The that dare not speak its name.

WHEN PEACE MEANS WAR

By John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera

he Dayton settlement on Bosnia is an tinfin- effect, that each regional government can defy' the cen- ished peace, hence a flawed peace. Major issues tral government's wishes at will. Most important, either retnain unsettled. The U.S. must send its can at any time declare and enforce its velvet divorce promised peacekeeping contingent to Bosnia, from the other and its sitiiultaneous remarriage to a T neighboring state. The Dayton accord even legitimates but, tinless it also moves to repair the Dayton accord, these defects will lead to new war, this time with Ameri- the first steps of this divorce-and-remarriage by allowing can troops caught in the middle. each entity to establish a "special relationship" with a Two types of Bosnia peace-schemes—one infeasible, neighboring state. one workable—have long contended. One type offered Dayton is the fourth Bosnia peace plan produced unitary federal solutions that wotild maintain Bosnia as since 1992 and the cttlmination of a glacial process of a single state where , and Muslims wotild U.S. acclimation to partition. The first was a prewar learn to live together. However, the triangle ot deep scheme agreed to in European Community-sponsored hatreds ttnleashed since 's breakup has long talks at Lisbon (February-March 1992). Although the made this solution implausible. Another type of plan plan spoke of national cantons within a Bosnian state, proposed partitions dividing Bosnia into several states the federal structure was so weak that the propos- (usually three), each free to go its own way. The Bosnian al, enthusiastically endorsed by Radovan Kiiradzic, Serb state then could (and surely would) join ; the amounted to partition. Tragically, the Lisbon plan Bosnian Croat state cotild join ; and a Muslim- failed when Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic changed majority rump state would remain independent. his mitid and scuttled it. Althotigh Warren Zimmer- Since before the war started in April 1992 the U.S. mann, the American representative at the talks, now has favored a federal soltition and opposed partition. denies it, most reliable reports sttggest that Izetbegovic Now we have belatedly seen the light and produced a acted with U.S. approval. partition settlement. This is good news, althotigh ihe Next came the Vance-Owen plan (September 1992- Clinton administration will not admit that its policy has May 1993). It proposed a unitary federal Bostiia divided changed. Announcing the accord. President Clinton along ethnic lines into ten semiatitonomous cantons asserted Ihat "the peace plan agreed to wf)uld preserve that wotild remain subordinate to a capable central gov- Bosnia as a single state." Secretary of State Warren ernment. The Bosnian Serbs predictably rejected it since Christopher likewise maintained that "the agreement is it denied them their prime goal, national independence. a victory for all those who believe in a multiethnic Vance-Owen was followed by a European proposal for democracy in Bosnia." Htimpty Dumptv', they sttggest, veiled tripartite partition (July 1993-January 1994). has been put back together again. Resemhiing the Lisbon plan, it envisioned three ethnic These are noble lies. The settlement is a veiled parti- reptiblics coexisting in a loose confederation under a tion but a partition nevertheless. It effectively divides powerless central government that could not prevent Bosnia into two separate states: a Serb Republic the inevitable final breaktip. Still dreaming of a united {) and a Muslim-Croat Federation. Bosnia ttnder their leadership, and again encouraged They coexist tmder an itiipotetit central government by the U.S., the Mtislims rejecled it in early 1994. that barely deserves the name. The reality of partition is At tliis point the LI.S. had torpedoed two peace plans starkly evident in the settlement's military provisions. while endorsing none. Exasperated, the Etiropeans Both Republika Srpska and the Federation are allowed demanded that the U.S. propose and stipport soltitions to maintain their own armies, and each army is forbid- of its own. This led to the so-called Contact Croup plan den from entering the other's territory. This means, in of April 1994, which reached frtiition at Dayton. It stemmed from two developments between February JOHN J. MKARSHKIMKR is professor of political science at and April 1994. First, tbe Americans pushed the Croats the University of Chicago. SI'KI'HKN VA\ EVKR.A. is associ- and Muslims, then engaged in a bloody war, to stop ate professor of political science at M.I.T. fighting and form a federation. Second, the United

16 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER IS, I995 States, Britain, France, Russia and Germany formed the never accept. Instead they will demand their own state five-power C.ontact Group, which then proposed a or insist on joining a Greater Croatia. veiled bipartite partition of Bosnia lietween the Muslim- Croat-Muslim relations were badly damaged by the Croat Federation and the Serbs. It envisioned a 51-49 brtual war they fought between April 1993 and Febru- territorial division ot Bosnia, with 51 percent allotted to ary 1994. The U.S.-brokored peace that ended it is little the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to Repul> more than a truce. Relations between the two sides lika Srpska. The Serhs would be allowed to remain out- remain venomous. Even as they strtiggled together side the Federation and to rttn their own republic. At against the Serbs, Muslim and Croat forces twice fell to the time, (Minton administration officials hinted that fighting each other in sotitliwestern Bosnia last stim- the U.S. might tolerate secession by the Bosnian Serbs. tner. Croat-Muslim relations in Mostar tell the same The basic outline of the bipartite partition agreed to in story. That city was devastated by the Croat-Muslim war Dayton was in place, although Serb acceptance had to and left divided, with the Croatians controlling the west- await the soliering ern half and the Mtis- impact of battlefield lims ruling in the east. defeats in the stimmer The Dayton Agreement The European Com- of 1995. mtmity then invested The Dayton accord over $200 million to embodies America's rebtiild and reunify belated embrace of Mostar. Yet the city partition, but it does remains divided, with not carry partition's no prospect of recon- logic to its necessary ciliation in sight. conclusion, and there- The Bosnian Croats in lies its weakness. can destroy the Feder- The Dayton agree- ation at will. Their ment posits bipartite political organiza- partition, but there tion, the Reptiblic are three competing of Her/.og-Bosna, al- parties in Bosnia. A ready boasts all the BOSNIAN/CROAT plan that denies this trappings of a state. It FEDERATION reality suffers from has its own 50,000- the same comforting man army. It delivers delusions that have the mail, runs the pre\ en ted the West schools and collects from sectiring a Bos- taxes. Most impor- nian peace for the tant, like the Repub- past three years. lika Srpska, it has a The main problem powerful ally next is that the Croatian- door in the Republic Mtislim Federation is Proposcd New Bt)und.irv of Croatia. It is untenable. Like the already closely linked Currently Under Bosnian/Croat Control Bosnian Serbs, the to its mother state: Bosnian Croats want Currently Under Serb Control Bosnian Croats carry otit of Bosnia. They Croatian passports, MAV HV |IM MOI.I.OWAV KOR THE NEW REPUBLIC accepted the Muslim- use Croatian currency Croat Federation as an expedient, but they chafe at and (joatian license plates, route their telephone calls membership in it, and they will surely move to destroy it throtigh Croatia and vote in Croatian elections, as someday soon. The U.S. should have anticipated this they did in Croatia's October 29, 1995, parliamentary development by forging agreement on the partition of elections. tlie Federation into Croat and Mtislim states at Dayton. Moreover, Croatia is a willing ally and partner in the Instead, their inevitable divorce may well occur by war. Federation's destruction. (Croatia's strongman. Presi- All evidence points to fierce Bosnian Croat resistance dent Franjo Tudjman, has shown undisguised contempt to political tinion with the Bosnian Muslims. 1 he mayor for the Bosnian Muslims. Even as he paraded with of a Bosnian Croat town near Mostar recently warned Richard Holbrooke in Dayton, he was promoting a that "if there were a referendum, the people would vote Croatian general, Tihomir Blaskic, charged recently by not 90 percent but 99 percent, not to be part of the the international war crimes tribtma! with anti-Muslim Federation." Simple demographics fuel this Croat hos- crimes against humanity. The tribtmal alleged that dur- tility. Muslims outnumber the Bosnian Croats by more ing the 1993-1994 Mtislim-Croat war Blaskic oversaw the than two to one and wotild, therefore, dominate Feder- systematic killing or expulsion of "alriiost the entire ation politics. This the highly nationalistic Ooats will Muslim civilian population in the Lasva valley" in cen-

DECEMBER 18,1995 THE NEW REPUBLIC 17 tral Bosnia—deeds that Tudjman apparently felt were gain these goals by force while Muslim and Croat forces tio bar to advancement. Tudjman has also spoken tie each other down. And if the Serbs jump through this openly of seizing Croatia's share of Bosnia and even of window of opportunity we will be back where we began, dividing it in two with Serbia. with a three-way war. If the Bosnian Croats oppose the Federation, why did Alternately, renewed Croat-Muslim fighting could they join it in the first place? In early 1994 the United also end with a SerlvCroat conquest of Muslim lands States offered Tudjman blandishments that he could and a two-way division of Bosnia between and not refuse. In particular, the U.S. promised to help him Zagreb, following the lines of their rumored 1991 regain the large chunks of C'roatian territory (about agreement. Such an outcome would be quieter in the one-third of that cotmtry) then controlled by rebel short run but would surely lead to guerrilla war, massive Croatian Serbs. Toward that end, the United States new flows of refugees and the cruel denial of Muslim helped Croatia build a powerful army by turning a national freedom. blind eye to weaponry flowing into (Croatia in clear vio- lation of the U.N. arms embargo. The United States ome 60,000 NATO and non-NATO troops are slated also sent a team of retired U.S. army generals to Croatia for deployment to implement the Dayton plan to teach tactics and strateg)' to Ooatia's new army. shortly after its signing in later this month. Other aid, still concealed, was probably sent as well. S The United States will provide 20,000 soldiers The results of American assistance have been spec- for the implementation force, or tFOR, as it is called. tacular. In May of this year, the Croatian army recap- These forces are assigned to patrol the roughly 550- tured Western Slavonia in two days. In August the tiiile border between the Federation and the Republika entire Krajina region, a Serb-populated Croatian ter- Srpska, to separate the two sides' forces and to oversee ritory that easily threw off Croat rule in 1991, was their deployment back to temporary barracks away reconquered in four days. And last month, faced with from the front lines. this Croat military juggernaut, Serbia's President Slo- U.S. forces will face two problems. First, there is no bodan Milosevic agreed to give up Eastern Slavonia secure peace in Bosnia for the tFOR peacekeepers to keep. without a fight and transfer it back to Croatia in one to Peacekeepers can bolster a stable peace accord, but they two years. do little good before such an accord is in place. And Thus the Muslim-Croat Federation paid handsome because the Dayton agreement is incomplete, it may not short-term dividends for the Croats. But Tudjman still prove stable. A worst-case scenario, and not an unlikely has no long-term interest in making the Federation one, is that the shooting will start while IFOR is still work. In fact, his main inducement to cooperate will deployed in Bosnia, and Ainerican soldiers will be caught vanish with his recovery of Eastern Slavonia, which is the in the crossfire, perhaps in the midst of a presidential last Ooatian area still in Serb hands. Tudjman tipped campaign. The Clinton administration might then be his hand last May when he told a British parliamentarian forced to withdraw U.S. forces ignominiously, as it did that he envisioned a Bosnia eventually divided and con- after casualties in Somalia sparked an outcry at home. quered by Croatia and Serbia, a scheme he illustrated Even if tFOR is able to keep a lid on thefighting whileit is with a now-notorious sketch on a menu. His remarks deployed in Bosnia, the American effort will nevertheless echoed earlier reports that he and Milosevic had agreed be wasted if the fighting resumes later, as it almost cer- to carve up Bosnia between them in March 1991, the tainly will unless the Croat-Muslim conflict is resolved. same year in which the Croat leader told then U.S. The second problem is that U.S. forces will have two Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann that missions in Bosnia that work at cross-purposes: peace- "Bosnia has never had any real existence," and "should keeping and arming the Muslims. The impact of the be di\ided between Serbia and Croatia." U.N. arms embargo has fallen unevenly on the three In short, the Muslini-Ooat Federation is a\irtual dead belligerents, hitting the Bosnian Muslims hardest. letter. W^ien it collapses, there is bound to be renewed Today they are outgimned by both the Croats and the fighting between Croats and Muslims over disputed ter- Serbs and cannot defend themselves. Thus, one reason ritory unless their divorce is carefully agreed to in IFOR is needed is to protect the Muslims from the Croats advance. Renewed Croat-Muslim fighting could in turn and the Serbs while the peace plan is implemented. cause a wider unraveling of the Dayton accord by trig- The need to establish security for the Muslims will con- gering renewed Serl>Mtislini and SerI>Croat fighting. tinue even after the agreement is implemented. Other- wise the Muslims' weakness will be a standing invitation he Bosnian Serbs remain especially bitter about to both the Croats and Serbs to return to war once tFOR three aspects of the Dayton accorci: its award of leaves. Hence the U.S. will have to bolster the Bosnian Sarajevo and Corazde to the Federation and Muslim army before it can leave Bosnia. 1 he Muslim the narrow width of the O»rridor, the army should be strengthened to a point where it has a T fair chance of defending successfully against a Croat or Serbs' territorial connector in northern Bosnia. The Belgrade Serbs would also like to renege on their Serb attack. If the U.S. leaves without creating such a promise to return Eastern Slavonia to Croatia and to power balance it will leave behind a powder keg. claim it for Serbia Instead. Figliting between Croats and Arming the Muslims, however, clashes with the neu- Muslims would create a golden opportunity for Serbs to continued on page 21

18 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER la, 1995 ernment of Lebanon maintain order controlled companies. Then, on Beirut to Bosnia until it can organize its military and November 7,Jean-Hubert Feuille, a its poliee and asstmie control of its cousin and close political ally of Aris- f the U.S. contributes 20,000 borders and its own internal security." tide, was murdered by gunmen. At troops, as planned, to a 60,000- As a result of mission creep, the U.S. Feuille's funeral on November 11, I strong NATO peacekeeping force in committed itself to supporting a fee- Aristide uttered a fiei y speech calling Bosnia, the rcsuitwill be the latest ble government and joining as a com- on supporters to disarm his enemies. example of what (he Pentagon knows batant in the Lebanese ci\il war— The speech was followed hy acts of by the acronym CO nv: Operations ambitious tasks without the support of arson, looting and murder of political Other Than War. Its success may the American public, hi February opponents by some of Aristide's fol- depend on how well the Clinton 1984, three months after the hombing lowers. Even worse, on Friday, Novem- administration has learned the lessons of the Beirut Marine barracks, the ber 24, Aristide alarmed the U.S. by of previous attempts at OOTV\: peace- U.S. began its ignominious pullout. raising the possibility that he would keeping, peace-making and nation- In December 1992, President Bush stay in power for three more years (he btiilding in Lebanon, Somalia and setin motion another misadventure in had promised to leave office on Febru- Haiti. In these three cases, the same OOTW, this time in Somalia. The Clin- ary 7 after a free election on Decem- pattern has been repeated: early suc- ton administration expanded a rela- ber 17 in which he would not be a can- cess in achieving narrowly defmed tively successful humanitarian relief didate). Wiietber an orderly and goals followed by catastrophe and operation into a more ambitious democnitie transition will take place as withdrawal when "mission creep" led nation-lniilding effort—the familiar planned, permitting the exit of U.S. to ambitiotis attempts at reconstrtict- pattern of initial success in a strictly along with U.N. troops from Haiti, ing disordered states and societies. defined task followed by mission creep remains to be seen. The terrorist bombing of the U.S. and disaster. In its attempt to help The lessons of these adventures in Marine barracks in Lebanon on Octo- rebuild a Somali government, the Clin- OOTW for the U.S. in Bosnia are clear. ber 23,1983, which killed 241 Ameri- ton administration abandoned neu- The U.S. and its allies might succeed, can soldiers, has overshadowed the trality and took sides in the struggle as long as success is defined in the nar- fact that the initial interventi(jn of the among rival Somali factions. After two rowest possible terms—the separation U.S. in Lebanon was a success. The dozen U.N. peacekeepers from Pak- of hostile forces by neutral peacekeep- purpose of that first mission—in which istan were killed by supporters of ers. If the U.S. tries to provide the the U.S. joined France and Italy in a Mohammed Farah Aidid, the U.S. mtiscle for a powerless central govern- multinational forct—was to impose launched a manhunt for General ment with a complicated multiethnic peace among the warring factions in Aidid, now identified as an evil "war- constitution and little legitimacy Lebanon in the aftermath of Israel's lord. "In a firefight between U.S. forces among rival populations (as in Leb- June 1982 invasion long enough to and Aidid's troops in October 1993, anon) or to take sides with one group permit the troops from the Palestine seventy-eight American soldiers were rather than another in an attempt at Liberation Organization (PLO) to be wounded and eighteen killed; the body "nation-building" by outsiders (as in evacuated. By earK September 1982, of one was dragged triumphantly Somalia), the NATO effort in Bosnia is this operation had been accom- through the streets of Mogadishu, be- likely to end in failure and humilia- plished. On September 16, however, fore a world watching on CNN. Once tion. The U.S. must choose between six days after the U.S. Marines had again, the U.S. had failed to force the enforcing a de facto partition of the returned to their ships, Lebanese reassembly of a broken society at gun- defunct Bosnian state and a more Christian militiamen began a tliree- point; once again, U.S. troops engaged ambitious attempt to reconstruct a day slaughter of 800 Palestinian in a htimiliating retreat. federal Bosnia under a new central refugees in the Sabra and Shatila Compared to the debacles in Leb- government with a complex and prob- refugee camps. anon and Somalia, the U.S. interven- ably unworkable constitution. President Reagan then sent 1,200 tion in Haiti at first appeared to be a Even a modest and successful marines back into Lebanon in late success. Faced with the prospect of peacekeeping effort in the Balkans September 1982. Doing so was a disas- war with the United States, the mili- may be prolonged indefinitely. The trous mistake. The first intervention tary dictatorship of General Raoul situation in Cyprus offers another had followed a strict timetable (the Ceclias abdicated and Presidentjean- striking parallel: just as Bosnian administration promised the Marines Bertiand Aiistide was restored to Croats and Bosnian Serbs are likely would be withdrawn alter thirty days), power in September 1994. The origi- to seek annexation of their fragments and the U.S., along with its allies, had nal all-U,S, contingent of 20,000 of Bosnia by C^roatia and Serbia, not taken sides with one or another of peacekeeping troops has been re- respectively, so Greek C-ypriots have the warring parties. The new mission placed by a U.N. peacekeeping force sought to join Greece, while Turkey in Lebanon was hound by neither of of 6,900 troops, including 2,300 ,\mer- has occupied and governed the Turk- these constraints. There was no date ican soldiers. Haiti appeared to be a ish .section of tbe island. If the parallel for a pullout. Even worse, the Reagan model of peacekeeping thai worked. holds in other respects, NATO forces, if administration committed the U.S. to In the last month, however, the sent into Bosnia, will not be disen- the task of strengthening the govern- apparently successful settlement has gaged soon. The U.N. peacekeeping ment of President Aiiiin CJemayel—a begun to crumble. The United States force has been keeping Creek and govei niTient that existed more in the- announced that it would withhold a Turkish Cypriots apart since March ory than in reality. According to Rea- fraction of its aid to Haiti to punish the 1964. gan, on May 17, 1983, the U.S. was .Vistide government for not moving now in Lebanon "to help the new gov- more rapidly to privatize govennnent- MrcHAEi, LiNn

20 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER I8, 1995 tral stance that peacekeeping requires. Peacekeepers not going to happen. Bosnia has witnessed mass murder inN-ite attack unless they act as honest brokers, showing and other unthinkable horrors. Rivers of blood have no favoritism toward any faction. If the Americans arc flowed. All three parties are uncontrite and deeply bitter. perceived as taking sides, which is sure to happen once There can be no restoration of integrated life until a pro- we start arming and training the Muslim army, the found reconciliation takes place. This is decades away. Serbs and Croats are bound to consider the Americans Hence, most of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in this as adversaries. U.S. peacekeepers patrolling the long war is going to stand for now. In fact, even more transfers Federation-Republika Srpska border will be in\iting and are needed. For example, many of Sarajevo's Serbs will easy targets for terrorist retribution. want to leave once that city comes under full Muslim control. Most Serbs will also llee Eastern Slavonia if Milo- he U.S. never should have signed the Dayton sevic turns it over to the Croats. The U.S. should accept agreement. It should, rather, have forged a tri- these sad facts and develop plans to ease the hardship partite partition of Bosnia, in expectation that that these migrations inflict on the displaced. T the Croatian and Serbian republics would join a Finally, tiio United States should press forward with Greater Croatia and , respectively. In an arming the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs and Croats alternative—and better—agreement, the Muslim state should be urged to publicly accept this arming pro- would be given a viable national territory. Its borders gram, to give U.S. peacekeepers exposed in Bosnia a would not be unduly long, would not include Muslim measure of political cover. The U.S. goal should be to enclaves isolated in Serb or Croat territory, would be mil- give the Muslims a strong self-defense capability, ade- itarily defensible and would provide access to the sea. quate to deter new Croat or Serb aggression. Even if The Muslims would be promptly armed so that they Serb and Croat leaders publicly accepted U.S. military could defend themselves without having to rely on Amer- aid to Bosnia, however, this part of the accord could ican or NAio ground forces but nol given enough offen- compromise U.S. neutrality, making peacekeeping sive capability to lead them to try to take lost territory. efforts much harder. While this arming went on, the Muslim state would be If, however, the Dayton agreement falls apart— secured by a NATO promise to use massive NATO (largely because, for instance, Bosnian Serbs sabotage it—the U.S.) air power to assist Muslim forces if the need were to U.S. will not be sent back to square one, because the arise. Under such a scenario, the European NATO states C-linton administration will have finally begun to do and the U.S. would pursue a division of labor: Europe what it should have done long ago: arm the Bosnian would assume all peacekeeping dulies while the U.S. Muslims. If the NATO force is not, in the end, sent, or is concentrated on arming and training the Muslim forces soon withdrawn, the U.S. would not face the present and on maintaining a ready sword in the air. No U.S. contradiction between neutral peacekeeping and peacekeepers would go to Bosnia. Finally, a transfer of armed support for one side. It could then try, without populations caught behind new national borders would Dayton s restrictions, to build up a Bosnian state capa- be organized and subsidized by the major powers. ble of defending itself. Furthermore, with the deal hav- hnportant elements of this ideal strategy are no ing fallen through, European opposition to arming the longtrr possible because the Clinton administration has Bosnian Muslims would be weakened. Even if Dayton committed the U.S. to the Dayton program—with its tails, therefore, good may come of it. incomplete partition, its cross-purposes and its lack of provisions for population transfer. But the U.S. cannot eacemaking in Bosnia has been slow and diffi- now abandon Dayton without cutting an absurd appear- cult because the U.S. shrank from partition. It ance. So Dayton must go forward. shrank from partition because partition is ugly. To have any chance of success, however, the Dayton But in Bosnia, sadly, it is also the only feasible schemPe for peace. This error reflects a general Ameri- plan must at least be repaired. In the first place, the partition of the Muslim-Croat Federation should be can tendency to underestimate the power and in- promptly arranged. The U.S. should oversee its details tractability of ; it reflects, too, a dogmatic and apply whatever coercion the parties require. The American faith that other multiethnic societies can har- U.S. now seems ready to manage the Serbian exit from monize themselves, that ethnic groups elsewhere can Bosnia but remains strangely unaware that the Muslims learn to live together as America's immigrants have. and the Croats will inevitably part ways as well. Instead, This faith finds expression in reflexive U.S. efforts to the U.S. should develop a plan for managing the keep together all states that face communal civil wars, breakup of the doomed Muslim-Croat Federation with a lately including Iraq, the LSSR and Yugoslavia. mininuim of bloodshed. But U.S. policymakers must be willing at times to The U.S. should also accept the need to organize decide that some states cannot be sustained and should some further transfer of populations. The Dayton accord instead be disassembled. Only if we accept this reality includes surreal language referring to the return of honestly and promptly will we have a reasonable chance refugees to their homes, implying that Bosnia now might of managing their disassembly and keeping it relatively somehow return to the stauis quo ante. This would peaceful. Partition should remain a last resort, but, surely be desirable from a humanitarian and moral per- regrettably, we still live in a world where it is sometimes spective. However, save for a handful of special cases, it is necessary. •

DECEMBER 18,1995 THE NEW REPUBLIC 21