ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS

Special Bulletin

· October 1998 No. 53/54

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ISSN 1051-08442 Five Dolla-rs ACAS Executive Committee* Co-Chairs Political Action Committee Bill Martin Jim Cason University of Illinois 101 N. Carolina Ave., SE, #310 326 Lincoln Hall Washington, DC 20003 , 702 S. Wright Street E-Mail: [email protected] Urbana, IL 61801 Tel: (217) 333-8052 Meredeth Turshen E-mail: [email protected] School of Planning & Public Policy Rutgers University Merle Bowen New Brunswick, NJ 08903 University of Illinois Tel: (908) 932-4101 361 Lincoln Hall E-mail: [email protected] 702 S. Wright Street Urbana, IL 61801 Tel: (217) 333-2956 E-mail: [email protected] Treasurer Bulletin Editor Steven Rubert Daniel Volman Department of History Africa Research Project 306 Milam Hall 2627 Woodley Place, NW Oregon State University Washington, DC 20008 Corvallis, OR 97331 Tel: (202) 797-3608 Tel: (503) 737-1261 E-mail: [email protected];org E-mail: [email protected]

ACAS Board of Directors*, Adotei Adwei (Amnesty International) Salih Booker (Council on Foreign Relations) Joye Bowman (U. of Massachusetts, Amherst) Carolyn Brown (Rutgers U.) Allan Cooper (Otterbein College) ·Jennifer Davis (American Committee on Africa) William Derman (Michigan State U.) Ed Ferguson (Smith College) Allen J. Green (Wesleyan U.) Asma Abdel Halim (WILD AF-Sudan & U. of Ohio, Athens) Frank Holmquist (Hampshire College) Allan Isaacman (U. of Minnesota) Willard R. Johnson (MIT) Tilden Le Melle (Africa Fund) Sidney Lemelle (Pomona College) Pearl-Alice Marsh (Afi:ica Policy Information Center) Bill Minter (Africa Policy Information Center) , James Mittelman (American U.) Prexy Nesbitt (Baobab Notes) · Thomas Painter (Centers for Disease Control) Hans Panof~ky (Northwestern U.) Christine Root · Joel Sarnoff (Stanford U.) Ann Seidman (Clark U.) frnmanuel Wallerstein (SUNY-Bingharnton) Michael West (U. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) David Wiley (Michigan State U.) *Affil iatiol1 for identification purposes only Table of Contents

Editorial 2

Political Declaration of the Congolese Rally for Democracy 3

The Removal of Kabila and the Alternative: the Position of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 6

Position du Professeur Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja sur la Crise en Republique Democratique du Congo 9

Academics and Politics, by "The Scrutator" 12

Why Wamba dia Wamba Needs to be Heard, by "The Scrutator" 15

Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo, by M. Mamdani 17

South African Initative in the Congo Crisis, by M. Mamdani 20

Comments on Regional Security and the War in the Congo by Yusuf Bangura 23

Union for Democratic and Social Progress (UDPS): Memorandum of the Democratic Opposition Forces, by Etienne Tshisekedi 30

Angolan and Zimbabwean Troops in Our Country, by RCD 35

The Congo Crisis: a Replay of the Middle-East?, by Issa Shivji 39

Notes on the Pace of the Struggle for a New Mode of Politics in the Congo, by Horace Campbell 47

An Agenda for Peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region: More Pan-Africanism is the Answer, not Less, by Dr. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem 64

Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis, by M. Mamdani 74

Declaration on Political Conflicts in Africa, by the African Association of Political Science 82

Message from ACAS Co-Chairs 83

ACAS Meetings and Panels at the 1998 ASA Conference 84 2

Editorial

This special issue of the ACAS Bulletin has been produced in late September and early October. It was prompted by three factors. First, Congolese colleagues of ours, Wamba dia Wamba and Jacques Depelchin, are in the political leadership of the rebellion; both are known to many ACAS members from days at the University of Dar es Salaam and from their participation in panels sponsored by ACAS at the annual ASA meetings. Jacques, who is the rapporteur of the Congolese Rally for Democracy, came to the US for a short visit in mid-September and made available some of the organization's statements which had not been available to us previously. We believe that our membership will be interested in reading these documents.

The second factor has been the availability over the worldwide electronic media of a number of insightful analyses of the course of events in the struggle written by African scholars on three continents. Most of these have limited circulation via electronic mail, so we are making them available in hard copy to our readers.

The third--and most important--motive is a genuine concern that the p e.ople of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the opportunity to live in peace and begin the difficult task of reconstructing their nation after decades of exploitation and plunder by imperialist powers and domestic tyrants. Many of the contributors to this Bulletin offer their thoughts on how these goals might be achieved by means other than warfare.

A broad range of source materials are found here, ranging from unpublished analytical works and opinion pieces that have appeared in the foreign press, to individual and organizational statements by those involved. Members will recognize a few of the authors as long-time ACAS activists while others are scholars affiliated with the University of Dar es Salaam in the past or present. Both of these forums have been centers of progressive political analysis and theoretical debate, and it is the purpose of this issue to continue that tradition.

Contributions are generally arranged in the chronological order in which they were written. Selections begin with the CRD statement of August 12th and end with that of the AAPS on October 3rd. All address the immediate crisis and most are concerned with the need for (1) opposition to external invasion; (2) recognition of internal opposition; (3) and demilitarization of politics so that internal reform may be induced to build a democratic state in the DRC.

Many thanks to contributors and colleagues.

Ed Ferguson, Editor October 12, 1998 3

Political Declaration of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD/CRD) Coma, August 12, 1998

We, Congolese patriots and democrats, members of CRD, meeting in Coma on August 12, 1998 to assess the situation prevailing in our country, have noted the following facts:

1. The worsening of the crisis in state institutions coupled with the very anti-values decried upder the Second Republic: corruption, misappropriation of public funds, nepotism, votes-catching, the reign of the arbitrary.

2. The collapse of the economy undermined by perdition of national resources and the increase in the number of one-sided contracts.

3. The ever-growing impoverishment of the population owing to gross mismanagement characterized by embezzlement of public funds by Mr. Laurent Desire Kabila and his entourage.

4. The incapacity of the regime to restore peace, security, unity and national as well as sub-regional stability.

5. The clear intention to divide the army while at the same time setting up tribal private militia.

6. ·Return in strength of the repression of all democratic forces; wholesale massacres, political assassinations and imprisonment, discrimination and human rights violations.

7. The incitement to violence, hatred and the fueling of ethnic sentiments.

Besides the above-cited facts which have compelled the Congolese People to take up arms and fight for democracy, the current situation proves that the evil causes at the root of the ruin of our country have been made worse by Kabila's new management of malpractice, namely:

a) Usurpation of the people's sovereignty through autocratic rule designed to consolidate his own domination as well as that of his entourage.

b) Personalization of the institutions: the army, the government, the parliament, justice and the central bank.

c) The draft constitution meant to shield his totalitarian rule. 4

d) The deprivation of the people's right to a say in the management of national resources.

e) The stalling of the country's democratization process giving as a pretext that there was no security.

f) The deliberate policy of placing our territory at the disposal of military- fascist groupings for their acts of destabilization throughout the sub-region.

Therefore, we, Congolese patriots and democrats, hereby inform the Congolese people and the international community that on August 1, 1998 in Coma, Democratic Republic of Congo, formed the "Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD /CRD)."

This is a platform of political personalities, political organizations and the civil society. It is open to the entire living strength of Congolese Society.

The CRD is a politico-military structure whose overriding aim is to topple Kabila's dictatorship and to usher in a democratic regime founded on a truly popular legitimacy.

CRD's Objectives:

1. At the domestic level:

• Bring to an end any form of dictatorship by establishing the rule of law and good governance. • Build a united, democratic and prosperous state by safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity and equal rights to citizenship. • Encourage the process of national reconciliation, democratization and reconstruction. • Fight tribalism, ethnicism, nepotism, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, the arbitrary, widespread impunity. • Encourage peasants, workers, women and the youth to self­ organization for them to be able to defend their material and moral interests. • Promote the Congolese peoples' social welfare through specific measures more particularly in the areas of health, education and employment. • Build an integrated economy through a rigorous and responsible management starting with priority sectors, in order to eradicate the extreme poverty the people are living in and to lay a foundation for the country's economic development. 5

2. At the sub-regional and international levels:

• Safeguard security by striving for peace and stability in the sub-region and in Africa as a whole. • Undertake to never allowing the Congolese territory to be used as a base to destabilize neighboring countries. • Promote sub-regional and regional integration and solidarity through economic development. • Champion t1'.e development of the African renaissance. • Strive for equitable international cooperation with all due respect for mutual interests.

For this reason the CRD appeals to the entire Congolese people--men, women and children--to:

• Wake up and overcome fear and submission. • Unite and fight all forms of dictatorship. • Organize themselves and defend their right to democracy, peace and social justice in a free and sovereign state.

The CRD appeals to the international community to:

• Support the Congolese people in their struggle for democracy. • See to it that the massacres of Congolese populations by Laurent Desire Kabila in Kinshasa as well as in other regions of the country yet to be 'liberated are put to an end.

The CRD declares its unreserved attachment to the Declaration of Human Rights, to the related international conventions and to the Human and Peoples' Charter.

The CRD is a democratic movement that opted for war as a last resort. for that was the only way left to bring down Kabila's dictatorial rule.

Long Live Peace and Freedom in Congo, in Africa and All Over the World! 6

The Removal of Kabila and the Alternative: The Position of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) RCD Headquarters, Goma, August 17, 19981

1. The Situation as it Stands

Since August 2, 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has entered again into a civil war. This one pits Kabila's forces on one side and the RCD forces on the other. At this time (August 18, 1998) the RCD forces control both Kivu provinces, portions of Oriental and Bas-Congo provinces which together represent approximately 15 million inhabitants (out of a total of about 45 million people). On the ground the forces of the RCD encounter little resistance because most of the military units prefer to join the RCD's side. The RCD forces could reach Kinshasa in a few days.

The RCD forces behave in a responsible manner when facing Kabila's troops which they consider as being part of their army, but which has been betrayed by Kabila. Thus our forces treat their adversaries without any revenge feelings even when they capture them. In the liberated areas controled by the RCD, the population is calm, thereby indicating its support to the RCD and its. rejection of Kabila' s politics. Those areas are characterized by good cooperation between the RCD's political executive, the military and the political and administrative leadership.

But Kabila's side is characterized by a scorched earth policy and arbitrary rule:

War prisonners are executed.

There is a witch hunt for any person who looks like a Tutsi and of all those who have shown sympathy to the movement. Many of them are summarily killed, imprisoned under the most inhumane conditions, tortured or have been stripped of all their property. Kabila and some of his ministers have gone on the air waves and television calling on the population to hunt the Tutsi. He is now recruiting among well known fascist groups simply to defend his power at any cost. He is syphoning the banks, printing false currency without any regard for the consequences on the population.

2. Assessing Kabila' s Power

Two years ago the progressive Congolese and the States of the region had decided to struggle against Mobutu's regime in order to resolve the three following questions:

loate in text is August 18, 1998. 7

Total destruction of the country. Through repression Mobutu had managed to avoid completely any control over his power. The result was a systematic plundering of the economy, the destruction of all economic and social infrastructures, and the collapse of the state institutions. Almost in its entirety, the Congolese people had been reduced to abject poverty, belying the well-known human and material potential of the country.

Socio-ethnic discrimination. The negation of fundamental rights to certain comunities has brought the country to the brink of implosion. Cases in point are the ethnic cleansing of Tutsi in Kivu and of the Kasaians in Katanga.

Instability in the sub-region. Mobutu had allied himself with all the fascist forces in the region allowing them to use freely portions of the DRC's territory, as rearguard bases for launching destabilizing operations in different countries of the region. The consequence was the lack of peace in the Great Lakes region.

The cooperation between the progressive and democratic Congolese under the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) and the states of the region was excellent during the war and it was everybody's wish to get rid of the ills which stood in the way of a better future for Africa and the Congo. Mobutu's regime was overthown and Kabila took over. But what do we see today?

·Disorganization of the movement (AFDL) which brought Kabila to power. Once accepted by all as the transitional authority, the AFDL has been emptied of all meaning by Kabila. Instead of being a movement led by a collective and responsible leadership which took its decisions in a collegial manner in its ruling organs, Kabila transformed it into his own propaganda machine for the sake of reinforcing his personal grip on power. Inside the movement no democratic debate whatsoever was allowed, quite the contrary : he resorted to state power to terrorize all the cadres who worked in accordance with the principles and objectives of the movement, i.e. for the principle of collective decision taking over monopolisation by one individual. Some cadres w ere summarily dismissed and others jailed.

Disorganization of the state and the government. Kabila resorted to selective recruitment for the State institutions by giving systematically precedence to clan clientism, ignoring completely all criteria of competence and responsibility. 8

Kabila's priorities. Kabila concerned himself most with reconstituting the repressive apparatus without any concern for the fundamental problems of the population.

The consequences of this behaviour have brought back in the country of ethno-fascist ideology, corruption, embezzlement, kickbacks. In short, the return of Mobutism, i.e. generalisation of insecurity, plundering of the economy and destabilization of the countries in the region.

3. The RCD and the State Institutions

The RCD constituted itself by taking into account the fundamental needs of the Congolese people, the necessity of regional stability, but also of the errors committed under Kabila's reign. The philosophy which guided the creation of the RCD rests on democracy and the principles of collegiality and openness to all democratic forces. These principles are embodied in the founding documents such as the Agreement Protocole which calls for a certain flexibility with regard to conditions and type of affiliation (by individuals or organisations); the Political Declaration which calls for wide consultations before putting in place a government, transition institutions and its dur.ation. However openness does not apply to persons who are suspected of economic or blood crimes.

The RCD welcomes with satisfaction the support of any country in the region or from the international community which aims at the realization of the movement's objectives, and which respects the principle of self­ determination of our people.

4. Proposals

Agreement to negotiate, but prior to this Kabila must stop the on-going killings and ethnic cleansing.

Should Kabila relinquish power without any conditions he will benefit from amnesty measures. 9

Position du Professeur Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja sur la Crise en Republique Democratique du Congo

Le professeur Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, president de la Sous-commission des Dossiers politiques a la Conference nationale souveraine (CNS) et ancien vice-president de la Commission nationale des elections (CNE), apres une analyse minutieuse de la situation qui prevaut au pays, fait la mise au point suivante:

1. Notre pays, la Republique democratique du Congo (RDC), est encore une fois plonge clans une guerre civile dont les enjeux strategiques et les implications politiques vont au-dela de nos frontieres. Peu apres son independance en 1960, ce pays aux vastes richesses naturelles et situe au coeur de l'Afrique s'attira les convoitises des grandes puissances, soucieuses avant tout de l'aligner clans l'un ou l'autre camp de la guerre froide. La victoire de Washington et du camp occidental fut scellee par le sang de Patrice Emery Lumumba, assassine le 17 janvier 1961 par les autorites de la province secessionniste du Katanga, en complicite avec le pouvoir central a Kinshasa et la CIA americaine.

2. Auteur du coup d'etat du 13 septembre 1960 contre Lumumba, Joseph­ Desire Mobutu (qui plus tard adoptera le postnom de Sese Seko), recidivera le 24 novembre 1965, cette fois-ci en prenant le pouvoir pour etablir une dictature personnelle supportee par les puissances occidentales. Pendant trente-deux ans de pouvoir sans partage, le president Mobutu et ses hommes de main, a la tete desquels se trouvaient Bisengimana Rwema clans les annees 70 et Leon Kengo wa Dondo clans les annees 80 et entre 1994-1997, ont reussi a ruiner le pays, en detruisant son tissu economique et social et en faisant de notre cher Congo la risee du monde entier.

3. Pour sortir le pays du marasme clans lequel le regime Mobutu l'avait plonge, les forces vives de la nation ont exige et obtenu la tenue d'une palabre nationale pour etablir la verite sur le passe, promouvoir la reconciliation nationale et adopter un cadre juridique consenseul pour la periode de transition a une democratie pluripartite. Ce forum, la Conference nationale souveraine (CNS), qui s'est tenue a Kinshasa entre le 7 aout 1991 et le 6 decembre 1992, etait le lieu indique pour la remise et reprise entre les forces du statu quo et celles du changement, entre les agents des puissances exterieures et les dirigeants nationalistes soucieux de voir le pays recouvrer sa pleine souverainete, laquelle constitue une des conditions sine qua non de l'elevation du niveau de vie des masses populaires. Malheureusement, compte tenu de la fourberie de Mobutu et des erreurs monumentales de l'opposition

4. L'echec de la transition democratique est venue s'articuler avec une situation generalisee de crise en Afrique centrale et marquee par le genocide de 1994 au Rwanda. Cest precisement !'initiative rwandaise visant la destruction des camps des refugies hutu au Congo, et partant, les bases des ex­ FAR (Forces armees rwandaises, l'armee de feu le president Juvenal Habyarimana) et des milices extremistes hutu, les lnterahamwe, qui portera Laurent Desire Kabila au pouvoir a Kinshasa, N'ayant pas d'organisation autonome credible ni de programme politique et de projet de societe coherents, M. Kabila fut ainsi propulse au pouvoir a la remorque d'une dynamique exterieure dont la grande majorite des Congolais ignorait les tenants et aboutissants. N'ayant pas une base politique solide au pays, le nouveau president a ete obsede par la preoccupation non seulement de faire table rase de tousles acquis de la CNS, mais aussi de supprimer les espaces de liberte que le peuple congolais avait cherement conquis face a la dictature faisandee du marechal-president Mobutu.

5. Les contradictions d'un regime coupe du tissu social, ensemble avec la presence clans les hautes instances de l'Etat d'un grand nombre de gestionnaires inexperimentes et recrutes sur base du nepotisme, du clientelisme OU d'attachement idolatrique a un homme providentiel (1 Mzee, "l'homme qu'il fallait"), n'ont pas tarde de s'eclater au grand jour, Caracterise par son pilotage a vue en politique interieure, son manque de serieux clans la diplomatie et son amateurisme generalise, le regime Kabila n'a pas satisfait aux attentes des unset des autres, y compris les principaux acteurs derriere son avenement, les Banyamulenge et les regimes de Kampala et de Kigali. Par consequent, le president autoproclame s' est coupe de ses allies interieurs et exterieurs.

6. La crise actuelle est avant tout une manifestation du desir de ses allies d'hier de substituer a Kabila une nouvelle equipe dirigeante beaucoup plus competente et mieux disposee a faire le sale besogne des autorites rwandaises et ougandaises vis-a-vis des groupes armes qui les contestent a partir du territoire congolais. Si le Rwanda et l'Ouganda, tout comme le Burundi et l' Angola, ont des interets securitaires legitimes aux frontieres qu'ils partagent avec la RDC, ces interets ne peuvent etre garantis que par un gouvernement pleinement responsable et clans lequel le peuple se reconnait, et par une armee veritablement nationale, Quelles que soient les bonnes intentions des compatriotes actuellement impliques clans la rebellion contre Kabila, ils auront beaucoup de difficultes a s' emanciper de leur encombrant allie militaire rwandais, dont la tutelle de fait sur la rebellion est loin d'etre negligeab le.

7. A l'heure actuelle, la priorite des priorites est un cessez-le-feu qui permette aux gens des vaquer a leurs occupations clans la

8. Seule une solution politique peut aider a resoudre la crise actuelle. Une table ronde de toutes les forces vives de la nation, comprenant les partis politiques les mieux connus et les representants de la societe civile, est indispensable. Elle permettra aux uns et aux autres d'etablir la verite sur les causes profondes de la crise, de debattre de l'avenir du pays et d'adopter un cadre juridique et politique de la transition. En plus de determiner la duree de la transition et les modalites pratiques de la creation de nouvelles institutions republicaines, la table ronde aura a definir un programme minimun de gouvernement pour la periode de transition et a mettre en place un gouvernement de large union nationale pour la mise en application de ce programme et la gestion globale de la transition.

Georges, Nzongola-Ntalaja Professeur emerite en etudes africaines a l'Universite Howard de Washington

Fait a Washington, le 13 aout 1998 12

Academics and Politics by "The Scrutator," The Zimbabwe Mirror (Ibbo Mandaza, Editor) 28 August-3 September 1998

It was with some surprise and indeed shock when I saw on TV last week my good old friend Wamba dia Wamba addressing a press conference, as leader of the rebels in DRC. I learnt later that he is, in fact, the President of the Congolese Democracy Movement (CDM) while another friend of ours, Jacques Depelchin, is the Secretary General.

Wamba dia Wamba is a Congolese intellectual, a philosopher and historian and, until he took "leave for personal reasons" some three weeks ago, was Professor at the University of Dar es Salaam. We met at that institution in the late 1970s, worked together in those days in both academic and liberation politics circles. More recently, he has been a key factor in the CODESRIA, AAPS and SAFES networks. Jacques Depelchin a Congolese historian, also hailing from the Dar es Salaam days and was for some time in the 1980s attached to the Centre for African Studies in Maputo. We attended President Machel's funeral together and he has visited us often in Harare.

Both Wamba and Jacques were long-standing exiles to Mobutu's regime and Wamba was detained by the latter while visiting Zaire in late 1979, to be released after a concerted appeal by various international groups, including those of us at the University of Dar es Salaam the time.

It was the declaration of the CDM, through the voice of Wamba dia Wamba in Coma on 12th August, 1998, that the offensive against the government of Laurent Kabila began formally, backed by Uganda and Rwanda.

"CDM calls on all Congolese people, men, women, and children: to be mobilized in order to rid themselves of fear and submissiveness; to unite and fight dictatorship in all forms; to organize themselves in defence of their democratic rights, peace and social justice in a liberal and sovereign state."

However, the first hint any of us had in Harare as to the involvement of some of our colleagues in the DRC fiasco was the article in a South African newspaper on 14 August, by another of our friends--Horace Campbell--from the Dar es Salaam days. Horace hails from the Caribbean but is so much part of Eastern and Southern Africa that it would be difficult to deny him nationality in Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe or Mozambique.

More important for our purposes herein is that Horace is so hand in glove ideologically with both Wamba dia Wamba and Jacques Depelchin. So, not surprisingly, the article reflected the content of the declaration already made through Wamba dia Wamba and his CDM, but went on to warn Zimbabwe against interfering in the affairs of the Congo. The latter message was 13 particularly significant and hence, perhaps, the reason for publishing the article in a South African newspaper, Business Day.

Yet this was a strange turnabout on the part of an academic who, hardly a year earlier, had made such a spirited defence of Zimbabwe's role and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security while, in a tone interpreted by some analysts as hostile, castigating South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. It is not so much that Horace might be inconsistent in his academic analyses; it is simply that he has always been incorrigibly faithful to Wamba dia Wamba and Jacques Depelchin.

Therefore, the question which has stood ever since the heady days of Dar es Salaam of the late 1970s has been this: can an academic sustain intellectual integrity while dabbling in post-independent politics? The reference to post­ independence politics was deliberate because pre-independence politics was obviously different in that it required only the very basic of nationalist commitment to the motherland. The post-independence period is fraught with many dangers, the main of which are class aspirations and the thirst for state power.

The passage of time has also exposed the state as an imponderable political quantity, more likely to swallow within its class and power logic even the best of our intellectuals. The University of Dar es Salaam itself is an important landmark against which to assess those intellectuals who have since the 1970s graduated from its seminar rooms into State Houses, Ministerial Offices and other offices in the state. There are many of us: some like Yash Tandon and Dani Nabudere might consider themselves fortunate for having been displaced so early after they had made it to the Ugandan State between 1979- 81; and others like Shamuyarira, still in place; and then there was K wesi Botchwey of Ghana, who was first a cabinet Minister, and is now in the circle of the World Bank.

However, the chief of them all, Yoweri Museveni, now views himself--and (his) Uganda--as the "centre of gravity" (his own words!) for a United States of Africa, similar to the United State of America, based on the "Bantu- Nilotic­ Sudanic peoples of Central and Eastern Africa (his own words!), and forming "a powerful union of African states with one union government and one army" (his own words!).

It is a great pity that such wild statements (on the part of a man who nevertheless fancies himself as some great intellectual) should cause to some to read so much into the current crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We should assess each case on its merits and not equate the process that brought Kabila to power last year with that which sought to replace him with Wamba dia W amba. In this regard, we might still want to give Wamba dia Wamba and Jacques Depelchin the opportunity to explain themselves to both 14

the Congolese people and those of us of their fraternity who are tempted to give them the benefit of the doubt.

All the same, the question lingers on, in the suspicion that academics and politics are so antithetical that the intrusion of one with the other is more likely to compound than resolve Africa's problems. 15

Why Wamba dia Wamba Needs to be Heard by "The Scrutator," The Zimbabwe Mirror, (Ibbo Mandaza, Editor) 4-10 September 1998

Not surprisingly, there have been some contacts between Wamba dia Wamba and some of us known to him in Zimbabwe and throughout the African scholarship community in Africa and the diaspora. Of course, we are worried about his personal safety and that of the other Congolese colleagues, like Jacques Depelchin, who are with him in battle ravaged Coma. Wamba's wife, Elaine is in torment and agony in Dar es Salaam, wondering whether she will see her husband again; our thoughts are with her, the children and all those who acknowledge that Wamba is one of the finest persons that the Congo--and Africa--has produced.

There can be no doubt that serious political mistakes have been committed by our Congolese colleagues, and that the "strategic alliance" (which is how Horace Campbell describes it) with Rwanda and Uganda has backfired and wreaked havoc for the Congolese Democratic Movement (CDM).

More perilous was the decision by rebel forces to occupy Matadi in the fringes of Cabinda, an area so vital to the security considerations of the Angolan government. As it turned out, the declaration by Wamba that the CDM "could never side with UNITA" came far too late after the damage was done; and, however opportunistic on its part, UNITA's assistance to the rebel forces last week will have confirmed the Angolan government's suspicions that a rebel take-over in the DRC could only enhance the military and political fortune of UNIT A.

Clearly, Wamba and his colleagues least expected that there would have been such a reaction as the military intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Without such intervention, there was every possibility that Wamba dia Wamba would have replaced Kabila less than two weeks ago, buttressed by his "strategic allies," Rwanda and Uganda.

It is unnecessary now to speculate what might have been the scenario unfolding in DRC. The point is that such an outcome now looks such a very remote possibility, unless and until Wamba dia Wamba and his CDM are able to convince SADC and the OAU that there is indeed a National Question in the DRC. it is unfortunate that Wamba and his CDM did not do enough political work in the sub-region as a precondition for their programme of resistance against Kabila. They took too much for granted. Worse still, they tried the dangerous precedent, so feared in the OAU, of seeking to overthrow a legitimate government through military means. Indeed, it is a dangerous precedent, under any circumstances, if a group of citizens in any country can simply 16

decide to take up arms, on the grounds that the government of the day is not to their liking. For, if Kabila was so useless as a political factor in DRC, the more reason why the CDM should have resorted to a concerted political programme that would expose the incumbent government and ensure that it lost at the polls which were due in 1999.

It is too early to say that it is all water under the bridge. But events are moving quite rapidly to the stage at which a ceasefire has to be effected and negotiations entered into. The fighting cannot go on indefinitely and Zimbabwe in particular will become increasingly vulnerable--especially at home--if this issue should become unduly protracted. As was stated in the Voice of the Mirror last week, "ultimately, this is all about the welfare and security of the people of Congo .... " Besides, Zimbabwe.cannot too confidently claim that she and the other "SADC allied forces" are confronting Rwanda and Uganda and in the same vein ignore Wamba dia W amba and the CDM. More important, we cannot all condemn Kabila for having failed to build a national consensus over the last year that he has been in Kinshasa, and in the . same vein not encourage him to make cause with such renowned Congolese nationalists as Wamba dia Wamba.

Wamba dia Wamba should be allowed to visit Zimbabwe as a matter o( urgency. He should be heard out and encouraged to begin negotiations with Kabila. Wamba dia Wamba and the CDM have already endorsed the idea of a National Conference in the Congo, as part of the process towards reconciliation and General Elections in the DRC.

Wamba dia Wamba might be the only card through which to end war in Congo and thereby establish the process towards democracy and stability in the DRC. 17

Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo by Mahmood Mamdani (A.C. Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town), Mail and Guardian, August 14-20, 1998

When Rwanda decided to provide foot soldiers to spearhead the anti-Mobutu rebellion in October 1996, the main objection came not from Mobutu's erstwhile patrons but from Rwanda's own staunch ally, President Museveni of Uganda. Museveni had not forgotten the Ugandan experience of being liberated by a mainly foreign army. He had not forgotten that when Tanzanian troops intervened in 1979 to remove Idi Amin, the intervention proved to be not just the end of a crisis but the beginning of another. The intervention in fact triggered a spiralling crisis, moving from one government to another.

Having come in as a benefactor, Tanzania was tempted to stay in as a custodian. No matter how hard it tried, and no matter how many times it changed local partners, Tanzania could not halt the spiral, at least not until a six year long guerrilla war gelled together an internal force strong enough to control the country on its own. That force was the National Resistance Army, and its fiercely independent leader was Yoweri Museveni.

It is surely a supreme irony of history that Museveni should have teamed up with Rwanda in support of a second regional intervention in Congo in less than two years. One is tempted to ask: Is not the same spiralling crisis afoot in Congo that Museveni feared an intervention would trigger, like the one Uganda experienced from 1979 to 1986 in the aftermath of the Tanzanian intervention?

No one disputes any longer that Laurent Kabila's government was installed into power by foreign forces. Few would deny that the parameters of Congolese politics for the first year of Kabila's power was defined by a twin reality. One, Kabila did little by way of political reforms to expand his domestic political base, and two, most Congolese saw the Kabila government as a stooge of Rwandese forces. As the Congolese came to see the Rwandese as an army of occupation, it was not difficult to foresee that a government in search of instant popularity would have one trump card at its disposal. That card was the demand that Rwandan troops leave.

That was the card Kabila played last month. Not unexpectedly, he reaped a mixed harvest: both civilian support and an armed rebellion. The Kabila government may not survive this rebellion. But even if it does not, it is hard to see how the Rwanda-Uganda intervention can come out at the winning end. 18

The lightening advance by Rwandan troops in their first intervention--when they took power in the short span of eight months, from October 1996 to May 1997--may have lulled them into thinking that a repeat is possible. But the conditions of that advance were not just the weakness of the Mobutu military. They included, vitally, the political isolation of the Mobutu regime, both regionally and internally. With the second armed rebellion, the military and political facts are at odds with one another. Having forged its core through a battle experience that stretches more or less without interruption from the beginning of the guerrilla war in Uganda in 1981, the Rwanda army is undoubtedly the strongest in the region. But it can hardly boast of a similar strength politically. The region harbours strong doubts about the legitimacy of Rwandese intervention in Congo.

At the same time, there is little indication of any change in Congolese hostility to Rwandese military presence on Congolese soil. Given its historical role, Rwanda, like Uganda, can expect to influence the process of internal development in Congo. But neither can expect to commandeer it. This point is bound to be driven home, if not by the Kabila government, than by one of its successors.

No doubt, it must be tempting for Rwanda and Uganda, and not just for Congo, to think that their problems come from across the border and not from within. The next step is to conclude that the antidote to their problem is external intervention rather than internal reform. For those in the region not directly involved in the second rebellion, it is important to recognize that the alternative to military involvement is not non-involvement, but a strong political initiative. South Africa is in a particularly strong position to take this initiative since it was not part of the regional coalition that backed the first armed rebellion and since it was, for that very reason, absent from last week's reportedly sharply-divided meeting of the coalition in Victoria Falls last week.

That political initiative needs to be two-pronged, one directed at the interventionist powers (Rwanda and Uganda), and the other at the government of Laurent Kabila. The interventionist powers need to be discouraged by strong peer pressure. Both the assumption of a rapid and relatively cost-free intervention, and the wisdom of conducting neighbourly relations through military interventions, needs to be questioned. The likely consequences of foreign military adventures by small and resource-poor neighbours need to be underlined.

It is time to pose some hard questions: if Israel has not been able to "pacify" southern Lebanon, what chances does Rwanda have of "pacifying" eastern Congo? The Kabila government in Kinshasa needs to be reminded that its real weakness is political, not military. It needs to be told plainly that the quid pro quo of regional political support must be internal political reform. That 19 means recognizing multiple centres of political power within the Congo, particularly those that came together through the process of internal civic opposition from 1990 to 1996. It is time to recognize that political reform cannot be brought about by military intervention and, on that basis, to turn a crisis that looks like it could fragment the country we know as Congo into an opportunity for political reform. 20

South African Initiative in the Congo Crisis by Mahmood Mamdani (A.C. Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town), Sunday Independent, August 30, 1998

In less than two years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has seen two major armed rebellions, the first against Mobutu, the second against Kabila. This single fact should drive home one conclusion: that the malaise driving forward the Congo crisis is generated by more than just the failure of Kabila's government to keep past promises.

Ever since Congo was carved up at the Berlin conference over a century ago, the people of Congo have not had a say in the affairs of Congo. Mobutu was put in place, and kept there, by Western interests. Laurent Kabila was put in power by foreign troops that were the mainstay of the first rebellion. The trend continues with the second rebellion, also backed by foreign troops.

The African coalition that removed Mobutu from power split in less than 15 months. One part met in Victoria Falls, the other in Pretoria. The Victoria Falls coalition decided to send troops and equipment in response to President Kabila's request for military assistance. The subsequent announcement !!Jy Uganda and Rwanda that they may also intervene should be taken as preparation to make their involvement official.

That foreign intervention should prove to be so decisive in shaping its immediate future is a sign of Congo's internal crisis. That both sides to the current military contention, the regime and the rebellion, have a narrow political base is a confirmation of this crisis. On both sides, the narrow support base is at once the reason for foreign intervention and a consequence of that intervention. Is there a way of breaking out of this seemingly vicious spirat of diffusing this very dangerous Africanization of the conflict in Congo?

Whatever the way, it will have to include a broadening of the political base of the government in power as a pre-requisite to reducing direct foreign intervention in Congo's internal affairs. At the same time, it will require an acknowledgment that the chances of a cease-fire without agreement on an internal political reform package remain slim.

An agenda for political reform is not as hopeless as it might otherwise seem, for there exists in Congo an organized political constellation other than the government in Kinshasa and the rebellion in Goma. This is the loose and diverse grouping, civic and political, that emerged as an internal opposition to the Mobutu dictatorship in the period 1990-96. It is by and large urban, but it transcends any particular region. At its height, it included roughly 400 civic and 100 political groups. This coalition came together as the National Conference in Kinshasa. It does not have a single political leader, though its 21 leadership was at one point identified with Etienne Tshisekedi. The closest South African analogy to this internal opposition is the UDP in the late 1980s. Its inclusion will be key to forging a broad national government in Kinshasa.

It is a sign of Congo's current crisis that such an internal reform is not likely to be without an external initiative. It is also a sign of deep divisions on the continent that the only country in a position to take such an initiative is South Africa. When the leadership of post-apartheid South Africa heralded the dawn of an African Renaissance, Africa and the world rightly understood it as a claim to political leadership on the continent. Congo is the first litmus test of that claim. That test has yet to be passed.

The main problem is that the South African initiative is seen as lacking in independence. This may be more a matter of perception than of fact, and yet the perception is not entirely unreasonable. For South Africa to stand against foreign military intervention--in the face of a rebellion already driven forward by foreign intervention--is to be seen as opposing any further foreign intervention, thereby condoning the existing intervention.

This perception is aggravated by the context of the second rebellion. The anti­ Mobutu coalition was a proud affair which believed it was ushering in an African solution to an African problem. That coalition broke up, not because the Victoria Falls powers were strongly committed to support Laurent Kabila, more so because they opposed an attempt by a part of the coalition to set itself up as the custodian of power in Congo, and because they saw this as a prelude to the breakup of Congo. For those committed to an independent African initiative, it is also of concern that when resource-poor countries such as Uganda and Rwanda try to translate political into military leadership, they have little choice but to turn elsewhere for support, opening themselves to becoming conduits for extra-continental interference.

To be credible, the South African initiative will need to be both independent and creative. Just as it will need to be seen as independent of the US, today's single global power, so it will need to be as close as possible to both factions that have come out of the anti-Mobutu coalition. If it is to usher in an internal reform programme successfully, it will require the cooperation of external forces, particularly those backing the Kabila government. That cooperation is unlikely to be forthcoming unless there is, first, a recognition that there is a difference between a government and rebels. As every advocate of peaceful co-existence knows, to recognize that difference is not necessarily to support the particular government in power. Second, it will need exploring, along with all interventionist powers, the common ground for internal reform.

Finally, the initiative will need to recognize that any extended military involvement by an external power will run into the same problem that 22

Rwanda ran into after the first rebellion: it will compromise the credibility of the government in power and provide that government a convenient excuse for failing to create credibility. Precisely because Congo needs foreign intervention, any intervention will run the risk of propping up a government with a narrow political base. To minimize that risk, foreign involvement will need to be diversified in composition and limited in duration, while being informed by a clearly-defined reform agenda ratified under the political umbrella of the OAU. 23

Comments on Regional Security and the War in the Congo by Yusuf Bangura, Research Coordinator, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland. August 1998

The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which broke out on August 2 in the eastern border town of Coma, threatens to become Africa's first modern regional war. Already five countries--Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia--have committed troops in the embattled country. Other countries in the region seem set to intervene or provide varying forms of support to those that are already in. Rebel groups in Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have also been drawn into the war. And there have been reports that private security firms and mercenaries from South Africa may have been enlisted by both sides. Why did the situation deteriorate so rapidly in the Congo, and what are the regional security implications of the war? These comments address three issues.

I. Rwanda and Uganda: A Security Blunder?

The first relates to the way Uganda and Rwanda have handled relations with Kabila's government and the security implications of the militarist orientation that seems to inform the foreign policies of .the first two countries. One key question needs to be asked: why did Museveni and Kagame squander, in the space of a year, the goodwill and leverage they enjoye

Kabila may well have acted in ways that were perceived by Kagame and Museveni to be contrary to the latter two leaders' national security interests-­ defined broadly as the need to protect their national borders against threats from the Hutu Interahamwe and the Ugandan rebels, the so-called Allied Democratic Forces. Kabila's approach to governance issues, as has been pointed out by critics, has been clearly driven by nepotism and patronage. His governance policy has been narrow, repressive and distrustful of autonomous civic groups and political parties that had played major roles in weakening Mobutu's rule. However, allegations that his rule was worse than Mobutu's cannot be well founded. Nor are we dealing with an Idi Amin type of blood-thirsty rule that justified Tanzanian invasion of Ugandan territory on humanitarian grounds in 1979. It is debatable whether Kabila would have been able to police Congo's very long eastern border during his first year in office, and whether, in fact, he would have supported the Hutu and Ugandan 24

rebels when he was so dependent on Rwanda and, to some extent, Uganda for his own security. The ease with which large segments of the armed forces of the Congo collapsed or crossed over to the rebels suggests that the security situation may have been much more complicated than the story of official complicity in the use of Congolese territory by Hutu and Ugandan rebels. Is it the case that Kabila proved to be too independent for the designs of his former benefactors?

Whatever the reasons for the deterioration of relations between the three leaders, it seems that both Kagame and Museveni as well as their security advisers did not factor in the following issues when the decision was taken to destabilise Kabila's government and the country generally: the security fears of Southern African countries, which also have a legitimate stake in the stability of Congo; Kabila's historical ties with the leaders of these countries during their liberation struggles; Kabila's deft decision to seek membership of SADC, which effectively offered him the opportunity to reduce his dependence on Rwanda and Uganda; the unpopularity of the large presence of Rwandan troops in the country and ethnic Tutsi in the government; the fact that both Rwanda and Uganda are resource poor, when compared to the countries of Southern Africa; and the vulnerability of the very small • population of the Banyamulenge Tutsi to Congolese nationalism.

In the long-term, landlocked Rwanda and Uganda face heightened tension and insecurity in eastern Congo, whether the government of Congo wins the war or not. With the presence of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the war, we can safely predict that western Congo is unlikely to be taken by rebel forces. If the east also falls to government hands, then Rwanda and Uganda will have a very large, resource rich, outspoken and hostile neighbour ( a wounded lion? ) to the west of their two countries. If, on the other hand, the east remains a contested zone, it is unlikely that Congo will accept the buffer that Uganda and Rwanda will ultimately seek to create on Congolese territory. Congo is likely to sustain the fight for the recovery of its land, using the kind of strident nationalism that it has demonstrated so far in this conflict.

The war could spill over into Rwanda and Uganda, and all parties in the conflict would be tempted to support their opponents' rebels. So, whatever the outcome, Rwanda and Uganda may come out of this war with higher levels of instability and threats to their security than they faced before the uprising of August 2. Whoever said that Kagame and Museveni are master regional strategists and visionaries? Rather than being a force for regional stability as was previously thought, their militarist policies risk plunging Central and East Africa into protracted chaos and a humanitarian disaster. In a context of ethnic divisions and social tensions, militarism may fan the flames of genocide as all parties to the conflict may be forced to calculate in terms of ethnic survival. The policy of exporting armed rebellions to foreign 25 countries needs to be strongly queried and contained, especially in Africa where political institutions and economies are very weak. In the Great Lakes region, this policy contributed to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and, as the current war has shown, it has endangered the lives, security and livelihoods of ethnic Tutsis in Congo. In the West African region, the export of armed rebellions by Libya, Burkina Faso and Liberia led to lumpen and indiscriminate violence, untold atrocities, and widespread humanitarian disasters in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

II. South Africa, Zimbabwe and SADC

The second point I would like to address is the role of South Africa, Zimbabwe and SADC in the conflict. The question which a lot of people have been asking is: how come it is small countries like Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia that have taken the lead in the Congo crisis and not South Africa, the real power in the region? Why is Mandela's government pushing the option of negotiation and cease fire, while his partners in SADC have opted for the military option? One explanation is that Mandela may not be fully in charge of the South African military, whereas Mugabe, the leader of the SADC military coalition in Congo, is in charge of his. Having just come out of apartheid, with an economy, public service and army that are still largely White, the last thing the ANC wants is to engage the SADF in external military activities.

Foreign and security policy in South Africa may also be constrained by inputs from · ~white or Western interests" in the bureaucracy in a way that they are not in Zimbabwe. These interests are not fully engaged in the African discourse north of the river Limpopo. Negotiation, compromise and tardy responses to African problems may seem, therefore, to be the defining features of South African policy until the real power balance shifts significantly in favour of Africans and Africa-focused individuals in that country. In a way, this crisis has exposed South Africa's limitations as the African country that is best placed to occupy a permanent seat in the UN's Security Council. Nigeria's leadership and decisive peace enforcement operations in West Africa under ECOMOG seem to put it in a much better position than South Africa to represent Africa in the Security Council if such types of UN reforms are to be implemented at this stage.

Through its defence industry, Zimbabwe obviously has military financial interests in Kabila's government, as has been widely reported in the media. A Southern African friend informs me that the Inga dam, the largest hydro­ electric dam in the world, also produces about 10 percent of Zimbabwe's electricity needs, and is central to the operations of the copper belt in Zambia. It may also be supplying power to Congo-Brazzaville and Angola, and possibly even Rwanda. Does this explain why the rebels and their backers were able to reach an agreement with Angola not to blow the dam up, in 26

exchange for a safe passage out of the area? On the Angolan side, Dos Santos's MPLA government is worried about the prospects of having an unfriendly government in Kinshasa that would make it difficult for it to have access to its Cabinda oil enclave, which is situated between Congo and the Angolan mainland. It is also concerned about its capacity to check the activities of the recalcitrant UNIT A rebel movement.

An additional argument for Zimbabwean intervention is that Mugabe may, from his own experience in Zimbabwe, be sensitive to the dangers of allowing minority groups to lord it over majorities. It is, indeed, interesting to study how and why Mugabe was able to use his chairmanship of the military organ of SADC to isolate South Africa in the crucial meetings that led to the decision to give Kabila' s government a helping hand: South Africa was not represented in the early meetings of 14 SADC countries on the crisis, and was also not part of the delegation that was sent to Coma to find out whether Rwanda and Uganda were truly violating the territory of Congo. Also worrying are the differences that developed between Mugabe, Mandela and the OAU on the strategies for the resolution of the crisis.

Given the fact that South Africa is a recent member of SADC, it may take quite some time before the former's neighbours begin to respect its natural claims of leadership in the region. These countries are used to running SADC without South Africa. There are closer official military ties between Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique than between South Africa and these countries. These differences stem from the history of the liberation movements in Southern Africa and the fight against apartheid. Unlike South Africa, which had problems overhauling its apartheid army, the other Southern African countries relied substantially on their liberation armies in the formation of their post-colonial national defence forces. And since the latter have been independent for a much longer time than South Africa, they have a much more decolonised army than South Africa's. Military strategy in these early independent countries was also oriented against white rule and the need to contain the South African army. Angola, indeed, defeated the South African army in the 1970s at Cuito Cuanavale.

South Africa, it seems, may have lost the initiative to influence the situation in the Congo. The Pretoria communique surely recognised Kabila as the legitimate ruler of Congo, but it failed to condemn the methods which the rebels and their backers have used in their efforts to change the government. The 1997 OAU's Harare resolution--passed after the military overthrow of the government of Sierra Leone--opposed the use of military means to change legitimate governments, and the organisation's charter itself is staunchly opposed to the violation of the territorial integrity of member states. The Pretoria communique should have upheld these two vital principles of African international relations. It should be noted that there have been about 27

75 military coups in Africa since 1960, and about 18 civil wars in the 1990s, with the majority of the wars occurring under military governments.

What is more, current methods of armed rebellion harbour more dangers than traditional military coups in the dynamics of political change in the continent. Coups had, in the main, been swift and sharp, and had generally affected only the armed forces and resulted in minimal casualties. Armed rebellions on the other hand have brought untold harm on the civil population through indiscriminate mass killings, large scale population displacement, and destruction of economic assets and livelihoods. The latter have also exposed the African population to the power of armed factions and war lords who are not in any way committed to democracy and economic development.

It is interesting to note that the same forces that are now trying to overthrow Kabila collaborated with Kabila in frustrating calls for the opening up of the political system to civic groups and opposition parties after the overthrow of Mobutu. The so-called political wing of the rebel movement, Rally for a Democratic Congo, has all the hallmarks of a hastily assembled front. The real power seems to be with the militarists as represented by Deogratias Bugera, Jean-Pierre Ondekane, and Sylvian Mbuki. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of the political wing, is a fine scholar and pan-Africanist, but it is doubtful that he is in charge of the movement. In a recent CNN news report on the war, the military commander in Coma stated in Wamba's presence that he and his military colleagues would act against Wamba's political group if, on attaining power, they became unsatisfied with their rule. Wamba's recent interview with the Belgian newspaper, De Standard, is also revealing. He advanced the view that the political wing was formed after the military operation and, therefore, lagged behind the military system. He hoped that those whose views were in line with the political liberation of the people would eventually gain the advantage in the movement. But would they?

It is important to note that elements within the ranks of the militarists are among the forces that committed the genocide against Hutu refugees and rebuffed all efforts by the UN to investigate the crime. They are also associated with the corruption that has been levied against Kabila. Why should anyone believe that they will behave differently this time? Kabila's rule has surely not been inspiring, and there is an overwhelming and urgent case for internal political reforms, but these reforms cannot be brought about by military means. Militarism breeds a culture of violence and empowers those with guns at the expense of civic groups and pro-democracy political parties.

If the Pretoria communique had condemned the rebellion, it would have been much easier to work on its cease-fire provisions. Mandela would have been in a stronger position than now to bring pressure to bear on Kabila's ADFL to open up the political system to other civic groups and opposition 28

parties, guarantee basic human and civic rights, and organise elections that will establish a truly representative government in the country. The prospects for a SADC peacekeeping force in eastern Congo, or the Great Lakes region itself, would have been much easier to push through than it is the case presently.

Instead, we have been left with a situation in which relatively small, underdeveloped, though resource rich, SADC countries with tenuous democratic credentials, have become the custodians of the OAU's resolutions and the territorial integrity of Congo. It would be difficult for Mandela's peace and reform option to prevail under these circumstances. And calling for a peacekeeping force now is likely to be interpreted as an attempt by South Africa to undermine Congo's independence and links with its military allies. Despite these problems, South Africa should still make the effort to condemn the rebel uprising, and stress the need to defend the territorial integrity of the Congo. This may help to undo the damage that seems to have been created by the present policy of "neutrality." A policy of neutrality that does not uphold the principles of the OAU on the territorial integrity of member states and opposition to military methods in changing African governments is not likely to be effective. Upholding these principles may put South Africq, in a formidable position to convince other SADC members and Congo of the need to place a peacekeeping force in the east to defend both the territorial integrity of that country and the security interests of the Banyamulenge Tutsi, Rwanda and Uganda. It will also make it relatively easier for South Africa and SADC to influence the political reforms that are badly needed in the Congo.

III. The Pitfalls of Calls for US Support for a Tutsi Republic

The third issue I want to talk about is Edward Marek's New Congo News' tired ethnocratic scenario, which expects the US to provide military support to the leaders of Rwanda and Uganda to do what the Jews have done in Israel­ -create a Tutsi republic and defend it resolutely with armed methods. It is dangerous to draw a parallel between the Jews and the Tutsi. Until the last half of this century, no one seriously questioned the rights of the Tutsi in the places where they live. Despite the racial prism that has been used to explain the ethnic problems in the Great Lakes region, the Tutsi are an integral part of the African social and cultural formation. The vast majority of African countries are multi-ethnic non-nation states, and are likely to be disturbed by calls for an independent Tutsi state. Others may well ask: Why not an Ewe republic? or a Zulu republic? or an Ndebele republic? or a Kikuyu republic? or a Buganda republic? or a Fulbe republic? or an Acholi republic? or, indeed, two thousand or more ethnic republics? The OAU saw the security dangers of such calls and decided, correctly, in its charter to freeze the colonially­ inherited borders. 29

The problem in Rwanda and Burundi has been the history of hierarchical structures that have governed relations between the Tutsi and Hutu, and the fact that both countries are in a way the only ethnic diarchies or bi-polar polities in the continent. Social hierarchies breed feelings of superiority and hatred; and diarchies or bi-polarity make it difficult to construct multiple alliances in the resolution of conflicts. One of the main reasons why Museveni's rule has been relatively accepted in Uganda is precisely because of the large number of ethnic groups in that country, which has made it possible for him to create a complex web of social and political alliances. If the elites of both groups in ethnic diarchies or bi-polarities, such as in Burundi and Rwanda, do not recognise their limitations, their struggles for power can produce pogroms and genocide, because conflicts may be cast in zero-sum survivalist terms: one group's gain may be seen as the other group's loss. History suggests that minorities are unlikely to win such wars in the long run. The best long-term guarantee for minority rights is democracy and constitutional safeguards--not ethnic hegemony, separatism or militarism.

It is true that Israel has survived as a Jewish polity in a hostile Arab environment largely because of US support. But that US support is grounded on the concrete, not on emotions--the large presence of Jews in the US, who not only have a high voter participation rate relative to their national size, but have been able systematically to influence US policy in the Middle East. Jews have a strong presence in the US executive, legislature, political parties, media, business and academy. Encouraging the Tutsi to base a policy of survival on the US when the material basis for that policy does not exist is dangerous and silly. The Tutsi are better served by recognising the rule of the majorify, and crafting of institutions that will guarantee minority interests and civic rights. The key Hutu individuals who directed the genocide of 1994 surely need to be brought to justice, but the Tutsi rulers in Rwanda need to move away from the mind-set which tends to associate all Hutu with the genocide.

A large multi-ethnic country like the Republic of the Congo cannot be ruled by authoritarian, winner-takes-all methods. Nor can it be governed by foreign forces. The people of Congo need a pluralist democracy; and major state reforms that will produce equitable representation, accountability and efficient delivery of public service. It also needs a civic order that will guarantee basic human rights. 30

Union for Democracy and Social Progress: Memorandum of the Democratic Opposition Forces

Brussels (September 28, 1998): Memorandum of the Democratic Opposition Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, headed by Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, Elected Prime Minister at the Sovereign National Conference, addressed to the General Secretary of the UNO and to the international community with regard to the global and durable political settlement of the crisis in the DRC.

With reference to my capacity as leader of the democratic opposition forces and as President of the UDPS (Union for Democracy and Social Progress), the main opposition Party in the DRC, I would like first of all, to express my pleasure at seeing an African-born child, in your person, presiding over the destinies of the United Nations Organisation at dawn of the XXI st century.

I wish to you plenty of success with your heavy responsibilities and take this . opportunity to thank you, and through your person, all the members state of the UNO for the interest and the solidarity they reveal concerning the settlement of the dangerous and heavy crisis which now shakes my country and the whole central Africa.

The aim of the present memorandum I have the honour to subject to yourself and to the international community, in the name of all the democratic opposition forces of the DRC and all our people is : (I) to explain the grounds and the effects of the present civil war aggravated by its regional ramifications; (II) to introduce a political settlement plan likely to gather very wide support among the population and the democratic political forces; and (III) to start a pathetic and pressing call upon yourself and all the international community in order to support and make succeed the political settlement plan to the crisis set forth in broadlines hereafter.

I. The Grounds and the Effects of the Present Civil War

A. The Grounds of the Civil War

1 - The crisis has essentially internal causes to the DRC, they are namely: absence of democracy and rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedom violations, chaotic and opaque administration of the State (Public Affairs), corruption, nepotism, well-known incompetency of the main political responsibles of the country, etc.

2 - Considering the foregoing, the ruling government has not been able to efficaciously control the eastern border with Uganda and Rwanda and prevent the rebel forces of the two countries from using the Congolese territory as rear-base or passage way to attack their countries. It also has not 31 been capable of resolving some national disquieting problems such as nationality or land distribution which regularly plunges the North and South-Kivu provinces in the east of DRC into mourning.

3 - The democratic forces have constantly informed about these facts and ask to President Kabila for democratic and economic reforms in accordance with the plan laid down in 1992 by the national sovereign conference in order to create a stable and strong state capable of resolving national problems and live in good neighbourliness with the surrounding countries.

4 - As President Kabila has refused to listen to the repeated calls on him, privileging totalitarian personal power reinforcement methods, some of his old national and foreign allies have taken the arms against his regime. Some other foreign countries have come to help President Kabila to be maintained in power. Thereby, the civil war involves national and regional aspects which request an appropriate answer in order to achieve a durable peace in the DRC and the whole Great Lakes Region.

B. Consequences of the Civil War

5 - The inauspicious war effects are well known. They are even heavier for the DRC since the Kabila government was unable to resolve the problems of the population during the peaceful period. It is advisable to specify that the human rights condition is seriously affected by the war and also to notice the increasing impoverishment and other social difficulties of the populations.

This situation calls for a quick reaction from the democratic forces in the DRC and the international community in order to reach peace and avoid a bigger social catastrophe in the country as well as in the Great Lakes Region. The political settlement plan detailed hereafter can allow the achievement of this result without too many difficulties.

II. Plan for a Political Settlement of the Crisis in the DRC

6 - The position of UDPS and all the democratic forces for change, for the political settlement of the grave political crisis that presently shakes the DRC, is based upon the following fundamental principle: There is no serious and defensible reason of sending to death the youth of our country and the youth of the other African countries which are implicated in the conflict, of useless wasting of the thin financial means of the DRC and the other concerned countries in an armed conflict, of heavily disturbing peace in the DRC and the region for a political problem mainly internal to the DRC and which can be resolved around a negotiation table in order to conclude a global political settlement which is satisfactory for all the concerned parties. 32

7 - Considering the gravity and the complexity of the armed conflict which is taking place in the DRC, and the real dangers which it presents for peace and development in the country and the region, I am convinced that the solution can not be military and it is an imperious necessity to obtain a cease-fire and conclude a global political settlement, including national and regional aspects, involving all the political representatives in the country without exclusion and enjoying an international guarantee.

8 - That is why, to reach such a global political settlement, on August 23, 1998, I openly conveyed my will to meet President Kabila and the leaders of the armed opposition settled in Goma. It's in connection with this fact that I called upon the international community and the interested African states, with the availability to meet some African statesmen, in order to incite them in politically and diplomatically support a global settlement of the crisis under examination.

9 - According to the democratic opposition forces whose leadership I am assuming, the global settlement of the crisis in the DRC can be summarized as follows.

A. At the National Level

10 - The grounds of the crisis being deeply internal to the DRC, namely the absence of democracy and rule of law respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as a chaotic and opaque administration of public affairs, it is advisable to seriously tackle these causes, without complaisance, with a view of suppressing their harmful effects at national and regional levels.

11 - So the following plan is proposed at the national level:

A.1- Organisation of negotiations, gathering all the representative and significant political forces in the country (Kabila's government, democratic non-armed opposition and armed opposition) under the auspices of the UNO, the OAU and the SADC.

A.2 - Conclusion of a political settlement foreseeing:

A.2.1 - Installation of a transition parliament.

A.2.2 - The adoption by the parliament of a constitution guaranteeing a democratic and transparent administration of power during the transition period which should take 24 months, in compliance with the democratic principles elaborated at the sovereign national conference held in 1992. 33

A.2.3 - The formation of a restricted government of national unit accountable before the parliament. Like the parliament, the government of national unity should include all the representative and significant political forces in the country.

A.2.4 - The amalgamation of the two armies which have been facing [one another], in order to create one national republican army subject to the civil authority, with the assistance of the OAU and the UNO.

A.2.5 - The deployment of an international peace-keeping force or of interposition to survey the respect of the cease-fire and prevent the resumption of the fighting up to the holding of free and democratic elections.

A.2.6 - Setting up of a group of peace-settlement observers.

A.2.7 - The adoption of a realistic electoral agenda for elections at all levels, in order to allow our people [to] designate the leaders of their free choice and regulate the matter of power legitimacy in the country. It is obvious that the adoption of a final constitution which will be submitted to a popular referendum, by the provisional parliament, will go before the organisation of the elections.

A.2.8 - Intervention of the Security Council by means of a compelling resolution offering an international guarantee of good fulfilment and especially of respect of the coming elections results by all the concerned political. forces.

12 - It is also advisable to emphasize that according to the complexity of the political situation and the possibility of the rejection of the election results by a defeated political force, we give our preference to free elections, honest and transparent under the supervision of the UNO and the OAU with the presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and of independent international observers.

B. At the Regional Level

13 - Starting from the principles which state that "democratic states do not make war but resolve their conflicts by peaceful means" and "the foreign policy of a state is the image of its domestic policy," we affirm that only a really democratized Congo, observing the rule of law, oriented towards peace and development can, not only stabilise and improve its domestic situation, but also will contribute to the security and the political stability of its neighbours.

14 - Consequently, the first priority is the democratisation of the DRC in order to make of it a stable state respecting the rule of law; strong and peaceful, led

L 34

by competent and democratically elected responsibles who, thereby, won't constitute a threat or a source of political insecurity or instability for the neighbour states.

15 - In its regional aspects, the global political settlement should include following points:

B.l - The affirmation by all the states of the region of the sacred characteristic and the intangibileness of their present frontiers consecrated in the international treaties in application, in conformity with international laws.

B.2 - Setting up of an appropriate mechanism to secure the borders between the DRC at one side, and Rwanda and Uganda at the other side, with a possibility of joint military patrols and the installation of observation positions monitored by an international force in order to avoid the Congolese territory of being used by Ugandan and Rwandan rebels to start armed attacks to these two countries.

B.3 - The respect by the DRC of the international settlements concluded with African and foreign countries.

B.4 - The planned and ordered withdrawal of all the foreign armies standing on the territory of the DRC, after setting up of the transition political institutions, and their substitution for an international peace keeping force.

Ill. Special Call to the International Communit~

16 - The democratic opposition believes in the virtue of dialogue and political settlement as well as of non-violence, in order to set up a durable peace in the DRC, a sine qua non condition of building a state respecting the rule of law founded on liberty and justice and capable of undertaking a durable development of the populations.

17 - It also believes that nevertheless the misleading appearances, the Congolese people has the abilities to assume their destiny and to carry their struggle through the setting up of a state of law in the country.

18 - Therefore all the democratic opposition forces, through my voice, specially appeal to the General Secretary of the United Nations and to the whole international community, in order to sustain with all necessary means, this political settlement plan which, however, remains perfectible and adaptable to the general development of the situation.

Expecting that the present memorandum will catch your special and kindly attention, I remain Mr. Secretary General, yours very truly, Dr. Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba. Kinshasa, 04 September 1998. 35

Angolan and Zimbabwean Troops in Our Country RCD Headquarters, Goma, September 10, 1998

The government of Zimbabwe has decided to send troops to our country to fight for Kabila against the Congolese people led by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD). The Congolese people have always had a fraternal relation with the people of Zimbabwe. The RCD wants that relation to prevail.

We thus regret, and have to denounce such a decision which, it seems, was rashly taken. The Ministerial Commission, set up after the Victoria Falls mini-summit of heads of state, to investigate President Kabila's allegation of Rwandese and Ugandan invasion of the DRC, had not even submitted its report when the decision was made. We have no quarrel with the friendly Zimbabwean people with whom we don't want to start having any confrontation.

We suspect that the decision was based on three grounds:

1. the relative ignorance, by the Zimbabwean political leadership, of who Mr. Kabila actually is;

2. the ignorance of what the real problem of Congo is and how it could be resolved; and

3. the fear of Zimbabwean investors that their money already invested in Congo could be lost.

Those three grounds were covered by the Zimbabwean claim that they had to prop up Mr. Kabila who was rapidly failing so that negotiations between fighting parties could take place among equals.

The Zimbabwean leadership thinks that it is backing a revolutionary; we know that Kabila is a pseudo-revolutionary whose political history, since his maquis (1967-1982), has been marked by killings and incapacity to accept criticisms or work with knowledgeable people. We know that Kabila has always turned against colleagues who have helped him rise to power.

The leaderships of the countries of the sub-region (Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa, even Angola) which jointly helped overthrow Mobutu and bring Kabila to power know this by experiences. His colleagues in the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) had been threatened with physical or political elimination and arbitrary arrests. In few months, he became the AFDL himself alone. He took over and developed them further than the worst practices of Mobutu: solitary-exercise of power, nepotism, clientism, corruption, ethnic cleansing, violation of human rights, 36

kangaroo court type of justice, etc. Kabila is President, Minister of Defense, President of the AFDL, etc. The second person in the government is his nephew, Mutomb; the head of the National Security Agency is from his village; the present commander of the armed forces is his 27 year old son, Joseph Kabila. And the list goes on up to about 15 top state positions which are given to either relatives or people from the same village, etc. Where Mobutu used to ask for 10% commission, Kabila requests 30%, etc. The three preoccupations Kabila had, while in the maquis, continue to be intact : absolute power, wealth and women.

The problem of the Congo is political, i.e. the absence of a political principle of legitimation of power, for decades, which could have prevented dictatorship. To solve the Congolese crisis of the 1960's, provoked by the cold-war US sponsorship of the dismantling of the elected government of Prime Minister Lumumba, power became tied to the so-called "strong man"--the "US­ friendly tyrant"--seen as the guarantor of national unity. For decades with Mobutu, this arrangement has led to a catastrophic situation. The analysis, arrived at through the Sovereign National Conference, showed that only with genuine democracy--with the Congolese people taking control over themselves, circumstances and their leaders--would the catastrophic situation be eradicated. The great hope generated by the first liberation movement which overthrew Mobutu was dashed off. Kabila became a reproduction of Mobutu, another "one-man show." That is why the rebellion had to take place to initiate a process of rectification up to real democracy.

Our political problems can only be resolved politically and by the Congolese themselves. Pro-dictatorship forces had to be defeated (or at least weakened) to set up conditions for most of the Congolese to sit in a conference and together go over the basic issues facing them to find a durable solution to the problem. Attempts to get Kabila to come to his senses, within the AFDL, produced but arbitrary arrests, suspensions, threats to the lives of those proposing changes, etc. He increasingly worsened the problem: with no vision, no policy, no real office, he surrounded himself with incompetent clan members and sycophants and was becoming very repressive and terroristic. He created a tribally based militia and tried to transform the army into a personal army run by incompetent clan members. He precipitated the violence and the war we are fighting. People--in the army and in the political system--whose names started being put on the list of those who had to be eliminated, had to run away from Kinshasa and regroup to counter-attack.

There was no pre-meditated plan on our part. That is why the political leadership of the movement, organized as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), could only take off on the 12th of August 1998, ten days after the beginning of the military rebellion. 37

The RCD believe that no foreign military intervention can solve our political problems. This intervention will, instead, make our problem more complex. As we can clearly see, such a development has lead to a conflict at the level of the sub-region. Regional states have started quarreling among themselves around a very unreliable person, Kabila, whom most of the states don't really know. This is very unfortunate. We must avoid a situation in which the Congolese people or other people in the region become the grass on which two elephants fight.

The RCD believes that its struggle is just, as it is wisely supported by the Congolese people. The relative calm in the liberated zones does contrast with the government harassment and racist and xenophobic inciting in the zones controlled by Kabila' s forces.

The task of the RCD, and all the democracy-loving Congolese people, is to resist and continue fighting even against any foreign troops which come to back, reinforce and perpetuate Kabila's arbitrary rule of arbitrary arrests, killings, ethnic cleansing, corruption and visionless and policyless power for power's sake. Those who do come to rescue such a rule, exhibit, thus, to the eyes of the entire humanity, on which side they are on : friends of those who commit crime against humanity. If is not surprising that they find themselves fighting along with the notorious genocidaire Interahamwe.

The case of Angola is more surprising. While they have failed to deal with their internal problem, Savimbi's UNITA, they seek for military victories outside Angola, in Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. On their passage, from Kifona, Moanda, Banana, Boma, etc., Angolan troops have behaved like Mobutu's FAZ : looting, raping women, killing and destroying property. In Kitona, it is reported that their tanks marched on civilians.

This made some comrades in the region (e.g. Dar es Salaam) to wonder whether or not there is still a difference between UNITA and MPLA government armed forces. All kinds of speculative reasons are given to justify their military intervention:

1. the RCD failed to contact them before it began its struggle;

2. the RCD is alleged to have contacts with UNIT A or some other unspecified enemies of Angola, etc.

The RCD has been trying very hard to have contacts with the Angolan authorities. An RCD statement and a letter were sent to the authorities. We strongly denied having, or intending to have, any links with UNIT A. The RCD is a movement open to all democratic forces in our country. People who worked under Mobutu and who have no record of a criminal past are welcome in the movement. The balance of forces in the RCD and its 38

organised connection with the Congolese people will determine the nature of the leadership of the movement. We have the right, as Congolese, to organize the movement the way we see fit. 39

The Congo Crisis: A Replay of the Middle-East? by Issa G. Shivji, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. [Published as three part series in Palaver column, The African, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Sept. 5, 12, and 19, 1998]

Part One [Sept. 5th]

Perhaps, in immediate terms, good sense will prevail and contending forces will sit at a negotiating table to resolve blood-letting in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But our region will never be the same again. What is more, it behooves us to think more deeply beyond the media propaganda to understand fully the global and regional socio-political forces behind the crisis, beyond once again, the immediate personal and paltry ambitions and interests of some of the leaders around the region.

It may be too early to draw all lessons particularly when we are all, understandably, moved by immediate emotions and partisan sentiments. We do not also have all the inside information to be able to arrive at accurate conclusions. However, we are not starting from scratch. We must, at least, be able to raise pertinent questions (both for seeking answers but also for guiding our enquiry) from our historical experiences. In this piece I will like to begin to raise this type of questions while keeping an open mind on the possible answers.

First, it is indisputable that a conflict of the kind we saw in this part of the region ~annot happen behind the back of the super-power. It is now a known fact that the US (through CIA and other instrumentality) was behind the killing of Patrice Lumumba, the secession of Katanga under Tshombe and the installation of Mobutu. Congo, as I said in my previous articles, is too important to be left on its own. A stable, relatively independent government in that country, with national and pan-African policies, would be an anathema to the super-power. That much cannot be denied by any one except the blatant surrogates of imperialism. What was then, the direct or indirect, through friends, sympathisers etc., the role of the super-power in the Congo crisis?

To begin to answer this question, we should refresh our memories on some relevant more recent happenings around the world as well as in this part of Africa.

One, since the end of the cold-war, we are witnessing the reorganisation of world hegemonies. The previous polarised world order with two super­ powers and its spheres of influence in the third world is undergoing some major changes. 40

Latin America may still be the backyard of the US, although not in the same way but Asia, particularly South East Asia, is flexing muscles and not delivering itself on a silver platter to the dictates of Western imperialism. The traditional ally of US, Japan, is experiencing problems and its hegemony in Asia is not assured. The furiously upcoming economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia etc. might have been temporarily subdued by the (almost manufactured) financial crisis but China is making its debut on the world stage in a forceful way on all fronts. In short, the US hegemony in Asia cannot be taken for granted.

Two, for the first time in almost fifty years, the hot war has come back to the European continent, the home of two world wars. The cold-war period was the longest period of "peace" in Europe in the last two, if not more, centuries.

Third, the military-industrial complex (President Eisenhower's term) in the US, which has been the basis of the US economy since the second world war, must be missing the cold-war. It should not be forgotten that the armament manufacture was the central component of the complex with widespread spin-offs such as the space programme, information technology, etc.

In this regard, ironically, the end of the cold-war was one of the worse things to happen to western imperialism.

Fourth, the Middle-East (Palestine) question remains unresolved continuously providing a highly coherent and militant rallying point (ideology) to the popular masses in Islamic countries and elsewhere, with large Muslim populations. In recent times, the Iranian revolution has been one of the, perhaps, only successful anti-imperialist political revolution against the Americans (albeit socially very retrogressive). That example will take long to be eradicated from the minds of militant Muslims.

In a book, little known to our intellectuals in this part of the world, Samuel Huntington, a known establishment intellectual and adviser to the US state department, develops the thesis that the major enemies of western civilisation in the present era are Islam and Confucianism (China?). (See his Clash of Civilisations.) That is not unimportant. I would not even be surprised if that position constitutes one of the building blocks of the American foreign policy.

In this scenario (a) US would not let go Africa and (b) given the experience of anti-imperialist liberation movements and relatively nationalist ideologies expounded in Africa, US would want to make sure that type of independence is once and for all denied the African countries.

From Eritrea to Uganda and (then and now) Congo, US policies and actions seem to be consistent with the premises I have stipulated. 41

Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are close US "allies." Eritrea has a weak (soft-belly) link in its lowlands which are inhabited mostly by Muslim pastoralists. These were never in any substantial sense part of the struggle conducted by the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) now in power. EPLF's support came from mainly the highlands inhabited by Christians. Since the liberation, again, it does not seem that the Eritrean government has managed to win over the lowland population. As a matter of fact, that population has been often accused of providing a launching pad for the Sudanese. It is (or was) said that there is even a secessionist movement called Jihad there.

When we come closer home, it is not very far-fetched to see that Uganda under Museveni is being built up as possibly a new regional mini-power by the Americans. At least we know that President Museveni embraced the idea of the African force under US with both hands. Eritrean, Ethiopian and Ugandan leaders have been touted as the "new breed" of African leaders by American spokespersons as high as Madeline Albright. To this list, we may now add Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

Interestingly, when the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out recently it was Rwanda which was entrusted with presenting the "American peace plan" to the warring sides.

Part Two [Sept. 12th]

In last week's palaver I began to look at the possible interests of the super­ power iri the Congo and the line-up of its "allies" in this region. From Eritrea, through Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Congo (with Kenya as a weak link having fallen from grace given its internal problems) forms an interesting belt with Sudan on one side and, the still recalcitrant Tanzania, on the other.

Paint the belt with US colours, if you like, on the map and you begin to see the kind of geopolitical and ideological considerations which must find, and find, a concentrated expression in the "Scramble for the Congo."

What about regional considerations of some of the pretentious "regional mini-powers?" I have already said that Museveni may have been growing some ambitions, nudged on by the Americans. On the other hand, if Rwanda followed Uganda's footsteps it would be understandable for that country was Rwanda's "friend in need." Rwanda has undergone an extremely traumatic experience with the genocide. The perceptions of its new leaders would understandably be heavily coloured by this experience.

Rwanda is a former "francophone" country now slipping out of that sphere into "anglophone" with its leaders all trained in "anglophonic" Africa. Thus 42

here we have a "minor" contradiction among "big powers" themselves (France vs. US/UK).

On the other hand, security considerations perhaps make Rwandan leaders see everything through military eyes. At the head of a fairly militarised state, South Africa being one of the most important arms supplier, some Rwandan and Ugandan leaders are talking the language (security and buffer zones) uncannily similar to that we have heard in the Middle-East. Throw into this fray personal business interests of the leaders and their cronies. We know of the rush of Ugandan "businessmen" into Congo (including the indomitable General from that country) after the "liberation" under Kabila.

All this would call for a pliant "Kabila" which indeed was the case when he was put into power. Uganda and Rwanda played a significant and probably a decisive role, no doubt, in the overthrow of Mobutu. The Rwandan and Ugandan commanders stayed on. It did not take long for the "liberators" to be perceived as "occupiers." No wonder when Kabila threw out (as it turns out it was the highest form of imprudence, "you don't bite the hand that feeds you") Rwandan commanders, he won instant popularity, at least, in Kinshasa.

Kabila himself turned out to be a great disappointment to regional leaders and people who pinned great hopes on a post-Mobutu Congo. Kabila comes from one of the most coherent and ideologically consistent (if somewhat puritan) resistance force in the Congo, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). But that was in the 1960s and early 1970s. Mobutu's vicious army ferociously decimated PRP's fine cadres including its great secretary-general Yumbu. By the time Kabila was "found" by its external benefactors to head the Alliance, he had lost all moorings of a revolutionary traditions and instead was dipped in the new ones of business, shady or otherwise.

Politically, the new president not only acted eccentric - to the chagrin of, perhaps, well-intentioned king-makers around from Mandela to Mwalimu - but utterly foolishly and undemocratically (and which is far more important) so far as the political forces within Congo were concerned. This weakened him enormously and made him a pawn in the regional power-game. Had it not been for the intervention of Zimbabwean and Angolan forces, he would by now have been a forgettable part of history. Indeed, the rebels had claimed, not incredulously, that they would have been in Kinshasa in a matter of weeks, if not days.

So there it was. As if taking a leaf from regional political history, the backers of the rebel force quickly put together a motley of totally unlike individuals to give a political face to what was, essentially, a military expedition. The "regional political history" I am referring to is of course that of 1978/9 overthrow of Idi Amin Dada by the Tanzanian army. As the army was poised 43 on the outskirts of Kampala, a hurriedly called two-days Moshi conference put together a liberation movement, (UNLF), a government, a cabinet and a ready president (Yusuf Lule) flown in from the United Kingdom with the compliments of Her Majesty.

That was not to last. A year later President Lule was flown out and the real liberation came (perhaps our erstwhile revolutionary Yoweri Kiguta Museveni may have now conveniently forgotten) by a bush war of some five years. If indeed president Museveni wanted to repeat the historical feat, he should have, at least, read the whole book. Mwalimu, as an astute reader of situations, very quickly realised how the Tanzanian "liberators" were turning into "wakombozi" (as the Ugandans described our soldiers using the term in a sarcastic sense2) and being perceived as occupiers and decided to pull them out just at the right time.

Be that as it may. On the other side of the divide, Angolan intervention was to be expected although no one could have easily foreseen on which side. Zimbabwe's intervention was not at all part of the equation and still remains unexplained. True, there are paltry personal interests--Mugabe's ego, his personal rivalry with Mandela and fray over SADC's leadership, business interests, etc.--but none of these as an explanation is satisfactory. It is also said that facing problems at home--which is very true--he wanted to deflect attention. This, too, is rather shallow because involvement in the Congo was not the best way of deflecting attention for the simple reason that the intervention was not (and even a distant observer of Zimbabwe could have predicted) popular with the people of Zimbabwe. If anything, rather than deflecting attention, it has made Mugabe even more vulnerable.

Namibia's involvement was token and that tokenism can makes some sense (or at least made sense to the Namibian leadership) in terms of asserting Nujoma's independence of, if you like, the big man Mandela. Intellectuals of the region, mesmerised by the media blitz, forget that their glamorised Old Man Mandela is also the powerful Big Man sitting on an apartheid built military-industrial complex. One thing we should always insert in our regional equations is that dismantling of apartheid has not meant dismantling of the apartheid military machine, including its erstwhile arms industry. Armscor is alive and kicking and searching for markets. South t Africa is the only country in this region manufacturing small and big arms. It ( is accused of supplying arms to Rwanda and who else, God knows. God also knows that Zimbabwe supplied arms to Kabila. But Zimbabwe's are borrowed, and its manufacture of arms is puny. Not that they don't kill, but, certainly cannot be equated.

2Wakombozi translates to "liberators" in English. Shivji explains: "As the Tanzanian troops overstayed, expropriating 'goodies' from Ugandan civilians, they were christened 'wakombozi,' with tongue in cheek, for liberating Ugandans of their properties!" /

44

These are patchy observations to bring to the fore the kind of geopolitical interests and considerations--realpolitik--which we have to take account of. In the next palaver I hope to come back to basic principles in the light of the realpolitik.

Part Three [Sept. 19, 1998]

When I first began writing this series I opened with a hope that the protagonists concerned would come together and negotiate so as to stop further blood-letting. Hopes raised by SADC summit and the Victoria Falls meeting seem to have receded. The whole conflict is taking a worse turning as all sides have thrown principles to the dogs and appear to be mobilising support on whatever lines they can--ethnic, parochial, reactionary, whatever. Nonetheless, before I continue discussing some of the dilemmas that progressive African opinion faces in this conflict, let me simply re-assert what has been paid lip-service without concrete action, and that is that the existing blood-letting is simply not justified; that all parties whether state or non-state must sit together and arrive at a compromise and that both the immediate, as well as the intermediate, resolution of the conflict lies in politics and not armed military struggle.

To my fellow-progressives who might believe that the so-called rebellion is a people's war out to resolve the long-standing oppression and exploitation of I' the Congolese people as a whole, and oppressed nationalities within, my caution is simply, "think twice and think again." And to those who believe that armed military intervention and occupation of other lands will resolve their security problems, I say, remember Israel in Lebanon and the West Bank.

In particular, pan-Africanist intellectual opinion which appears to be sympathetic to the regional intervening states, on whatever side, whether waving the flag of internal security concerns, or that of avenging genocide or waging a just war for a brotherly state, etc., I say, always take the swearings of those heading the state with a pinch of salt. The least that you can do, whatever your convictions about the rights and wrongs of external state \ intervention, is to condemn all of it and urge withdrawal of all of them whether or not they have admitted to be in the Congo.

Let me now return to what I had set out to do in this palaver and that is to return to principles, if you like.

First, I think it would be utterly wishful and even irresponsible, not to take account of the forces of global hegemonies and regional realpolitik in this conflict. I tried to summarise some of the salient features of these forces in my "albeit" patchy observations in the last two palavers. These considerations 45 cannot simply be wished away by stating of some general principles. More important is how are the principles stated and applied.

Those who would describe themselves as progressive Africans, who would like to see real people's democracy and liberation in the Congo could agree that Kabila failed and made many "mistakes" and, therefore, deserved to be overthrown. But we should go a step beyond regional politicians (who would have also liked to see the end of Kabila without caring as to how this was done) and ask ourselves whether Kabila's removal at the behest of Rwanda­ Ugandan military force would bring the liberation of the people of Congo any closer.

Once again, let us remember history. Most pan-Africanist intellectuals supported and celebrated (and rightly so) Tanzania's role in removing Idi Amin Dada. But the same intellectuals were divided and, perhaps overwhelmingly, (and again rightly so), over Mwalimu's continued political interference over leadership succession in post-Amin Uganda. This distaste was some times even expressed in less than intellectually persuasive arguments such as that Nyerere's sole interest in Uganda was to put his friend Obote in power. It seems to me that our distaste for Kabila is getting expressed in a similar, rather demagogic, fashion.

Many of us would agree on another principle that it is dangerous - playing with fire - to play power politics with ethnic diversities in our region. We would all agree to the last person to condemn genocide and do everything to prevent it. But can we really, in the same breath, support the so-called prevenHve measures to include militarisation of states in the region and creating security and buffer zones on other lands?! And shouldn't we guard against, consciously or unconsciously, falling into the same trap that European progressive intellectuals have fallen before us which is that any criticism of Israel and imperialist-Zionism is shut up by condemning and labeling the critic "anti-Semitic." In our case, any criticism of Museveni­ Kagame being condemned as anti-Tutsi and pro-genocide and, ergo, pro­ Kabila!

Fortunately, we have not gone very far with this type of debating. But earlier it is arrested the better.

Take another principle--more contentious and more debatable, nevertheless a central issue for all progressives at all times. I am referring to the role of imperialism. States and state leaders on all sides of the present split--whether supporting the present rebels or the previous rebel (Kabila)--without exception cannot condemn or even talk about imperialism except in the language of "misguided international community" at best, a vocabulary some of our critical intellectuals are beginning to internalise. "Our" states are all indebted to imperialism for their existence, as many of them, as we know, 46

exist against the wishes of their people. No wonder they have to create, or exaggerate, other stereotypic arguments to deflect attention.

We have heard of Mugabe being accused of Bismarckian ambitions and Museveni allegedly dreaming the dreams of resurrecting Bahima or Hima empire. I do not hold brief for any one of them to try to establish the truth or otherwise of the allegations and counter-allegations. All the same, true or not, it is nonsense, as one of our comrades would say. Not that some fellow's little success could not go to his head and begin to dream such dreams! Dangerous dream, no doubt, and for that reason alone even dreams stand to be condemned. But nonsensical still the same, for, at least one, obvious reason. In this era of superpower hegemony and imperialism, on the one hand, even a dream cannot be dreamt without the consent of the overlord. On the other hand, if such dreams can keep us fighting and divided, and if such division (as is the case in many an imperialist design) works in its favour, there is no reason why imperialism wouldn't nod.

Precisely for that reason we cannot stop at "non-sensing" the argument without going further to analyse and call the spade by its name instead of some garbled talk about undifferentiated "international community." ~ am aware that these days it is not fashionable to talk about imperialism. Even some progressive opinion would rather use some confused notion of "globalisation," at best/ or dismiss any analysis based on global imperial hegemonies as "conspiratorial theory," at worse. Be that as it may, this is not the place to take on that contestation.

The other point on the imperialist question is even more fundamental but not easily answerable. Let me raise it all the same. Can the progressive forces install democracy in their societies through military means, backed by, and organised from outside their societies, and perhaps edged on by the superpower?

Perhaps we cannot give a textbook answer to this question but, certainly, the way to begin to answer is to reflect on unambiguously, boldly and courageously on the role and interests of imperialism in this region and the character of "our" states and politics. Even more important is to understand internally generated people's forces, organisations and resistance rather than continue to hope for "external liberators."

If these palavers would help to stimulate us in that direction, regardless of whether we agree or not, they would have played their part. 47

Note on the Pace of the Struggle for a New Mode of Politics in the Congo [Written by Horace Campbell on September 14, 1998 and revised October 5, 1998 with this preface: Dear Comrades--! have just read with interest Issa Shivji's position on the current situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This position needs to be debated widely among the progressive forces. Imperialism is surely a force we must contend with, but we mustn't always attribute everything to imperialism. We cannot dispute that the Ugandan government is hand in glove with the Africa Crisis Response Initiative of the USA. This does not mean, however, that the CDM is a political front for the two countries. I am sharing the second of a reflection piece that we have been having with our Pan-African comrades.]

Dear Comrades and Colleagues.

I want the discussion that has been initiated among us since the first week in August to continue. If there are more questions than answers, then let the questions come forward since this would be in the spirit of emancipatory politics. There are three areas that I want to comment on. They are the political, military and diplomatic context of the war to liberate the Congo.

The Political Context

On August 12, the Congolese Democratic Movement (also called the RCD) launched its program for political renewal. This program was an attempt to lay the foundations for the politics beyond authoritarianism and arbitrariness. The le~acies of Mobutism are so entrenched that the CDM will face a difficult task in establishing a program for emancipatory politics in a short period. Many comrades are still not past the stage of all-class nationalism and the components of emancipatory politics will have to be clarified in the Congo as well as in all the other societies of Africa. The program that the CDM sent out remains modest. The program calls for the involvement of all Congolese political forces to be involved in a program of reconstruction. The August 12th declaration called for inter alia:

1. Promotion of the process of national reconciliation, democratization and national reconstruction;

2. Combating tribalism, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, arbitrariness and general impunity;

3. Supporting organizations of peasants, workers, women and youth in defense of their interests both material and moral;

4. Promotion of a good social services base for the Congolese people in specific areas, notably in the sectors of health, education and employment; 48

5. Working for economic integration in all spheres and having a responsibility for up-lifting priority sectors and eradication of misery of the people and putting in place a base for economic development of the country.

On the external front:

1. Promotion of security and work for peace and stability in this region in particular and Africa in general;

2. Never allowing Congolese territory to serve as base for destabilization of neighboring countries;

3. Working for economic development as a driving force for integration and solidarity in the sub-region and the region;

4. Contribution to development and renaissance of Africa;

5. Opening for cooperation based on respect for mutual interests.

These modest objectives reflect the spirit that Cheikh Anta Diop conveyed when he wrote of the Congo as the basis for economic reconstruction in Africa. The book, Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State, is an important text that many should be consulting now as we ponder both the short-term end of the war and the long-term tasks of reconstruction. Both the short- and long-term challenges are interwoven. As long ago as the period of the Pan African Movement of Eastern and Central Africa in the fifties there was the understanding that there must be political and economic cooperation between the peoples of the Eastern and central African region. The CDM presents itself as a Pan-Africanist organization with objectives for peace and renewal. The CDM is a coalition of more that twenty political parties and organizations that have their roots in the period of the Sovereign National Conference. The members of the leadership of the CDM have a long history of involvement in the struggles for democratic participation and expression. The test is whether within the structure of the leadership there is transparency, accountability and democratic politics.

The call for emancipatory politics on the part of Wamba dia Wamba, who was elected as Chairman of the CDM, remains a key component of the political process. In an interview with the Monitor newspaper, Wamba declared that "I have been an exponent of what I call emancipatory politics that emphasize a notion that all people think and that one has to start from that premise. People must be empowered so that they can participate in improving their own lives, but also making sure that the institutions that are put in place reflect these aspirations." 49

This position of the African people as thinking beings moves a long way from the colonial stereotypes of Africans as a mass of energy capable only of being hewers of wood and drawers of water. From the period of the slave trade up to the recent genocide, there has been the tendency to devalue African lives.

That thinking people can emancipate themselves is the key to emancipatory politics. It is the essence of the politics of self-emancipation. In the period after the Cold War, Afro-pessimism, and retreat in Africa there has been a lot of doubt on the ability of the ordinary people to change their political situation. The program of the CDM seeks to set in motion a new form of politics in the Congo. The CDM will have to demonstrate within its ranks the practice of this new politics. Because of the disparate forces that are brought together in the anti-Kabila fight, the ability to develop collective leadership, democratic decision-making and confidence in the people will in the short run distinguish the leadership of the CDM. This is the political context. Wamba dia Wamba has acknowledged that all liberation movements start out with limitations. The task is for progressives inside and outside the CDM to strengthen those forces that are struggling to establish new forms of politics that will center the producers.

It is significant that many of the more than one hundred political parties that were formed during the Mobutu period are silent. The hundreds of civic organizations formed during the anti-Mobutu period are also silent. These forces are being called upon by the CDM to be part of the transition process. There are many other Congolese democrats, belonging to neither formal political organizations nor non-governmental organizations, who want peace and an end to the Kabila government. Thus far, many have remained cool towards the CDM because of its perceived dependence on Rwanda. These various political forces can be distinguished from the ex-generals and Mobutists who are against Kabila but want to bring back dictatorship and theft in the society.

On Popular Support

One question raised in the context of the CDM is whether there is support for their political program in the Congo. One way of measuring the lack of support in the eyes of some is the manner in which Kabila has mobilized anti-Tutsi sentiments in and outside the Congo. The evidence of people rounding up so-called Tutsis comes through from the media and there is evidence that the language that was used by the Interahamwe in Rwanda is now being used by Kabila and the leaders of his government. Popular support built on xenophobia is not the way forward for Africa. One remembers that Mobutu from time to time mobilized these sentiments in the population to entrench himself in power. The Banyamulenge were denied their citizenship on this basis. 50

The political machinery of Mobutu, which created a climate of fear and uncertainty, still remains in the society and the political objective of any movement seeking to uplift Congo from the climate of Mobutuism must be to develop a political framework where all citizens will feel secure. This is the challenge and it is for this reason that the political solution of bringing all political forces in the Congo to a new dispensation remains the powerful call of the CDM for a "New Political Dispensation."

The elements in the call for a new political dispensation that must be reinforced include:

1. The cease-fire and discussion among all political forces;

2. The bringing into the political process all the political parties and all the active political groups in the country;

3. The reconvening of the Sovereign National Conference to complete the task of establishing a new framework for governance, elections beyond the Mobutu form.

Why the War

Many people have asked, if these are the goals of the CDM why did they have to fight? This question is an urgent one, especially in the context of a society that requires all of the resources necessary for reconstruction. This is a recurring question and not simply a historical issue, since this will define whether there were grounds for starting the war. Were all avenues for discussion and negotiations with the Kabila government closed?

This question is part of the military context and the view of some that what is going on in the country is an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. In my view there was a declaration of war when Kabila turned to the authors of genocide in Rwanda to be the mainstay of his army at the end of July when the Rwandan army decided to leave.

The government of Kabila mobilized the crudest violence against Congolese citizens from the East, referred to as the Banyamulenge and routinely called Tutsis. The government repeated the claim of the Interahamwe that Museveni was attempting to build a Tutsi-Hima empire from East Africa to the Atlantic Ocean. The government radio called on citizens to "take a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, a spade, rakes, nails, truncheons, barbed wire, stones and the like to kill the Tutsis." This consistent broadcast over state radio in Kinshasa was reminiscent of the broadcasts of the government of Rwanda in 1994. Many citizens of Kinshasa did as they were told and killed 51 those who were called Tutsis. It should not be surprising that the Banyamulenge form the bulk of the army of the CDM.

The mobilization of the people on grounds of ethnic hatred reminds one of the Nazis call against Jews, gypsies and communists in the thirties. This is the internal dimension of the war.

To add to this, the threats to Uganda and Rwanda from a remobilized Interahamwe force brought together the internal and external dimensions of the politics that created the conditions for open Ugandan (and in my estimation) Rwandan military involvement. One newspaper reporter from the London Guardian remarked on the outbreak of the war in this way. "Before the rift (with Rwanda and the Banyamulenge) emerged Mr. Kabila prepared an insurance policy for himself. He secretly trained in Katanga 10,000 of the Rwandan militia who took part in the genocide and opened links with the Sudanese who back the Ugandan dissidents. With these two groups, Mr. Kabila was ready to take up Mobutu's old alliances, undermine his former allies and he believed, consolidate Katangese power. It was a security threat that Rwanda and Uganda could not afford to take lightly."

The recruitment of the Interahamwe brought to the fore the principal issue of the war, that there must be a fight against genocidists. The issue of genocide is one central component of this war. There can be no compromise on this issue. In 1997, Wamba, Jacques Depelchin and Elaine Wamba wrote the "African Declaration Against Genocide." This declaration is in fact a declar;:tion of no tolerance for the forces that commit genocide in Africa.

Africans cannot await the work of western journalists and writers to oppose genocide. The recent book by Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families, brings out the chilling details of the 1994 genocide. Before becoming involved full time in the fight against Kabila, Wamba was working with Nyerere to end genocidal violence in Burundi.

Kabila has been exploiting a deep seated anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo. It is one thing to manipulate ethnicity, but it is quite another to work with those who should be brought to trial under the international tribunal for crimes against humanity. There can be no negotiations with the authors of genocide, whether they are in Rwanda, Burundi or the Congo. The recruitment and arming of the army of the former government of Rwanda provides a firm foundation for a war. The fact that these forces alone could not protect Kabila brought in the armies of Zimbabwe and Angola and later Namibia. Between September 3rd-10th, the Sudanese army ferried supplies to Kabila. There is now the framework for a regional war in the Congo, of immense consequences for the whole continent of Africa. The Kabila 52

government is seeking to expand the war with his search for support from Libya, Chad, Gabon and other countries.

The widening war and its implications should lend urgency to negotiations. The government of Kabila has maintained that there should be negotiations with Rwanda and Uganda for their troops to leave the Congo and end the invasion. In the view of the Kabila government, there is nothing to negotiate in terms of a new political dispensation in the Congo. In fact, Kabila ordered the arrest of those diplomats of the CDM that were invited to the meetings in Victoria Falls on September 6th and 7th.

The Military Impact of the War

The specter of a regional war emanates from the politics of the Congo. This war involves the Kabila regime supported by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and the Sudan on one side and the Congolese Democratic Movement, supported by the Rwanda and Ugandan governments, on the other side. There are now many other armies involved. With the involvement of the Sudan, the war draws in the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army. There are persistent reports that all of the armed groups from Jonas Savimbi (i\ngola), to the Interahamwe (Rwanda), the Lords Resistance Army (Uganda), the Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda), FLEC (Cabinda) and others, have used the war to expand their military and political linkage. This points to the urgency for diplomatic and peaceful solutions.

The Military Situation

As of the end of September, 1998 the Congolese Democratic Movement was in military and political control of the East of the Congo, in an area as large as Germany. The key cities under their control are Coma, Bukavu, Uvira and Kisangani. The city of Kisangani is a key city for commercial, transportation and communications situated at the head of the Congo River.

The attack of the forces of the Interahamwe on Coma on September 13 and 14 brought out more clearly the fact that the Hutu militias are under the command, control and communications network of the Kabila military (and hence in alliance with Zimbabwean forces). The Hutu militias have been in the forests around the border of Rwanda making forays into Rwanda to kill and maim innocent people and to release from prison those being held for genocide. Since 1994 this armed group has killed an average of one hundred person per day. They are committed to finishing the task of exterminating the Tutsis. This Interahamwe is now coordinating with the Kabila government in a more direct manner.

The military situation in the central area of the country remains unclear with claims and counter claims by the CDM and Kabila of who is in control. The 53

battles for Kindu and Mbuji Mayi promise to be key turning points in the weeks and months ahead. The issue for progressive forces is not who is in control of land and territory, but what kind of governance and administration is being put in place by the CDM. One report from Kisangani suggests caution on the part of the citizens, but many see that there are differences between the behavior of the Kabila forces and the CDM.

There is evidence that the Kabila forces carried out atrocities against the citizens who are considered Tutsi. These atrocities emanate from the mobilizing of ethnic hatred in the Congo and in the region. There is now such widespread anti-Tutsi feeling that a lot of work will be required to repair the health of the society.

The so-called Western Front

Three weeks ago there was an imminent attack on Kinshasa before the troops from Zimbabwe and Angola intervened on the side of the government of Kabila. According to the CDM they retreated from Kitona, Matadi and Inga when the Angolans were coming into the war. The CDM had airlifted troops to Kitona and the troops from the barracks there (former foot soldiers of the Mobutu era) joined the uprising against the Kabila government. The supply line from Kitona was to support the gradual surrounding of the capital and remove Kabila from power. But when the Angolans and Zimbabweans intervened, the forces of the CDM who had already been in Kinshasa were cut off.

The press represented this as a big victory for Kabila and his supporters. In the words of the CDM, this was a strategic retreat so that the destruction and damage to important infrastructure would be limited. The question remains: were the forces of the Congolese Democratic Movement defeated or did they withdraw strategically as they claimed?

The Angolans and Zimbabweans claim that they won a major victory in the West. There are reports of captured Ugandan regular soldiers and of others who have retreated with their weapons. The Ugandan and Angolan military have been having discussions to have the troops released to the Red Cross. This position is opposed by the Kabila government. The full extent of the involvement of regular troops from Uganda and Rwanda is still not known. Museveni and the Ugandan government have admitted that their troops are in the Congo. However, the Rwandan military leadership has so far refused to acknowledge that their regular troops are involved.

The involvement of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia has been presented as the legitimate basis for supporting the sovereignty of the Congo. The representation of sovereignty by these states demonstrates the masculinist conception of sovereignty that deals with territory and not with the ordinary 54

persons. Objectively, these three countries have joined with Kabila who is aligned with the Interahamwe. A brief word needs to be said on the military involvement of these three countries.

(a) Namibia

Namibia is said to have sent up to 500 infantry troops to assist Kabila in Kinshasa. The Namibian army is small and there is no material or financial basis in Namibia to support a larger deployment of soldiers. This is a symbolic deployment to support the claim of Mugabe in the SADC discussion that they are supporting a legitimate government. There is a vigorous debate in Namibia on the question of the deployment of Namibian soldiers to protect Kabila.

(b) Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is supposed to have sent two battalions to assist Kabila. There is supposed to be another two battalions that went by rail to Lubumbashi. The reality is that if Zimbabwe were to deploy more than 3,000 troops to the Congo, this would provide a serious strain on the economy. Zimbabwe­ cannot afford this deployment. Its continued presence in the Congo provides the basis for a financial and political catastrophe for Zimbabwe.

It is said that when the political leadership in Zimbabwe decided to send forces, cooler heads in the military wanted to send the airforce. There was opposition from General Mujuru who was the head of the liberation army of Zimbabwe. However, Kabila understood that bombing the CDM would not do and required ground troops.

The commander of the Zimbabwe forces is a general who has very little experience in this kind of war. His experience has been that of a peace keeper. If Zimbabwe hopes to take the war to the East, this would require a deployment of over 50,000 soldiers because the requirement of supplies, logistics, ammunition and communications for the long distances would be too demanding. It is for this reason that Mandela and others at the Non­ Aligned Movement and the SADC summit have been trying to find a formula to extricate Zimbabwe from the Congo so that Mugabe can save face.

The conclusions from the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar and the social costs imposed on the Zimbabwean workers, are that if the war continues for over six months and Zimbabwe remains, there would be a political and economic crisis for Zimbabwe with repercussions for the whole region of Southern Africa. This places urgency on the diplomatic aspects of the war and finding a mechanism for the Zimbabwean troops to leave. Despite this reality, there are a few generals who are making money out of the war and are seeking to ways of expanding the war. 55

The involvement of the Sudan in the war creates a further complication for Zimbabwe. Up to this point, outside of Uganda, Zimbabwe has been one of the main supporters for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The regional headquarters of the SPLM in Southern Africa is based in Harare. With the deployment of Sudanese troops to the Sudan, the Zimbabwean army now finds themselves where they provide military and diplomatic support to the SPLM while they coordinate military strategies with Kabila and the Sudan Government. Sudan is using the Congo as a staging ground to attack the military headquarters of the SPLA at Maridi (on the border of the Sudan and the Congo). Like the Namibian situation, there is a vigorous debate in Zimbabwe on the deployment of troops to assist Kabila.

(c) The Angolan Forces

The government of Angola has the financial resources to engage in war in the Congo, but like Zimbabwe does not have the military supplies for a long war. Angola's involvement was decisive in the reversals of the gains of the Congolese Democratic Movement at Kitona, Matadi, and Inga. The Angolan government declared that they became involved because UNITA was fighting with the CDM. UNITA has made many broadcasts, reproduced routinely by the media, to the effect that they are fighting with the CDM.

The CDM has issued statements stating categorically that they have no alliances with Savimbi and the military wing of UNITA. Wamba sent mess.ages to the Angolan people, but these messages have to be reinforced by direct contacts between Wamba and the Angolan government. It is my view that there are elements in the Angolan military who believe that because Wamba is from the Bas Zaire region of the Congo, his leadership in Congolese politics will give courage to the forces of Cabinda who are calling for autonomy. These forces regard any talk of popular sovereignty and peoples participation in politics as subversive.

On the other side there are reports that the military forces of the CDM retreated into Angolan territory held by UNIT A when Angola entered the war. The Angolan military claim that there are military commanders of the CDM who are working closely with Savimbi and with FLEC. The visit of Jonas Savimbi to Uganda gives credence to the Angolan justification for entering the war. The Angolans indicated that the CDM was working closely with UNITA.

The Angolan Dimension of the War

The military wing of UNIT A has been fighting the government of Angola since 1966. UNITA discredited itself by its alliance with the apartheid in regime South Africa. After the defeat of the South African army at Cuito 56

Cuanavale in 1988, UNITA used Zaire as its main base. This army of UNITA was supposed to be demobilized for the peace process, but after Savimbi lost the elections in 1992, there was a new war. In this war over 300,000 Angolans lost their lives. The UNIT A army occupied over sixty percent of the municipalities.

The Lusaka peace accord of 1994 halted this war, but UNITA did not disarm. Savimbi built a stronghold in Huambo in Bailundo. Since the recent build up of the Angolan army in 1998, Savimbi moved the bulk of his forces to Cazombo and controlled the whole area of the Zambian border. If the Angolan army did in fact want to confront Savimbi, it would have launched offensive strikes in the southeast of the country along the border with Zambia. There is still fear that this would bring an invasion of Zambia by the army of Angola.

It is for this reason that there are voices calling for new strategies beside military strategies to deal with Savimbi. The recent divisions in the ranks of UNITA should provide the basis for the government of Angola to find ways of defeating Savimbi politically so that militarily, Savimbi would be isolated. Then there would be no long drawn out war such as 1993-1994 that killed over 300,000.

The Angolan army is overstretched by its deployment in the Congo. The seizure of Matadi, Inga and Kitona were in reality defensive actions to create a rear base from which to confront the military expansion of the army of UNITA in the Northern regions of Angola, specifically Mbanza, Congo and Uige. The incursion into the Congo were more an aspect of the war in Angola itself than support for Kabila. Savimbi and the military wing of UNITA control the areas around the border with the Congo. In the past weeks the military wing of UNITA captured Maquela da Zombo and their forces are twenty kilometers outside of Soyo.

The cynical politics of "my enemy's enemy is my friend" has crept into the war creating a dangerous precedent where opportunists will exploit the conflict so that the war can be escalated. The attack on Coma and Gisenyi in September followed by the visit of Jonas Savimbi to Kampala is an example of this cynical politics. Collective security cannot be guaranteed in this condition. Countries such as Sudan will want the war to continue so that they can open a new front against the SPLA from the Congo. Elements from UNITA, the Pentagon and Sudan will be the beneficiaries of a long war. It is for this reason that Wamba has been very active in calling for negotiations and for diplomatic solutions to the political problems of the Congo.

In Angola, Savimbi has used the opportunity of the war in the Congo to expand his prolonged war for power. This prolonged war cannot be laid at the door of the CDM. The fact is that peace in the Congo is a requirement for 57

those forces that want peace in Angola to come to the forefront. Those who profit from war as a business delight in the expansion of the regional war.

The mass of the African people want peace, and peace must be understood not simply as the absence of war, but also as the condition under which life can go on without force, coercion and violence on a day-to-day politics. In the Sudan where millions are dying of hunger and neglect, the government insists on militarily imposing its version of a theocratic state on the population.

The Sudan

Apart from the three main combatants who have declared that they are fighting to defend the sovereignty of the Congo from foreign invasion, the Sudan government is now an active combatant in the war on the side of Kabila. In the past weeks there were reports that the airforce of the Sudan was ferrying supplies to Isiro and Kindu. These forces are supposed to provide the main defensive line for the Kabila forces at Kindu. The government of the Sudan has been involved in a protracted war against its people. The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army has been fighting against this government for about 15 years. The SPLA receives support from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. In turn, the government of the Sudan has been supporting the Lords Resistance Army fighting from Northern Uganda and the ADF fighting in Western Uganda, in the region of Toro and the Ruwenzori Mountains. Press reports say that the Sudanese airlift of military personnel and hardware to the Congo was financed by the Libyans. The Islamic fundamentalist government of Sudan wants to use the Congo as a rear base to fight the SPLA.

The involvement of these forces brings out the extent of the Ugandan war in the Congo. There is a debate in Uganda itself as to how deep the Ugandan army has penetrated the Congo to stop the incursions into Uganda. President Museveni and the Ugandan army have said that they have troops in the Congo supporting the CDM. Uganda says that they will withdraw if their security interests are guaranteed. Museveni declared that certain airfields (possibly Kisangani) were now being occupied by the Ugandan army to deny access to the military of Sudan.

The Ugandan involvement is complicated by the fact that Uganda is very close to the US military. Uganda was one of the only countries to embrace the Africa Crisis Response Initiative of the Pentagon. For this reason there are those who say that Uganda is working hand in glove with the USA in the Congo. The question that may be asked is, does Uganda have interests that are independent of imperialism?

The involvement of the Sudan in the Congo augurs for a long war and this is another reason the diplomatic initiatives must be intensified. 58

Rwanda

The government of Rwanda has denied that they have troops in the Congo, though they claim the right to self defense given the fact that the Hutu militias are so intricately involved with Kabila in the war. It would be hard to accept this denial since the clear interests of Rwanda in fighting genocide have been made a central aspect of the policy of that government.

The Rwandans are the ones who have their people being killed everyday by the Interahamwe who declare that they did not complete the task in 1994. This intent on genocide is one of the firmest components of the war in Rwanda and the Congo. This is one area where there is little room for negotiations. Those who committed genocide and who are intent on committing further genocide will be fought by those who suffered from genocide.

The question that was asked of Angola and Zimbabwe in the Congo can be asked of Rwanda and Uganda. Can their societies afford a long war, a war that demands weapons that will enrich the militarists and the armaments . industry in the West? These questions sharpen the question of negotiations.

The question of opening up the politics of the society of Rwanda is an urgent one so that the issues of ethnicity can be dealt with in a manner to separate the Hutu militias from the ordinary citizens.

The Diplomatic War

There are many forces that are active in calling for a diplomatic solution and a political settlement. The chief element in this is the voice of Wamba dia Wamba, who said that there is no military solution to the problem of dictatorship and there must be a political solution to the problems of the Congo.

When Wamba was recently interviewed on the military set backs on the Western Front, he maintained that the CDM withdrew because they wanted a political solution. His words were carried by the African News Service. Wamba denied that the rebellion has been quashed by Kabila's African allies. "The decision to pull troops out of the eastern port city of Matadi and surrounding areas near Kinshasa was a strategic move," Wamba said, "If the Angolans and Zimbabweans want to fight, we will fight," and he continued, "but we don't think our problems are going to be solved by fighting. They have to be resolved politically."

The CDM has maintained its willingness to negotiate with all forces in the Congo who want change, but Kabila has declared that the CDM are puppets of 59

Rwanda and Uganda and therefore there is no basis for negotiations. This position scuttled the attempts at a cease-fire by the SADC. There are, therefore, two distinct positions: that of the CDM for peace and a cease-fire and that of Kabila who says that the rebellion will be crushed as a foreign invasion while calling on citizens to kill Tutsis.

The Zimbabwe government has been active in the diplomatic process. It has lent its considerable diplomatic experience to mobilize governmental support in Africa and in the Southern Africa Development Community for the Kabila government. The foreign minister of Zimbabwe has repeated the cruder xenophobic comments from the Kabila government. Cooler heads in the Zimbabwe government know that there is no basis for the support for Kabila and support negotiations. These elements are discussing alternatives to Kabila with those whom they can reach.

While Zimbabwe claimed that they were acting under the mandate of SADC, the involvement of the Sudan now renders this claim irrelevant. Sudan, Chad and those francophone countries that have promised support for SADC are not bound by decisions of the SADC. Moreover, the recent fiasco of the South African-led intervention in Lesotho should lend strong support to those voices calling for a diplomatic and political solution to the problems of the region. Military intervention is the reflex of the warriors.

The Angolan government has been very active in the negotiations that took place in Victoria Falls. The government of Angola continues to maintain that theY. are fighting against the CDM as a component of their fight against UNITA. The media is continuing to report that the CDM is fighting with UNIT A while the CDM reports that they have no links with UNIT A. The press claims that the ex-generals and mercenaries are working with the CDM. Is this disinformation?

Tanzania

The Government of Tanzania has been silent on the war, taking the overt position of respecting the sovereignty of states. While the government of Tanzania has in public been supporting the position of Zimbabwe in SADC, in seminars and meetings they have been urging the Zimbabweans to study the lessons of the Tanzanian involvement in Ugandan politics since the period of the war against Idi Amin.

Julius Nyerere has been active in seeking a negotiated settlement. What is the position of Nyerere on the war? What was his role at the Non-Aligned meeting? Did the about-face of Mandela at the SADC/NAM meeting have to do with the foresight of Nyerere or with revelations on the extent of Ugandan and US involvement in the attack on Kinshasa? Only history will answer this 60

question. Because of the activities of Nyerere there are those militarists who claim that Nyerere's mother is a Tutsi, hence his support for the CDM.

Nelson Mandela reversed his earlier opposition to the Zimbabwean involvement in the Congo, declaring that it was quite reasonable for a legitimate government invaded by a foreign force to request military support from neighbors. What did Nyerere suggest to Mandela to bring this new position? What new evidence was brought to Mandela that led to the change of position? What kind of arrangement for an international peace keeping force to replace the Zimbabwean and Angolan army was hammered out with Kofi Annan?

The declaration by Mandela was considered a major diplomatic victory for the position of Mugabe by the Zimbabwean press. However, there was silence on the issue of the real intent of negotiations, that is the question of peace. For the Zimbabwean government, the diplomatic initiatives are to vindicate their position while for the South Africans negotiations are to bring peace. The summit of the SADC leaders in Durban started a process. The elements are basic. The summit in Durban called for an immediate cease-fire and peace talks in the DRC. The meeting, convened by South African President Nelson Mandela, urged both sides to freeze their military positions. However, the DRC government representative at the talks said that a cease-fire would be conditional on the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops.

The summit communique expressed its support for the territorial sovereignty of the Congo. But it called for an all-inclusive national conference for all Congolese and a transitional government to lead the country to democratic elections to be held in a reasonable period of time. The meeting mandated Mandela to organize the cease-fire in consultation with OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim. Less than a month after the initiatives, three facts are clear:

(a) The government of Kabila is not willing to negotiate for a new political dispensation with a transitional government. Instead it called on the government of Zimbabwe to arrest the leaders of the CDM who went to the meeting at Victoria Falls.

(b) The meeting at Victoria Falls and the subsequent meetings in Addis Ababa and Mauritius failed because of the refusal to see the CDM as an independent force. This position means that the government of Angola and Zimbabwe are in the short run echoing the position of the Kabila regime that there is a foreign invasion.

(c) All of the militarists in the region want to have a long war. Those who want to make war a business want the war to buy more weapons and carry the war to civilian centers in the Congo as well as Angola, Uganda and Rwanda. 61

Such an escalation reinforces the involvement of warriors such as Jonas Savimbi and the warrior I generals from all sides that make money out of the misery of the producers. The Pentagon is also interested in an expanded war since this will further weaken the African people.

The involvement of the government of the Sudan and other forces has escalated the war into a massive regional affair. The governments of Rwanda and Uganda have declared that the Kabila government must speak to the CDM with its army of tens of thousands of troops (reports are from 30,000 to 100,000). For the government of Kabila to do this will be signing its death warrant since it would be an acknowledgment that there were legitimate reasons for the CDM to have started fighting.

In the beginning, the CDM was not calling for an end to Kabila. They had declared that Kabila must be part of the new political transition. All of the forces who now support Kabila agree that his short rule has been a failure and that he used the machinery of Mobutu to stay in power. It is for this reason that even his allies (Zimbabwe and Angola) with whom he is fighting is thinking of the Congo after Kabila. The attempt to expand the war will mean that Kabila has set in motion forces over which he will have no control, forces that will lead to his political demise.

A Long War or a Short War?

The peoples of the Congo and East and Central Africa are the main sufferers in the war. The leaders of the CDM have declared that the struggle will be a long one. This is borne out by the view that they are not fighting simply to replace Kabila, but for a new mode of politics. The people of the Congo have borne the brunt of militarism ever since the murder of Lumumba. Whether the war is long or short the decisive factor will be the extent to which the CDM clarifies its political program in theory and in practice.

Neither Zimbabwe nor Angola can afford a long war (over three months in the Congo). Some sort of negotiated settlement is necessary for their own local purposes. This has more to do with their own political stability than with the interests of the Congolese people. The government of Uganda has called on Kabila to speak to the CDM. This is the position of the Rwandan government.

External Forces

The Security Council of the United Nations has been unable to take a clear position on the regional war. The involvement of the Secretary General in the meetings in Durban signaled the fact that the UN wanted the leadership of Mandela to be crucial in any cease-fire in the Congo. The USA and the European Union have called for a cease-fire. These elements have been 51 62

sidelined by the active involvement of Mugabe, Museveni, Wamba, Kagame, Nyerere, Mandela, Dos Santos and Kabila.

In the USA, the Pan-African forces are divided because they see the hand of the USA and the Pentagon in the war. It is not obvious how the Pentagon is involved in the war, but their instincts tell them from years of US military activities in Africa that there is no place where the Pentagon is simply an observer. This reality has brought charges that the CDM is simply an instrument of imperialism. This is the political position of the · representatives of the Kabila government.

Africans in the West who are familiar with the imperialist actions of the US government remain cautious and cool to the CDM. This is the logic of the pro-Lumumba sentiments in the African-American and wider progressive community. However, there is room for an analysis that centralizes the interests of the peoples of the Congo and Central Africa. One remembers the regime of Idi Amin in this respect.

When Tanzania was forced to send troops to assist the Ugandans fighting against Amin, the government of Uganda said that Tanzania was w9rking with imperialism. Amin mobilized Libya and other forces on these grounds. Amin used the issue of territorial integrity to cover his decimation of the lives of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans. The Tanzanian army had to fight against Amin with the knowledge that it violated a key principle of the OAU (that of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states). But the principle of the value of African life was more important than the question of territory. Tanzania became engulfed in the Ugandan politics and was not able to extricate itself until a Ugandan force emerged that could give leadership to the society. Independent political understanding is needed.

Independent Political Understanding Needed

The CDM and Wamba are in a position to learn from this experience and to demonstrate that the CDM has the military and political capacity to give leadership for a new mode of politics, for peace and an end to genocidal violence. The recent statement for peace from the Global Pan African Movement in Kampala captured the contradiction in this way. "All the countries militarily involved in the DRC conflict are very poor countries that cannot afford to spend scarce resources on a war. All the countries have failed to significantly improve the conditions of living of a majority of their peoples. Development has been surrendered to the IMF /World Bank and western NGOs. Infrastructural development is often dependent on so-called donors and loans. They cannot build schools and hospitals without a begging bowl across the world, yet when it comes to war they are ever ready! That is the only thing we seem to be self-sufficient in. It is a perverse demonstration of sovereignty that shows its assertiveness in war. The infinite ability to 63 mobilize resources for war need to be redirected towards social progress and development for our peoples. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be turned into an opportunity for transformation in our outlook and the way in which we relate to each other." 64

An Agenda for Peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region: More Pan-Africanism is the Answer, not Less

Part One: Is the Dream Over?

Last year was a good year for Africa and Pan Africanism. The exit of Mobutu after 32 years of misrule promised to be a new beginning, hope about hope. The spectacular military alliance and political consensus that saw off Mobutu was quite unusual: African leaders building a consensus to get rid of another head of state. For most of our Post Colonial experience African states have intervened in each others politics but have done so without admitting it and with strong disapproval by other states. One remembers the shouting match at the Rabat OAU Summit in 1979 between General Olushegun Obasanjo, then military leader of Nigeria and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania over the latter's intervention on behalf of Ugandan exiles to topple the dictatorship of Field Marshal Idi Amin. Those days the crippling OAU principle of "non­ interference in the internal affairs of member states ... " was the holly grail that dictators, oppressors and usurpers of power in various African states swore by. The unspoken consensus was "leave my victims to me in my border and you can do what you like within your borders too."

However, since the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the thawing of the cold war the world has witnessed tremendous shifts in alliances and geo-political strategies. A majority of African countries, programmed for neo-colonial failure, from inception, whose lives were unnaturally prolonged by the life­ support machine dictated by the cold war, have ceased to be of any significance internationally. No power is in any hurry to make deals or alliances with them any more. The previous threat of going East or West as bargaining chips has no resonance in the new global imperialist order dominated by one super power (the U.S.A.).

As in other regions of the world the African response to declining individual state prestige and bargaining power and globalisation was to seek salvation in numbers through renewed efforts to give regional blocs (ECOWAS, SADCC, Maghrib Union, EAC, PTA, COMESA, etc.) a new relevance. Even the dormant OAU was expected to play a more protective role in African affairs. The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and the colossus of Mandela, the forgiving and humane global personality bestriding the whole world with universal moral authority, at home and abroad, rekindled optimism that it is not all bad news from Africa. Indeed we all expected that post-apartheid South Africa will provide a new leadership both for the Southern African region and the rest of Africa.

Elsewhere on the continent Africans seem to have rediscovered the much neglected Pan African Spirit. The slogan "African Solutions to African Problems" reemerged with a vengeance. Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and 65

Sierra Leone, regardless of the brutal military dictatorship in the country was seen as positive, even if the Nigerian military had no much moral authority, but the intervention showed that Africans can solve their own problems. To add to this optimism a new club of enlightened leaders were emerging on the continent. Focused, assertive, independent, confident in making political, Diplomatic and Strategic alliances both internally and externally. Museveni, Meles, Afwerki became standard bearers of the new crop of leaders. They are supposed to be in alliance with older "progressive" leaders or countries like Tanzania, Mugabe, Nujoma, Chissano, all of them under the symbolic umbrella of the new South Africa and Mandela.

Genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 (the same month that a multi-racial election was being held in South Africa) provided the first test for the leaders to show a collective will but it was too early to demonstrate any resolve because the civil war that preceded genocide fed into the old alliances on the continent and cold war politics. However as a result of guilt over collective in action over genocide and the assertive new leadership in Rwanda, the new leadership became the youngest recruit of the Young Turks.

Mobutu's collaboration with genocidaires and the continuing threat to new Rwanda coupled with the connivance by Foreign powers, some UN institutions and international NGOs, in aiding and abetting the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR (former government army of Rwanda) finally sealed the fate of his 32 year misrule. Mobutu's Zaire had been a source of instability to the whole region and the rest of Africa for all these years. Cold war politics protected him but now even his Western/ American backers were no longer prepared to sustain him in power.

Thus an essentially regional military collaboration with limited support internally removed Mobutu from power. In lightening strikes the giant country laid prostate (with Mobutu himself suffering from prostate cancer). The country the region, Africa and even most of the World were glad to see the back of Mobutu.

New hopes emerged. The world media (always looking for short hand phrases for complex historical processes) focused on "New leaders in Africa" of which Museveni of Uganda was seen as the titular head. Thabo Mbeki, Deputy President of South Africa introduced the symbolic phrase that captured the huge expectations and aspirations: The African Renaissance.

One year later the dreams seems to be crumbling. Most the so-called new leaders are at each other's throat again over the DRC which ignited the hopes in the first place. Is the dream over? Has Renaissance been proclaimed too early? 66

The answer is of course no. The fact that there are some gaps in a dream does not mean it is over. What we are witnessing are some of the contradictions inherent in a historical transition. We all thought that nobody could be worse than Mobutu. But within 15 months we now know that it is easier to get rid of Mobutu than being rid of Mobutuism.

What went wrong?

A number of factors led to the current debacle. The backdrop for the plethora of contradictions is the relatively very easy victory secured over Mobutu. Amilcar Cabral always advised the P AIGC cadres in the war against Portuguese colonialists: "Tell no lies ... claim no easy victories." Easy victories can bring in problems that are not so easy. Matters of ideology, political direction, policies and programmes that could have been resolved through political struggles were glossed over with some sort of naive hope that they would work out alright because "we know the people involved." I remember visiting Coma soon after it fell and asking for the programme of the AFDL from all the leaders including at the AFDL headquarters and Kabila himself. All I could get was that "we will get it for you!" Other factors include: . One, the alliance that removed Mobutu was essentially military and regional. Congolese people did not liberate themselves they were liberated. Very soon liberators began to be perceived as occupiers. The masses of the people were onlookers in their own destiny.

Two, while there was consensus around removing Mobutu there was no wide ranging programme that addresses both the internal and regional issues for a sustainable post-Mobutu government.

Three, the new leader and the political alliance (AFDL) was casually agreed upon as "our man" without consultations with the Congolese he will rule.

Four, the new leadership entered Kinshasa as conquerors with little understanding and contempt for all the unarmed civil and political forces inside the country. They were either seen as cowards or collaborators.

Five, "Our Man" Kabila had a tabula rasa to do as he pleased politically and immediately embarked on a "Winner Takes All" attitude. Very early in the regime it was clear that the transition from war-lordism to states man was not going to be easy for this particular president. When alarm bells were sounded by Congolese patriots and opposition forces they were drawn out by an almost universal apologia that "the man must be given a chance."

Six, the regional consensus soon gave way to inter state rivalries by the various states for personal influence with the "big man." Consequently the 67 tail began to wag the dog as he got enormous room to play one state or group of states against another.

In these circumstances the opportunity was lost both individually and collectively to positively influence the domestic agenda in the direction of an inclusive broad-based government that would have delivered responsible government to the Congolese and also address the legitimate security concerns of the region.

Part Two: Allies at War

The current crisis has a lot to do with the inability of the Kabila regime to establish any structures on the ground to facilitate a transparent transition with popular legitimacy on the one hand and the short term nature of his politico-military alliances regionally.

There is no guarantee that even if he "wins" the current military struggles with the help of his new allies there will be a fundamental shift in his behavioural patterns or a meaningful political process at home. The SADC allies (namely Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) could just find themselves (in another few months) in the same quagmire that both Rwanda and Uganda and even Angola found themselves after helping him to Kinshasa last year.

The arguments for supporting or opposing Kabila are many:

One, that he has not been given enough time to consolidate his rule. Opponents retort that he has no plans for the country therefore even if he is given 10 years he would only consolidate personal rule and they are not prepared to give him another 32 years like Mobutu.

Two, Kabila insists that the rebel group, RDC, is a creation of his erstwhile allies (Uganda and Rwanda) who had invaded the country and are using the RDC as a cover. Uganda and Rwanda and the rebels react that the rebellion is an internal matter. To the extent that they are concerned it is only for their legitimate national security needs as neighbours whose countries are being attacked by rebels based in the DRC. After flip flopping Uganda has admitted that it is actually involved whereas Rwanda has denied active involvement. This is an unnecessary debacle because the facts on the ground speak for themselves. Kabila did not complain of invasion last year when the same forces brought him to power. So when did they become invaders?

Three, the countries backing Kabila claim they are there to help a "brotherly" country whose territorial integrity was violated and its sovereignty under threat. This is another circumlocution because the same states actively supported Mobutu's overthrow why didn't anybody think of sovereignty 68

then? Does sovereignty belong to territories, to people or to the president? There are technical and pragmatic answers to this question which all states adjust depending on what issues are at stake and at what time.

Four, related to this is the argument put forward by Rwanda and Uganda that the way Kabila has exercised his sovereignty is adversely affecting their own sovereignty because rebel groups and genocidaire elements are distabilising their countries. It is not unknown in international relations for states to engage in hot pursuit of rebel groups into other countries . Even countries have sometimes virtually annexed parts of other countries as self-declared security zones. Israel in Lebanon is the most notorious of this type f example. We can also look at Turkey's incursion into Iraq and now Syria as contemporary examples. May be what we need to be talking about is collective sovereignty guarantied by collective security.

There are many more reasons and counter arguments from all sides but the most disturbing aspect of the whole conflict is that regional concerns seem (yet again) to dominate the matter at the expense of the wishes and determination of the people of the DRC who are the victims of the processes.

This is why regardless of the military outcome of the conflict the fundamental issues will remain unresolved and the whole region will be sucked further down into the abyss of cyclical conflict with an ever widening alliances of the strangest bed fellows.

The rebels may have thought that another lightening victory was possible. But even if they had succeeded, the challenges facing them would have been the same as the ones Kabila failed to resolve. The SADC-trio intervention has given them the opportunity to put forward programmes and engage themselves politically. We know more about their programmes in the last two months than we know about the AFDL. And from all indications they have settled for a long haul.

However it seems that the new allies of Kabila are the ones who now believe in a quick military victory. After that then what? The original strategy was to stop Kinshasa from falling into rebel hands which would have presented a fait accompli. There are uncanny echoes of the original aim of ECOWAS through ECOMOG in Liberia to stop Charles Taylor and his NPFL from capturing Monrovia. After more than 6 years of tragic destruction of lives, property and the infrastructure of the country, the same Charles Taylor was sworn in as "democratically" elected president of Liberia in 1997. Could we not have saved the country all the trauma and devastation by working on a political solution right from the start?

There is, for all intents and purposes a military stalemate in the DRC. The most decisive military force on the new allies side is Angola. It does not look 69 likely that it will move beyond the western frontiers in its war against UNITA which has allied it to Kabila. Zimbabwe has superior air power but the jungle war cannot be won from the skies. This is no Gulf war. Ultimate victory has to be won on the ground. Does it have that capacity? Can it afford it? If quick victory is not possible what are the complications of continuing stalemate?

So far the war has been an intra-African matter but Kabila's desperate search for new allies has lined up Chad, Central Afrique and Sudan. He is also engaged in rapprochement with France there by inviting the Anglo­ American and francophone competition which will only exacerbate the conflict.

With Sudan now an ally of Zimbabwe which along with most of the SADC states is fully committed to the cause of the SPLA/M there is no doubt that the latter will also intervene actively. Just imagine the tragic spectacle of guns given to SPLA by Zimbabwe being turned against Zimbabweans soldiers in the DRC.

All these troubling issues beg for answers beyond the self justifying partisanship that is being spinned by all the parties. They call for sober reflection and dictate that all parties to the conflict internally and externally look for a wider political settlement. It is time for bruised egos to be plastered. It is time for the interests of African peoples in the Congo and the region to take precedence over short term alliances. We need to demonstrate car:acity for peace as opposed to perpetual readiness for war.

Part Three: An Agenda for Peace

If the war is a no win situation for all the parties involved in the long run why can't we give peace a chance? The UN Human Development Report for 1998 make a very depressing reading for the conditions of living of Africans in general. Considering that the figures are largely from official IMF /World Bank sources one will be correct to suggest that the situation is probably worse than the statistics reveal. On a global ranking of 174 countries into high human development, medium human development and low human development, the last category seems to be a monopoly of African states. Only three African states (Libya 64, Mauritius 61 and Seychelles 56) made it to the high human development bracket. Of the Medium human development groups, only ten African countries (South Africa 89, Botswana 97, Namibia 107, Egypt 112, Cape Verde 117, Gabon 120, Sao Tome 121, Congo Brazzaville 128 and Zimbabwe 130). The rest of the continent juggle for who is lower than whom in the low human development category. Even those who are in the medium range, majority of them are so low in this category that their positions would certainly have collapsed into the low income by the time the 70

costs of these conflicts are taken into consideration next year. Zimbabwe for instance is the last at 130 for the medium group.

Therefore all the countries militarily involved in the DRC conflict are effectively in the low development group barring Namibia which is at a precarious last quarter of the medium development group.

All the countries have failed to significantly improve the conditions of living of a majority of their peoples. Development has been surrendered to the IMF /World Bank and western NGOs. Infrastructure development is often dependent on so-called donors and loans. They cannot build schools and hospitals without a begging bowl across the world yet when it comes to war they are ever ready! That is the only thing we seem to be self-sufficient in. It is a perverse demonstration of sovereignty that shows its assertiveness in war. The infinite ability to mobilise resources for war need to be redirected towards social progress and development for our peoples.

The conflict in the DRC should be turned into an opportunity for transformation in our outlook and the way in which we relate to each other. How we resolve it will determine whether the renaissance is a candle in the dark or a candle in the rain.

What has been missing is the voice of the people be it inside Congo or in most of the countries involved. What are the parliamentarians, scholars, human rights and peace activists, youth groups, women, trade unionists and business people of the region saying and doing about the war? What about the political parties, even ruling parties, that are silent, let alone opposition ones? Since the war started has the leadership of the NRM tried to talk to those of the RPF? Has either of them tried to talk to ZANU(PF), MPLA, SW APO? Did any of the latter tried speaking to either of the former? Similarly parliamentarians on all sides . How many of the parliaments actually know the level of the involvement of their governments? Did any of the warring parties actually sought parliamentary approval? It is depressing that the answer to these questions are resounding no across the board.

Diplomacy and interstate relations have been reduced to the exclusive action of the executive and even within the executive, the prerogative of the army /president and the security establishment. In some cases a war may be declared simply because the president woke up on the wrong side of the bed! In such highly centralised system we had better be preparing for war the moment you hear that president "x" is no longer talking to president "y"!

The limits of this type of Pan Africanism from the top has been demonstrated by the DRC crisis. It does not work and it is not working There is a need to build and strengthen people to people contacts at various level who can continue to engage each other when the presidents stop eating or 71 72

drinking together. If this type of multi-track diplomacy was available and explored may be some of these conflicts could have been avoided or early warning given to the leaders. The state as the exclusive war maker and guarantor of peace is like a stool on one leg. No matter how strong it is it cannot hold out for long. The various governments have shown diligence in waging war not in making peace. They need help. We should not wait to be asked. All stake holders in this region must claim their space.

A comprehensive agenda for peace would have to address both the internal and regional dimension of the conflicts and seek wider political settlement of the issues that make the region so vulnerable to armed conflicts. This will include:

A. Inside the DRC:

1. Recognition and acceptance by the government and the rebels that the problem is political, not military. And that it should be resolved by the people of the Congo themselves.

2. Recognition by the government of the DRC that there is an armed rebellion in the country regardless of its external dimension. Even if all external forces withdraw today there will not be an end to the rebellion. This recognition is important in order to begin to negotiate ceasefire that may even lead to the formation of an African peace-keeping force agreeable to both parties. The two talks in Victoria Falls and the ones of Mauritius and Addis Ababa are not credible because of the unwillingness of the government of the DRC to talk face to.face with the rebels. The RDC had indicated several times that it is willing to talk but face to face. However the Kabila regime has been adamant that what it is facing is "invasion." This is just been clever by half. The linkage between "foreign" and "internal" is too blurred at the moment. Concentrating on the invasion may have temporarily given him crude jingoistic support at home but it won't last. Sooner than later the internal contradictions have to be faced even if he succeeds in mobilising the whole of Africa to support him against "invaders" they cannot perpetuate him in power.

3. There is a need to engage the various political forces in the DRC positively not the negative mobilization on cheap populism, xenophobia and war that is going on at the moment. This will require the reconvening of the National Conference which should decide on the transition process and institutions.

4. The voices of all the people of the Congo armed or unarmed must be heard and heard effectively. 72

B. At the regional level:

1. Diplomacy and political engagement must be given a chance to rebuild burnt and creaking bridges.

2. A genuine commitment by all parties to the conflict to resolve the conflict peacefully.

3. Parallel diplomatic efforts by other institutions and forces must be encouraged.

4. The legitimate national security of all the neighbouring states must be recognised. For instance Angola does not want UNITA to use DRC to continue to attack it. Uganda does not want to deny ADF, LRA and other armed groups to continue to use DRC to cause havoc in Uganda. Rwanda has specific and dangerous problems with the Interahamwe and ex-FAR. This is not a normal rebel group that just wishes to overthrow the government but .· genocidaire extremists who wish to exterminate sections of the population.

5. The cynical politics of my enemy's enemy is my friend must be stopped otherwise collective security can not be guaranteed.

6. The culture of genocide and impunity in the region must be ended. It is not just a problem for Rwanda and Burundi but a regional and global issue.

7. All the states must realise that interstate rivalries in befriending the DRC government or the rebels are in the long run only going to produce belligerence on the part of the warring parties and stop them from taking meaningful; steps to resolve the conflicts internally.

8. At the moment there are too many parallel peace initiatives by different states, regional institutions and the OAU. These need to be streamlined because of the generalised suspicions and doubts that surround most of them.

9. There must be a commitment to African solutions to African problems because internationalisation of the conflict is not in the interest of all the states and Africa. All extra-African powers who have wars to fight on this continent should do so directly without recruiting Africans as proxies.

10. There is an urgent need for a regional consultation and agreement on citizenship, rights of peoples, democratisation, borders, refugees, internal displaced persons, migration, and regional economic development and social progress. This will stop the petty squabbles for trade, commercial opportunities, competing regional blocs, etc. 73

Finally the solution to the crisis is not less Pan Africanism but more. The fundamental cause of these problems is poverty and underdevelopment. Defeating it requires bigger markets, regional integration, free movement for goods and services and labour. If we are building roads from Cape town to Cairo, creating jobs, improving agriculture and sending all our children to school we would be too busy working to enquire whether one was born here or there. We need to give our youth sustainable employment opportunities other than war.

Dr. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem General-Secretary Pan African Movement

Global Headquarters: Plot 1874, St. Barnabas Road, Opposite Reste Corner Hotel, Kisugu-Muyenga, Kampala.

Postal Address: P.O. Box 7168, Kampala, Uganda. East Africa.

Tel: 256-41-267075 or 256-41-269912; fax: 256-41-267075 e-mail: [email protected].

Visit our web site: http:/ /www.prairienet.org/ acas/panafrican.html 74

Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis by Mahmood Mamdani, A.C. Jordan Professor of African Studies, Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town

[Text of talk delivered at the workshop on Congo, SAPES Trust, Harare, 23 September 1998]

It is widely believed that the root problem of the African state is the artificial nature of its boundaries; were not these boundaries, after all, first arbitrarily drawn up at the Berlin Conference of 1885-86 and then imposed from the outside? I would like to begin by putting forward two suggestions for your consideration. One, all boundaries are more or less artificial. Two, an understanding of how power is organised is likely to prove a more illuminating starting point than the nature of boundaries, if we want to understand the crisis of the state.

Citizenship and the Congolese State

There is a thesis now common in Africanist political science: that the state is collapsing in more and more African countries. The Congo is often held. up as an example of this. The key problem with this thesis is that it proceeds by making analogies. In the process, it overlooks what is different about the state in Africa. Its starting point is not the state in Africa, particularly the type of state created under colonialism, but the assumption that the African state is an attempt to reproduce the modern state in Europe. Hence the conclusion, that the attempt to imitate the original has failed. The difference is understood as evidence of a failure, and is then theorised as a collapse.

The state in Africa is a product of a radically different history, a history of conquest. Alien power faced the problem of legitimacy. In response, the British reformed their mode of rule, first in equatorial Africa in the early part of this century. They called it "indirect rule." The French followed suit in the 1920s, when they shifted from "assimilation" to "association" as the basis of colonial rule in the African colonies. Belgium effected a similar shift in its African colonies in the 1930s.

It is this reform which begins to explain what is different about the state in Africa. Indirect rule reorganised colonial power as two distinct authorities, each ruling through a different legal regime, one civic and the other ethnic. The basis of civic power was the central state, which expressed its will through civil law. In contrast, the local state was organised as a Native Authority, overseeing the implementation of a customary law. Civil law claimed to speak the universal language of rights, but the regime of rights was applied only to the population of metropolitan origin, described as racially distinct. Natives were portrayed as creatures of habit, rather than being capable of a rational exercise of freedom. It was said that they needed to be 75 7(

ruled through a different regime, one that would enforce custom. This, however, did not lead to the creation of a single customary law and a single customary regime ruling all natives. Instead, the· colonial power claimed that each ethnic group had its own distinctive custom; so it created a different set of customary laws for each ethnic group, and established a separate Native Authority to enforce each set of laws. The final result was a Janus-faced power, with two faces. Like civic power, native power too was a colonial creation. The difference, however, was that while civic power was racialized, the Native Authority was ethnicized.

This form of the state underwent a reform after independence. The reform process varied from one country to another, but one could discern the more radical from the more conservative current. The Congolese reform followed the more conservative variant: while civic power was de-racialized, the Native Authority remained ethnicized. In fact, with the withdrawal of the Belgian cercle commander at independence, one could say that the ethnic aspect of the Native Authority got further entrenched.

When Africanists speak of the collapse of the state, they are speaking of the collapse of civic power, not that of the Native Authority. The point is that what holds Congo together is not as much the civic power in Kinshasa and Kisangani, and so on, but the hundreds of Native Authorities that control the bulk of the population in the name of enforcing "custom." For southern Africans, the Congo is better thought of as a giant federation of Bantustans, a reformed colonial state.

Citizenship and the Banyamulenge Question

This bifurcated state has become the basis of a bifurcated citizenship. The colonial state enforced a dual political identity. It made a distinction in law between those indigenous and those not. It went further and drew a racial distinction among the non-indigenous and an ethnic distinction among the indigenous. It thus imposed a racialized civic identity on the former and an ethnicized native identity on the latter. The post-colonial state de-racialized the civic identity; civic citizenship stopped recognising any difference based on race or place of origin. But it continued to reproduce the native identity as ethnic. The result has been a double, or bifurcated, citizenship: one civic, the other ethnic. Civic citizenship is a consequence of membership of the central state; it is specified in the constitution, and is the basis of rights. These are mainly individual rights, in the political and civil realm. In contrast, ethnic citizenship is a consequence of membership in the Native Authority; it is the source of a different category of rights, mainly social and economic. Further, these rights are not accessed individually but by virtue of membership of an ·ethnic community. The key socio-economic right, it is worth mentioning here, is the right to use land as a source of livelihood. Herein lies the material basis of ethnic belonging, particularly for the ethnic poor. 76

The political consequence of this bifurcated citizenship is that while everyone is a civic citizen, a citizen of the state called Congo, not everyone has an ethnic citizenship. Since civic citizenship has been de-racialized, everyone­ whether indigenous or not--is a citizen of Congo. But only those indigenous have a Native Authority and, as a consequence, an ethnic citizenship. Because they do not have a Native Authority of their own, immigrants considered non-indigenous are excluded from ethnic citizenship. The immediate practical consequence of this is that non-indigenous citizens are denied "customary" access to land since they do not have their own Native Authority.

The Native Authority in Congo is three-tiered. It is the chief of the second tier who controls access to land. The Banyamulenge in Kivu Province have their own chief at the first tier, but they are treated as ethnic strangers at the second tier. The 1981 law accepted the Banyamulenge as civic citizens, but not as ethnic citizens with the right to their own Native Authority. It is worth noting that the Banyamulenge identity- as that of other immigrants from Rwanda, like the Banyamasisi and the Banyaruchuru-is territorial, not ethnic: the Banya-Mulenge refers to those of the place called Mulenge. 'Fhis group identity is, in turn, like a geological deposit, layered, with each layer signifying a different history. Starting from those who were there when the borders of colonial Congo were first demarcated, the identity Banyamulenge includes every wave of immigrants to Mulenge, including those who came in the wake of the genocide of 1994. They are all Banyamulenge. The irony of a common identification for all Rwandese-speaking persons resident in a single place, regardless of when they got there, is that the depth of claim of those longest resident is obscured by the shallowness of the claim of the latest wave of immigrants. It is common to hear civil society organisations in Kivu Province complain thus: you can't tell who is who and when they got here; they all claim to be Banyamulenge, even those who got here only yesterday. The consequence is that, in native eyes, Banyamulenge becomes a collective identification of those non-indigenous.

This question is not unique to Congo. It is a dilemma that arises where ever there are substantial numbers of immigrants and where the state inherited from colonialism makes a structural distinction between two kinds of citizens: those indigenous, and those not.

One can see this in the case of Uganda, historically another neighbour of Rwanda with a substantial number of Kinyaruanda-speaking immigrants. It is the state oppression of all Banyaruanda--whether they were born in Uganda or not, and whether they were civic citizens or not--by the Obote II government that led to Banyaruanda youth joining the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni. It is estimated that as many as 4,000 of the 77 roughly 16,000 NRA guerrillas who marched into Kampala in January, 1986, were Banyaruanda.

Ironically, the Banyaruanda question became a major social--and political-­ question in Uganda as individuals of Rwandese origin occupied prominent state positions under the NRA. The social question was connected to land and became a major public issue when Banyaruanda squatters confronted Baganda ranchers in Mawogola county in Masaka District. The squatters laid a claim to land, and utilised their majority status in the county to press it home as a democratic demand. Ranchers countered by questioning whether a non­ indigenous group can have land rights as do natives. As the land question was translated into a nationality question (specifically, the Banyaruanda question), national attention focused on the prominent position of individuals of Rwandese origin in the hierarchy of the NRA and that of the state. The social question triggered a political crisis. This was in the late 80s. The important point to understand, for our purposes, is that the key impetus behind the decision of the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) to cross the border from Uganda into Rwanda in 1990 was not a political crisis in Rwanda, but one in Uganda.

How is one to come to terms with the conflict between those the Native Authority identifies as ethnically indigenous and thus with a claim to customary rights, and those it brands as ethnically non-indigenous and thus lacking in any such customary claim? We can identify two different solutions from recent developments in the region. The first solution is to create a separate Native Authority for those branded as non-indigenous, such as the Banyamulenge in Kivu Province. This was the solution promoted by the Rwandese army in Congo, after Kabila came to power. But it was also a solution that was very unpopular in Congo, especially amongst those living in Kivu. From their point of view, this solution meant that the land over which the Native Authority would be created would be the land that would be appropriated by the Banyamulenge. Not surprisingly, the solution advanced by the Rwandese army exacerbated ethnic tension in Kivu Province.

An alternative to changing the boundaries of existing Native Authorities to create a new Native Authority, is to reform the very nature of power organised as the Native Authority in the local state. This was the solution arrived at in practice by the NRA during its guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle. It was also the solution endorsed as policy by Uganda's National Commission of Inquiry into Local Government System, set up in 1986. This solution was to democratise the local state by dismantling the system of chiefship, by turning the chief into an administrative officer supervised by an executive committee elected by a village assembly of all adults resident in the village, whether indigenous or not. It thus re-defined the basis of customary rights from ethnicity to locality (territoriality). While this was a better 78

solution than multiplying the number of Native Authorities--and thus multiplying the problem itself--it did not do away with the problem. As subsequent developments showed, it would not hold without a political alliance of working people, of both those indigenous and those non­ indigenous, cementing the fissure the conquest state had introduced into the local population. As this alliance began to erode toward the late 80s, the Ugandan solution also began to unravel.

The lesson of the Ugandan experience is that the reform of the state, and therefore of citizenship laws, will not be an automatic consequence of elections and majority rule. It will require a combination of an enlightened leadership with an organisational capacity and will to undertake a protracted education of the population, both those indigenous (the majority) and those not (the minority). This lesson is confirmed by the Congolese experience. For it is worth bearing in mind that while the Mobutu-sponsored 1981 law granted civic citizenship to the Banyamulenge, the National Conference of democratic forces in Congo opposed this law when it convened a decade later, · in 1991.

Kivu Province and its Link with Rwanda

Kivu province is where losers in Rwanda traditionally end up; and it is in Kivu that they prepare .to return to power in Rwanda. That, at least, is how conventional wisdom in Coma and Bukavu has it. This, no doubt, introduces a double tension in Kivu, both internal and external, the former within Kivu society and the latter between Kivu and the power in Rwanda. It is also a tension that has tended to grow in intensity as the refugee and exile population has grown in size. No wonder Kivu found it difficult to contain this pressure in the aftermath of the Genocide of 1994. Then, over a million Rwandese refugees streamed into Kivu, both north and south, and set themselves up in camps. The Interahamwe, who continued to be supplied militarily by the French, controlled the camps--while international NGOs, mostly American-funded, fed them.

The insertion of a million plus refugees in camps that were armed and resourced from the outside had a devastating effect on civilian life in Kivu. It led to the dollarization of the economy, and to militarization of ordinary life. The Intrahamwe roamed the countryside, often collaborating with the Congolese army. In response many of the Native Authorities created their own militia. These are the Mai Mai. The anatomy of political life in Kivu began to take on a resemblance to that in Rwanda. As in Rwanda, where every political party had come to have its own militia by the Genocide of 1994, so in Kivu every Native Authority began to acquire its own militia in the post-Genocide period. 79

The Mai Mai joined the First Rebellion in Congo, the rebellion against Mobutu, but opposed the rebellion when it came to power. Why? They joined it when the rebellion targeted the Interahamwe and the allied Congolese state army. And they opposed it when they saw the rebellion turn into the spearhead of a Rwandese-installed government. On the one hand, the Rwandese army began to resemble an army of occupation, its commander even being formally appointed the commander of the Congolese National Army. On the other, this same army began to actively support the demand by the Banyamulenge that they be given a separate a Native Authority in south Ki vu.

Militarization spread two tendencies in Kivu and in Congo, as it had in Rwanda. First, the link forged between militarization and genocidal tendencies inside Rwanda spread across its borders. The First Rebellion led to an indiscriminate slaughter of Intrahamwe and of unarmed Hutu refugees. Those responsible for that slaughter were part of the forces that opposed a UN Inquiry into the matter. They remain a part of the military forces of the Second Rebellion. The Second Rebellion, in turn, evoked from the Kabila government an invitation to the general population in Kivu to slaughter indiscriminately not only invading forces from Rwanda, but also the Banyamulenge in the rebellion, and even any ordinary Tutsi civilian. We need to keep in mind that genocidal tendencies are present on both sides of the conflict, that of the government and that of the rebellion.

Secondly, the militarization of politics has reduced all credible politics to armed politics. The result is to marginalize all civil society-based politics. Once again, this tendency has become consolidated in Rwanda. Beginning with a marginalization of the Hutu opposition autonomous of both Hutu Power and the RPF, the tendency of state politics in Rwanda has been to demonise all politics autonomous of the RPF--regardless of its political character--as "genocidaire." It is a tendency strong in both the Kabila government in Congo, and in a section of the political leadership of the Second Rebellion. The tendency to reduce all credible politics to armed politics is also present on both sides, that of the government and of the rebels.

The Second Rebellion

We must begin by rejecting two tendencies, one which paints the rebellion as entirely a home grown affair, and the other which would make us believe that it is wholly a foreign invasion. The Rebellion is characterised by both internal and external factors. I shall begin with the internal factor.

It is clear that the political organ of the Rebellion--the Rally for Congolese Democracy or the CDM--is a hastily put together affair. As such, it lacks cohesion. We can identify at least three distinct and even opposed tendencies in it. The first is that identified with its Chairperson, Wamba dia Wamba. The 80

second is identified with the Banyamulenge group, closely allied to Rwanda. And the third is identified with the ex-Mobutists. In this coalition, the balance of forces is clearly in favour of those with military forces, being the pro­ Rwanda Banyamulenge group and the ex-Mobutists. These also represent the core of the militarist tendency in the Rebellion.

Let me illustrate my point with two examples. In a recent CNN Report on the war, the military commander in Goma stated--in the presence of Wamba dia Wamba--that he and his military colleagues would act against Wamba's political group if they became dissatisfied with their rule. In a recent interview with De Standard in Belgium, Wamba explained that the political wing lagged behind the military system because it was formed after the military operation. He added that he hoped that those in favour of political liberation of the people would eventually gain advantage in the movement. Such honesty and transparency is rare to come by in politics. Wamba dia Wamba is a fine scholar and a person of great integrity. While he is formally the political leader of the Rebellion, I suggest we will make better sense of both the Rebellion and the tendency identified with Wamba if we understand it as opposed to the dominant political tendency in the Rebellion.

The fact is that both the Rebellion and the Government are internally contradictory. The dominant tendency in both is characterised by a militarised form of politics. The question we need to ask is: How to de-militarise politics? As a starting point, I suggest it requires making politics more inclusive, particularly by reorganising the legitimacy of unarmed opposition. To recognise the political limits of both the government and the rebellion is to recognise the political opposition to Mobutu that gelled as the Sovereign National Conference in 1990-91. Comprising over 400 civic and over a hundred political groups, this opposition thrived in the period from 1990 to 1996. It was neither a part of the First Rebellion (Kabila) nor of the Second Rebellion (anti-Kabila). It is this unarmed opposition, particularly the democratic sector within it, that will be key to de-militarising Congolese politics by making it more inclusive.

We can now turn to the external factor in the Rebellion. There is need to oppose the external invasion without denying the existence of an internal opposition. It is worth noting that all regimes in the region--and this includes, in particular, Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Angola--have a habit of insisting that their internal problems are generated by external involvement. Of all, however, Congo falls in a special category. For, unlike all others, Congo is the object of direct foreign invasion, not just indirect foreign interference. By this, I am referring to the invasion that began with the entry of Ugandan and Rwandese forces, which was then countered with forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and others. The foreign invasion seems to have given Kabila a second lease on life. If you want an analogy, think of how Hitler's invasion transformed Stalin into a national hero. Increasingly 81 isolated at home by late 1997, it is clear that Kabila now enjoys growing popularity as he wears the mantle of national independence.

The result is that internal reform is more difficult today than it was before the foreign invasion. This is why the first precondition to internal reform is that all foreign forces leave the Congo. And yet, we know that foreign forces are unlikely to leave Congo without the acceptance of a broad agenda of internal political reform. Such an agenda will need both international credibility and international support. To marshal both that credibility and that support, any agenda for internal reform will need to recognise the legitimacy of all internal political forces, whether in or out of government, whether armed or not.

Conclusion

Foreign invasion cannot give us democracy as a turnkey project. This was true of Uganda in 1979. It was true of Congo in 1997, and it remains true of Congo in 1998. A lot of problems ascribed to Kabila would have been faced by any government put in power by foreign forces. It is better to face up to this fact, no matter how things turn out in the present conflict in Congo. Even if our friend Wamba dia Wamba should turn out to be the head of the next government, or another person of equal integrity and democratic persuasion, this single political fact will not go away.

The irony of the Congo crisis is that the government claims to stand for the national question, while the rebellion highlights the democratic question. Oµr dilemma, and that of Wamba dia Wamba, is that any political force which hopes to realise its democratic aspirations will first have to establish its nationalist credentials.

The lesson of Congo is that Africa needs to re-assert and strengthen two principles. The first is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of militarism and the associated tendency to export revolution. This means making a clear distinction between the right of peoples to negotiate and to re-define sovereignty, and the obligation of states to respect existing definitions of sovereignty. The second is to oppose militarism in politics, as a first step to democratisation. It is my view that this two-fold commitment can provide us the basis for dealing with deeper issues that the Congo crisis has brought to surface, being those of citizenship and state reform.

Thank you. 82

Declaration on Political Conflicts in Africa African Association of Political Science Pointe-aux-Piments, Mauritius, October 3, 1998

Meeting from 2-3 October 1998 at Pointe-aux-Piments, Mauritius, the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) examined at length the current armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes Region, particularly the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Guinea-Bissau. The growing instability in the Kingdom of Lesotho and the still unsettled situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were also noted.

The Association is greatly disturbed by the growing tendency to opt for military solutions to inter-state and internal conflicts in Africa. At a time when the people of Africa are confronted with the negative consequences of globalization for their economic security and the future of their children, the recourse to force can only result in destroying what is left of the productive infrastructure and undermining the prospects for economic recovery, reconstruction and development.

Mindful of the complexity of the issues involved in both inter-state and . internal conflicts, the Association calls on African states and leaders to recognize the legitimate concerns of all parties to the various conflicts, and to find ways and means of responding to these concerns in a fair and inclusive manner consistent with the principles of justice, equality and Pan­ Africanism. These conflicts should also be resolved through the framework of the OAU, without the involvement of outside powers with vested interests in Africa. Conflict resolution should be undertaken in accordance with the basic objectives and principles of the OAU Charter such as respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inalienable right to independent existence of Member States, non-interference in their internal affairs, the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Respect for human rights and cultural diversity should underpin the whole conflict resolution process, while every effort should be made to eliminate incitement to ethnic hatred. In all circumstances, there should be no place for genocide on our continent.

The Association offers its expertise to the OAU Secretariat to help find solutions to the various conflicts, beginning with the most explosive of them all, the widening war in the DRC. 83

Message from the Bill Martin and Merle Bowen, Co-Chairs: ACAS Annual Meeting at the 1998 African Studies Association Conference

This has been a busy year for ACAS and all those concerned with Africa. On this side of the Atlantic we have seen President Clinton depart for the continent; a new free trade bill for Africa; greater efforts to mobilize a new constituency for Africa, most notably the Africa Summit; and the bombing of US embassies and the US bombing of Sudan. From the African side of the Atlantic have arisen new challenges to dictators and US-supported regimes, as well as calls for US sanctions and assistance from Nigeria to the Congo.

ACAS and ACAS members have been quite active in responding to these challenges. We have issued briefings and alerts on legislation and other events, often with other progressive organizations, addressed the public in print and meetings, collated and published special briefing packets on urgent issues, and issued topical ACAS Bulletins. Among the latter are the special issues on the Congo and Nigeria, both coming out this month.

No other organization provides these progressive, scholarly, and activist perspectives, materials and actions.

To continue this work we need your support, ideas, and criticism. We thus urge you to come to our membership meeting at the African Studies Association conference this month if you are attendin'g the conference. Our membership meeting is scheduled for:

Saturday October 31. 1:15-3:00 p.m.

(Unfortunately this conflicts with several other events, something we tried to avoid, but could not given ASA rules and room availability.)

Please bring ideas for future activities, projects, and, if possible, nominations for positions on the Executive Committee. We particularly could use assistance in carrying out new projects related to critical issues and areas of Africa, as well as membership and outreach to students and youth.

If you are not attending the conference, please send us your ideas by e-mail, phone or fax (see front cover for addresses).

We look forward to seeing you at ASA or hearing from you.

Merle Bowen Bill Martin 84

ACAS Meetings and Panels at the 1998 African Studies Association Conference

Meetings:

Saturday October 31, 1998

7:30-9:00 am: ACAS Board and Executive Meeting

1:15-3:00 pm: ACAS Membership Meeting

(Check final program for rooms.)

Panels:

Friday 9:00-11:00 am. Session III, Panel III-05

Panel: U.S. Policy Toward Africa, More Attention, Different Visions. Chair: Merle Bowen (University of Illinois) Panelists: Adotei Akwei (Amnesty International): "U.S. Foreign . Policy Leading Toward the 21st Century." Salih Booker (Council on Foreign Relations): "U.S. Policy Toward Africa: Getting the Right Mix." Jennifer Davis (Africa Fund): "In Whose Interest? Building U.S. Policy From the Ground Up." Discussant: Jim Cason

Friday 3:00-5:00 pm., Session V, Panel V-02

Panel: Mobilizing New Constituencies for Africa Chair: Joye Bowman (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Panelists: Imani Countess (Africa Development Foundation): "Preparing the Ground for Constituency Building" Gerald Horne (Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill): "The Black Constituency for Africa: Looking Backward, Looking Forward." Meredeth Turshen (Rutgers University): "Constituency Building at the National Summit." William G. Martin (Univ. of Illinois): "Who and Where are the Constituents?" Discussant: Michael 0. West (Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) ASSOCIATION OF CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS 1999 MEMBERSHIP FORM Special Offer: As part of our continuing effort to enhance the benefits to members, we have arranged for a special offer that includes reduced membership costs for ACAS (and thus issues of the ACAS Bulletin) and a discounted one-year subscription to the Review of African Political Economy (normally $40/year). This offer is valid only for individual memberships, and not institutional or overseas memberships/gifts. The rates are listed below. Name ------Address ~------City/State/Zip------­ Affiliation ------Phone (office) ______(home) ______E-mail Fax ------~----~ ------~ Interests: Region ______

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