SAFE WINGS Flight Safety Magazine of Air India, Air India Express and Alliance Air Issue 38, JULY 2015

This issue…  BAGHDAD DHL A-300 ATTACKED BY MISSILE

 PROTECTION TO CIVIL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT AGAINST SHOULDER- FIRED MISSILE (SFM) THREAT

* For Internal Circulation Only SAFE WINGS July Edition 38

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BAGHDAD DHL A-300 ATTACKED BY MISSILE

n the Morning of 22nd November 2003 European Air Transport/DHL A300B4 O arrives in Baghdad from Bahrain earlier. Locally the weather and visibility is good and, on the ground, work to turn the aircraft around begins quickly. The cargo is unloaded and aircraft reloaded with about 7 tons of general cargo for the trip back to Bahrain. At take-off the aircraft's weight is only 105 tons, the maximum allowable take-off weight is 165.9 tons. The crew taxi the A300 out to runway 15L for take-off. Because of the light weight and the need for a maximum-angle climb from lift-off to gain as much height as possible before reaching the airfield boundary, the selected configuration is "slats only" - no flap - and full power. Climb is to be straight ahead to waypoint LOVEK. The crew consisted of 38 year old Belgian Captain Eric Gennotte with 3300 hrs flying experience, 29 year old Belgian First Officer Steeve Michielsen with 1275 flight hours and 54 year old scot Flight Engineer Rofail with 13423 hours flight experience.

As the aircraft powers up through 8,000ft an explosion rocks the aircraft, a cacophony of aural warnings erupts and lights flash for multiple systems. Rofail tells the pilots almost immediately that all pressure is lost from the Green and Yellow hydraulic systems, and 20 seconds later the Blue system pressure also begins to drop and soon hits zero. The primary flight control surfaces and spoilers go limp as their actuators drain, trailing in the slipstream. The horizontal stabiliser, which controls the aircraft's pitch, is frozen at the trim position for 215kt with climb thrust set - the angle it is at when drained of hydraulic power. Flaps and slats are unavailable.

The crew know something has hit their aircraft. Michielsen believes a missile has hit the rudder because he sees the yaw damper switches trip out, but Rofail does not rule out a collision with an unseen aircraft. While the cause is unknown, the effects are dramatic. Michielsen makes an emergency call to Baghdad approach, then Rofail takes over communication with air traffic control because the pilots are preoccupied with fighting the aircraft's apparently out-of-control state.

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From his seat behind the pilots, Rofail, like all flight engineers, can see the big picture: systems panels; primary flight instruments; the real horizon as it rocks and pitches - often disappearing from sight - and he joins the pilots' struggle to understand what - if any - control they have left. He says: "The aircraft was like a piece of paper in the air. We went through a series of steep banks and dives - you could not leave your seat". The aircraft's rollercoaster manoeuvring throws the crew against their harnesses.

All the crew are taking part in everything, doing whatever they see needs to be done. "The rulebook has gone out the window," explains Rofail. "Situations like this are unique every time. You cannot train for them. You cannot write a checklist for them." The crew have since listened to the cockpit voice recorder tape and say they are quite surprised at how calm they all sound. Rofail says: "All you can do is apply common sense and stay calm. We were the right combination of crew."

What most concerns the crew is lack of control over airspeed. Initially, Michielsen and Gennotte try to use the control yokes and rudder pedals, but quickly accept they are ineffective. Although the crew know theoretically they could control the aircraft with the throttles alone, it takes them about 10min to learn how to keep the aircraft at an acceptable attitude. During the learning process airspeed lurches wildly between 180kt and 300kt.

Because, like most big jets, the A300's engines are slung below the wings, an increase in thrust causes the nose to pitch up, conversely a thrust decrease causes a pitch-down moment. The problem for Gennotte and his crew is that, on applying power, the increase in nose-up attitude tends to dampen an increase in speed. Then because they cannot apply any direct pitch control or change the pitch trim, when any power-induced increase in speed exceeds the trimmed indicated airspeed (IAS) of 215kt, there is a gradual further pitch-up followed by a loss of speed as the nose-up attitude steepens. Thrust reduction may provide an instant nose-down pitching moment, but then the descending flightpath tends to make the speed increase, and as airspeed rises above the 215kt trim speed, the nose gradually pitches further up. The result is a counter-intuitive secondary effect to every power change. Selection of asymmetric thrust provides roll control, but altering heading or picking up a wing by this method is painfully slow compared with the almost instant primary effect a power change has in pitch.

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VIOLENT PITCHING

By the time they have carried out the first gradual, violently pitching and rolling left turn toward the airfield, they are at about 4,000ft and they have the airfield in sight. The captain calls for the gear to be lowered using the emergency gravity system, even though airspeed is slightly higher than the 270kt limit for deployment. While Rofail leaves his seat to do this, Michielsen has to push his own seat as far forward as it can go, making him temporarily almost useless in assisting Gennotte.

To the crew's relief, the gear locks down at the first attempt. Its deployment makes the aircraft noticeably more stable, potentially providing enough control over airspeed and attitude to make a viable attempt at landing. It provides the pilots with an increase in overall drag and a slight pitch-down moment against which to use the pitch-up effect of an increase in power. (Airbus has since told the crew that if they had attempted a gear-up approach, they almost certainly would not have succeeded.)

The crew know they have to land quickly because the wing is still trailing a 50m flame. They cannot see this - Gennotte cannot see the left wingtip from his seat - but ATC and a helicopter circling nearby confirm that their left wing remains on fire; they know that if a part of the wingtip separates they will lose all control of the aircraft.

At present - although the crew does not know it - the leading edge of the wing is complete along almost its entire length, but the fire is gradually destroying the outer wing, creeping forward from the trailing edge. At some stage before they land the rear wing spar separates and the remaining structure is held together only by the forward spar. It is only a matter of time before that also fails. Meanwhile,the asymmetry in thrust needed to compensate for the difference in lift and drag between the damaged and undamaged wings is increasing.

Michielsen suggests to the captain that they position for a long, straight final approach to

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runway 33R - starting about 37km (20nm) out - and assists the captain with navigation by monitoring the VOR/DME readouts. They lose visual contact with the airport as they turn away to position the aircraft on long final approach, but ATC has no radar to provide the crew with vectors.

Rofail is meanwhile wrestling with another task vital to keeping the aircraft airborne. Although the missile has not damaged the engines, if a fuel flow interruption causes failure of either they will be dead within a minute. When it hit, the missile destroyed the outer left wing tank 1A - so comprehensively that the fuel just fell out of it. There was no explosive ignition of fuel because the tank was full, so there was no fuel-air vapour inside - if there had been, the wing would have been blown off the aircraft.

But Rofail's problem is more complex. When the missile hit, the engines were both feeding directly from their respective inboard wing tanks (tanks 1 and 2) and he is keeping it that way. But as well as destroying tank 1A, the missile also pierced tank 1, so it is losing fuel. Rofail does not want to open the crossfeed valve to transfer fuel from right wing to left for fear of bleeding away all the fuel; and neither does he want - unless there is no alternative - to break the golden rule that separate engines should be fed from separate sources. So he does not open the crossfeed, but monitors the fuel quantity and feed to both engines and selects ignition on both permanently on.

Gennotte, with Michielsen's guidance, flies the aircraft outbound and crosses the extended centreline for 33R from right to left, setting up for a teardrop turn to the right onto final approach. When the aircraft begins to turn toward the airport, it is about 20 Nm out and at about 3,000ft. Gennotte stabilises the aircraft at that height, heading inbound in approximately level flight. Michielsen monitors the DME to determine when they are approaching a standard 3° descent point toward the runway. The visibility is excellent, but Gennotte realises the aircraft is drifting to the right. He calls Michielsen for a wind vector reading and is told it is 290° at about 20kt. The crew find they are lined up for 33L and, despite it being shorter than 33R, they decide to use it. Runway 33L is further from obstacles and they cannot guarantee their touchdown point or heading.

Early in the long final approach, Michielsen points out that, counter-intuitively, Gennotte must not retard the throttles before touchdown. It was that move which, after brilliant handling beforehand, led the crew to a crash-landing, as the nose and one wing dropped just before the aircraft landed.

The crew's co-operation is impeccable, Gennotte is not merely an able pilot, he is also no autocrat and makes good use of all information fed to him by his crew.

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Rofail, the senior crew member by far in terms of age and experience, carries out the final approach checks in his head without disturbing the pilots. He depressurises the aircraft so the doors can be opened on landing. The gear is down and there are no high lift devices to deploy. Gennotte does not call for the landing checklist: he and Michielsen are busy trying to direct the aircraft and manage its stable descent toward 33L. Rofail knows the spoilers will not deploy on touchdown and, since their airspeed will still be about 210-215kt, he knows the aircraft will want to keep flying when it hits the surface, so he readies himself to slam on full reverse thrust.

FINAL APPROACH

Gennotte handles the approach, with call-outs from Michielsen to guide the descent profile, and the aircraft is almost stabilised when it passes 1,000ft. At this point, Michielsen still gives himself only a 20% chance of survival, but that percentage is climbing as they close with the runway.

Then, at 400ft, surface-generated turbulence starts to upset the aircraft and the left wing tips upward, turning them toward the buildings between the two runways. Gennotte manipulates the throttles relative to each other to control the aircraft's roll, but its response is agonisingly slow. As landing becomes imminent the aircraft is going to make it to a runway touchdown, but with its heading 8° to the left of centreline. In an attempt to line up, the right throttle is retarded slightly, but there is no attempt to close them both, as would be instinctive. The right wing drops and they touch down, right wheel first. Both pilots revert to instinct and are pumping the rudder pedals, stick and control wheel - uselessly. Rofail grabs the throttles and slams them fully into reverse. The aircraft has departed the runway into the sand to its left-hand side, the wheels and thrust kicking up a plume of thick dust, but the sand is helping to slow them down. The aircraft is suffering jolts registering 7.5g vertical acceleration on the uneven ground and several tyres have failed. The aircraft smacks through the razorwire fence to the left of 33L and carry it with them before the aircraft comes to a halt.

INTO A MINEFIELD

Rofail already has both front doors open and the crew exit down the slide on the right. They run from the aircraft, believing the fuel tanks could explode at any moment, but are stopped by soldiers screaming that they are running through a minefield. They wait until a rescue vehicle is called and they can walk behind it. Records show the aircraft touched down with a nose-up attitude and a descent rate of about 10ft/s (3m/s) - a normal touchdown rate, with a 10° right bank. That evening the crew were back in their hotel bar in Bahrain when the news item about what they had just been through came onto CNN. Michielsen says: "In the morning we were just freighter pilots. That evening a Lockheed C-5 test pilot from Andrews Air Force Base wanted to shake our hands."

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AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ACCIDENTS 1950s Cathay Pacific VR-HEU VR-HEU, a four-engined propeller-driven Douglas DC-4 airliner operated by Cathay Pacific Airways, en route from Bangkok to Hong Kong on July 23, 1954, was shot down by People's Liberation Army Air Force Lavochkin La-7 fighters off the coast of Hainan Island; ten on board died.

El Al Flight 402 El Al Flight 402, a Lockheed L-149 Constellation pressurized four-engine propliner , registered 4X-AKC, was an international passenger flight from Vienna, Austria, to Tel Aviv, Israel, via Istanbul, Turkey, on July 27, 1955. The aircraft strayed into Bulgarian airspace, refused to land, and was shot down by two Bulgarian MiG- 15 jet fighters several kilometers away from the Greece border near Petrich, Bulgaria. All seven crew and fifty-one passengers on board the airliner died.

1970s Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 Libyan Airlines Flight 114 was a regularly scheduled flight from Tripoli, Libya, via Benghazi to Cairo. At 10:30 on February 21, 1973, the Boeing 727 left Tripoli, but became lost with a combination of bad weather and equipment failure over northern Egypt around 13:44 (local). It entered Israeli-controlled airspace over the Sinai Peninsula, was intercepted by two Israeli F-4 Phantom II fighters, refused to land, and was shot down. Of the 113 people on board, 5 survived, including the co-pilot.

Korean Air Lines Flight 902 Korean Air Lines Flight 902 (KAL902, KE902) was a civilian Boeing 707 airliner shot down by Soviet Sukhoi Su-15 fighters on April 20, 1978, near Murmansk, Russia, after it violated Soviet airspace and failed to respond to Soviet interceptors. Two passengers died in the incident. 107 passengers and crew survived after the plane made an emergency landing on a frozen lake.

Air Flight 825 Flight 825, was a scheduled flight between Kariba and Salisbury, Rhodesia (now Harare, ), that was shot down on September 3, 1978, by Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas using a Strela 2 missile. Eighteen of the fifty-six passengers of the Vickers Viscount survived the crash, but ten of the survivors were killed by the guerrillas at the crash site.

Air Rhodesia Flight 827 Air Rhodesia Flight 827 was a scheduled flight between Kariba and Salisbury that was shot down on February 12, 1979, by ZIPRA guerrillas using a Strela 2 missile in similar circumstances to Flight RH825 five months earlier. None of the fifty-nine passengers or crew of the Vickers Viscount survived.

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1980s Linhas Aéreas de Angola Yakolev Yak-40 On 8 February 1980 Linhas Aéreas de Angola airliner registered D2-TYC, a Yakovlev Yak-40, was shot down near Matala, Angola with the loss of all on board (4 crew and 15 passengers). ICAO report a sudden situation took place in response to actions by a foreign aircraft and accidentally the Yak-40 was hit and crashed.

Korean Air Lines Flight 007 Korean Air Lines Flight 007, also known as KAL 007 or KE007, was a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 civilian airliner shot down by a Soviet Su-15TM fighter on September 1, 1983, near Moneron Island just west of Sakhalin island. 269 passengers and crew, including US congressman Larry McDonald, were aboard KAL 007; there were no survivors. An official investigation concluded that the course deviation was likely caused by pilot error in configuring their air navigation system.

Polar 3 On February 24, 1985, the Polar 3, a Dornier Do 228 research airplane of the Alfred Wegener Institute, was shot down by guerrillas of the Polisario Front over West Sahara. All three crew members died. Polar 3 was on its way back from Antarctica and had taken off in Dakar, Senegal, to reach Arrecife, Canary Islands.

Zimex Aviation Lockheed L-100, Angola On October 14, 1987, a Lockheed L-100 Hercules registered HB-ILF, owned by the Swiss company Zimex Aviation and operated on behalf of the ICRC was shot down about four minutes after departing at Cuito airport, Angola. It was hit by an unknown projectile fired by unknown combattants during the Angolan Civil War. Four crew members and two passengers died. On the ground, two persons died and one was severely injured.

Air Malawi 7Q-YMB On November 6, 1987, an Air Malawi Shorts Skyvan 7Q-YMB was shot down while on a domestic flight from Blantyre, Malawi to Lilongwe. The flight plan took it over Mozambique where the Mozambican Civil War was in progress. The aircraft was shot down near the Mozambican town of Ulongwe. The eight passengers and two crew on board died.

Iran Air Flight 655

A missile departs the forward launcher of Vincennes during a 1987 exercise. The

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forward launcher was also used in the downing of Air 655.

Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai, UAE. On July 3, 1988, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the aircraft flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class guided missile USS Vincennes when it fired a RIM- 66 Standard surface-to-air missile. The airplane was destroyed between Bandar Abbas and Dubai; all 290 passengers and crew died. USS Vincennes was in Iranian waters at the time of the attack, and IR655, an , was allegedly misidentified as an Iranian F-14.

T&G Aviation DC-7 On December 8, 1988 a Douglas DC-7 chartered by the US Agency for International Development was shot down over Western Sahara by the Polisario Front, resulting in 5 deaths. Leaders of the movement said the plane was mistaken for a Moroccan Lockheed C-130. The aircraft was to be used to spray insecticide to control a locust outbreak.

1990s 1993 Transair Georgian Airline shootdowns In September 1993, three airliners belonging to Transair Georgia were shot down by missiles and gunfire in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, Georgia. The first, a Tupolev Tu- 134, was shot down on September 21, 1993 by a missile during landing approach. The second plane, a Tupolev Tu-154, was shot down a day later also during approach. A third one was shelled and destroyed on the ground, while passengers were boarding.

Rwandan presidential airliner The Dassault Falcon 50 airplane carrying Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, Rwanda, on 6 April 1994. Both presidents died. This double assassination was the catalyst for the Rwandan Genocide and the First Congo War. Responsibility for the attack is disputed, with most theories proposing as suspects either the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) or government- aligned Hutu Power extremists opposed to negotiation with the RPF.

Lionair Flight 602 Lionair Flight 602, operated by an Antonov An-24RV, crashed into the sea off the north-western coast of Sri Lanka on September 29, 1998. The aircraft departed Jaffna-Palaly Air Force Base on a flight to Colombo and disappeared from radar screens just after the pilot had reported depressurization. Initial reports indicated that the plane had been shot down by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam rebels. All seven crew and forty-eight passengers died.

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2000s 2001 Siberia Airlines Flight 1812 On 4 October 2001, Tu-154 crashed over the Black Sea. The plane was hit by a S- 200 surface-to-air missile, fired from the Crimea peninsula during a Ukrainian military exercise. All on board (66 passengers and 12 crew) died. The President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and several high commanders of the military expressed their condolences to the relatives of the victims. The Ukrainian Government paid out $200,000 in compensation to the families of every passenger and crew who died when the plane crashed. They paid out a total of $15 million in compensation for the accident.

2002 Mombasa attacks On November 28, 2002, two shoulder-launched Strela 2 (SA-7) surface-to-air missiles were fired at a Boeing 757 airliner owned by Israel-based Arkia Airlines as it took off from Moi International Airport in Mombasa. The missiles missed the plane, which landed safely in Tel Aviv.

2003 Baghdad DHL attempted shoot down incident On November 22, 2003, shortly after takeoff from Baghdad, Iraq, an Airbus A300 cargo plane owned by European Air Transport (a subsidiary of the German express-mail serviceDHL) was struck on the left wing tip by a surface-to-air missile. Severe wing damage resulted in a fire and complete loss of hydraulic flight control systems. The pilots used differential engine thrust to fly the plane back to Baghdad, and were able to land without any injuries or major aircraft damage.

2007 Balad aircraft crash On January 9, 2007, an Antonov An-26 crashed while attempting a landing at Balad Air Base in Iraq. Although poor weather is blamed by officials, witnesses claim they saw the plane being shot down, and the Islamic Army in Iraq claimed responsibility. Thirty-four of the thirty-five civilian passengers on board died.

2007 Mogadishu TransAVIAexport Airlines Il-76 crash On March 23, 2007, a TransAVIAexport Airlines Ilyushin Il-76 airplane crashed in outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia, during the 2007 Battle of Mogadishu. Witnesses, including a Shabelle reporter, claim they saw the plane shot down, and Belarus has initiated an anti-terrorist investigation, but Somalia insists the crash was accidental. All eleven Belarusian civilians on board died.

2010s 2014 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a Boeing 777-200ER, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, crashed near Donetsk in the eastern part of Ukraine. All 283 passengers and 15 crew are reported dead when the plane crashed from roughly 33,000 ft (10,000 m). The crash of Flight 17 coincided with claims by Russian separatists from Donetsk region in Eastern Ukraine of having shot down a military An-26.

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Protection to Civil passenger aircraft against Shoulder- Fired Missile (SFM) Threat

By Air Vice Marshal (Retd) P. Govindarajan THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY agency (EASA) has recently issued a warning to all national aviation authorities and aircraft operators of enhanced risk of safety of civil aircraft on account of the possibility of attack by terrorists while flying over Pakistan. This warning has been issued at the AVM (Retd) P. Govindarajan is a M E from IISc Bangalore. behest of the civil aviation regulator of France, the DGAC, who He is also a Graduate of has made it mandatory for French aircraft operators not to fly Defence Services Staff below an altitude of 24000 ft when operating through College, Wellington, Tamil Nadu. As a young officer in Pakistani airspace. Indian and south East Asian airlines flying Air Force Technical to and from Europe routinely overfly Pakistan. (Electronics) branch, in the initial few years, he served as Danger to civil aircraft these days emanate from man-portable Aircrew Signaler in transport shoulder-fired missiles (SFM) now easily available to terrorists. aircraft. These constitute a serious threat to airliners that are lucrative Later, for more than 2 and easy targets. Downing of a passenger aircraft with heavy decades, he was involved in loss of life, creates a tremendous psychological impact on the the design and implementation of air defence travelling public, is debilitating for the airline industry and network, interlinking low confronts the nation owning the aircraft with a serious level, medium and long range dilemma. radars, AWACS, and other sources for aircraft detection, At the civil airports in India, the level of security has been various voice and data communication media like enhanced considerably in the last few years at enormous cost troposcatter, LOS radio links, to prevent access to terrorists. However, a terrorist armed VSAT satcom, air ground with SFM, operating outside the airfield perimeter, can easily VUHF links into a integrated target an aircraft that has taken off or is approaching to land. air defence network. At these times, an airliner is well within the range of SFMs and He was appointed as Indian presents an easy target. A UN report states that the world representative in technical over, there are more than 5,00,000 SFMs that are popularly forum of International Telecommunication Union known as Man Portable Air Defence Systems(MANPADS). A (ITU). He has presented large proportion of these are held by terrorists. Since 1979, number of papers and took there have been seven confirmed instances of airliners falling part in deliberations of victim to SFMs. technical meetings of ITU held in Geneva, UK, France and Germany. PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR CIVIL AIRCRAFT. In the period 2003 -04, the Department of homeland Security of the US After retirement, he served in decided to equip the 7,000-plus fleet of civilian airliners with multinational computer and VSAT satcom companies. He suitable equipment to provide protection against the threat of has served few years in SFMs. Two companies were identified and tasked to Central Research Laboratory, independently carry out research and development to design the R&D unit of Bharat such a system. Currently, all airliners of EL AL, the national Electronics Ltd, a defence PSU. airlines of Israel, are equipped with a system for protection against SFMs. Singapore airlines has also evinced interest in

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such a protection system. Other Airlines that operate over terrorist-affected areas in Africa, the middle-east, Europe and Asia, are also evaluating this concept seriously.

VULNERABILITY OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT. An aircraft is most vulnerable to ground fire while approaching to land or after take-off when it is close to the ground, is flying at low speed, not manoeuvring and is presenting a large target. The danger zone is roughly up to about 15 km from the end of the runway, up to an altitude of 5,000 ft and in a cone of plus or minus 30 degrees either side of the runway centre line. A terrorist present anywhere in this zone armed with an SFM can easily target an aircraft transiting through this area.

Many airfields in India and abroad, where Indian aircraft operate, are vulnerable to such terrorist attacks. It will be an expensive affair to secure such large areas outside all the airfields. While own airfields can be secured to some extent, airfields outside India may continue to remain threatened. A pragmatic solution would be to equip all airliners with a system that would provide protection against such threats. No weapons will be required onboard the aircraft and the system will only deflect the incoming missile away from the aircraft.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS. While systems to warn against an air-to air missile attack are employed on military aircraft, the problem is more complex for both civil and military aircraft in the case of attack by SFMs. In this case, the sensor of the warning device would be required to scan the surface of the Earth below the aircraft and ought to be able to distinguish the oncoming SFM from ground clutter. Some firms have developed ultra-violet (UV) band sensors to detect the missile exhaust plume. Some other firms state that frequency spectrum study of the exhaust plume of MANPADS and taking into account the atmospheric absorption, the infrared (IR) band is most appropriate to detect an incoming SFM. UV and IR sensors have their advantages and drawbacks. The US Navy and the US Air-force have a test range at white Sands, where they carry out live test of airborne sensors against plumes of different types of MANPADS obtained from different countries. The tests are repeated several times.

It is also possible to detect an SFM by radar return but the missile being of small size and at close range, this system has not been found to be effective. Pulse Doppler Radar is useful to detect radar return against heavy ground clutter, when the sensor is pointing towards the ground. Multiple sensors have to be used to look in different directions and rapid scan capability is a must as time of flight of the missile is short. A terrorist may not exactly be positioned in line with the runway, may successfully conceal himself and may be immune to visual observation, so the sensors would need to scan 360 degrees. The system is vulnerable to false alarms as it can confused by other heat sources such as active chimneys, vehicles and a blazing fire on the ground.

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Processing power and time, The terrorist aims at an aircraft and fires the missile, an operation that is relatively simple and requires no special training. After launch the missile takes a few seconds to stabilise, build up speed and the heat-seeking homing device of the missile locks on to the aircraft exhaust. This takes few seconds and thereafter, the missile moves at supersonic speed. The distance and height involved for the missile to travel towards the aircraft is small and time to travel is of the order 10 to 20 seconds only, thus restricting the time available for automatic countermeasure. The protective system must respond within this time frame to prevent the incoming missile impacting the aircraft.

COUNTERMEASURES. Passive countermeasures include dispensing of chaff, i.e. aluminium foil or flares to disrupt the guidance system of the missile, deflecting it away from the aircraft. Active countermeasures involve firing of high-power solid-state laser beam towards the incoming missile. It is, of course expensive and such high power solid- state lasers are available from few sources only.

Since the time available is limited, the operation of the defensive system is required to be totally automated. The crew of the airliner, however, would become aware of the incoming missile and that it has been deflected. The pilot would not be required to execute evasive manoeuvres that could endanger the aircraft if carried out while flying at low speed and low altitude during approach for landing or after take-off.

COST CONSIDERATIONS. It has been estimated that the cost of fitment of an anti-SFM system on a civil airliner would be lower than that for a combat aircraft. The figure is pegged at $1.25 Million. Over the complete life-cycle of the aircraft, based on the average load factor achieved, the cost per passenger is computed to be a mere 25cents per ticket, hardly a burden of consequence for the passenger. This can be reduced even further for the air passenger travelling by Indian carriers through increase in the indigenous content of the protection system.

An airliner is equipped with a variety of safety equipment such as life jackets, Emergency chute and firefighting equipment. Most of these may remain unused during the lifecycle of the aircraft and yet passengers bear the cost of all this equipment through the price of air

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ticket. The system to provide protection for a airliner against threat from SFM is just another piece of safety equipment. Passengers will feel secure in the knowledge that the airliner is immune to SFMs launched by terrorists on the ground.

INDIGENIOUS CAPABILITY. For military aircraft , defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs ) such as Bharat Electronics Ltd and Defence R&D laboratories such as Defence Application Research Establishment (DARE) and testing establishments such as Aircraft Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) are addressing this threat , against stringent avionics specifications for size, weight, power consumption, structural design, space constraints, shock, vibration ,”g” specs and system configuration. IAF aircraft utilized for VIP traveller and those operated by the Border Security Force (BSF) are equipped with defensive systems provided by the original equipment manufacturers at the time these aircrafts are procured.

For civilian aircraft, the National Physical Laboratory (NPL), Instrument research and development laboratory (IRDE) have been working on Electro-optical devices and systems for defence against SFM threat. However, success in the indigenous effort is not visible as yet. While hardware such as sensors and laser jammers of the avionics grade with the reliability called for may not be possible indigenously in the near future, the Indian R&D establishment could focus on software for integration of sensor inputs, real-time signal processing, avoidance of false alarm and giving required direction input to the jammer. Also, aircraft installation, design and actual field installation can easily be handled indigenously. This will also help bring in cost reduction of up to about 25 to 30 per cent at the very least.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. There is no doubt that in the prevailing environment of increasing global terrorism, a civil passenger aircraft is becoming increasingly vulnerable to being targeted by SFM-armed terrorists from abroad or even from terror modules in India. Countries such as the US, Israel and others are alive to this threat to civil passenger aircraft from terrorists and are equipping their passenger carriers with suitable avionics equipment that are classified not as ‘Weapon Systems’ but as ‘Electronic Countermeasures’. There is undoubtedly the need to indigenously develop such protection systems for Indian carriers as well.

While regulatory issues can be addressed at the appropriate time, the proposal needs to be examined jointly by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the National Aeronautical Laboratory(NAL) and any other related organisations. A specific R&D project for this important safety feature for civil aircraft should be initiated without delay at NAL, which is a prime civil national laboratory. Assistance can be sought from firms that have hands-on experience in such systems that are operational elsewhere.

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