industry); ZiyaKaramursel, Osmanli devletlnln Kurulusundan XIX uncu asrin yarisina Kadar sur 1 *hTsfoTre ^conomTque de ia Turquie (Paris: Imprimerie Tmperiale, 1885). 23See Tarih, Vol. Ill, pp. 290-295. See also Ali Resat, Kapitulasyonlar (Istanbul, 1930); Osman Nebioglu, "Yabanci Imiiyazlarin Turk iktisadiyatina tesirleri," Turk Iktisat Cemiyeti Yayinlarlndan (Ankara, 1944) (In­ fluence on foreign concessions on -the Turkish economy). 24For a study of Muhammad Ali and the rise of na­ tionalism in the Middle East, see George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (N. Y.: Putnam's Sons, 1946). See also chapters I ana II which deal with the Ottoman Empire in Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1961); Chapters IV and V in George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: PraegeF, 1961)• 25See Antonius, The Arab Awakening, op. cit.. pp. 79-100. See also Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's, 1$5&) see chapiter III; and Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottomyi Empire (Amsterdam: Djamhatan, 1958) especially chapter VI. (Both writers give a sympathetic interpretation and have used Turkish sources)• For a Turkish view see Celal Tevfik Karasapan, Filistin ve Sark-ul-Urdun (Istanbul: Ahmet Ihsan Basimevi, 1943) Vol. I, II. (The title is mis­ leading, and reads Palestine and Transjordan, but it is a history of Turkish-Arab relations.) 26The main sources for a study of the Turkish press include: Selim Nuzhet Gercek, Turk Gazeteciliqi. 1831- 1931 (Istanbul: 1931); Server iskit. Turklyede Matbuat Idarelerl ve Politikalari (Istanbul: Tan Basimevi, 1943) (Press Administrations and Policies in Turkey), by the same author; also see Tykivede Matbuat Re 1 imleri (Istanbul: Matbuat Umum Mudurlugu Nesrlyatindan, 1939; (Press Regimes in Turkey), and Turklyede Nesriyat Hareketleri Tarlhlne bir bakls (Istanbul: DevletBasimevi, 1938) (A survey of Turkish Press movements)• This writer also made use of an article by K. Key, The Turkish Press and the Development of Democracy in Turkey 1611-1954 (Washington. D. C.. I§b4)• 95 27The principal political parties and politicians during the Young Turk period had their own newspapers. The tradition was started earlier by the Young Ottomans. The first private (that is, non-government) newspaper was Tercuman-i Ahval. See Server Iskit, Hususl ilk Turkce Gazeiemiz Tercuman-i Ahval ve Aqhah Efendl (Ankara: Ulus Basimevi, 1 9 3 ’)') (Our first privately owned newspaper and Agah Efendi). 28See Server Iskit, Turklyede Matbuat Idareleri, op. cit., p. 11. Tercumanl Ahval appeared in lflfio. Its owner was Agah Efendi, onethe great leaders of the Young Ottoman movement. Shinasi Efendi at first aided the newspaper by writing articles for it. The official Ceridei Havadis, which had appeared without any rival com- peting with it, could not tolerate this new rival and thus began criticizing the new newspaper, which led, to a long drawn-out struggle. The Ceridei Havadis was a semi­ official paper. The Takvlmi Vekayi was the official news­ paper, and now the first privatelyowned unofficial paper appeared in the form of Tercumanl Ahval. Soon Shinasi left the Tercumanl Ahval to establish in 1861 the Tasviri Efkar which became the ^irst effective and well-known privately owned paper. 29For a discussion on the Committee of Union and Progress see chapter IX. Both Tanin and Tasviri Efkar are important Turkish newspapers and appeared at different times, including later during the Republican period. These newspapers, and others such as Cumhuriyet, are im­ portant sources for modern Turkish history. Turkish news­ paper owners and editorialists have played a major role in the political life of Turkey. See Ahmed Emin (Yalman), Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press (New York: Columbia-University, 1914), by the same author, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Carnegie, 1930), and Turkey Tn My Time (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,

30The Turkish press played an important role during the War for Turkish Liberation. The mouthpiece of the Kemalists was the Hakimiyeti Milliye. Cumhuriyet, an independent newspaper, has been appearing since the early days of the Republic and is a most reliable paper. Zafer was the organ of the Democratic Party, which is now banned and the paper discontinued. Ulus, the organ of the Republican People's Party for many years, continues to be published. Another Republican People's Party paper is Dunya, while Yeni Istanbul is Justice Party orientedj Tercuman is a conservative paper, while Millivet, Ajcsham, Vatan. Sid Hurrivet are independent papers. Among periodicals

THE YOUNG OTTOMANS AND THE MIDHAT PASHA CONSTITUTION OF 1876

The Modernists Form the Young Ottoman Society The origin of the Young Ottoman society was obscure until recent research in Turkey has brought out details and facts which were not fully known or understood.^- Ac­ cording to a Turkish scholar interested in this period, an Ittifak-i Hamiyyet (Patriotic Alliance) was formed in 1865 which later developed into the Young Ottoman Society 2 in 1867. In 1865, six young men met in the suburbs of Istanbul to decide what action should be taken to save the Empire from the bankrupt policies of Sultan Abdul Aziz. These six "patriotic" intellectuals included Ahmed Bey who had studied in Paris and worked in the Translation Bureau, and his colleagues of the same Bureau, Nuri Bey and Reshad Bey. The patriotic poet Namik Kemal, Ayetullah Bey, an intellectual versed in both eastern and western culture, and Refik Bey, owner of the newspaper Mirat formed the rest of the group. According to some sources, other founders of the Society included Mustafa Fazil Pasha and Agah Efendi and Pazarkoylu Ahmed Aga. Later many others joined its ranks. The aim of this Alliance was to change the existing absolute rule of the Sultan to a constitutional 98 system. The Young Ottomans, as they came to be called, were bitterly opposed to Ali Pasha for his failure to pre­ vent Great Power intervention in Turkish affairs. They were not so much interested in democratic government as they were in creating a stronger government structure, and they believed that constitutional government was the only workable means to attain this end. It can be said that at no time, before or after, had the Turkish leadership such distinguished sons, who were outstanding scholars, philosophers, and raen-of- letters. The distinguished group of Young Ottomans in­ cluded Shinasi, Ali Suavi, , and Namik Kemal. These members of the Ottoman elite opposed the policies of Ali Pasha because of his alleged failure to prevent foreign interference in Ottoman internal affairs and for what they considered his repressive domestic measures. On the other hand, however, the traditionalists also opposed Ali Pasha for trying to introduce reforms which they felt undermined the Islamic character of their society. Thus, on September 17, 1859, the Kuleli Revolt broke out in Istanbul, con­ sisting of some army officers and members of the ulema. This was a plot of zealots protesting the extension of new privileges for the non-Muslims of the Empire set down in the Rescript of 1856, and was a demonstration of their despair and indignity at the weakness of their once all 99 3 powerful Islamic Empire, The rebellion was easily quelled. Ali and Fuad Pashas, who have been maligned by most writers,were trying to introduce reforms and prepare the people for eventual self-government. But external and internal pressures were too great. They are unpopular with Turkish historians because they failed to strengthen the Empire. They are unpopular with European writers because they promised reforms and equality for the non-Muslims and were unable to deliver. In any case, it should be noted that the Law of the Organization of Provinces of November, 1864, was passed during their time. But the other side of the coin shows Ali Pasha's anti-liberal attitudes when he had the poet Shinasi expelled from the civil service and instituted the infamous censorship of the press. Appar­ ently, he had to do this because the persistent attacks of the modernist Young Ottomans against the policies of the Porte could not be tolerated and really hurt. In a later age, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was faced with similar problems and reacted in much the same way with even more dire consequences. While it is true that the Young Ottomans were influ­ enced by the ideals of the European Enlightenment and the Jugenbund and Giovine Italia, it should be stressed here that they thought of themselves as Ottoman reformers, and. their reforms were to be along Islamic lines. There is a tendency of recent writers to think of the Young Ottomans as liberals in the Western sense. Their main concern was saving the Empire. They had visited Europe and seen how strong and powerful these European States were. They de­ cided to adopt some of the European institutions and methods in order to strengthen the structure of the Otto­ man State and, thus,counter foreign interference more ef­ fectively. This meant that a solution had to be found regarding the role of the non-Muslims in the Empire and, therefore, the documents and pronouncements included the idea of equality for all in the Ottoman Empire under the new Patriotism— the Ottoman Patriotism that Namik Kemal was to develop. However, everyone knew that, while all were equal, Muslim Turks would be more equal than the rest. And this, after all, was fair enough. The same was true of minorities in other Empires; such as, in the German, Austrian, and Russian. During the period 1865, when the Patriotic Alli­ ance met, and 1867, when the Young Ottoman Society became active, two important events took place which affected the direction taken by the modernist groups. First, the troubles in Crete, which dated back to 1860, resulted in a serious Greek insurrection in 1866 on the island, and Ali Pasha and his Government were unable to deal with it. 101 Also, other Insurrection took place in the Balkans. The Young Ottoman journalists ridiculed the Government's in­ aptitude and many papers were suspended. The other impor­ tant event was a letter written in 1867 by the Turco- Egyptian Pasha, Mustafa Fazil Pasha, addressed to Sultan Abdul Aziz, calling for constitutional reforms. The letter was published and distributed by the Young Ottomans who 4 used this opportunity to further their own ideas. Namik Kemal, Ziya Pasha, and Ali Suavi met Mustafa Fazil Pasha in Paris at the end of May 1867. Shinasi was there too, and helped them find living quarters. One can say that the Young Ottoman Society was born in 1865, when the Patriotic Alliance was formed, but took more definite shape in August 1867, when in a Paris meeting Mustafa Fazil Pasha, Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, Nuri, Suavi, Mehmed, Reshad, and Rifat Beys took a decision to form the New or Young Ottoman Society. Ziya Pasha was its head, and Ali Suavi was to revive the Muhblr (one who informs) which would be the organ of the new group. However, the paper had to be published in London since censorship in the Ottoman Empire made it impossible to operate even the most moderate paper. The new organization, which had its roots in 1865, decided to build its program in 1867, based on the prin­ ciples presented in a letter by Mustafa Fazil Pasha to 102 Sultan Abdul Aziz. It is doubtful if the letter ever reached Abdul Aziz, but it appeared in the Paris daily Liberte on March 24, 1867, and Namik Kemal and his col­ leagues obtained a copy of the letter as early as March 8, and had it translated into Turkish and published 50,000 copies which were smuggled into the Empire. The letter suggested that the decline of the Empire could be arrested by streamlining the government, ending corruption, and was not much different from the principles of 1839 or 1856. For the first time, the letter did not blame Ottoman decline on the neglect of the new generation of the prin­ ciples of Islam, but instead, the letter strongly emphasized the necessity of establishing modern institutions and a complete overhauling of the structure of the Ottoman State.^ Unfortunately, even at this early stage, the Young Ottomans began disagreeing. Mustafa Fazil, Halil Sherif, Mehmed Bey favored emancipation from remnants of the old traditions, Namik Kemal, who developed the concept of Vatan or the Fatherland, while favoring modernization, had a romantic attachment to Islam and the greatness of the early Ottomans. On the other hand, Ziya Pasha, who was a man of the Palace and a liberal aristocrat, quarreled with the autocrats of the Porte, but was fundamentally the more conservative among the Young Ottomans and he often dis­ agreed with Namik Kemal. Ali Suavi, who was, in a way, 103 the nearest representative of the people, was unstable and a zealot. They all were united against the misrule or alleged misrule of Ali and Fuad Pashas and the weakness and ineffectual Sultan Abdul Aziz. They were finally in­ strumental in the deposition of Abdul Aziz for his failure in fulfilling the requirements of the office of Sultan- Caliph in 1876, and bringing Murat to the throne. However, as will be seen later, Murat who was supposed to be favor­ able to the modernists, failed also to act effectively because he was mentally weak. This resulted in his depo­ sition and the enthronement of Abdul Hamid. During this period from 1865 to 1876, the Young Ottomans were the most dynamic and energetic group of reformers and conspirators. It is of interest to note that regular Army officers were not involved in these movements, although, of course, many of the Pashas who were high functionaries also held mili­ tary rank. It was only at the dawn of the twentieth century and during the Young Turk movement that the leader­ ship was seized by the Army officers who made the 1908 revolution possible. It should also be noted that one of the reasons for opposition to reform in the Empire by the traditionalists and the majority of the Muslim population was that the reforms called for equality for non-Muslims in the Empire. Even some of the reformers themselves had a hard time accepting this change in the status of the 104 non-Muslims, which had been regulated for centuries under the Islamic tolerance and the concept of the role of the dhimmi and millet system. It was not the subject nation­ alities so much as the Great Powers who pressured the Ottomans to change the status of the non-Muslims of the Empire. In 1873, Ali Pasha died and the new Grand Vezir Mahmud Nedim Pasha issued an amnesty. The Young Ottomans who were in self-exile in Europe returned home. From 1873 on, the Young Ottoman movement was associated even more than previously with the leadership of Namik Kemal. The newspaper Ibret (Example) reappeared, thanks to the finan­ cial backing of Mustafa Fazil Pasha. In fact, Namik Kemal returned to Istanbul as early as November 1870. He worked with the journalist Ebuzziya Tevfik, who was an old col­ league and had taken over the publication of the Tasvir-i Efkar (Protral of Thoughts) after Namik Kemal had left the country. However, the Young Ottomans who had returned from self-exile in Europe found that, despite the death of Ali and Fuad Pashas, an even more obstructionist group was in power which created an obstacle to their hopes for reform. Their hatred now turned toward the new Grand Vezir, Mahmud Nedim Pasha. In addition to the "tyranny" of the Minis­ ters (Ali and Fuad, now Mahmud Nedim and his cabinet), they saw the appearance of a new influential group of 105 reactionaries. Since Ebuzziya Tevfik had been dismissed from his government post for failing to appear at a new religious prayer meeting instituted by the reactionaries, it became obvious to the Young Ottomans that they had to streamline their policies to include support of the more moderate Muslim religious elements, and so they began studying the possibilities of Pan-Islamism, and the Ibert began discussing the idea of the unity of all Muslims. When in April 1873 Ibert was suspended for criticizing the Government’s failures in the Balkans, and Namik Kemal, Ebuzziya Tevfik, Ahmet Midat and others were arrested and sent into exile, it became clear to the Young Ottomans that they needed support in higher places. This was made pos­ sible when differences between Ziya Pasha, a more conser­ vative Young Ottoman, and Namik Kemal were eliminated and the Young Ottomans finally found in Midhat Pasha a sponsor of great ability and energy. A brief description of the events that led to the first Constitutional period will be discussed here with emphasis on the role of the Young Ottomans and the external and internal pressures. Also the role of Midhat Pasha in the events that immediately preceded the formation of the first Constitution and the first Ottoman Parliament will be discussed in some detail.® By the year 1875, the ’’Eastern Question" had become 106 desperately complex, and a serious crisis faced the Empire. Thus, the inauguration of the first Ottoman Constitutional Period, which was to follow soon, was in part due to the decision of the Ottoman Government to introduce a consti­ tution to avoid European intervention. The real impetus was given to the reform movement by the Young Ottomans who were able to gain support among the more liberal leaders of the Ottoman Government, especially Midhat Pasha. The death of Fuad Pasha in 1869 and Ali Pasha in 1871 was followed by weaker leadership. The death of Sultan Abdul Mejid in 1861 and the accession of Abdul Aziz had led to no improvement since the new Sultan was even more extravagant than his predecessor and was mentally weak and unstable. At this time, the internal problems of the Empire were overshadowed by the "Eastern Question" with rebellions in the Balkans and increased foreign inter­ vention, especially as a result of the finacial crisis, 7 due to the foreign debt. The Porte tried to meet all these pressures by the now common policy of yet another reform edict. The so-called Reform Edict of December 12, 1875, called for judicial and court reforms and stressed O religious freedom. However, this did not impress the Great Powers. The Court Andrassy Note of December 30, 1875, attempted to present minimum reform principles, which were approved by the Great Powers, and the Porte 107 agreed to it, but rejected only the provision on the use of direct taxation. Rebellions in the Balkans continued, partly because of Ottoman misrule, but also because of Great Power (especially Russian) encouragement of the Slavs, and Austrian intrigues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was trouble in other parts of the Empire at this time. The Porte met these rebellions with repressive measures, which led to further resistance, and conditions went from bad to worse. Gladstone the Liberal Prime Minister of Great Britain followed an anti-Ottoman policy, but Disraeli, the Conservative Prime Minister, was more concerned with the imperial interests of the British Empire and feared that Russia would be the main beneficiary of Ottoman col­ lapse. This situation turned out in favor of the Ottoman Empire, since Britain remained in favor of supporting the integrity of the Empire from 1840 to 1914 even though there were ups and downs in this policy. When in the spring of 1876, the Bulgarians rebelled against the Porte, the revolt was put down in the harshest manner. This g resulted in European indignation and the Berlin Memorandum, but Disraeli's intervention saved the Ottoman Government and gave the Porte another chance to introduce reforms. The more liberal members of the Government and the Young Ottoman reformers were convinced by now that the safety of the Empire lay in the reshaping of the faulty structure of the Ottoman State and, therefore, they began thinking in terms of a constitution. Not even the most liberal among the Young Turks were doctrinaire constitu­ tionalists, but desired a constitution as pragmatists who saw in modernization the only hope for saving the Empire. On March 9, 1876, the Young Ottomans distributed what has been called "Manifesto of the Muslim Patriots," not only in Turkey but abroad, and to the leading statesmen of Europe.1® At this time, the ulema suddenly swung to the support of the reformers, backed Midhat Pasha and Minister of War Huseyin Avni Pasha (a conservative but who agreed that immediate action was needed to save the Empire) and the stage was set to depose Abdul Aziz and replace him with Murad, who was believed to favor constitutionalism.11 The crisis came to a head when softas (religious students) demonstrated against Grand Vezir Mahmud Nedim Pasha for being allegedly willing to be subservient to the Russian Ambassador General Ignatiev. The softa demonstration forced Sultan Abdul Aziz to dismiss Mahmud Nedim Pasha, but it was too late. On May 30, 1876, the Sheikh-ul-Islam issued a fetva which authorized the deposition of the Sultan because of insanity, and Murad was proclaimed the new Sultan.12 The period was barely an interlude to further developments. At first, things looked hopeful for 109 the modernists. Ziya Pasha was appointed as the Sultan's First Secretary, and Namik Kemal and the other Young Otto­ mans who were again in exile were invited to return. However, Ziya Pasha resigned soon thereafter and was re­ placed by Sadullah Bey. Each Sultan issued a Hatt when he was enthroned. On June 1, 1876, the Sultan's Hatt was not the original document prepared by Midhat Pasha proposing constitutional reforms, but a revised watered-down version prepared by Rushdu Pasha, the Grand Vezir. Midhat Pasha did not give in easily, and his popu­ larity was demonstrated when, on June 2, 1876, softas demonstrated in his favor and a constitution. On June 3, Midhat Pasha presented his views in the presence of Sultan Murat and Rushdu and Huseyin Avni Pashas, in which he refuted their contention that reforms should be gradual and that it was too early to proclaim a constitution. When Suleyman Pasha voiced support of Midhat Pasha's views, Huseyin Avni Pasha silenced him on the basis that military men should not meddle in politics. 13 An incident at this time helped the Midhat Pasha faction, when on June 15, 1876, Cherkes Hasan, an Army captain killed Huseyin Avni Pasha and several other high-ranking officials, because of fancied grievances. This incident robbed the anti­ constitutionalist of their leader, for Rushdu Pasha, al­ though Grand Vezir, was a weak man and soon changed his mind and decided to support Midhat Pasha. Thus, although Midhat Pasha at this time was only President of the Coun­ cil of State, he emerged as the real leader in the Empire. On July 15, 1876, a Grand Council met to discuss the still unsettled question of reform. But now the traditionalist ulema, realizing that a constitution would grant equality to non-Muslims began wavering in their support of Midhat. On July 2, 1876, insurrections in the Balkans had flared up again, and Sultan Murat’s mental condition was deterio­ rating. Debate on the constitution became so heated that, on August 2, 1876, the Porte issued an order forbidding discussion on reforms. While the ulema wished to see the curtailment of the Sultan’s authority by a constitution, they opposed equality for the non-Muslims. Even the non- Muslims considered this an illusion. 14 The constitution­ alist movement had now reached an impasse. Midhat Pasha was able to contact Murad’s half-brother, the heir appar­ ent, Abdul Hamid, and offered him the throne if he accepted a constitution. Ziya Pasha and Namik Kemal were rather dubious about this move, but the wily Abdul Hamid apparently convinced Midhat of his sincerity. On September 1, 1876, a fetva authorized Murad's deposition, and Abdul Hamid II was proclaimed the new Sultan-Caliph.1^ In the following pages, it will be seen how the constitutionalist had their day, but it was a short-lived victory. The crafty Abdul Hamid had no trust in constitu­ tions and liberal views and believed that the Empire could be preserved by repression of all nationalist and liberal movements and by playing one Great Power against another. For thirty years this policy was carried out with some success, but the ultimate fate of the Ottoman Empire was not averted.

The Re-Emergence of the Modernists and the Midhat Pasha Constitution oi 1876 The Young Ottomans and their supporters, dissatis­ fied with the failure of the Sublime Porte in solving the problems facing the Empire, were able to gain the support of Midhat Pasha, an experienced administrator and statesman. The combination of the energetic and vocal intellectual leaders (such as, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi, Agah Efendi, and Ziya Pasha) with Midhat Pasha and his modernist supporters in the bureaucracy, made possible the re-emergence of the modernist reform group, which for a short time assumed control of the destinies of the Empire. They were able to introduce a constitution and parliament, even if it was over the strong resistance of the traditionalists, and even if it was short lived. It indicated that the reform movement had failed, but the realities of the modern age would again give the modernist element an opportunity to have their voice heard. 17 112 The story of the way in which the Young Ottomans and the modernist leadership were able to establish con- stitutional government is quite complex, 18 but is treated very effectively in Robert Devereux's recent contribution. 19 Since this writer is interested primarily in the role of the modernists and traditionalists in the Empire, only highlights that shed light on this subject will be stressed in this eventful and vital period which lasted only a few years. 20 The short span of three or four years (1875-1878) saw the deposition of Abdul Aziz, 21 the enthronement and deposition of Murat V, 22 and the coming to power of Abdul Hamid, 23 who reluctantly agreed to the promulgation of the 1876 Constitution, but was, by 1878, able to crush all progressive movements, dissolved Parliament, and shelved the Constitution. It was unfortunate that during this crucial period of Ottoman history, the mentally ill Abdul Aziz and the equally sick Murat had to be succeeded by the able, but crafty, Abdul Hamid who was opposed to reform. While he promised a Constitution in order to win the support of Midhat Pasha and the reformists, who happened to have gained control of the capital, once he became Sultan, he forgot his promises and worked for the downfall of the reformists. He had the support of conservative politicians such as the vacillating Grand Vezir Rushdu Pasha, the able 113 reactionary Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha (the Sultan's son-in-law), and his satellites Kuchuk Said Pasha and Inglilz Said Pasha, as well as the conservative Redid Pasha, Minister of War. The SUltan, with the aid of the above anti-modernists, was able to frustrate and obstruct the efforts of Midhat Pasha and the constitutionalists, first, during the period that the Constitution was being prepared, and later during the brief parliamentary period. Midhat Pasha was a most able administrator and his reputation was very high in European circles, but he was out-maneuvered by the wily Sultan. Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha were very suspicious of Abdul Hamid, and they tried to warn Midhat. Midhat Pasha was so anxious to get re­ forms moving that he agreed that Abdul Hamid should be made Sultan instead of regent while Murat was incapaci- tated. 24 Midhat Pasha made the mistake of believing in the good faith of Abdul Hamid and, thus, he allowed control of the Government to fall into the hands of an anti­ reformist Sultan and his traditionalist supporters. A brief description of the difficulties that Midhat Pasha was faced with in trying to force Sultan Abdul Hamid to allow the promulgation of a Constitution is presented here since it shows the weakness of the modernist element in the Empire which made it possible for the tradition­ alists to obstruct progress. 114 The main argument in favor of a Constitution was the fact that the Great Powers were threatening the Empire to halt the fighting in the Balkans. It must be remembered that during 1875-1876, the Balkans were in open revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and Russia was threatening to intervene. The Russian note of October 31, 1876, demanded a cessation of hostilities in the Balkans, since Russia claimed to be the protector of the Slavs and other Chris­ tians in the Ottoman Empire, However, despite the grave danger facing the Empire, Abdul Hamid and his supporters felt that they could continue to temporize, that they could exploit Great Power rivalries, and try to put off European pressures by promises and half measures. Foremost among the Sultan supporters for such a policy was Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, who held the important office of Marshal of the Palace. It was also unfortunate that the able Minister of Justice Cevdet Pasha was a conservative who feared change, and the Minister of War Redif Pasha was opposed to Midhat's policies. The Chief Eunuch Behram Aga as well as key officials were under the influence of Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pashin. On September 26, 1876, a Grand Council had met to decide whether to accept or reject European proposals to end the fighting against the rebellious Balkan separatist groups. Midhat Pasha used this opportunity to force the 115 Council to agree to a constitution which would be pre­ sented to the Powers as an alternative to their interfer­ ence in the Balkans. Midhat argued that a constitution would solve most of the problems of the Empire, and it would dispel the fears of the nationalities in the Balkans, who would henceforth, as Ottomans, enjoy equality in the Empire. But despite constant European pressure and even threats by Russia, the program to establish a constitution was slowed down because of the strong resistance of the ulema and other conservative leaders to the granting of equality to non-Muslims in the Islamic State. The ulema were not all obstructionists. Midhat Pasha was able to win the support of an important leader of the Islamic hierarchy, Seyfuddin Efendi, and thus it was decided that a mixed National Assembly should be al­ lowed to draft a constitution which had, however, to con­ form to the Sharia. Midhat Pasha presented the draft of the constitution to the Commission, and it was decided to present it to the Powers in lieu of their persistent peace proposals in the Balkans. 25 Abdul Hamid caught between the pressure of the Great Powers and Midhat Pasha and his constitutionalists, finally issued an imperial irade on October 7, 1876. 26 A commission was established under Midhat Pasha to prepare a constitution with the help of the ulema, so that it would conform to the Sharia. Namik 116 Kemal was among those who had a hand in the preparation of the constitution. At this time, partly due to the foreign threat, the leadership of Midhat Pasha and his reformist supporters (such as, Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha) out­ weighed the objections of the conservatives; such as, Cevdet Pasha and Namik Pasha. Thus, the first Ottoman Constitution was finally promulgated on December 23, 1876. 27 A minor incident should be mentioned here to show how strong the conservative sentiment was. A large segment of the ulema, who were close to the people, were not con­ vinced that equality for Christians was feasible. An anti­ constitutionalist plot was hatched by some of the ulema, led by Muhyiddin Efendi, Gurcu Sherif Efendi, Ramiz Pasha, Uzunetek Riza Bey, and Kamil Efendi during October 1876; and it had to be curbed by Midhat Pasha and the reluctant authorities, since European threats made a constitution imperative. It is of interest to note that the conserva­ tive Damad Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, Redif Pasha, Rushdu Pasha, and most of the higher ulema, while opposing the constitutional movement, were agreeable to the promulga­ tion of a weak constitution because of their awareness of the European threat to intervene in the Balkans. Also, Abdul Hamid was new on the throne and had to be careful not to antagonize Midhat Pasha and the constitutionalists who still held the real power in the capital. However, 117 Midhat Pasha, despite all his greatness as a far-sighted and enlightened statesman, made some serious tactical errors which were to be exploited by the wily Sultan. Midhat Pasha agreed that Muhyiddin Efendi and his reac­ tionary associates should be exiled for their plot against the Government. Later Audul Hamid would use this as a precedent to eliminate all his enemies and even exile Midhat Pasha himself. The Grand Vezir, during most of this period, was the vacillating Rushdu Pasha; he was fearful of the Con­ stitution but, at the same time, agreed that it was essen­ tial to announce the promulgation of a constitution in order to appease the Great Powers. But, at the same time, he did all that was possible to weaken the Constitution. When on December 1, 1876 Midhat had presented a draft of the Constitution, it went through by December 9, after provisions limiting the Sultan's authority were removed. The final document consisted of 119 articles and was a rather limited constitution. Midhat Pasha settled for it; for he believed that, once Parliament met, progress could be made toward the gradual introduction of more progres­ sive policies. Unfortunately, the Constitution allowed the Sultan to expel from the country anyone deemed dan­ gerous to his safety. It never occurred to Midhat that he would be a victim of this provision. The ill-fated first 118 Ottoman Constitution of December 23, 1876, opened a new era which was to last a short time, but it was a most significant period in Ottoman history. Parliament held two sessions, one lasting from March 9, 1877 to June 28, 1877, and the second from December 13, 1877 to February 14, 1878.28 Unfortunately, when Parliament met, it became a debating society. Instead of creating unity under the con­ cept of Ottomanism and the new Patriotism, Parliament exposed the real divisions in the Empire. The non-Muslims stressed their particularistic and separatistic sentiments. The Young Ottomans and their supporters in the Parliament violently attacked the Porte for the failures in stemming the tide of foreign intervention and domestic unrest. Sadik Pasha, deputy from Istanbul tried to warn the members of the Chamber of Deputies that their intemperate criticism of the Government and the Sultan would ultimately lead to their downfall. However, an unending torrent of criticism and complaints continued, especially during the second session. The Sultan and his conservative supporters had expected some criticism, but they were amazed and scared at the violence of the deputies, who would not listen to Sadik Pasha. The Empire was in dire danger, and they felt that it was their duty to correct the many abuses. There were several changes in the office of the Grand Vezir when Ahmed Hamdi Pasha replaced Edhem Pasha on January 11, 1878 because he had failed to take a determined stand against the deputies. 29 The end came on February 14, 1878, when Abdul Hamid used the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which was going badly for the Empire, as an excuse to curb the constitutionalists. An imperial irade declared the ses­ sion at an end. This action was legal since the Constitu­ tion allowed the Sultan to cut short a parliamentary session. Parliament was dissolved temporarily, which lasted thirty years! It is also believed that Russian pressure was directed against the Parliament, for the vic­ torious Russians did not want to deal with a Parliament but with the autocratic Sultan, 30 The Sultan himself must also have felt that members of Parliament would turn their wrath on him for the failures of the Government to support the armies at the front, where Gazi Osman Pasha had made glorious history at the defense of Plevne against large Russian odds. A few words on the 1876 Constitution may be in order. The Constitution was based primarily on the French and Belgian constitutions with certain changes to satisfy the ulema and also further weakened by non-inclusion of provisions objectionable to Abdul Hamid. 31 The Midhat Pasha Constitution declared the indivisi­ bility of the Ottoman Empire, liberty of the individual, 120 freedom of conscience and speech, equality of taxation, and autonomy of judges. The unique privileges of Dar-ul- Saadet (Istanbul), whose inhabitants had been exempt from income taxes and military service, were abolished. All Ottoman subjects were to be known as Ottomans. Islam was declared the religion of the State, but all other recog­ nized religions were to be protected according to Islamic tradition. The civil and military service was open to all Ottoman subjects having command of the Turkish languages. A bicameral legislature was to be established. A president and the members of the senate were to be appointed for life by the Sultan. The number of senators was not to exceed one third the number of deputies, who were to be Elected on the basis of one per fifty thousand male inhabi­ tants. The Grand Vezir and other Ministers were to be appointed by the Sultan. Legislation was to be approved by both houses and by the Sultan. A Supreme Court of Appeals was also to be created. The powers of the Sultan would, nonetheless, remain enormous (as a result of re­ moval of provisions which limited his powers). The Sultan could, for example, convene and dissolve the Parliament as well as dismiss his chief Ministers. The anti-reform character of Abdul Hamid doomed the Constitution. By February 14, 1878, the Parliament was dissolved. Earlier on February 5, 1877, Midhat Pasha was dismissed and 121 banished. 32 This story seems a rather sad one. Espe­ cially since a period of absolutism followed which lasted to 1908. Therefore, a brief evaluation of the achieve­ ments and failures of the Young Ottoman Constitutionalists is in order here. An appraisal of the achievements and failures of the Young Ottoman Constitutionalists is not easy. Most Turkish writers have stressed the failure of the reformers. However, if one is to take into consideration the very great difficulties that Midhat Pasha and his supporters had to face, then one would have a more charitable opinion of the 1876 reforms. In fact, Tarih, the official history of Turkey published by the Ministry of Education in 1935, while realizing the great obstacles facing the reformists, nevertheless blames them for following unworkable policies; such as, Ottomanism. 33 The official history also blames the Great Powers, not only Russia but also France and England, for intriguing in the Empire and for agitating among the Christian minorities. This writer’s view is that the significant fact was not whether the Constitu­ tionalists were realistic or not, but the fact that their courageous insistence created a Constitution and a Parlia­ ment which, although short lived, inspired future genera­ tions. The 1876 Constitution was the cornerstone of the 1908 Young Turk reform. It should be stressed here that the Young Turks had merely to re-establish the 1876 Con stitution in 1908. This, in itself, should be enough evidence to vindicate the memory of Midhat Pasha. 123 CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

The most important single work on the Young Otto­ mans is an account by the famous Turkish journalist Ebuzziya Tevfik, Yeni Osmanlilarin Sebebi Zuhuru (Istanbul, 1909) which appeared in serial form in the"*Hreni Tasviri Efkar during 1909, which deals with the reasons for the emergence of the New Ottomans. Unfortunately, this work is not accurate and must be used in conjunction with more recent critical articles in Turkish historical journals. Also useful for this subject is Abdurrahman Sheref, Tarih Musahabeleri (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1924) chapter on "Yeni Osmanlilar ve Hurriyet" (The New Ottomans and Liberty). 2 Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) is a most comprehensive and well-documented work on the Young Otto­ mans by a young Turkish scholar. While this is the best work available in English on the subject, some of the inter­ pretations of the author seem rather far fetched. See review of this book in the American Historical Review, April 1963, by Roderic H. Davison. 3 The Kuleli revolt was not an outburst of liberals against the tyranny of the Sultan. The 1859 plot to assas­ sinate Sultan Abdul Medjid was rather an abortive coup by zealots and reactionaries who wanted to overthrow the regime because the 1856 Rescript gave non-Muslims equality in the Empire. The leaders were arrested and deported when the plot was discovered. Some European works con­ sider this attempted coup as the beginnings of the con­ stitutional movement of 1876. Acutally, the Kuleli incident was engineered by a clique of conspirators who were anti­ modernist, whereas the Young Ottomans and the Midhat Pasha constitutionalists consisted of a band of modernist patriots and idealists, who aimed at educating the Palace, and used persuasion and influence rather than violence. Namik Kemal was particularly opposed to any violence in achieving constitutional government. See Ulug Igdemir, Kuleli Vakasi Hakkinda Bir Arastirma (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 19$7) (A study of the Kuleli Incident) for an authoritative rendition. See also Karal, Tarih VI, pp. 95- 97; Tunaya, Partiler, pp. 89-90; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence. pp. 373-374. 4 For information about the letter of Mustafa Fazil Pasha to Sultan Abdul Aziz, see Mardin, og. cit•, p. 276. The Turkish source is: Paristen bir Mek'fcup TSersaadet: 124 Artln Asadoryan Matbaasl, 1908)• This letter written In 1867 which described the reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire and which suggested changes In Its struc­ tural framework became the thesis of the Young Ottomans and Constitutionalists and, therefore, Professor Mardin dates the origins of the Young Ottomans to the 1865 Patriotic Alliance, but Its real emergence to 1867. 5The Young Ottomans, rather than the Tanzlmat re­ formers, can be considered the real modernists In Ottoman history since they no longer stressed a return to the early days of Islam as the only solution for revival. They tried to apply the ideals of the 18tb century Enlightenment and for the first time requested a constitution, which tney thought would solve most of the Empire*s ills. However, the Young Ottomans were a band of intellectuals and bureaucrats with diverse views and failed to form a united front, and their mentality was more oriental than European. Despite their differences, they were united in their oppo­ sition against absolutism. The Young Ottomans included Shinasi, Namik Kemal, All Suavi, Ziya Pasha, and Agah Efendi. See Tunaya, Batiliasma. pp. 33-34, 64-68. ^The best study on the first Ottoman Constitutional Period is a recent work by Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963)• See also Bekir Sitki Baykal, **93 mesruti- yeti,** Belleten, Nos. 20-22, 1942; Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha, Mlrat-i Hakllcat (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1910-1911), 3 vols. (Mirror of Truth) a most important history of this period; and Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Uss-u ink1lap (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1877-1878), 2 vols. (The Basis of the Revolution) also an important source. For further details see the next chapter which deals with the Midhat Pasha Constitution of 1876. 7 The Eastern Question and the problem of the foreign debt sure given as the two main causes which led to the restlessness and discontent among the Ottoman intellec­ tuals and bureaucrats known as the Young Ottomans. These two subjects are treated well in J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), and D.C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929). Q The Reform Edict of December 12, 1875, can be found in: Fermani Adalet, Islahatl dahiliveve dalr vekaletl mutlakava hitaben serefsurdur plan fterraanl Alinin 125 sureti munifesidir (text of above is available in (jozubuvuk & kill. Turk Anayasa, pp. 15-20). See also Birinci Tertip Dusfcur, Vol. 3, pp. 2-9. q The Berlin Memorandum is discussed in William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments (New York: Knopf, 1950), pp. 8l-83. 1®The "Manifesto of Moslem Patriots," is discussed in Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, pp. 31-32. The Text of the Manifesto is available in Stamboul. June 2, 1876, and Standard, June 15, 1876. The Manifesto discussed the causes of the plight of the Empire, blamed the Sultan for doing nothing constructive, and made sug­ gestions to save the Empire, and also appealed to the European Powers for patience and understanding in dealing with the Ottoman Empire. ■^The deposition of Abdul Aziz is discussed in Haluk Y. Sehsuvaroglu, Sultan Aziz, Hususi, Slvasi hayati, devri, ve olumu (Istanbul": Hilmi Kitabevi, 1945J (Sultan Abdul Aziz, his private and political life, his Times, and his death). 12For a discussion of Murat V, his enthronement, see: Suleyman Pasha, Hiss-i Inkilap. yahut Sultan Azizin hal1i ile Sultan Murad-1 Hamisin culusu (Istanbul: Tanin Matbaasi, 1916) HFhe Deposition of Sultan Aziz and the enthronement of Murat V). See also Comte E. de Keratry, Mourad V (Paris: E. Dentu, 1878). A study about the medical treatment and death of Murat V is worth noting: I. H. Uzuncarsili, "Muradin tedavisi ve olumne dair rapor ve mektuplar," Belleten, No. 35, 1947. A brief but ex­ cellent discussion on taurat V is also available in Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), chapter IX. ^ S e e Devereux, o£. cit., p. 37. For recent informa­ tion on the role of the military see: Sydney N. Fisher, "The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Turkey," in the Military in the Middle East (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963); Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963). *4The Young Ottoman desire for equality for all subjects of the Sultan was opposed by traditionalist Muslims as well as by most Christians, who considered it a chimera. The non-Muslims preferred independence. See Devereux, o£. cit., p. 37. 126 Information on Murat V and Abdul Hamid II are available in Ahmed Saib, Tarihi Sultan Murad Hamls (Cairo: nd., circa 1910); Osman Nuri. Abdulhamid-1 Sani ve Devr-i Saltanati (Istanbul: Matbaai Hayriye, i909); See chapter VII ^or the reign of Abdul Hamid, ^The Turkish authority on Midhat Pasha and the First Constitutional Period is Professor Bekir Sitki Baykal, See his ”93 Mesrutiyeti,” op, cit. Also important sources are: Mahmud Celaleddin Pasna, 0£. cit.. and Ahmed Midhat, Uss-u Inkilap. Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Con­ stitutional Period, op. cit,, is a most comprehensive recent work. For a life of Midhat Pasha see Ali Haydar Midhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha (London,. 1903); Mehmet Zeki Pakalln, Midhat Pasa (Istanbul, 1940); Kadircan Kafli, Midhat Pasa (Istanbul, 1$48); "Midhat Pasa ozel sayisi," in Karinca (Istanbul, June, 1951). See also I. A. Govsa, Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1946), pp. 254-

17Tunaya, cit., pp. 33-34. 18There was limited and contradictory information about the events of 1876-1878. Recent scholarship, both Turkish and non-Turkish has clarified many of the obscure points. Among the American scholars are Professor Roderic H. Davison of George Washington University, and Robert Devereux's work, quoted extensively in this study are most up-to-date and accurate. 19See Robert Devereux, cit. 20 See Davison, _o£. cit.. Chapters IX and X. 21Abdul Aziz, 1861-1876, was a well-meaning weak Sultan whose extravagances lost him the support of the Young Ottomans, and toward the end of his reign he was mentally ill. His death involved an obscure scandal, it is not clear to this day whether he committed suicide or was murdered. Midhat Pasha was blamed for being involved in his murder, which was highly unlikely. The enemies of reform and Abdul Hamid charged Midhat with implication in the so-called murder in order to crush the constitutional movement. Murat V, 1876-1876, ruled for a brief time. Again, it is not clear whether he was murdered or committed suicide. He was more favorable to reform than his predeces­ sor or successor, but he was mentally ill and became com­ pletely incapacitated. It is of interest to note that both Abdul Aziz and Murat were deposed by a fetva of the Sheikh- ul-Islam. Later the same would happen to Abdul Hamid in 127 1909. For Abdul Aziz see: Haluk Y. Sehsuvaroglu, Sultan Aziz (Istanbul, 1949). 22For Sultan Murat see the works of I. H. Uzuncarsili, especially, "Besinci Muradin tedavisi ve olumune ait rapor ve raektuplar 1876-1905," Belieten, No. 33, 1945, pp. 89- 133 which deals with all the letters and documents involv­ ing the mental illness and death of Murad V. ^3For Abdul Hamid see Chapter VII. Abdul Hamid ruled from 1876 to 1909. He was deposed by a fetva like Abdul Aziz and Murat, but he lived in exile until his death on February 10, 1918. The main source is Osman Nuri, Abdul Hamid-i Sani ve devr-i saltanati (Istanbul, 1911), 3 vols. 24 Devereux, 0£. cit., p. 42. 25Ibid., p. 45. See also William L. Langer, European Alliances & Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Knopf, 1950) for diplomatic history. 26For the text of the Imperial Irade of October 7, 1876, see Ahmed Midhat, o£. cit., Vol. II, pp. 195-196. 27The text of the first Ottoman Constitution is available in Dustur, Vol. IV., pp. 4-20, and in Gozobuyuk and Kili, op. cifc., pp. 25-38. 28See Devereux, o£. cit.. p. 16. It is pointed out that many Turkish and European secondary sources have wrong dates and that the correct dates are as shown above. 29For a list of the Ottoman Grand Vezirs see Appendix. 30See Devereux, o£. cit., pp. 55, 88-91, 102; and Sir Henry G. Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences (London: John Murray, 1^22). 31Devereux, c>£. cit., pp. 42-43. opFor details about Midhat Pasha's banishment and death see: Ali Haydar Midhat, Midhat Pasanin Hayat-1 Siyasiyesi (Kahire: Matbaa-i Ictihat, 1966i; I. H. Uzuncarsili, Midhat ve Rustu Pasalarin Tevkiflerlne dair veslkalar (Ankara: 77 T. K., 1^46) ^Documents regarding the arrest of Midhat and Rushdu Pashas); by the same author, Midhat Pasa ve Talf Mahkumlari (Ankara: T. T. K., 1950) (Midhat Pasha and his imprisonment in Taif). 33Tarih, III, pp. 291-296. CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF ABSOLUTISM UNDER SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II

Sultan Abdul Hamid II ruled from 1876 to 1909. The Hamidian era is also known as the period of absolutism which covers part of his reign (1878-1908). Abdul Hamid is a controversial figure in Ottoman history. Whether one admires him or abhors him, one has to admit that he was an important figure in Ottoman history. He has been called "Abdul the Damned," the "Red Sultan," and even "The Great Assassin. While most modern Turkish historians have criticized him as a reactionary, in recent years a few writers have tried to rehabilitate him in the same way as some writers tried to explain Metternich and his policies. Metternich was the target of most liberal historians in the past. However, some recent writers have attempted to show that the apparently reactionary policies of the great Austrian leader were dictated by the peculiar circumstances facing the Habsburg Empire between 1815 and 1848. In the same manner, recent revisionist historians, as well as the former apologists for conservatism, stress the fact that Abdul Hamid ruled a heterogeneous Empire in which an elite Muslim-Turkish minority ruled over an Empire consisting of 129 non-Turkish Muslims (such as, Arabs and Kurds) and non- Muslim subject peoples (such as, Greeks, Slavs, Armenians, and Jews)* In the same way that the Habsburg Empire ruled by a small Austrian-German elite, who were faced with the separatist sentiments of their Slavic and other minorities, the Ottoman Turks of the nineteenth century also were faced with problems of nationalism and separatism. Both Empires tried to introduce reforms, but also used repres­ sive measures to retain control; and both Empires received a bad press from the nineteenth century liberal newspapers 2 and periodicals. While this writer realizes that Abdul Hamid may have been maligned to a certain extent, it is obvious that he was the wrong leader for the Empire during its period of great crisis and opportunity, in which constitutionalism and liberal movements were the order of the day. One can speculate as to what would have happened had a Sultan who was well disposed toward modernism and liberalism ruled instead of Abdul Hamid. If Murad V had overcome his mental illness, or if a ruler of the Selim III caliber appeared at this time, perhaps Midhat Pasha would have been appre­ ciated instead of destroyed. These speculations may be 3 futile, but Turkish writers indulged in such exercises. In this study, we are primarily concerned with the struggle between modernists and traditionalists in Ottoman 130 history. No matter what view one should take, the pre­ dominance of evidence indicates that Abdul Hamid was a reactionary who depended heavily on traditionalist ele­ ments. We will see how he was influenced, or at least felt close to several traditionalist leaders. Also, one can say with little fear of contradiction that the Hamidian era was a period when liberalism appeared to have disap­ peared in the Empire, and the traditionalist elements were in control. Yet, the extreme absolutism and oppression of the Hamidian regime made possible the unity of all modernist groups within the Empire (and of the self-exiled Ottoman liberals in Europe). The reaction to the tyrannical Hamidian regime resulted in the birth of the Young Turk Movement and the rise of Turkish nationalism in the early twentieth century. However, most histories stress the fact that Abdul Hamid destroyed the chances for reform started by Midhat Pasha and the Young Ottomans. When the efforts of the great Midhat Pasha were frustrated by the wily but short­ sighted Sultan, it was clearly a victory for the forces of reaction against the advocates of reform. Most historians of the Hamidian era stress the fact that the period of absolutism lasted thirty long years (1878-1908). The op­ pressive policies of Abdul Hamid were directed against all progressive and nationalist groups, including the Young 131 Ottomans and later the Young Turks. This, of course, made Abdul Hamid unpopular in intellectual circles. On the other hand, Abdul Hamid had the support of the reactionary and ultra-conservative elements who remained strong in the Empire despite the reforms of 1839* 1858, and 1876. During the nineteenth century, and even in the early years of the twentieth century, the ultra-conservative groups had a stronger grip over the masses of the popula­ tion than the more progressive Young Turks, who were still a relatively small group with no real roots among the people. The Ottoman modernist tended to spend his time in Europe and the cosmopolitan capital of Istanbul (Constanti­ nople) and had much more in common with professional people of the West than with his own superstition-ridden, ignorant Anatolian peasants. But perhaps even worse, the Ottoman intellectuals had little contact with the provinces. When­ ever a bureaucrat was sent to the provinces, he agitated to return to Istanbul or be transferred to such advanced outposts of the Empire as Beirut, Damascus, or Salonica. The Young Turk modernist had little to offer the Muslim- Turkish peasantry of Anatolia, and he was to lose the loyalty of the non-Muslim nationalities, which had never been very firm. It will be seen later how the Young Turk policy of stressing Turkism alienated the Arab portions of the Empire. Abdul Hamid, on the other hand, found support 132 among the traditionalists, and, as will be seen, his em- 4 phasis on Pan-Islamism kept the Arabs in line. Thus, many historians who wrote at the end of the nineteenth century tended to praise the allegedly wise policies of Abdul Hamid and considered the efforts of the modernist Young Turks as rash and juvenile. It should be noted here that, while suppressing liberal movements, Abdul Hamid was forced to allow the modernization of the Ottoman armed forces along Western lines, although displaying serious misgivings about the impact of European ideas among the officer class. Some of the military officers were trained by European specialists in Turkey, but others went abroad for training. In Europe they had witnessed the progress and prosperity of the countries they visited, which they contrasted unfavorably with the inefficiency, corruption, and weakness at home. These officers were in contact with Ottoman intellectuals at home, who also came from the same elite upper middle class and middle classes, the bureaucracy, and slowing growing professional groups. Even some of the non-Muslim minorities made common cause with the emerging Young Turks, since they still hoped for better opportunities under a revived Ottoman constitutional regime. The alliance of the military, intellectuals, and the more enlightened members of the bureaucracy were joined by some members of 133 the ulema* All these groups were united by concern felt at the defeats and weakness of the Empire vis-a-vis Europe.

This concern about the destiny of the Empire was also strengthened by a "New Patriotism,” first formulated by

Namik Kemal and the Young Ottomans, and now further de­ veloped by the Young Turks and writers such as Mehmet Emin

Yurdakul, who at the turn of the present century began praising the great achievements of the Turks in history."*

A study of Abdul Hamid and the Hamidian period must be approached from several different angles in order to get as near an approximation of the truth as possible.

One approach is to study his crafty and reactionary per­ sonality and the way he was able to overcome the constitu­ tionalists and gain full control of the reigns of govern­ ment. To a certain extent, an attempt was made in the previous chapter to examine how Abdul Hamid was able to outmaneuver Midhat Pasha, who had brought him to power.

Another approach is to study diplomatic history and the pressures of the Great Powers exerted on the Porte, and Abdul Hamid’s reaction to these tactics. Abdul Hamid tried to play one Great Power against another. He promised reforms but never intended to carry them out. He oppressed

separatist groups and used the Kurdish regiments

against the Armenian revolutionaries. This type of

approach has been common in the Middle East. Another 134 approach includes Abdul Hamid's views on Pan-Islamism and his relationships with Muslim leaders (such as, Jamal al- Din al-Afghani) and the reactionary genius of his adviser, the Arab reactionary Abu'l-Huda.^ A few words will be said in this connection, since this subject involves the problem of traditionalism and modernism. Also, a few words on the personality of Abdul Hamid will be useful, for his whole training, personality, and early experience made him a fearful, suspicious, and crafty individual. Since his personality affected his decisions and, as an absolute monarch, he often had great power which he could wield for the good or the ruin of the Empire, a few words about his character may be in order. Abdul Hamid was an absolute monarch who was con­ fronted with many serious problems, both external and internal. The Sultan viewed any progressive reform as dangerous, since it would strengthen the separatist tendencies of the non-Muslim nationalities and extend the foreign control in the Empire. His suspicion of the Young Turks, liberals, and nationalists was conditioned largely by the fear that they were plotting against him. After all, Abdul Aziz, as well as Murad, had been deposed, and the efforts of some Young Ottoman extremists to restore Murad to power in the 1878 Chiragan Plot, only confirmed his fears. Since this plot affected his whole thinking, 135 a few words about this incident may not be out of place here. All Suavi, one of the Young Ottoman intellectuals, a professor at the Galatasaray lyc4e and a journalist of note who had become famous for his violent articles against the Palace in the paper Muhbir (that which informs), is typical of many Middle Eastern intellectuals and reformers. He was violent, extremist, impractical, and unpredictable. His plot is important in a way, since the same type of rash and unplanned revolts continue to be characteristic of many parts of the Middle East today. Ali Suavi and a small group of his followers at­ tempted to return Sultan Murad to the throne as the wronged and lawful monarch. They felt that Abdul Hamid had be­ trayed his promise to allow constitutional government. Also, they saw in Murad a weaker person whom they could control. It should be noted here that the more responsible Young Ottomans (such as, ziya Pasha and Namik Kemal) also deplored the turn of events, but they opposed violence. The plot was ill conceived and poorly executed. Suavi and a handful of his supporters tried to rescue Murad and re­ store him to the throne. They raided the Chiragan Palace, but their plot was foiled by Hasan Pasha, the chief security officer of Beshiktash. The plotters have been estimated between four and five hundred. They had contacted 136 the mother of Sultan Murad, ShevJcefza Kadln Efendi, and Murad who was a virtual prisoner within the Palace* Among the plotters, Uskudarli Nuri (Kiz Nuri) was able to send communications to Murad; and, on May 20, 1878, the rescue operation failed when Suavi was killed and his followers dispersed. Such a poorly planned and desperate action, 7 without Army support was doomed to failure. The result was that the plot scared Abdul Hamid, who believed in the ill-founded rumors that Murad had a large following. To counter plots and revolutions, he built up a whole system of Palace spies and informers known as jurnalcis. Other plots of this type were attempted, but none of them suc­ ceeded and led to persecution of liberal and nationalist elements. In the next chapter, there will be a discussion of Pan-Islamism. Here a few words on Abdul Hamid's policy on Pan-Islamism will be presented to explain how this concept fitted with his ideas. Abdul Hamid followed a policy of giving Arabs important posts. This was, in part, due to his desire to counter Arab separatist tendencies. For example, Dr. Hassan Saab points out that among the numerous Arab officials Abdul Hamid had appointed were such names as Abu'l-Huda Al-Rifai, Sherif Husein, Ali Haydar, Izzat el-

Q Abed, Najib Bey, Salim Bey Malhama, and so on. A recent study by Haslip on Abdul Hamid, emphasizes the significant 137 role of Abu'l-Huda in the Palace. He advocated Pan- 9 Islamism and was a reactionary of the first order. On the other hand, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who also advo­ cated Pan-Islamism, was more of a reformer who wished to revive Islamic greatness to counter European imperialism Al-Afghani was invited to Istanbul and for a while had the favor of the Sultan, but al-Afghani was a controversial person and sometimes the two strong characters clashed.^ An excellent discussion of Abdul Hamid's pro-Arab and Pan- Islamic policies is available in Professor Zeine N. Zeine's recent study.^ Abdul Hamid had no concept of the impor­ tance of the new dynamic force of nationalism, and placed his reliance on a policy of Pan-Islamism. Although Pan- Islamism ultimately failed, it helped to hold the Empire together for a time. George Antonius points out that after the fall of Abdul Hamid in 1909 and the advent of the Young Turks who preferred a Pan-Turkist policy to Pan- Islamism, Arab support was lost, and this led to the Arab revolt of 1916.12 One writer, who has tried to bend backward to be fair to Abdul Hamid, has this to say, which is quoted here, although the present writer tends to be more critical of the Sultan: There is no doubt that Abdul Hamid was a reactionary ruler who feared real and imagined attempts against his life. However, one cannot rightly say that he 138 was merely a tyrannical and confused despot who had no policy but one of despair. In his wily and crafty way he was smart enough to deal with matters that he understood. Unfortunately, his limited vision, narrow education and lack of understanding of modern trends and new forces made it impossible for him to keep in step with the times. One may better understand the personal outlook of Sultan Abdul Hamid when it is realized that he was a tra­ ditionalist himself. He actually belonged to a dervish order and was personally close to traditionalist leaders, including a number of ultra-conservative Arab Muslim leaders. According to Professor Bernard Lewis: . . . the dervish leaders closest to the Sultan were Arabs, such as the Syrian Abu'l-Huda and the Hejazi Sayyid Ahmad As'ad, leaders of the Rifa'i order, or the Medinese Muhammad Zafir, leader of the Shadhiliyya. to which the Sultan himself is said to have belonged.14 Despite Abdul Hamid's reactionary views, however, he was unable to halt the reformist and modernist trend that had started with the Tanzimat, and after thirty years of absolutism, the modernists were able to seize power. In the words of Professor Tunaya: Thirty years of absolutism failed to prevent the rise of the Young Turk movement, nourished as it was by the political climate created by revolu­ tions in the West. Despite differences among them, the Young Turks were fundamentally Western oriented. They struggled against the Hamidian regime, which sought salvation for the Empire through Islam.15 Professor Tunaya voices the same view as most modern Turkish writers when he points out that Westerni­ zation rather than emphasis on Islam was the solution for 139 Turkey. In discussing the reason for the decline of the Empire and Islamic countries, he lists the following causes: external attacks of Great Powers, the lack of creativeness and the tendency to imitate, general ignor­ ance and fanaticism, and laziness and economic stagnation.1® Only Westernization and modernization could halt the Otto­ man decline. The diplomacy of Abdul Hamid was also of a special type referred to as the Hamidian policy of playing one Great Power against another. According to one historian: Abdul Hamid was trying to maintain the Empire through a policy of appeasing the Great Powers and suppressing all opposition at home. This policy did not satisfy the Young Turks who felt that more positive measures were necessary to save the Empire.17 It will be remembered that the Ottoman Empire was threatened by the expansionist policies of Russia after 17 74. Continued Turkish defeats led Reshid Pasha to try and win the support of Great Britain in the period leading to the 1839 Tanzimat. It will also be remembered that Turkey was allied with Great Britain and France against Russia in the Crimean War (1854-1856). In 1878, the Otto­ man Empire was defeated by Russia, but Great Britain and the other Great Powers were able to minimize Russian gains at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Turks, aware of their weakness, continued seeking support abroad. 18 140 However, the main support of Turkey came from England during the period 1840 to 1914. Britain protected the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, because she feared that, in any partition of the Ottoman Empire, Russia would get the "lion's share" of the spoils. 19 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Germany appeared in the Middle East and was to play a major role in the future of the Ottoman Empire.^ It will be remembered that the Triple Alliance, which developed in 1882 and which include Germany, Austria- Hungary, and Italy, created a power bloc in Europe which had ramifications in the Middle East. In 1892, France and Russia formed the Dual Alliance against Germany and Austria- Hungary. By 1904, the British-French rivalries were re­ solved by the birth of the Entente Cordiale because of the rising danger of Germany. In 1907, Russian British rival­ ries were temporarily resolved for the same reason. Thus, an alignment of the powers generally referred to as the Triple Entente, which included England, France, and Russia, found themselves arrayed against the Triple Alliance, the major architects of which were Germany and Austria, with Italy a reluctant partner. As a result of these new developments in Great Power alignments, Great Britain's support of the Ottoman Empire shifted gradually and was replaced by Germany. To a great extent, Sultan Abdul 141 Hamid was blamed for this policy. However, it was only after his deposition by the Young Turks in 1909 and the advent of Enver Pasha's pro-German policies that the Empire was to side with the Germans in the First World War. 21 This development will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 142 CHAPTER VI—FOOTNOTES

Primary sources for a study of Abdul Hamid are difficult to obtain and include archival materials in the Yildiz Maruzat Dairesi Arsivi (The Yildiz Palace Archives). These materials are divided into four main record groups classified under the reign of the Sultans (1839-1918). Some of these materials have appeared in Belieten and Tarih Vesikalari. Also see the Guide to the Topkapu Palace Museum Archives, Topkapu Sarayi Muzesi Arsivi Kilavuzu (Istanbul, 1938, 1^40, 2 vols.) While newspaper files are useful, censorship between 1878 and 1908 limits their value. However, Young Turk papers, published in Europe, are more useful. There is no definitive biography on Abdul Hamid, but there are numerous books and articles of varying importance. See A. H. Ongunsu, "Abdulhamid II," Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1943), Vol. I, No. 1, pp. ^6-80. 2 Abdul Hamid was confronted with many of the same problems that Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia were faced with during the period of rising nationalism, liberalism, and the new ideals of a growing middle class in the 191& century and early 20U> centuries. See Sir Edwin Pears, The Life of Abdul Hamid (London: Constable, 1917). 3 Among the writers on the Hamidian period, one can mention Osman Nuri, Abdurrahman Seref, I. H. Uzuncarsili, Ulug Igdemir, Halil Inalcik, Enver Ziya Karal, and A. H. Ongunsu. The official non-critical history is that of Osman Nuri, Abdulhamid-i Sani ve Devr-i Saltanati (Istanbul, 1909) 3 vols. 6ngunsu's articTe in the Islam Ansiklopedisi is very useful. The following books are of varying im- portance: F. McCullagh, The Fall of Abdul Hamid (London: Methuen, 1910); G. Roy, Abdul~~Hami5~(Paris: Payot, 1936); Alma Wittlin, Abdul Hamid (London: Jane and Head, 1940); and a recent study by Joan Haslip, The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid (London: Cassell, l^i>8). 5ince there is no outstanding study on Abdul Hamid, this writer has found chapters in the following books quite informative: Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire. Chapters IX and X; Robert Devereux, TKe First Ottoman Constitu­ tional Period. Chapters XI and X; and for the later period Ernest E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1^S7). See also I. A. Govsa, Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Yedigun Nesriyati, 1946) (An Encyclopaedia of Famous Turks), pp. 10-12 for a 143 biography of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Turkish historical journals and articles in newspapers have popular and un­ documented items on Abdul Hamid and the Palace. Resimli Tarih Mecmuas it July, 1950, has an article on the per- sonaiity of Abdul Hamid. 4See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), chapters IV and VI; and Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat1s, 1§58), Chapters III and IV. George Antonius claims that the Arabs were all united against the Ottoman Turks, whereas the Zeine corrective is that most Arabs after 1913 were against Turkey but some remained loyal until the very last to the Sultan-Caliph during the Arab Revolt of 1916. 5M. E. Yurdakul (1869-1944) was author of Turkce Siirler (Turkish poems) and one of the first modern Turkish nationalist writers. For brief studies on Turkish litera­ ture see: K. Key, "Trends in Modern ," Muslim World. October, 1957; and Kemal H. Karpat, "Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature," Middle East, Journal. Winter, 1960 and Spring, 1960. See alsoHasan Ali Yucel. Turk Edebiyatina Toplu bir Bakls (Istanbul, 1933) (A GeneralView of Turkish Literature); and Mustafa Nihat Ozon, Son Asir Turk Edebivat Tarihi (Istanbul, 1941) (The History of Turkish Literature in the Last Century). ^For Ebul-Huda see A. Vambery, "Personal Recollec­ tions of Abdul Hamid II," The Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1909. For al-Afqhanl see Edward 6. Browne ,"TRe Persian Revolution 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ versity Press, 1910). See also K. Key, "Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and the Muslim Reform Movement," The Islamic Literature. October, 1961; and H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 28-29. A most interesting treatment of Islamic development is available in Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, i§<>4) chapter V, entitled "The Revolt of Islam." 7 The Chiragan Palace Plot of 1878 confirmed Abdul Hamid's fears regarding the Ottomans. He also believed that Murad had a strong following, which was not the case. See I. H. Uzuncarsili, Ali Suavi ve Ciraqan Vakasi (Ankara: T. T. K. , 1944). See A. B. Kuran, Inlcilap""Tarlhlmiz ve Jon Turkler (Istanbul, 1945) (The History of our Revolution and the Young Turks), pp. 18-19; and Govsa, Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi. p. 40, for the life and activities of Ali 144 Suavl (1838-1878), a fiery journalist who, as early as 1866, criticized the Porte and Abdul Aziz, and was exiled for a while. He published Muhbir, joined the Young Otto­ mans, and was killed in a foolhardy attempt to overthrow Abdul Hamid in 1878, O Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire (Amsterdam: Jambatan, 1^5), chapter VI, p. 188. g See J. Haslip, The Sultan; and Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations, p, 54, in which the influence of Abu1! Huda Effendi In stressing the necessity of reuniting Islamic countries to resist Europe which could not be trusted, Abu'l-Huda, Abu'l Huda, Ebul-Huda are different spellings of the same name. ^For a discussion on al—Afghani, see K, Key, "Jamal ad-Din al—Afghani and the Muslim Reform Movement," The Islamic Literature, October, 1951, 11Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations, pp. 53-65. 12George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 101-125. "^K. Key, "An Appraisal of Sultan Abdul Hamid II," The Islamic Literature t September, 1956. 14Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, T5STT, pi 3T02. ^Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkivenin Siyasi Hayatinda Batililasma Hareketleri (Istanbul: Yeaigun Matbaasi, 1960), p. 46 (Westernization Movements in the Political Life of Turkey)• ■^Tarik Z. Tunaya, Islamcilik Cereyani (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962), pp. 5-11 (The Islamic Movement). ^ K . Key, op. cit. , p. 533. 18For the diplomatic history of this period see Sir J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (London: Oxford University Press, 1946)"; and for the later period, Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (Norman: Oklahoma Uni­ versity Press, l§3i). ^ee also Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1§59), Chapter I. 19See the following for British policy in the Middle 145 East: Sir R. Bullard, Britain and the Middle East (London: Hutchinson, 1952) and Elie Kedourie, Enplane!""and TThe Middle East (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956), Chapter I. For a Turkish view see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, Turk-Inqiliz Munasebetlerine Kisa bir bakls 1553-1952j (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevl, 1952) (A Short Survey of Turco- British Relations). ?n See Altemur Kilic, ojo. cit., pp. 22-31. 21 For the relations of the Great Powers with Turkey see: Rifki Salim Burcak, Turk-Inq1i1iz—Rus Munasibetleri 1791-1941 (Istanbul: Aydinlik Matbaasi, 194*51 (Turkish- English-Russian Relations); Turgut Can Mamas, Tarih Bovunca Turk—Rus Munasebetleri (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaasi, 1955) (Turkish—Russian Relations during the course of history); Akdes Nimet Kurat, Turk-Amerikan Munasibetlerine Kisa bir bakis (1800-1959) (Ankara: Dogus Matbaasi, 1959) (A Short Survey of Turco—American Relations). For docu­ ments on international relations, treaties, etc., see: J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton: Van Nostrand, T556), Vols. I and II. See also Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), Chapter VI. For information on theories of international relations see, Charles 0. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965). CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF THE MODERNIST AND TRADITIONALIST IN OTTOMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduction The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic State.1 Therefore, concepts applicable to the Islamic State were also appli­ cable to the Ottoman Empire to a large degree. After the late eighteenth century, however, the impact of the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution started new trends in the Middle East.^ The failure of the Tanzimat reformers and the Young Ottomans to solve Turkey's problems through reforms and the concept of Osmanlilik (Ottomanism), led to the rise of Pan- Islamism. Later, the concept of Pan-Turanism became popular. As will be seen in the following pages, these concepts were not always contradictory, and not all thinkers and writers meant the same thing when they advo­ cated Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism, or Turkism. It can be said that Ottomanism came first during the first three quarters of the last century. Pan-Islamism developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and continued into the early twentieth century. Pan- Turanism became popular in Turkey at the turn of this century. By Ottomanism, the Ottoman reformers meant 147 equality for all subjects of the Sultan. Pan-Islamism envisaged the unity of all Islamic peoples, while Pan- Turanism referred to the unity of all the Turkish peoples of the world. Finally, the failure of all these concepts to solve the problems of the Turkish people, resulted in the concept of Turkism or Turkish nationalism. In the next pages, a brief discussion on Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism, Turkism, and the ideology of the Young Turks will be presented in order to help clarify the policies followed by the Young Turks after the 1908 Revolution.

Ottomanism (Osmanlilik) The concept of Ottomanism initially developed by the Tanzimat reformers, and later adopted by the Young Ottomans, was first put into actual effect by Midhat Pasha during the first Ottoman Constitutional Period. Ottomanism has been defined as the aspiration of the nineteenth cen­ tury Ottoman reformers for the creation of a common Otto­ man citizenship and loyalty, irrespective of religion or 3 ethnic origin. According to the official History of Turkey, Tarih, the main cause for the failure of Ottomanism was the reluctance of the non-Muslim minorities to accept the "New Ottoman Patriotism." The non-Muslim nationalities were suspicious of these offers of partnership in an Islamic State, and also were unwilling to give up their particularistic interests and desires to establish 148 independent nations of their own. Also, these non-Muslim elements sought support for their separatist aspirations 4 in the capitals of Europe. Despite the failure of Ottomanism during the Tanzimat period, and during the first Ottoman Constitu­ tional Period, Ottomanism again became a policy which was supported by some of the Young Turks after the 1908 Revo­ lution. At this time the Empire was threatened by rebel­ lions and loss of territory in the Balkans, and the fate of Albania and Macedonia was seriously worrying the Young Turk leadership. It was hoped that the re-establishment of the Constitution and the concept of Ottomanism would placate the non-Muslim nationalities. Unfortunately, how­ ever, the advocates of Ottomanism were again to be disil­ lusioned. It should be emphasized here that Ottomanism was not only resisted by the non-Muslim nationalities who were influenced by new ideas of nationality which came from Europe, but even Muslim Turks were doubtful of the pallid doctrine of Ottomanism, which had little chance of success. The Christian nationalities struggled for independence. The natural reaction of the Turkish leadership was to quell what they considered rebellious actions. This type of struggle hardly led to an atmosphere in which the vague, 149 impractical, though perhaps pious wishes of a few Otto- manists could flourish. The Ottoman Turks were faced with real obstacles in their effort at creating a new loyalty for an Empire peopled with diverse nationalities who spoke different languages and whose roots went deep into the past. Turkish leaders sought vainly for solutions, one of which was Otto­ manism. First, the great Ottoman patriotic poet Namik Kemal, who developed the concept of Vatan (The Fatherland) himself was never clear on what he meant by Ottomanism. The Tanzimat concept of Ottomanism was that as a result of the 1839 Rescript, all subjects of the Sultan were henceforth equal and were Ottomans. In some of his writ­ ings, Namik Kemal uses the term Ottoman as a name to describe all citizens of this ideal Empire of the Osmanlis. But in his most impassioned writings, he identifies real Ottomanism with the great achievements of the Turks.^ Also, it will be remembered that Ali Kemal, one of the Young Turks who favored Ottomanism and opposed Turkish national­ ism, was actually lynched by a mob in Izmid in November, 1922, so strong was the nationalist Turkist feelings against the "appeaser" and "betrayer" of the national ideal.® Thus, a doctrine which was neither acceptable to the non-Muslim nationalities, nor to the Muslim Turks was doomed to failure. 150 Pan-Islamism (Ittihad—1 Islam) Pan-Islamism is a complex religio-political concept about which much has been written. This study is not con­ cerned with the various interpretations, but will only discuss Pan-Islamism as it developed in the nineteenth 7 century in the Ottoman Empire. Despite the failure of Ottomanism, it was never completely given up by the modernists, continued to be the policy of Young Ottomans and Young Turks. However, at this time, the concept of the Umma al-Islam (Islamic com­ munity), which was a traditional view, became a convenient ideal which was modernized into a sort of political- religious concept of Ittihad—i Islam (Pan-Islamism). Abdul Hamid made Pan-Islamism into a political instrument to counter European imperialism in the Muslim lands. Pan-Islamism offered certain advantages to Sultan Abdul Hamid, even though the Ottoman Empire no longer en­ joyed the power to enforce the will of the Sultan. Pro­ fessor Lewis points out these advantages as follows: Inside the Empire, the appeal to Muslim loyalty could win support for his efforts to repress the liberals, nationalists, reformers, and other opponents of his autocratic power. Outside the Empire, he might hope to rally an important body of Muslim opinion to his support and, by creating difficulties for the Imperial powers in their Muslim territories, forestall possible action against Turkley.® It will be remembered that after the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate, and especially following the destruc­ tion of Baghdad by the Mongolians in 1258, the office of the Caliphate lost much of its importance. Physically, the Caliphs resided in Egypt, but the Mamluke Sultans of Egypt had little respect for the weakened leadership of a once great office. When Sultan defeated the Mamlukes in 1517, and conquered Egypt, the Muslim relics and the honorary titles of Islam, including the title of Caliph became the prerogative of the Ottoman Sultans who, hence­ forth, were to be known as the Sultan-Caliph. However, the Ottoman Sultans at the height of their power did not give much importance to this additional title. It was after 1774, following Russian claims that the Tsar of the Russians was the protector of the Christians in the Otto­ man Empire, and especially the members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, that the Ottomans began countering this Russian move by emphasizing the title of Caliph in offi­ cial pronouncements. Abdul Hamid went one step further and, as Caliph of Islam, devised a modern form of Pan- Islamism in order to claim spiritual primacy in the affairs of all Muslims, including those living beyond the Ottoman borders, in Russia, and in parts of Asia and Africa which had fallen under the direct or indirect control of Great Britain and France. Pan-Islamism, the concept of the unity of all 152 Islamic peoples was not new. However, Sultan Abdul Hamid II and some of his advisers sought to use the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism to counter Great Power pressures and to strengthen the Empire by gaining the support of the Muslim members of the "Establishment," since it was obvious that the non-Muslim nationalities were not to be depended on. The advocates of Pan-Islamism claimed that it would not only strengthen the Empire internally by sharpening the existing unity among the Muslim subjects, but that, at the same time, it would tend to raise the prestige of the Empire abroad, at a time when Ottoman prestige was at an all-time low. Since Pan-Islamism would gain the support of Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire, this would make Turkey an international power. At the same time, the Great Powers (such as, Great Britain, Russia, France, and the Habsburgs) would be given notice that the Sultan- Caliph could not be ignored or pressured. What this study is concerned with is to find out whether the concept of Pan-Islamism can be classified as a traditionalist or conservative concept, or whether Pan- Islamic ideas were compatible with modernism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Also, an addi­ tional task is to decide whether its advocates were con­ servatives or modernists. In order to be able to draw such conclusions, some further discussions of the concept 153 of modernism in Islamic States may be necessary, as well as an analysis of the motives of Sultan Abdul Hamid who adopted this policy in the latter half of the last century. According to a Middle Eastern authority, Abdul Hamid was aware of the fact that "suspicion between Arabs and g the Turks increased." Abdul Hamid was disturbed at anti- Turkish agitation in Lebanon. He realized that the admin­ istration of his Arab provinces was greatly decentralized and wished to tighten his controls. Abdul Hamid was fear­ ful that the Arabs were working towards the establishment of an Arab Caliphate. To counter this trend and win over the Arabs, he appointed Arabs to high administrative and military offices and used the "ingenious device of Pan- Islamism"1® as a policy not only to counter European policies vis-lt-vis the Ottoman Empire, but also to win over the support of the Muslim peoples of the world, and thus neutralize anti-Turkish feeling in the Arab lands. Pan-Islamism attracted the more conservative elements in the Empire and can hardly be considered a modernist move­ ment.

Pan-Turanism (Turancilik) Pan-Turanism, as one aspect of Turkish nationalism,11 may be worth examining briefly to see to what extent it can be considered a traditionalist and to what extent a modernist movement. The purpose of this discussion is not 154 the presentation of a detailed analysis of the origins and development of the Pan-Turanian movement, but is merely concerned with the ideas of the Pan-Turanian leaders. The discussion of the Pan-Turanian concept is undertaken with the view of finding out in what way the ideals of this movement fitted the pattern of Turkish society and the aspiration of the officers and small bureaucratic and in­ tellectual elite. The discussion will be limited to the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out here that some writers distinguish between Pan-Turanism (seeking unity among Turkish, Mongolian, Finnish-Ugrian peoples) and Pan-Turkism (seeking unity of the Turkish­ speaking peoples). However, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism are often used synonymously. This writer will use Pan- Turanism and Pan-Turkism synonymously for the sake of clarity and simplicity. Pan-Turanism or Pan-Turkism is essentially the cultural and political concept dealing with the problem of the unity of the Turkish-speaking peoples, and as such would tend to resemble the European nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century in many respects. In fact, it will be remembered that it was European Orientalists who first inspired Turkish historians with the significance of the Turkish contribution to world 155 civilization prior to the Islamic period and the Ottoman Empire. 12 It will also be remembered that, during the last decade of the nineteenth century and early in this century, an increasing number of Turks from Russia took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Many of these Turks from Russia were men of ability and education and, thus, found a place in Turkish society since they were Muslims and spoke Turkish. These Turks who had lived under Russian domination were aroused by feelings of nationalism and found sympathetic supporters among the Young Turks. A large number of these Caucasian and other Turks from Russia rose to important positions of leadership in Turkey. It was natural that these Turks from Russian-dominated areas, which were formerly Turkish, advocated a program aimed at the liberation of their suppressed brethren in the Trans- Caucasus and Central Asia. Several of these Turks from abroad joined the Turkish army, taught at the University, and contributed substantially to the political and intel- lectual life of Turkey. 13 According to Professor Tunaya: The Pan-Islamic leaders opposed the Turkists, giving Turkism a secondary position to Pan-Islamism and even considered Turkism as dangerous. They claimed that if Turkism was to be achieved it could only be done by first realizing the aims of Pan- Islamism. If the Pan-Turanian ideal was to be a success, it could not be based only on Turkism. In brief, the concept of Pan-Islamism could lead to an ultimate Turkish union, but Turkism would not lead anywhere.14 156 If one should analyze the program, aspirations, and policies of the Pan-Turanian leaders in Turkey and those among the Young Turks who supported them, it will be seen that they resembled some of the European nationalistic movements; such as, Italian nationalism, Pan-Germanism, and even Pan-Slavism.15 Since most of the European nation­ alistic movements and efforts to attain ethnic unity are considered part of the struggle for modernism, to that ex­ tent Pan-Turanism may be considered a modernist concept. Also, since Turkish officers, intellectuals, and politi­ cal leaders supported this movement at certain periods, and many of the Pan-Turks favored the creation of a strong modern State, perhaps even a secular State, one can again see in this movement certain tendencies which may be con­ sidered modernist. On the other hand, the group favoring Pan-Turanism tended to be extremely nationalistic and were generally not liberal in their domestic political views. They favored the superiority of the Turkish element, which was the ruling elite, over other Ottoman subjects. Thus, as has been mentioned before, they ultimately alienated the Arabs who, although predominantly Muslims realized that Enver Pasha*s new policies after 1913 could work against their preferred status in Turkish society under Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic policies. Also, the Pan-Turanist policy created concern among the non-Muslim subjects of the Porte who had found support in Prince Sabahattin's Liberal Union Party which had advocated a loose Ottoman federation in which all the different millets and ethnic and religious minorities would enjoy equal treatment. Thus, compared to the Liberal Union and its policies, the Pan-Turanists, who were allied with the Committee of Union and Progress, can be considered as being nationalistic but not liberal in the democratic sense. Yet, they could not be considered traditionalists, since they favored the creation of a strong, centralized modern State. They favored unity of all the Turkish-speaking peoples, and were ready to break with the old Islamic State and the Ottomanism of the nineteenth century. Also, not all Pan- Turanists had the same identical views. Some, like Enver Pasha, had adopted Pan-Turanism for political reasons; while others, such as the intellectuals Turan, Akcuraoglu, Agaoglu, or Hamdullah Suphi Tanriover, were both modernist as well as Pan-Turanists, and favored democratic institu­ tions at least in theory. Others tended to be militantly nationalistic and hardly liberal in their views. This brief discussion indicates that it is difficult and even dangerous to make broad generalizations. One can­ not attribute certain qualities of conservatism or liberalism to movements such as the Pan-Turanian movement. There was, and is, such a movement, but the views of its leaders and members are not all identical, and the general policy and views vary at different periods. The question of whether the Pan-Turks or Pan-Turanists were modernists and liberals is not clear. While all will agree that they are modernist in the sense that they are nationalists, there is less unanimity of opinion about their being liberal and democratic in their views and actions.

Turkism (Turkculuk) The concept of Turkculuk (Turkism) developed gra­ dually towards the end of the nineteenth century and was formalized by Ziya Gokalp in the early twentieth century. Turkism and Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism are often used synonymously. One of the factors influencing the development of Turkism, which gradually was to replace Ottomanism, was the arrival in Turkey of a number of Turkish-speaking refugees who escaped from Russian tyranny at the end of the nineteenth century. These intellectuals were given positions in the University, joined the Army and Young Turk Movement, and in their writings and speeches empha­ sized the broader concept of the history of the Turks. Among the leaders of this group were Ismail Gaspirali (1851-1914), Huseyinzade Ali Turan (1864-1941), Akcuraoglu Yusuf (1876-1933) and Agaoglu Ahmet (1869-1939). At the same time, some Turkish writers and poets, 159 such as Mehmed Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944) began inspiring the nation with his patriotic writings. He became one of the pillars of the new Milli Edebiyat (National Literature) and used Turkish instead of Arabic and Persian terminology. He was understood both by the common people and appealed to the new nationalistic Turkish elite, especially the Young Turks. 17 However, the greatest leader of Turkism, who was able to formalize and articulate effectively the vague longings of the rising nationalist elements in Turkey of the early twentieth century, was the great Turkish sociolo­ gist Ziya Gokalp (1875-1924), who is considered the intel­ lectual leader of both the Young Turk and Kemalist revolutions. Gokalp is considered the real founder of Turkism or modern Turkish nationalism. He was influenced by the ideas of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), and wrote on the inter-relation of history and sociology. He founded and wrote in such journals as the Yeni Mecmua and Kucuk Mecmua. Among his works are "Tarih ve Ictimaiyat," (History and Sociology), which appeared in Yeni Mecmua, No. 52, Istanbul, 1918, and Turk Medeniyet Tarihi (History of Turkish Civilization), Istanbul, 1925. Gokalp traced the origins gf the Turks to Central Asia and Turkestan (Turan). In his lectures at the 160 University of Istanbul, he emphasized the importance of patriotic historiography and, at the same time, stressed the significance of historical evidence, the use of original sources, and the role of the auxilliary sciences as aids in the study of history. Although some of the critics of Gokalp have charged that his ideas were not always original, his writings were important in the development of historical methodology and sociology in Turkey. Gokalp*s influence in Turkish history is significant not only because of his contribution to the development of Turkism, but also because he trained and inspired a number of young men who later were to play major roles in the development of modern Turkey. 18 The Turkist was the real modernist of the Ottoman Empire and later of Turkey.

The Ideology of the Young Turks It is doubtful that the Young Turks had a clearcut ideology. One can more safely say th^t the different fac­ tions followed somewhat different policies, often a result of the particular leader of the group, and his views, rather than any doctrinaire beliefs. Let us start with the two main groups. The Ahmet Riza and Prince Sabahaddin factions, which later developed into the Centralists (Committee of Union and Progress) and Decentralists (Liberal Union) groups which will be discussed 161 in greater detail in Chapter VIII. The first group tended to be nationalistic but stressed the importance of Turkism, whereas the second group tended to favor Ottomanism and liberalism. Between these two major groups were a whole flock of groupings; such as, the Pan-Islamic reactionary elements, and even very insignificant radical socialist groups whose ranks never exceeded more than a few hundred. The extreme external pressures forced all these groups to assume an anti-foreign and anti-European view, although the Centralist, in general, saw more hope in an alliance with Germany and the Decentralists favored France and England. All groupings were united in their fear and suspicion of Russia. The ultimate decisions were affected more by outside pressures than by domestic ideologies. Since Germany at this time favored the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the pro-German Centralist party won out after 1913, and the Empire was at war on the side of the Central Powers (1914- 1918). During this period, the pro-French and English politicians overcame their personal leanings and struggled patriotically in the war effort. Mustaf Kemal Ataturk was one of these leaders who, although opposed to entering the war on the side of the Central Powers and favoring neu­ trality, once his country was at war fought bravely for the Empire at Gallipoli and many other fronts. CHAPTER VII— FOOTNOTES

See E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University, T?58). See also al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultanla (Ordinances of Government) translated by P. K. Hitti. For Turkish Islam see Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," in Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1§55), edited by G. E. von Grunebaum. 2 See Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," Journal of World History, (July, 1953), pp. 105-125; Serii: Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton: Princeton UniversTty Press, 1962);and W7 Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, isTS’). ^Tarih, Vol. Ill, pp. 128-129. 4Ibid., p. 134. 5See Serif Mardin, op. cit.•, Chapter X; and K. Key, Namik Kemal: Patriotic Poet of Turkey: An Inquiry into the gources for a Study of NamTk Kemal (Washington: Hamilton Printing Co. , l"5T5 ) . 6See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, T561), pp. 192, 215, for the activities of Ali Kemal (1867-1922). See also I. A. Govsa, Turk Meshurlari, p. 36, for a biography of this Young Turk. 7 For a study of Pan-Islamism see: Celal Nuri, Ittihad-1 Islam (Istanbul: 1913); G. W. Bury, Pan- Islamism (London: Macmillan, 1919); Dwight E. lee, ’^Origins of Pan-Islamism," American Historical Review, January, 1942. Q Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, op. cit., p. 336. g Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations, p. 54.

For Pan-Turanism see: Charles W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (New York: Praeger, 1957); S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-furkism anST Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19SoTf A Manual on Turanians and 163 Pan-Turanianism (London: Naval Staff, Intelligence De­ partment, I D. 1199, November, 1918); A. z. V. Togan, Turk ill (Turkistan) ve Yakin Tarlhi (Istanbul: Arkadas, I, Horoz ve Guven BasTmevleri, 1947) (The Lands of the Turks, Turkestan, and its Recent History); and George G. Arnakis, "Turanism - an aspect of Turkish nationalism," Balkan Studies, Salonica, I, 1960. 12For influence on Orientalist in the thinking of Turkish Historians of the 19tb and early 20tb centuries see: Bernard Lewis, "History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey," Middle Eastern Affairs, IV, 1953. See also an important new study on historiography, including chapters on Turkey in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), Historians of the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 1962). 13For the contribution of Turks from the Caucasus and Central Asia, see Charles W. Hostler, Turkish and the Soviets. See also the Central Asian Review, a quarterly issued by the Central Asian Research Center, London, and Derqi, a journal in Turkish published irregularly in Munich, edited by Edige Mustafa Kirimal. See also the report of the Middle East Institute on the Conference dealing with the Muslim peoples of the USSR, held in September 1962. The Report is at the printers and should be out in 1964. 14Tarik Z. Tunaya, Islamcilik Cerevani (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962), p. 82. (fhe Islamic Movement.) This is the most important recent contribution on the role of Islam in Turkey. 15The Turkish intellectuals and nationalist were influenced by European ideas, especially Pan-Germanic concepts. They were also aware of Pan-Slavism which re­ sulted in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Russian activities and interference in the Balkans during 1908, and later during the (1912-1913), also affected Turkish thinkers, who developed a strong anti-Russian feeling. *^Ziya Gokalp*s views on Turkism are not very clear. He still clung to Islam although he emphasized modernism. The best study on Turkism is Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),which is a translation of selected essays of Ziya Gokalp with an Introduction by Professor Berkes of McGill University. See also Uriel Heyd, Founda­ tions of Turkish Nationalism (London: Luzac, 1950); and 164 Enver Behnan Sapolyo, Ziya Gokalp (Istanbul: Guven Basimevi, 1943). 17Gokalp is a most important figure in Turkish political thought. He was a sociologist, among other things. His major contribution was Turkculuqun Esaslari (Ankara, 1923) (The Principles of Turkism). 18Ziya Gokalp died in 1924 and, therefore, it is not clear whether he would have approved of the Kemalist secularism. He expressed his views in a work in 1918 entitled Turklesmek. Islamlasmak, Muasirlasmak (Turkifica- tion, Islamisation, Modernization). CHAPTER VIII

THE FAILURE OF THE MODERNIST LEADERSHIP IN THE 1908 YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION

Ikinci Mesrutiyet Devri, the second Ottoman Consti­ tutional Period, was ushered in by the Young Turk Revolu­ tion of 1908. The 1876 Constitution was re-established by the Young Turks, with minor amendments. This Constitution, which was modeled after European constitutions, was super­ imposed by the Ottoman leadership on a Muslim society and a heterogeneous empire, and never adequately met the special requirements of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War, but Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and the Turkish nationalists fought a war for liberation (1919-1922), and a smaller but more united Turkish Republic emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. The second Ottoman Constitutional Period (1908-1913, sometimes given as 1908-1918) was also short lived and was interrupted by the First World War.1 Turkish historians consider this period important for the understanding of present-day Turkish politics, since the origins of political parties are traced to these formative years.^ As has already been mentioned, the Young Ottomans felt that reforms were necessary to save the Empire from 166 disaster. They were able to obtain the support of the great liberal statesman Midhat Pasha, and the Constitution of 1876 was the fruit of their labors. However, as we have seen, Sultan Abdul Hamid II soon dissolved the Parlia­ ment and shelved the Constitution. This was followed by a period of reaction (1878-1908). All nationalist and liberal movements went underground during this period. Many of the Young Ottomans, now referred to as the Young Turks, experienced difficulties at home and some of them went into self-exile in Europe where they continued the struggle for liberty. In 1889 these Young Turks in Istanbul organized the Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Prog­ ress— CUP). Its original founders, included Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, Ishak Sukuti, Mehmed Reshid, and Huseyinzade Ali Turan. The first Young Turk Congress was held in Paris during February 1902. At this time, the Young Turks split into two main groups. The first group led by Ahmet Riza was called Terakki ve Ittihad Cemiyeti (Committee of Progress and Union). It favored centraliza­ tion and was supported by the nationalist elements. The other group, headed by the liberal Prince Sabahaddin, was known as the Tesebbusu Sahsi ve Ademi Merkezlyet Cemiyeti (Society for Private Initiative and Decentralization). This group favored a loose federation and won some support 167 among both liberal and conservative groups as well as 3 among the non-TurJcish elements of the population. Thus, the Committee of Union and Progress was often referred to as the Centralists, while the Prince Sabahaddin group, later known as the Liberal Union Party, was referred to as the Decentralists. As conditions in the Empire went from bad to worse, the Young Turks began to organize secretly. By this time, many of the Army officers had joined the movement. In September 1906, the Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti (Ottoman Liberty Party) was formed in Salonica (which changed its name to Terakki ve Ittihad Cemiyetti in 1907 and later merged with a party of the same name in Paris). In 1907 the Vatan ve Hurriyet Cemiyeti (Fatherland and Liberty Party) was formed in Damascus. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was active in both these organizations as were many of the Young 4 Turks. The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) is a most important period in Turkish history. The develop­ ments in the Balkans and the pressures on the Ottoman Empire from all sides led to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The Young Turks felt that the Sultan was unable to take effective measures to stop the dissolution of the Empire. They, therefore, decided to strive for the re­ establishment of the Constitution of 1876 and the 168 introduction of reforms to save the Empire. On September 27, 1907, the Salonica Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti and the Paris Terakki ve Ittihad Cemiyeti and other groupings of Young Turks merged into one united group on the eve of the revolution. The Second Congress of the Young Turks was held in Paris during December 190 7, and Prince Sabahaddin was chosen its chairman. The success of the Young Turk Revolt of 1908 brought the Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetti (Committee of Union and Progress— CUP) into power. The CUP was considered a liberation party and included all elements of Young Turks. It was not directly connected with the party of the same name organized in Paris in 1889. The political honeymoon did not last long. An opposition to the CUP developed after 1909 as different groups, including an assortment of liberals, conservatives, and some„personally ambitious individuals, formed a number of new political groupings. There were many splinter parties which appeared at this time, but they failed to gain much support. The following are a few of the more important of these parties. The Ahrar Firkasi (Liberal Party) founded in Istanbul by Nureddin Ferruh (Alkend) on September 14, 1908, lasted to January 30, 1910. The Ittihadi Muhammedi Firkasi (Moslem Union Party) founded by Suheyl Pasha, Mehmed Sadik Efendi, and other Muslim religious leaders in Istanbul on April 5, 1909, was 169 abolished by the end of the same month for being involved in the Counter-Revolution of 1909. The Hurrivet ve Itilaf Firkasi (Liberal Union Party) founded by Ismail Hakki Pasha in Istanbul on November 21, 1911, lasted to June 1913.5 A word about Enver Pasha may be in order here. He was an ambitious visionary, and somewhat mystical and impractical. His patriotism and sincerity cannot be ques­ tioned, but his judgment and general ability proved to be inadequate to meet the great tasks of the Empire. Since Ataturk was a personal rival and disliked Enver, histories written after World War I tended to make Enver the "scape­ goat” for all Turkey’s misfortunes. While there is no doubt that Enver's impractical schemes and unrealistic ambitions brought ruin to the Empire, nevertheless, the ultimate destiny of Turkey at this time was decided not so much by any Turkish leader, but rather by the decisions and policies of the Great Powers. Prince Sahaddin was the liberal leader. He was sup­ ported by many who opposed Enver Pasha and the non-Muslim elements generally favored him. While it is true that Prince Sabahaddin was friendly to Great Britain and France, and favored free enterprise and a loose federation and, thus, might be considered a liberal, nevertheless, Enver Pasha also was breaking with tradition and favored a 170 modern state. He was pro-German because he felt Germany could do something for the Empire. While he favored centralization, strong Turkish nationalism, and war, yet his main aims were not fundamentally different from those of Sabahaddin. Both wanted to save the Empire, but their methods were different. Therefore, one can say that, in 1914, the largest segment of Ottoman leadership favored modernism. But the modernists were divided into the nationalists and liberals. Enver Pasha was a chauvinistic Turkish nationalist who favored centralization, while Prince Sahabaddin favored modernism in the form of a loose Ottoman Federation. Both were sincere men, both struggled for the salvation of the Empire, but they were unable to save the Empire from destruction. The liberals failed to work together. Their ranks were infiltrated by reactionaries. Also non-Turkish ele­ ments in these parties tended to follow their own separa­ tist aspirations. Thus, by 1913, the CUP emerged as the sole party in power in Turkey. Following Enver Pasha's coup in 1913, a Triumvirate (Enver, Talat, Cemal) con­ trolled the destinies of the Empire. This Triumvirate involved the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Fol­ lowing the collapse of the Empire in 1918, the CUP leaders were discredited and left the country. The role of the modernist and traditionalist in the 171 Young Turk Period is hard to discern because of external pressures and the rapidity of developments In the crucial years 1908 to 1913; after 1914, the war forced the whole Empire into a life and death struggle which temporarily submerged all other considerations. However, one can draw some tentative and limited conclusions to the effect that by 1909 the power of the modernists was in the ascendancy and that the traditionalist and reactionary forces were weakened considerably, not only by the deposition of Abdul Hamid II in 1909, but also because the grim necessities of the Tripolitanian War (1911-1912), the Balkan War (1912- 1913), and the First World War (1914-1918) gave the modernist activists the upper hand.** The Republic was established in 1923, and a modern Constitution promulgated in 1924. However, despite the adoption of Western Codes, the emphasis on Westernization reforms and the introduction of secularization, events proved that the forces of traditionalism and reaction were not completely dead. The Kurdish revolts of 1925, 1929, and 1937 were partly influenced by traditionalist tribal and religious leaders. The efforts to create a second party in 1930 failed because of infiltration of the Free Party of the Republic by reactionaries, and even in the 1950’s, the revelation of Mahmut Makal writings indicate that the reactionaries were still active in the remote 172 7 parts of Anatolia. Also, the Democratic Party, after 1954, tended to encourage the so-called "prayer-rug" vote of the traditionalist peasants, since they formed 70 per cent of the electorate. Today, however, despite the existence of reactionary and traditionalist forces, their time is limited and their power is declining as the moderni­ zation and industrialization of the new Turkey advances 0 slowly but surely. The study of the First and Second Ottoman Constitu­ tional Periods are important to students of Turkish affairs since an understanding of those formative years of Turkish political parties and political thought is essential for an appreciation of present-day happenings. While many of the leaders of the 1908 Revolution were not involved in the developments in the Kemalist period, there were many who served their country in both periods. Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) who was known as Mustafa Kemal Bey in those days was quite active in the political developments of the period. Mustafa Kemal served Turkey as both a great mili­ tary hero as well as a farsighted political leader. Therefore, although Mustafa Kemal was a young officer at the time of the Young Turk Revolution, a few words about his contribution to the Young Turk movement is in order, since he was the greatest leader of the modernists in the 9 history of Turkey. 173 According to the official history of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Bey graduated from the Military Academy on December 12, 1905, with the rank of staff captain. He was the brightest student in the Military Academy and was ad­ mired and respected by his friends and teachers. While a student, he worked for the future of the country with the other students in the military school and openly criticized the unwise and autocratic rule of Abdul Hamid. He thus attracted the attention and suspicion of the Sultan who had him arrested as soon as he graduated. He was finally exiled to Damascus to serve in one of the regiments in Syria. Here he managed to travel, organizing patriotic resistance in the Ottoman regiments stationed at Beirut, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, and worked against the oppression and reactionary backwardness which was weighing so heavily on the conscience of his country. In October 1906, he and a group of his friends formed a secret and revolutionary committee in Damascus known as the Vatan ve Hurrivet or Homeland and Liberty Committee. Again, summarizing from the official history, we see that Mustafa Kemal Bey organized a branch of this committee in Jaffa, and he left for Salonica via Egypt and Greece in order to organize a branch in Macedonia where many of the Young Turks were gathering. He worked here with the other revolutionary officers, but was obliged to 174 return to Jaffa upon the advice of a friend who found out that the Istanbul government was on his trail and would arrest him in Salonica, as he was not supposed to be there. On his return to Syria, he kept out of the way for awhile and, then in 1907, he managed to get appointed as staff officer to the Third Army stationed in Macedonia. He worked energetically for the Ittihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress) in Salonica. He was one of its founders in Izmir (Smyrna) and helped to develop it in Syria. He later introduced this party in Salonica under the name of Vatan ve Hurriyet (Homeland and Liberty). The name of the Homeland and Liberty committee, he had organized in Salonica, had been changed to Terakki ve Ittihat or Progress and Union, after he had left for Syria. This name was ultimately changed to the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Firkasi) before the time of the 1908 Revolution. The brightest officers and most of the liberal intelligentsia had joined this committee. The leadership was primarily in the hands of officers; this was due to the fact that, in spite of the autocratic rule of the Sultan, the Armed Forces managed to keep in contact with the West to a larger degree than the rest of the country. The 1908 meeting of the English and Russian rulers at Reval created concern in the Ottoman Empire. Also, the 175 fact that the Ottoman Empire lost Macedonia to all prac­ tical purposes led the Young Turks to revolt. The Young Turk leadership sent a storm of telegrams to the Porte for the application of the long forgotten Constitution of 1876. As has already been seen, the Sultan realized that he could not stop this movement, which was directed against him for allowing foreign interference to go so far. He was, there­ fore, obliged, on July 23, 1908, to declare that the Constitution, which had not been formally enforced for such a long time, would be re-established. Parliament met the next day, July 24, 1908, and the Second Constitutional Period began. According to the Tarih, Mustafa Kemal was a strong supporter of the CUP (referred to as the Committee by some writers for purposes of brevity) up to and a little after the re-establishment of the Constitution. At this point, however, he realized that the Committee was making vital mistakes. He, therefore, came into conflict with the Committee, especially with Enver Pasha, who was involving the Army in politics, and who was following a policy favoring Germany. Mustafa Kemal was not the only staunch supporter of the Committee who had decided to withdraw, for many farsighted statesmen and officers saw that the Committee would soon lead the nation into disaster. Mustafa Kemal did not agree with Enver Pasha*s views. He 176 differed both In domestic policies and, most important, in foreign policy. He also warned that the Armed Forces should not be allowed to get involved in politics.1® Referring again to Tarih, we read that Mustafa Kemal was one of the most important members of the Com­ mittee. However, when he saw that some of the Young Turks were following an unwise policy, he decided to withdraw his support.11 The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were neglecting their duty in partisan quarrels and in the pursuit of personal aggrandizement. Mustafa Kemal, therefore, attacked the Committee with all his might and withdrew from its ranks after having tried to show them that the Army should be kept out of politics. Here a direct quote may be useful: Mustafa Kemal Bey who founded the Homeland and Liberty Committee, and who worked personally for the Union and Progress, was of the opinion that drastic and radical changes were necessary in the country. He believed that the Army should not be involved in politics, and should return to its basic duty of defending the country from external danger. However, the other leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were not in agreement with him and even charged that by withdrawing Army support Mustafa Kemal was aiming at the destruction of the Committee. Mustafa Kemal Bey tried to show that although the Army had made the Revolution possible, the adminis­ tration of the nation should now be left to those best fitted and trained in governmental matters. He considered men in uniform unfit for these duties, and thought that their interference in such matters would result in disorders in the Government, lack of discipline in the Army, and trouble in the country. The Tarih then goes on to say that unfortunately Enver Pasha could not see these realities that Mustafa Kemal was trying to explain. The result was the abortive reactionary counter—revolution of April 13, 1909, in Istanbul, and later in 1912-1913, the Balkan defeats.13 It is pointed out that the Sultan profiting from the quarrels of the political factions, and exploiting his position as Caliph, organized a counter-revolution with the aid of some Army units stationed in Istanbul by the Committee and some Anatolian troops. He nearly succeeded not only in defeating the Committee, but in crushing all progressive movements with one blow. Again, it is pointed out that the counter-revolution was put down largely thanks to Mustafa Kemal's efforts, since he convinced General Mahmut Shevket Pasha stationed at Salonica to march on the capital and put down the reactionary movement in Istanbul. Kemal was a staff officer in the Army corps, and the counter-revolution was put down and Abdul Hamid deposed. Again, a direct quotation may be helpful here: He went to the general headquarters to convince them that an army should be sent tfo_ put down the counter-revolution, and became the general staff officer of that army. He begged Husnu Pasha to take command. He also talked in person to Mahmut Shevket Pasha and convinced him on his point of view.14 After the counter-revolution was put down in 1909, the Tarih goes on to show how Sultan Abdul Hamid was de­ posed and succeeded by Sultan Mehmet V. Then the Tarif describes how Enver Pasha entered Parliament and shot 178 Nazim Bey, the Minister of War. Enver then with Talat and Cemal obtained absolute control of the government. From 1913 to 1918 Enver Pasha was in complete power, but there was always an opposition to him even if it was obliged to keep quiet. The Tarih also states that at every opportunity Mustafa Kemal tried to show the mistakes of the Committee, for he was against party factions which sacrificed the good of the country for their own petty ends; he was against politics entering the army;'*-'* he was against the Liman von Sanders Mission, though he respected the great German General himself, but was suspicious of the real aims of the Mission; he was against Turkey's participation in the War on any side; and he had no confidence in the wisdom of Enver Pasha's policies as one can see from his memoirs.^® It is appropriate to end with the following quota­ tion: "In short, the Union and Progress failed to achieve anything, because they were caught in a policy of baseless opportunism."17 Despite the failure of the Young Turks to save the Empire, the trend toward modernism that was initiated at that time bore fruit later in the period of the Turkish Republic. The course of democratic development has not been smooth in the last forty years, but great progress 179 has been made in the establishing a modern secular repub­ lic. Professor Bernard Lewis, a most outstanding au­ thority on Turkey, has attempted to explain why Turkey has shown a striking contrast with other Muslim countries of the Middle East in being a valuable ally of the West. Turkey is also shown as a country which is striving to form a modern State. Despite some set-backs and retro­ gression, the general trend appears to be toward modern­ ism. In explaining the reasons for Turkey's peculiar position in the Middle East, Professor Lewis states that "the Turks have the advantage of realism and practical sense, derived from the long exercise of sovereignty." 18 He also adds that "the movement of Westernization began earlier and went further in Turkey than elsewhere." 17 He concludes by saying: Finally— and perhaps most important of all— there is the personal quality that has been shown by so many Turks of different allegiances and from different walks of life— a quality of calm self- reliance, of responsibility, above all of civic courage. Without these, no attempt at democracy, however well-intentioned, can succeed. Against them, the ancient habits of autocracy and acqui­ escence cannot indefinitely survive. 180 CHAPTER VIII— FOOTNOTES

For the period immediately before the First World War and the position of Turkey in that conflict see: Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, l"5To); and by the same author, whose new name is Yalman, Ahmed Emin Yalman, Turkey in Time (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, i9l>£). 2 See Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasl Partiler (Istanbul: Dogan Kardes Yayiniari, 1^52) (Political Parties in Turkey), pp. 161-471 for the parties during the Second Constitutional Period. See also Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), Chapter I. 3 The single most up-to-date and authoritative work on the Young Turk Revolution is Tarik Z. Tunaya, Hurriyetin Ilani (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1959) (The Proclamation of Liberty)• See also Ernest E. Ramsaur, The Youncr Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); ana K. key, The Ottoman Intellectuals and the Young Turk Reformation o f 1908 (Washington: The American University, unpublished pK.D. dissertation, 1950). Other useful works on the Young Turks include: Ahmed Bedevi Kura, Inkilap Tarihlmiz ve Jon Turkler (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1945) (The History ^ (5ur RevoTuEion and the Young Turks); by the same author, Inkilap Tarihimlz ve Ittihad ve Terakki (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1948) (History oiOur Revolution and the Com­ mittee of Union and Progress); and again by the same author, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkilap Hareketleri ve Milli Mucadefe (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 19S6) (Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle). For documents regarding the establishment of constitutional government on July 23, 1908, see I. H. Uzuncarsili, "1908 yilinda Ikinci Mesrutiyetin ne suretle ilan edilecegine dair vesikalar," Belieten, January, 1956. The 1908 Constitution was the same as that of 1876 with some minor changes and amendments. See A. S. Gozubuyuk and Suna Kili, Turk Anayasa Metinleri (Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaasi, l§!i7) (Annotated comments on Turkish Constitutions and other documents). See pages 25-38 for the Ottoman Consti­ tution, and pages 69-76 for amendments of 1909 and 1914. ^For Ataturk's contribution to the Young Turk Revolution see: Afet Inan, "Vatan ve Hurriyet," Belieten, April, 1937, pp. 289-298; and by the same author AtahurkEen Hatiralar (Ankara: Turk Tarik Kurumu Basimevi, 1956) 181 (Memories of Ataturk). See also I. A. Govsa, Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi, pp. 50-53, for a briel biography of Ataturk. An important recent contribution on Ataturk is Tarik Z. Tunaya, Devrlm Hareketleri Icinde Ataturk ve Ataturkculuk (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1964) (Ataturk and Ataturkism in the movements of the modernization period)• ^K. Key, "The Origins of Turkish Political Parties," World Affairs Interpreter, Spring, 1955, pp. 50-53. ^Enver and the members of the Committee of Union and Progress were modernists, but they were not liberals. See Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkiyenin Sivasi Hayatinda Batililasma Hareketleri (Istanbul! Yedigun Matbaasi, 1960) (Western!- zation Movements in the Political Life of Turkey), pp. 75- 99 for a discussion of the various views and policies of Young Turks. Tunaya divides the Young Turks into five major groups: (1) Garpcilar (those who favored Westerni­ zation), (2) Islamcilar (Pan-Islamists), (3) Turkculer (Turkists), (4) Meslekciler (professionals and liberals), (5) Sosyalistler (Socialists). A brief description of the views and leaders of the five groups are given here for the general reader. (1) Garpcilar favored Westernization, but there were divisions among them, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet favoring the wholesale adoption of Western institutions, while Celal Nuri opposed this policy; (2) Islamcilar, were the remnants of the old traditionalist leadership who wrote in such journals as Sirati Mustakim, Sebilurresad, Beyanul- hak, and other Pan-Islamist journals and who were split into moderate Islamists and fanatical Pan-Islamists, in­ cluding such names as Sheikh Abdulhak Baghdadi, Mehmet Akif, Dervish Vahdeti, Said Kurdi Nursi, and a host of others; (3) Turkculer, who were modernist nationalists and who wrote in such journals as Turk Yurdu, Yenl Mecmua, and Kuchuk Mecmua emphasizing and literature and whose great leader was Ziya Gokalp; (4) Meslekciler, consisting of professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and bureaucrats who were influenced by liberal French ideas of free enterprise and social justice, whose leader was Prince Sabahaddin; and (5) Sosyalistler, a very small group led by Dr. Refik Nevzat, publisher o t Besherlyet (Humanity) who was influenced by moderate French socialist ideas, but this group failed to gain any support. 7 See Mahmut Makal, A Village in JUiatolia (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1954T translated from the Turkish by Sir Wyndham Deedes. 182 Q For information for recent developments in Turkey see: Firouz Bahrampour, The Political and Social Trans­ formation of Modern Turkey 1923-15)^3 (Washington: The American University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1964); Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963); and Dank- wart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Second Try at Democracy," The Yale Review, Summer, 1963. g There is no good biography of Ataturk. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) was President of the Turkish Republic from 1923 to 1938. See M. 0. Durusoy and M. M. Godman (eds.), Ataturk ve Devrimleri Blblloqrafyasl (Ankara: T. T. K. BasimevTJ 1963) fa Bibliographyof Ataturk and his Period). Tarih (Istanbul: Devlet Mat­ baasi, 1933), Vol. Ill, pp. 29&-300, describes Ataturk's role in the 1908 Revolution. 10Tarih op. cit., III, pp. 298-304. 11Ibid. p. 300. 12Ibid. p. 299. 13Ibid. pp. 300-301. 14Ibid. p. 300. 15Ibid. pp. 300-304. 1®Afet Inan, "Vatan ve Hurriyet," Belleten, April, 1937, pp. 289-298. 17Tarih. op. cit., p. 304. 18 Bernard Lewis, "Turkey Westernization," in Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) (edited by G. E. von Grunebaum), pp. 311-312. 19Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p, 480. CHAPTER IX

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In tracing the struggle between the modernists and traditionalists in the course of Ottoman history, the first conclusion at which this writer arrived is the fact that the real struggle began in the eighteenth century. Although it is true that at different periods there were individual religious, civilian, military, and other leaders who advocated better ways of doing things to solve cer­ tain crises that develop (such as, in the case of the enlightened Sheikh-ul-Islams of the period of greatness of the Ottoman Empire and the "advice” of certain Palace func­ tionaries), most of these "reformers" emphasized the per­ fection of the Islamic society and blamed all the ills on deviation from this perfect state. These early "reformers" advised the rulers to follow the teachings of Islam, to rule with Islamic compassion and according to Islamic justice. None of these advisers could be characterized as modernists, since their remedy for the ills of existing society was to return to the ways of the al-Khulafa al- Rashidun, the period of the four Orthodox Caliphs of Islam, which they considered as the age of greatness of Islam. Therefore, although some general remarks are made in 184 Chapter II on the earlier periods of Ottoman history, the emphasis has been placed on the period since 1790. Modernism and the desire to introduce reform ap­ pears to go hand in hand. The early Ottoman "advisers" did not advocate reforms in the modern sense, nor did they ask for innovation. They believed that reforms were super­ fluous since by the ninth century A.D. all necessary changes had been made by Islamic jurists, when legal deci­ sions were based on ijtihad (independent legal decision, judgment arrived at by knowledge and reasoning). There­ after, legal decisions were based on the authority of their predecessors capable of ijtihad. This state of development is referred to as taglid which only allowed legal decisions based on past authorities capable of ijtihad. According to modern Islamic thinkers and, espe­ cially, Turkish historians this attitude led to a rigidity in Islamic society which affected the whole of Ottoman life. Even at the height of power of the Ottomans, this freezing of all development by the ulema, prevented inno­ vation and did not allow for the modernization of institu­ tions with the changing requirements of the times. But even worse, this policy of splendid isolation prevented contacts with Europe, limiting relations with the outside world virtually to the contact of war at the frontiers. Modern Turkish historians further charge that, despite the 185 fact that the Ottoman ruler was the Sultan-Caliph, in actual fact Islamic countries developed separately, as in the case of Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and parts of the sub-continent of India; and the Ottomans had little influence outside the borders of their Empire. Another general observation to be made is the fact that up to the eighteenth century, the Ottoman leadership considered Islamic society superior in every respect to the rest of the world. As has already been shown, this way of thinking was a result of the belief that the Muslims had achieved a perfect society and that innovation was not necessary. The Ottoman leaders were convinced of this, and Ottoman victories confirmed them in their be­ liefs. Even if, after 1699 and 1774 when the victories changed to defeat at the hands of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs, these defeats were explained away by insisting that deviation from the ideals of early Islam was the real cause of the misfortunes. The solution was to be found by returning to Muslim ideals, and not through the adoption of the "godless” ways of the infidels. After the middle of the eighteenth century, a changing attitude is to be noted, when the Ottoman leadership at last was forced to face facts. They still insisted on the spiritual superi­ ority of Islam, but admitted the "material" superiority of Europe. After an agonizing self-appraisal, the ulema 186 agreed that it was permissible to copy European methods in the material field (such as, in the case of weapons and military tactics) in order to defeat the infidel with their own instruments. Since the Ottoman Turks, as the leaders of the Islamic community, considered their civilization superior to all others, it was very difficult for them to acknowl­ edge the realities they faced. The first efforts at reform involving military institutions were considered during the later years of the reign of Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) by Grand Vezir Nevsehirli Ibrahim Pasha. In 1720, Yirmisekiz Mehmed Chelebi's studies of French insti­ tutions and his recommendations to the Porte, the first printing press of Ibrahim Muteferrika in 1729, and the advice of European officers assigned by the Sultan to train the Army, all had an impact on the Sultan and the Palace bureaucracy, who were slowly convinced about the necessity of reform, at least in the Army. During the period from 1720 to 1839, as many as forty major reports were presented to the Porte advocating reforms of one kind or another. Most of these writers were reformist bureau­ crats who had held office, at one time or another, in the Reis ul-Kuttab (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), where they had to learn foreign languages and were in closer contact with Europe than most other officials. These officials 187 were Influenced by the Ideas of the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution. However, the full impact of these ideas were not felt in the Ottoman Empire until later in the opening years of the nineteenth century. In addition to military defeats, the Ottoman Empire was faced by nationalist and separatist movements among the non-Muslim subject peoples, who were inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution. To counter these rebel­ lions in the Balkan provinces of the Empire, the Ottoman leaders tried the introduction of reforms and, at the same time, tried to quell revolts through harsh punitive meas­ ures. Neither policy was a success in curbing the new force of nationalism. The rise of more powerful empires after the seven­ teenth century threatened the existence of the once great Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman leadership failed to modernize effectively Ottoman institutions and to meet this ever­ growing danger. This failure was due to the outmoded mentality of the ulema and the corruption of the Janissary forces, as well as the unfortunate weakness of the Sultans during this critical period. The major effort at reform by a slowly growing modernist leadership in the Empire in the last days of the eighteenth century found a leader in the person of the reformist Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). Unfortunately, Sultan Selim's efforts to modernize the Ottoman Armed 188 Forces was frustrated by the alliance of the traditional­ ist ulema and the Janissaries. The Empire was faced with revolts in many of its provinces as Ottoman administration became increasingly oppressive and inefficient. Not only were the Balkans in revolt, but Muhammad Ali of Egypt, a vassal of the Sultan, challenged the leadership of the Porte. During this critical period, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), who was not a liberal but who favored centralization of power in his own hands, succeeded in destroying the Janissaries in 1826. He was able to establish a modern conscript Army. The success of the Greeks in their War for Independence (1821- 1829) and continued Russian victories against the Turks further weakened the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. The first major victory of the modernists against the traditionalists' forces in the Empire took place during the reign of Sultan Abdul Medjid (Abdulmecit) (1839-1861). The ulema had lost their Janissary allies. This would make the introduction of reforms easier. Continued defeats and unrest in the Empire forced Grand Vezir Reshid Pasha to seek British support against the increasing encroach­ ments of Russia. The British promised support but asked for the introduction of reforms. As a result of this new Ottoman policy, Great Britain undertook to defend the 189 Integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Turkey's tradi­ tional enemy, Russia, which had seized Turkish territory and threatened the Turkish Straits* This British policy was to continue with minor changes until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914* Grand Vezir Reshid Pasha's efforts to stop the de­ cline through political and administrative reforms, known as the 1839 Tanzimat, was only partially successful. The rise of nationalist and separatist movements among the subject peoples and increased Great Power interference in the Empire's affairs through the instrumentality of the capitulations and concessions speeded further the decline of the Empire. Despite the weakening of the traditional­ ist elements, the ulema continued their obstructionist and anti-reform activities. Also, the Crimean War (1854-1856) resulted in the worsening of the financial situation, and the 1856 reforms, virtually dictated by the Great Powers, were unpopular and weakened the position of the reformists in the Empire. Reshid Pasha died in 1858. His disciples, Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha, were the leaders involved in the 1856 Hatt-i Humayun Reforms and the Treaty of Paris. Al­ though trying to save the Empire as best they could, they became the target of the Young Ottomans who felt that their policies were not effective. The Young Ottomans included many of the Tanzimat reformers. Ottoman intellectuals, bureaucrats, and members of the literati organized the Young Ottoman Society during 1865-1867 under the leadership of Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, Agah Efendi, Ali Suavi, and others. They called for re­ forms to save the Empire and criticized the policies of Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876). The Sultan was blamed both for his inability to resist foreign interference in the affairs of the Empire and for his personal extravagances. After 1861, the financial crisis became acute. In fact, Ottoman history from 1856 to 1876 appears to be a long crisis of provincial rebellion and financial insolvency. It was perhaps unfair to blame everything on Abdul Aziz and his Ministers, but during this period the struggle was not so much one of modernists against traditionalists, but a series of crises that led to the death of Abdul Aziz and the deposition of Sultan Murat V in 1876. The reformist Young Ottomans won the support of Grand Vezir Midhat Pasha and, thus, the short-lived First Ottoman Constitutional Period was inaugurated in 1876, when the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) was brought to power by Midhat Pasha upon promising a constitution. This appeared as a great victory for the modernists. Unfor­ tunately, the defeat of Turkey in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and the results of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 worked against the interests of the modernist 191 reformers. In 1878, Sultan Abdul Hamid, the anti­ modernist monarch, dissolved Parliament and shelved the Constitution despite his promise to support reforms. A period of thirty years of absolutism followed (1878-1908), when all liberal movements were suppressed. As conditions went from bad to worse, the Young Turks, the successors of the Young Ottomans, re-established constitutional government by the 1908 Young Turk Revolu­ tion, but continued external and internal pressures resulted in the rise of the strongly nationalistic Trium­ virate of Enver, Cemal (Djemal), and Talat Pashas. The modernist-traditionalist struggle was reflected during the Second Ottoman Constitutional Period (1908-1918) in the following events. The 1908 Revolution itself was a victory of the modernists. However, the modernists, Young Turks, who were able to force the reactionary Sultan to re­ establish the 1876 Constitution, were split into two major groups: the Decentralists who were primarily liberals, and the Centralists who were nationalists. In 1909, there was an abortive counter-revolution and, by 1913, Enver Pasha was able to seize power. Thus the Triumvirate, representing the Centralist group, emerged all powerful at this time and involved the Empire in the First World War (1914-1918) on the side of the Central Powers. Although the Young Turks, whether liberals or nationalists, were 192 modernists, external pressures and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of 1918 limited their achieve­ ments . During the first decade of the present century, Germany displaced Great Britain as the supporter of the Ottoman Empire. Following the collapse of the hetero­ geneous Ottoman Empire in 1818, the Turks fought a War of Liberation (1919-1922) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). The new Turkey that emerged from the ruins of the Empire in 1923 was a smaller but more homoge­ neous nation. Profiting from past experiences, Ataturk and the nationalists attempted to build a modern secular republic. Ataturk believed that a more drastic break was necessary with the past in order to modernize Turkey. Although great progress was made in modernizing the new Turkey, the Westernization program was more successful in the urban areas than in the more remote rural areas where tradition­ alism has survived to this day. The Turkish dilemma today arises from the existence of a large traditionalist peasant majority and a small modernist ruling elite. During the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1923-1938) basic reforms were introduced, largely under a one-party system. The Republican People's Party emphasized ^tatism (state capitalism) and secularism. The policy of 193 cooperation with International organizations and reliance on the West was initiated during this period. Ismet Inonu (1938-1950), Turkey’s second President, continued Ataturk's policies. In 1950, the Democratic Party won the first free elections in the Middle East on a platform advocating free enterprise as against the Republican People’s 4tatism. The period from 1950 to 1954 gave promise for the maturing of Turkish democracy. However, a period of retro­ gression followed during 1955-1960, in which Democratic Party politicians led by President Bayar (1950-1960) and Premier Menderes tried to exploit the traditionalist peasant vote to retain power. Harassment of the opposition and threats to constitutional government resulted in the Revolution of May 27, 1960, indicating that the Turkish leadership is determined to defend the Constitution and the ideals of the Kemalist Revolution. The Second Turkish Republic, inaugurated in October, 1961, is headed by President Cemal Gursel and Premier Ismet Inonu. Today, Turkey is a member of NATO and CENTO and a staunch ally of the West. Although the modernist- traditionalist struggle has not been completely resolved, time is on the side of the modernists. It is the belief of this writer that, despite the growing pains of a society in transition, democratic institutions are well established in Turkey today, and that, in the long run, modernism will triumph over traditionalism. Also, the Ottoman and later Turkish foreign policy of resisting Russian and now Soviet threats and blandishments was conditioned to a certain extent by the reformist policies of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks and, in recent times, by the Kemalists, who all strove for the establishment of constitutional government. This, in turn, has affected Turkey's position in international affairs. Therefore, it is hoped that this study of the struggle between the modernists and traditionalists in the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire will help the student of international relations to understand better recent developments in Turkey. BIBLIOGRAPHIES CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

The preparation of a bibliography is often a sub­ jective matter. This student of Turkish history would be tempted to include the Sehnames of the early Historians, the nasihatnames of officials and intellectuals about how the State should be run most effectively in con­ formity with the teachings of Islam, the sefaretnames, the reports of the Ottoman envoys to Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the works of the vakanuvis or official Imperial Historiographers, as well as the memoirs of certain important men-of-letters and adminis­ trators. However, while some of the more important of the above sources are mentioned in the selected bibliography, an effort has been made to keep the list of publications limited to those which were actually read, or those which are pertinent to the subject of modernism and tradition­ alism in the Ottoman Empire. Most of the sources included in the selected bibliography are concerned with the Ottoman » Empire from about the end of the eighteenth century to the collapse of the Empire in 1918. In the field of histori­ ography, one has to mention Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan's Tarihde Paul. Istanbul, 1950 (Methodology in History); Tarik Z. Tunaya's important contribution on Turkish politi­ cal parties Turkiyede Siyasl Partiler 1859-1952, Istanbul, 1952, Cevdet Tarihi. Istanbul, 1853-1884, 12 volumes; Abdurrahman Seref, Tarihl Devleti Oaaanive. Istanbul, 1897-1901 (History of the Ottoman State); and Enver Ziya Karal’s Osmanll Tarihi. Istanbul, 1947. These indispen­ sable references for the period under study are mentioned in the selected bibliography along with more specialized works; such as, the contributions of Turkish historians on the Tanzimat, the Midhat Pasha Constitution, the Young Turk period, and nationalism. In this connection, the three recent studies of T. Z. Tunaya, Hurrivetin Ilani, Istanbul, 1959 (on the Young Turk Revolution of 1908), Turkivenln Sivasi Hayatinda Batllllasma Hareketleri, Istan­ bul, 1960 (Westernization Movements in the Political Life of Turkey), and Islamcilik Cereyanl, Istanbul, 1962 (The Islamic Movement) were found very useful. Other essential works include I. H. Danismend, Izahli Osmanll Tarihl Kronololisi. Istanbul, 1955 (Anno­ tated chronology of Ottoman History); Mehmet Sureyya, Slcllli Osmani. Istanbul, 1890-1893 (Ottoman Register); I. Mahmut Kemal Inal, Osmanll Devrinde Son Sadriazamlar. Istanbul, 1930-1942 (The Last Grand Vezirs of the Ottoman Period); Tanzimat, Istanbul, 1940, prepared by the Turkish Historical Society, dealing with different aspects of development during the period 1839 to 1908; and the works of such historians as Yusuf Akcura, I. H. Uzuncarsili, Halil Inalicik, Fuat Koprulu, A. B. Kuran, Adnan Adivar, 198 Hikmet Bayur, Zlya Gokalp, M. T. Gokbilgin, Ulug Igdemlr, H. Y. Sehsuvaroglu— to mention a few of the more outstand­ ing historians and writers. In addition to Salnames (almanacs and year books), Kanunames (laws), Islam Anslklopedlsl and other encyclo­ pedias , and journals such as Belleten. Tarlh Veslkalarl, Turklvat Mecmuasl, Avin Tarihl also contain Important articles and documents. For biographical Information, I. A. Govsa Turk Meshurlarl Anslklopedlsl, Istanbul, 1946, Is extremely useful. Also Turkish newspapers, whether Otto­ man papers such as Mlzan, Ictlhat, Hurrlvet. Tasviri Efkar. Turk Yurdu. or the more recent newspapers such as Cumhurl- vet and Vatan, or magazines such as Forum and Akls also contain historical and other scholarly articles. Mehmed Fuad Koprulu's, Les Orlolnes de 1*Empire Ottoman. Paris, 1935, and Paul Wlttek's The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London, 1938, are still most useful sources for the early period of Ottoman history. Older works, such as I. M. d ‘Ohsson, Tableau General de 1*Empire Othoman (Paris, 1788-1824) and Edward S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks (New York, 1878) will not be Included since they are available In most bibliographies. John Kingsley Blrge, A Guide to Turkish Area Study (Washington, O.C., 1949) can be consulted for an excellent bibliography on Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. 199 The most important recent contributions on Turkish history include Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962), Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore, 1963), and Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Prince­ ton, 1963). For diplomatic history, J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Cambridge, 1940), J. T. Shotwell and F. Deak, Turkey at the Straits (London, 1940), and Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (Oklahoma, 1931) are essential reading. Pertinent treaties and other documents are available in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1957). Kemal Karpat's Turkey * s Politics (Princeton, 1959) contains historical background materials from the early years of the Republic, more current developments being discussed in Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1963). A brief selected bibliography follows. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

JL. Turkish Sources (In Turlclah) Imperial Chronicles Nalma Tarihl (covers period 1591-1659) Reshid Tarihl (1660-1721) Izzi Tarihl (1744-1752) Vaslf Tarihl (1752-1774) Cevdet Tarihl (1774-1825) Lutfl Tarihl (1825-1876) Tanzlmat Period (1839-1876): Gulhane Hatti Hueavunu (Gulhane Rescript), November 3, 1839 in Blrinci fertlp Dustur. Vol. I, pp. 4-7; Turk Anavasa Metlnlerl. pp. 3-5. Islahat Feraanl (Firman and Hatti Humayun), February 18. l5b6 In bus’tur. Vol. I. p. 7; Turk Anavasa Metlnlerl. pp. V-l2 . Abdulaziz tarafindan culusunu mutakiD Sadarete aondarrien*Tia'F"7TBS'l )'"7 T zlThi'cce T7 11 . 'T httl humayun of Abdul Aziz in Dustury Vol. I, pp. 14-15, Turk Anavasa Metlnlerl. pp. 13-14. Feraanl Adalet (1292). Islahati dahiliyye dair vekaleti mutlakaya hitaben Serefsudur olan Fermani All (Decree regarding Jfeforms, administrative and domestic reforms of 1875j, in Dustur. Vol. 3, pp. 2-9 and 24; Turk Anavasa Metlnlerl. pp. 15-20. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (1876-1878)s Suretl munlfel hatti humayunu (1876 Kanunu Esasisinin llani) (Proclamation oi tne Constitution of December 23, 1876) in Dustur. Vol. IV, pp. 2-3; Turk Anayasa Metlnlerl, pp. 23-34. 201 Kanunl Esasi. Memaliki Devletl Osmaniye, 1876. (Constitution of the Ottoman Empire, 7 zilhice 1293, 11/23 December 1876) in Dustur. Vol. IV, pp. 4-20; Turk Anavasa Metinleri. pp. ^5-38. Sultan Abdulhamidin mecllsi acis nutku (Sultan Abdul Mamid li's speech Inaugurating the first Ottoman Parliament, 1877) in Hakki Tarik Us, Heclisi Mebusan 1293 (1877), Vakit. Istanbul, 1940 (March 25, 18771) Takvimi Vakavl. March 8 , 1877; Turk Anavasa Metinleri. pp. 39-44. Mecllsi Ayanln Cevabl (Reply to Sultan by Upper House) Tawlm! Vakavf. March 28, 1877, p. 1,881; H. T. Us, Mecllsi Mebusan. Vakit (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 13-15; Vakit. Maurch 23, 1877; Turk Anavasa Metinleri. pp. 4^-48. Mecllsi Mebusanin Ceyabi (Reply of the Lower House) tt. fr. Us. MeclfST Mebusan. pp. 16-19; Turk Anavasa Metlnlerl. pp. 49-^4. Mecllsi Vukela Mazbatasi (10 safer 1295, 1878) (Minutes of the Council of State); Turk Anavasa Metinleri. p. 55; Mahmut Kemal Inal. Osmanll Bevrinde Son SadrTasamlar. Istanbul, 1941, pp. 677-6^8. The Second Ottoman Constitutional Period (1908-1918): Mecllsi mebusannin lctlmaa dayet olunmasi hakkinda iradel ’seniye (24 cemaiziullahire 1U26, 10 Temmuz, 1324, July 10, 1908) (Calling Parliament into session) Mecllsi mahsusa vukela mazbatasi, 2 n d tertip, Dustur. Vol. I, pp. 1-2; Turk Anayasa Metlnlerl. pp. £9-60. Kanunu Esasinln Meriveti hakkinda sadir olup Babi Xlide kTraat ecfilen nattl humavunu (1968) (Re­ establishing the Constitution). July 19, 1908. 2n d tertip, Dustur, Vol. I, p. 11; Turk Anavasa Metinleri pp. 61-6i3. Abdulhamidin iskatl hakkinda fetva (1909)• Deposi- tion of Abdul hami<4 II. April 14, 1909. 2 n d tertip, Dustur. Vol. I, p. 116; Turk Anayasa Metinleri. p. 65. Takvimi Vekavi. April 15, 1909, No. 194. Mecllsi Uaumi Milll Karanamesl (1909), April 14, 1909. (Decree oi the General Assembfy) 2 n d tertip, Dustur. Vol. 1, p. 167, Turk Anavasa Metinleri. p. 6 6 . 202 Sultan Mehmet Renat*in culuau munasebetlla Babi Aii'de ofcunan natti humayun. l£ rebiulahir 1327, 1909. ^ncl iertip. Dustur. vol. 1. p. 167; Takvimi vekayi. Nay 12, 1909, no* 226; Turk Anavasa rfsilnleri. pp. 67-68. (Enthronement of Mehmetv). Kanunu EsasinIn tadlll (amendments to the Constitu­ t ion,190$, 1914, lSi4) April 8 , 1909 a n d tertip Dustur. Vol. 1, p. 638; Takvimi Vekavi. August 22, 1909, No. 321; Turk Anayas? nailnTer1. pp. 69-73. Mecllsi mebusan muzakeresi. Takvimi Vekayi. No. 206, 218. May 15, 1914, Dustur, vol. 4, p. 749; Takvimi Vekavl. May 22, 1914, Ho. 1837; Turk Anayasa metinleri. pp. 74-75. Jan. 19, 1914, Dustur. Vol. 7. p. £24; Takvimi Vekayi, February 2, 1914, No. 2084; Turk Anay­ asa Hetlnlerl. pp. 76-77. General Sources: Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal), Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk. 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212 Namlk, Kemal. Osmanll Tarihl. Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaasi, l4l0. (dttoman History.) Okcu, Yahya. Turk Rus Mucadeleleri Tarihl. Ankara: Dogus Matbassl, 1953. (History of the Turkish Russian Struggles.) Ongunsu, Hamit, Teker, Muhsln. Turklve Tarihi. Istanbul: DevlOt Matbaasi, 1930. (History of Turkey.) Oral, Cavid. Akdeniz Meselesi. Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1^4*>. 2 vols. (Mediterranean Problems.) Ozek, Cetin. Turkiyede Lalkllk. Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi, Hukuk Pakultesi, 1962. (Secularism in Turkey.) Ozturk, Halil Nimetullah. Turklesmek, layiklasmak. caq- daslasmak. Istanbul: M. Siralar Matbaasi, 1953. ('fcurklfication, secularization, modernization.) Said Pasa, Mehmed. Pasanln Hatirati. Istanbul: Sabah Matbaasi, I9l2. 3 vols. (Memoirs of Said Pasha.) Saygin, M. Celal. Divanet cephesinden Ataturk inkllaplarl. Ankara: T. T. k. Matbaasi, 1952. (Ataturk's reforms in the field of religion.) Soylemezoglu, Ghalib Kemaly. Harlcive Hizmetinde 30 Sene, 1892-1922. Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 195^• (•thirty tears in the Foreign Service, 1892-1922). Suleyman Husnu Pasa. Hissl Inkllab. Istanbul: Tanin Matbaasi, 1910. (The Feeling of the Revolution. Deals with deposition of Abdul Aziz.) Sapolyo, Enver Behnan. Kemal Ataturk ve Milli Mucadele. Ankara: Refet Zaimler Yayinevi, T?58. (Kemal Ataturk and the National Struggle.) . Ziya Gokalp: ^ttihadi Terakkl ve Mesrutivet Tarihi. Istanbul: Guven basimevi, T?4i. (iiya Sokalp: History of the Union and Progress and 1908 Constitutional Period.) Sehsuvaroglu, Haluk Y. Sultan Aziz. Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1949. (Sultan 'Abdul Aziz.) 213 Tanzimat. Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940. (History of ike Tanzimat Period prepared by the Turkish Histori­ cal Society, each chapter written by a specialist.) Tarih. Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1933. 4 vols. (His­ tory, prepared by the Turkish Historical Commission.) Torun, Sukru. Turkie Inailitere ve Yunanlstan arasinda Kibrisin Polltik Durumu. isTTankul: (Sazetecller Maibaasi, 1956. (¥ke Political Status of Cyprus and Turkey, England and Greece.) Tukin, Cemal. Osmanli Imparatorluqu devrlnde boqazlar meselesi. Istanbul: universlte matbaacili komandit S., 1947. (The problem of the Straits during the period of the Ottoman Empire.) Tunaya, Tarik Z. Turkivede Sivas! Partiler. Istanbul: Dogan Kardes Yayinlari, 1§52. (Political Parties in Turkey.) . Osmanli Imparatorluqundan Turkive Buvuk Millet Mecllsi Hukumetl Re limine (Seels. Istanbul: Ismail Akgun Matbaasi, 1956. (The ‘transition from the Otto­ man Empire to the Regime of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.) . Hurriyetin Ilani. Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1959• (The Proclamation of Liberty, 1908 Revolution.) ■ . Turklyenin Sivas! Havatinda Batllllasma Hareket- leri. Istanbul: YedigunMatbaasi, i960. (Westerni­ zation movements in the political life of Turkey.) . Turkive Buvuk Millet Mecllsi Hukumetinln Kurulusu ve Siyasl Rarakceri. Istanbul: Istanbul unlversltesi, TSfcB. (Jhe establishment of the government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and its political character.) . Islamcllik Caravan!. Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962• (^he Islamic Movement•) ______• Ataturk ve Ataturkculuk. Istanbul: Baha Mat­ baasi, 1963. TXtaturk and Ataturkism.) (The author received the "Turhan Emeksiz" award for this work during April 1964.) 214 Turkgeldi, All. Mondros ve Mudanya wutarelcalTlnln tarihl. Ankara: Gunay Natbaas1, 1948. (History of the Mudros and Mudania Armistices•) Unal, Tahsln. 1700 den 1958*a fca<**g Turk sivas! Tarihi. Ankara: AyyildizMatbaasi, i4$8. (Political history of Turkey from 1700 to 1958.) Ucok, Coskun. Sivasal tarih 1789-1950. Ankara: Ajans- Turk Matbaasi, 1956. (Political history 1789-1950.) Ulgener, Sabri F. Iktlsadl Intlhat Tarlhlmlzln Ahlak ve Zihnivet Meseleieri. IstanbuT: Ismail Akgun tfatEaasi, 1951. (Ethical Problems and Attitudes during the Period of the History of Our Economic Decline.) Uzuncarsili, Ismail Hakki. Osmanll Devletlnln Sax ay Teskilati. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1945. (Court organization of the Ottoman State•) . Osmanll Tarihi. Vol. I-V. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1947- • (Multi-volume History of the Ottoman Empire•) Yinanc, Mukrimin Halil. "Tanzimattan Mesrutiyete kadar bizde tarihcilik," in Tanzimat. Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1940. (Turkish historiography from 1839 to 1908.)

2. Books in non-Turkish languages Addison, J. T. The Christian Approach to the Moslem. New York: Columbia University Press, T542. Afet Inan (Afetinan). Apercu general sur 1 'histoire ^conomique Turc-ottoman. Istanbul: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 194I. Alderson, A. D. The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty. Oxford: Clarendon Press, T?5S. Alphand, H. Le Partage de la Dette Ottomane et son reqlemenET Paris: "Ferrand Soriot, 19^8. Antontius, George. The Arab Awakening. New York: Put­ nam's Sons, 1946. Arnold, Sir Thomas W. The Caliphate. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. 215 Arpee, Leon. The Armenian Awakening. Chicago: University of Chic ago Press, l909. At amian, Sarkis. The Armenian Community. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Babinger, Franz. Pie Gesechlchtsschrelber der Osmanen und ihre Werke. Leipzig: O ^ o rtarrassowitz, 1^27. Bailey, Fran Edgar. British Policy and Turkish Reform Movement. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1942. Baker, A. G. Christian Missions and a New World Culture. Chicago: Willed,Clark, 1$34. “ Baynes, Norman H. The Byzantine Empire. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. Belin, F. A* Essai sur 1*histoire economlque de Turqule. Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1885. Benedikt, Heinrich. Per Pascha-Graf Alexander von Bonneval 1675-1747. Graz-KoIn: Hermann Bohlaus Hachf., 1959. Berkes, Niyazi. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civiliza­ tion: Selected Essays on £lya Golcalp. New York: dolumbia tfniversity press, 19!>9. Bilge, Suat A. Le Conflit de Chypre et les Cypriotes Turcs. Ankara: A j ans-^Turk Ma^Faasl, 19'ST. Birge, John Kingsley. The Bektashi Order of Pervlshes. London: Luzac, 19777 Bisbee, Eleanor. The New Turks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1^51. Glaisdell, Ponald C. European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire. New York: dolumbia University Press, 1^29. Brockelmann, Carl. History of the Islamic Peoples. New York: G. P. Putnam*s Sons, 194^. Brown, Philip M. Foreigners in Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, I9l4. Bullard, Sir.R. Britain and the Middle East. London: Hutchinson, -1^52• Bury, G. Wyman. Pan-Islam. London: Macmillan, 1919. Cahun, Leon. Introduction a l*Hlstolre de l ^ s i e . Paris: Armand Colin et Cle., T89<>. Castagne, Joseph. Les Basmatchis. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1925. Charmes, Gabriel. L« Avenir de la Turquie: le Panis- lamisme. Paris: Michel-Levy treres, lB?3. Churchill, Sir Winston. The World Crisis. New York: Scribner's Sons, 192i-19^§.4 vols. Cobb, Stanwood. The Real Turk. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1914.

9 . Islamic Contributions to Civilization. Washington Avalon Press, 196^. Cox, Samuel S. Diversions of £ Diplomat in Turkey. New York: Charles It. WebsTer” TBsTI Cuinet, Vital. La Turquie d ’Asie. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1890. 4 voTs. Davey, Richard. The Sultan and his Subjects. New York: Dutton, 1897. Davison, Roderic H. Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856- 1876. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. . "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in Craig and Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^3. Deeds, Sir Wyndham. A Village in Anatolia, trans• of Mahmut Makal, Bizim key. London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1954. Devereux, Robert. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Mldhah 'Constitution and Parliament. Baltimore: ¥Ke Jrohns fcopkins Press, 1963. Djemal Pasha, Ahmed. Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913- 1919. New York: George TT7 Loran Co., 1922. Djemaleddin Bey. Sultan Murad V. London: Kegan Paul, 1895. 217 Djuvara, T. G. Cants Prolets de Partaqe de la Turquie 1281-1913. Paris: F. Alcan, l9l4. Du Velay, A. Essal sur 1 1Histolre Financiers de JLa Turquie. Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1903. Earle, Edward Mead. Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway. New York: Macmillan, l9i$• Edib, Halide (Adivar). Memoirs of Halide Edib. New York: Century, 1926. Edmonds, C. J. Kurds, Turks and Arabs. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Emin, Ahmed (Yalman). Turkey in the World War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937. Engelhardt, Edouard. La Turquie et le Tanzimat. Paris: A Cotillon et Cie., 1&82, 18*57. 2 vols. Evliya (Celebi). Narrative of Travels in Europe. Asia and Africa in the i7tt Century. London: Oriental trans­ lation f'und, lS34. trans. von Hammer. Fesch, Paul. Constantinople aux dernier jours dVAbdul- Hamld. Paris: Libralrie des Sciences Politiques et Soclales Marcel Riviere, 1907. Finlay, George. History of the Greek Revolution. Edinburgh, 1861. 2 voTST Fisher, Sydney N. The Foreign Relations of Turkey. 1568- 1605. Urbana: University ot IllinoTs, 1948. • The Middle East: A History. New York: Knopf* r?59.------Forster, Edward S. A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821- 1945. London: “Methuen, 1946. Frye, Richard N. (ed.). Islam and the West. The Hague: Mouton, 1957. Gates, Caleb F. Not to Me Only. Princeton: Princeton University Press, l97o. Gibb, H. A. R. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago ^ress, 1947. 218 ______. Islamic Society and the West. London: Oxford University Press, 1950, 19b1). Vol. I, Part I, Vol. I, Part II. Gordon, Leiand J. American Relations with Turkey, 1830- 1930. Philadelphia: ~University o£ Pennsylvania Press, 1932. Grunebaum, G. E. von (ed.). Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955'. Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. Pest: C. A. Hartleben, 1827-1835. 10 vols. Harris, David. A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis. 1875-1878. “Palo Alto: Stanf orcfTTniversity Press, 1935. Haslip, Joan. The Sultan: The Life of Abdul Hamid. London: Cassell, 1958. Hasluck, P. W. Christianity and Islam under the Sultans. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929. 2 vols. Heidborn, A. Manuel de Droit Publique et Admlnistratlf de 1*Empire Ottoman. Leipziq: U. W."7tein, 1908-1912. 7 vhTs.------Heyd, Uriel. Foundations of Turkish Nationalism. London: Luzac, 1950. Hill, Sir George. A History of Cyprus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195k. Hoskins, Halford L. The Middle East. New York: Macmillan, 1954. Hostler, Charles W. Turklsm and the Soviets. New York: Praeger, 1957. Howard, Harry N. The Partition of Turkey. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. The Kinq-Crane Commission. Beirut: Khayats, T?63. — Ismail Kemal Bey. The Memoirs of Ismail Kcmal Bey. London: Constable, 1920.' (ed. ; py"3ommervile story• ]

219 Izzet Pascha. Denkwurdigkeiten des Marshalls Izzet Pascha. Leipzig: Koehler, 1927, Jaschke, Gotthard. Per Turanismus der Junturken. Leipzig, 1941. Jonquiere, le Vicomte de la. HlatoiiB de l1Empire Ottoman. Paris: Hachette, 1914. 2 vols. Jorga, Nicholas. Geschichte des Osmanlschem Reiches. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1908-1913. 5 vols. Juchereau de Saint Denys, Le Baron Antoine* Revolution de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808. Paris: Librairie Brissot-Thivars, 1819. ”7 vols. Karpat, Kemal H. Turkey’s Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. Khadduri, N. and H. J. Liebesny (eds.). Law in the Middle East. Washington: The Middle East InstTEuTe, T95T5T” Kerner, R. J. and H. N. Howard. The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente. Berkeley: University o i California Press, 1^6. Kilic, Altemur. Turkey and the World. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959. Kirk, George. A Short History of the Middle East. London: Methuen, 1748. Kohn, Hans• Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. London: G. Routledge, l9l2. Koprulu, Mehmed Fuad. Les Oriaines de 1«Empire Ottoman. Paris: E de Boccard, 1955. Ladas, Stephen P. The Exchange of Minorities: . Greece and Turkey, hew lorlcT Macmillan, 1932. Langer, William L. The Jiii>i<>5££X — Imperialism. 1890- 1902. New York: Knopf, 1935. £ vols. Lerche, C. O., Jr. and Abdul A. Said. Concepts of Inter­ national Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-kall, 1963. 220 Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, l*9£l. . Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire. Norman: University oi 6klahoma Press, 1963. . The Middle East and the West. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1464. Lewis, B. and P. M. Holt (eds.). Historians of the Middle East. London: Oxford University Press,“T9fe2. Lewis, Geoffrey L. Turkey. New York: Praeger, I960. Lybyer, Albert A. The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the MagnTFic4nt. Cambridge: Harvard University tress, 1913. Mardin, Serif. The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Marriott, Sir J. A. R. The Eastern Question. London: Oxford University Press, 1^46. Masson, Paul. Histoire du Commerce Francals dans le Levant. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1396. McCullagh, Francis. The Fall of Abdul Hamid. London: Methuen, 1910. Mears, Eliot Grinnell. Modern Turkey. New York: Mac­ millan, 1924. Mldhat, All Haydar. The Life of Mldhat Pasha. London: John Murray, 1903. Miller, Barnette. Beyond the Sublime Porte. New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^1• . The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Miller, William. The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors. Cambridge: CamErldge university Press, 1936. Mosely, Philip E. Russian Diploswcy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in "55ci 1839. Cambridge: Harvard university f>ress, 1934. 221 Omer, Hilmi. A Treatise on the Laws of Evkaf. Nicosia: C. R. Tys¥r"and D. G. Demetriades, Trans,, 1899, Orga, Irfan. Portrait of a Turlcish Family. New York: Macmillan, 1950. *“ Pallis, A. A. Greece*s Anatolian Venture and After. London: MetKuen, 1937. Pears, Sir Edwin. Life of Abdul Hamid. New York: Henry Holt, 1917. Peters, Richard. Die Geschichte der Turken. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1961. Pinon, Rene. L ♦Europe et _la Jeune Turquie. Paris: Perrin, 1911. Puryear, Vernon John. France and the Levant. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1^4l. . International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near feast. Palo Alto: Stanford UniversityTress, 1935. Ramsaur, Ernest E., Jr. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. Princeton: Princeton University Gres's ,"19'57:------Rice, Tamara Talbot. The Selluks of Asia Minor. London: Thames and Hudson, i960. Rodkey, Frederick Stanley. The Turco-Eoyptlan Question in the Relations of England. France and Russia. 183^- 1841. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1^25. Rosenthal, E. I. J. Political Thought in Medieval Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19£fe. Saab, Hassen. The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire. Amsterdam: DjamEatan, 1958. Sanders, General Liman von. Five Years in Turkey. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Company, 1928. Sarkissian, A. 0. History of the JUrmenlan Question to 188S. Urbana: University of""Tllinois, 1938. Seton-Watson, R. W. The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. 222 London: Constable, 1917. Schevill, Ferdinand and W. M. Gewehr. History of the Balkan Peninsula. New York: Harcourt. Brace and Co., TS3T. ------Shaw, Stanford J. The Financial and Administrative Organi­ zation and Development of Ottoman Egypt. 1517^1798. Princeton: PrincetonlinTversity Press, 1962. Shotwell, James T. and Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits. New York: Macmillan, 1§4'0. Smith, Elaine.D.. Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the TSranS National Assembly, 1^19-1^23. Washington: Judd and Deiweiler, 1959• Sousa, Nasim. The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. Balti­ more: Johns Hopkins University Press, i£33. Stavrianos, L. S. The Balkans since 1453. New York: Rinehart, 1959. Temperely, Harold. England and the Near East: the Crimea. London: Longmans Green and do., l936. Thomas, Lewis V. and Richard N. Frye. The United States and Turkey and Iran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1^52• Toynbee, Arnold J. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. LondonT ConstabTe, 1923. . Turkey. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1927. Tugay, Emine Foat. Three Centuries: Family Chronicles of Turkey and Egypt. London: Oxford University Press,

Vambery, Arminius. La Turgule d'aulour.d'hui et d'avant guarante ans. Trahs. G. Tirara. ^aris ,”T898. Webster, Sir Charles. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. London: G. Bell and Sons, I95TI 2 voTs. Webster, Donald E. The Turkey of Ataturk. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and social Science, 1939. Welker, Walter F. The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1953. 223 Wittek, Paul* The Rlae of the Ottoman Empire* London: Luzact 1958* Wittlin, Alma S* Abdul Hamid, the Shadow of God* London: John Lane, 194o. Wright, Walter Livingston, Jr. Ottoman Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University tress, l93S. Wolff, Robert Lee. The Balkans in Our Time. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l5!T6. Yale, William. The Hear East: A Modern History. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, 195&. Yalman, Ahmed Emin. Turkey in Time. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. Zeine N. Zeine. Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism. Beirut: Khayats, 195k. Zinkeisen, J. W. Geschichte des osmanlschen Reiches in Europa. Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1840-1863. 8 vols•

C. BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ENCYCLOPEDIAS, HISTORICAL GUIDES

1. Bibliographies. Encyclopedias. Historical Guides (in Turkish) Acaroglu, M. T. "Turk Tarihinin Bibliografyasi Kaynaklari," Belleten. April 1954. (Bibliographical sources of TurkishHistory.) Arar, Ismail. Ismail Arar Kutuohanesi Katalogu _I (Ataturk, Kurtulus Savasi, bevrimleri ve Cumhurlyet Turkiyesi lie ilgili kitaplar). Istanbul, I960. (Catalogue of the Ismail Arar Library dealing with books on Ataturk, the War of Independence, the Kemalist reforms, and the Republican period.) Durusoy, M. 0. and Gokman. Ataturk ve Devrlmlerl Biblloorafvasi. Ankara: T. T. K. ftasTmevi, 1957. (a bibliography of Ataturk and his Period.) Govsa, Ibrahim Alaettin. Turk Meshurlarl Anslklopedisi Istanbul: Yedigun Nesriyati, 1946• (Encyclopedia of Famous Turks•) 224 Inalt Ibnuemin Mahmud Kemal• Osman11 Devrlnde Son Sad- riazamlar. Istanbul: Maarlf Matbaasl, 1936-1942. 12 vols* (The last Grand Veziers of the Ottoman Empire.) Islam Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Maarlf Matbaasl. 1939- . (This is a Turkish version of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, published since 1939 and not yet completed.) Islam-Turk Anslklopedlsl. Istanbul: Ilmlye Kutuphanesi, 1946- 1 tIslam-Turkish Encyclopedia edited by Esref Edip.) Koray, Enver. Turkive Tarlh Yavlnlarl Biblloqrafvasi. Ankara: MI11I Egitim Vekaletl Basimevi,1952. (Bibliography of Turkish Historical Works.) Mehmed Sureyya. Sicilll Osreanl. Istanbul: Matbaai Amire, 1890-1893. 4 vols. (btioman Register, a biographical dictionary.) Mehmed Tahir (Bursali). Osmanli Muellifleri. Istanbul: Matbaai Amire, 1917-1626. 3 vols. (Ottoman Writers.) Melzig, Herbert. Ataturk BiJfrlloqrafYasi. Istanbul: Zerbamat Basimevi, 1941. (Bibliography on Ataturk.) Mercanligil, Muharrem D. Eski Harflerle Basllmis Turkce Tarlh KltAplarl. Ankara: ^urkiye Tarlh Yayinlari, Sevlnc Matbaasl, 1959. (Turkish Historical Works published in the old script.) Pakalin, Mehmet Zeki. Son Sadrazamlar ve Basvekiller. Istanbul: Ahmed Said Haibaasi, 197^-1948. S vols. (Last Grand Vezirs and Prime Ministers.) Sertoglu, Midhat. Muhteva Bakimindan Basyekalet Arsivl. Ankara: T. T. K.Basimevi, l95§. (Guide to the Contents of the Prime Ministry Archives.) Tarih Kilavuzu. Istanbul: Iskit Yayinevi, 1951. (His- torical tiuide published by the Resimll Tarih Mecmuasi, a sixty-four page historical gdlde toOttoman and Turkish history.) Topkapl Saravi Muzesl Arsivl Kilavuzu. Istanbul, I (1938), iT (194&) (Guide to the fopkapi Palace Museum Archives•) 225 Turkive Biblioqrafvasi. Published by the Ministry of Education 19^8-1^54. (Monthly listing of publications published in Turkey since 1928.) Turkive Biblioqrafvasi (new form since 1955). Ankara: Milli Kutuphane Bibliografyas Enstitusu Yayinlari, T. T. K. Basimevi, 1955- • (Quarterly bibliography published by the Turkish National Library.) Turkive dinler tarihi ve Islam dlnlne ait blr bilioqrafva aenemesl 19^^-19677 Ankara: Ankara universltesl Ilahiyat Fakultesl Yayinlarindan XLVI, 1963. (A Bibliography of the history of religions in Turkey and on Islam, 1928-1960.) Unat, Faik Resat. Hlcrl Tarihleri Miladi Tarihe Cevirme Kilavuzu. Ankara: Waari# katbaasi, 1943. (Tables' for converting dates from A.H. to A.D.) XXII Milletlerarasi Mustesrikler Konqresi Munasibetiyle Basbaksnilk Arslvlnde ffertlpTenen Tarih Vesikalar ^erqlsl kabaToqu. Istanbul: Miili Eqitlm Basimevi, 19^1. (Catalogue of historical documents prepared on the occasion of the 22nd Conference of Orientalists by the Prime Ministry Archives.)

2 . Bibliographies. Encyclopedias. Historical Guides “ (in non-Turkis"h languages) Birge, J. K. A Guide to Turkish Area Study. Washington: American Council &>r Learned Societies, 1949. Davis, Helen Miller. Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States""ln bhe Sear and Middle East. DurhamUuke University Press, 1$5$. 2nd. edition. Davison, R. H. "The Middle East since 1450," in American Historical Association's Guide to Historical Litera­ ture. New York, 1961, pp. 218-2T?. . The Near and Middle East: An Introduction to History and bibliography. Washington: American Historical Association, 1959. Ettinghausen, Richard (ed•)• Books and Periodicals in Western Languages dealing with the Wear and EasTT- Washington: kiddle East Institute, 1951, and Sup­ plement , 1954• Hurewitz, Jacob C. Diplomacy In the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record. Princeton: 5. van Nostrand, T956. 2 vols. Materials in the National Archives Relating to the Middle EaslE.""Washington: National Archives Publication No. 55-16, Reference Information Papers No. 44, May 1955. Pearson, J. D. Index Islamicus 1906-1955. Cambridge: Heffer and Sons, 1958. ______• Index Islamicus Supplement 1956-1960. Cambridge: Heffer and Sons, 1962.

4. Journals and Periodicals a. Journals and Periodicals (in Turkish). Ankara Universltesl Dil ve Tarlh-Cografya Fakultesl Dergisi. Published by the University ofAnkara since 1942. Ayin Tarihi. (Current history, published in Ankara since T53TT7 Belleten. (Journal of the Turkish Historical Society, pub- lished in Ankara since 1937). Resimli Tarlh Mecmuasi. (Illustrated Historical Magazine, published in Istanbul since 1950). Tarih Vesikalari. (Journal of Historical Documents, pub- lished by the Ministry of Education since 1941). Tarihi Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasi. (Journal of the Ottoman Historical Commission, published in Istanbul from 1910 to 1924). Turk Tylhl Encumeni Mecmuasi. (Journal of the Turkish Historical Commission, published in Istanbul from 1924 to 1928). Turklvat Mecmuas1. (Journal of Turcology of the University of IstanbuT7 published since 1926). Vaklflar Dergisi. (Journal of the Muslim Pious Foundation.J 227 b. Journals and Periodicals (in non-Turkish languages. Archives d «etudes orientals. Uppsala, Sweden. * Archives d'histoire du droit oriental, Brussels. American Historical Review. Washington, D. C. Ars Islamica. Ann Arbor. Michigan. Bvzantion. Brussels. Per Islam. Berlin. Die Welt des Islams. Muster (Westf•), Germany. Journal of the American Oriental Society. New Haven, Conn. Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Chicago. Journal of the Roval Asi&tic Society. London. Middle East Journal. Washington, D. c. Middle Eastern Affairs, New York. Muslim World. Hartford, Conn. Oriens. Leiden, Netherlands. Oriente Mode mo . Rome. Revue des Etudes Islamlgues. Paris. Rivlsta deoli Studii Orlentall. Rome. Roval Central Asian Journal. London. APPENDIXES APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 1789-1923

1789 Selim III (1789-1807) Reformist Sultan 1791 August 4, Treaty of Sistova with Austria 1793 Nizami-i Cedid. New order, providing for reorgani­ zation of the Army modeled on European lines. Revision of commercial arrangements and tax system. At this time diplomatic envoys were first assigned abroad on a permanent basis. 1798 Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition (1798-1799). 1799 February. Ottoman Government declared war on France. Bonaparte's Syrian campaign fails. 1804 February. Rising of Serbs in the Balkans. 1806 War with Russia (1806-1812).. Turks suffer military reverses. 1807 July. Selim III dethroned by Janissaries and re­ placed by Mustafa IV. Bayraktar Pasha marches on Instanbul in support of Selim and takes city, but Selim strangled by reactionaries before he could be rescued. Bayraktar thereupon supported Selim's nephew who became Sultan Mahmud II. 1808 Mahmud II (1808-1839) re-established the absolute power of the Sultan by putting down the rebellious pashas in the provinces and displacing most of the derebeyis (feudal lords) in Anatolia. 1812 Treaty of Bucharest gives Russia Bessarabia and ex­ tensive rights in the .

Other important dates prior to 1789 are: 1299 foundation of the Ottoman State, 1453 to the Turks, 1514 Battle of Chaldiran, 1517 Ottoman con­ quest of Egypt, 1520-1566 reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz with Austria marks the beginning of Ottoman decline, 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (Kaynarca) with Russia which marked the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire. 1

230 1815 Second rising of the Serbs (1815-1817). 1817 Turkey recognized Milosh as hereditary Prince of Serbia. 1820 First American missionaries arrive in Izmir (Smyrna). Pliny Fiske and Levi Parsons. 1821 Greek War of Independence (1821-1830). 1826 Destruction of the Janissaries. 1827 October 20. Battle of Navarino. Ottoman (Egyptian) naval forces defeated by British, French and Russian naval squadrons. 1828 April 26. Russia declared war on Turkey. Russo- Turkish War (1828-1829). 1829 March 22. London Protocol. Autonomy of Greece. 1829 September 14. Treaty of Adrianople with Russia. 1829 November 30. London Conference. Independence of Greece• 1831 William Goodell opened American Board Mission station in Istanbul. 1831 First Turkish newspaper published Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events). 1832 Conflict between Sultan Mahmud II and Muhammad Ali of Egypt (1832-1833). 1833 April 8. Convention of Kutahya regarding Egypt. 1833 July 8. Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi between Russia and Turkey regarding joint defense of the Straits. 1834 The Ottoman Government resumes sending permanent diplomatic missions to major world capitals after having withdrawn them for several years. 1835 Mahmud II attempts to centralize provincial adminis­ tration. Established new Governmental Ministries including a Foreign Office. 231 1839 Mission of Reshld Pasha to England (December-April 1839). 1839 June 24. Battle of Neslb. Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt defeats Turks. 1839 July 1. Death of Mahmud II. 1839 July. Abdul Medjid (1839-1861). 1839 November 3. Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane (also known as Hatt-i Humayun), a reform decree (known as the Tanzimat) issued by the Sultan under the influence of Reshid Pasha. 1841 July 13. Straits Convention. Turkish Straits to be closed to all foreign warships in time of peace. Beginning of British policy supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire which lasted to 1914. 1851 Dispute between France and Turkey regarding the privilege of the Roman Catholic monks in the Holy Places in Palestine. Turkish concessions to France angers Russia, the "protector” of the Greek Orthodox Christians. 1853 October 4. Turkey declared war on Russia. 1854 Crimean War (1854-1856). England and France declare war on Russia, March 28, 1854. First Ottoman public debt contracted. 1856 February 18. The Hatt-i Humayun (reform edict) of 1856, also known as Islahat Fermani (Reform decree). 1856 February 25-March 30. Congress of Paris. Treaty of Paris. 1859 First private newspaper appeared in Turkey entitled Tercuman-i Ahval (Interpreter of Events). 1860 Insurrections in Syria and Lebanon, conflict between the Druze and the Maronites followed by provincial reforms (1860-1861). 1861 Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876). 1864 Law. Reforms regarding provincial adminis­ tration • 232 1864 First Ottoman budget. First Ottoman Press Law. 1865 Establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Adminis­ tration. 1865 Formation of the Patriotic Alliance during the summer of 1865 by Mustafa Fazil Pasha, Mehmed Bey, Namilc Kemal Bey, Nuri Bey, Reshad Bey, Agah Efendi and Pazarkoylu Ahmed Aga which was later to be known as the Young Ottoman Society. 1866 Cretan insurrections (1866-1868). 1867 Formation of the Young Ottoman Society by Mustafa Fazil Pasha, ziya Bey, Naraik Kemal Bey, Nuri Bey, Suavi Bey, Mehmed Bey, Reshad Bey, and Rifat Bey, August 10, 1867. The New or Young Ottomans press for reforms. 1868 Galatasaray Lise reorganized as a modern college with French assistance. 1868 Elaboration of the Ottoman Civil Code (1868-1876). 1869 Opening of the Suez Canal. 1870 Opening of the modern reorganized University of^_. Istanbul. 1871 Ali Pasha's Political Testament, probably written during September 1871 aimed at the reorganization of the Empire. Ali Pasha died September 6, 1871. 1873 Sultan suppressed Namik Kemal's patriotic anti- Russian play Vatan Yahut Silistire (Fatherland or Silistria) after its first performance on April 1, 1873. 1874 Worsening of the financial crisis. 1875 July. Insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1876 May 30. Midhat Pasha and his associates deposed Sultan Abdul Aziz and proclaimed Murat V as Sultan. 1876 August 31. Deposition of Sultan Murat V and enthrone­ ment of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) who prom­ ised Midhat Pasha and his associates reforms and a constitution. 233 1876 December 23* Proclamation of the First Ottoman Constitution by Mldhat Pasha. 1877 February 5. Dismissal of Mldhat Pasha. 1877 March 19. Opening of the first Ottoman Parliament. 1878 April 24. Russia declares war on Turkey. Russo- Turkish War of 1877-1878. 1878 June 13-July 13. The Congress of Berlin. 1878 Period of Absolutism under Abdul Hamid II (1878- 1908). 1881 December 20. Establishment of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. 1882 British occupation of Egypt. 1889 Young Turks organize Committee of Union and Progress In Istanbul. 1897 April 17. War between Greece and Turkey. 1897 September 18. Peace settlement following Greco- Turkish War. 1902 Insurrection in Macedonia (1902-1903). 1902 February. First Young Turk Congress held in Paris. 1907 Second Young Turk Congress held in Paris during December 1907, Prince Sahabaddin was chosen chairman. 1908 June 9. Reval meeting between King Edward and Tsar Nicholas II. 1908 July 24. Young Turk Revolution results in the restoration of the Constitution of 1876. Emergence of the Committee of Union and Progress. 1908 October 5-6. Proclamation of Bulgarian independence. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. 1909 April 13. Counter-Revolution. Reactionary uprising against the Committee of Union and Progress. 1909 April 26. Sultan Abdul Hamid II deposed. 234 1909 , a weaker and helpless Sultan (1909-1918) is a figurehead* Enver Pasha and his supporters in the Committee of Union and Progress conspire to gain control of the Government. 1909 April* Armenian incidents in Adana* 1909 August* Revision of the Constitution* 1910 April-June* Insurrections in Albania* 1911 September 29 to October 15, 1912* The Tripolitanian War with Italy. 1912 April* Committee of Union and Progress wins elec­ tions* 1912 October 18*' Treaty of Lausanne ends Tripolitanian War. 1912 October 8-17* Outbreak of the (October 8, 1912-May 30, 1913). 1913 January 23. Enver Pasha's coup d'etat against the Government* Triumvirate of Enver, bjemal, Talat gradually assuming full control of the Government. 1913 May 30* Treaty of London ends the First Balkan War. 1913 June 11. Assassination of General Mahmud Shevket Pasha. Country under full control of Enver, Djemal and Talat Triumvirate• 1913 (June 29-July 30, 1913). 1913 July 20. Turks take Adrianople in course of Second Balkan War. 1913 August 10. Treaty of Bucharest. 1913 September 29. Treaty of Constantinople. 1913 November-December* German General Liman von Sanders crisis. He is made Inspector General of the Ottoman Army instead of Commander of Istanbul as a result of Russian protest. 1914 Augu&t 2. Secret treaty of alliance with Germany. 235 1914 October 1. Turkey unilaterally abrogated the capitulations• 1914 October 29. Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers to all Intent and purposes when Odessa Is bombarded. 1914 November 2. Russia declared war on Turkey. 1914 November 5. England and France declared war on Turkey. 1914 November 14. Sultan-Caliph of Ottoman Empire de­ clared Holy jihad. 1916 June 5. Beginning of Arab Revolt. 1918 July 4. Sultan Mehmed VI (Vahdettin) last Ottoman Sultan (July 4, 1918-November 1, 1922). 1918 October 30. Armistice of Mudros. 1918 November 13. Allied and Associated Powers enter Istanbul. 1919 May 15. Landing of Greeks at Izmir (Smyrna) with Allied approval. 1919 May 19. Mustafa Kemal Pasha lands in Samsun. Beginning of Turkish War for Independence (1919- 1922). 1919 July 11. Formation of the Association for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. 1919 July 23. Erzurum Congress (July 23-August 6, 1919). 1919 September 4. Sivas Congress. 1920 January 28. Adoption of the National Pact. 1920 April 23. Opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. 1920 August 10. Abortive Treaty of Sevres. 1921 January 10. Victory of the First Battle of Inonu. 1921 April 1. Victory of the Second Battle of Inonu. 1

236 1921 August 23. Battle of Sakarya starts. September 13 Turkish victory against Greeks marks turning point in the war. 1922 September 9. Liberation of Izmir by Kemalist forces. 1922 October 11. Armistice of Mudanya. 1922 November 1. Abolition of the Sultanate. 1922 November 17. Sultan Mehmet VI (Vahdettin) flees from Istanbul on British warship. Abdul Medjid called to Caliphate. 1922 November 20. Opening of the Lausanne Conference. 1923 July 24. Treaty of Lausanne signed. 1923 October 6. Kemalist forces enter Istanbul. 1923 October 14. Ankara becomes the capital of Turkey. 1923 October 29. Declaration of the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) becomes the first President of Turkey.*

Important dates since 1923 include: Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1923-1938); Abolition of Caliphate, March 3, 1924; Turkish Constitution April 20, 1924; Con­ stitutional amendment removing statement that religion of Turkey is Islam, 1928; Turkey joins the League of Nations, 1932; Balkan Pact, 1934; Treaty of Montreux, 1936; Saadabad Pact, 1937; Ismet Inonu elected second President of Turkey,. 1938-1950; Turkey joins the United Nations, 1945; Truman Doctrine, 1947; Democratic Party wins elections, May 1950; Bayar, third President of Turkey, 1950-1960; Turkey sends brigade to Korea, 1950; member of NATO, 1952; member of Baghdad Pact, 1955; May 27, 1960 Revolution; Provisional Government of Turkey, MAy 1960-October 1961; Second Turkish Republic established October 25, 1961; General Cemal Gursel elected first President of the Second Turkish Republic, October 26, 1961. APPENDIX B

OTTOMAN SULTANS

The Ottoman Sultans, with Dates of Accession (1299-1922)

Osman I 1281 Tribal authority 1. 1299 Independence 2. 1324 3. 1360 4. 1389 5. 1413 6. Murad II 1421 7. Mehmed II 1444 8. Beyezid II 1481 9. Selim I 1512 10. Suleyman I 1520 11. Selim II 1566 12. Murad III 1574 13. Mehmed III 1595 14. 1603 15. 1617 16. Osman II 1618 17. Murad IV 1623 18. Ibrahim 1640 19. Mehmed IV 1648 20. Suleyman II 1687 238

21. Ahmed II 1691 22. Mustafa II 1695 23. Ahmed III 1703 24. Mahmud I 1730 25. Osman III 1754 CM u> . Mustafa III 1757 27. Abdul Hamid I 1774 28. Selim III 1789 29. Mustafa IV 1807 30. Mahmud II 1808 31. Abdul Medjid I 1839 32. Abdul Aziz 1861 33. Murad V 1876 34. Abdul Hamid II 1876 35. Mehmed V Reshad 1909 36. Mehmed VI Vahdeddin 1918 37. Abdul Medjid (Caliph only) 1922 APPENDIX C

STRUCTURE OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT

The Su tanate

JSheikh-ul Islamate ’(Sheikh-ul-Islam, head of Islamic Religious Hierarchy). * * Grand Vezirate (Prime Ministry) (Sadaret-i Azamiye) i i

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti) Ministry of Education (Maarif Nezareti) Ministry of Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti) Ministry of Finance (Maliye Nezareti) Ministry of Marine (Bahriye Nezareti) Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti) Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture (Ticaret ve Ziraat Nexareti) Ministry of Justice (Adliye Nezareti) Ministry of Pious Foundations (Evkaf Nezareti) Ministry of Public Works (Nafia Nezareti) President of Council of State (Shura-i Devlet Reisligi) APPENDIX D

THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Hariciye Nez&ret Baliyesi or Hariciye Vekaleti)

1. Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Mustesari) 2. Bureau of Translation (Tercume Kalemi) 3. Bureau of Correspondence (Mektub-u Hariciye Kalemi) 4. Bureau of Foreign Correspondence (Tahirat-i Ecnebiye Kalemi) 5. Bureau of Documents (Evrak Kalemi) 6. Bureau of Accounting and Audit (Mhuasabe Kalemi) 7. Bureau of Mixed Claims (Umuru Hukukiye-yi Muhtelit Kalemi) 8. The Chamber of Jurists (Hukuk Musavirleri Odasi) 9. Bureau of Nationality (Including naturalization) (Tabiyet Kalemi) 10. Bureau of Personnel (Sicil Ahval Kalemi)

The structure of the Ottoman Foreign office is shown above as it was at the beginning of the present century. There was a Foreign Minister, Hariciye Naziri or Hariciye Vekili. The Grand Vezir was above all the Ministers. APPENDIX E

ETHNIC BACKGROUND OP OTTOMAN VE2IRS (1323-1920)

Nationality Number Turkish 79 Probably Turkish 16 Albanian 31 Probably Albanian 2 Bosnian 11 Herzegovinian 3 Russian 1 Serbian 1 Bulgarian 1 Poraak (Muslim of Bulgarian race) 11 Georgian 11 Greek 4 Armenian 2 Italian 2 Abaza (Eastern Turks related to Georgians) 9 Circassian 3 Herzegovinian or Hungarian 1 Greek or Herzegovinian 2 Greek or Albanian 2 Greek or French 2 Slavic (from Herzegovina) 1 Slavic (from Dalmatia) 1 Probably Arab 5 (Orphans of captured nations converted to~Islam) 8 Donme (Jews converted to Islam) 1 Unknown 14 Total 7T7

Source: I. H. Danismend, Izahll Osmanli Tarihi Kronolooisi (Istanbul: Turkiye feasimevTJ 1945-1950,vol i-ili) (Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History). Due to affinity of certain nationalities and other considerations an alphabetical order has not been followed. A P P E N D I X F

PRINCIPAL OTTOMAN POLITICAL PARTIES*

Name of Organization Headquarter; Yeni Osmanlilar Cemiyeti Istanbul (New Ottoman Society or Young Ottoman Society) Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Istanbul 1889 (Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress) Paris branch of above party Paris 1889 Geneva branch of above party Geneva 1897 Cairo branch of above party Cairo 1897 Osmanli Terakki ve Ittihad Cemiyeti Paris 1902 (Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union) Tesebbusu Sahsi ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyete Paris 1902 (Society for Private Initiative and Decentralization) Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti Salonica 1907 (Ottoman Liberty Party) Vatan ve Hurriyet Cemiyeti Damascus 1907 (Fatherland and Liberty Party) * • Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Salonica 1908 (Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress)

m Only the principal parties are listed here. For a list of 133 political parties and societies see Tunaya, Turklyede Sivasl Partner, pp. 773-777. * • Newly organized party not directly connected with older party of the same name. 244 Name of Organization Headquarters Date Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi Istanbul 1909 (Ottoman Liberal Party) Hurriyet ve Xtilaf Firkasi*** Istanbul 1909 (Liberal Union Party) Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudefaai Hukuk Sivas 1919 Cemiyeti (Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia) to become the Cumhuriyet HaIk Partisi (Republican People's Party) in 1923, when Turkey became a Republic, with headquarters in Ankara

• • • Ended activities after 1913 and re-established in 1919 under different leadership. - APPENDIX G

THE TURKISH NATIONAL PACT JANUARY 28, 1920

The members of the Ottoman chamber of deputies reoognlze and affirm that the Independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society is impossible outside of the said principles: First Article. Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30tb October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts whether within or outside the said armistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance. Second Article. We accept that, in the case of the three which united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote. Third Article. The determination of the juridical status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in com­ plete freedom. Fourth Article. The security of the city of Con­ stantinople, which is the seat of the Khalifate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening tf the Bosporus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid. 246 Fifth Article. The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us— in reliance on belief that the Moslem minorities in neighboring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights. Sixth Article. It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible and that it should be possible to con­ duct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration. For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, finan­ cial, and other matters. The conditions of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles. APPENDIX H

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

I. MUSTAFA RESHID PASHA (1799-1857)

The Great Reshid Pasha (Buyuk Mustafa Resit Pasa) was an Ottoman statesman born in Istanbul. He is also known as Koca Mustafa Resit Pasa. Reshid Pasha entered Government service when very young. He studied French privately. Reshid Pasha was Minister to France in 1834 and was later Ambassador to France and England. He also was Grand Vezir and Foreign Minister. In 1839, he was responsible in convincing the new Sultan Abdul Mejid of the necessity of reform and, therefore, was directly credited with the Tanzimati Hayriye decree. Reshid Pasha was aware of the plight of the Empire and was anxious to win both the friendship of France and Great Britain against Russia, and to stop the disintegration of the Empire through reforms. In 1848, Reshid Pasha won the respect of liberals in Europe when he refused to return political refugees from Austria, , and Hungary despite pressure from Austria and Russia. He was Foreign Minister during the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and trained such Ottoman statesmen as Ali Pasha 248 aind Fuat Pasha. He sponsored the intellectual Ibrahim Shinasi's studies in France, and was instrumental in opening schools, libraries, museums, and archives. He wrote some poetry and was interested in the simplification of the Turkish language. Reshid Pasha is known as the greatest figure of the period of the Tanzimat.^

II. FUAD PASHA (1815-1869)

Fuad Pasha (Kececizade Mehmed Fuad Pasha), a close associate of Ali Pasha and a protege of Reshid Pasha was born in Istanbul in 1815 of an upper middle class family. His father was the well-known Kececizade Mehmet Izzet Efendi, who was both a scholar and an official under Sultan Mahmud II. Fuad entered the medical school in 1827, and joined the Army Medical Corps. His knowledge of French resulted in his being appointed as a civil servant in the Translation Office in 1837, and in 1840 he was appointed First Secretary of the Ottoman Embassy in London. He was a member of the High Council of Reform, and became the

^For a biography see: Cavit Baysun,"Mustafa Resit Pasa," in Tanzimat, I, pp. 723-726; Mehmet Selahettin, Bir Turk dlpiomatjjuin eyraki slvasivesi (Istanbul: Alem Matbaasi, 1889) (Thepolitical documents of a Turkish diplomat); and Turk Meshurlari Anslklopedlsi. pp. 322-323. Resat Kaynar, Mustafa Rest P*sa ve Tanzlmat(Ankara, 1954) includes collection of archival documents• 249 organization's President. He collaborated with historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha in the preparation of the first modern Turkish grammar, Kavaidi Osmaniye in 1851. He died in 1869. Fuad Pasha, as Foreign Minister, and Ali Pasha, as Grand Vezir, were responsible for the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 and the Treaty of Paris of that same year. Both Fuad and Ali favored Ottoman equality and Ottomanism, but failed to understand the new concept of nationalism. For an in­ teresting discussion of Fuad Pasha's policies, see Roderic 2 H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire. Chapter III.

III. ALI PASHA (1815-1871)

Ali Pasha (Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha) was born in Istanbul of lower middle class parents. His father was a shopkeeper. He became a career civil servant and rose through the ladder of official promotions. He had studied French and, therefore, in 1833 he was transferred to the office of the of the Porte, and handled translation

2 There is no outstanding biography of Fuad Pasha. The best available study is Orhan Koprulu, "Fuad Pasa," Islam Anslklopedlsi. IV, pp. 672-681, which is a very sound and well-written account. See also Turk Meshurlarl Anslklopedlsi. pp. 144-145. See also R. H. Davipon, "Tne Question of Fuad Pasa's Testament," Belieten. January, 1959. 250 work. In 1836, he went to Vienna on the Staff of Ahmet Fethi Pasha, a special envoy of the Porte. After several appointments in the foreign service, he was appointed Ambassador to London in 1840. In 1844, he became a member of the Council of Justice and held other important posts in association with his sponsor Reshid Pasha. In 1852, he became Grand Vezir when Reshid Pasha was dismissed by the Porte. In 1854, he became the president of the newly- formed High Council of Reform, and later again held the office of Grand Vezir in time to preside over the 1856 Rescript (Hatt-i Humayun). He held the position of Grand Vezir and other high offices and dominated the policies of his times until his death in 1871. Ali Pasha is supposed to have written a political testament which was published in the Turkish newspapers of his times. Although there is some doubt about the authen­ ticity of the document, it is an interesting review of the history of the Ottoman Empire during the early Tanzimat period. For details on Ali Pasha*s Political Testament, see Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire. pp. 415-418.3

While there is no outstanding biography on Ali Pasha, an excellent study is that of A. H. Ongunsu, "Ali Pasa," Islam AnsiJclopediai. I, pp. 335-340. See also Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisl.™*p. 34. 251 IV. MIDHAT PASHA (1822— 1884)

Ahmet Shefilc Mldhat Pasha was born In Istanbul In 1822. He entered government service when very young, and studied Arabic and Persian. He learned French at the age of thirty. He held government posts in Damascus, Konya, and Kastamonu (1844-1849), later being transferred to Istanbul, and was sent on an inspection tour to Syria, then a part of the Ottoman Empire. His effective work there brought him to the attention of Grand Vezir Reshid Pasha. During 1858, he went on a six months trip to France. In 1861, he was appointed governor of Nish, in the Balkans. He believed in "Ottomanism" and that the Empire could be saved through reforms and a Constitution. Midhat Pasha was governor of the newly-organized province of the , and later President of the Council of State. In 1869, he was appointed governor of Baghdad, and later Minister of Justice and Governor of Salonica. Namik Kemal, Ziya Pasha, and other founders of the Young Ottoman Society looked for support from him. However, pressure from reactionary elements forced Sultan Abdul Aziz to request his resignation, but he was appointed to another government post and became President of the Coun­ cil of State for a second time. Abdul Hamid II appointed him Grand Vezir, and he worked with Manik Kemal and Ziya 252 Pasha in drafting the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. In 1877, Abdul Hamid used the pretext of the Russo-Turkish War (1877—1878) to dissolve Parliament and suspend the Constitution. Midhat Pasha was exiled, recalled and ap­ pointed Governor of Syria; but in 1881, he was tried for the alleged murder of Abdul Aziz and exiled to Taif where he was apparently assassinated in 1884 by orders of Abdul Hamid and his personal and political enemies. Midhat Pasha was a leader with administrative ability and was at his best as a governor. As a statesman, his judgment was not always good. He was difficult to get along with. A series of major political errors led to his ultimate down­ fall and death. Despite these weaknesses, Midhat Pasha is considered one of the greatest Ottoman statesmen of all 4 times•

V. AHMED CEVDET PASHA (1822-1895) Ahmed Cevdet Pasha was born in Lofcha, a small town which was part of the Ottoman Empire at that time, but is

4 The best study on Midhat Pasha and the First Otto­ man Constitution is Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the kidhat Constitution and Parliament (Baltimore": The Tohns Hopkins Press, 19^3). &ee also Ali Haydar Mldhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha (London: J. Murray, 1903); and TurC BesTmrlarl Ansiiclo- edisi, pp. 254-255. See also R. H. Davison, keform In the Sttoman Empire, Chapters V, IX, and X. 253 now in Bulgaria. His father was Hadji Ismail Efendi. Ahmed Cevdet was educated in the local medrese and at seventeen went to Istanbul where he studied in religious schools and learned Persian and Arabic and a reading knowledge of French. While Cevdet Pasha is known for his public service, he is best known for his great contribu­ tions to Turkish scholarship. Among his most important works is the twelve volume Tarlhi Cevdet which covers the period 1774 to 1852. Ahmed Cevdet was a protege' of Reshid Pasha and later Fuad Pasha. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha was an enlightened member of the Ulema, but he was also a vigorous defender of the Islamic tradition. He was suspicious of Midhat Pasha and the Young Ottomans and was among the officials in the Midhat Pasha trial. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha held many important religious, academic and public positions. He was President of Otto­ man learned societies, Director of the Teacher's College, President of the Council of Justice, Council of State, and mayor and governor of important cities and provinces, in­ cluding Aleppo, , Marash, and Yana. He was several times Minister of Evkaf (Pious Foundations), Minister of Education, Justice, Interior, and Commerce and Agriculture. Unlike many of the prior vakanuvls (historiographers) his works were well documented and based on archival 254 materialsf and he wrote in modern Turkish rather than the 5 older obscure classical style.

VI. NAMIK KEMAL (1840-1888)

Born in Tekirdag on January 21, 1840, of upper mid­ dle class parents, he entered government service in 185 7, and held a number of moderately responsible positions. Along with Ibrahim Shinasi (1824-1871) and Ziya Pasha (1825* 1880), he was one of the founders of the Edebiyatl Cedlde (New Literature). In 1865-1867, he was active in the founding of the Young Ottoman Society with several other intellectuals and officials. Namik Kemal knew Arabic and Persian and while in self-exile in France (1867-1870) learned French and was in­ fluenced by the Romanticism of Victor Hugo. Realism and naturalism also influenced his thinking. He favored Ottomanism, and was devoted to Islam. He is best known for his anti-Russian play Vatan Yahut Sillstire (Fatherland or Silitria) suppressed by the Sultan on April 1, 1873.

5Govsa, Turk Meshurlari. pp. 19-20. See also E. Mar din, Medeni Hukuk^ephesln5Ten Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, 1stanbul, 1^46, which is critical of Cevdet Pasha's dealings with Midhat. See also R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 419; and Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Mode'rn Turkey, pp. 120-121. 255 Namik Kemal helped draft the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876* After Sultan Abdul Hamid XI dissolved Parliament and the reformists Young Ottomans were persecuted, Namik Kemal was exiled to an island in the Aegean were he died on December 2t 1888. Namik Kemal was perhaps the first Turkish intellec­ tual leader to attempt a formulation of Turkish nationalism in a modern sense by his concept of the "New Patriotism" and the ideal of Vatan (Fatherland or La Patrie). However, his nationalism was somewhat confused by the Ottoman- Muslim character of his ideal. The further developments of Turkish nationalism had to wait for Ziya Gokalp and his concept of Turkism which was later to be applied by Ata- turk to build a modern Turkey.®

VII. CEMAL PASHA (DJEMAL PASHA) (1872-1922) Cemal Pasha was one of the members of the Trium­ virate of the Committee of Union and Progreslf. He was born in Istanbul and was a graduate of the military staff school.

®See Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. Chapter X for an excellent stu3y of Namik Kemal. See also Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi. pp. 212-213; M. Kaplan, Namik 'Kemal Havatl ve EaerlerT. Istanbul, 1948, (Namike Kemal rtis Life and Works); K.Key, Namik Kemal: Patriotic Pogt of Turkey (Washington: Hamilton Printing Company, l£!T5T. 256 Cemal Bey was one of the officers who was attached to the Hareket Ordusu, or the Army under Mahmut Shevket Pasha which marched on Istanbul In 1909 to put down the counter-revolution. He was made governor of Adana and later Baghdad. Cemal Bey participated in the Balkan War and was made Minister of Public Works, and then Minister of the Marine. Cemal Pasha was In charge of an expedition against Egypt which failed in 1915 and was then made mili­ tary governor of Syria where he was very unpopular among the Arabs for his repressive policies. In 1918, he escaped along with the other members of the Committee of Union and Progress, first to Berlin and then to Tiflis where he was assassinated by an unknown person. Cemal Pasha wrote his memoirs which attempt to 7 justify the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress.

VIII. TALAT PASHA (1874-1921)

Talat Pasha was the last Prime Minister of the Com­ mittee of Union and Progress and one of the Triumvirate that ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1914 to 1918. He was born in (Adrianople) of middle class parents.

7 See Turk Meshurlari Anslklopedlsi. pp. 82—83. See also Ahmet D^mal Easha. Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman (New York: Doran Co., 192Z)• 253 Talat Bey attended local schools in Edirne and studied and taught Turkish in the Edirne Alans Mektebi where he learned some French. He later attended the Law school at Salonica for two years. At eighteen, he was an employee of the Edirne Post Office. He was asked to leave his post just prior to the 1908 Revolution for having allegedly joined the Young Turk Movement. In 1908, after the Revolution, he was elected deputy from Edirne, and held such positions as vice-chairman of the Parliament, Minister of Interior, Minister of Postal and Telegraf Affairs, and became the Union and Progress Chairman in the Parliament and then Minister of Interior again. In 1916, he was appointed Sadrazam or Prime Minis­ ter and in 1916 escaped with the other members of the Com­ mittee of Union and Progress. He was assassinated in Berlin in 1921 by an Armenian. Opinions on Talat Pasha differ. Armenian writers blame him for the deportations of 1915, while some Turkish historians have criticized his policies. Other Turkish p writers consider him a sincere and patriotic leader.

8 See Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedlsl. pp. 374-375* and Huseyin Cafalt Valcln. Talat Pasa (Istanbul: Yedigun Matbaasi, 1943). 258 IX. ZIYA GOKALP

(1875-1924)

Ziya Gokalp (also known as Ziya Bey) was born In Dlyarbakir in 1875 of middle class parents and attended military and political science schools. He joined the Young Turk Movement after 1908 and became a professor at the University of Istanbul. Gokalp was the intellectual leader of both the Young Turk and Kemalist Movements. He was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress and was exiled to Malta by the Allied and Associated Powers when they occupied Istanbul in 1920. Ziya Gokalp was re­ leased with other Turkish leaders in Malta and returned to Turkey to join the Kemalist Movement. This great Turkish philosopher and sociologist was influenced by the ideas of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858—1917) and French Positivist thinking. He developed the concept of Turkculuk (Turkism). Gokalp founded several Important journals and wrote a number of important works. In his search for a "Great Man" in history to save Turkey, he saw in Ataturk the 9 Saviour of his country.

9 See Turk Meshurlari Anslklopedlsi. pp. 152-153. The best study on Ziya Gokalp is that of Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 19!j9) • 259 X. MEHMET CAVIT (DJAVID BEY) (1875-1926)

Cavlt Bey was Ottoman Minister of Finance In the last years of the Empire. He was born In Salonica and was a Muslim of Jewish origin. He attended local schools in Salonica, and graduated from the Political Science School in Istanbul in 1896. Cavit Bey held various positions in the Agricultural Bank, Ministry of Education and taught in the Teacher's College in Salonica. He established a private school in Salonica and joined the Committee of Union and Progress. He was made deputy for Salonica in 1908 and worked on the Budget Commission. He was the first modern type Minister of Finance of the Ottoman Empire. With Ahmet Suayip and Riza Tevfik, he published a journal on economic and social problems known as Ulumu Iktisadive ve Ictimavlve Mecmuasi. His memoirs appeared in the newspaper Tanin in serial form. He was condemned to death in 1926 for participating in a plot in Izmir against the Kemalist regime.1®

^S e e Turk Meshurlari Ansiklopedisi. p. 78. 260 XI. ENVER PASHA (1881-1922)

Enver Pasha was born in Istanbul in 1881. He gra­ duated from the Army Staff College with the rank of captain in 1903 and joined the Young Turk Movement in Salonica several years before 1908* In 1909, he was military at­ tache in Berlin. He fought in the Tripolitanian War of 1911-1912 and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and was involved in the assassination of Minister of War Nazim Pasha in 1913. He became a leader of the Committee of Union and Progress. He married into the royal family by marrying Prince Suleyman Efendi's daughter, Princess Naciye. Enver and Mustafa Kemal were rivals and did not like each other personally and disagreed on national policies. In 1913, Enver Pasha became Minister of War and was instrumental in involving the Ottoman Empire in the first World War on the side of the Central Powers. He favored a Pan-Turkist policy and hoped to build a greater Turkey. However, as a result of the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, he escaped from Istanbul and was finally killed in Turkestan in 1922, fighting the Bolsheviks. As head of the Committee of Union and Progress Triumvirate, which included Talat Pasha and1 Cemal (Djemal) Pasha (1913-1918), he led the Ottoman Empire through the 261 war years. He has been criticized by some Turkish his­ torians for his rash policies and military blunders. Despite his errors, he is sometimes depicted as a romantic and dashing leader.11 c.

13,See Turk Meshurlari Anslklopedisi. p. 116. See also Charles il. tiosilert ^urklsm and the Toviets (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 148-1^6. APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY

Adalet: justice Adliye Vekaleti: Ministry of Justice Aga: country gentleman, master, chief footman Ahi: Akhi, member of Muslim medieval craft guilds Anadolu: Anatolia, Asia Minor Asker: soldier Ayan: notables Bab: door, official residence Babiali: Sublime Porte Bektashi: adherents of a dervish order Bey: a title, modern usage: Bay before a name, Ottoman usage: after a name. Buyuk Millet Meclisi: Grand National Assembly, also Meclis (parliament) Cihat: Jihad, Holy War Cami: mosque Cumhuriyet: republic Dahiliye Vekaleti: Ministry of Interior Darulfunun: university, also universite Dar ul-Harp: the abode of war, the realm of war Dar ul-Islam: the abode of peace, the realm of peace or Islam Derebeyi: feudal lord, a local semi-autonomous ruler Dervish: religious order (mystics) 263 Devlet: State Din: religion Divan: Privy Council, collections of a poet Divan-i Edebiyat: Classical Literature Edebiyat: Literature Edebiyat-i Cedide: The New Literature Efendi: a title used after the name; in Ottoman times also the usual designation for a government cleric and other educated person Erkani Harp: General Staff, Staff Officer Brmeni: Armenian Esnaf: artisan; artisan of trade guilds i Evkaf: Awqaf, Muslim Pious Foundations (plural is vakif) : province, term used before 1867 (after 1867 vilayet) Fatih: victorious, conqueror Fen: Science Ferman: Firman, a decree of the Sultan Fetva: Muslim juridical decision Firka: Political party, military brigade

/ Futuwet: Futuwwa, ethics of Muslim chivalry Garpcilik: Occidentalism, modernism Gazi: Ghazi, warrior, victor, conqueror Haci: Hadji, pilgrim, one who has been to Mecca Half: folk, people Halkcilik: populism Harp: war 264 Harbiye Vekaleti: Ministry of War Hariciye Vekaleti: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hat: a writing; in the form of hatt-i humayun an edict of the Sultan to his Grand Vezir Hazine: treasury Hilafet: Caliphate Hoca: Hodja, mosque school teacher, religious functionary Hukuk: law, jurisprudence Hukumet: government Hunkar: imperial Hurriyet: liberty, freedom Idare: administration Ihtilal: insurrection, revolution Iktisat Vekaleti: Ministry of Economy Imam: Muslim preacher; leader of public worship in mosque Inkilap: revolution, reformation, innovation Irade: a decree (usually of the Sultan). Islahat: reforms, reformation Istiklal: independence Ittihad-i Islam: Pan-Islamism : Cadi, judge, Muslim judge Kanun: law Kanunu Esasi: Constitution, fundamental law Kayraakam: Governor of a (in the vilayet organization) Kaza: subdivision of a sancak (in the vilayet organization) Kuran: Quran, Koran Kurt: Kurd Layiklik: laicism, secularism Lira: basic money unit, Turkish pound Lise: lycee, high school Liva: administrative subdivision of Ottoman province Maarif Vekaleti: Ministry of Education Maliye Vekaleti: Ministry of Finance Matbaa: printing-house Matbuat: press Mebus: deputy, congressman : the codified Muslim Civil Law Meclis: Parliament, assembly Mecmua: journal, magazine Medrese: Muslim Quranic school attached to mosque Memleket: country, fatherland, native land, town, city Memur: official, functionary Millet: religious community; in later usage, "nation" Millet system: Ottoman administration of non-Muslim subjects Milli Mefkure: National ideal Milli Misak: National Pact Mudur: governor of a nahiye; director Mufti: Muslim jurist Muhtar: village headman Mulkiye mektebi: Civil Service School. Political Science School Mutasarrif: governor of sancak Nahiye: subdivision of the kaza in the vilayet organiza­ tion Nazir: Minister, also Vekil Nizami-i Cedid: the "new order" in the Army, the "New Army" Osmanli: Ottoman Osmanlilik: Ottomanism Padisah: , Sultan, sovereign, king Pasa: Pasha, general, also a civilian title Rum: Roman, Greek minority in Turkey Rumeli: Rumelia, European Turkey Sadriazara: Prime Minister “ Sancak: , subdivision of a province; flag Seriat: Sharia, Muslim sacred law

i Seyh: Sheihk, leader-of a tribeJ'head of a Muslim religious order Sihhat Vekaleti: Ministry of Health Sii: Shi'a, Shi'ite, followers of Ali, a Muslim sect Softa: A Muslim theological student Sultan: sovereign, king Sunni: Sunnite, Sunni, followers of the Sunna, Orthodox Muslims Tarih: history Ticaret Vekaleti: Ministry of Commerce Turk Tarih Kururau: Turkish Historical Society Turkculuk: Turkism 267 Turkiye: Turkey Turkiye Cumhuriyeti: The Turkish Republic Ulema: 'ulama, learned men of Islam, interpreters of the Quran Vakanuvis: historiographer Vakif: Waqf, Muslim pious foundations Vali: governor of vilayet Vatan: Fatherland, homeland Vekil: Minister, also Nazir __ Vezir: , minister, highest rank in Ottoman official­ dom; was Sultan's chief official Vilayet: term for province after 1867 Yahudi: Jew, also Musevi Yenciceri: Janissary Yunanistan: Greece Zabit: officer Ziraat Vekaleti: Ministry of Agriculture