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Israel and Palestine, a brief history of the negotiations

This article will present a brief history of the negotiations between and Arab counterparts since 1948. The article touches the important and difficult issues of the conflict: Jerusalem, territory, refugees and security.

Shaul Arieli er pensjonert israelsk oberst og seniorforskar ved Economic Cooperation Foundation i . Arieli var ansvarleg for førebuingane av dei offisielle forhandlingane med palestinarane, som leiar av «Administrasjonen for Interimavtalen» i Yitzhak Rabins regjering, og som leiar av «Fredsadministrasjonen» i Ehud Baraks regjering.

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refugees and security. This breadth of und- erstanding is the outcome of a prolonged historical and political process that includ- es the activities of many stakeholders, both formal and informal, who have had valu- able parts in its attainment. In order to recognize and understand the long path taken by both sides individu- ally and in the framework of the Arab-Isra- eli-conflict, and in order to point at what is still required from them, and to a no lesser extent from the international community that supports the solution of two states for two people, we should go back to the beg- inning of the previous century. At that time, a clash took place between two national claims: the right of the Jewish people to self determination in its historic homeland, and the right of the native Arab majority in Palestine to political independ- text: Shaul Arieli ence, after it was politically and physically separated from the rest of the Arab people exiting israeli prime minister Ehud at the end of World War I. Olmert recently briefed the Special Envoy Due to scope constraints and practicality of US president Obama, Senator George aspirations, however, I seek to concentrate Mitchell, about the details of the under- on the development of the parties’ posi- standings reached in the negotiations with tions with regard to the three practical the chair of the PLO and the PA, Mahmoud “legacies” left by the ’48 war. These include Abbas, on the central issues of a perman- borders, Jerusalem and refugees. Their ent status agreement between Israel and solutions dictates the solution of the fund- the Palestinians. If we ignore the consid- amental issues: recognition of the right of erable skepticism within the Israeli public each side for an independent state of its about Olmert’s motivation and about own, which exists in secure and recognized Abbas’ ability to implement the agreement, borders, and in which each side can as well as the continuing decline in Abbas’ maintain national identity and character internal Palestinian legitimacy to lead and and a democratic regime. represent the Palestinian people, we may The development of positions was a point at the formation of the possible function of pressures and transformations breadth of understanding between the in each side’s internal arena, the Arab and moderate camps in the Israeli and Pales- regional arena and the international arena. tinian societies. These concern the core The conciliation convention held in issues of the conflict: territory, Jerusalem, Lausanne, Switzerland in 1949 ended as a

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complete failure. However, it was refugee problem, Israel or the Arab States. instructive on the important following This touched a deeper layer in Israel: details: assuming that the national and cultural First, despite the fact that they engaged character of democratic states is dictated by in bi-lateral negotiation with Israel on the majority, what would be the character ceasefire agreements signed in 1949, the of the Israeli state should all refugees Arab states refused to engage in direct return to it? The Israeli position was that an negotiations with Israel on permanent stat- Arab majority would contradict UN us since it was more convenient for them resolution 181 determining that Israel will to present a unified position, in line with be established as a “Jewish state”, and the the resolution of the Arab League, not to UNESCO report that determined that recognize the outcome of the 1948 war. “both the Balfour Declaration and the Israel understood from this that the Arab mandate included international commit- states would only talk with Israel if they felt ments to the Jewish people in its entirety”.2 that Israel was capable of threatening the Fourth, even West Jerusalem, which particular interests of each state in theory, according to the partition resolution was or in the event that it threatened them in supposed to be part of the “special regime” practice. Therefore, Israel’s priority became of Jerusalem, and under international con- direct negotiation with each state individu- trol, remained in Israeli control. Jerusalem ally, enabling it to sidestep the commit- ment to pan-Arab narratives and interests, [ both real and imagined. An influential factor on the territorial Second, in addition to demanding that issue and Jerusalem was the Israel accept the same partition boundaries that they had rejected by voting against the separation barrier built by Israel. UN resolution 181 in 1948, the Arab states [ added far-reaching demands changing those boundaries in their favor, and not in was announced as the Israeli capital and favor of establishing a Palestinian state.1 the as well as the government was This move reinforced the Israeli under- relocated there. This happened despite the standing that as far as the Arab world is 1949 General Assembly resolution to concerned, it is not about the right of the consider Jerusalem a separate, UN gov- Palestinian people for an independent state erned entity,3 Israel has learned the lesson but a territorial dispute that may be about the importance of pre-emptive initia- resolved by partitioning the territory of the tive and resolve vis-à-vis positions of the Arab state proposed in UN resolution 181 UN, which bore some debt to Israel owing between Israel and the Arab States. to its failure to implement the partition Third, to Israel, the state’s willingness to resolution and prevent the ’48 war. allow the return of 100, 000 Palestinian Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai at the end refugees, to which the Arab response was of the ’56 war and return to the ’49 borders that it is not enough, reflected the real demonstrated the capacity of the great pow- argument about who is responsible for the ers, US and USSR, to force their will on

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Israel, but undoubtedly also strengthened the Israeli settlement project. What Israel’s hold in territories occupied in the appeared to have begun as the old Israeli 1949 war. Until 1967, the Zionist move- equation of settlement equals security equ- ment proved that it can materialize all of its als borders, of attempts to annex regions basic aims within the ‘49 borders, and be necessary for security, was soon to be trans- satisfied with that, if it had the recognition formed. Under the new approach, the of and peace agreements with its neigh- “historic right” of the people of Israel bors. outweighed any other consideration or right. Accordingly, the Israeli control of the After the 1967 War and Gaza Strip was deemed The UN and USA, whose pre-war guar- legitimate in the eyes of the mainstream antees for Israeli freedom of navigation Israeli public, as would have been attempts and demilitarization of Sinai proved to be a to annex them. Israel sought to occupy the “signature on ice”,4 accepted the ’49 bord- land as it did after the ‘48 war, ignoring the ers at least by implication only in UN differences in circumstances and Security Council resolution 242 at the end conditions and with an illusion that this of the ’67 war. Despite the fact that the may be done without occupying the Pales- resolution begins with “Emphasizing the tinian people who lives there. inadmissibility of the acquisition of terri- The military failure of Syria and Egypt in tory by war”, it continues by determining the ’73 war did not prevent the latter from that Israel shall have just and lasting peace starting a political process that ended with following “withdrawal of Israel armed forc- a peace agreement with Israel, in which es from territories occupied in the recent Egypt gained back the Sinai Peninsula. Jor- conflict [only S.A.]”. This was the birth of dan, which did not participate in the war, the formula of “land for peace” that subse- rejected in August ’74 the possibility of quently formed the basis of negotiations interim arrangements with Israel, thus for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab con- beginning the end of the “Jordanian flict. Further, the resolution stipulated that option”. The PLO headed by Yasser Arafat, the refugee problem should be settled by a gained responsibility for the occupied terri- just settlement and did not reiterate UN tory in accordance with an October 1974 General Assembly resolution 194, which Arab League resolution in Rabat, Morocco. was adopted before the end of the war in PLO was defined as the “only legitimate December 1948. representative of the Palestinian people”.6 The three NOs of the September ’67 This strengthening enabled the PLO to Arab League convention in Khartoum,5 and adopt the “phases plan”7 that included the the refusal of the newly established PLO to seeds of a compromise with Israel. any resolution other than “a single Pales- Nonetheless, Israel perceived it as a tine” on the one hand, and the Israeli tactical, rather than strategic change in the power intoxication that led territorial explicit aim of the organization seeking its aspirations and the settlement urge on the destruction. other, strengthened the Israeli approach on The peace agreement between Israel and the need to hold on to territories, but also Egypt signed in March 1979 determined

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two constants regarding the territorial including: progress was determined to be issue: the applicable interpretation of gradual, conditioned by fragile reality that resolution 242’s territorial article was threatened by radicals on both sides; strengthened the Arab position and inter- divergent interpretation of agreement pro- pretation, i.e. “the territories in exchange visions by the parties; Arafat’s failed war for peace” (according to the French version against the terrorism of Hamas and the of the resolution) and that the Gaza Strip is Islamic Jihad that aimed to forestall the the business of Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel. political process; Israeli acceleration of the The thwarting by Likud Prime Minister of settlement project in the territories; the the “London Agreement” formulated existence of the Syrian track that competed between Shimon Peres and King Hussein for Israeli attention and capacity; inade- in April 1987 led Jordan to exit the terri- quate management of the negotiations on torial game one year later, in July 1988. behalf of both sides; and inadequate US King Hussein declared the disengagement mediation. I will briefly discuss the central of the Kingdom of Jordan from the West “milestones” of the Oslo process in the Bank, and a final transmission of all years 1993-2001, with regard to the core responsibilities and authority to the PLO.8 issues.

Changes in the PLO The Oslo Process. Territory In the late 1980s, following two decades of The territorial issue was central from the Yasser Arafat’s leadership, the PLO was beginning and in all interim agreements caught between contradicting trends. Even- that were signed. Its non-resolution was a tually, the newly created world hegemony key factor in the failure of the parties to led to the success of the Reagan admin- reach a permanent status agreement. istration’s pressure on the PLO to change Despite the fact that the Oslo agreements its positions. On November 15 1988, the signed by Israel included the provision that Palestinian National Council accepted UN “the permanent status will lead to the resolution 181 that implies the right of Isra- implementation of Security Council el to exist and adoption of the two state Resolutions 242 and 338”,9 Israel did not solution. In December that year Arafat consider the territorial principle of “all the accepted the US conditions for talks with territories for peace”, as implemented in the PLO, including Security Council the peace agreements with Egypt and Jor- resolutions 242 and 338. From there, the dan, as valid for the arrangement with the road was short to mutual recognition with Palestinians. Prime Minister Rabin was the Israel in the framework of exchange of lett- first to delineate Israel’s position in clear ers with Prime Minister Rabin in August geographical terms in his speech at the 1993, on the eve of signing the Knesset in October 1995. A transcription of “Declaration of Principles” (the “Oslo his words into geographical terms would Agreement”) on September 13, 1993 in have meant that the Palestinian state, Washington, D.C. termed by him “the Palestinian entity”, The Oslo process encountered many ups would have no more than 75% of the terri- and downs owing to many factors, notably tory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.10

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Benjamin Netanyahu who was elected as residing in the West Bank. The exchange of Prime Minister in 1996 was forced to territory with a ratio of 1:1 maintained the maneuver between his position that “the Palestinian interest relying on resolution PLO state that would be planted 15 kilo- 242 on the one hand, but eased the job for meter from Tel Aviv will constitute an Israeli governments to market the agree- existential threat to the Jewish state”,11 and ment to the Israeli public, as it would be his commitment to agreements signed by reached at the price of removing only a Israel and international pressure led by the small fraction of settlers. US to comply with them. Netanyahu The failed 2000 Camp David Summit succeeded in passing a government decis- led to flexibility in the Israeli position, ion in 1998 on “the map of vital interests” which fluctuated between 87-92% to the for Israel, which reduced the possible terri- Palestinian state, but was far removed from tory for the Palestinian state to only 40%. the Palestinian position that ranged around Ehud Barak, who entered the office of Prime Minister in May 1999, began by [ defining that a solution to the territorial Each side will need to demonstrate an issue will be found by a “just partition of effective ability to safeguard the the territories of Judea and Samaria”.12 The practical interpretation to this position led, interest of the other side. in the beginning of the negotiations on a [ permanent status agreement, to a Pales- tinian state on 66% of the territory, which leaving only 2% under Israeli sovereignty expanded to almost 80% in the eve of the and insisted on a 1:1 exchange ratio rather July 2000 Camp David summit. The Pales- than the Israeli demand of 1:9, as was pre- tinians thoroughly rejected the Israeli posi- sented at the Camp David summit. The tion and presented their own formula that Taba meeting held in January 2001, after matches resolution 242: “100% of the terri- the parties accepted in principle President tory, minus critical needs of Israel with Clinton’s principles published in Decemb- exchange of territory”.13 A month before the er 2000, further reduced the gap. Israel Camp David summit Israel adopted the came down to 6-8% while the Palestinians first part of that formula, i.e. the ’67 bord- accepted 3-3.5%. ers as a base of reference to the issue of The parties turned to engage with the borders. This formed, for the first time, a issue of Jerusalem in details only in the fra- shared basis for negotiations that remained mework of the permanent status arrange- valid to this day. ment, as determined in the “Declaration of Exchange of territory represented Principles”. Israel sought to remove the flexibility on behalf of Palestinians in link between “unified Jerusalem” and the relation to the basic Arab position of Israeli larger territorial issue, while the Palestini- withdrawal to the ’67 lines and dismantling ans insisted on the framework of of all settlements. Arafat knew that no Isra- resolution 242. Like the other core issues eli government was able to completely and despite the religious dimension evacuate hundreds of thousands of settlers surrounding it, Jerusalem was part of the

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“package deal” intended to bridge the gaps In other words, Arafat’s choice of the and conclude the entire “give and take” on political process instead of the “armed all of the issues. Subject to the flexibility struggle” was too large and too early a com- demonstrated by the Palestinians in their promise for a Palestinian state on 22% of positions on refugees and security, the the Palestinian homeland, which in fact solution that appeared to be shaped seemed unattainable from Israel. Despite towards the end of the Oslo process was the fact that this move had strengthened partition of neighborhoods in east the Hamas movement that denounces any Jerusalem according to a demographic compromise, Israel repeated in summer principle, including in the Old City, i.e. 2005, under the leadership of Sharon, a Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sove- unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip reignty and Arab ones under Palestinian which assisted the Hamas election victory sovereignty. Partition of the sovereignty in in 2006. the Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall would be done according to the current After 2001 administrative status quo. The six years between 2001, when the On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the negotiation for a permanent status agree- Palestinians were required to accept the ment stopped, and 2007 when it was most significant compromise since letting renewed in the framework of the Anna- go of claims to 78% of what they conside- polis Summit in the US, were red Palestine (Israel within the ’67 lines) in characterized by a range of local dramatic 1988. The formulation that began prior to events: the second Intifadah that broke out the Camp David Summit created a practical in October 2000, Sharon’s rise to power in solution that concentrated on solving the February 2001, the death of Arafat and the non-citizenship of Palestinians by means rise of Mahmoud Abbas in 2004, the Isra- other than returning to Israel, and included eli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the compensation through an international removal of all Israeli settlements there in mechanism. Disagreements on the narra- the summer of 2005, Hamas’ victory in the tive of refugee-hood and responsibility for Palestinian parliamentary election in 2006 the problem were not completely settled, and its military takeover of Gaza in 2007, but were not too far from it. the election of Olmert in 2006, and the Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Leba- second Lebanon war in the summer of non in 2000 led to strengthening of the 2006. During these years, the number of ’49 borders, as the UN recognized the wit- Israelis residing behind the Green Line hdrawal as complying with resolution 425. rose and today reaches almost half a milli- However, it also painted a picture accord- on: 194.000 in the 14 Jewish settlements in ing to which Israel withdrew, for the first east Jerusalem and 290.000 in 130 settle- time, due to military pressure applied by ments and dozens of outposts in the West Hizbullah. This had significant influence Bank. on Palestinians. Many had regained the Despite the fact that during these years feeling that territories could be returned from Israel without paying a political price. Israeli soldiers raises the flag in Eilat, 1948.

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we witnessed a long series of plans such as (not including Arab East Jerusalem), which the Quartet’s Road Map (2002), it was brings its position to 6.8%. Despite Abbas’ mainly the informal initiatives that led to declaration on the eve of the Annapolis reducing the gaps between the parties: the Summit of November 2007, that he will “Ayalon-Nusseiba” initiative launched in only accept 2% of territorial exchange, he 2003 posing principles for a permanent demonstrated greater flexibility in the status agreement,14 and mainly the “Geneva negotiations and neared 3% in the overall Accords” launched in December 2003.15 package deal. An additional contention is the status of the “no-man's land” in the Separation Latrun enclave (located half way between An influential factor on the territorial issue Jerusalem and Tel Aviv) – a territory of 46 and Jerusalem was the separation barrier square km (0.8% of the West Bank). Israel built by Israel. From the Israeli side, the claims that it was the first to apply effective barrier was built to answer a security need, control over this no-man land and there- facing the wave of terrorism that flooded fore has sovereignty over it, according to Israel between 2001 and 2003. Its very customary law.17 establishment strengthened the idea of Conversely, the Palestinians claim that separation, and its route expressed precise- the area was occupied by Israel in the ’67 ly the Israeli position on the issue of bord- war, and is therefore part of the occupied ers.16 The International Court in The territories. In my assessment, this Hague debated the legality of the barrier contention will not be a hurdle to a built by Israel in the territories and publis- resolution on the border, and its solution hed its advisory opinion in July 2004, in would similar to the one offered by the which it determined that the route of the Geneva Accords, i.e. equal partition barrier and its accompanying regime between the parties. This way, even if the violate international law. But it also granted entire area stays under Israeli sovereignty, Israel, for the first time, conclusive Palestinians will be compensated by international recognition of the ’67 lines as exchange of territory. its recognized borders. A stronger contention prevails over the ratio of exchange. Israel proposes 5.5% Annapolis around the Gaza Strip and south of the The negotiations that took place last year West Bank, and seeks to complete the between Israel and the PLO at various lev- remainder via a territorial corridor els of government reached the following connecting Gaza to the West Bank, though understandings and gaps. Where the its area is negligible (only 4 square Km). picture is not sufficiently clear, I have chos- This is justified by Israel by the fact that en to complete it by presenting under- such a connection did not exist prior to the standings that took place between the par- June ’67 war. The Palestinians insist on a ties in unofficial tracks. On the territorial 1:1 exchange ratio and consider the corridor issue, Israel continues to insist on the to be Israeli compensation for the flexibility planned route of the barrier which would they demonstrated on other issues, includ- annex 8% of the territory of the West Bank ing Israeli use of some of the main roads of

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the Palestinian state via a special arrange- aims to create a better security reality on ment. the one hand, and on the other to maintain On the issue of Jerusalem, the solution military deployment that suits a reality of rests on two components. The first is parti- conflict and violence and preserves the tion according to a demographic basis of occupation. Israel was thus requested to the Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in east forgo most of its territorial claims in the Jerusalem. The second component is the application of a special and international [ regime, with the participation of Israel and Until 1967, the Zionist movement Palestine, on the “historic basin” that proved it can materialize all of its includes most of the holy and historic plac- es in Jerusalem, and stretches on 0.25 basic aims within the ‘49 borders. Hectares. The administration of the holy [ places will remain unchanged and in accordance with the status quo. Jordan Valley, which in practical terms and The issue of the refugees rests mostly on certainly in the public's perception, had the solution suggested initially in Camp served as Israel’s defense space against any David in 2000 and later agreed unofficially Eastern threat. Furthermore, Israel has in the Geneva Initiative.18 However, unlike been requested to forgo control of territori- exiting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, es east to the Green Line which are stra- Foreign Minister and head of the Kadima tegically situated overlooking Israel’s party Tzipi Livni objects to any return of coastal area, including 73% of its pop- refugees to Israel, even a symbolic number. ulation, as well as civilian and military air- ports. Thus, the border delineation pro- Security posed by Israel is not characterized by The issue of security, which has been used consistency with a security rationale, but in claims made by Israel since its mainly a demographic and political consid- inception, is relatively easier to agree on. eration that seeks to ensure the annexation Under the rationale that a permanent of a maximum number of Israelis and no arrangement should be avoided if it creates Palestinians to Israel. Conversely, over the a reality of a greater threat potential in the years the Palestinians have hardened their event of non-compliance, Israel seeks to position that they require a force to protect guarantee two interests. The first is that the them from future Israeli invasion. The Palestinian state should not create a more reoccupation of areas A and B by Israel in convenient platform from which any 2002 was a response to a wave of terrorism coalition of forces from the East might that led to hundreds of casualties and attack Israel. The second is to prevent terr- thousands of wounded in the Israeli side. orism against Israel coming from or The Palestinians perceive this as an through the Palestinian state. During the unbearably light application of force and negotiations, Israel internalized the Pales- violation of agreements by Israel.19 tinian basic claim that it is impossible to The arrangements required to answer sign a permanent status agreement that Israeli and Palestinian needs includes

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several main components, according to border passages to Jordan to the Palestini- understandings reached at Camp David an state prior to the establishment of an and in the Geneva Accord. The first is international and Palestinian mechanism demilitarization of the Palestinian state, that can guarantee with reasonable trans- including no Palestinian military and a pro- parency the prevention of smuggling hibition on inviting or hosting a foreign attempts of unauthorized weapons to the military in its territory. Similarly, Palestine Palestinian state. Also, Israel will not trans- will be demilitarized of heavy weapon such fer to the Palestinians areas adjacent to the as airplanes, tanks, artillery and rocket Gaza Strip in the context of territorial based weapon, and only agreed upon exchange before the Palestinians clearly weapons will be permitted. The aerial space materialize in Gaza the principle of “one will serve the Israeli air force as well as authority, one weapon”. On the other hand, Palestinian civilian aviation. Second, the the Palestinians will not accept dismantling Palestinians will establish a strong police of the UNRWA and the cancellation of force capable of enforcing law and order refugee status before the establishment of and fight terrorism. Third, Israel will keep an international mechanism responsible and manage two early warning sites. Four- for the issues of repatriation and compen- th, international forces will be deployed in sation. sensitive areas to both sides: on the Israeli- In sum, as stated in the beginning of the Palestinian border, on the borders between article, the parties have been through a Palestine and Jordan and Egypt, in long and complex path. Along this path, international passages, in Jerusalem, in regional and global actors have had a early warning sites and along agreed upon strong influence on the development of routes. Coordination and liaison will apply their positions. This article has not dealt between all sides. sufficiently with regional contexts and Finally, one of the central hurdles to nearly entirely sidestepped global ones. attaining an agreement is the question of The chance of reaching a permanent status its implementation, on the backdrop of agreement, and even more importantly to Hamas’ control in Gaza and its refusal to implement it, is conditioned by a series of recognize Israel. I do not wish to address processes and influencing factors not ana- the issue of the internal Palestinian conflict lyzed here. These include the survivability in this article, but I would like to overcome of the 2002 Arab League peace initiative this obstacle through a practical separation that strives to end the Arab-Israeli conflict between the signing of an agreement and subject to given conditions and compro- its implementation. An agreement will mises, and that includes peace agreements need to pass the required authorizations on between Israel and Syria, Lebanon and the both sides, as well as parliamentary voting Palestinians en route to normalization of and/or a referendum. Each side will need relations between Israel and the Arab to demonstrate an effective ability to safe- world. They also include regional, national, guard the interest of the other side, prior to social and religious confrontations and moves that entail potential threats. For tensions involving Sunnis and Shiites, example, Israel will not pass the control of fundamentalists and moderates, pro west-

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erners and radicals, hub and periphery in negotiation with Israel. the Middle East and more. They further 6 At the Rabat Conference in October 1974, leaders of Arab states officially recognized the PLO as the only legitimate include ’s nuclear program and the representative of the Palestinian people. UN General counter response to it, the future of Iraq Assembly resolution 3210 of the same month also recognized the PLO as such, and UN General Assembly and the US involvement there and in resolution 3237 of November 1974 accorded the PLO Afghanistan. observer status at the Assembly. A permanent agreement between Israel 7 The PLO’s “Phased Plan” was the nickname for a plan which was decided upon at the 12th Palestinian National and the Palestinians necessitates deep, Congress which took place in June 1974. Article 2 of the plan states, “The Palestinian Liberation Organization will intensive and sincere involvement of employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, countries that support it. It requires to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the inde- pendent combatant national authority for the people over massive use of “carrots” with both sides, every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance but also of “sticks” when needs be. Without of power in favor of our people and their struggle.” fear of using clichés, the attainment of 8 On 31st July 1988 King Hussein of Jordan announced that such an agreement will neutralize one of the Kingdom would break its legal and administrative ties with the West Bank. On 7th August, King Hussein said at the most sensitive detonators that may a press conference that Jordan would never again negoti- ignite local and regional eruptions whose ate on behalf of the Palestinians. repercussions may reach everywhere and 9 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP) with the PLO; Washington, every field in the world arena. When such September 13th 1993. an agreement is reached, it will not be a 10 Rabin, Yitzhak; speech to the Knesset, 5th October 1995. moment too soon. www.knesset.gov.il

11 Netanyahu, Binyamin; “Place Under the Sun”, Yedioth • ƒ • Ahronoth, 1995. 12 Author’s archive. 1 Shlaim, Avi, «The Iron Wall», pp. 74-74, Book in the Attic, 2005. 13 Drafts presented during negotiations in 2000.

2 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine; Report to 14 See website http://www.mifkad.org.il/ the General Assembly; Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly' New York, 1947' ch.2. 15 See website http://www.mifkad.org.il/ Article 146. 16 Arieli, Shaul, Sfard Michael; “The Wall of Folly” (Hebrew), 3 UN General Assembly Resolution 194, 11th December Book in the Attic, 2008. 1948, Article 8. 17 State of Israel v. Eitan Kramer, 3/3/2004, 4 Shlaim, Avi, p.89. On May 17th the President of Egypt (criminal)1193/04. demanded from the commander of the UN emergency force in Sinai and the Gaza Strip to withdraw his forces 18 See website http://www.heskem.org.il/; Article 7 of the from the border and to redeploy to their base camps. The Agreement. UN forces waited for the order from the UN Secretary General, and Nasser requested that Secretary General U 19 Conversations between the author and Palestinian Thant order the withdrawal of the UN emergency force counterparts. from Egyptian territory. On May 22nd Nasser’s request was granted, and Nasser announced that the following day he would close of the Straights of Teheran to Israeli sea vessels, and that he was willing to go to war with Israel. On May 23rd, the Straights of Teheran were closed to Israeli sea vessels. This was a call to war.

5 The Khartoum Conference was held on 1st September 1967 following the Six Day War, and was attended by the leaders of 8 Arab countries. The declaration that was made at the end of the conference defined the Arab policy towards the State of Israel until the Yom Kippur war of 1973. This declaration included the "three Nos": No to peace with Israel; No to recognition of Israel, and no to 75