Particulars with Rebard to the Position of Arhiauiehts Id the Iiarious Countries

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Particulars with Rebard to the Position of Arhiauiehts Id the Iiarious Countries [Distributed to the Council, the Officiai No.: C. 698. M. 304. 1931.IX. Members of the League and the [Conf. D. 26.] States invited to the Conference.] Geneva, October 9th, 1931. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PARTICULARS WITH REBARD TO THE POSITION OF ARHIAUIEHTS ID THE IIARIOUS COUNTRIES 24* COMMUNICATION FROM THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT Note by the Secretary-General : At the request of the Canadian Government, dated October 8th, 1931, the Secretary- General has the honour to communicate to the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference a letter from the Canadian Advisory Officer to the League of Nations, dated September 21st, 1931, with an annex giving detailed information on the position of armaments in his country. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CANADIAN ADVISORY OFFICER TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Geneva, September 21st, 1931. With reference to Circular Letter 124.1931.IX, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a memorandum giving particulars as to the position of armaments in Canada. (Signed) W. A. R i d d e l l , Canadian Advisory Officer. CHAPTER 1. — LAND FORCES. E f f e c t iv e s . The military forces of Canada are constituted under the Militia Act of 1906. The forces consist of an active militia (permanent and non-permanent) and a reserve militia. The active militia consists of corps raised by voluntary enlistment on a basis of three years’ service, subject to an extension of one year in case of emergency. That portion of the active militia which is permanently embodied for the purpose of providing for the care and protection of forts, etc., and to establish schools of military instruction, is designated the permanent force. The members of the non-permanent active militia are liable to be called out annually for training not exceeding thirty days in any one year. The reserve formations of the active militia are intended for the purpose of providing for the organisation of the officers and men who have completed their service in the active militia or who have otherwise received a military training. The permanent forces train throughout the year, and certain of their officers and N.C.O.s are detailed to assist in the training of the non-permanent militia at local headquarters, as well as at camps of instruction. The strength of the permanent active militia is limited by law to 10,000 all ranks. The Peace establishment now authorised comprises 514 officers and 6,647 other ranks. * This figure indicates that 24 documents (with in addition one annex to document C.440 M.187. 193i.IX) in regard to the position of the armaments in the different countries have already been Published. Series of League of Nations Publications S'&N. 3,130 2,075 (A.). 10/31. I m p . d u J . d e G en èv e. IX. DISARMAMENT 1931. IX. 29. The peace establishment of the authorised corps, units and formations of the non­ permanent active militia comprises 9,061 officers and 125,782 other ranks. Calculated on the basis of Article 3 of the draft Convention, this would give a total number of effectives, if the Canadian forces were at their maximum legal strength, of 1,258 officers and 18,243 total effectives. For a number of years, the peace establishments, both of the permanent and non­ permanent active militia, have not been completed. For the year ending March 31st, 1931, the average strength of the permanent active militia (including headquarters staffs) was 434 officers and 3,189 other ranks. As regards the non-permanent active militia, although the commissioned and enlisted strength on December 31st, 1930, was 6,859 officers and 46,342 other ranks, for reasons of economy, only 4,506 officers and 28,402 other ranks were given a short training period (maximum 13 days) during the year. Calculated on the basis of Article 3 of the draft Convention, and returned in the form prescribed by Article 30 of that Convention, the average daily number of army effectives, therefore, given training during the year ending March 31st, 1931, is as follows : Table II. — Land Armed Forces stationed Overseas. Nil. Tables I and I I I . — Land Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country, and Total Land Armed Forces. Officers ...................................................................................................... 570 Total Effectives 1 ..................................................................................... 4,644 Table IV . — Formations organised on a Military Basis. 2 Officers or officials ranking as o fficers................................................... 59 Total effectives......................................................................................... 1,277 CHAPTER 2. — NAVAL FORCES. A. E f f e c t iv e s fo r t h e Y e a r 1930-31, r e t u r n e d in a c c o r d a n c e w it h t h e F orm prescribed in t h e T a b l e s a n n e x e d to A r t ic l e 30 o f t h e D r a f t Co n v e n t io n . Table VI. — Naval Forces. Officers ...................................................................................................... 81 Total e ffe c tiv e s............................................................................................... 838 The figures inserted in Table VI were arrived at as follows : (a) Royal Canadian Navy: Average total effectives...................................... 741.4 Total “ effective ’’-days....................................... 741.4 x 365 = 270,611 Average total officers........................................... 75.3 Total " officer ’’-days........................................... 75.3 X 365 = 27,484 (b) Royal Canadian Naval Reserve: Average Strength : Average number of officers borne during fiscal year 1930-31 . 35.5 Average number of ratings borne during fiscal year 1930-31 . 131.1 Training : Officers to the number of 21 received a total of 792 days, and 129 ratings a total of 5,699 days’ training. Total “ effective ’’-days............................................................. 6,491 Total “ officer’’-days................................................................. 792 1 In making the above calculations for the army, navy and air forces, periods of leave and furlough are not deducted from the number of days’ service during the year. 2 There is only one such formation, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which is a constabulary maintained by the Federal Government, though controlled and administered by a Minister other than t Minister of National Defence. The term of engagement in the force is three years, and the officers commissioned by the Crown. — 3 — (c) Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve: Average Strength : Average number of officers borne during 1930 59 Average number of ratings borne during 1930 822 P. 0 . instructors ................................................... 17 Training : Officers to the number of 47 received a total of 1,325 days’ training, 632 men received a total of 20,688 days’ training, and 17 P. 0 . instructors served 17 x 365 = 6,205 “ effective ’’-days. Total “ effective ’’-d a y s ........................................................................ 28,218 Total “ officer ’’-days................................................................................ 1,325 (d) Grand total “ effective ’’-days: (« ).......................................................................................................................270,611 (6) ................................................................................................................... 6,491 (c )................................................................................................................... 28,218 Total.........................305,320 (Average daily effectives = 836) Grand total “ officer ’’-days: («).................................................................................................................. 27,484 (b ) ............................................. 792 (c) ..................................................................................................................................................... 1.325 Total..................... 29,601 (Average daily officers = 81) Table V II. — Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis. Nil. With regard to Table VII, consideration was given to the following services : (a) Dominion Steamers, Tugs, Icebreakers, etc., operated by the Department of Marine. — None of those ships are armed, so that their officers and crew do no weapon training. Officers and crews are not permanent Government servants. They sign merchant-service articles which give them, on the one hand, the right to leave the service whenever they wish and, on the other hand, give the Minister the right to dispense with their services at pleasure. Consequently, the officers and crews of those ships could not be required to serve in time of war without some “ measure of mobilisation ” in the form of either voluntary enlistment in the Royal Canadian Navy or the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, or else some form of compulsory service act. It is therefore considered that they do not come within the definition contained in Article 4 of the draft Convention. (b) Fisheries Protection Vessels. — There are four vessels (two on each coast) armed with 3-pounder guns. The officers and crews are not permanent Government servants, but are taken on on similar terms to the Dominion vessels referred to in (a). They could not be compelled to serve in time of war without some voluntary or compulsory " measure of mobilisation ”. It is considered that they do not come within the definition contained in Article 4 of the draft Convention.
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