“Please Don’t Walk Through The Mass Grave”

Does this Message Reflect the Memorialization of the Cambodian ?

Max de Kruiff 10886230 June 2015 Supervisor: Nanci Adler Word Count: 22.910 Table of Contents

Introduction 2

The Struggle of Politicized Memorialization 11

The Cambodian People and their Past: Memorializing 25 the Genocide from the Bottom Up

Memorialization in and the International Community 37

Conclusion 48

Bibliography 52

1

Introduction

Fourteen kilometers southeast from the Cambodian capital lies Choeung Ek. For those who do not wish to engage themselves in history, this site seems to be a calm part of the Cambodian rural landscape. A beautiful place, untouched by busy urban influences, Choeung Ek is Cambodia in its purest form. Sadly, Choeung Ek is an example of how something that seems so innocent at first sight is in fact a dark place which echoes the voices of death. Visiting Choeung Ek anno 2015 is a visit to one of history’s darkest pages. The well- preserved of Choeung Ek give a horrible and interesting peek in the terror of the Red Khmer regime at the same time. When entering the memorial site, the large stupa comes immediately into sight. Before reaching this building, the visitor is warned about the content of what will be seen at Choeung Ek. In the stupa, hundreds of skulls are shown to the visitor, a rather unpleasant but unfortunately realistic illustration of what happened there. I had the chance to visit Choeung Ek in 2011. The things that I experienced there and in Cambodia as a whole, inspired me to write this thesis. What follows after the stupa, is a tour over the former Killing Fields. I remember walking on the path, seeing small white pieces on the surface of the grass. It was as if those pieces were part of the ground, a strange sort of ground surface. However, our guide told us, these were remains of the bones of the Cambodians who were brutally slaughtered by the . One has to be constantly aware of what you are looking at when it comes to a historical subject like this. However, as a human being, some things seem so unreal, that it is impossible sometimes to fully engage yourself with the historical context. I had this experience when I saw a sign which said: “Please Don’t Walk Through the Mass Grave”. Clinical was the word that came to my mind. A clinical sign, like a warning in traffic. Was that really how the was remembered?

Cambodia’s history cannot be studied openly. This is for a large part the result of the genocide which happened in the 1970s and its aftermath. The genocide was a devastating episode in the country’s rich history. Cambodia was a wealthy nation during the Khmer empire, which lasted from the ninth till the thirteenth century. This was the time in which the Angkor Wat temples were built. After the Khmer empire had fallen, influences from outside increased in the country. First, Spanish and Portuguese travelers made it to Cambodia. Later, in the nineteenth century, Cambodia became part of French Indochina. The French ruled the colony until 1953. In 1941, the French appointed Norodom Sihanouk as the king of

2

Cambodia, which made the country a monarchy. Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the throne in 1955, after which he became leader of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, a socialist party. Sihanouk won the elections and became prime minister. He stayed in this function until 1970, when he was overthrown by General Lon Nol. Nol led a coup against Sihanouk, who was popular at first – he led the struggle for Cambodian independence -, but opposition was simply a matter of time. The Vietnam War had a great impact on former Indochina. Sihanouk did not want to cooperate with the Americans, which has fed ideas that the Americans were behind Nol’s takeover of Cambodia. The General ruled the country until 1975: the year in which Cambodia’s history would take a dramatic turn. ’s Khmer Rouge took over the country and installed a Maoist communist regime. The Khmer Rouge killed one third of the Cambodian population during its reign which lasted until 1979.1 Remembering Cambodia’s history today is not the same as it was before the Khmer Rouge took over the country. The current Prime Minister Hun Sen has been in the government since the end of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. His administration has been struggling with the genocidal past ever since. However, the government has been able to make this struggle slightly more comfortable by implementing a narrative about Cambodia’s past which makes it easier for the elite to memorialize the past: the past is made usable. On the other side, we have the Cambodian population. They are struggling with the past as well. Since more than twenty percent of the population was killed during the genocidal years, almost every Cambodian has a direct link with the events of the 1970s. Therefore, the population is heavily traumatized. However, they are not able to express this trauma and to resolve it. This will be made clear if we see how the Cambodian leadership memorializes the genocidal past and how this narrative of memorialization is implemented in the Cambodian population. This narrative is not only implemented in the Cambodian people. A third force has a role in the Cambodian memorialization as well: the international community. In this thesis, I will argue that the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide is particularly influenced by the Cambodian government. Moreover, the memorialization is influenced from the outside, which is the international community. As a consequence, the memorialization of the Cambodian people has been suppressed.

1 Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979,” in Century of Genocide, Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, eds. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 84.

3

Memorialization and Lieux de Mémoire

In order to understand the context of this thesis, it is important to explain what is meant here while speaking about memorialization. According to Jay Winter, memory is ‘performed at the heart of the collective memory. When individuals and groups express or embody or interpret or repeat a social script about the past, they galvanize the ties that binds groups together and deposit additional memory traces about the past in their own minds.’2 What individuals and groups are doing is performing their memory. This helps them remembering the past. In this thesis, when the term memorialization is used, I mean the performing of memory through rituals (for instance religious rituals), stories (personal stories of the past), cultural phenomena (museums), grand narrative (the official lecture of the past), or a metanarrative (the counter narrative of the grand narrative). These last two definitions are closely linked to the idea of the lieux de mémoire on which I will come back in this section. They are especially important since the two types of narratives point to the major problem in Cambodia, which is that the government’s narrative overshadows that of the Cambodian population. Memorialization of the Cambodian genocide will be discussed by looking into the initiatives of memorialization of three different groups: the Cambodian government, the Cambodian population, and the international community. These three groups have their own way of memorializing the Cambodian genocide: they perform memory differently. Cambodia’s main sites of memorialization are the Tuol Sleng Museum (S-21) and Choeung Ek. Besides these two places where crimes were actually committed, the government installed two official holidays which remind of the Khmer Rouge period: Victory Day on January 7 and the Day of Remembrance on May 20 – which was formerly known as the Day of Hatred. Although the Cambodian government made these efforts to keep the memory of the genocide alive, criticism has never been off the table. This criticism has particularly been coming from the international community. Especially in the late 1990s, calls for justice and truthful memorialization became louder. The Cambodian people are primarily concerned that good memorialization will never come to exist. Their quest for memorialization and justice is still going. As we will see in chapter 2, Cambodian people do not feel that the government are handling their past well. The most notorious example is the refusal of the Cambodian government to burn the remains of the people which are now displayed on the former killing

2 Jay Winter, “The Performance of the Past: Memory, History, Identity,” in Performing the Past, Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe, ed. Karin Tilmans et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 11.

4 field. As Paul Williams has put it, Choeung Ek’s historical significance is ‘dwarfed’ by the government.3 Therefore, the question if the efforts of memorialization undertaken by the government help the Cambodian people is best answered with a no. Why is this the case? This thesis will show how the Cambodian government’s efforts of memorialization have failed to serve the people’s needs: the initiatives taken by the government do not help the Cambodian people in remembering the genocidal past correctly.4 In 1989, Pierre Nora defined the concept lieux de mémoire. According to Nora, lieux de mémoire are ‘fundamentally remains, the ultimate embodiments of a memorial consciousness that has barely survived in a historical age that calls out for memory because it has abandoned it.’5 Nora uses some examples from the French history to clarify this term. One of them is the Arc de Triomphe. This monument was built to celebrate Napoleon Bonaparte’s victories in Austerlitz. In Nora’s vision, this Arc represents a significant part of the French history. The monument is a symbol which cannot be forgotten, since it is a fundamental remainder of the past. Nora calls this an elementary tool and a symbolic object of our memory.6 By looking at the Arc de Triomphe, one immediately recalls the French history. Examples of lieux de mémoire at work can be found everywhere. For example in Rome, the grand old city of the Romans with its Pantheon or the Colosseum. Cambodia has these places as well: the Tuol Sleng museum and the Choeung Ek killing field are only two examples where Cambodian lieux de mémoire is at work. Lieux de mémoire does not occur spontaneously. It is created by people and can therefore be twisted. It is essential for a minority to illuminate the truth of lieux de mémoire, since without ‘commemorative vigilance, history would soon sweep them away.’7 In Cambodia, lieux de mémoire has been created by the government. Here, the difficult relationship between history and memory is very clear. If history is not told correctly, memory of the past gets troubled as well.8 In other words, it is almost impossible for the Cambodian people to memorialize their genocidal past correctly as long as the government

3 Paul Williams, “The Atrocity Exhibition: Touring Cambodian Genocide Memorials,” in On Display: New Essays in Cultural Studies, eds. Smith and Wevers (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004), 204. 4 In fact, many Cambodians do not believe that the genocide even happened, Craig Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (London: Praeger, 2005), 3. 5 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (1989): 12. 6 Ibid., 12. 7 Ibid. 8 Or as Nora calls it, memory is seized here by history (“Lieux de Mémoire,” 13-15). For another explanation of Nora’s concept, see Nancy Wood, “Memory Remains: Les lieux de mémoire,” History & Memory 6 (1994): 126- 7.

5 does not offer rightful education in the country’s history.9 Objective archives which could be entered by Cambodians did not exist until 1995, when the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCC) was opened. The DCC is a non-governmental research institute which has provided the means for scholars (Cambodian and non-Cambodian) to study the country’s past. Whereas Nora specifically points to lieux de mémoire as official places of memorialization, Jens Meierhenrich believes that the concept is also at work in what he calls ‘underprivileged memory.’ He states that places of commemoration can also be found in non- official places. Taking the Nyabarango River in Rwanda as an example, Meierhenrich shows how the Tutsis see this place as far more important than officially installed places of remembrance, since a river like the Nyabarango is much better accessible and therefore a very practical place to remember the past.10 What is good about this form of lieux de mémoire is that it was created by the people themselves and not by the government, which might make it a more truthful place of memorialization. In this thesis, the Cambodian lieux de mémoire will be defined. Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek are examples of Nora’s definition of lieux de mémoire, but are there also sites of underprivileged memory? In here, I will show how Cambodia memorializes its past and what is good and bad about it.

First, it is reasonable to ask ourselves how we can determine what good memorialization is. Does such a thing even exist? According to Lisa M. Moore, memorialization is good when the past is embalmed and memory is ordered correctly. Moore states that memorialization can often be seen at places where crimes were actually committed. She states that this can work, as long as the site is signified as authentic. According to Moore, the presentation of physical evidence at a site of memorialization can help as well in memorializing the past rightfully.11 Although the argument that a visitor to the site can memorialize better when confronted with the past directly, one cannot say that physical evidence is always a condition for good memorialization. This will be made clear in the second chapter of this thesis. Another way to look at memorialization in Cambodia is to compare it with other cases. According to Rebecca Jinks, most of the literature about memorialization in general has been

9 For a more theoretical piece on the framing of memory, see Aleida Assmann. “Re-framing Memory. Between individual and collective forms of constructing the past,” in Performing the Past, Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe, ed. Karin Tilmans et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 35-50. 10 Jens Meierhenrich, “The Transformation of Lieux de Mémoire: The Nyabarongo River in Rwanda, 1992- 2009,” Anthropology Today 25 (2009): 13. 11 Lisa M. Moore, “(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: the Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity,” Journal of Public and International Affairs 20 (2009): 50.

6 written on single cases, such as one genocide museum or a public form of remembrance.12 However, memorialization of a genocide can be done in various ways and these ways should all be included in order to create a complete picture of how the remembrance of a genocide is experienced in a country. Therefore, instead of discussing one single museum, various topics will be discussed in this thesis. Nevertheless, most often memorialization can be seen in museums, set up by the government to show a certain narrative of the past. Initiatives like these are often supported by keywords like empathy, experience and education.13 These narratives promoted by a state are often misleading. There is not so much attention for the victims and it is questionable whether the museum helps preventing violence in the future. Moreover, it does not help the population with recovering from a genocide. Jenny Edkins states that people do not remember mass violence correctly since they are often highly influenced by a narrative promoted by the state: they suffer from the grand narrative and are not able to promote their own metanarrative.14 Although Edkins primary focus of study is the Holocaust, we have seen this happening in Cambodia as well. Another example may be how the Bosnian war in the 1990s has been remembered by people whom experienced the conflict.15 How people experience genocide and how they remember such an event may also for a large part be linked to culture. have occurred on all continents. Mass violence is therefore not unique for one culture or one place. In each separate example of genocide, the crimes were different, but the aftermath was different as well. How a society brings those responsible for the crimes to justice is highly dependent on its culture. For example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was successful in South Africa, but an initiative like this may not have worked after another conflict. In Bosnia, for example, initiatives for truth commissions were made as well, but they failed.16 This teaches us that culture is crucial in genocide as a whole, but in remembering a genocide as well. This brings us to the question how a genocide should be remembered. The answer is not easy to give. It differs in every situation and it is therefore hard to compare cases of

12 Rebecca Jinks, “Thinking Comparatively about Genocide Memorialization,” Journal of Genocide Research 16 (2014): 425. 13 Ibid., 426. 14 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4. 15 For examples of Bosnian lieux de mémoire at work, see the articles by Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, “Knowledge, Acknowledgement and Denial in Serbia’s Responses to the Srebrenica Massacre,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17 (2009), and Christine Lavrence, “Between Monumental History and Experience: Remembering and Forgetting War in Belgrade,” Ethnologie Française 37 (2007). 16 Johanna Mannergren Selimovic, “Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 57 (2010). 7 genocide with each other. However, to make a start in answering this question, it is valuable to have an idea how the culture of the country which suffered from a genocide, in this case Cambodia, functions. What should be mentioned here first, however, is that it was nearly impossible for Cambodia to start the process of memorializing right after the Cambodian genocide. Cambodia was a country in chaos after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia in 1979, which made an end to the Pol Pot regime. What followed were years of civil war, with an unpopular new regime. Nearly fifteen years after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations started to intervene in the country, which marked the beginning of efforts to bring those responsible for the Cambodian genocide to justice. In the first chapter, I will elaborate on this. Efforts of memorialization did start earlier, though. Already in 1979, the Tuol Sleng museum was opened, but this was done in times of civil war by a Vietnamese-Cambodian government.

Khmer Culture

The initiatives for memorialization in Cambodia had to fit in with Cambodian culture, the Khmer culture. Understanding Cambodian culture may help to understand how the Cambodian people experience their past and the way its darkest pages are memorialized. The Cambodian is best described as a ‘peaceful, compassionate, gentle’ human being. Religion is very important in Khmer culture. The Khmer religion is largely influenced by both Indian Brahmanism and Theravada Buddhism.17 Within this religion, the concepts of reincarnation and karma are interesting and important. Reincarnation means that a person comes back to earth in another form after one dies. In which form this is, is decided by karma. All actions, good and bad, influence how one will reincarnate. Therefore, the Cambodian believes that everything that happens during lifetime, is more or less decided beforehand because it is a result of the actions in a former life.18 This cultural asset may be important in defining how the Cambodians experience their genocide memorialization: after all, do the Cambodian people see the genocide as an event which was inevitable and maybe, in a way, something which they deserved based on their previous life? These notions will be elaborated on in the second chapter. Cambodian culture was largely contested during the Khmer Rouge period. One of the

17 Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth, “Understanding the Khmer: Sociological-Cultural Observations,” Asian Survey 31, (1991): 445-46. 18 Ibid.

8 first acts of the regime was to target the Buddhist monks in the country. Religion was forbidden in . The Khmer Rouge made a division between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ people. Religion was considered as ‘old’ and therefore dangerous, it had to be destroyed. The cultural genocide had started.19 Family life was destroyed as well, together with the Cambodian intellectual elite. Those who were highly educated did not fit the peasant- loving ideology of the Khmer Rouge. The result is that anno 2015, Cambodian people are mostly low-educated. Most of their parents died during the 1970s. After this time, education was hard to get, especially non-biased education.20 This may be influencing Cambodian memorialization as well.

This thesis will focus on how the Cambodian genocide is memorialized by the Cambodian government, the Cambodian people and the international community. In my opinion, these three actors have all influenced memorialization in Cambodia on their own way. The Cambodian government did this top down. The result has been a state implemented narrative on the Cambodian people and the international community in which victims do not play a role. The government acknowledges that crimes were committed during the Khmer Rouge period, but the policies towards these crimes have been changing many times. The result has been impunity for the perpetrators and frustration for the victims of the genocide. These victims have been trying to take initiatives to memorialize the past on their own way. However, this is not allowed by the government. Therefore, the bottom up initiatives cannot work. The international community has been trying to help the population with this, but has not succeeded so far. As will be made clear in chapter 3, efforts to stabilize Cambodia’s political situation have been undertaken, but none of them have truly worked. The three chapters of this thesis will each deal with one of these actors. The sources that will be used to develop the argument differ. For years, the Cambodian genocide was not a subject which was studied on a large level. In the past decade, this seems to have changed.21 Nevertheless, a study on memorialization in which these three actors have been involved has not been done yet. For those interested in studying Cambodia, there has been an increase of primary and

19 For a definition of the term cultural genocide, see David Nersessian, “Cultural Genocide,” in Genocide, A Reader, ed. Jens Meierhenrich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For this part of the Cambodian genocide, see also the chapter on Cambodia in Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide, Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 20 Ben Kiernan, “Cambodia: Coming to Term with the Past,” History Today 54 (2004). 21 This notion is made by many scholars who have been studying Cambodia for a longer time. Craig Etcheson, for example, notes this in the introduction of After the Killing Fields. 9 secondary sources in the last ten years, which is particularly the result of the efforts of the Yale Project on the Cambodian genocide, led by Ben Kiernan and the Documentation Center of Cambodia. One disadvantage of many primary sources is that Khmer is a very complicated language, which is not easy to read. In this thesis, all sources, primary and secondary, were originally written in English or French. Secondary sources come plenty in number, but do not answer all questions. Literature on how Cambodian people experience memorialization of their past is scarce. Therefore, the use of oral history has been a major part of my research. Besides that, Rachel Hughes has made a great start in studying some aspects of memorialization in Cambodia. Craig Etcheson and Evan Gottesman wrote a useful monograph on post-genocidal Cambodia. These two works will be useful for the historical context in which the argument will unfold. For more specific works on memorialization in Cambodia is it necessary to turn to the literature on tourism as well, since here it is often described how a memorial place is decorated. Primary sources are mostly derived from the Documentation Center of Cambodia, newspapers and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts in Cambodia, as well as some international databases on which I have based the facts and numbers presented through the chapters. With help of the literature, I will argue that memorialization of the Cambodian genocide is influenced by three actors: the Cambodian government, the Cambodian people and the international community. The government is responsible for the grand narrative, which cannot be countered by the metanarrative of the people. Whereas the international community should help the Cambodian people in countering the state narrative, we will see that the efforts to do so have failed.

10

The Struggle of Politicized Memorialization

In 1998, prime minister Hun Sen held a press conference in which he welcomed and back to Cambodian society. In his speech on December 28, Sen stated that the two top leaders of the Khmer Rouge should ‘be welcomed with bouquets of flowers, not with prisons and handcuffs.’22 The past was the past, and had to be buried.23 The words delivered by Cambodia’s prime minister were remarkable. At the end of the 1990s, the United Nations and Cambodia were finally working towards a solution regarding the country’s genocidal past. A tribunal was to be established, only the dots on the i’s and the crosses on the t’s missed. The reluctant attitude shown by Sen was a setback for the United Nations operation. Did Cambodia really want justice? After all, its people hoped that the tribunal would help in giving them some peace with the past. In order to understand the politicized memorialization of the Cambodian genocide, it is useful to discuss the issue of impunity briefly for this concept is highly influential to the political way of dealing with the country’s past. The December 1998 speech by Hun Sen is only one example out of many in which impunity is deeply rooted in Cambodian political life.24 Since Norodom Sihanouk became king in the 1950s, impunity seems to be a ‘consistent characteristic’ in Cambodian politics, the Khmer Rouge being the most famous and notorious example. Other examples can be found in present Cambodia as well. For instance, in 1997 political violence broke out between supporters of the Cambodian’s People Party and the FUNCINPEC, the royalist party. According to Craig Etcheson, more than 100 people were killed during this period, but no one has ever been charged with a crime.25 As we will see, especially when the Vietnamese left Cambodia in 1989, the Cambodian government was not keen on punishing those who were responsible for the mass crimes which occurred in the 1970s during the Khmer Rouge period. At the end of the 1990s, the United Nations tried hard to establish an international criminal tribunal in Cambodia which would deal with the perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide, based on similar experiences in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and South Africa (South African Reconciliation- and Truth Commission (SATRC). The first step towards a

22 Seth Mydans, “Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge,” The New York Times, December 29, 1998. 23 “We should dig a hole and bury the past and look ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate” – quote by Hun Sen in Mydans, “Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge”. 24 See Steve Heder, “Cultures of Genocide, Impunity and Victors’ Justice in Cambodia, 1945-1999: Colonial Communist and Other International Sources,” (unpublished transcript, 2000) 5f. 25 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 168.

11 tribunal was made in 1997, when Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen – the first and second prime minster of the Cambodian government at the time - asked for ‘the assistance of the United Nations and the international community in bringing justice to those persons responsible for the genocides and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.’26 The reaction of the United Nations was skeptical. Secretary- General Kofi Annan wrote in a letter to the General Assembly that ‘the facts which gave rise to the request remain unclear.’27 Nevertheless, Annan stated that the representative of the United Nations in Cambodia was looking into the situation. What followed was a time in which the UN tried to negotiate with the Cambodians, but these negotiations were not fruitful for five years. Despite the request which was sent to the UN in 1997, the Cambodian government was not willing to make concessions to the United Nations. According to Craig Etcheson, this is typical for Cambodian culture, which he calls a ‘culture of impunity.’28 The Cambodian culture is one which has ‘a set of social expectations – structured by supporting laws, customs and behaviors – that the strong can do what they will and the weak will suffer what they must.’29 In this context, we should see the attitude of the Cambodian government, not only to the establishment of the , but to the past as a whole. In 2003, Cambodia finally came to an agreement with the United Nations. The argument which was used by Hun Sen’s government to turn down the United Nations proposals up to 2003, was that Cambodia wanted to work on a tribunal without help from the international community, stating that a national tribunal would work better against the culture of impunity.30 This argument contrasts the request of 1997, but can nevertheless be explained. The Cambodian government is still largely influenced by the genocidal past: former Khmer Rouge members have been in the government ever since the Vietnamese takeover in 1979. Therefore, the realization that the United Nations, or any other party, would intervene in the process of punishing perpetrators, was not alluring for those in the government who had a contaminated past. Moreover, the decision of the Cambodian government to seek assistance had in the first place a political goal, which was gaining recognition from the United Nations. As Phuong N. Pham and Patrick Vinck notice, this political goal had a higher priority than the

26 Letter sent by Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen to the United Nations on 21 June, 1997, http://www.unakrt- online.org/sites/default/files/documents/June_21_1997_letters_from_PMs-2-1.pdf. 27 Letter sent by Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 June 1997, http://www.unakrt- online.org/sites/default/files/documents/June_21_1997_letters_from_PMs-2-1.pdf. 28 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 167. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

12 abstract notions of truth and reconciliation. Once the United Nations had noticed Cambodia’s existence, the need for a tribunal had fallen away.31 Pressure from the international community, especially from NGOs such as Amnesty International, made Cambodia finally decide otherwise. The result was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), in which international judges and lawyers cooperated with Cambodian fellow workers. Although the establishment of the tribunal was a first step towards justice, in practice the tribunal has known some serious problems. The tribunal has only been trying high-level perpetrators - of which Kang Kiek Iew alias Duch, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were convicted. The number of cases which is handled by the ECCC is limited as well.32 Low-level perpetrators are still profiting from the Cambodian culture of impunity.33 This is a problem, since low-level perpetrators in Cambodia are plenty in number. The Khmer Rouge separated families, broke up villages and destroyed city life. In this chaotic time, especially young children were made to participate in the Khmer Rouge crimes. One account of a former Khmer Rouge fighter is that of Sayon Soeun, who was six years old when the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia. In the years that followed, Soeun was ordered to kill people. He had no choice: it was kill or being killed. The story of Sayon Soeun has been recorded in the documentary Lost Child: Sayon’s Journey. The example of Soeun is interesting, since he is both a victim and a perpetrator. There are many more people in Cambodia like him. However, they have not had the opportunity to confront the past. What might be a good approach for these types of perpetrators in finding justice and peace with their actions is a truth commission. Since the Khmer Rouge Tribunal only tries high-level perpetrators, truth commissions could be helpful for the perpetrators to confess what they did. Moreover, the victims might be able to process the past better. However, this idea cannot be executed, since the government does not allow the Cambodian people to openly speak about or recall the past. This is a missed opportunity, since the Khmer Rouge Tribunal cannot cover Cambodia’s past by itself. A major reason is that the tribunal lacks funds. As a result, is it questionable whether the tribunal will still exist in a while and if it will be able to reach its goals.34 It will be a tough

31 Phuong N. Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Cambodia,” in Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, Volume 2, eds. Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88. 32 On the website of the ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/caseload, information can be found about the cases which are handled by the ECCC. There are only four cases handled (Cases 001, 002, 003 and 004), of which the content of the last two are unknown to the general public. 33 Khatharya Um, “The Perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide Are Still Eluding Justice,” History News Network, January 27, 2014. 34 Holly Robertson, "UN Asked to Prove $29M to Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” The Cambodia Daily, November 20, 2014.

13 challenge to break the culture of impunity. In chapter two and three, I will come back to these problems.

The Cambodian-Vietnamese Narrative

The troubles surrounding the tribunal are exemplary for the Cambodian way of dealing with its past. The last twenty years have shown that Cambodia has always had troubles in the aftermath of their genocide. The Cambodian government has made it through a few waves in which they handled their past differently. First, the genocide was used as a propaganda tool: the Vietnamese used the events of 1975-79 to condemn the Khmer Rouge and to justify the Vietnamese takeover and the measures which came along with this takeover. Second, the government acted as if the genocide had never happened. In the third wave, which is the current situation, Cambodia seems to be working towards a more truthful narrative, although there are still many problems; for instance, in classrooms, history about the genocidal past is not taught.35 The political narrative in which the genocide is memorialized started directly after the Khmer rouge fell in 1979. When the Vietnamese entered Cambodia and made an end to the regime of Pol Pot, the national narrative of the years of genocidal violence was immediately a point of attention for them. In fact, what the Vietnamese did was creating a usable past. The Vietnamese made the genocidal past one in which the crimes committed could be relativized. By pointing to other criminal regimes, such as Nazi-Germany, the Vietnamese made Cambodia’s past explicable. This notion of the usable past is not a Vietnamese-Cambodia invention. After the Holocaust, the same was done in Nazi-Germany. As Omer Bartov states, relativizing the Holocaust was done in post-Nazi-Germany as well by ‘shifting the focus to the allegedly positive elements in Nazi society and rejecting the centrality of the Holocaust.’36 In this chapter will be shown how the creation of this usable past influenced the Cambodian official narrative of the genocide. The development of this narrative, what its characteristics are and how it affects the official memorialization of the genocide will be the central theme in

35 Ben Kiernan, “Cambodia: Coming to Terms with the Past.” 36 Omer Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34. For more information on the notion of the usable past, see Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); William James Bouwsma, A Usable past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1990); Tad Tuleja, ed., Usable Pasts: Traditions and Group Expressions in North America (Salt Lake City: Logan, 1997); Lois Parkinson Zamora, The Usable past: The Imagination of History in Recent Fiction of the Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

14 the pages to come. Whereas the new government did not officially promote revenge against the Khmer Rouge, reality proved different. After Cambodia was taken over in January 1979, the Vietnamese-Cambodian government encountered a period of chaos. The Khmer Rouge soldiers and supporters fled to the edges of Cambodian territory and some moved into Thailand. Cambodia turned into a scattered country on many levels: the economy was bad, the new government had to find its way and the Cambodian people were recovering from a disastrous period in their country’s history. In this time of chaos, Cambodians were looking for revenge and acts of it were not discouraged at all. Account of violence against Khmer Rouge soldiers are plenty in number. This violence remained unpunished.37 As a result of this violence, it took some time for the new regime to install their authority. Gradually, however, this authority came. The Vietnamese were careful in their attitude towards local initiatives made by Cambodians to restore society. They saw the importance of these initiatives, since they understood that Cambodians at this point recognized and accepted these forms of leadership.38 For example, the Vietnamese allowed the Cambodian people to come back to the cities. The Cambodians were eager to start their search for the family members and friends that they had lost during the Khmer Rouge regime. As Evan Gottesman points out, it was for the first time in four years that Cambodians felt a sense of freedom: they were able to speak about the Vietnamese takeover and had the opportunity to trade food and consumer goods in a relatively open way.39 Slowly, the Vietnamese were able to take over Cambodian society and to restore the order in the country. This took some time, since the newly installed regime in Phnom Pen was not able to focus on reconstructing Cambodian society: the Third Indochina War was fought at the same time. As Stephen Morris stated, the main goal for the Vietnamese in this war was to achieve complete domination over Cambodia.40 However, this was not as easy as it seemed. Not only the fractions of the Khmer Rouge were battling with the Vietnamese, the Thai and the Chinese were involved in the war as well. The Thai did support the Khmer

37 For some of these accounts, see Loung Ung’s well known novel First they Killed my Father (New York: HarperCollins, 2000). Revenge violence is something which can be seen in other countries in transition periods as well. For instance, in South Africa violence and crime numbers increased strongly after the end of the Apartheid. For literature on this subject, see the Violence and Transition Series of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 38 Evan Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, Inside the Politics of Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 55-56. 39 Ibid., 39. 40 Sophie Quinn-Judge, “Victory on the Battlefield; Isolation in Asia: Vietnam’s Cambodia decade, 1979-1989,” in The Third Indochina War, Conflict between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972-79, eds. Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (New York: Routledge, 2006), 207.

15

Rouge rebels, with the motivation that they did not want the Vietnamese to get to much power in the Indochina region.41 The Chinese did not approve of the show of strength of the Vietnamese either. The powerful Chinese were determined to isolate Vietnam and turn the country into a ‘Cuba of the East.’42 Therefore, 1979 was a year in which military matters were more important than working on a new national narrative of the past. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese saw it as their duty to interfere in Cambodia. The motivation to do so was primarily out of nationalist rhetoric. As Stephen Morris states, the Vietnamese saw the Cambodians as ‘barbarians’ who needed to be civilized. The Vietnamese saw themselves as morally superior.43 Already in the second half of 1979, priorities shifted slowly. Although the Third Indochina War was still raging, the PRK (People’s Republic of Kampuchea) was taking shape. The new republic was found by Vietnamese standards: power was in the hands of an unnamed communist party, which was led by former Khmer Rouge commander Heng Samrin. He was selected as head of state by the Vietnamese. Amongst the top leaders was Hun Sen as well, serving as foreign minister.44 The Vietnamese tried to convince Cambodians that they had the right intentions for their country. The government showed this by installing the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT), a court in which Pol Pot and were tried (in absence). However, the trial against the Khmer Rouge leaders was nothing more than a show trial.45 Both Pol Pot and Ieng Sary had fled when the Vietnamese took over Cambodia. Therefore, the start of a trial against the two top leaders of the Khmer Rouge did not lead to a concrete result. Later, the Cambodian government granted amnesty to those who were indicted in 1979.46 Being reliable and trustworthy or not, the PRT may serve as an example of how the Vietnamese were concerned of how Cambodians thought about the leadership. The Vietnamese made work of the implementation of their narrative of Cambodia’s past. The installation of the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum is another example of this. In 1979, the Vietnamese Colonel Mai Lam was ordered by the government to turn the torture prison S-21 into a museum: the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. The choice for Lam was a logical one, since this Vietnamese man had experience in this field: he was responsible for the curation of

41 Ibid., 213. 42 Ibid. 43 Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, Political Culture and the Causes of War (New York: Stanford University Press, 1999), 235. 44 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 45-46. 45 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 16. 46 Khatharya Um, “The Perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide Are Still Eluding Justice.”

16 the American War Crimes museum in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).47

Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek

The Tuol Sleng museum was established for several reasons. First of all, with this initiative the Vietnamese based their legitimacy of their presence in the country. Moreover, the legitimacy of the PRK, the party which had ruled the country since the Vietnamese takeover, was ensured. This was done by pointing out to the public that it were the Vietnamese who had freed the Cambodian people from Pol Pot’s genocidal regime.48 A second reason why the genocide museum was built was that the Vietnamese needed an official narrative of the past in which the Communist character of the Khmer Rouge could be tucked away. This was a strong wish not only from within the Vietnamese Communist party, but also from their communist allies, especially the Soviet Union.49 The third major reason for the installation of Tuol Sleng was that the reign of the Khmer Rouge had to be remembered as a genocidal one.50 Mai Lam did not change the composition of the museum, things were left mostly how the Vietnamese army had found them. The horrific scenes which the Vietnamese saw when entering S-21 for the first time, fitted precisely in the set-up for the museum.51 However, one major contribution was made to the museum, a notorious map of Cambodia made from skulls and blood. This rather repulsive image of what happened in the country was a typical example of how the Vietnamese wanted the Cambodians to remember their past. The official narrative which was promoted by the regime was one of hate. Feelings of hate towards the Khmer Rouge had to be promoted so that every Cambodian would see the Khmer Rouge as a ‘fascist regime, like Nazi-Germany, rather than a Communist one.’52 The Tuol Sleng museum was a perfect place for the Vietnamese to promote this narrative: they made it the museum’s mission to evoke feelings of hate against the Khmer Rouge, combined with a propagandist agenda in which the Vietnamese were depicted as the

47 Peter Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia (New York: Colombia University Press, 2005), 84. 48 David Chandler, “Tuol Sleng and S-21,” Searching for the Truth, Documentation Center of Cambodia, 18 (2001): 28. 49 This should be seen in the context of the Cold War. The Vietnamese, Soviets and the Chinese wanted the crimes which happened in Cambodia not to be remembered as a communist act, but rather as a fascist act (David Chandler, “Tuol Sleng and S-21”). If would take the blame for the genocide, this could weaken the position of communism in the world in general. 50 Ibid., 29. 51 Peter Maguire, Facing Death in Cambodia, 84. 52 David Chandler, “Tuol Sleng and S-21,” 29.

17 saviors of the Cambodian people. The museum had to be a place of hope as well. After all, the genocide had only just ended and many Cambodians were still looking for family members. The museum gave people the opportunity to find their loved ones: one of the major features of the museum was – and still is – the vast amount of photographs of those who were imprisoned. Through these photographs, a lot of Cambodians were able to find out what happened to their relatives.53 Therefore, the photographs served as a useful tool as well in the legitimizing of the regime. By showing the photos of the Tuol Sleng prisoners, the Vietnamese could show how concerned they were with the Cambodian people. Only seven people survived S-21, so visiting the museum was not exactly a visit of hope.54 The highest a Cambodian could expect was seeing a photograph of someone he knew. By visiting the museum, some of the visitors got to know more knowledge about what happened to their loved ones, but still many questions were yet to be answered. Why did so many people get killed for no reason? Did they suffer a lot? The photographer, Nhem En, remembered mostly the fear he saw in the eyes of the people while taking pictures of them. En stated that he felt that the photographs displayed in the Tuol Sleng museum were received by him with a mix of ‘pride and regret.’ The international attention that he got through his photos felt good, but the fact that the pictures were made in tragic circumstances made his feelings disappear.55 A critical reaction to the museum was made by Sopheara Chey. Chey has been working in the museum since it opened in 1979. He stated that the photographs had never left Tuol Sleng and were displayed to the public immediately after the museum was opened.56 What he remembered most vividly about the establishment of the museum, was the making of the map of skulls and blood. According to Chey, the map was more than a ‘ghoulish overstatement’ made by Mai Lam: it was a ‘religious transgression’, since the dead were not able to rest properly.57 At first, the Tuol Sleng museum was not accessible to the public. In 1979, the first people did enter the former prison, but they were not Cambodian. According to Lisa M.

53 For an example of such a story, see a clip from VOA Khmer, Hope for the Future (film by Ouch Makara), Documentation Center of Cambodia, December 31, 2014. This video is openly accessible through Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10152739335678800&set=vb.154829473799&type=2&theater. 54 For more information on these people, see Huy Vannak, , A Survivor from Khmer Rouge Prison S- 21, Justice for the Future, Not Just for the Victims (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2010). 55 Testimony by Nhem En which can be found in Peter Maguire, “Cambodia Genocide – Memories from Tuol Sleng Prison,” American Suburb X, April 20, 2012. 56 “Written Record of Interview of CHEY Sopheara,” document no. E3/4641, November 25, 2008, on the website of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts in Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh. 57 Interview with Sopheara Chey, conducted by Peter Maguire in Facing Death in Cambodia, 22. The connection between the Buddhist values and the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide will be further explored in the second chapter of this thesis.

18

Moore, the reason for this decision was that the museum was at first not meant for the Cambodian population, but for foreigners only.58 One year later, on July 13, 1980, the Tuol Sleng genocide museum was openly accessible. Why the Vietnamese decided to change their visitor policy is not answered by Moore, but, as mentioned above, there were reasons to use Tuol Sleng in a Vietnamese advantage, so this turnaround is not completely surprising. Before the public was allowed access to Tuol Sleng, the government wanted to show delegates from allied socialist countries what happened in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime.59 According to numbers from the Ministry of Culture, Information and Propaganda, the opening of Tuol Sleng for the public was a huge success. In the first week, the museum welcomed 32.000 guests. Only a minor number (1930) of them were foreigners. According to the report in which these numbers can be found, the total number of visitors to the museum were 320.241 (in the period January-October 1980).60 These numbers show that there was in fact a need for the Cambodians to visit the site. However, this success was far from everlasting. Judy Ledgerwood states that the museum’s underlying text was the ‘reconciling of the horrors of one failed communist regime with the logic of an inevitable march of progress.’61 The state showed a narrative to the public in which the revolution of 1975 was hijacked by the leaders of the Khmer Rouge. As mentioned above, the depiction of the Vietnamese as liberators of the Cambodian people was a major asset of the museum’s context. Although many Cambodians wanted to visit the museum to search for their loved ones, the state narrative which was presented to them did not feel right.62 Most importantly, the museum did almost nothing to honor those who died during the genocide. This notion is supported by the drop in number of visitors. Whereas the visitor numbers of Tuol Sleng in 1980 show that mainly Cambodians visited Tuol Sleng, this trend has shifted hugely towards a more international interest in the museum.63 The former prison has turned into a perfect example of dark tourism, rather than serving as a place in

58 Lisa M. Moore, “(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: the Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity,” 55. 59 One of the major features of the Khmer Rouge was that it sealed off the country: practically all diplomatic ties were broken. Cambodia became isolated. The genocide happened out of sight of the international community. Although rumors existed about what happened in the country, no one knew for sure. Therefore, the Vietnamese- Cambodian government was even more able to influence the memorialization of Cambodia’s genocidal past. By showing around outside parties before the Cambodians themselves had the chance to do so, the Vietnamese narrative became already accepted by a significant part of the international community. 60 Judy Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative,” Museum Anthropology 21 (1997): 88. 61 Ibid., 90. 62 Ibid. 63 Brigitte Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” in Humanity (2011): 5. 19 which the victims of the Cambodian genocide are memorialized. The same can be seen at another major site of memorialization: Choeung Ek. Just as was the case with Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek was also shaped by Mai Lam. In the former prison, Lam shocked the visitors with the map of skulls, at the killing field of Choeung Ek a similar shock was delivered to its visitors. This was done in the form of a large stupa which was filled with skulls of people who had perished at the killing field. A major difference between Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek is that the former killing field could be visited by the public much later. Choeung Ek opened its doors as a museum of genocide in 1989. Officially, the goal of Choeung Ek is to a) educate Americans, Cambodian Americans and other nationalities about the factual history of the Khmer Rouge atrocities and help prevent future crimes against humanity, b) provide students, scholars, journalists and the public access to information, photographs, artifacts and documents relating to the holocaust, c) honor and remember the victims and survivors of the Khmer Rouge holocaust, d) help preserve the art and literature of Cambodia – nearly extinguished by Khmer Rouge policies through exhibits, performances and lectures, and e) serve as a fund-raising channel to humanitarian, cultural and educational projects benefiting Cambodians, Cambodian Americans and the community at large.64 In theory these are fine-looking goals, but in reality the killing field of Choeung Ek is primarily a tourist attraction, instead of a place of memorialization. The third goal of the museum, honoring the victims and survivors of the genocide, seems therefore awkward. Near the stupa of Choeung Ek, a small exhibition tells the visitor background information of what happened on the killing field during the genocide. However, the information which is provided is far from complete. Little background information is given on how the Khmer Rouge functioned, what drove them and how they implemented the genocide.65 This raises the question whether the museum takes its mission seriously. Moreover, the first two goals do not really fit the interests of the Cambodian people. Whereas Tuol Sleng was able to provide significant information for survivors of the genocide, Choeung Ek has not been of interest for Cambodians as a place of closure or memorialization.66 This is particularly so because of their religious belief system, which is not, in any way, recognized at the site. This point will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

64 The goals of the Killing Field Museum of Choeung as presented on its official website, http://www.killingfieldsmuseum.com/about-us.html, consulted on 29-04-2015. 65 Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” 8. 66 Ibid., 8-9.

20

The connection between tourism and memorialization is a problematic issue in Cambodia. Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek are major tourist attractions in which the emphasis is on the crimes and the perpetrators who committed these crimes, instead of on the victims of the genocide. A third example of this problem is Anlong Veng. Colin Long and Keir Reeves analyzed the situation in this village in the south of Cambodia, the final resting place of Pol Pot and the last stronghold of the Khmer Rouge before the organization was defeated. Long and Reeves describe how they visited the village and went to the house of , the Butcher of Cambodia, responsible for many massacres. According to the authors, the government of Cambodia has been primarily concerned with turning Anlong Veng into a third major tourist attraction. They raise the question why Anlong Veng, a perpetrator site, has to be turned into a tourist attraction.67 The result will be that there is no respect for the victims at a place so important for memorialization of the genocide. According to Long and Reeves, the grave of Pol Pot should not be tourist bait. Instead, both authors plead for forgetting Anlong Veng, because they believe that reconciliation and a healing of the national trauma can only happen when no one pays attention to Khmer Rouge sites. According to Long and Reeves, the perpetrators will be silenced then forever.68 This conclusion is slightly problematic. Although the authors have a point in raising the question why Anlong Veng should be a tourist attraction, ignoring and forgetting a place like Anlong Veng does not help Cambodia in memorializing its past. On the contrary, by arguing that the past needs to be ignored, both authors state exactly what the Cambodian government wanted after the Vietnamese left the country in 1989, which was to ‘dig a hole and bury the past in it.’69 The current government seems to use the genocidal past to attract tourists. It raises the question whether the large sites of memorialization are nowadays meant for Cambodians, those who really suffered from the genocide, or if they are meant for tourists. Cambodia benefits largely from the commercialization of its genocide. If we look at the number of tourists that have been visiting Cambodia over the years, we see a rapid increase in numbers. In 1993, official numbers from the Tourism Office of Cambodia show that 118,183 tourists visited Cambodia. Five years later, this number had been increased to a total of 286,524. Past year, in 2014, Cambodia welcomed 4,502,775 tourists.70 The enormous increase in tourists have made tourism one of the major sources of income for the Cambodian economy.

67 Colin Long and Keir Reeves, “Dig a hole and bury the past in it,” in Places of Pain and Shame, Dealing with ‘Difficult’ Heritage, eds. William Logan and Keir Reeves (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), 72. 68 Ibid., 80-81. 69 Mydans, “Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge.” 70 “Executive Summary Report in March 2015,” Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia, www.tourismcambodia.org.

21

According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, tourism determines 23.4 percent of the Cambodian GDP. The expectation is that this share will be growing even more in the near future. In comparison with 184 other countries, Cambodia’s tourist branch is one of the fastest growing.71 The government welcomes tourism as a major source of income for Cambodia. However, the problems that tourism brings with it in regard to memorialization of the genocide – in particular the lack of respect for victims of the genocide - has not been an issue for the people in charge. On the contrary: the government encourages them by following a specific policy of memorialization of the genocide in which the difficult parts of the past seem irrelevant.72

National Holidays

After the Vietnamese left Cambodia in 1989, a new era of dealing with the genocidal past began. A time came in which the Cambodian government conducted a policy in which the past had to be buried. What happened, happened, and people were encouraged not to look back anymore but to focus on the future instead. The grand narrative of what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime which was promoted for a decade by the Vietnamese was not countered or critically reviewed. On the contrary: the government did not seem to feel that Cambodia’s past was important enough to pay attention to it. As a result, many Cambodians did not have the chance to learn about what happened during the period of genocide.73 The government’s most important concern became the market economy, in which tourism has been playing a significant role.74 As a result, memorialization of the genocide has become largely neglected. The first state narrative which was developed by the Vietnamese, has not changed much since. The focus in this narrative has always been on the victors on the one hand and the evil deeds of the Khmer rouge on the other. Victims do not have a place in the state narrative: there is a lack of respect and attention for the victims and survivors of the genocide.75

71 World Travel & Tourism Council, Economic Impact 2014 “Cambodia”, 2. 72 David Chandler, “Cambodia deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9 (2008). 73 Ben Kiernan, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia.” 74 Timothy Dylan Wood, “Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge,” in Expressions of Cambodia: The Politics of Tradition, Identity and Change, eds. Leakthina Chau-Pech Ollier and Tom Winter (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 192. 75 This conclusion has been made by various authors who are specialized in this field. See for example Dylan Wood, “Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge,” 191-92, Rachel Hughes, Memory and Sovereignty in Post- 1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials (New Haven: MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, 2004), Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia.” 22

A good example of this is the installation of two national holidays by the Vietnamese- Cambodian government after the takeover in 1979. These two holidays were named Victors’ Day (January 7) and the Day of Hatred (May 20). Victors’ Day celebrates the Vietnamese takeover of Cambodia. This day fitted perfectly in how the Vietnamese wanted the Cambodians to see the past. The Vietnamese were liberators who freed the Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge. In other words, this holiday was completely focused on how great the Vietnamese communists were. Attention for the victims did not matter. Not surprisingly, this holiday was not that popular by the Cambodian people. At first, they were thankful for the Vietnamese takeover, but after a while it became clear that the Vietnamese were occupiers as well.76 Even more striking was the second holiday which was installed by the Vietnamese- Cambodian government, the Day of Hatred. The goal of this day was to remind Cambodians how evil the Khmer Rouge was. By organizing speeches and rallies, the Vietnamese hoped to win the Cambodians for their case, which was portraying the Khmer Rouge as genocidal and fascist, a motivation which is to be seen in the reasoning to build the Tuol Sleng Museum as well. Victims and survivors did not get the chance to officially memorialize the past the way they wanted.77 Instead, they were encouraged by the regime to have feelings of hate, which did not help to resolve their trauma. After the Vietnamese had left Cambodia, the official name of the Day of Hatred changed into Remembrance Day. The reason for doing this was that the government wanted to show the people that they were in fact concerned with memorializing the past correctly. However, the day kept lacking popular support.

On March 26, 2015, Deputy Prime Minister Sok An of Cambodia presided over a ceremony in which a new monument at the Tuol Sleng museum was inaugurated. Sok An stated that the monument would ‘serve as an educational tool for the next generations to remember and prevent the return of such a dark regime.’78 More or less the same was stated when Tuol Sleng was opened for the public in 1980. Again, in 1989, when Choeung Ek became a museum, statements like these were offered. Has anything changed from 1980 to 2015? It is questionable. The narrative of the government has stayed largely intact. This is the result of a policy in which the government wants to bury the past, which has led to a major problem

76 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 150. 77 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, and Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia.” 78 The Associated Press, “Cambodia Inaugurates Memorial at Khmer Rouge Genocide Museum,” The New York Times, March 26, 2015. 23 which is a lack of good education in the country. This problem is not only the current government’s fault, since many highly educated people were killed during the genocide and the country is still recovering from this lack of highly educated people.79 As a result of all of this, the memorialization of the past which is delivered by the Cambodian government is turned into a one-sided affair: one in which the government has decided how to remember the genocidal past and how to deal with the sites of memorialization linked to that past. This raises the question how the Cambodian people experience this. Do they feel that the government has done a good job in memorializing the genocide? Is the state narrative supported by the population? And, if not, how do the Cambodian people memorialize the past themselves?

79 Ben Kiernan, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Cambodia.”

24

The Cambodian People and their Past: Memorializing the Genocide from the Bottom Up

On a muggy day in July, 2011, I was walking with a friend through the streets in Phnom Penh. We did not have a clear destination in our minds, but this was not necessary since walking through any big Asian city is an experience in itself. The streets were busy, filled with cars. People were everywhere, selling all kinds of stuff. However, in Phnom Penh, the streets were far less crowded than in Ho Chi Minh City, the Vietnamese capitol. The Cambodian genocide has influenced the population number significantly until today.80 According to a 2004 survey of the Cambodian National Institute of Statistics, only 12 percent of the Cambodian people is older than 50. It is clear that a whole generation has been killed in the genocide. As a result, Cambodia has a very young population. According to the numbers of the same 2004 survey, 60.4 percent of the Cambodian population is between 0 and 24 years old.81 We were staying in Phnom Penh for a couple of days at the time we went for a walk on that summer day in 2011 and we were surprised how quiet the streets were. Not long after this realization, we walked into the Olympic Stadium of Phnom Penh. The stadium is located near Preah Sihanouk Boulevard, one of Phnom Penh’s major roads, not far from where the Documentation Center of Cambodia is housed. After the Khmer Rouge had taken over Phnom Penh, the stadium was used as an execution site where officials and supporters of the Lon Nol regime were killed.82 We were surprised to walk into the stadium without being asked to show a ticket. Clearly, something was going on, since the stadium and the ground surrounding it was filled with people. Children were playing all kinds of sports, people were dancing and singing. While in the stadium, we were surprised to see a Cambodian football league match going on. Even more interesting was that people on top of the stands of the stadium were dancing a hypnotic dance. No one except us seemed to pay attention to the game on the field. I wondered what was going on. One day later, I visited the Tuol Sleng museum and Choeung Ek. After an emotional day, I thought of the massive gathering I encountered the day before. What did it mean? The

80 According to Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program the number of people that were killed during the Cambodian genocide was approximately 1,7 million, which was 21 percent of the Cambodian population, data can be found on the website of the Yale CGP, www.yale.edu/CGP. 81 National Institute of Statistics, Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey, 2004 (CIPS). The figure can be found on http://www.nis.gov.kh/nis/CIPS%202004/p_pyramid.htm. 82 Huy Vannak, The Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-destruction (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2003), 26-27. 25 spontaneous vibe of the gathering and the hypnotic dance performed on top of the stadium made me think. Could it have been a form of trauma processing? The Cambodian people have not had an easy past to confront. Together with a government which has not been helping in creating a truthful memorialization, it surely has not been easy to memorialize their past rightfully. This chapter will explore how Cambodians deal with the genocidal past of their country. How do they see their past? How can we define the Cambodian lieux de memoire of the people?

Souls and Bones

When the Vietnamese took over Cambodia in 1979, it seemed to be a liberation. However, the takeover turned out to be a substitution of one harsh regime with another. The Vietnamese did not commit genocide of course, but as Evan Gottesman states, they did kill Cambodian history by declining to memorialize the past rightly.83 As shown in the previous chapter, the installment of Victors’ Day and the Day of Hatred were major examples of this. The population was more or less forced to be involved, particularly in the latter. They had to memorialize the genocide in a way which was prescribed by the government. The Khmer Rouge got publicly condemned through ‘political rallies and speeches, banners and posters bearing slogans, song and prayers recited in schools, and wreath laying at memorial sites such as Choeung Ek.’84 Survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime had to share their stories in villages, all dominated by a message of hate. However, the anger which raged through Cambodia in the direct aftermath of the genocide slowly disappeared. More and more, Cambodians did not want to be angry anymore: they wanted peace, reconciliation and justice.85 Ceremonies of the Day of Hatred became less popular over the years, precisely because of this reason. Cambodians did not want to celebrate a day in which there was no attention at all for the victims of the genocide. After the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement – when the Vietnamese left Cambodia – the Day of Hatred became suspended.86 This was done because the government felt it was time for a new policy concerning the past, one in which the crimes of the past were largely buried.87 Nevertheless, the holiday was not completely removed from the official agenda. In 2001, efforts were made to reinstate the holiday. The Day of Hatred got renamed

83 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 50. 84 Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” 17. 85 Huy Vannak, Bou Meng, A Survivor from Khmer Rouge Prison S-21, 71. 86 Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” 17. 87 David Chandler, “Cambodia deals with its Past,” 362. 26 into the Day of Remembrance. Popular support kept lacking though, despite the return of official ceremonies at places of memorialization such as Choeung Ek. In the previous chapter it has been made clear how Choeung Ek has become a tourist destination, instead of a place of memorialization for the Cambodian people. Still, one can wonder why the killing field is not more important in the memorialization of the genocidal past. The ceremonies held by the government at Choeung Ek are not visited by many people. On the contrary: the visitor numbers confirm that the former killing field serves a major tourist spot instead of a local place of memorialization.88 Especially in the years after the Vietnamese had left Cambodia and when the post-genocidal policy of forgetting the past was promoted, Choeung Ek was being left aside by Cambodians. Together with the lack of attention for victims of the Khmer Rouge, the motivation to do so was probably a religious one. In Khmer Buddhism it is believed that the souls of persons who die a sudden death will remain around the place where they died. The only way to make sure that the souls of these people will be sent to heaven to rest in peace is to burn the remains. The corpse has to be cremated or buried. This ritual has to be carried out properly: for instance, corpses who die an unnatural death cannot be brought into the houses of others. According to Charles F. Keyes, who studied Khmer Buddhist rituals, people are afraid of the souls that have died an unnatural death. They fear that the spirits of these people will return to them to haunt them. Moreover, these spirits are considered as bad luck, it is believed that good people will fall ill because of them. Therefore, the remains of the people who died unnaturally should not be kept for a long time. The corpse has to be placed in a wat, a Buddhist temple. Then, clergymen are invited to ensure that the soul of the dead is made pure. Since a wat is the entrance to the afterlife, a monk has to be sure that the soul is pure: otherwise, the corpse cannot enter the wat.89 In short, Buddhists belief that if a corpse is not buried or cremated properly, the spirit can haunt other people and will never rest properly. Therefore, going to Choeung Ek had to be a fearful experience for a Cambodian. Whereas Tuol Sleng provided actual information for the victims regarding their loved ones (the photographs), Choeung Ek may have been nothing less than an open air haunted house. The bones of Khmer Rouge victims are still being displayed to visitors of the former killing field, despite some efforts to burn the bones and put the souls to rest. In 2001, prime minister Hun Sen stated that it was not necessary to burn the remains of the victims. Sen said that ‘we

88 Chea Vannak, “Tourist Numbers at the Killing Fields Keep Rising,” The Khmer Times, May 24, 2015. 89 Phra Kru Anusaranasasanakiarti and Charles F. Keyes, “Funerary Rites and the Buddhist Meaning of death: an interpretative text from North Thailand,” Journal of the Siam Society 68 (1980): 14-15. 27 have kept the bones for 22 years. To keep them longer is not a problem.’90 The prime minister promised to hold a referendum when the Khmer Rouge Tribunal would be ready with its task. Since the tribunal is not doing a great job, the skulls of the victims are still not burned. Five years after this statement by Hun Sen, Norodom Sihanouk demanded openly that, for the people of Cambodia, the bones had to be burned, rather than being ‘displayed for the pleasure of tourists.’91 Moreover, there are no specific reasons for the Cambodians to visit Choeung Ek. After all, there is no specific attention for victims at the site. Victims are ‘represented as a vague aggregation of grim experiences.’92 There is no list of victims’ names, no individual biographies are recounted. Not even an attempt is being made to imagine the details of a victim’s story.93 Therefore, it seems logical that the Cambodians are not eager to visit Choeung Ek. However, if the Cambodians did not feel the need to attend national memorial services at a site like Choeung Ek, what did they do to memorialize the past themselves? Religion is very important here too. Whereas the reason to avoid Choeung Ek has been influenced by religious motives, places of memorialization which are attended by Cambodians are drenched with religious aspects as well. One example of this is a local memorial which stands in Kampong Tralagh, a small village next to the Vietnamese border. In the center of this kampong, an old pagoda cannot be missed. What is striking though, is that next to the pagoda, in a small house, hundreds of bones are kept. This memorial was built by monks and villagers of Kampong Tralagh. The reason for building the house is that they did not want the past to be forgotten.94 This is an interesting place of memorialization, because it seems to contradict the common Buddhist norms described above. However, the bones of the dead which rest in the house next to the pagoda are guarded by Buddhist monks, who are in charge of guiding the death souls to peace. If we look at Kampong Tralagh that way, there is a difference with Choeung Ek. The massive form of memorialization at the former killing field and the influences of tourism cannot be equated to the Buddhist rituals. What is happening at Kampong Tralagh, is exactly what is lacking at the main sites of memorialization. At

90 Alex Spillius, “Vote on Displaying bones of Khmer Rouge Victims,” The Telegraph, April 26, 2001. 91 Agence France-Presse, “Ex-King Urges Cremation of Khmer Rouge Victims,” The New York Times, July 20, 2006. 92 Louis Bickford, “Transforming a Legacy of Genocide: Pedagogy and Tourism at the Killing Fields of Choeung Ek,” Memory, Memorials, and Museums (MMM) Program of the International Center for Transitional Justice (2009): 13. 93 Bickford, “Transforming a Legacy of Genocide,” 13. 94 Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” 15.

28

Kampong Tralagh, the monks have been performing rituals which give respect to the victims of the genocide. This bottom up initiative of memorialization is lacking at Choeung Ek.

UNTAC

The importance of religion in the Cambodian people’s lieux de memoire is a recurring theme in stories of eyewitnesses as well. In this section, three of these eyewitnesses will be discussed. All three were in Cambodia during the start of the 1990s. In 1992, the United Nations came to Cambodia to restore peace and civil government in the country. The UN created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to make sure that the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991 would be honored. UNTAC based itself in Phnom Penh and was active in Cambodia from February 1992 till September 1993. The United Nations provided maximal strength and deployment to make the mission a success. Along the military and civilian personnel were people from many countries, including the Netherlands.95 Their jobs included functions as policemen, doctors, or nurses. On 8 March, 2012, a few veterans of the UNTAC mission established the ‘Vereniging Cambodja-veteranen’ (Organization for Cambodia-veterans). The mission of this organization is to keep veterans in contact with each other and to strengthen their bond.96 Its members were part of the UNTAC mission in the detachments “Cambo I, II, or III”. How much members the organization exactly has is not published, but the Vereniging Cambodja-veteranen is the only official veteran organization for the UNTAC mission in the Netherlands. The reunion of June 2014 had many visitors: 269 people signed up for the event.97 This is a sign that the events which are organized by the Vereniging Cambodja-veteranen are still popular under the former UNTAC members. The veterans of UNTAC can serve as great sources to get more insight in how Cambodian people have been memorializing their past. The years 1992-93 are particularly interesting since it was the first time in years that Cambodia was considered a country with a government of its own without interference from Vietnam.98 In their jobs, the veterans were able to meet Cambodians during their daily lives. They did not only serve in the cities, but in villages and the countryside as well. Through the Vereniging Cambodja-Veteranen, I came in

95 “Cambodia – UNTAC, Facts and Figures” on the United Nations website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html. 96 See the constitutive act of the organization, which can be found on its website, http://www.untac.nl/Untac/Info.html. 97 See the UNTAC website. The subscriptions for the reunion can be found under ‘nieuws’. 98 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 174. 29 contact with three veterans: Ronald Westmaas, Richard Huijssoon and Seng-Ly Ouk. Ronald Westmaas came to Cambodia as a marine subdivision nurse. He was employed in the field hospital of Phum Nimit, a small village between Paoy Paet and Sisophon in northwestern Cambodia. Phum Nimit was Westmaas’ primary work location, but he had to work at others places as well, because of leave schemes of colleagues. During his time working for UNTAC, Westmaas went to many kampongs. He visited Siem Reap as well. Richard Huijssoon served as Chief Planning in the headquarters of UNTAC in Phnom Penh. After the mandate of UNTAC had expired, Huijssoon became Chief Staff. During this time, he was responsible for the leaving of the troops and all civil components of UNTAC. Huijssoon has visited many places in Cambodia. He claims to have had a very good relationship with Lieutenant-General Gerald Sanderson and was therefore asked to go to battalions throughout the country to solve problems. Seng-Ly Ouk’s story is different from those of Westmaas and Huijssoon. Ouk was born in Cambodia and lived in the country while the Khmer Rouge was at power. In 1985, Ouk came to the Netherlands. At the time, he had been living in a refugee camp in Thailand since 1982. Seng-Ly Ouk is not only an UNTAC veteran, he is an eyewitness of the Khmer Rouge crimes as well. He still has family living in Cambodia and visits the country at least once every four years.99 His story is valuable for the questions raised in this thesis, since his cultural background and – personal - knowledge of Cambodian daily life give insight into matters which cannot be done by non-Cambodians. Unfortunately, there is a gap in the source material when it comes to interviews with Cambodians. The ones which have been done only speak about stories of survival, not about what happened in Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge had fallen. Moreover, most of these accounts are in Khmer, not in English. This gap in source material is not very surprising if we take into account that the Cambodian government does not allow the Cambodian people to talk about the past openly. After all, this could hurt the state-implemented narrative. As we have seen in the first chapter, Cambodians can talk about the past as long as they blame Pol Pot and his fellowmen for the crimes committed during the genocide. However, a critical note on the current regime is not tolerated. Of course, Seng-Ly Ouk is only one Cambodian out of many. However, his story is representative enough to include him in this thesis. Ouk lived and worked in different regions in Cambodia. He was born in an urban environment, but lived on the countryside during the Khmer Rouge years – Pol Pot and his fellowmen prohibited city life, after all. As mentioned

99 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, conducted at his house in Breda, the Netherlands on May 14, 2015.

30 above, after the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Seng-Ly Ouk lived in refugee camps for a few years before coming to the Netherlands. As a translator for UNTAC, Ouk worked on a lot of different locations in Cambodia. Therefore, Ouk serves as a reliable and representative source. He is able to speak about the Cambodian mindset, since he has the knowledge to do so. For the outsider perspective, Ronald Westmaas and Richard Huijssoon are also reliable sources, since they both served at different locations in Cambodia. Huijssoon was employed in Phnom Penh, which made it easier for him to visit the main sites of memorialization, Choeung Ek and Tuol Sleng. He visited both of them; in his private time – alone and with his family -, but also officially, with a delegation of Dutch politicians. Huijssoon was particularly touched by what he saw at Choeung Ek, mentioning the ‘bones which came out of the ground’.100 Westmaas was not stationed near Phnom Penh, and therefore did not get the opportunity to visit the two largest sites of memorialization. Nevertheless, he witnessed local forms of memorialization. According to Westmaas, at those places ‘the pain and the scars of the past were very visible, as well as fear.’101 These local forms of memorialization cannot in any way be compared with official sites such as Choeung Ek. Richard Huijssoon states that he was not able to visit any local ceremonies or sites of memorialization to commemorate the past, since they were not held at all.102 Westmaas states the opposite: there were local ceremonies, but they were mostly held in people’s houses and were kept within the family. According to him, ‘for a subject like this, people make sure a monk is involved. Families have a small temple in their own house or they have a small pole for their doors in which they place incense. They pay their respect to these poles each time they walk by.’103 Seng-Ly Ouk confirms both stories, stating that local ceremonies to memorialize the genocidal past are not held. The reason is that ‘we are not allowed to do so. The people at power have been blocking efforts to memorialize what happened. We cannot do anything. The government forbids us to do anything.’104 People do commemorate the deaths, but not in official ceremonies. According to Ouk, the government does not allow Cambodians to have proper ceremonies because the top of the leadership and Hun Sen in particular, are former Khmer Rouge fighters. Therefore, they do not want the population to pay attention to the Khmer Rouge. According to Ouk, many Cambodians ask themselves the question ‘who the

100 Telephone interview with Richard Huijssoon, May 3, 2015. 101 Telephone interview with Ronald Westmaas, May 5, 2015. 102 Telephone interview with Huijssoon, May 3, 2015. 103 Telephone interview with Westmaas, May 5, 2015. 104 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015.

31

Khmer Rouge is. Pol Pot was the Khmer Rouge, but Hun Sen was the Khmer Rouge too. Hun Sen is now in the government. Therefore, we cannot do or say anything. We can remember the death, but only if we blame Pol Pot.’105 The forms of memorialization which Westmaas describes, are probably Buddhist rituals. Seng-Ly Ouk states that Buddhists remember the death on special days in September and October. They think of the death spirits in silence. These rituals are performed in family circles, not in large ceremonies. In these rituals, Cambodians do not only pay attention to those who were killed during the genocide, but they think of all their ancestors. The genocide does not play a special role here.106 The role of silence in the memorialization of the genocidal past is confirmed by Richard Huijssoon as well. According to him ‘Asians do not express their emotions to outsiders, but I believe that they did cry a lot when they were amongst families.’107

Religion and Karma

The statements of Westmaas, Huijssoon and Seng-Ly Ouk make one thing clear: local memorialization does not really exist. The main reason is that the government does not allow this to happen. In other words, the Cambodian people’s lieux de memoire - and therefore the metanarrative - cannot be shaped correctly. Due to a lack of good education and a corrupt government, the Cambodian people suffer from a one-sided narrative provided by the government. The only way through which they are able to express their grief is in their religion. For example, Ronald Westmaas went to a temple in a village to pay his respect to victims of the genocide. Here, a Buddhist monk welcomed him and gave him an orange bracelet, which was blessed by the monk.108 According to Westmaas, the bracelet was a sign of respect for the death. That religion plays such a large part for Cambodians in dealing with the past is not strange. After all, it may also be an extra form of rebelling against the Khmer Rouge and the present government. During the Khmer Rouge period, religion was forbidden. People were not allowed to practice Buddhism. On the contrary, the Buddhist monks were amongst the first people who were targeted by the Khmer Rouge.109 Especially after the Vietnamese had

105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Telephone interview with Huijssoon, May 3, 2015. 108 Telephone interview with Westmaas, May 5, 2015. 109 Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide, Utopias of Race and Nation, 159. 32 left Cambodia and when UNTAC came, Cambodians must have felt free for the first time again in a long time. Seng-Ly Ouk states that when he came back to Cambodia in 1992, he immediately sensed this renewed feeling.110 The Vietnamese were communists, and therefore not fond of religion, so it was finally time for the Cambodians to return to their faith. Seng-Ly Ouk states that religion binds Cambodians together, all over the world. A Buddhist himself, Ouk goes to gatherings of Cambodian people in the Netherlands, Belgium or France to memorialize the death each year. At these gatherings ‘people do not only mourn. They think of the past and how we can make sure that the past will not be repeated, comparable to how the Europeans remember the Second World War.’111 An example of this shows that Cambodians feel the need to come together and talk about the past. At these gatherings, they pay their respect to their death loved ones. It is therefore crucial that the Cambodian people can have these gatherings in their own country as well. This right should not be exclusively for those who emigrated from Cambodia. In his story, Seng-Ly Ouk confirms the notion that Buddhist Cambodians see the people who died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge are lost souls. Here, Ouk speaks of the importance of karma as well. Cambodians believe that karma determines a person’s life conditions. If a person did wrong in a former life, he will be punished in his next life. Ouk states that not all Cambodians ‘did something wrong during the war, but still, a lot happened to us […] we cannot rewind the past and because of karma, nobody is responsible for their actions.’ The idea of karma makes it hard to punish the perpetrators of the genocide. After all, in this way of thinking, no one can really blame them for what they did. It is in fact circular reasoning influenced by karma: the victim is unlucky that he was born in a situation in which he is confronted with mass violence. According to the rules of karma, he probably deserved this fate. For the perpetrators, it works the same way. Their karma worked in another way, but they too deserved what has befallen them.112 This does not mean that the Cambodian people are taking the past for granted.113 Especially in the last few years, opposition seems to rise against the current regime. News articles of protestors who are knocked down by the government are numerous. These protestors speak out openly against human rights violations and corruption. The situation in the country is critical; if we take a look at the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, Cambodia

110 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015. 111 Ibid. 112 Peang-Meth, “Understanding the Khmer: Sociological-Cultural Observations,” 446-47. 113 Huy Vannak, Bou Meng, A Survivor from Khmer Rouge Prison S-21, 74. 33 achieves an alarming score: only twenty countries are more corrupt.114 According to Ronald Westmaas, ‘corruption was and is everywhere and has been taking place on a higher and a lower level.’115 This does not only influence daily practical life but it also influences how people memorialize their past. As a result of the corruption, people do not trust each other. This makes Cambodians unwilling to reveal their emotions towards each other. An example is delivered by Westmaas: during his time in the field hospital in Phum Nimit he felt that his ‘patients did not trust other patients anymore. I felt it on a higher and lower level. In the hospital, people did not seem to know who to believe or trust. On a different level, I have experienced corrupt policemen and soldiers many times. This corruption made it hard for people to trust each other and in particular to trust officials.’116 This notion is confirmed by Seng-Ly Ouk. This lack of trust in each other makes it harder for Cambodians to speak openly about what happened to them. The people are scarred by the past and are afraid to build up strong relationships with people they do not know. Moreover, Cambodian people feel ashamed about the past, which have prevented them from connecting with others as well. An example can be found in a story of the Anlong Veng community. Right after the Vietnamese takeover, many Cambodians stayed in refugee camps here in horrible circumstances. An eyewitness named Ang describes how ‘it was so bad that men and women were no longer modest about defecating in front of each other.’117 Moreover, in the camps was no place for Buddhist rituals when it came to those who died. On the contrary, when people died, ‘holes were dug, and the carts would simply transport the bodies to be thrown into the pits.’118 Since the Cambodians feel ashamed about stories like this, it seems that they do not feel comfortable speaking about it towards fellow Cambodians. Based on what we have seen so far, it is more likely that they would tell their stories towards non-Cambodians than to their own people. The connection between corruption, trust and memorialization can best be brought back to the trauma that the Cambodians have. According to Thomas Hammerberg, ‘people in positions of power, people with money, people with weapons – they can do whatever they want against the small people. It is like cancer in a society. [People do not] trust the

114 According to numbers of the non-profit organization Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results. 115 Telephone interview with Westmaas, May 5, 2015. 116 Ibid. 117 Dy Khamboly and Christopher Dearing, A History of the Anlong Veng Community, The Final Stronghold of the Khmer Rouge Movement (Phnom Penh: Sleuk Rith Institute/Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2014), 147. 118 Ibid., 147. 34 system.’119 According to Fawthrop and Jarvis, this ‘cancer’ can only be removed when some form of justice is delivered. They see the Khmer Rouge Tribunal as the solution for improving the situation. In fact, we come back here at the issue of impunity on which was briefly elaborated in the first chapter of this thesis. If the culture of impunity is broken, maybe Cambodians are able to trust each other again and to trust the government again. This might lead to a satisfying approach to remember the victims of the genocide properly.

Concluding, how can we define the Cambodian people’s lieux de memoire? Jens Meierhenrich made a distinction between privileged memory and unprivileged memory while taking the Nyabango River in Rwanda as a case study. In this study, he saw that Rwandans memorialized their past differently than the government wanted them to do. Instead of going to actual places of memorialization, the Rwandans chose to go to the Nyabango River, a place with more emotional value for the people than the official sites established by the government.120 In Cambodia, the situation is different from that in Rwanda. The Cambodian government creates the official lieux de memoire as described by Pierre Nora, but the Cambodians themselves do not get the chance to develop their own, perhaps more accurate, narrative of the genocide. There are a few reasons for this. The first can be found in their cultural belief system, in which religion takes a very significant place. The concept of karma creates a society in which the Cambodians do not see how it is possible to achieve some form of justice. Second, Cambodia is an extremely poor country in which corruption is rampant. As a result, the people do not trust each other anymore. This may also be a result of the unresolved traumatic past. In any way, it prevents the people from organizing memorial services in villages. Corruption and distrust go hand in hand with the third reason which make it impossible for the Cambodians to create their own story of the past, which is the government. The Cambodian government does not want the Cambodians to memorialize their past, other than the narrative they promote. This can be seen in many things: the constant delay of the decision to burn the bones of victims at sites as Choeung Ek is one of them. Even more important is that the government does not allow the new generation to be educated truthfully about the Cambodian past. People are told about the Khmer Rouge, but only in a minor

119 Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 147. 120 Meierhenrich, “The Transformation of Lieux de Mémoire,” 13.

35 way.121 This may not come as a surprise, taking into account the fact that Cambodia’s leader, Hun Sen, was a former Khmer Rouge member – and he has not been the only one in the Cambodian government. Cambodia’s past was muted in the schools for a long time. It was not until 2007 that the first Cambodian history book was accepted in schools which had a chapter in it about the genocide.122 Moreover, Cambodia’s educational system is still highly corrupt. Students who graduate from school do so most of the time through cheat sheets which are allowed, as long as the teacher is paid an acceptable fee. This situation is getting slightly better, but this does not, unfortunately count for the way students are taught at school in history.123

I am going back in my mind to that muggy Summer Day in 2011. The Olympic Stadium in Phnom Penh is filled with people. They sing, they dance, and they play sports. It all seemed so peaceful. Especially the dancing people looked like they were practicing a form of meditation, while Phnom Penh Crown – Cambodia’s all-time national football league champion – defeated Chllam Sakmut with 5-3.124 However, behind this image is a scarred society. A society whose people are not allowed to confront their past as they might wish to do, since the government does not allow its people to speak openly about the past, to be taught about the past. As we have seen, this is for a large part the result of a narrative which is promoted by the government. However, there is a third actor at play: the international community. Whereas the Cambodian government is responsible for maintaining its narrative, the international community is also involved in the fact that the Cambodian people struggle with their past.

121 Ben Kiernan, “Cambodia: Coming to Term with the Past;” interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015. 122 Khatharya Um, “The Perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide Are Still Eluding Justice.” 123 Kevin Ponniah, “Cambodian crackdown on corruption in schools scores low with exam cheats,” The Guardian, September 2, 2014. According to Seng-Ly Ouk, at some schools history as a whole is even a forbidden subject. 124 The Cambodian football league is also a great example of corruption in the country. Cambodia is a paradise for illegal gamblers and match fixers. For an example, see David Eimer, “Cambodia’s football betting Mecca fuels rise in match-fixing scandals,” The Telegraph, April 7, 2013.

36

Memorialization in Cambodia and the International Community

In the summer of 2011 I was staying in Sunday Guesthouse, Phnom Penh, when I got acquainted with Cambodia’s darkest history for the first time. On the day of arrival, a paper sign near the reception desk announced the film screening of The Killing Fields. That night, I watched the 1984 British made film in the lobby of the guesthouse, together with a few tourists who had, just like me, never seen the film before. In 1985, The Killing Fields won three Academy Awards. These three famous film prices were not the only awards which the film won. For example, the film was praised highly in Britain as well: The Killing Fields received eight British Academy Film Awards. The Killing Fields, based on a true story, shows the viewer an inside look in the revolution of 1975, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia. The story revolves around the journalist , a local Cambodian, and Sydney Schanberg, an American reporter for the New York Times. Pran, played by Haing Somnang Ngor, is a victim of the Khmer Rouge regime. He is put into a labor camp, where he has to work for day after day in the burning sun. Regular meals are not provided. The moment when Pran tries to escape from the camp for the first time is an especially moving part in the film. In a horror-like scene, Pran stumbles upon one of Cambodia’s killing fields. As a viewer, you can feel the panic and fear when Pran is trying to move forward between the seas of bones and skulls. A few days later, I was going to encounter the horrors of the Cambodian genocide myself when I visited Choeung Ek. The film was, as an outsider, in a way a wake-up call for me. I did not know that much of what happened in Cambodia during the 1970s. When I walked on the grass paths of Choeung Ek, only a few meters away from mass graves, the film kept playing in the back of my head. In the previous two chapters we have seen how the Cambodian genocide has been memorialized by the government and the Cambodian people. So far, a distinction can be made between the ways both parties – the government and the people - memorialize their past. In order to complete this story, we need to add the narrative of memorialization by a third party: the international community. From the moment that the Khmer Rouge was thrown over by the Vietnamese, Cambodia has been a subject on the international agenda. The international community has been a major influence in the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide: it can be seen on many levels. Whether it is in official organizations (United Nations, NGOs) or in tourism, influences from the outside cannot be dismissed. A film like The Killing Fields is also an example of a contribution of the international community to the memorialization of

37 the Cambodian genocide. This chapter will deal with the role which the international community has been playing in Cambodia with regard to memorialization of the genocide on various levels.

The International Context: Vietnam and Thailand

The years 1975-79 marked a period in which Cambodia had practically no contact with other countries. Only China, North Korea, Egypt, Albania, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Romania, and Yugoslavia had diplomatic ties with Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period. Pol Pot and his fellowmen sealed off the country, making it hard for the international community to understand what was going on. Moreover, the major players on the international field, the United States and the Soviet-Union were fighting their Cold War. The United States’ focus was not on Cambodia, but on the neighboring country Vietnam for many years. After the war in Vietnam had ended, the United States were not keen on intervening in Cambodia. The fact that China considered the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate ruling party of Cambodia made it even less imaginable that any country would decide to intervene in the country.125 China is the only country in the world which is not fond of the idea of bringing justice to Cambodia.126 Since Cambodia was sealed off, the international community was not fully aware of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime. There were rumors, but they could not be confirmed. Vietnam and Thailand, Cambodia’s bordering countries, were probably amongst the few that knew what was happening in the country. Both neighbors backed the Khmer Rouge in different times. Whereas the Vietnamese supported the Khmer Rouge during the Second Indochina War (1954-75), the Thai helped the Khmer Rouge during the Third Indochina War, which was in fact a battle with the Vietnamese.127 Therefore, it is not surprising that both countries have played a dual role in interfering in Cambodia in the past twenty years. The Vietnamese agreed to sign the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, which made an official end to their time in Cambodia. The Vietnamese do, however, still have close ties with the Cambodian government. A thorough investigation on Cambodia’s past will probably hurt this relationship. After all, Cambodia’s government is still one whose members had strong links with the Khmer Rouge. Interference with Cambodia’s post-genocidal policy would only bring problems to the table for the Vietnamese. Moreover,

125 Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 173. 126 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 162. 127 Ibid., 151-52. 38 the Vietnamese already established a tribunal in 1979, the PRT (see chapter 1). Therefore, they can always claim that they did their job in helping Cambodia to work on their past. In terms of memorialization, the Vietnamese have had a great influence on Cambodia. After all, as we have seen in chapter one for example, it was the Vietnamese Colonel Mai Lam who was responsible for the creation of the Tuol Sleng Museum. The role of Cambodia’s other neighboring country is somewhat different. Thailand had supported the Khmer Rouge, even long after Cambodia was taken over by the Vietnamese. The Third Indochina War was therefore a responsibility of Thailand as well. In 2001, Thailand’s Chairman of the Thai Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Kraisak Choonhavan, openly stated that Thailand owed Cambodia an apology. He urged for more ‘understanding and respect for Thailand’s neighbors’, because, after all, ‘Thailand derived most of its culture from the Khmer civilization.’ After years of conflict, the time had come for Thailand to ‘admit that it was a wrong policy’ to support the Khmer Rouge.128 This switch in international relations made it more likely that Thailand would back Cambodia’s tribunal, but two years later new tensions broke out between the countries.129

The United Nations

The role of the western world in Cambodia’s post-genocidal society did not have so much influence until the Paris Peace Accords of 1991. After this agreement, the Vietnamese left Cambodia and it became time for the international community to interfere in Cambodia. The result was the UNTAC administration. One of the major achievements of this administration that was backed by the United Nations, was that it had pulled off an election. For the first time in decades, the Cambodian people felt a sense of freedom: ‘you could notice it immediately on the streets. People felt that something had changed […] they were more willing to talk about the past too.’130 Nevertheless, it turned out to be impossible for UNTAC to hold a truly unbiased election. Although the FUNCINPEC party – the royalists – won the election, Hun Sen’s CPP threatened not to recognize the election. The result was a government in which the CPP still had a major voice. Was UNTAC not able to do anything about this or did they not see what was going on in Cambodia? According to Richard Huijssoon, ‘the [Cambodian] government thinks the same way as the [Cambodian] people. What happened in the past, may

128 Tom Fawthrop, “Thai Senator Urges Apology,” The Phnom Penh Post, March 18, 2001. 129 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 152. 130 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015.

39 never happen again.’131 Moreover, Huijssoon stated that he believed ‘there was no censorship in Cambodia.’132 These statements, derived from a man who had a leading function in UNTAC in Phnom Penh, is astounding. If we take a look at the newspapers and literature, it cannot be denied that censorship has been a common thing in Cambodia. It raises the question whether some of the United Nations delegations have been working in a cocoon. After all, for foreigners it is hard to understand the Cambodian culture the way Cambodians do. The idea that censorship did not exist and that the government has been following a policy which is not criticized by the people is not convincing, especially since Seng-Ly Ouk, a Cambodian native, stated the exact opposite. According to Ouk, the UNTAC mission was ‘a chance for Cambodia to actually get some things done. In retrospect, it was a missed chance.’133 An example of this western view on transitional justice and the effects of it, can be found as well in the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. After UNTAC was disarmed, it was the dawn of a time in which the international community did not pay much attention to the country again. The mandate of UNTAC had ended in 1993, when the Kingdom of Cambodia was exclaimed. However, at the end of the decade, series of talks started to establish a tribunal to bring those responsible for the genocide to justice – comparable to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. The Cambodian government was not willing to establish such a tribunal. Twice, there seemed to be an agreement between negotiators of the United Nations and Hun Sen’s administration, but ultimately, the Cambodian authorities decided not to go for a tribunal, stating that they ‘believed they could solve the problems themselves.’134 Nevertheless, the pressure on the Cambodian government to establish a tribunal became too big to ignore. As a result, in 2003, the ECCC was established. As a branch of the Cambodian government, its task became the prosecution of senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge. On paper, the ECCC seems to be a well-thought of approach of transitional justice. After all, the Tribunal is not an isolated Cambodian organ. It was established with the cooperation of the United Nations and has an international staff: lawyers and judges are not obliged to have the Cambodian nationality, so the international community has had a significant part in helping Cambodia bringing those responsible for the crimes of the Khmer

131 Telephone interview with Huijssoon, May 3, 2015. 132 Ibid. 133 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015. 134 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 172. 40

Rouge to justice. However, paper is not the real world. In reality, the ECCC is not very successful and it has been unable to live up to its promises. This is particularly so because the Cambodian government is too much involved in the tribunal. It has already led to a few scandals. For example, three lawyers decided to quit working at the ECCC, because of the interference of the government in the trials.135 Besides that, the ECCC have been facing major financial problems. Without the help of the United Nations, the tribunal would probably have been dismantled already.136 This will be elaborated on shortly. Moreover, the tribunal is highly criticized by NGOs as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. According to these organizations, the tribunal is ‘second-class justice’ for Cambodia.137 In 2000, a few years before the ECCC was established, Amnesty declared that Cambodia’s judicial system was not ready at all for a tribunal. According to Amnesty, ‘the imposition of executive authority over who should or should not be in custody in Cambodia underlines longstanding concerns about the independence of the judiciary and its capacity to conduct any trials to international standards for fairness.’138 The concerns which were expressed by Amnesty were not misplaced. It takes a long time to prepare judges for such a task. The judicial system has to be well-functioning in order to start a tribunal. The United Nations and Cambodia could have known this, if they had taken into account other cases such as the Former Yugoslavia or South Africa. A year before the actual establishment of the ECCC, both human rights’ organizations supported the decision of the United Nations to withdraw from negotiation talks with the Cambodian government. Although the United Nations was happy to have this support, it did not prevent them from going back to the table a few months later. Amnesty’s reaction was dual: on the one hand the organization was glad to see a tribunal coming to Cambodia, but there were still grave concerns about the content of the agreement: ‘Despite several significant improvements on the previous draft text, which Amnesty International felt to be unacceptable because it fell far short of international standards, the organization believes the current draft remains seriously flawed. The combined provisions not only threatens the integrity of the legal process for the proposed Cambodian tribunal, but if approved, would set a dangerous

135 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “The Extraordinary Trial of Khmer Rouge Leaders,” The New York Times, January 16, 2013. 136 Holly Robertson, “UN Asked to Provide $29M to Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” Cambodia Daily, November 20, 2014. 137 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 162. 138 Amnesty International, “Kingdom of Cambodia, Law and Order – Without Law,” Index number: ASA 23/001/2000, published on November 1, 2000.

41 precedent that could compromise fair trial standards for any future international or mixed tribunals which may be proposed to confront and end impunity for the most grave abuses of human rights and humanitarian law.’139 Amnesty International has been following the Khmer Rouge Tribunal very critically ever since. Although the organization has stated many times how important the initiative is to bring justice to those who committed the Khmer Rouge crimes, Amnesty has been primarily concerned about the developments at the Phnom Penh based tribunal. For instance, when Siegfried Blunk resigned in 2011 as International Co-Investigating Judge at the ECCC because he felt that the Cambodian government interfered too much with the trial, Amnesty came with a statement that ‘it is vital that the UN acts to safeguard the tribunal’s future, ensuring that it meets international fair trial standards of independence and impartiality. The UN should seek guarantees from the Cambodian government that it will not interfere in its proceedings and make clear that any attempts to influence the work of the ECCC will force the UN to review its involvement.’140 Despite the criticism on the tribunal, the United Nations keeps sending money to Cambodia. According to a 2013 figure, the ECCC has had serious financial problems. The estimates for that year was that the tribunal would fall 2.2 million dollars short.141 In that same report, the official reason which was provided by the UN to keep sending money was that without the contributions, there would be ‘a risk that the Chambers will not be able to complete their work.’142 The money provided by the United Nations would be spent on salaries for the international staff. Therefore, the UN estimated that for 2014 and 2015, 46.4 million dollars were necessary to keep the tribunal alive: a shocking amount of dollars, since the average amount of dollars which were sent to the ECCC between 2005 and 2013 was 16.6 million dollars. In a few years, the costs increased dramatically, but the tribunal was not very successful.143 Therefore, it is a legitimate question why the United Nations keeps backing the ECCC. The fact that the ECCC is an expensive project, surrounded by criticism from many angles makes the decision to support the ECCC doubtful. According to Craig Etcheson, the reason for this attitude is that the United Nations top had a feeling that they had something to

139 Amnesty International, “Kingdom of Cambodia: Amnesty International’s position and concerns regarding the proposed “Khmer Rouge” Tribunal,” Index number: ASA 23/005/2003, published on April 24, 2003. 140 Amnesty International, “Cambodia: UN must act to safeguard future of Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” statement delivered on the Amnesty International website on October 10, 2011. 141 United Nations General Assembly, “Request for a subvention to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” December 4, 2013, 3. 142 Ibid., 7. 143 Ibid.

42 prove to the world. After all, they had not been able to protect the Rwandan people from the genocide that happened there in 1994.144 Therefore, prestige has been at stake in Cambodia. Nevertheless, the fact is that the ECCC is not really helping Cambodian people. The trials have been taken a long time and it is questionable whether the tribunal will still exist in five years. With regard to memorialization of the past, the ECCC is not helping either. The efforts of the United Nations to help Cambodia, have all been undertaken from a western perspective. An informed notion of what is important for the Cambodians seems to be lacking. It is questionable whether a tribunal like the ECCC was a good idea in a society like that of Cambodia – one in which corruption is part of daily life and whose government is still entrenched in a Khmer Rouge past. The initiative to establish a tribunal may have been the best approach for the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, but Cambodia would have been better off with another approach. The international community has failed in its task to help Cambodia. First, nothing was done to stop the Khmer Rouge. Second, the (western) world stood by when the Vietnamese took over and the Third Indochina War ruptured Cambodian society. Third, after this conflict, UNTAC was not able to fully control Cambodian politics. Elections were called, but the political climate in Cambodia did not change dramatically after the mandate of UNTAC had ended. The ECCC can be counted as another failure – so far.

Tourism

The problematic role which is played by the international community with regard to the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide can be seen in tourism as well. In the previous two chapters, we have seen that tourism in Cambodia is growing and that with this growth, certain problems arise. In terms of memorialization, the main issue is that the Cambodian government is commercializing the genocide. The international community is not blameless here, either. The first example of the commercialization of Cambodia’s memorialization can be found at the Tuol Sleng Museum. The numbers of tourists coming from capitalist, western countries are strongly increasing. Despite the problems that this development brings with it, there are some positive notes to it as well. After all, a visit to Tuol Sleng cannot be missed. The museum has an entrance fee, guided tours, bathrooms: everything a modern tourist needs. Brigitte Sion mentioned that many tourists have written in the guestbook of the museum about

144 Etcheson, After the Killing Fields, 161. 43 the horrors which they encountered during their visit. Moreover, many people made a link to present-day situations in other countries where human rights are violated.145 This is an interesting development, because the Cambodian memorialization becomes a global form of memorialization, which is not a bad development. Moreover, the Cambodian case becomes intertwined with other, similar cases. On the one hand, this might be a good thing, because people can relate to the material and will be better able to process what they see. On the other hand, the crimes and violations which happened in the S-21 prison lose their uniqueness and result in a suppression of Cambodian memorialization. The Cambodian government has made the decision to shape the museum in an international way. This focus on tourism instead of memorialization may not help the Cambodian people in their memorialization of the genocide: this is the main problem. Of course, by making the site more accessible to the general public, there is also a form of recognition for the victims of the genocide. However, the focus of the government is not on those people, but on the commercial side of the genocide. Whereas victims are not memorialized personally, tourists have everything they need. Moreover, the international community plays along with the Cambodian government. In taking the story which is presented in the museum for granted, tourists are playing along with the lines of the narrative which were installed by the Vietnamese after they took over Cambodia in 1979. Tourists cannot be fully blamed here: there is a significant market for dark tourism supporters. Dark tourism is, as stated by Lennon and Foley, ‘the tourist interest in recent death, disaster and atrocity.’146 One of the most famous examples of dark tourism is the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau. At the place where thousands of Jews were gassed by the Nazis, tourists make photographs each day. Tuol Sleng has become such a place, a symbol of thanatourism, which is “travelling to a location wholly, or partially, motivated by the desire for actual or symbolic encounters with death, particularly, but not exclusively, violent death.’147 Whether it is a visit to Auschwitz or to Tuol Sleng, the violence which happened in places like these attracts people. What is lacking though, in this form of tourism is a respect for the past. Dark pages of history become commercialized. Outside Auschwitz, tourists can buy souvenirs, Jewish flags, and books.148 The same counts for the

145 Sion, “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia,” 5. 146 J. John Lennon and Malcolm Foley, Dark Tourism, the Attraction of the Death and Disaster (New York: Continuum, 2000), 3. 147 A.V. Seaton, “Guided by the Dark: From Thanatopsis to Thanatourism,” International Journal of Heritage Studies 2 (1996): 240. 148 See for a concise study of the commercialization of the Holocaust Tim Cole, Selling the Holocaust: From Auschwitz to Schindler; How History is Bought, Packaged and Sold (New York: Routledge, 2000).

44

Tuol Sleng museum, where a tourist can shop for postcards, keychains, and disturbing images of the insides of the former S-21 prison. As a result, the focus of the site is not on paying respect to the victims of the genocide, but on pleasing tourists. This is not in line with how the Cambodian population would deal with the former prison. For instance, there is no place for religious initiatives at the site. Cambodia’s commercialization of the genocide and the participation of the international community in doing so, is even better illustrated in an example from Choeung Ek. In 2005, the Japanese company AC Royal made an agreement with the Cambodian government to lease the Choeung Ek killing field. Cambodian people were shocked to hear this news, which was best expressed by Youk Chhang of the Sleuk Rith Institute, who stated that ‘memories cannot be sold, cannot be contracted.’149 However, this is exactly what both parties did. The Japanese company pays 15.000 dollars a year, for 30 years to come. For this money, the company will clean up Choeung Ek and will make serious profit from the entrance fees which are being paid each day – a monthly result of 18.000 dollars. The profits that are made with the deal go to a fund which is half owned by Cambodian officials.150 Tourism is not the only branch in which money can be earned of the genocide. In the introduction of this chapter, a scene from the film Killing Fields was described. The film was a pretty accurate depiction of what happened in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period, and should therefore not be considered as a movie made purely out of commercial motives. Nevertheless, it was an economic success as well. The total budget for the film was 14.4 million dollar, whereas, for example, in the United States alone, the box office income was 34.6 million dollars. However, if we take a closer look at the amount of films made about Cambodia and the Cambodian genocide, we see that the topic has not been getting that much interest from filmmakers worldwide. It is only in the past few years that Rithy Panh, a Cambodian film maker, started doing so. He directed the well-received documentaries S-21, The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine (2003) and The Missing Picture (2013).151 The film The Killing Fields is not unique in its genre. For example, on the Rwandan genocide, the film Hotel Rwanda (2004) was made. The Second World War has been a source of inspiration for filmmakers ever since the end of it. The Holocaust was an event which was so devastating and horrendous that people sought ways to express grief, anger or disbelief

149 Seth Mydans, “Cambodia Profits From Killing Fields and Other Symbols,” The New York Times, November 6, 2005. The Sleuk Rith Institute is a research center which is part of the Documentation Center of Cambodia. 150 Ibid. 151 For an overview of Cambodian made films and documentaries, see the International Movie Database, www.imdb.com. 45 through mediums such as art or film. Perhaps one of the most intriguing account of documentary material made about the Holocaust, is Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah. This documentary – which has a total length of more than ten hours of material – came out in 1985, the same year that The Killing Fields won its three Academy Awards. Shoah is an intriguing story in which Lanzmann primarily focuses on three Nazi death camps (Chelmno, Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau) and the Warsaw Ghetto. For the film, he spoke with survivors, witnesses and perpetrators. This makes Shoah a very complete story, in which many answers are given to difficult questions, including a question how victims of the Holocaust memorialize their past. A full-scale documentary like Shoah has not been made about the Cambodian genocide. Of course, Lanzmann waited many years before Shoah was made: the documentary about the Holocaust went into premiere 40 years after the end of the Second World War. Rithy Panh did already make the documentary S-21, The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine, but a true international interest in Cambodia from the film community was missing. It has been 40 years now since the Cambodia genocide ended, but this lack of interest keeps continuing. It might be a missed chance. After all, more films like The Killing Fields, or a well-made, objective documentary might have helped to understand what happened in Cambodia in the 1970s. It might have been a contribution to a better understanding of the Cambodian culture. Moreover, it would have created a better understanding of the genocide and therefore, for the outsider a better memorialization of the genocide as well. Fortunately, there other mediums as well which can help the international community in understanding Cambodian culture better. However, popular books or novels about Cambodia are barely published. Loung Ung’s First they Killed my Father has not been followed by many other examples of Cambodian literature which have made it to the west. Documentaries and other film material seem to be an effective way to confront the international community with Cambodia’s past: especially in a time in which social media has such a dominant presence, film clips can help a lot in spreading information and stories about Cambodia. Concluding, what role has the international community been playing in the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide? There are two answers to this question. On the one hand, initiatives have been taken to restore the country’s justice system and to bring the perpetrators of the genocide to justice. In the 1990s, UNTAC was a UN mission which had a high classification, meaning that the supplies for the mission and manpower were at a maximum level. However, UNTAC did not resolve the largest problems in Cambodian society. Corruption is a large problem. Former Khmer Rouge soldiers are still part of the government

46 and, even worse, president Hun Sen was a former Khmer Rouge member. The attempt to establish a tribunal which had to help Cambodia resolve its issues with the past developed into a time- and money consuming drama. The ECCC was established after a political tug-of- war, but the result was a tribunal which has major financial problems and a track record which is not that impressive. On the other hand, without the international community, these initiatives would probably not have taken place at all. Although they have been only moderately successful, at least something happened in Cambodia. Nevertheless, there is still a discrepancy with how the Cambodian population looks towards the past, since the international community has worked together with the Cambodian government in focusing on the punishment of only a few big fish. Initiatives to reconcile low-level perpetrators with victims on a smaller scale have not been undertaken. Another vital topic is that of tourism. As we have seen, the numbers of tourists that are visiting Cambodia are growing. The government is taking advantage of this and is actively trying to promote tourism to the country. For example, in S-21 foreigners can enroll in state- sponsored lectures and classes which tell them about the past. This might be problematic, since these tourists are in fact working with the government in respect to the state narrative of the Cambodian genocide. It is easier for the Cambodian government to uphold the state narrative if they can frame their story into the minds of their international guests. It will make it even harder for Cambodia’s population to work on their own memorialization without governmental interference. Still, just like the ECCC, tourism has advantages as well - besides the obvious point that Cambodia profits from tourism, which is a major source of income for the population. After all, the Cambodian people can come into contact with people from other countries. Cambodia is not isolated anymore. It might be a hopeful idea that by learning from and listening to each other, Cambodians and non-Cambodians can come to a better understanding of the country’s past.

47

Conclusion

In the chapters above it has been shown how the Cambodian lieux de mémoire of the genocide is implemented in the Cambodian society. This lieux de mémoire is influenced by three parties: the Cambodian government, the Cambodian people, and the international community. As we have seen, the grand narrative of Cambodia’s genocidal past is the story of the government. After the Vietnamese take-over in 1979, a story was told - to the Cambodian people and to foreigners – in which the Khmer Rouge was depicted as a fascist organization with strong similarities to Nazi Germany. The fact that the Khmer Rouge killed Cambodians was emphasized. In this narrative, the communist-Maoist identity of the Khmer Rouge was left aside by the Vietnamese. Although the Vietnamese take-over meant an end to the genocide, Cambodia was still not a free country. The Vietnamese leadership was just another dictatorship. Freedom of speech was restricted, as well as freedom of memorialization of the past. The government did not allow the people in Cambodia to organize official ceremonies in which they commemorated the past. Instead, the leadership organized two holidays in which they promoted a narrative of revenge and anger towards the past. Respect for the victims was not included here. This lack of respect for the victims has been a recurrent theme in the memorialization of the genocide. The voices of the victims of the Cambodian genocide are not heard by the government or the international community. The government of Hun Sen has followed different policies towards the past.152 The first one was the policy of hate, which was implemented together with the Vietnamese. During the second policy (1989-2001), the Cambodian government did not want to pay any attention to the past. The past had to be buried in a deep hole, so those who were responsible for the genocidal crimes in the years of Khmer Rouge terror still did not have to account for what they did. Moreover, talking about the past was forbidden. The only thing which the government allowed was a little bit of attention to the Khmer Rouge in the classrooms; this is only a recent development. Other than that, Cambodians ‘did not speak of what happened, because Hun Sen and his administration have not been allowing it.’153 This second policy towards the past ended with the installment of the ECCC.

152 This classification of KR policy in Cambodia is to be found in David Chandler, “Cambodia deals with its Past.” 153 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015. 48

According to David Chandler, the tribunal had to be the solution for Cambodia to confront its past.154 Furthermore, it had to be the answer to the nagging question of how to pay some respect to the victims of the genocide.155 However, as we have seen, real justice is still far away. The ECCC has had only a few people on trial and in the years that the tribunal has been active, only a few of those people were really convicted. In fact, looking back at Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge policy since the end of the genocide, no real progress has been made.

The narrative of the genocide which is told by the Cambodian government is one in which there is no place for rightful memorialization of the past. There is no place for memorialization of the people: the bottom up initiatives do not stand a chance against the top down initiatives of the Cambodian government. The people in charge emphasize a past in which the crimes and perpetrators are clear. However, no respect is being paid to the victims of the Cambodian genocide. The other two parties, the people and the international community, both have a different role in maintaining the state narrative. The international community has tried to help Cambodia on many levels. Whether it is the UNTAC administration, the establishment of the ECCC, or the presence of many NGO’s in the country: it is impossible to state that the international community has left the country aside. Nevertheless, the international community is for a part responsible for maintaining the narrative of the government that is not grounded in the experience of the Cambodian people. This is particularly to be seen in the tourism branch. Each year, the numbers of tourists who choose Cambodia as their destination is rising. They go to the Tuol Sleng Museum and the Choeung Ek killing field, where they are confronted with Cambodia’s past. However, the past which is presented there, is the past told by the government. In other words, by going to these places, tourists contribute to maintaining the state narrative and the commercialization of the genocide. After all, not all tourists think critically about what they see. It is tempting to accept the information and stories presented in the Tuol Sleng museum. However, this is the information which is given by the government. It is written from a grand narrative perspective. Therefore, by going to a site like Tuol Sleng, tourists make it even harder for the bottom up initiatives to stand up against the state narrative. The people’s experience is not presented at all: respect for the victims is lacking. For instance, at the main sites of memorialization there are no memorial walls with victim’s names. An individual form of memorialization does not exist. The government has eyes only for the collectiveness of the

154 Chandler, “Cambodia deals with its Past,” 364. 155 Huy Vannak, Bou Meng, A Survivor from Khmer Rouge Prison S-21, 74.

49 genocide – a collectiveness which is commercially exploited. This is perhaps the worst which can happen to a victim of genocide: its death is collectivized, which makes the death nameless and slightly meaningless. The international community contributes to this lack of respect too. The most painful example is the Japanese company AC Royal which uses Choeung Ek as a commercial goldmine. Due to suppression by the state narrative, the Cambodian people have to turn to their religion in order to memorialize their loved ones correctly. The services which are held to commemorate the death, take place within the family. According to former UNTAC- translator and Cambodian native Seng-Ly Ouk, people not only do so because it is forbidden, but also because they only feel safe within the family. Years of suppression made people suspicious in trusting each other. Perpetrators of the genocide have not been caught and judged. Seng-Ly Ouk does not believe this will ever happen - and many other Cambodians with him.156

All in all, we can conclude a few things about the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide. This memorialization is influenced primarily by the authorities: top-down memorialization. At the same time, memorialization in Cambodia is influenced bottom-up, by the population. However, both forms of memorialization fight an uneven battle. The top-down initiatives are far stronger than those from the bottom. As long as Cambodia has a regime which is still authoritarian, this will not change. At the same time, there is a third influence on memorialization, which comes from the outside; the international community. Although the latter has tried to nuance the state narrative, this has not worked. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the three forms of memorialization. The question is now how Cambodia can come to a situation in which the people can memorialize their past rightfully. There are a few things necessary for this. First, Cambodia’s government and governmental structure has to change. As long as Hun Sen and other former Khmer Rouge fighters are in charge of the country, it is unthinkable that any progress will be made. Second, the United Nations should rethink its involvement with the ECCC. The tribunal is more a façade for the Cambodian government than an actual, working organ which can deliver justice. Right now, the ECCC can serve as an excuse; the authorities can say that something is done to help the victims, but in reality this is not true. If the United Nations decided to stop funding the tribunal, this façade might be lifted. Third, there has to be good

156 Interview with Seng-Ly Ouk, May 14, 2015.

50 and truthful education about the past for the new generation. The hopes of Cambodia lie in the hands of the young people. Right now, it is still forbidden to learn about the country’s past. This has to change. NGOs are doing good work in this respect, and the Documentation Center of Cambodia is working towards a future in which every Cambodian is able to study their country’s past. However, as long as the government prevents good education, Cambodia still has a long way to go. The three points stated here stand in close contact with the issue of memorialization. If the preconditions are right, memorialization can be better delivered as well.

There is still a lot that we do not know about Cambodia’s past and present. Although progress has been made in the past ten years, further research is necessary to complete the picture of Cambodia’s past. One of the things that is missing in the field right now are interviews with Cambodians themselves. It would be a great attribution to the field if more Cambodian people would speak about their past, so we can work with more personalized stories. The Documentation Center of Cambodia has been doing some work in this respect by organizing meetings in small villages. Reports on these meetings can be found in their magazine Search for the Truth. However, the content of interviews with Cambodians is not openly accessible yet – at least not in English. It is necessary to have this information so we can learn more about the Cambodian metanarrative. What do Cambodians actually want in regard to the past? Are they seeking for justice and if so, when do they think justice has been achieved? If we can come to an answer to these questions, it might be even clearer how Cambodians see the memorialization of their past: the Cambodian lieux de mémoire could be better defined.

At the end of July, 2011, I left Cambodia. After a few days in Siem Reap, where I saw the cultural highlight of the Khmer civilization, Angkor Wat, I flew back to the Netherlands. My visit to one of the world’s poorest countries had made a deep impression on me. Without knowledge of the past, the country might be considered as a peaceful society without any problems. Compared to Vietnam, Cambodia was easier to travel through and at first sight, less influenced by the remains of a communist era. However, appearances are deceptive. After all, the Cambodians can smile to everyone, but in reality, the country and its inhabitants are still struggling with an unprocessed past. A past of which the grand narrative has to be changed or nuanced. However, the Cambodians are pessimistic about this change, for which peace and democracy is needed. As long as these goals are not achieved, the souls who found their death on Choeung Ek and other killing fields, will never rest in peace.

51

Bibliography

Assmann, Aleida. “Re-framing Memory. Between individual and collective forms of constructing the past.” In Performing the Past, Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe, edited by Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, and Jay Winter. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Bartov, Omer. Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Bouwsma, William James. A Usable past: Essays in European Cultural History. Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1990.

Cole, Tim. Selling the Holocaust: From Auschwitz to Schindler; How History is Bought, Packaged and Sold. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Dylan Wood, Timothy. “Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge.” In Expressions of Cambodia: The Politics of Tradition, Identity and Change , edited by Leakthina Chau-Pech Ollier and Tom Winter. London/New York: Routledge, 2006.

Edkins, Jenny. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Etcheson, Craig. After the Killing Fields, Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide. London: Praeger, 2005.

Fawthrop, Tom, and Helen Jarvis. Getting Away with Genocide? Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. London: Pluto Press, 2004.

Gottesman, Evan. Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, Inside the Politics of Nation Building. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

Hughes, Rachel. Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials. New Haven: MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies,

52

2004.

Khamboly, Dy and Cristopher Dearing. A History of the Anlong Veng Community, The Final Stronghold of the Khmer Rouge Movement. Phnom Penh: Sleuk Rith Institute/Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2014.

Kiernan, Ben. “The Cambodian Genocide, 1975-1979.” In Century of Genocide, Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William Parsons. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Lennon, J. John and Malcolm Foley. Dark Tourism, the Attraction of the Death and Disaster. New York: Continuum, 2000.

Long, Colin and Keir Reeves. “Dig a hole and bury the past in it.” In Places of Pain and Shame, Dealing with ‘Difficult’ Heritage, edited by William Logan and Keir Reeves. London/New York: Routledge, 2009.

Maier, Charles S. The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia. New York: Colombia University Press, 2005.

Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia, Political Culture and the Causes of War. New York: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Nersessian, David. “Cultural Genocide.” In Genocide, A Reader, edited by Jens Meierhenrich. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Pham, Phuong N., and Vinck, Patrick. “Cambodia.” In Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, Volume 2, edited by Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Quinn-Judge, Sophie. “Victory on the Battlefield; Isolation in Asia: Vietnam’s Cambodia decade, 1979-1989.” In The Third Indochina War, Conflict between China, Vietnam, and

53

Cambodia, 1972-79, edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Tuleja, Tad, ed. Usable Pasts: Traditions and Group Expressions in North America. Salt Lake City: Logan, 1997.

Ung, Loung. First they Killed my Father. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.

Vannak, Huy. Bou Meng, A Survivor from Khmer Rouge Prison S-21, Justice for the Future, Not Just for the Victims. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2010.

Vannak, Huy. The Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-destruction. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2003.

Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide, Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Williams, Paul. “The Atrocity Exhibition: Touring Cambodian Genocide Memorials.” In On Display: New Essays in Cultural Studies, edited by Smith and Wevers. Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004.

Winter, Jay. “The Performance of the Past: Memory, History, Identity.” In Performing the Past, Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe, edited by Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, and Jay Winter. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010.

Zamora, Lois Parkinson. The Usable past: The Imagination of History in Recent Fiction of the Americas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

54

Articles

Agence France-Presse. “Ex-King Urges Cremation of Khmer Rouge Victims.” The New York Times. July 20, 2006.

Anusaranasasanakiarti, Phra Kru, and Keyes, Charles F. “Funerary Rites and the Buddhist Meaning of death: an interpretative text from North Thailand.” Journal of the Siam Society 68 (1980).

The Associated Press. “Cambodia Inaugurates Memorial at Khmer Rouge Genocide Museum.” The New York Times. March 26, 2015.

Bickford, Louis. “Transforming a Legacy of Genocide: Pedagogy and Tourism at the Killing Fields of Choeung Ek.” Memory, Memorials, and Museums (MMM) Program of the International Center for Transitional Justice (2009).

Chandler, David. “Cambodia deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 9 (2008).

Chandler, David. “Tuol Sleng and S-21.” Searching for the Truth, Documentation Center of Cambodia 18 (2001).

Eimer, David. “Cambodia’s football betting Mecca fuels rise in match-fixing scandals.” The Telegraph. April 7, 2013.

Fawthrop, Tom. “Thai Senator Urges Apology.” The Phnom Penh Post. March 18, 2001.

Heder, Steve. “Cultures of Genocide, Impunity and Victors’ Justice in Cambodia, 1945-1999: Colonial Communist and Other International Sources.” Unpublished transcript (2000).

Jinks, Rebecca. “Thinking Comparatively about Genocide Memorialization.” Journal of Genocide Research 16 (2014).

Kiernan, Ben. “Cambodia: Coming to Term with the Past.” History Today 54 (2004).

55

Lavrence, Christine. “Between Monumental History and Experience: Remembering and Forgetting War in Belgrade.” Ethnologie Française 37 (2007).

Ledgerwood, Judy. “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative.” Museum Anthropology 21 (1997). Maguire, Peter. “Cambodia Genocide – Memories from Tuol Sleng Prison.” American Suburb X. April 20, 2012.

Meierhenrich, Jens. “The Transformation of Lieux de Mémoire: The Nyabarongo River in Rwanda, 1992-2009.” Anthropology Today 25 (2009).

Moore, Lisa M. “(Re)Covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: the Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity.” Journal of Public and International Affairs 20 (2009).

Mydans, Seth. “Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge.” The New York Times. December 29, 1998.

Mydans, Seth. “Cambodia Profits From Killing Fields and Other Symbols.” The New York Times. November 6, 2005.

Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 26 (1989).

Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena. “Knowledge, Acknowledgement and Denial in Serbia’s Responses to the Srebrenica Massacre.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17 (2009).

Peang-Meth, Abdulgaffar. “Understanding the Khmer: Sociological-Cultural Observations.” Asian Survey 31 (1991).

Ponniah, Kevin. “Cambodian crackdown on corruption in schools scores low with exam cheats.” The Guardian. September 2, 2014.

56

Robertson, Holly. "UN Asked to Prove $29M to Khmer Rouge Tribunal.” The Cambodia Daily. November 20, 2014.

Seaton, A.V. “Guided by the Dark: From Thanatopsis to Thanatourism”, International Journal of Heritage Studies 2 (1996).

Selimovic, Johanna Mannergren. “Perpetrators and Victims: Local Responses to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 57 (2010).

Sion, Brigitte. “Confliction Sites of Memory in Post-Genocide Cambodia.” Humanity (2011).

Spillius, Alex. “Vote on Displaying bones of Khmer Rouge Victims.” The Telegraph. April 26, 2001.

Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. “The Extraordinary Trial of Khmer Rouge Leaders.” The New York Times, January 16, 2013.

Um, Khatharya. “The Perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide Are Still Eluding Justice.” History News Network. January 27, 2014.

Vannak, Chea. “Tourist Numbers at the Killing Fields Keep Rising.” The Khmer Times. May 24, 2015.

Wood, Nancy. “Memory Remains: Les lieux de mémoire.” History & Memory 6 (1994).

57

Primary Sources

Amnesty International, “Kingdom of Cambodia: Amnesty International’s position and concerns regarding the proposed “Khmer Rouge” Tribunal,” Index number: ASA 23/005/2003, published on April 24, 2003.

Amnesty International, “Kingdom of Cambodia, Law and Order – Without Law,” Index number: ASA 23/001/2000, published on November 1, 2000.

Amnesty International, “Cambodia: UN must act to safeguard future of Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” statement delivered on the Amnesty International website on 10 October, 2011.

Constitutive Act of UNTAC Veterans.

“Executive Summary Report in March 2015,” Ministry of Tourism of Cambodia.

Letter sent by Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen to the United Nations on June 21, 1997, to be found on the website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT), http://www.unakrt-online.org/sites/default/files/documents/June_21_1997_letters_from_PMs- 2-1.pdf.

Letter sent by Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan to the General Assembly of the United Nations on June 23, 1997, to be found on the website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT), http://www.unakrt-online.org/sites/default/files/documents/June_21_1997_letters_from_PMs- 2-1.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly, “Request for a subvention to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” December 4, 2013.

World Travel & Tourism Council, Economic Impact 2014 “Cambodia.”

Worldwide Corruption Index.

58

“Written Record of Interview of CHEY Sopheara,” document no. E3/4641, November 25, 2008, to be found on the website of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts in Cambodia.

Interviewees

Huijssoon, Richard

Ouk, Seng-Ly

Westmaas, Ronald

59

Video Material

Joffé, Roland (director), The Killing Fields (Great Britain, 1984).

Panh, Rithy, S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine (Cambodia, 2003).

VOA Khmer, Hope for the Future (film by Ouch Makara), Documentation Center of Cambodia, December 31, 2014.

Websites

“Cambodia – UNTAC, Facts and Figures” on the United Nations website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html

Website of the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism, www.tourismcambodia.org

Website of the (Cambodian) National Institute of Statistics http://www.nis.gov.kh/index.php/en/

Website of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, http://www.eccc.gov.kh

Website of the International Movie Database, www.imdb.com

Website of the Killing Fields museum of Choeung Ek, http://www.killingfieldsmuseum.com/about-us.html

Website of UNTAC Veterans, http://www.untac.nl/Untac/Info.html

60

Website of the Yale Cambodian Genocide Project, www.yale.edu/CGP

Worldwide Corruption index, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

61