COMMENTARY

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 2003 in review

NELSON ALUSALA

Introduction the two countries to deliberate on the Luanda Accord of September 2002. The two heads of This paper reflects on major political events state affirmed their commitment to the that took place in the Democratic Republic of accord, which provides for the total withdraw- Congo (DRC) in 2003 and which have signif- al of Ugandan troops from the DRC and the icantly shaped the peace process in the DRC, normalisation of relations between the DRC as well as the politics of the Great Lakes and . The relationship between Region. It concludes with observations drawn and Kampala seemed to improve from the events. further when delegates of the two govern- ments, ethnic militias and different rebel The review groups operating in Ituri signed the Ituri Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in . The year 2003 was a year of remarkable achievement and a turning point for the peo- Under this agreement the Uganda People’s ple of the DRC, as it marked the beginning of Defence Force (UPDF) was to withdraw from what many would call ‘the road to peace’ after the DRC by 24 April. The only obstacle to the close to five years of war. agreement was the Union des Patriotes Congolais When in January the UN Security Council (UPC’s) failure to sign. unanimously approved resolution 1457 to Following a continued escalation of vio- renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts on lence in Ituri, the UN Security Council in the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources March increased the number of personnel in and Other forms of Wealth of the DRC, the the UN peacekeeping force – MONUC’s world’s attention was aroused.1 The Panel’s (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en report, which came out in October, height- République Démocratique du Congo) human ened awareness of the illegal exploitation of rights component – in order to enhance the natural resources and other forms of wealth in capacity of the Congolese parties in investi- the DRC in the context of conflict and, in par- gating the serious violations of international ticular, its connection with the illicit trade in humanitarian law and human rights perpetrat- small arms and light weapons. ed on DRC territory since the outbreak of the The early part of 2003 also saw a boost in war in 1998. relations between the DRC and Uganda, The search for peace was further boosted in when in February a summit hosted by March when parties to the inter-Congolese brought together the presidents of dialogue meeting in Pretoria agreed on a pro-

NELSON ALUSALA is a senior researcher in the Arms Management Programme at the ISS. 94 African Security Review 13(1) • 2004 gramme for drafting a constitution and for a to claim major stakes in the military and future unified army of a national government reserving the post of chief of army for itself. that will eventually lead to national democrat- This led to a postponement of the swearing-in ic elections, envisaged to take place some time of the transitional government. in 2005. Recognising the challenge facing the DRC For the victims of conflict in the DRC, the transitional government with regard to the month of April brought with it a pleasant sur- formation of a unified national army, UN prise. For once the feuding parties seemed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed in agree to listen to one another. At talks held at early June two special envoys, Moustapha Sun City, South , the DRC government Niasse (who had served as the UN Special and rebel groups on 1 April 2003 unanimous- Envoy for the DRC peace process) and ly endorsed a transitional constitution to gov- General Maurice Baril (a former military advi- ern the DRC for two years, while at the same sor to the UN), to help with the formation of time endorsing the Global All-Inclusive a unified national army. The month ended Agreement (which addresses the political with the naming of Kabila’s transitional gov- power-sharing structure) signed in Pretoria on ernment. 16 December 2002. Under the transitional US diplomat William Swing replaced constitution promulgated soon after the sign- Amos Namanga Ngongi as the UN Special ing, all parties agreed to the establishment of Representative to the DRC on 1 July, bringing a two-year transitional government under Ngongi’s mandate to an end. Swing’s entry President , supported by four was followed by MONUC’s deployment of vice-presidents from rebel groups and the 3,800 additional troops in Ituri, in preparation civilian opposition.2 for the 1 September handover from the IEMF. Mineral-rich eastern DRC is, and may Another major occurrence was the swearing-in remain, a theatre of war for quite some time. on 17 July of the four vice-presidents. Despite efforts aimed at tranquilising the However, this did not pass without anticipat- DRC, various armed groups battled for Bunia, ed challenges. The MLC and RCD- the main town of the Ituri district, throughout officials designated to the transitional govern- the month of May. This saw groups such as ment declined to take the oath of office Human Rights Watch and Amnesty because it included swearing allegiance to International appeal to the UN to reinforce President Joseph Kabila. Ensuing negotiations MONUC by authorising the deployment of a led to a modification of the pledge of alle- rapid reaction force to protect civilians in Ituri giance and the subsequent signing by MLC District. The massacres in Bunia led to a visit and RCD-Goma officials on 24 July 2003. by the UN Under Secretary-General for The inaugurated transitional Cabinet pledged Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie to resolve the conflict in Ituri. Guehenno, who called for urgent UN inter- Continuing loss of human life and the vention to stop the massacres. deteriorating security situation in eastern The UN responded to the appeals by pass- DRC, coupled with global appeals from vari- ing UN Security Council Resolution 1484, ous circles for a new MONUC mandate, authorising deployment of an Interim made the UN respond by granting MONUC Emergency Multilateral Force (IEMF) in UN Charter’s Chapter VII mandate, enabling Bunia, led by France. The force’s mandate the peacekeepers to use force where necessary, lasted until 1 September, when a larger including disarming Congolese combatants. MONUC force operating under Chapter VII At the same time the UN extended the mis- of the UN Charter replaced it. sion’s mandate by one year (until 30 July Tension within the DRC government 2004), while MONUC strength was increased mounted when on 22 May RCD-Goma tem- from 8,700 to 10,800 troops. The UN also porarily withdrew from discussions of the fol- imposed a 12-month arms embargo against all low-up committee of the inter-Congolese armed groups (whether Congolese or foreign) dialogue, accusing the government of wanting in the east of the DRC. Alusala 95

The DRC is a country rich in natural the town of Bunia. This took place soon after resources but lacking the ability to harness a horrific massacre of some 65 people (mostly them due to endemic conflicts. This is the children) in Katchele village, north-east of only reason why the country appears on the Ituri. International Monetary Fund and World Challenges in relationships between the Bank’s list of Heavily Indebted Poor DRC and her neighbours manifested again on Countries. However, in July 2003 the Bretton 8 October when Ugandan President Yoweri Wood’s institutions declared an 80% reduc- Museveni declared that under no circum- tion of the DRC’s total external debt. stances would Uganda be drawn back into a Amidst the search for economic stability, conflict in the DRC. A few weeks later, how- the new Kinshasa government remained ever, the DRC minister for regional co-opera- engaged in political negotiations as it finalised tion reported the presence of Ugandan rebel the second quarter of 2003. The month of training camps in North Kivu Province, August was therefore marked with major between Beni and Kasindi. events, such as the inception of the National At the height of events in October was the Assemby and the Senate of the two-year tran- release of the final report by the UN Panel of sitional government; Kabila and his four vice- Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural presidents presided over the first session of Resources and Other forms of Wealth of the that government on 22 August. DRC. The report lists the names of govern- During the same month, Kabila and the ments, companies and individuals involved in former belligerents agreed on the division of the plunder of natural resources, and gives the country into 10 military regions. They also recommendations on measures to be taken to agreed on a revised list of candidates for top curb such exploitation.3 military positions after several stakeholders November was by and large a month of rejected an earlier list proposed by RCD- reconciliation for the DRC. On the one side Goma, and which was thought to have been was the DRC’s request that the International controversial. The military leaders nominated Court of Justice (ICJ) postpone the hearing of were drawn from all former armed rebel the case filed by it against Uganda, on Armed groups signatory to the national power-shar- Activities on the Territory of the Congo ing accord, as well as the Mayi-Mayi militias. (Democratic Republic of the Congo vs. Uganda). In an effort to initiate peace in the east, the On the other side, accepted the government held talks in Kinshasa on 22 return of 103 members of the Democratic August with the leaders of Ituri militias. The Liberation Forces of Rwanda, after almost a talks culminated in the signing of a decade in the DRC. Memorandum of Understanding between the A similar occurrence was the demobilisa- two parties. tion of 2,000 Mayi-Mayi militia in Kindu. A The IEMF handed over to MONUC on 1 number of them returned to civilian life while September, when their mandate expired. others are to be integrated into the national During the same week, the new unified army. As a further move towards reconstruc- national military leaders were sworn in in tion, President Kabila extended an olive Kinshasa, with Lt-Gen Liwanga Mata branch to 315 magistrates who had been Nyamunyobo named as the chief of general sacked en masse in 1998 following a strike staff. However, three RCD-Goma officers over pay, by reinstating them on 25 who had been named commanders and November 2003. deputy commanders boycotted the inaugura- The month of November ended on a high tion. Their action warranted the chief of staff note when in a spirit of good neighbourliness to refer the matter to the Military High Court the DRC and Rwanda committed themselves (Haute Cour Militaire). to complete the repatriation of Rwandan Residents of Bunia received some relief Interahamwe militia and former soldiers in when in early October 2003 MONUC began the DRC within a year. It is hoped that deploying its first permanent troops beyond Rwanda lives up to this promise. 96 African Security Review 13(1) • 2004

As 2003 drew to a close, the DRC and its DDR programmes should be conducted sympathisers remained steadfast in the search simultaneously countrywide to avoid possible for lasting peace. This was witnessed by the suspicion among armed groups. This will call UN Security Council’s appeal to the transi- for international support by both the UN and tional government to adopt a national disar- donor partners, particularly if the envisaged mament, demobilisation and reintegration 2005 democratic elections are to be held suc- (DDR) programme, and to accelerate the for- cessfully. mation of the national army and the reform Another significant issue to be tackled is of the police force. the illegal involvement of foreign countries, companies and individuals in the affairs of the Observations DRC, especially as relates to exploitation of the country’s mineral resources. Congo’s The events of 2003 show a clear wish by the neighbours need to adhere to the various DRC transitional government to solve the con- peace agreements reached between them and flict within the country; however, certain major the DRC. There is also an apparent need to bottlenecks still pose a challenge. Most evident implement the recommendations of the final is mistrust among the officials of the transi- report of the UN Panel of Experts on the tional government. Each member of the All- Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Inclusive Agreement seems to be wary of what Other forms of Wealth of the DRC. amount of the cake will go his way, as was The DRC entered 2004 with growing opti- manifested by RCD-Goma’s accusation that mism that successful democratic elections the government was claiming major stakes in could be held in 2005. In this regard, it is clear the military, and the refusal of MLC and RCD- that President Joseph Kabila needs to move Goma officials to take the oath of office. fast in creating an environment conducive to Anyone in Kabila’s position would not have a peace. However, Kabila will only achieve this simple answer to the problem of ridding the with the full support of his Cabinet, neigh- mistrust that exists among his government offi- bouring countries and the international com- cials. This is a process that calls for sacrifice by munity. The electoral commission to be all in the DRC transitional national govern- established to oversee the elections should ment. It is a process that requires time and also adhere to all democratic principles of fair- commitment to cultivate. President Kabila ness and independence. himself has no option but to remain trustwor- thy throughout the entire process if he is to deliver peace to the Congolese. Notes An important building block to sustainable 1. On 13 August, the UN Security Council adopted peace in the DRC would be a solid, well resolution 1499 (2003), extending the Panel of planned and executed DDR programme, Experts’ mandate until 31 October 2003. agreeable to all parties in the government. 2. The four vice-presidents are MLC leader Jean- Given the convolution of armed parties with- Pierre Bemba; Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, a in the country, the government must first close ally of President Joseph Kabila; Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma, a representative of the unarmed identify the size and needs of the national political opposition; and Azarias Ruberwa army then, through consultation with the var- Manywa, leader of RCD-Goma and its former ious government representatives of armed secretary general. Manywa replaced Adolphe groups, agree on how many members of each Onusumba Yema as RCD-Goma leader on 16 June 2003. Previous RCD-Goma leaders were armed group should be integrated into the Ernest wamba dia Wamba and Emile Ilunga. national army at the onset of a formal DDR 3. See UN Security Council Report S/2003/1027 programme. (annex).