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Israel and Palestine, a Brief History of the Negotiations

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Israel and Palestine, a Brief History of the Negotiations !"!#$%&'()!"!#$%&*++,-./(./0++'()(*++1234+5, Israel and Palestine, a brief history of the negotiations This article will present a brief history of the negotiations between Israel and Arab counterparts since 1948. The article touches the important and difficult issues of the conflict: Jerusalem, territory, refugees and security. Shaul Arieli er pensjonert israelsk oberst og seniorforskar ved Economic Cooperation Foundation i Tel Aviv. Arieli var ansvarleg for førebuingane av dei offisielle forhandlingane med palestinarane, som leiar av «Administrasjonen for Interimavtalen» i Yitzhak Rabins regjering, og som leiar av «Fredsadministrasjonen» i Ehud Baraks regjering. 108 !"!#$%&'()!"!#$%&*++,-./(./0++'()(*++1234+5( refugees and security. This breadth of und- erstanding is the outcome of a prolonged historical and political process that includ- es the activities of many stakeholders, both formal and informal, who have had valu- able parts in its attainment. In order to recognize and understand the long path taken by both sides individu- ally and in the framework of the Arab-Isra- eli-conflict, and in order to point at what is still required from them, and to a no lesser extent from the international community that supports the solution of two states for two people, we should go back to the beg- inning of the previous century. At that time, a clash took place between two national claims: the right of the Jewish people to self determination in its historic homeland, and the right of the native Arab majority in Palestine to political independ- text: Shaul Arieli ence, after it was politically and physically separated from the rest of the Arab people exiting israeli prime minister Ehud at the end of World War I. Olmert recently briefed the Special Envoy Due to scope constraints and practicality of US president Obama, Senator George aspirations, however, I seek to concentrate Mitchell, about the details of the under- on the development of the parties’ posi- standings reached in the negotiations with tions with regard to the three practical the chair of the PLO and the PA, Mahmoud “legacies” left by the ’48 war. These include Abbas, on the central issues of a perman- borders, Jerusalem and refugees. Their ent status agreement between Israel and solutions dictates the solution of the fund- the Palestinians. If we ignore the consid- amental issues: recognition of the right of erable skepticism within the Israeli public each side for an independent state of its about Olmert’s motivation and about own, which exists in secure and recognized Abbas’ ability to implement the agreement, borders, and in which each side can as well as the continuing decline in Abbas’ maintain national identity and character internal Palestinian legitimacy to lead and and a democratic regime. represent the Palestinian people, we may The development of positions was a point at the formation of the possible function of pressures and transformations breadth of understanding between the in each side’s internal arena, the Arab and moderate camps in the Israeli and Pales- regional arena and the international arena. tinian societies. These concern the core The conciliation convention held in issues of the conflict: territory, Jerusalem, Lausanne, Switzerland in 1949 ended as a 65 !"!#$%&'()!"!#$%&*++,-./(./0++'()(*++1234+56 complete failure. However, it was refugee problem, Israel or the Arab States. instructive on the important following This touched a deeper layer in Israel: details: assuming that the national and cultural First, despite the fact that they engaged character of democratic states is dictated by in bi-lateral negotiation with Israel on the majority, what would be the character ceasefire agreements signed in 1949, the of the Israeli state should all refugees Arab states refused to engage in direct return to it? The Israeli position was that an negotiations with Israel on permanent stat- Arab majority would contradict UN us since it was more convenient for them resolution 181 determining that Israel will to present a unified position, in line with be established as a “Jewish state”, and the the resolution of the Arab League, not to UNESCO report that determined that recognize the outcome of the 1948 war. “both the Balfour Declaration and the Israel understood from this that the Arab mandate included international commit- states would only talk with Israel if they felt ments to the Jewish people in its entirety”.2 that Israel was capable of threatening the Fourth, even West Jerusalem, which particular interests of each state in theory, according to the partition resolution was or in the event that it threatened them in supposed to be part of the “special regime” practice. Therefore, Israel’s priority became of Jerusalem, and under international con- direct negotiation with each state individu- trol, remained in Israeli control. Jerusalem ally, enabling it to sidestep the commit- ment to pan-Arab narratives and interests, [ both real and imagined. An influential factor on the territorial Second, in addition to demanding that issue and Jerusalem was the Israel accept the same partition boundaries that they had rejected by voting against the separation barrier built by Israel. UN resolution 181 in 1948, the Arab states [ added far-reaching demands changing those boundaries in their favor, and not in was announced as the Israeli capital and favor of establishing a Palestinian state.1 the Knesset as well as the government was This move reinforced the Israeli under- relocated there. This happened despite the standing that as far as the Arab world is 1949 General Assembly resolution to concerned, it is not about the right of the consider Jerusalem a separate, UN gov- Palestinian people for an independent state erned entity,3 Israel has learned the lesson but a territorial dispute that may be about the importance of pre-emptive initia- resolved by partitioning the territory of the tive and resolve vis-à-vis positions of the Arab state proposed in UN resolution 181 UN, which bore some debt to Israel owing between Israel and the Arab States. to its failure to implement the partition Third, to Israel, the state’s willingness to resolution and prevent the ’48 war. allow the return of 100, 000 Palestinian Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai at the end refugees, to which the Arab response was of the ’56 war and return to the ’49 borders that it is not enough, reflected the real demonstrated the capacity of the great pow- argument about who is responsible for the ers, US and USSR, to force their will on 66 !"!#$%&'()!"!#$%&*++,-./(./0++'()(*++1234+5* Israel, but undoubtedly also strengthened the Israeli settlement project. What Israel’s hold in territories occupied in the appeared to have begun as the old Israeli 1949 war. Until 1967, the Zionist move- equation of settlement equals security equ- ment proved that it can materialize all of its als borders, of attempts to annex regions basic aims within the ‘49 borders, and be necessary for security, was soon to be trans- satisfied with that, if it had the recognition formed. Under the new approach, the of and peace agreements with its neigh- “historic right” of the people of Israel bors. outweighed any other consideration or right. Accordingly, the Israeli control of the After the 1967 War West Bank and Gaza Strip was deemed The UN and USA, whose pre-war guar- legitimate in the eyes of the mainstream antees for Israeli freedom of navigation Israeli public, as would have been attempts and demilitarization of Sinai proved to be a to annex them. Israel sought to occupy the “signature on ice”,4 accepted the ’49 bord- land as it did after the ‘48 war, ignoring the ers at least by implication only in UN differences in circumstances and Security Council resolution 242 at the end conditions and with an illusion that this of the ’67 war. Despite the fact that the may be done without occupying the Pales- resolution begins with “Emphasizing the tinian people who lives there. inadmissibility of the acquisition of terri- The military failure of Syria and Egypt in tory by war”, it continues by determining the ’73 war did not prevent the latter from that Israel shall have just and lasting peace starting a political process that ended with following “withdrawal of Israel armed forc- a peace agreement with Israel, in which es from territories occupied in the recent Egypt gained back the Sinai Peninsula. Jor- conflict [only S.A.]”. This was the birth of dan, which did not participate in the war, the formula of “land for peace” that subse- rejected in August ’74 the possibility of quently formed the basis of negotiations interim arrangements with Israel, thus for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab con- beginning the end of the “Jordanian flict. Further, the resolution stipulated that option”. The PLO headed by Yasser Arafat, the refugee problem should be settled by a gained responsibility for the occupied terri- just settlement and did not reiterate UN tory in accordance with an October 1974 General Assembly resolution 194, which Arab League resolution in Rabat, Morocco. was adopted before the end of the war in PLO was defined as the “only legitimate December 1948. representative of the Palestinian people”.6 The three NOs of the September ’67 This strengthening enabled the PLO to Arab League convention in Khartoum,5 and adopt the “phases plan”7 that included the the refusal of the newly established PLO to seeds of a compromise with Israel. any resolution other than “a single Pales- Nonetheless, Israel perceived it as a tine” on the one hand,
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