When Peace Means War
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The partition that dare not speak its name. WHEN PEACE MEANS WAR By John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera he Dayton settlement on Bosnia is an tinfin- effect, that each regional government can defy' the cen- ished peace, hence a flawed peace. Major issues tral government's wishes at will. Most important, either retnain unsettled. The U.S. must send its can at any time declare and enforce its velvet divorce promised peacekeeping contingent to Bosnia, from the other and its sitiiultaneous remarriage to a T neighboring state. The Dayton accord even legitimates but, tinless it also moves to repair the Dayton accord, these defects will lead to new war, this time with Ameri- the first steps of this divorce-and-remarriage by allowing can troops caught in the middle. each entity to establish a "special relationship" with a Two types of Bosnia peace-schemes—one infeasible, neighboring state. one workable—have long contended. One type offered Dayton is the fourth Bosnia peace plan produced unitary federal solutions that wotild maintain Bosnia as since 1992 and the cttlmination of a glacial process of a single state where Serbs, Croats and Muslims wotild U.S. acclimation to partition. The first was a prewar learn to live together. However, the triangle ot deep scheme agreed to in European Community-sponsored hatreds ttnleashed since Yugoslavia's breakup has long talks at Lisbon (February-March 1992). Although the made this solution implausible. Another type of plan plan spoke of national cantons within a Bosnian state, proposed partitions dividing Bosnia into several states the federal structure was so weak that the propos- (usually three), each free to go its own way. The Bosnian al, enthusiastically endorsed by Radovan Kiiradzic, Serb state then could (and surely would) join Serbia; the amounted to partition. Tragically, the Lisbon plan Bosnian Croat state cotild join Croatia; and a Muslim- failed when Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic changed majority rump state would remain independent. his mitid and scuttled it. Althotigh Warren Zimmer- Since before the war started in April 1992 the U.S. mann, the American representative at the talks, now has favored a federal soltition and opposed partition. denies it, most reliable reports sttggest that Izetbegovic Now we have belatedly seen the light and produced a acted with U.S. approval. partition settlement. This is good news, althotigh ihe Next came the Vance-Owen plan (September 1992- Clinton administration will not admit that its policy has May 1993). It proposed a unitary federal Bostiia divided changed. Announcing the accord. President Clinton along ethnic lines into ten semiatitonomous cantons asserted Ihat "the peace plan agreed to wf)uld preserve that wotild remain subordinate to a capable central gov- Bosnia as a single state." Secretary of State Warren ernment. The Bosnian Serbs predictably rejected it since Christopher likewise maintained that "the agreement is it denied them their prime goal, national independence. a victory for all those who believe in a multiethnic Vance-Owen was followed by a European proposal for democracy in Bosnia." Htimpty Dumptv', they sttggest, veiled tripartite partition (July 1993-January 1994). has been put back together again. Resemhiing the Lisbon plan, it envisioned three ethnic These are noble lies. The settlement is a veiled parti- reptiblics coexisting in a loose confederation under a tion but a partition nevertheless. It effectively divides powerless central government that could not prevent Bosnia into two separate states: a Serb Republic the inevitable final breaktip. Still dreaming of a united {Republika Srpska) and a Muslim-Croat Federation. Bosnia ttnder their leadership, and again encouraged They coexist tmder an itiipotetit central government by the U.S., the Mtislims rejecled it in early 1994. that barely deserves the name. The reality of partition is At tliis point the LI.S. had torpedoed two peace plans starkly evident in the settlement's military provisions. while endorsing none. Exasperated, the Etiropeans Both Republika Srpska and the Federation are allowed demanded that the U.S. propose and stipport soltitions to maintain their own armies, and each army is forbid- of its own. This led to the so-called Contact Croup plan den from entering the other's territory. This means, in of April 1994, which reached frtiition at Dayton. It stemmed from two developments between February JOHN J. MKARSHKIMKR is professor of political science at and April 1994. First, tbe Americans pushed the Croats the University of Chicago. SI'KI'HKN VA\ EVKR.A. is associ- and Muslims, then engaged in a bloody war, to stop ate professor of political science at M.I.T. fighting and form a federation. Second, the United 16 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER IS, I995 States, Britain, France, Russia and Germany formed the never accept. Instead they will demand their own state five-power C.ontact Group, which then proposed a or insist on joining a Greater Croatia. veiled bipartite partition of Bosnia lietween the Muslim- Croat-Muslim relations were badly damaged by the Croat Federation and the Serbs. It envisioned a 51-49 brtual war they fought between April 1993 and Febru- territorial division ot Bosnia, with 51 percent allotted to ary 1994. The U.S.-brokored peace that ended it is little the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to Repul> more than a truce. Relations between the two sides lika Srpska. The Serhs would be allowed to remain out- remain venomous. Even as they strtiggled together side the Federation and to rttn their own republic. At against the Serbs, Muslim and Croat forces twice fell to the time, (Minton administration officials hinted that fighting each other in sotitliwestern Bosnia last stim- the U.S. might tolerate secession by the Bosnian Serbs. tner. Croat-Muslim relations in Mostar tell the same The basic outline of the bipartite partition agreed to in story. That city was devastated by the Croat-Muslim war Dayton was in place, although Serb acceptance had to and left divided, with the Croatians controlling the west- await the soliering ern half and the Mtis- impact of battlefield lims ruling in the east. defeats in the stimmer The Dayton Agreement The European Com- of 1995. mtmity then invested The Dayton accord over $200 million to embodies America's rebtiild and reunify belated embrace of Mostar. Yet the city partition, but it does remains divided, with not carry partition's no prospect of recon- logic to its necessary ciliation in sight. conclusion, and there- The Bosnian Croats in lies its weakness. can destroy the Feder- The Dayton agree- ation at will. Their ment posits bipartite political organiza- partition, but there tion, the Reptiblic are three competing of Her/.og-Bosna, al- parties in Bosnia. A ready boasts all the BOSNIAN/CROAT plan that denies this trappings of a state. It FEDERATION reality suffers from has its own 50,000- the same comforting man army. It delivers delusions that have the mail, runs the pre\ en ted the West schools and collects from sectiring a Bos- taxes. Most impor- nian peace for the tant, like the Repub- past three years. lika Srpska, it has a The main problem powerful ally next is that the Croatian- door in the Republic Mtislim Federation is Proposcd New Bt)und.irv of Croatia. It is untenable. Like the already closely linked Currently Under Bosnian/Croat Control Bosnian Serbs, the to its mother state: Bosnian Croats want Currently Under Serb Control Bosnian Croats carry otit of Bosnia. They Croatian passports, MAV HV |IM MOI.I.OWAV KOR THE NEW REPUBLIC accepted the Muslim- use Croatian currency Croat Federation as an expedient, but they chafe at and (joatian license plates, route their telephone calls membership in it, and they will surely move to destroy it throtigh Croatia and vote in Croatian elections, as someday soon. The U.S. should have anticipated this they did in Croatia's October 29, 1995, parliamentary development by forging agreement on the partition of elections. tlie Federation into Croat and Mtislim states at Dayton. Moreover, Croatia is a willing ally and partner in the Instead, their inevitable divorce may well occur by war. Federation's destruction. (Croatia's strongman. Presi- All evidence points to fierce Bosnian Croat resistance dent Franjo Tudjman, has shown undisguised contempt to political tinion with the Bosnian Muslims. 1 he mayor for the Bosnian Muslims. Even as he paraded with of a Bosnian Croat town near Mostar recently warned Richard Holbrooke in Dayton, he was promoting a that "if there were a referendum, the people would vote Croatian general, Tihomir Blaskic, charged recently by not 90 percent but 99 percent, not to be part of the the international war crimes tribtma! with anti-Muslim Federation." Simple demographics fuel this Croat hos- crimes against humanity. The tribtmal alleged that dur- tility. Muslims outnumber the Bosnian Croats by more ing the 1993-1994 Mtislim-Croat war Blaskic oversaw the than two to one and wotild, therefore, dominate Feder- systematic killing or expulsion of "alriiost the entire ation politics. This the highly nationalistic Ooats will Muslim civilian population in the Lasva valley" in cen- DECEMBER 18,1995 THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 tral Bosnia—deeds that Tudjman apparently felt were gain these goals by force while Muslim and Croat forces tio bar to advancement. Tudjman has also spoken tie each other down. And if the Serbs jump through this openly of seizing Croatia's share of Bosnia and even of window of opportunity we will be back where we began, dividing it in two with Serbia. with a three-way war. If the Bosnian Croats oppose the Federation, why did Alternately, renewed Croat-Muslim fighting could they join it in the first place? In early 1994 the United also end with a SerlvCroat conquest of Muslim lands States offered Tudjman blandishments that he could and a two-way division of Bosnia between Belgrade and not refuse.