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SAFE WINGS Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air Issue 38, JULY 2015

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SAFE WINGS Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air Issue 38, JULY 2015 SAFE WINGS Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air Issue 38, JULY 2015 This issue… BAGHDAD DHL A-300 ATTACKED BY MISSILE PROTECTION TO CIVIL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT AGAINST SHOULDER- FIRED MISSILE (SFM) THREAT * For Internal Circulation Only July Edition 38 SAFE WINGS 1 | P a g e Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air July Edition 38 SAFE WINGS BAGHDAD DHL A-300 ATTACKED BY MISSILE n the Morning of 22nd November 2003 European Air Transport/DHL A300B4 O arrives in Baghdad from Bahrain earlier. Locally the weather and visibility is good and, on the ground, work to turn the aircraft around begins quickly. The cargo is unloaded and aircraft reloaded with about 7 tons of general cargo for the trip back to Bahrain. At take-off the aircraft's weight is only 105 tons, the maximum allowable take-off weight is 165.9 tons. The crew taxi the A300 out to runway 15L for take-off. Because of the light weight and the need for a maximum-angle climb from lift-off to gain as much height as possible before reaching the airfield boundary, the selected configuration is "slats only" - no flap - and full power. Climb is to be straight ahead to waypoint LOVEK. The crew consisted of 38 year old Belgian Captain Eric Gennotte with 3300 hrs flying experience, 29 year old Belgian First Officer Steeve Michielsen with 1275 flight hours and 54 year old scot Flight Engineer Rofail with 13423 hours flight experience. As the aircraft powers up through 8,000ft an explosion rocks the aircraft, a cacophony of aural warnings erupts and lights flash for multiple systems. Rofail tells the pilots almost immediately that all pressure is lost from the Green and Yellow hydraulic systems, and 20 seconds later the Blue system pressure also begins to drop and soon hits zero. The primary flight control surfaces and spoilers go limp as their actuators drain, trailing in the slipstream. The horizontal stabiliser, which controls the aircraft's pitch, is frozen at the trim position for 215kt with climb thrust set - the angle it is at when drained of hydraulic power. Flaps and slats are unavailable. The crew know something has hit their aircraft. Michielsen believes a missile has hit the rudder because he sees the yaw damper switches trip out, but Rofail does not rule out a collision with an unseen aircraft. While the cause is unknown, the effects are dramatic. Michielsen makes an emergency call to Baghdad approach, then Rofail takes over communication with air traffic control because the pilots are preoccupied with fighting the aircraft's apparently out-of-control state. Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and 2 | P a g e Alliance Air July Edition 38 SAFE WINGS From his seat behind the pilots, Rofail, like all flight engineers, can see the big picture: systems panels; primary flight instruments; the real horizon as it rocks and pitches - often disappearing from sight - and he joins the pilots' struggle to understand what - if any - control they have left. He says: "The aircraft was like a piece of paper in the air. We went through a series of steep banks and dives - you could not leave your seat". The aircraft's rollercoaster manoeuvring throws the crew against their harnesses. All the crew are taking part in everything, doing whatever they see needs to be done. "The rulebook has gone out the window," explains Rofail. "Situations like this are unique every time. You cannot train for them. You cannot write a checklist for them." The crew have since listened to the cockpit voice recorder tape and say they are quite surprised at how calm they all sound. Rofail says: "All you can do is apply common sense and stay calm. We were the right combination of crew." What most concerns the crew is lack of control over airspeed. Initially, Michielsen and Gennotte try to use the control yokes and rudder pedals, but quickly accept they are ineffective. Although the crew know theoretically they could control the aircraft with the throttles alone, it takes them about 10min to learn how to keep the aircraft at an acceptable attitude. During the learning process airspeed lurches wildly between 180kt and 300kt. Because, like most big jets, the A300's engines are slung below the wings, an increase in thrust causes the nose to pitch up, conversely a thrust decrease causes a pitch-down moment. The problem for Gennotte and his crew is that, on applying power, the increase in nose-up attitude tends to dampen an increase in speed. Then because they cannot apply any direct pitch control or change the pitch trim, when any power-induced increase in speed exceeds the trimmed indicated airspeed (IAS) of 215kt, there is a gradual further pitch-up followed by a loss of speed as the nose-up attitude steepens. Thrust reduction may provide an instant nose-down pitching moment, but then the descending flightpath tends to make the speed increase, and as airspeed rises above the 215kt trim speed, the nose gradually pitches further up. The result is a counter-intuitive secondary effect to every power change. Selection of asymmetric thrust provides roll control, but altering heading or picking up a wing by this method is painfully slow compared with the almost instant primary effect a power change has in pitch. 3 | P a g e Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air July Edition 38 SAFE WINGS VIOLENT PITCHING By the time they have carried out the first gradual, violently pitching and rolling left turn toward the airfield, they are at about 4,000ft and they have the airfield in sight. The captain calls for the gear to be lowered using the emergency gravity system, even though airspeed is slightly higher than the 270kt limit for deployment. While Rofail leaves his seat to do this, Michielsen has to push his own seat as far forward as it can go, making him temporarily almost useless in assisting Gennotte. To the crew's relief, the gear locks down at the first attempt. Its deployment makes the aircraft noticeably more stable, potentially providing enough control over airspeed and attitude to make a viable attempt at landing. It provides the pilots with an increase in overall drag and a slight pitch-down moment against which to use the pitch-up effect of an increase in power. (Airbus has since told the crew that if they had attempted a gear-up approach, they almost certainly would not have succeeded.) The crew know they have to land quickly because the wing is still trailing a 50m flame. They cannot see this - Gennotte cannot see the left wingtip from his seat - but ATC and a helicopter circling nearby confirm that their left wing remains on fire; they know that if a part of the wingtip separates they will lose all control of the aircraft. At present - although the crew does not know it - the leading edge of the wing is complete along almost its entire length, but the fire is gradually destroying the outer wing, creeping forward from the trailing edge. At some stage before they land the rear wing spar separates and the remaining structure is held together only by the forward spar. It is only a matter of time before that also fails. Meanwhile,the asymmetry in thrust needed to compensate for the difference in lift and drag between the damaged and undamaged wings is increasing. Michielsen suggests to the captain that they position for a long, straight final approach to Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and 4 | P a g e Alliance Air July Edition 38 SAFE WINGS runway 33R - starting about 37km (20nm) out - and assists the captain with navigation by monitoring the VOR/DME readouts. They lose visual contact with the airport as they turn away to position the aircraft on long final approach, but ATC has no radar to provide the crew with vectors. Rofail is meanwhile wrestling with another task vital to keeping the aircraft airborne. Although the missile has not damaged the engines, if a fuel flow interruption causes failure of either they will be dead within a minute. When it hit, the missile destroyed the outer left wing tank 1A - so comprehensively that the fuel just fell out of it. There was no explosive ignition of fuel because the tank was full, so there was no fuel-air vapour inside - if there had been, the wing would have been blown off the aircraft. But Rofail's problem is more complex. When the missile hit, the engines were both feeding directly from their respective inboard wing tanks (tanks 1 and 2) and he is keeping it that way. But as well as destroying tank 1A, the missile also pierced tank 1, so it is losing fuel. Rofail does not want to open the crossfeed valve to transfer fuel from right wing to left for fear of bleeding away all the fuel; and neither does he want - unless there is no alternative - to break the golden rule that separate engines should be fed from separate sources. So he does not open the crossfeed, but monitors the fuel quantity and feed to both engines and selects ignition on both permanently on. Gennotte, with Michielsen's guidance, flies the aircraft outbound and crosses the extended centreline for 33R from right to left, setting up for a teardrop turn to the right onto final approach. When the aircraft begins to turn toward the airport, it is about 20 Nm out and at about 3,000ft.
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