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Catholic religion and reproduction in the Netherlands, 1870-1970

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Letteren.

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof.dr. C.W.P.M. Blom, volgens besluit van het College van Decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 11 mei 2005 des namiddags om 1:30 uur precies door

Marloes Marrigje Schoonheim

geboren op 6 april 1976 te Middelburg Promotor: Prof.dr. P. Klep Copromotor: Dr. Th. Engelen

Manuscriptcommissie: Prof.dr. P. Raedts Prof.dr. K. Matthijs, k.u.Leuven Dr. J. Kok, iisg Amsterdam Table of Contents

Introduction 9

1 Denominations and demography 15 — Historiography and methodology 1 Aims of the chapter 15 1.1 The Dutch fertility decline and the concept of religion 16 2 Ireland and the religious determinants of fertility 21 2.1 Demographic disparities and the conflict in Northern Ireland 21 2.2 Catholic demographic behavior and the Irish border 24 2.3 Evaluating two decades of Irish demographic variety 26 2.4 Irish demographic historiography: a case of absent Catholicism 28 3 Revisiting the matter of religion and demography: Kevin McQuillan 29 3.1 Goldscheider’s propositions 30 3.2 The curriculum of the demographic historian 31 3.3 The Church’s pathways to regulating behavior 33 4 The Dutch Case 34 4.1 The comparability of Irish and Dutch Catholics 35 4.2 Dutch historiography on denominations and demography 37 4.2.1 Hofstee and the secondary importance of religion 38 4.2.2 Following up on Hofstee 40 4.2.3 Opening up the debate: international publications and cooperation 44 4.2.4 Dutch demographic historiography: a case of absent religion 50 5 Unraveling the concept of religion: sociological methods 53 5.1 Single factors determining religiosity 54 5.2 Theories on the determinants of religiosity 57 5.3 Sociology of religion and its gains for historical demography 59 6 Mixing methods: the study of Catholic religion and reproduction in the Netherlands, 1870-1970 62 6.1 Religion on a macro level in the Netherlands: social sectarianism 63 6.2 Competitive motives for demography: meso level 64 6.3 Transmuting dogma into demography: micro level 65 7 Conclusion 67

2 A nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 69 — Pillarization and moralization 1 Aims of the chapter 69 1.1 The emancipation of the Dutch Catholics 70 2 Pillarization: the denominational pathway to propagating morality 72 2.1 Pigeon-holing on a large scale: history and meaning 72 2.2 Periodization: rise, culmination and fall 75 2.3 The origins of pillarization 78 2.4 State discipline and the confessional pillars 80 3 The moral nation 82 3.1 Diagrammatized morality 83 3.2 The ‘moralization offensive’: from Liberal initiative to confessional crusade 86 3.3 From Neo Malthusianism to the Public Decency Act 88 3.4 The women’s issue: a moral issue 90 3.5 Morality, pillarization and demography 95 4 The Catholic ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 97 4.1 The Catholic National Party: setting the tone in the pillar 98 4.2 Catholic organizational pillarization: snaring the flock 101 4.3 The clergy: one and all supportive of Catholic pillarization 105 5 Conclusion 107

3 Scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 111 — Demographic, socio-economic and cultural situations of three case studies 1 Aims of the chapter 111 1.1 Intentional wrong or farmers’ stubbornness: political dissent in Mheer 112 2 Getting round to case studies: selecting Dutch Catholic municipalities 115 2.1 In the midst of all transitions: 1930 115 2.2 The negative case analysis and the selection of municipalities 117 2.3 Data and variables 120 3 General characteristics of the case studies: location and size 123 3.1 Mheer and St Geertruid 123 3.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 125 3.3 Grave and Escharen 127 4 Deviating demographic behavior? Fertility and nuptiality 131 4.1 Mheer and St Geertruid 131 4.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 134 4.3 Grave and Escharen 136 5 Demographic causes of deviating behavior: sex-ratios, infant mortality 139 5.1 Mheer and St Geertruid 139 5.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 144 5.3 Grave and Escharen 148 6 Socio-economic causes: industrialization and agricultural modernization 153 6.1 Mheer and St Geertruid 153 6.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 157 6.3 Grave and Escharen 161 7 Cultural causes: mobility and religious multiformity 165 7.1 Mheer and St Geertruid 166 7.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 168 7.3 Grave and Escharen 170 8 Conclusion 173

4 “We put up with what we were told” 178 — Catholic women on the regulation of fertility 1 Aims of the chapter 178 1.1 The Vatican, morality and post-war restoration 179 2 Affecting fertility: the doctrines of the Catholic Church 182 2.1 Sin, Church and forgiveness 182 2.2 Marriage, parenthood and the gendered division of tasks 184 2.3 Sexuality versus procreation 187 3 Internalizing doctrines: Catholic attitudes to family planning, contraceptives, sexuality and motherhood 189 3.1 Persisting in deviance: desired family size and family planning 191 3.2 Only if Church-approved: the use of methods of birth control 193 3.3 Practicing what is preached: sexual experience 196 3.4 Compliance and a sense of duty: the motherhood ideology 199 3.5 Effectiveness of indoctrination: variation among Catholics 204 3.5.1 Socio-economic position and education: the Catholic exception 204 3.5.2 Religiosity and the obedience to Church doctrines 206 4 Pathways of pronatalism: women’s accounts of indoctrination 208 4.1 The sources: letters of mothers of large families 209 4.2 Imposing the rules: the Church’s means of indoctrination 211 4.2.1 The priest’s marital message 211 4.2.2 Deterrence: Church punishment 214 4.2.3 By courtesy of the Church: permission to practice birth control 216 4.2.4 “Father, I abused matrimony”: confession 220 4.2.5 Crossing the threshold: house visits 223 4.3 A matter of the conscience: faith, fear and guilt 225 4.3.1 ‘God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb’: faith and family size 225 4.3.2 The price of sinning: guilt and fear 227 4.4 The Catholic social standard of fertility 231 4.4.1 Youth: the mother-to-be 231 4.4.2 A matter of mutual agreement: pronatalism in marriage 233 4.4.3 Just like everyone else: fertility and the Catholic community 234 5 Conclusion 237

5 That rag freedom! 241 — Catholic faith and fertility in the Netherlands, 1870-1970 1 Aims of the chapter 241 2 Catholic religion and reproduction in the Netherlands, 1870-1970: conclusions 241 3 The final blow for Catholic fertility, 1960-1970 244 4 Mixing ovaries and rosaries: observations 249

List of graphs 252 List of tables and maps 254 Bibliography 255 Word of thanks 278 Summary 281 Samenvatting 284 Curriculum vitae 287 Introduction

In her 1963 novel The Unicorn Iris Murdoch ventured to demythologize Christian- ity.1 The life of the leading character of the book, a woman who rejects the world and allows herself to be imprisoned, is an imitation of the life of Christ. Together with the other characters of the book, the leading character is enslaved in the ‘magical’ cycle of the events that portray the odd relationship between spirituality, sex and power. Throughout the story the scene of action unfolds as an erotic prison masquerading as a place of religious retreat, demonstrating that the impulse to worship is ambiguous and rarely pure. Only one of the characters in The Unicorn remains outside the chain of power that connects human sexuality and spirituality – a Platonist who watches the events of the story from a distance and describes the automatic communication of power and suffering in which the others are involved. “In morals, we are all prisoners,” this ageing contemplative is found arguing, “but the name of our cure is not freedom.”2 The demythologization of Christianity has been a particularly bitter pill for the Roman Catholic Church. Unlike the Anglican Church or many of the Protestant denominations, it refused to take part in any of the shifts in moral norms and val- ues that have characterized the history of secularization in many industrialized countries during the twentieth century. With every statement on current morality the Vatican, claiming to represent the whole Catholic world community, not only demonstrated its dismay and despair but also the growing gap between the Church’s moral doctrines and the ethical standards held by large population groups, amongst them the Church’s own members. With Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger’s July 2004 letter to the bishops, for example, the Vatican officially denounced femi- nism. In its effort to blur differences between men and women, Ratzinger argued, feminism eroded the institution of the family based on a mother and a father and

1 Iris Murdoch, The Unicorn (London 1963), Peter Conradi, The saint and the artist: a study of the fiction of Iris Murdoch (London 2001) 133-166. 2 Murdoch (1963) 114. 10 mixing ovaries and rosaries

created a “virtual” equivalency of homosexuality and heterosexuality.3 However, Ratzinger’s moral reprimand has hardly affected the activities of feminists or the growing numbers of advocates for same-sex marriage – nor will many nominal Catholics feel concerned about his message.4 The consequences of the statement impinged mainly on the devout part of the flock, as the document formed a possi- ble occasion for Church conservatives to condemn any form of advocacy for women in the Catholic community. Additionally, Ratzinger’s letter affected devout Catholics in particular because it forced them to divide their loyalty between their doctrinal Church and a modernizing secular society with entirely different moral standards. An early 1990s study on the factor of religion in the psychological prob- lems of Catholic women showed the troubles of Catholics brought up in a closed, hierarchic community before the 1960s when the Church still decided how one lived. Nowadays, members of this group in particular find little countenance in the Church to give a meaning and direction to their life. “In the present society in which consciousness and autonomy occupy the center stage, they are not able to manage with the doctrine that has been preached to them.”5 Moral norms and val- ues that have been enforced, and which the Vatican still holds true, clash with those of the non-Catholic society and cause moral dilemmas. The gap between the behavioral norms and values of the Catholic Church and those of society developed when, at the end of the nineteenth century, in industrial- izing countries the demographic transition started. Mortality, in particular infant mortality, declined. While a higher number of children reached adulthood, socio- economic motivations to have children diminished with the end of child labor. The introduction of compulsory school attendance and the professionalization of the labor market required investment in higher education. As a result, fertility plan- ning, for a large part of the population of industrialized countries, in the course of the twentieth century became financially as well as socially a most reasonable thing to do. With the wider large-scale practice of birth control, the postponement or abandonment of marriage was no longer required as a means to limit a popula- tion’s fertility. Hence, from the first decades of the twentieth century a third aspect of the demographic transition manifested itself with the decline of the age at first marriage and the increase of proportions married.

3 Joseph Ratzinger and Angelo Amato, ‘Letter to the bishops of the Catholic Church on the collaboration of men and women in the Church and the world’ (May 31, 2004). Retrieved January 26, 2005, from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ cfaith/ documents/ rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html 4 United Press International, ‘Analysis: gay marriage around the globe’ (July 15, 2003). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030714-073510- 5671r 5 Hennie Derksen, De parel in het zwarte doosje: de rol van het geloof in de psychische pro- blemen van katholieke Limburgse vrouwen (Nijmegen 1994) 28. introduction 11

Though the demographic transition theory holds an established position in his- toriography, several anthropologists have formulated severe criticisms of the way the concept has been studied by demographers, historians and social scientists alike. Scholars studying aspects of the demographic transition have tended to iso- late cause and effect in empirical generalizations or ‘laws’ in order to focus on one dimension through time – and have been criticized of overdoing this tendency. Additionally, scholars working on the demographic shift were inclined to picture countries as on a single continuum of change from traditional to modern and focused too much on Western demographic behavior – two aspects of the studies on the demographic transition that have also been disputed by anthropologists. “There is little question about the fact of the demographic transition in very broad terms,” argued Dudley Kirk from Stanford University, usa. The late professor in sociology and population studies wrote the foreword to Culture and reproduction: an anthropological critique of demographic transition theory, a volume to which both demographers and anthropologists contributed. But, Kirk admitted, for the an- thropologists, the research on the topic focused too much on the “how” rather than the “why” of the transition. “Thus demographers point with a certain justifiable pride to the sophisticated and meticulous measurement of levels and trends in fer- tility and mortality and to multivariate analysis of the association between socio- economic measures, especially education, with progress in the reduction of fertil- ity. Demographers are much more involved with the objective mechanics than with the subtleties of attitudes, motivations and behavior of individuals that collec- tively bring this about. They all too often ignore the cultural and historical content which promotes or retards reduction of the birth rate (…),” Kirk argued in Culture and reproduction. “Why fertility occurs at all and why it occurs at different rates and in different ways in different countries is inadequately explained by demogra- phers.”6 The anthropological perspective on the way the processes and causes of the demographic transition have been studied has provided scholars working on the theory with constructive criticism. Multivariate analyses of data sets that have been carefully collected on an individual level showed the correlation between religion and demography. However, few studies have focused on the interpretation of this correlation. For example, historiography indicated that the Catholic religion has had a particular strong effect on fertility levels and development in industrialized countries – at least until the last quarter of the twentieth century. But what is the mechanism behind the influence of religion on demographic behavior? That is the matter this book addresses while researching fertility and nuptiality among Cath- olics in the Netherlands.

6 Penn Handwerker, Culture and reproduction: an anthropological critique of demographic transition theory (Boulder and London 1986) xi-xii. 12 mixing ovaries and rosaries

At the time of the population census of 1930, in the middle of the fertility decline, only 14% of the Dutch declared they did not to belong to any denomina- tion. Back then, the Netherlands were still a profoundly Christian nation where the majority of the population was Protestant. In 1930 the majority of the Protestants were members of the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk), divided in four ‘branches’ ranging from liberal to conservative, who made up 34.4% of the whole population.7 Catholics made up over 36.4% of the population of the Netherlands.8 Despite their minority in numbers, the fertility behavior of the Catholic part of the population deviated from that of the Protestant and non- denominational Dutch to the extent that that it altered the average birth rate of the whole of the Dutch nation. Only in the second half of the twentieth century did Catholic fertility rates subsequently converge with those of other religious groups in the Netherlands. This study will focus on the nature of the religious determinants of Catholic reproductive behavior in the Netherlands between the start of the fertility decline in the late 1870s until the end of it in the early 1970s. In doing so, the scope of this thesis extends beyond merely the strong ideas of the Catholic Church on the issues of reproduction and the practice of birth control. This research includes an investi- gation into the influence of religion on Catholic fertility on different levels of Dutch society. Only by gaining insight into the way Dutch Catholicism affected fertility both on a macro, meso and micro level, can the mechanism behind the effects of religion on demographic behavior be revealed as well as the particularity of that influence in the Netherlands. The question of how the organization of the Catholic religion on national, municipal and individual levels affected the fertility levels of the Catholic popula- tion will be preceded by a historiographical and methodological introduction to the subject. Chapter 1 deals with the way the influence of religion on demographic behavior in general and Catholicism in particular have been studied abroad as well as in the Netherlands. This chapter covers the way the fertility decline developed in the Netherlands as well as the current status quo maintained in Dutch research where it concerns the Catholic determinant of fertility. Taking stock of both natio- nal and international historiography entails not only the Dutch characteristics of the research topic but also provides us with a clear understanding of what the anal- ysis of Catholic determinants of fertility in previous research has lacked. In chapter 1 it will also become clear that because Western European fertility was restrained by nuptiality, marriage behavior will be mentioned frequently in this thesis despite its main focus on the effects of religion on fertility.

7 Hans Knippenberg, De religieuze kaart van Nederland: omvang en geografische spreiding van de godsdienstige gezindten vanaf de Reformatie tot heden (Assen 1992) 106-120, 268. 8 Ibid, 273. introduction 13

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 discuss the way Catholic religion in the Netherlands was organized to such an extent that it was able to affect reproductive behavior of the whole of the Catholic population group. In the last decades of the nineteenth cen- tury a social compartmentalization along ideological lines developed that made religion into the fundament of the social structure of the Netherlands. This pro- vided (Christian) religious institutions with considerable capacity to check on obedience to their doctrines, a power extending from the political organizations via the leisure clubs to the bedrooms of the believers. Moreover, it made respect paid to the church’s moral authority into a standard – even for people without a reli- gious denomination. This infrastructure for the interference of religion with demographic behavior on a national level remained intact until the 1970s. Even more so than the orthodox Protestant churches (including the Gereformeerde kerken and the more conservative branches of the Dutch Reformed Church), the Roman Catholic Church (or simply the Church) profited immensely from the social compartmentalization in the Netherlands – and in particular its promotion of the ‘pronatalist ideology’ stemming from the Catholic doctrines that stimulated fertil- ity.9 The study of the relationship between religion and demography on a macro level offers an explanation for the conditions that provided the Church with social power to impose a code of behavior on parts of the population. The third chapter focuses attention on the influence of Catholicism on reproduction on the meso level of Dutch society. The motivations for couples to limit their family size, a pres- sure that increased with the ongoing development of the industrialization and market-oriented economy during the twentieth century, by no means passed the Catholics in the Netherlands by. Data from particular Catholic municipalities show the socio-economic and cultural circumstances that increased or rather di- minished the influence of religion on fertility behavior. Descriptive statistics cover- ing the middle of the fertility decline show why in some Catholic municipalities motivations for family planning strengthened to the extent that fertility behavior was altered, while other municipalities maintained the fertility levels that corre- sponded with Catholic pronatalism.

9 In this publication, orthodox Protestants refer to Christelijk gereformeerden, members of (Vrije) evangelische gemeenten,(Oud-)gereformeede gemeenten,(Synodaal) gereformeerden and Gereformeerden (vrijgemaakt), together constituting 9.4% of the 1930 Dutch population, but also to moderate conservative (Ethischen) and conservative branches of the Dutch Reformed Church (Confessionelen and Gereformeerden) that included 78% of its members in 1920. Knippenberg (1999) 66-119.The collective term ‘liberal Protestants’ refers to Remonstran- ten, (Hersteld) Lutheranen, Doopsgezinden, Baptisten, Apostolischen and members of the Sal- vation Army, together constituting 3% of the 1930 Dutch population, and the 22% Vrij- zinnigen among the 1920 Dutch Reformed Church members. Knippenberg (1999) 110-156. 14 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Chapter 4 reports on an investigation into the influence of the Catholic religion on fertility related decisions on a micro level. Both abroad and in the Netherlands, surveys conducted from the 1930s onwards have shown in what ways Catholic doc- trines affected norms and values of individuals, resulting in reproduction behavior that deviated from members of other denominations. In chapter 4, the directives of the Catholic Church that particularly affected reproductive behavior will be dis- cussed, as well as the pathways via which they could be enforced on individuals. Testimonies of Catholic women bear witness to the moral codes they were pro- vided with and of the way they turned into a standard of behavior. For her research on the causes, content and consequences of domestic service as a stage of life for Dutch women in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the demographic historian Hilde Bras combined the analysis of life course data of domestic servants with qualitative research based interviews, biographies and letters.10 Like Bras’ study, this research into the role of religion in fertility behavior ventures to use a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative research has been performed to retrieve the mechanism behind correla- tions between religion and the reproduction behavior of the Catholic population of the Netherlands. While investigating the reproductive behavior of Dutch Catholics during the period of the national fertility decline, this study intentionally did not de- velop into a quantitative research based on highly advanced statistical methods. Nei- ther did the exploration of religion, as an ideology that is a complex of convictions and attitudes by which means people give meaning to their existence, result in a theological reference book. Mixing ovaries and rosaries is a historical research on the influence of religion on Catholic reproduction in the Netherlands and aims at being interdisciplinary both in its audiences and in the methods it applies. As Bras shows in her excellent study of the maidservants, the combination of quantitative and quali- tative data proves that attention to historical patterns does not rule out notice of the exceptional, the multidimensional character of time and the whimsicality of change. Historical demographers rightfully have indicated that in industrialized, more developed countries fertility and nuptiality characteristics of Catholics deviated from those of other denominations – differences that declined with the progres- sion of the national fertility decline. Anthropologists on the other hand have been right in emphasizing that, to speak with Murdoch, the circumstances under which Catholics have been ‘morally imprisoned’ have been different. The characteristics and causes of fertility behavior of Dutch Catholics between 1870 and 1970 offer a good opportunity to show how both approaches complement each other well.

10 Hilde Bras, Zeeuwse meiden: dienen in de levensloop van vrouwen, ca. 1850-1950 (Amster- dam 2002). Chapter 1 Denominations and demography

— Historiography and methodology

1 Aims of the chapter

“Now they tell us they’ll breed us out,” the prominent loyalist politician Ian Paisley remarked in 1988 about high fertility among Catholics in Northern Ireland. “I would say to them Protestants also breed” he added.1 Paisley’s statement mirrors a despair that, even in the 1980s, was not completely groundless where it concerned the future of the Protestant majority in numbers in Northern Ireland. In several Western European countries as well as in the usa, fertility rates among Catholic population groups remained high while those among other denominations de- clined during the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Apparently, Catholic reli- gion determined a particular reproduction pattern, resulting in deviant demo- graphic behavior that, eventually, could even change political balances. This chapter concerns the quest for a well-considered method to study the influence of religion on Catholic reproduction in the Netherlands during the sec- ond phase of the demographic transition period. How has the subject been treated in international and national historiography? Regarding the former, studies on religion and Irish demography at the end of the transition period offer an interest- ing case in paragraph 2: demographic characteristics of Catholics were studied both in the homogeneous Catholic Republic and in Northern Ireland where Catho- lics constituted a minority. Subsequently, in paragraph 3, Kevin McQuillan’s ideas on the best way to study religious determinants of demography will be discussed, as advocated in his recent contribution to the methodology of the subject. After having established several do’s and don’ts in the international research field of the subject, methods used in the demographic historiography of the Netherlands will be focused on in paragraph 4. What have the views of Dutch scholars been on the mechanism behind the influence of religion on demography? In paragraph 5 the evaluation of international and national methods of research will be put into the context of definitions and methods developed by sociologists of religion. Finally,

1 Ian Paisley in the Irish Times 11 June 1988 quoted in Cormac Ó Gráda and Brendan Walsh, ‘Fertility and population in Ireland, North and South’, Population Studies 49 (1995) 259-279, 259. 16 mixing ovaries and rosaries

paragraph 6 shows how the stock taken of historical and social scientific ap- proaches used abroad and in the Netherlands to study the impact of religion on demography results in the methodological structure of Mixing ovaries and rosaries. But first the development of fertility and nuptiality in the Netherlands will be dis- cussed briefly. Subsequently the subject will be religion as it left its mark on the demography of the period between 1870 and 1970.

1.1 The Dutch fertility decline and the concept of religion

The last phase of the demographic transition in the Netherlands developed differ- ently from that of other western European countries.2 The onset of the fertility decline was late in the nineteenth century – only after 1875 marital fertility passed, as Onno Boonstra and Ad van der Woude observed, “what has turned out to be its lasting downward turning point.”3 Moreover, in the Netherlands the fertility de- cline was more gradual than in other countries and lasted longer throughout the twentieth century. The birth rate decreased from 37‰ to 33‰ between 1875 and 1890, dropped under the level of 30‰ after 1900 and settled under the 20‰ level only in the late 1960’s and 70’s. The languid development of the Dutch fertility decline contrasted sharply with for example that of Belgium. While in the nine- teenth century the average marital fertility rate of the Netherlands had been quite equal to that of Belgium (about 355 per 1000 married women), from 1900 until the 1960s Dutch marital fertility remained about 35% higher than that of the Belgian population.4 The decline of fertility formed the last phase of the demographic transition. After a decline in the mortality rates, particularly those among infants, population increased.5 Nuptiality changed when the proportion married among the Dutch population increased slightly from 85% in the first half of the nineteenth century to

2 Ansley Coale and Roy Treadway, ‘A summary of the changing distribution of overall fer- tility, marital fertility, and the proportion married in the provinces of Europe’, Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins (ed.), The decline of fertility in Europe (Princeton 1986) 31-181. 3 Onno Boonstra and Ad van der Woude, ‘Demographic transition in the Netherlands: a statistical analysis of regional differences in the level and development of the birth rate and of fertility, 1850-1890’, A.A.G. Bijdragen 24 (Wageningen 1984) 1-59, 12. 4 Evert Hofstee, Korte demografische geschiedenis van Nederland van 1800 tot heden (Haarlem 1981) 132; Ron Lesthaeghe, ‘Vruchtbaarheidscontrole, nuptialiteit en sociaal-economische veranderingen in België, 1846-1910’, Bevolking en gezin 72 (1972) 251-305; Chris Vanden- broeke, ‘Karakteristieken van het huwelijks- en voortplantingsgedrag in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 17e-19e eeuw’, Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis 21 (1976) 107-145. 5 Hofstee (1981) 143. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 17

90% in the subsequent part of the century.6 The decline of the marital age, another invariable component of the demographic transition in Europe, preceded the downward trend of fertility too. Between 1860 and 1910, the average age at first marriage declined from 29 to 27,5 for males and 28 to 26 for females. The drop continued during the 1930s and again after the Second World War to reach a bot- tom level of 25 years for men and 22.5 for women in 1975.7 The causes for the changes in nuptiality behavior were diverse. Economic and social trends, like the introduction of family planning and the emancipation of women, determined public values regarding the ‘appropriate’ marital age that directed the long-term development of nuptiality behavior.8 Changes in socio-eco- nomic circumstances, such as the economic crisis of the 1930s, affected develop- ments in marital cohorts, resulting in small, temporary fluctuations in the process. Regional variations in marriage patterns, however, to some extent were deter- mined by religious denominations.9 Catholics, showing a nuptiality behavior that deviated from Protestants, mainly lived in two provinces in the south of the Nether- lands. As graph 1 shows, in 1930, in the middle of the period of national fertility decline, the provinces of Limburg and Noord-Brabant had an almost homoge- neous Catholic population while consisting of Catholics for 93.5% and 88.6% respectively – rates that did not differ much with those in other years.10 The average age at first marriage and the proportion married in these provinces differed from, for example, that in Drenthe, the Dutch province with the highest percentage of members of the Dutch Reformed Church (63.7% in 1930, see graph 1), of which in this province a large proportion was of the liberal kind.11 Nuptiality in the Catholic provinces also differed from that in Noord-Holland. That province not only count- ed mainly liberal branches of the Dutch Reformed Church but, compared to other provinces, also had the highest proportion of people indicating not to belong to any

6 Frans van Poppel, Trouwen in Nederland: een historisch-demografische studie van de 19e en vroeg-20e eeuw (Wageningen 1992) 21. 7 Ibid, 21-23. 8 Ibid, 29-117. 9 Ibid, 272. 10 In the province of Limburg, the population consisted of 97.7% Catholics in 1869; 98.1% in 1899; 93.5% in 1930 and 94.4% in 1960. In Noord-Brabant, these percentages were 88.0 in 1869; 87.9 in 1899; 88.6 in 1930 and 89.0 in 1960. Erik Beekink, Onno Boonstra, Theo Engelen en Hans Knippenburg (ed.), Nederland in verandering: maatschappe- lijke ontwikkelingen in kaart gebracht 1800-2000 (Amsterdam 2003) 62. 11 For the geographical distribution of liberal branches of the Dutch Reformed Church, see Knippenberg (1999) 110-111. In the province of Drenthe, members of the Dutch Reformed Church constituted 81.8% of the population in 1869; 75.5% in 1899; 63.6% in 1930 and 55.8% in 1960. Historische Databank Nederlandse Gemeenten (HDNG), public database on cd-rom included with Beekink, Boonstra, Engelen and Knippenburg (2003). 18 mixing ovaries and rosaries

denomination. The proportion inhabitants without a denomination increased from 4.5% in 1899 and 28.5% in 1930 (see graph 1) to reach 37.7% in 1960.12

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

Proportion per province 0% n d e l d t d d d t g e n h e n h n n n an r g a t ss la c la la a u in l n ij r re l l l ab b n es re r e t o o ee r o ri e ld U H H B im r F D v e - - Z - L G O rd id rd G o u o o Z o N N

Roman Catholic Church Dutch Reformed Chuch no religious denomination other denomination

Graph 1 Average proportion Catholics, members of the Dutch Reformed Church, citizens without reli- gious denomination and other denominations among provincial populations, 1930. Source: HDNG.

Regional diversity in faith not only affected marital ages and rates but also left its mark on the Dutch fertility pattern. The late onset of the fertility decline and its languid development to a large extent were caused by the exceptional birth rates of the two Catholic provinces. In Limburg and Noord-Brabant, two provinces in the south of the Netherlands, marital fertility rates commenced to decline several decades after they had started to fall in the rest of the country – and kept the natio- nal average high. Moreover, in Limburg and Noord-Brabant birth rates remained higher than in any other province, at least up to the 1970s. Graph 2 shows the development of marital fertility in the provinces of Noord-Holland, Drenthe, Noord-Brabant and Limburg and the national average of all eleven provinces.

12 At the time of the 1869 census there was no category for people who did not belong to any denomination. Only from 1977 onwards a distinction was made between the denomina- tion to which a person counted him or herself and the regularity of church visits (at least once a month). HDNG, see footnote 11. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 19

As graph 2 proves, the marital fertility rates of Limburg and Noord-Brabant lagged behind the national average – only after 1900 the fertility decline in the two Catholic provinces showed a downward trend. In the mainly liberal Protestant province of Drenthe, marital fertility in 1875 was much lower than the Dutch aver- age and continued to decrease gradually throughout the twentieth century. From 1945 onwards, marital fertility in Drenthe completely corresponded with the natio- nal average. In the fast secularizing province Noord-Holland, marital fertility dived under the national average in the 1880s and remained much lower during the major part of the twentieth century. Compared to Drenthe and Noord-Holland, fer- tility in the Catholic provinces remained strikingly high throughout the major part of the period of national fertility decline.

425

375

325

275

225

175

125

75 Number of births per 1000 married women (aged 15-45) 1911-15 1931-35 1951-55 1881-85 1971-75 1921-25 1941-45 1891-95 1901-05 1961-65 1876-80 1916-20 1926-30 1936-40 1946-50 1886-90 1906-10 1956-60 1966-70 1896-1900 Noord-Holland Drenthe Noord-Brabant Limburg Netherlands

Graph 2 Dutch marital fertility rates 1876-1975: births per 1000 married women (aged 15-45). Source: Hofstee (1981) 132.

At the end of the fertility decline, the balance between the provincial fertility rates changed completely. During the early 1970s, Limburg and Noord-Brabant, the Catholic provinces that had been notorious for their high marital fertility rates throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, had rates below those of Drenthe and Noord-Holland. Between 1971 and 1975, Drenthe counted 117 births per 1000 women; Noord-Holland 105 and Noord-Brabant 111 (like the national Dutch average). The province of Limburg had the lowest marital fertility rate of only 95 births per 1000 married women. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the national fertility decline, then, not only brought to light the most extreme demographic differences between Catholic and Protestant regions but 20 mixing ovaries and rosaries

also witnessed first the total convergence, and later on even the inversion, of the demographic differences between these denominations in the Netherlands. Elaborating on the fertility decline in the Netherlands is one thing – but how should the concept of religion that, apparently, affected its development, be stud- ied in a demographic research? The Dutch social scientist Peter van Rooden from the University of Amsterdam distinguished two aspects of religion. The first one is personal: religion to a greater or lesser extent has a moral influence on human beings. This angle concerns the field of research of social scientists specializing in developments on a micro scale, like anthropologists and psychologists. According to Van Rooden, historians working with religion should focus on its second, social aspect: the influence of religion in the society.13 As Van Rooden separated religion on micro and macro level, a historian interested in both the personal and the social aspect of religion requires a different approach to the concept. “In our natio- nal history, religion is not only a phenomenon of the consciousness, but also part of the social order,” three prominent Dutch sociologists of religion from Nij- megen University Albert Felling, Jan Peters and Osmund Schreuder stated in a joint publication, suggesting a less stringent division between religion on a micro and macro level.14 In his dissertation on illegitimacy in one of the Dutch provinces during the nineteenth century, the socio-economic historian Jan Kok from the International Institute of Social History (iisg) in Amsterdam refrained from dis- tinguishing between the functioning of religion on different levels altogether. He depicted religion as a social force among others, like economic and demographic developments, that works equally on all levels of society.15 Apparently, various dif- ferent views and propositions on the study of religion offer an approach to research on the influence of religion on Catholic demography in the Netherlands. Before investigating the way Dutch demographic historians have dealt with the concept of religion as a determinant of fertility behavior, especially among Catho- lics, a particular part of the international historiography will be discussed. Dealing with an island where Catholics occupy both a majority and minority position, Irish demographic historians more than their colleagues abroad have had the opportunity to study the influence of religion in the context of other factors deter- mining demographic behavior. How did the Irish approach Catholic religion in demographic research?

13 Peter van Rooden, Religieuze regimes:over godsdienst en maatschappij in Nederland 1570- 1990 (Amsterdam 1996) 13-14. 14 Albert Felling, Jan Peters and Osmund Schreuder, Geloven en leven. Een nationaal onder- zoek naar de invloed van religieuze overtuigingen (Zeist 1986) 7. 15 Jan Kok, Langs verboden wegen: de achtergronden van buitenechtelijke geboorten in Noord- Holland 1812-1914 (Hilversum 1991) 5. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 21

2 Ireland and the religious determinants of fertility

The reconstruction of religious determinants in the demographic history of Ireland deserves particular attention. Irish scientists working in the field might have faced the same difficulties with methods and theoretical frameworks as their colleagues elsewhere – but the context in which they performed their research, was different. The topic of the influence of Catholicism on reproduction had, and per- haps still has, a distinctive political edge. The fertility of the Catholic population of the island has been part of an opposition against the British occupation. During the last decades, high fertility levels of the Catholics have been regarded as one of the weapons against Northern Ireland’s joining of Britain. Apart from politics, the socio-economic changes of the last years accelerated the demographic transitions in the Republic. In particular Ireland’s entry into the European Economic Com- munity in 1973 and the welfare increase that followed had considerable impact on the development of the Irish fertility and nuptiality. Despite these changes, the Roman Catholic Church maintained its social and political authority and still in- fluenced policymaking and decisions concerning the legal system – much unlike its position in Northern Ireland. The political situation of and socio-economic changes in the Republic and Northern Ireland both before and after the 1970s have drawn attention of historians to the demographic heterogeneity of Irish Catholics in the north and south. The historiography that was the result not only showed the complexity but also the importance of the study of the religious determinant of fer- tility and nuptiality behavior.

2.1 Demographic disparities and the conflict in Northern Ireland

The press coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland has made it evident that the two disputing communities involved feel they have distinctly different nation- alities. Whether portrayed as a fight for the dominion of the geographical area or as the struggle of the Catholic minority for rights that the Protestants have refused them for decades, few reports and analyses of the conflict have given evi- dence of its demographic aspect. Much to the surprise of P.A. Compton, a geog- rapher from Belfast, who discussed it in his 1976 article ‘Religious affiliation and demographic variability in Northern Ireland’.16 “If the Roman Catholic popula- tion were a small and declining minority as are Protestants in the Irish Republic, the extremes of nationalism in Ulster would in all likelihood be a more manage- able phenomenon”, Compton believed. The implications of demographic con- trasts between the conflicting groups in Northern Ireland were even more com-

16 P.A. Compton, ‘Religious affiliation and demographic variability in Northern Ireland’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series 1 (1976) 433-452. 22 mixing ovaries and rosaries

plicated than in terms of majority in numbers only. The Catholics’ larger families also played a role in finding appropriate housing and employment. “A lower birth rate,” Compton suggested, “would also mean a lower rate of emigration and so help prevent the social disruption caused by the breakup and uprooting of the families.”17 During the twentieth century, only a third of the Northern Irish population was Catholic. As census data show, Roman Catholics constituted 34.8% of the North- ern Irish population in 1901. During the 1950s and 60s the proportion Catholics slowly rose to 36.8% in 1971, due to Catholic reproduction rates.18 In 1961, the crude birth rate of Northern Irish Catholics was estimated to be 28.3 per 1000 against 19.5 among Protestants in the region.19 In spite of a high age at first mar- riage and a very high level of permanent celibacy, the rate of reported extramarital childbearing in Ireland remained low up to the 1970s.20 During the 1970s, the overall fertility disparity between the two denominations narrowed as the crude birth rates of the Catholics declined with 9% and that of the Protestants with 7%. However, by 1971 Catholic fertility was still some 50% higher than that of Protes- tants in Northern Ireland when measured in terms of total fertility rates.21 For the Catholic community, this demographic disparity stimulated its hope for unifica- tion with Ireland whereas for the Protestants it was a cause for fear of the future ratios. For decades, the growth of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland was restrained by their mass emigration.22 The Catholic Irish that left Northern Ireland did not constitute a representative part of the population. In the middle of the nine- teenth century, 70% of the emigrants were clustered in the age group 16-34.23 Emi- gration of biologically reproductive citizens, therefore, must have had a negative effect on the Irish birth rate. Emigration also affected nuptiality in Ireland: it might have resulted in the postponement or even cancellation of marriages and threw sex

17 Ibid, 433. 18 In reality the proportion of Catholics might have been bigger because of those not stat- ing their religion in the census. Ibid, 436. 19 Ibid. 20 The marital fertility rate is estimated to have accounted for at least 96% of all births in Ireland in each intercensal period from 1871 to 1961. Robert Kennedy, The Irish: emigration, marriage and fertility (Berkeley 1975) 174. 21 Compton (1976) 436-438. 22 Timothy Guinnane, The vanishing Irish: household, migration and the rural economy in Ireland, 1850-1914 (Princeton 1997) and R.C. Geary and J.G. Hughes, ‘Migration between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland’, Brendan M. Walsh (ed.), Religion and demo- graphic behaviour in Ireland (Dublin 1970). 23 Joel Mokyr and Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘New developments in Irish Population History, 1700-1850’, The Economic History Review, New Series 37 (1984) 473-488, 487. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 23 ratios off balance.24 Hence, if it weren’t for the high emigration rates, Catholic fer- tility in Northern Ireland would have been even higher during most of the twenti- eth century. In the 1960s, Catholics in Northern Ireland suddenly joined the European fer- tility decline. Marital fertility fell with a dazzling speed of 18% from 241 in 1961 to 198 per 1000 Catholic women aged 15 to 49 in 1971. Among Protestants, the rates declined less sharply, with 12% from 126 per 1000 women in 1961 to 110 in 1971. During the same period, nuptiality increased: among Catholic women of the age group 20-24 for example it rose over 8% (from 32.1% in 1961 to 40.3% in 1971). The proportion married among the Protestant population group increased too, though less drastically with 5.7% from 44.5% to 50.2%. In other age groups, Catho- lics showed a stronger rise in the proportion married than Protestants too.25 Ob- viously, the Irish, and particularly the Catholics among them, experienced the sec- ond phase of the demographic transition later than other parts of Western Europe – but at a much higher speed. The Ulster Pregnancy Advisory Association, a Belfast based organization that has been assisting women in obtaining a legally induced abortion, mirrored the fast pace of the fertility decline among Catholics in Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 70s. In the early 1960’s, Ireland still had the highest fertility rates of the whole of Europe.26 From its foundation in 1970 onwards, the Ulster Pregnancy Advisory Association witnessed a continuously rising percentage of Catholic women among its clients.27 Two-fifths of these women were using some form of contraceptive, which, according to Compton, was not strikingly lower than among Protestants at the time.28 Compton failed to explain why one section of the Northern Irish population delayed the transition from a high to a low fertility rate for so long. In every so- cio-economic group the average size of Catholic families was significantly larger than that of Protestants, Compton deduced. Discrepancies in socio-economic structure of the population groups, hence, can only partly account for the differ- ence in fertility behavior between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Rather then socio-economic causes, Compton surmised the demographic varia-

24 Shipping lists from the usa in the middle of the nineteenth century showed uneven sex ratios: the ratio of males to females aged 15-34 was 58.6 to 41.4 in Boston and 57.6 to 42.4 in New York. Compton (1976) 487. 25 Ibid, 438-439. 26 Kennedy (1975), Coale and Treadway (1986). 27 In 1999, the Ulster Pregnancy Advisory Association in Belfast had to close after anti- abortion campaigns. bbc, ‘Campaigners force pregnancy centre closure’ (August 5, 1999). Retrieved January, 26, 2005 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/413184.stm 28 Compton (1976) 442 and R.S. Rose, An outline of fertility control, focusing on the element of abortion, in the Republic of Ireland to 1976 (Stockholm 1976). 24 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tions to arrive from “disparities in the practice of family limitation”. Cultural and political values among the Catholic population group, the author believed, in this matter might be just as important as “the specific normative structure of their Church”. Blaming the lack of in-depth studies on “the awareness, attitudes and practice of family planning” by Northern Irish women, Compton remained indis- tinct with regard to the determinants of Catholic fertility.29

2.2 Catholic demographic behavior and the Irish border

If it weren’t for the partition of the island, Catholics would form the majority of the population in Northern Ireland. In Ireland as a whole, Catholics constituted three- quarters of the population by the 1970s. The partition of 1921 divided the island into a Republic with an almost completely Catholic population (94% in 1971) and the Northern part in which Catholics were a minority (approximately 38% of the 1971 population).30 Using the 1971 Census Fertility Reports, John Coward, lec- turer in Geography at the New University of Ulster, in his 1980 article focused his attention on the differences between Catholic fertility in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Following on Compton’s results, Coward found that the fertility rates in the south of Ireland were much higher than in most other Western European Coun- tries.31 As in Northern Ireland, marital fertility among Catholics appeared to be extraordinarily high and the proportion married among members of this denomi- nation was lower than among non-Catholics in the Republic. In both parts of the island, nuptiality increased and marital fertility declined between 1961 and 1971. The drop in Northern Ireland, however, began from a much higher level – in 1961 the index of marital fertility was 0.70 and by 1971 only 0.55. For that reason the fer- tility decline in the north, according to Coward, was much more important than in the south, where marital fertility index dropped ‘only’ from 0.63 to 0.56.32 In 1961,

29 Compton (1976) 441. 30 John Coward, ‘Recent Characteristics of Roman Catholic Fertility in Northern and Southern Ireland’, Population Studies 34 (1980) 31-44, 32. 31 Coward compared the index of 1971 marital fertility and proportions married of North- ern Ireland (0.42 and 0.63 respectively) with those of the Republic (0.56 and 0.51 respec- tively) and for example England and Wales (0.26 and 0.71 respectively), Belgium (0.25 and 0.70 respectively) and the Netherlands (0.28 and 0.67 respectively). Ibid, 34 (table 1). 32 Ibid, 35. Coward derived the data from Ansley Coale who for his indices used three yearly averages of births around each census and took into account births to women in reproductive ages, differences in age structure within the 15-49 age group and the separate contributions of marital fertility and proportions married to overall fertility. Ansley Coale, ‘The decline of fertility in Europe from the French Revolution to World War Two’, Samuel Behrman, Leslie Corsa and Ronald Freedman (ed.), Fertility and family planning: a world view (Ann Arbor 1969) 3-24. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 25

Coward continued, the “reluctance” among women in Northern Ireland to limit their fertility was mainly found among women over 30 years old – whereas in the south women younger than 30 were less inclined to practice birth control.33 A decade later, this disparity in age-specific fertility had almost completely vanished. From 1971 onwards, the crude birth rates in both Northern Ireland and the Repub- lic declined, in the former though at a higher pace than in the latter.34 Nuptiality, on the other hand, was higher among Catholics in Northern Ireland and their families remained slightly bigger than in the south both in 1961 and 1971. Demographic differences, like variations in duration of marriage, age of the wife at marriage, lev- els of childlessness or even occupation of the husband, failed to completely explain this continued difference.35 After having determined to what extent fertility and nuptiality differed among Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Republic, Coward tried to find an explana- tion for his results. Did the apparent similarity of the post-1961 declining marital fertility rates and increasing nuptiality in the north and the south of the island con- ceal different origins for the demographic changes, the author wondered. For one, Coward stated, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church had been particularly strong in both countries: its persistent opposition against artificial forms of birth control “undoubtedly” contributed to the high levels of marital fertility amongst Catholics both north and south of the border. Contrasting social-economic circum- stances in Northern Ireland and the Republic contributed to the characteristic fer- tility decline. But the similarities between the north and south, like high employ- ment in agriculture, low urbanization rates and high emigration rates, were more striking than the differences, according to Coward.36 In his attempt to explain the slightly higher marital fertility among Catholics in Northern Ireland, Coward seriously considered their minority status. One of the possible links, he suggested, was that “Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland are strongly drawn towards their Church as a means of security and identity and thus tend to conform more closely to the Church’s teaching on family life.”37 On top of this Coward added a strong awareness of minority status, sentiments with regard to political underrepresentation and discrimination in housing and employment. The high degree of residential segregation by religion in Northern Ireland might well have stimulated the adherence to communal, Catholic norms too. After all, Coward argued, Catholics in Northern Ireland have lived within the confines of their own denomination for decades.

33 Ibid, 35-36. 34 In the Republic of Ireland, the crude birth rate had fallen from 22.7 in 1971 to 21.6 in 1975, in Northern Ireland from 20.7 in 1971 to 17.1 in 1976. Ibid, 36. 35 Ibid, 37-39. 36 Ibid, 40. 37 Ibid, 41. 26 mixing ovaries and rosaries

If indeed minority status stimulated fertility, something must have changed either with regard to the Northern Irish Catholic identity, the emigration rates or the economic situation of the north – because between 1961 and 1971 fertility in Northern Ireland declined even more dramatically than in the Republic. In fact, Coward stated, while the influence of the Roman Catholic Church remained strong in Ireland, “indications of changing attitudes to family life” became evident in the 1970s when popular aversion towards the ban on advertisement and sell of contraceptives increased.38 Besides the growing disloyalty to the morals of the Roman Catholic Church, Coward pointed to the falling rates of emigration and agricultural employment between 1961 and 1971. Coward concluded that the fertility decline must be understood in changing so- cio-economic structures of the Northern Irish Catholic population. The fact that he left the subject of the relation between the Catholics’ minority status and their fer- tility behavior was most regrettable. During the period Coward wrote his article, tensions between the religious communities in Northern Ireland only increased. In spite of socio-economic changes, awareness of minority status apparently had not altogether disappeared among Catholics in the north. Moreover, in the Repub- lic of Ireland the Roman Catholic Church continued to interfere with matters of legislation and education. If socio-economic developments after 1961 in only a decade brought about a transformation of the fertility pattern, where does that leave the Catholic nature of the demographic features?

2.3 Evaluating two decades of Irish demographic variety

Both with regard to politics and historiography, little seems to have changed in the two decades after Compton’s article was published. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland continued. In historiography, no stock had been taken of the importance of the religious, economic and social determinants of fer- tility and nuptiality, of which some remained controversial.39 The two elapsed decades, however, did provide Cormac Ó Gráda and Brendan Walsh, both from the department of Economics of the University College in Dublin, with data.40 In their 1995 article the authors were able to test various hypotheses using data from both Northern Ireland and the Republic, supplied by the census of 1991. Since 1961, the shares of the denominations in the population of the Republic of Ireland have changed. This trend started in 1911 and was caused by emigration, low fertility rates and mixed marriages.41 As a result, the proportion of Catholics in

38 Ibid, 43. 39 Mokyr and Ó Gráda (1984) 488. 40 Ó Gráda and Walsh (1995) 259-279. 41 In mixed marriages in the Republic, children with only one Protestant parent were usu- ally raised as Catholics. Ibid, 263. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 27 the Republic increased from 90% in 1911 to 95% in 1961 – until the census of 1961 when it became possible to indicate not to have a religion or leave the matter ‘not stated’.42 Based on the 1981 census, Ó Gráda and Walsh confirmed the con- vergence of Catholic and Protestant fertility patterns in the Republic, as noted by Compton: “much of the substantial gap in fertility between Catholics and others had been eliminated among those who had married in the 1970s.”43 The authors added that the difference in migration rates between the two population groups started to change at that time too: from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, Protestants instead of Catholics were the ones that were more likely to leave the Republic of Ireland. As Ó Gráda and Walsh showed, the data of the 1981 and 1991 census in North- ern Ireland deviated from those of the Republic on several points. Although the population in the north of the island hardly increased, it showed a dynamic pattern on a regional level. Moreover, the Catholics’ share in the population increased sur- prisingly – it rose from 31% in 1971 to over 38% in 1991 – even to 42% if respon- dents who did not state their religion (but mainly lived in Catholic regions), are included.44 Not only population numbers, but also birth rates changed in Northern Ireland, as marital fertility declined and general fertility showed an even bigger drop – particularly among Catholics.45 Nonetheless, by 1991 Catholic fertility still was significantly higher than that of Protestants: in 1971 the marital fertility of the two populations in the north was in the proportion of 173 to 100, in 1991 of 142 to 100.46 Demographic differences between Catholics and Protestants remained far more “interesting” than those between the various Protestant denominations.47 Interestingly enough, the 1981 and 1991 data contradict the suggested conver- gence of Catholic and Protestant demographic behavior – at least where it con- cerned Northern Ireland. “Only in a few districts in the Belfast suburbs has Catho- lic fertility converged to Protestant levels during the last two decades, while in an equal number of areas the difference actually widened over the period,” Ó Gráda and Walsh stated.48 In Northern Ireland, religion still appeared to determine repro- duction: Catholic fertility rates dropped most heavily in regions outside the tradi- tional denominational ‘ghettoes’. The Protestants in Northern Ireland, however, were not only “bred out”, as Ian Paisley said; their majority in numbers was threat-

42 Ibid, 262. 43 Ibid, 263. 44 Ibid, 269. 45 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘New evidence on the fertility transition in Ireland 1880-1911’, Demog- raphy 28 (1991) 535-548. 46 Cormac Ó Gráda and Brendan Walsh (1995) 266. 47 Presbyterian women in Northern Ireland showed a slightly lower fertility than female members of the Church of England. Ibid, 270. 48 Ibid, 266-268. 28 mixing ovaries and rosaries

ened by a declining emigration among Catholics too: “there can be little doubt that Catholics were less likely to leave than others during the 1970s and 1980s.”49 In 1991, even the fertility rates of cities like Dublin and Cork in the Republic were still below those with the lowest fertility rates in Northern Ireland, illustrating the continuous difference between Catholic fertility in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Nevertheless, Ó Gráda and Walsh showed, the demographic differences between Catholics and Protestants in both parts of the island remained more strik- ing and could not be explained by socio-economic factors only. “Detailed compari- sons controlling for social class,” Ó Gráda and Walsh stated, “showed that a mark- ed Catholic/Protestant differential existed on both sides of the Irish political bor- der in 1961.”50 And although the difference declined between 1971 and 1991, the research of Ó Gráda and Walsh showed that the differences between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland remained significant. In that sense, the border be- tween Northern Ireland and the Republic might be misleading for existing differ- ences between demographic: Catholic determinants of fertility behavior appeared to be much stronger than those characteristic of the region.

2.4 Irish demographic historiography: a case of absent Catholicism

Compton and Coward as well as Ó Gráda and Walsh showed that even during the late 1980s, Irish Catholics and Protestants had different attitudes regarding family size. When region or socio-economic background were controlled for, the differ- ences did not disappear. “Catholic religiosity or ‘culture’ remains the best explan- ation for the gap,” Ó Gráda and Walsh concluded their article.51 In this matter, not all Catholics on the island seemed to behave the same – Northern Irish Catholics appeared less enthusiastic to limit their family size than their fellow believers in the Republic. Whilst the authors optimally utilized census data and carefully indicated their limits in order to precisely map the context of Catholic fertility in Northern Ireland and the Republic, it remained obscure how the influence of religion on Catholic fertility came about. Ireland is famous for the powerful social position of the Roman Catholic Church.52 But how did the Church use its position in the socio- political arena to organize interference with demographic issues? What local so- cial, political or economic circumstances motivated a community to obey or ignore

49 Ibid, 273. 50 Ibid, 277. 51 Ibid, 278. 52 David Miller, Church, state and nation in Ireland 1898-1921 (Dublin 1971), Dermot Keogh, Ireland and the Vatican: the politics and diplomacy of church-state relations, 1922-1960 (Cork 1995) and Maaike den Draak and Inge Hutter, Fertility in the Irish Republic: nurtured by Irish law and the Catholic church (Groningen 1996). denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 29

Church directives with regard to reproduction? What did the Church actually have to say to its flock about sexuality and procreation and what methods did it use to impose fertility behavior on individuals? In a country where religious affiliation apparently usually implied a radical political orientation, how could Catholicism continue to appeal to a code of conduct for procreation? The Irish case demonstrated the importance and consequences of the effect of religion on demographic behavior. Scholars working on the subject sometimes did not even manage to impartially report the differences between Catholic and Prot- estant demography. Compton in 1976 for example referred to the high Catholic birth rate as the “demographic irritant” and the cause of social inequality between Protestants and Catholics.53 The historiography of Catholicism as determinant of Irish fertility has proven that religion, like economy, can influence fertility behav- ior. The next paragraph will show that, with that conclusion, the trouble has just begun.

3 Revisiting the matter of religion and demography: Kevin McQuillan

Ireland is not the only country where fertility of Catholics converged with those of other denominations. In many other industrialized societies, differences be- tween Catholic demographic characteristics and those of other denominations have eased during the last decades of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, this resulted in a decline of enthusiasm for the subject among demographers and demographic historians. Unjustly so; during the 1980s and 90s, studies that were part of the ‘Princeton Project’, short for the ‘European Fertility Project’ from Princeton University in the usa, offered a new perspective on cultural factors behind the fertility transition.54 Kevin McQuillan from the Department of Sociol- ogy of the University of Western Ontario in Canada in 1999 published a study on demographic behavior in Alsace that was motivated by the same kind of interest for cultural circumstances that, besides social and economic factors, pressed fer- tility and nuptiality developments.55 In 2004 this publication was followed by an evaluation of three decades of research on religious affiliation as a determinant of demographic behavior. McQuillan wished to seize the opportunity to “revisit the question of religion and fertility in the light of a generation of new theoretical and

53 Compton (1976) 451. 54 Barbara Anderson, ‘Regional and cultural factors in the decline of marital fertility in Europe’, Coale and Watkins (1986) 293-313 and Ron Lesthaeghe and Chris Wilson, ‘Modes of production, secularization and the pace of the fertility decline in Western Europe, 1870- 1930’, Coale and Watkins (1986) 261-292. 55 Kevin McQuillan, Culture, religion and demographic behavior: Catholics and Lutherans in Alsace, 1750-1870 (Montreal and Kingston 1999). 30 mixing ovaries and rosaries

empirical work”.56 The resulting article put forward convincing suggestions about the way religious determinants of demography should be approached in research.

3.1 Goldscheider’s propositions

While discussing the most important theoretical approaches to the relationship between religion and demography, McQuillan starts off with Calvin Gold- scheider’s 1971 publication of Population, Modernization and Social Structure.57 Goldscheider, who worked as a sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley in the usa, divided demographers, attempting to explain the influence of religion on demography, into two groups. The first category concerned scholars who main- tained a “characteristics proposition”, hypothesizing that “the distinct fertility of religious subgroups merely reflects a matrix of social, demographic, and economic attributes that characterizes the religious subgroup.”58 According to Goldscheider, these scholars regarded denominational affiliation as an indication of social class and degree of social mobility. Membership of a certain religious group, this approach held true, is not significant but the implied social, demographic and eco- nomic characteristics determine deviating demographic trends. Fertility differ- ences between religious groups, therefore, were of a temporary nature according to this approach and represented a social or cultural gap. The fallacy of this approach, Goldscheider argued, was that it regarded religion, religious affiliation and reli- gious institutions as independent factors – while in reality they have become inex- tricably bound up with other (economic, political) components of society. More- over, the ‘characteristics approach’ failed because even while controlling for vari- ables like education and income, socio-economic factors could not completely account for the religious determinants of demography – as Irish historiography has illustrated. The second approach to demographic contrasts between denominations did not meet with Goldscheider’s approval either. The ‘particularized theology’ propo- sition implied that “the impact of religion on fertility behavior and attitudes oper- ates with particular church doctrine or religious ideology on birth control, contra- ceptive usage, and norms of family size”.59 According to this point of view, reli- gious ideology affected variables that in their turn shaped fertility levels. This hypothesis, Goldscheider wrote, did not come up to the mark at all. “It is analogous to explaining the unique voting or political behavior of Catholics in terms of spe-

56 Kevin McQuillan, ‘When does religion influence fertility?’, Population and development review 30 (2004) 25-56, 25. 57 Calvin Goldscheider, Population, Modernization and Social Structure (Boston 1971). 58 Ibid, 272. 59 Ibid. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 31 cific church norms with respect to voting or political behavior”. Distinctions between fertility of, for example, Irish and Italian Catholics in the usa cannot be explained by “specific commitments of these ethnic subgroups to the family size and contraceptive norms of the church”, but rather to the “integration of these groups into the institutionalized Catholic structure”, their “assimilation-accultura- tion patterns” and the “more general social and cultural milieu” of the Catholic subgroup in the usa.60 While studying determinants of Catholic behavior, scholars had to include not only denominational teachings on fertility control but the whole content of the social organization of a denomination, Goldscheider argued. Addi- tionally, the social status of a religious group had to be taken into account. A minor- ity status with accompanying social and economic barriers would stimulate a re- duction of fertility, Goldscheider continued – a statement that was refuted by the Northern Irish Catholics who, in spite of their minority status, for decades did not seem to be inclined to limit the number of their children. Notwithstanding his harsh words with regard to the ‘particularized theology’ approach, Goldscheider attached great importance to religion as “the most common although not the only manifestation of value orientations”. Religion, according to this sociologist, has re- mained “a vigorous and influential institution in modern, secularized, economicly developed, educated, industrialized societies” touching the very core of social behavior, attitudes and values.61

3.2 The curriculum of the demographic historian

Like Goldscheider, McQuillan in his 2004 article stressed the role of religious norms: “religions have elaborated moral codes that are meant to guide human behavior and,” he continued, “many of the great religious traditions have given special attention to issues of sexuality, the roles of men and women, and the place of the family in society.”62 McQuillan however managed to supplement his plea for the importance of denomination-specific norms with relevant instructions for demographers who stumble across a religious variable while studying determi- nants of demography. McQuillan advocated distinguishing two types of religious values: first the directives that are quite specific in regulating behavior “that is directly connected to the proximate determinants of fertility”, and, secondly, broader norms that have a more indirect influence on fertility.63 During the last centuries, the Roman Catho- lic Church stood out among other religions and denominations in unconditionally

60 Ibid, 293. 61 Ibid, 270. 62 McQuillan (2004) 27. 63 Ibid. 32 mixing ovaries and rosaries

repudiating almost all means of contraception and abortus provocatus.64 But, McQuillan underlined, religions like Catholicism have designed other directives stimulating or restraining fertility than just those regarding the use of contracep- tion and the practice of abortion. Among these are conditions under which one is allowed to form a sexual union: the minimal age, the number of spouses, and whether or not one is allowed to marry again after divorce or widowhood. More- over, McQuillan argued, religious prohibitions regarding sexual activity outside the officially recognized unions are important – illustrative is the negative connota- tion unmarried motherhood still has in many industrialized, secularized coun- tries. Rules regarding sexual matters within wedlock have been part of a denomin- ation’s impact on fertility too: in Catholicism these directives include for example the fact that partners are not allowed to refuse their spouse sexual gratification. McQuillan’s second category of religious directives that affect demography concern broader norms that have a more indirect impact on fertility behavior. Interest in this category of church regulations is in line with Goldscheider’s advice for demographic historians to study the social organizations of the religions and their possible impact on fertility rather than their dogma’s. However, McQuillan’s elaboration on this approach has given considerable space to a broad interpretation of the category: he referred to “values that speak directly to issues of fertility, al- though they do not involve specific rules about practices of fertility regulation”.65 Among these indirect religious influences on fertility are the division of gender- specific tasks between men and women and the eulogium of the family as the soci- ety’s ‘cornerstone’ – values that were detached from their religious base and have become social institutions on their own. As Goldscheider described, many scholars first try to explain demographic characteristics of a religious group with its socio-economic characteristics. Only when they’re absolutely sure that some part of a demographic profile remains reli- giously determined, they turn to religious teachings to explain the discrepancies in their statistics. McQuillan agreed with Goldscheider that conjuring dogma out of the demographic hat in this way is too shallow. In addition, he proposed to switch around the method of research and start off with religious directives regarding demographic behavior, “because fertility differentials among religious groups that are not tied in to variations in their religious beliefs are likely to be the result of dif- ferences in their socio-economic situation, and thus do not constitute examples of a true religious effect”. Religious determinants of fertility form the net result of a

64 John Noonan, Contraception: a history of its treatment by the Catholic theologians and canonists (Cambridge 1965) 387-438, Barbara Brooks, Abortion in England 1900-1967 (Lon- don 1988), Hanneke Westhoff, Natuurlijk geboorteregelen in de twintigste eeuw: de ontwikkeling van de periodieke onthouding door de Nederlandse arts J.N.J. Smulders in de jaren dertig (Baarn 1986) 34-42. 65 McQuillan (2004) 29. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 33 sum, of which denominational directives are but one element – yet a distinct, inevi- table component. McQuillan hence added another task to the curriculum of the religiously challenged demographic historian. Not only the elements of religious directives that may control fertility should be identified, but also pathways had to be traced that, as McQuillan formulated it, “lead from these values to the proximate determinants of fertility”.66

3.3 The Church’s pathways to regulating behavior

The example of Ireland has shown that Catholics north and south of the Irish bor- der may share a faith, but not all demographic characteristics. The differences between Catholics in Ireland and France, of which certain regions are regarded as the leaders in the European fertility decline, are bigger still.67 A religious institu- tion’s success in imposing rules of behavior onto believers, McQuillan stated, com- pletely depended on the means required to get the directives to the believers and on the development of “mechanisms to promote compliance and punish noncon- formity.”68 The institutional influence of religion in a society can be observed on various levels, McQuillan argued. In the larger society, the Roman Catholic Church was able to assert influence, for example via the school system or via political parties. In the community, the Church submitted its views on life to the members of the con- gregation during church services, in particular Sunday mass. But there were many more pathways that provided the Roman Catholic Church with excellent opportu- nities to lay down rules of behavior to its flock. The Church was involved in all ritu- als marking birth, marriage and death: believers were dependent on the Church where it concerned admittance to the religious congregation, getting married or being buried in the family grave at the Catholic graveyard. Additionally, the Church asserted control over many ceremonies throughout the year – the holy days, festi- vals and celebrations that were part of the liturgical calendar, the calling down of a fortunate harvest or good health. In addition to taking care of religious activities, the Roman Catholic Church took part in the organization of secular life with the establishment of numerous associations, groups and clubs dealing with all kinds of social activities from health care and social welfare to recreation. In this way, the Church was able to check its flock’s conduct during non-church related pursuits. While discussing the social power of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, McQuillan aptly describes this control as “a near monopoly on the symbolic uni-

66 Ibid, 31. 67 Ansley Coale and Roy Treadway, ‘A summary of the changing distribution of overall fertility, marital fertility, and the proportion married in the provinces of Europe’, Coale and Watkins (1986) 31-181. 68 McQuillan (2004) 32. 34 mixing ovaries and rosaries

verse such that even secular community events invariably involved a religious dimension”.69 As McQuillan underlined, whether in the larger society, in the local community or in the individual lives, the case of the Roman Catholic Church persuasively shows the striking institutional aspect of a denomination’s means to mould indi- vidual behavior. On an individual level, a special means of control by the Church was based on the sacrament of confession. During this private conversation with a priest, all violations of church directives had to be brought forward. In this setting, a priest was able to examine an individual’s behavior down to the last detail. This procedure was generally accepted as absolution of sin was required in order to go to heaven.70 Those who had committed serious sins, like having used contracep- tives, sometimes were left without absolution, thereby finding themselves in an uncomfortable position: from then on any misfortunate accident could have them end up in hell forever. Religion influenced demographic behavior, McQuillan argued, in circum- stances where three conditions were fulfilled. For one, religion had to cherish behavioral norms that have linkages to fertility results. Furthermore, religion required means to impose these norms on believers. The third condition was that believers needed to have great affinity with their religious community.71 As soon as any of these elements changed and, as in many western countries, social and politi- cal developments diminished the dominant role of religion, its influence on demography waned swiftly. The next paragraph will show how scholars presented the circumstances under which religion influenced fertility behavior in the Nether- lands. Did Dutch historiography, like McQuillan, reduce that impact to regulations concerning reproduction, a system of Church control and punishment and reli- gious affiliation of the flock?

4 The Dutch Case

Regarding abortus provocatus, the Republic of Ireland and the Netherlands have radically different legislation. In the former country, performing abortion is only legal in case the life of a woman is threatened by a pregnancy; in the Netherlands, not even a license is needed to provide early pregnancy terminations (up to 45 days of pregnancy). In June 2001, this contrast induced a Dutch ‘abortion ship’ to pay a visit to the harbor of Dublin. The Dutch organization “Women on waves”, which aims at providing reproductive health services and catalyzing legal change in coun-

69 Ibid, 34. 70 Ibid, 36. 71 Ibid, 49-50. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 35 tries in which abortus provocatus is illegal, planned to allow Irish women seeking an abortion to board in Dublin. The ship would take them 12 miles from shore, where women could be treated since in the international waters the law of its country of origin applied on the ship. Despite the fact that during this ‘pilot voyage’ to Ireland ‘Women on Waves’ limited their actions to the provision of contraception and information on abortion, counter-campaigns were triggered.72 The Irish pro-life or- ganization ‘Human Life’ sent ‘Women on Waves’ a rosary and a copy of Evan- gelium vitae, The Value and Inviolability of Human Life in which Pope John Paul ii in 1995 reconfirmed the Roman Catholic Church’s views on abortion. In an ac- companying letter, ‘Women on waves’ was reminded of the dignity the Catholic Church wants to uphold in every human person, from fertilization to (natural) death.73 As the Dutch ‘Women on Waves’ and the Irish ‘Human Life’ illustrate, Ire- land and the Netherlands seem to be opposites with regard to the successful enforcement of Catholic directives regarding reproduction. This paragraph will show how much religious determinants of fertility behavior the countries really have in common. Subsequently, attention is focused on the way Dutch historiogra- phy has dealt with the influence of religion on demography.

4.1 The comparability of Irish and Dutch Catholics

To what extent are demographic characteristics of Catholic population groups in the Netherlands and Ireland comparable? Graph 3 offers the possibility to compare marital fertility rates and patterns of the Republic of Ireland, England and Wales, the Netherlands and the two Dutch provinces of Limburg and Noord-Brabant. Obviously, England and Wales lead the fertility transition: by 1870, marital fertility was already declining steadily in these parts of Britain. Before the Second World War, fertility rates reached their lowest level to stabilize after 1945. As graph 3 shows, the development of the Dutch marital fertility unmistakably bore elements of the last phase of the European demographic transition. The de- cline of the fertility rates, however, started much later than in England and Wales and continued to decline a decade after the English and Welsh fertility drop had been halted. Moreover, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century the Dutch fertility rates have been much higher than those across the Channel. Even during the 1970s, the differences between birth rates in the Netherlands and Eng- land and Wales were still apparent. 74

72 Women on Waves, ‘Ireland in short’ (2001). Retrieved January, 26, 2005 from http:// www.womenonwaves.org/article-1020.360-en.html 73 Human Life International (Ireland), ‘Letter to the Women on Waves’ (June 21, 2001). Retrieved January, 26, 2005 from http://www.iol.ie/~hlii/women.html 74 In 1971, the crude birth rate of the Netherlands was 17.2, that of England and Wales 16.0; in 1975/76, the crude birth rates were 12.9 and 11.9 respectively. Coward (1980) 34. 36 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The Irish fertility pattern developed differently from both that of the Nether- lands and from England and Wales. During the last decades of the nineteenth cen- tury, marital fertility increased and continued to do so during the start of the twen- tieth century, surpassing the level of the Dutch fertility rate just prior to 1915. From that year on the marital fertility rate began to decline in Ireland too. The level of marital fertility, however, remained above that of the Netherlands and much above that of England and Wales.

425

375

325

275

225

175

Births per 1000 married125 women (aged 15-45)

75

5 0 75 0 85 0 95 0 5 0 15 0 25 0 35 0 4 0 55 0 5 87 8 88 8 9 8 0 90 91 9 2 9 93 9 4 9 95 9 6 96 1 1 1 1 18 1 19 1 1 1 19 1 1 1 19 1 1 1 19 1

R. of Ireland England and Wales Netherlands Limburg Noord-Brabant

Graph 3 Marital fertility 1870-1970: births per 1000 married women aged (15-45) in the Repuclic of Ire- land, England and Wales, the Netherlands, Limburg and Noord-Brabant. Source: Kennedy (1975) 176 and Hofstee (1981) 132.75

The contrast between patterns and levels of the fertility decline in the Netherlands and Ireland disappears when the demographic situation of the latter is compared with the Catholic part of the Netherlands only – the provinces Limburg and Noord- Brabant. Just like Ireland, the Catholic south of the Netherlands did not witness a decline in fertility prior to 1910. Afterwards, Limburg and Noord-Brabant fertility rates fell much faster than that of Ireland, which showed a much more steady declining pattern. By 1950, however, the Limburg and Noord-Brabant patterns had

75 For Ireland the periods or years were 1870-72, 1880-82, 1890-92, 1900-02, 1910-12, 1925-27, 1935-37, 1945-47, 1950-52, 1961 and 1966; For England and Wales the periods or years were 1871-75, 1881-90, 1891-1900, 1901-05, 1911-15, 1926, 1936, 1946, 1951, 1960 and 1965. Rates of missing years have been interpolated. Kennedy (1975) 176. For the Nether- lands, Limburg and Noord-Brabant five yearly averages are used. Hofstee (1981) 132. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 37 caught up with those of Ireland and from that year on the patterns as well as the lev- els of marital fertility were similar. In 1950, the number of children born per 1000 married women between 15 and 45 years was 248 in Ireland and 245 in Limburg; in 1960 both rates had fallen to 190 and 195 respectively. During the 1960s, the Irish fertility rate remained stable at 190; only by 1965 Noord-Brabant caught up with Ireland and Limburg and reached the level of 189. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Catholics in Ireland and the south of the Netherlands not only shared a faith, they also showed a similar lack of interest to participate in the last phase of the demographic transition – though until the 1970s fertility rates in Noord-Brabant and Limburg were higher than those in the Republic of Ireland. Only two decades later, however, the situa- tion was reversed and a clash between Dutch and Irish ideas on the religious aspect of reproduction took place in the harbor of Dublin. Bearing that in mind, it might be interesting to see how receptive the Dutch Catholics have been to their Church’s doctrine compared to their Irish co-religionists. Irish historiography has suggested that, for decades, Irish Catholics converted their socio-political position, economic deprivation and moral rules into extremely high fertility rates. How did the Catho- lic reproduction pattern in the Netherlands contrast to that?

4.2 Dutch historiography on denominations and demography

In the Netherlands, the issue of the religious determinants of demographic behav- ior emerged from the debate on the Dutch fertility decline during the last century. Research on this demographic phenomenon in the Netherlands has revolved around two Dutch characteristics of the process. In comparison with other coun- tries in Western Europe the marital fertility rate remained high during the start of the twentieth century – as was the case in Ireland. On the other hand, the percent- age of ever-married remained quite low. In addition, the study of the development of Dutch fertility centered on large regional differences in the fertility rates from the start of the nineteenth century onwards, which resulted in a series of mono- graphs.76 The debate on the origins of the Dutch fertility pattern and its many regional variations culminated during the fifties and sixties of the twentieth cen- tury. Some decades later, the debate was continued by a fresh levy of historians and social scientists with a different view on the matter. Both parts of the discussion have been summarized, in Dutch as well as in English, in several historiographical

76 Theo Engelen, Fertiliteit, arbeid, mentaliteit. De vruchtbaarheid in Nederlands-Limburg, 1850-1960 (Assen 1987), Hans Hillebrand, Van motivatie tot acceptatie: een onderzoek naar de daling van de vruchtbaarheid in de provincies Utrecht en Groningen, 1879-1960 (Nijmegen 1991), Kok (1991) and Piet van Cruyningen, Behoudend maar buigzaam: boeren in West- Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 1650-1850 (Wageningen 2000). 38 mixing ovaries and rosaries

publications.77 Only in recent years have Dutch demographic historians started cooperating with colleagues in the rest of Europe, the United States and Asia in the course of which process the Dutch case finally was included in the international discussion.

4.2.1 Hofstee and the secondary importance of religion The sociologist Evert Hofstee from Wageningen University started the debate on the Dutch fertility decline. In 1954, Hofstee analyzed the large geographical differ- ences between birth rates in the Netherlands.78 Hofstee developed a particular out- look on the explanation of the phenomenon that became the trademark of his re- search and publications for decades.79 In his view, until 1850 Dutch fertility was characterized by the ‘agrarian-crafts reproductive pattern’, an approach that corre- sponded with the thesis of the ‘Western European marriage pattern’ introduced by John Hajnal a decade later.80 Just as Hajnal did with regard to the whole of Western Europe, Hofstee appointed postponement or renouncement of marriage as the most important means of regulating the size of the population in the Netherlands. Matrimony, Hofstee argued, could only be entered into in case a farm or traditional enterprise became available, often after the death or retirement of the father of the groom. Brothers and sisters, Hofstee continued, would stay unmarried and went to live with the new head of the household. This would also explain the rise of the extended family during the eighteenth century. However well considered his approach was, monographs published on the demographic characteristics of various regions undermined the thesis of Hofstee:

77 Frans van Poppel, ‘De differentiële vruchtbaarheid in Nederland in historisch perspec- tief: de invloed van religie’, Bevolking en gezin 3 (1974) 329-347, 331-334; Engelen (1987) 20-27; Theo Engelen and Hans Hillebrand, ’De daling van de vruchtbaarheid in de negen- tiende en twintigste eeuw: een historiografisch overzicht met bijzondere aandacht voor Nederland’, Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden 105 (1990) 354-367, 354-358; Theo Engelen and Hans Hillebrand, ‘Fertility and nuptiality in the Nether- lands, 1850-1960’, Population Studies 40 (1986) 487-503, 488-489. 78 Evert W. Hofstee, Regionale verscheidenheid in de ontwikkeling van het aantal geboorten in Nederland in de 2e helft van de negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1954) 59-100. 79 Evert W. Hofstee, ‘De groei van de Nederlandse bevolking’, Drift en koers: een halve eeuw sociale verandering in Nederland (Assen 1962), Ibid, ‘Enkele opmerkingen over de ont- wikkeling van de huwelijksvruchtbaarheid in Nederland’, Onderzoek en overdracht: socio- logische opstellen voor prof.dr. F. van Heek (Rotterdam 1972), Ibid (1981). 80 John Hajnal, ‘European Marriage Patterns in Perspective’ in: D.V. Glass, D.E.C. Eversley (ed.), Population in History (Londen 1965) 101-143. For a comparison between the theses of Hofstee and that of Hajnal see Van Poppel (1992) 117-122 and Theo Engelen, ‘The Hajnal hypothesis and transition theory’, Theo Engelen and Arthur P. Wolf (ed.), Marriage and the Family in Eurasia: Perspectives on the Hajnal Hypothesis (Amsterdam 2005) forthcom- ing. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 39 the ‘agrarian-crafts reproductive pattern’ was scarcely found in any Dutch region.81 In 1981, Hofstee published a reconsideration of his approach.82 In spite of the fact that the revised thesis cleared the way for regional differences in the ‘agrarian- crafts reproductive pattern’, Hofstee really considered these to be variations of the same pattern.83 While designing a scheme for Dutch fertility and nuptiality behav- ior, Hofstee drew up a remarkable division of the Netherlands into districts with a similar demography. With regard to nuptiality, Hofstee argued that a line could be drawn from the northwestern part of the Netherlands to the southeastern part. To the west of this line, clay areas were situated where the population practiced a low marital age and a high marital rate. To the east of the line, the sand areas revealed a reverse pattern: the population married at a high age and a large part remained sin- gle.84 According to Hofstee, the Dutch pattern of fertility divided the Netherlands in similar parts and, like nuptiality, developed from the west to the east. Another line could be drawn, now from the mid-west (at the latitude of the city of Haarlem) to the mid-east (at the latitude of the city of Arnhem) of the country. North of this line, the municipal marital fertility was lower than 35‰ whereas to the south of the line the permillage was higher.85 Even though the economic structure of the regions provided the Netherlands with a solid base for the demographic variations, Hofstee continued, norms and values performed an effect of their own too. A socio-cultural change, which Hofstee referred to as the rise of the “modern dynamic cultural pattern”, caused transformations of traditions from the Renais- sance onwards.86 The crucial willingness to accept changes in behavior, he under- lined, would be present only if the transformations implied improvements in life. In the form of the population’s positive attitude towards family planning this ‘mental willingness’ extended from the northwest to the southeast of the Nether- lands, Hofstee stated. Certain variables like market-oriented production, urbaniza- tion and available systems of communication supposedly have been conditions under which the ‘mental willingness’ with regard to birth control developed. None of them though, the author argued, was decisive.87 Between 1954 and 1981 Hofstee might have changed his perspective on the causes of regional differences in Dutch demographic patterns; he did not alter his ideas about the relative importance of religion in determining demographic behav-

81 Ad van der Woude, ‘De omvang en samenstelling van de huishouding in Nederland in het verleden’ in: AAG Bijdragen 15 (Wageningen 1970) 202-241. 82 Hofstee (1981). 83 Ibid, 14-17. 84 Ibid, 20-25. 85 Hofstee (1981) 25-30, Engelen and Hillebrand (1986) 487-503 and Boonstra and Van der Woude(1984) 1-59. 86 Hofstee (1981) 32-35. 87 Ibid, 13-64. 40 mixing ovaries and rosaries

ior during both the pre-industrial and the industrial age. Concerning the slow onset of the restricted birth frequency in the Netherlands, “a direct influence of ideological relations, in particular of Catholicism, do not offer any explanation,” Hofstee wrote.88 Catholics, Hofstee continued, varied in the perception on their faith. In Belgium, for example, they were pious and still the fertility decline pre- ceded that in the Netherlands. Dutch demography contrasted with the Belgian and that of other Western-European countries, because from 1875 onwards well-orga- nized denominationalism in the Netherlands imposed a kind of prudery on the non-confessional part of society. Hofstee called this phenomenon ‘asymmetrical tolerance’.89 Yet with regard to the late start and the languid pace of the fertility decline in the Netherlands, Hofstee concluded, religion itself was of secondary importance.

4.2.2 Following up on Hofstee Hofstee’s mapping of the Dutch demography during the transition period and his rather explicit ideas on the origins of patterns of fertility and nuptiality could count on the attention of his colleagues. His ideas on how religion in the Netherlands determined fertility, however, provoked a particular fierce discussion among demo- graphic historians and social scientists. In this matter, the sociologist Frederik van Heek from Leiden University became Hofstee’s primary opponent.90 In 1954, Van Heek published a study focusing on the slow decline of the fertil- ity rate among Roman Catholics in the Netherlands.91 In his opinion, the fact that Catholics lagged behind in the practice of family planning was one of the most important factors, if not the most important factor, that brought about the slow pace with which the Netherlands reached the general European level of fertility

88 Ibid, 55. For a short overview of his perspective on religious determinants of demo- graphic behavior, see also Ibid 38-39 and 55-62. 89 Ibid, 58-64. 90 The debate between Van Heek and Hofstee was started by the former and published completely in an issue of the magazine Mens en Maatschappij. Frederik van Heek, ‘Het Nederlandse geboortepatroon en de godsdienstfactor gedurende de laatste halve eeuw’, Mens en Maatschappij 38 (1963) 81-103; Evert Hofstee, ‘Het proces der geboortedaling in Nederland, 1850-1960: een antwoord aan Van Heek’, Ibid, 103-133; Frederik van Heek, ‘Nogmaals: het Nederlandse geboortepatroon en de godsdienstfactor gedurende de laatste halve eeuw: een antwoord op het commentaar van Hofstee’, Ibid, 257-268; Evert Hofstee, ‘Nogmaals: het proces der geboortedaling in Nederland, 1850-1960: een antwoord op het antwoord van Van Heek’, Ibid, 269-277. 91 Frederik van Heek, Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieken. Een demogra- fisch-sociologische studie van een geëmancipeerde minderheidsgroep (Leiden 1954), summarized in English in Ibid, ‘Roman Catholicism and fertility in the Netherlands: demographic aspects of minority status’, Population Studies 10 (1956) 125-138. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 41 during the twentieth century.92 The Dutch Catholic demographic behavior differed from that of Belgian and German co-religionists, Van Heek argued, because of the ‘front’-mentality and bigger religious zest that characterized Dutch Catholics. Church regulations, as a consequence, were observed much more keenly.93 Van Heek even underpinned his views with a brief outline of the ethical norms of the Catholic Church.94 Van Heek’s views on the background of Catholic reproduction behavior met with approval among other scholars. His ideas joined in with an international debate on the link between a population group’s minority status and its demo- graphic characteristics.95 In the Netherlands, Van Heek’s rehabilitation of the sig- nificance of religion concerning Dutch fertility developments were supported by the historian John Buissink, working at Delft University. Buissink indicated that the strong opposition of the Roman Catholic Church against the practice of birth control caused the regional differences in the Netherlands. In the Catholic regions, Buissink found, marital fertility declined at least 25 years later than in similar areas populated by non-Catholics.96 Buissink and Van Heek did not manage to convince Hofstee of the autono- mous impact of religious determinants on demographic behavior. Hofstee re- mained a firm believer of his ‘modern dynamic cultural pattern’ and the conse- quential spread of ‘mental willingness’ regarding family planning. No agreement was reached on the subject. Stimulated by the studies on the subject abroad, other scholars resumed the debate. 97 In 1984, Onno Boonstra and Ad van der Woude published the results of a Wageningen University based study on the fertility decline during the period 1850- 1890.98 Using advanced statistical methods, they analyzed the fertility decrease in 375 Dutch municipalities. Reacting against the rather introverted debate between Van Heek and Hofstee, their main point of criticism on the preceding studies was that the discussion had focused too much on the argument of region versus reli-

92 Van Heek (1963) 103. 93 Van Heek (1954) 77-115. 94 Ibid, 14-15. 95 Van Heek (1956), Lincoln Day, ‘Natality and ethnocentrism: some relationships sug- gested by an analysis of Catholic-Protestant differentials’, Population Studies 22 (1968) 27-50, P. Neal Ritchey, ‘The effect of minority group status on fertility: a re-examination of concepts’, Population Studies 29 (1975) 249-257, R. Jiobu and H. Marshall, ‘Minority status and family size: a comparison of explanations’, Population Studies 31 (1977) 509-517. 96 John Buissink, De analyse van regionale verschillen in de huwelijksvruchtbaarheid: een me- tho- dologisch-historische verkenning (Delft 1970) 342-346, summarized in English in John Buissink, ‘Regional Differences in Marital Fertility in the Netherlands in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century’, Population Studies 25 (1971) 353-374. 97 Lesthaeghe and Wilson (1986), Engelen and Hillebrand (1990) 359-360. 98 Boonstra and Van der Woude (1984). 42 mixing ovaries and rosaries

gion. The deadlock in the debate on the determinants of demographic behavior could be overcome by drawing in other variables, Boonstra and Van der Woude argued, like mortality, migration, urbanization and illiteracy and by sorting out their relationship with the fertility decline. A second point of criticism concerned the methods used in previous research on the fertility decline. According to Boonstra and Van der Woude, Van Heek and Hofstee had been studying and dis- cussing two different aspects of the fertility transition. This criticism led to an important methodological innovation: the authors separately analyzed the level of fertility on the one hand and the development of it on the other. According to Boon- stra and Van der Woude, regional differences in the development of fertility in the Netherlands were to be explained mainly by differences in mortality and by the type of soil (sand or clay). While analyzing the fertility differences, Boonstra and Van der Woude found a different elucidating factor: the percentage of Catholics in the municipality partly accounted for differences in fertility behavior. Boonstra and Van der Woude stated, “it may be noticed that the late start [of the fertility decline, ms] seems to corre- spond to the Netherlands’ later industrialization. The role of religion in this whole affair should not be forgotten, for it has also played an important part in the Neth- erlands’ slow adaptation to the general European levels of fertility.”99 At this point, the authors left the subject of the role that religion played in the development of fertility in the Netherlands. Whereas Boonstra and Van der Woude concentrated on the second half of the nineteenth century, Frans van Poppel from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (nidi) in The Hague engaged in the topic of the twentieth century fertility decline.100 Consequently, unlike the research of Boonstra and Van der Woude, Van Poppel’s studies were not hampered by a lack of sources. Based primarily on the census of 1960, Van Poppel paid attention to data on the number of children, occupation, religion, income bracket, marital age and marital cohort. In this way, causal connections were shown, for example between Catholics and a high level of fertility. According to Van Poppel, Catholics employed in agriculture, Catholic laborers and self-employed living in the southern and some of the western parts of the Netherlands were the most important originators of the late fertility decline.101 The deviating fertility behavior of these social groups apparently could not solely be explained by their economic position. While comparing Catholics with Protestants of a similar socio-economic level and who lived in the same region, Catholicism still turned out to account for a higher level of fertility. Hence,

99 Ibid, 12-13. 100 Frans van Poppel, ‘Late Fertility Decline in the Netherlands. The influence of Reli- gious Denomination, Socio-Economic Group and Region’, European Journal of Population i (1985) 347-373. 101 Ibid, 361-365. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 43

Van Poppel concluded that the “Catholic moral and intellectual milieu” was responsible for delaying the fertility decline.102 This conclusion confirmed Van Poppel’s conjecture regarding the importance of religion in explaining Dutch demography. In a 1983 article, Van Poppel had already shown that the economic and religious characteristics of certain social groups enhanced their delaying effect on the Dutch fertility decline.103 Among Catholics, the ‘family economy’ was in use until far into the twentieth century; much longer than among Protestants. Notwithstanding the importance of this eco- nomic factor, Catholic religion remained a key factor in Van Poppel’s contribution to the explanation of the Dutch fertility decline and in his further research.104 Some years after the publication of Van Poppel’s findings on the role of religion in the late fertility decline, Theo Engelen and Hans Hillebrand published the results of their Nijmegen University based research on the subject, covering the whole of the period between 1850 and 1960.105 This study tied in with some of the methods and theories produced by previous studies, but stood out in various aspects as well – for example by its use of aggregated data on the provincial level. Just like Van Poppel, Engelen and Hillebrand acknowledged an economic stimu- lus to introduce family planning. Whereas Van Poppel referred to religion as the factor that curbs the introduction of family planning, Engelen and Hillebrand termed that factor the ‘mental filter’.106 Following the example of Boonstra and Van der Woude, they separated the analysis of the level of fertility and its development through time. The results of the study by Engelen and Hillebrand partly confirmed the conclusions of Boonstra and Van der Woude. While explaining the differences in the development of fertility, the influence of economic motivations appeared to be much stronger than that of mentality.107 From the analysis of the differences in levels of marital fertility, however, the reverse had to be concluded. When it con- cerned levels of fertility rates, the factor of mentality, measured by the percentages of Catholics and orthodox Protestants in a province, seemed to play the most sig- nificant role.108 Concerning the Netherlands on the whole, the research of Engelen and Hillebrand showed that conservative religions, like Catholicism, strongly influenced the provincial levels of fertility whereas the degree of economic mod- ernization considerably affected the development of fertility. Engelen and Hille-

102 Ibid, 368-371. 103 Frans van Poppel, Demografische ontwikkelingen in Nederland, 1850-1950 (Voorburg 1983). 104 Frans van Poppel, (1992) 272. 105 Engelen and Hillebrand (1986) and (1990). 106 Ibid, 364. 107 Ibid, 499-501. 108 Ibid, 501-502. 44 mixing ovaries and rosaries

brand indicated that, beside the ‘mental filter’ of conservatism, slow industrializa- tion caused the deviant demographic development of the Netherlands.109 The ‘mental filter’, applied by Engelen and Hillebrand in their 1986 research, returned in Engelen’s 1987 study of the fertility decline in the province of Lim- burg.110 In this book, Engelen tested the conclusions resulting from the research by Hillebrand and himself on the provincial level while using municipal and individ- ual data from Limburg on the same period (1850-1960). The results were com- pletely different: in this Catholic province, economy appeared to be the factor that throughout the research period explained the differences in the fertility levels be- tween municipalities more and more. Engelen suggested that a ‘mental filter’ was at work in Limburg, pulling back the effects of the economic stimulus of family planning, but that the effect of this ‘mental filter’ declined throughout the twenti- eth century. Even in its reduced form however, Engelen alleged that this ‘filter’ consisted of much more than religion only, hence his use of the concept of ‘men- tality’.111 The other components of the ‘mental filter’, he continued, must have been cultural conventions of a more general character and pointed to specific regional traditions.112 Engelen was well aware that this left his study with an open end; con- sequently, he concluded his book with the question of what is hidden behind that ‘regional culture’.

4.2.3 Opening up the debate: international publications and cooperation Since the 1990s, articles on Dutch demographic history have increasingly been published in English. The result was that the audience for Dutch demographic his- tory increased significantly. Moreover, important findings and perceptions on causes of determinants of fertility and nuptiality could be discussed in a broader context than the Dutch historiography. Jan Kok for example in 1990 summarized and translated in English the results of his dissertation on illegitimate births in the province of Noord-Holland.113 In addition, he translated some of his ideas on life course analysis, a demographic approach advocated by him.114 In 1998, Van Poppel

109 Ibid, 503; Engelen and Hillebrand (1990) 365. 110 Engelen (1987). 111 Ibid, 20-33. 112 Ibid, 184-187, 195. 113 Jan Kok, ‘The moral nation: Illegitimacy and bridal pregnancy in the Netherlands from 1600 to the present’, Economic and social history in the Netherlands ii (1990) 7-35. 114 Jan Kok, ‘The Challenge of Strategy: A Comment’, International review of social history 47 (2002) 465-486. See also Jan Kok, ‘Transities en trajecten: de levensloopbenadering in de sociale geschiedenis’, Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis 26 (2000) 309-329 and Jan Kok, Kees Mandemakers and Henk Wals, “Toen scharrelde ze met haar zoodje naar een derde- achterkamer”: verhuizen als bestaansstrategie, Amsterdam 1890-1940’, Tijdschrift voor so- ciale geschiedenis 29 (2003) 333-360. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 45 published his 1992 findings on marriage patterns in the Netherlands in English.115 Besides nuptiality patterns Van Poppel applied himself to the study of mortality in the Netherlands which resulted in various English publications too.116 More re- cently, family structures and kinship have become part of his research curriculum as well.117 At the same time that Dutch demographic analyses became available for a broader, English-speaking public, scholars in the Netherlands started cooperating more often with colleagues abroad. Van Poppel has been working with many inter- national scholars, amongst others the statistician and geographer Jona Schelle- kens from the Hebrew University in Israel.118 In 1995 Theo Engelen started the comparative study project ‘Population and Society in Taiwan and the Netherlands’ with historians and anthropologists from the Dutch N.W. Posthumus Institute, Stanford University in the usa and the Academia Sinica in Taiwan.119 One of the articles stemming from this project was written by Engelen and Kok and discussed permanent celibacy and late marriage in the Netherlands between 1890 and

115 Frans van Poppel, ‘Nineteenth-century remarriage patterns in the Netherlands.’ Jour- nal of Interdisciplinary History, 28 (1998) 343-383. See also Frans van Poppel, ‘De tweede echt, een duivelsgift? Weduwen en weduwnaars in Nederland, negentiende en begin twintigste eeuw’, Jaarboek van het Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie en van het Iconographisch Bureau 48 (1994) 176-213. 116 I.M.A. Joung, J.J. Glerum, Frans van Poppel, J.W.P.F. Kardaun and Johan P. Mackenbach, ‘The contribution of specific causes of death to mortality differences by mari- tal status in the Netherlands’, European journal of public health 6 (1996) 142-149 and J.H. Wolleswinkel-van den Bosch, Frans van Poppel, E. Tabeau and Johan P. Mackenbach, ‘Mor- tality decline in the Netherlands in the period 1850-1992. A turning-point analysis’, Social science and medicine 47 No. 4 (1998) 429-444. 117 Frans van Poppel, ‘Children in one-parent families: Survival as an indicator of the role of the parents’, Journal of Family History 25 (2000) 269-290; Frans van Poppel, G. Bloothoofd, D. Gerritzen and J. Verduin, ‘Naming for kin and the development of mod- ern family structures: An analysis of a rural region in the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’, The History of the Family. An international quarterly 4 (1999) 261-296; Erik Beekink, Fans van Poppel and Aart C. Liefbroer, ‘Surviving the loss of the par- ent in a nineteenth-century Dutch provincial town’, Journal of Social History 32 (1999) 641-669. 118 Frans van Poppel, Jona Schellekens and Aart C. Liefbroer, ‘Religious differentials in infant and child mortality in Holland, 1855-1912’, Population Studies 56 (2002) 277-289; Frans van Poppel and Jona Schellekens, ‘Religious differentials in marital fertility in Hol- land 1860-1910’ (Unpublished paper Social Science History Association Conference Baltimore usa, 2003). 119 The project ‘Population and Society in Taiwan and The Netherlands’ is headed by Chuang Yin-chang (Academia Sinica, Taiwan), Arthur Wolf (Stanford University, usa) and Theo Engelen (Nijmegen University, the Netherlands). This project entails a series of com- parisons between Dutch and Taiwanese nuptiality, fertility and mortality. See Engelen and Wolf (2005). 46 mixing ovaries and rosaries

1960.120 Kok also worked with the sociologist Jan van Bavel from Leuven University in Belgium.121 What effect did these international publications, comparisons and cooperation have on the status quo of the research on religious determinants of fer- tility and nuptiality in the Netherlands? After having studied religious characteristics in infant and child mortality in the city of The Hague during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Schellekens and Van Poppel in 2003 presented the results of their research on reli- gious differentials in marital fertility, using the same data.122 The papers were the result of a cooperative research project on the deviating demographic behavior of Jews in the Netherlands during the transition period. In the context of Jewish demography and religion, the authors questioned the socio-economic and demo- graphic origins of religious characteristics, the religious ideology of the groups and the extent to which Jews appeared to be ‘forerunners’ in the fertility decline rather than Catholics and Protestants. They also studied the ‘proximate determinants’ responsible for the religious differences. Before turning to the sample of couples married in The Hague between 1857 and 1902 that formed the base of their research, Van Poppel and Schellekens briefly discussed Goldscheider’s ‘characteristics’ and ‘particularized theology’ ap- proaches to study religious determinants, as well as the ‘minority group status’ approach. They also paid attention to the ‘social milieu hypothesis’. This theory related group behavior to its social context and opposed the ‘minority group status’ approach in that the former connected a high fertility to a minority position and the latter argued that such a social position would lead to a low fertility.123 Van Poppel and Schellekens did not value all theories they discussed positively. The explana- tory power of the ‘particularized ideology hypothesis’ was mistrusted by the authors in advance of their analysis, as it failed to explain religious determinants of demography prior to the phase of the demographic transition when fertility levels of Protestants and Catholics were similar, Van Poppel and Schellekens argued. The authors, however, noted that the ‘minority group status’ hypothesis could pro- vide an explanation for Jewish demographic behavior, as previous research from

120 Theo Engelen and Jan Kok, ‘Permanent celibacy and late marriage in the Netherlands, 1890-1960’, Population 58 (2003) 69-102. 121 Jan van Bavel and Jan Kok, ‘The role of religion in the Dutch marital fertility transition: starting, spacing and stopping in the heart of the Netherlands 1845-1945’ (Unpublished paper Social Science History Association Conference Baltimore usa, 2003) and Jan van Bavel and Jan Kok, ‘Birth spacing in the Netherlands. The effects of family composition, occupation and religion on birth intervals, 1820-1885’, European Journal of Population 20 (2004) 119-140. 122 Van Poppel, Schellekens and Liefbroer (2002) and Van Poppel and Schellekens (2003). 123 Ibid, 3-4. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 47 the ‘Princeton Project’ indicated that, indeed, Jews in Europe were earlier in lower- ing their fertility than Protestants and Catholics.124 The research of Van Poppel and Schellekens on the Jews in The Hague during the second half of the nineteenth century did not confirm the outcomes of the ‘Princeton Project’. The Hague Jews showed an even higher marital fertility rate than their Christian townswomen which was seemingly caused by their poor socio- economic situation rather than their religion. “Our hazard analyses show that the characteristics hypothesis explains much, if not most, of the high marital fertility observed among Jews. Thus, Dutch Jews were not ‘forerunners’ in the fertility decline,” Van Poppel and Schellekens concluded.125 With that, Van Poppel and Schellekens not only contradicted the results from ‘Princeton Project’ but also those of a recent research by Van Bavel and Kok, who found that Jews in the prov- ince of Utrecht did show signs of a more ‘modern’ demographic pattern.126 More- over, Van Poppel and Schellekens contradicted the outcomes of their own previous research. In a 2002 article they had argued that the deviating demography of the The Hague Jews could not be explained by the ‘characteristics approach’ as it showed that “socio-economic and demographic characteristics do not explain any of the religious differentials in infant or child mortality.”127 Van Poppel and Schelle- kens in 2002 assumed that the life style of the Jews, in particular their social isola- tion, protected children from infectious disease and hence determined a lower mortality. It seemed inconsistent that the deviating mortality behavior of Jews was caused by their life style whereas their fertility behavior was only accounted for by their social position. In Van Poppel and Schellekens’ 2003 research, socio-economic variables failed to explain the high marital fertility of Catholics. Consequently, the authors tried to find a different explanation than that offered by the ‘characteristics approach’. “Since high marital fertility among Catholics is more often found in places where they constitute a minority rather than where they are a majority, as in Belgium, the third [social milieu, ms] hypothesis would seem to be a more appropriate explana- tion for the relatively high marital fertility of Catholics (…).”128 High fertility among Catholics was caused by their social milieu in which they constituted a minority, Van Poppel and Schellekens argued. But Irish data indicated that Catholics not only had high birth rates if they constituted a social minority. Moreover, the study

124 Massimo Livi-Bacci, ‘Social-group forerunners of fertility control in Europe’, Coals and Watkins (1986) 182-200. 125 Ibid, 14. 126 “Finally, although the number of Jews in our sample is very small, we found signifi- cantly earlier stopping [behavior i.e. timing of stopping fertility, ms] among Jewish mar- riages, even after controlling for occupation”. Van Bavel and Kok (2003), 20. 127 Van Poppel, Schellekens and Liefbroer (2002) 288. 128 Ibid, 14. 48 mixing ovaries and rosaries

of Catholic fertility behavior in the usa has shown that the decline of the religious demographic characteristics in this population group had nothing to do with obtaining a majority position but rather with a change in the authority of the Roman Catholic Church in matters of fertility control.129 Obviously, several of the explanations Van Poppel and Schellekens have offered for Jewish and Catholic fer- tility behavior contrasted with those offered by other scholars. Undoubtedly, that aspect of their work partly accounted for their valuable contribution to the debate on religious determinants of Dutch demography. Equally important but less controversial were the results of the 2003 article of Engelen and Kok.130 The authors wondered if permanent celibacy has been an acci- dental consequence of the postponement of marriage or whether it ought to be regarded as an independent phenomenon due to the European marriage restraint. Using data from a sample of the 1890-1909 birth cohort of the whole of the Nether- lands, the authors compared the life courses of people who remained single throughout life with those marrying late. Permanent celibacy appeared to be in- tended rather than the result of marrying at an advanced age, though correlation between permanent celibacy and age at marriage differed between regions and social subpopulations. Their regression analysis showed that among the women in their data collection religion – and Catholicism in particular – was as important as social status in determining permanent celibacy and late marriage, and much more important than mobility.131 The results of Van Bavel’s Ph D research on birth control in the Belgian city of Leuven during the last five decades of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century – published in Dutch – appeared to be important for the histori- ography of the Netherlands too.132 Using three generations of Leuven citizens’ data on an individual level, he proved that even before the fertility transition, postpone- ment of pregnancy was a common means of family planning. The new aspect of

129 Charles Westoff and Elise Jones, ‘The end of “Catholic” fertility’ in: Demography 16 issue 2 (1979) 209-217. 130 Engelen and Kok (2003) 67-96. 131 Ibid, 91-92. 132 Jan van Bavel, Van natuurlijke naar gecontroleerde vruchtbaarheid? Geboortenbeperking in Leuven (1846-1910) (Leuven 2002). See also ibid, ‘Does an effect of marriage duration on pre-transition fertility signal parity-dependent control? An empirical test in nineteenth- century Leuven, Belgium’, Population Studies 57 (2003) 55-62; Ibid, ‘Birth spacing as a fam- ily strategy. Evidence from 19th century Leuven, Belgium’, The History of the Family; and International Quarterly 8 (2003) 585-604; ibid, ‘Diffusion effects in the European fertility transition: historical evidence from within a Belgian town (1846-1910)’, European Journal of Population 20 (2004) 63-85 and ibid, ‘Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transi- tion in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium’, Population Studies 58 (2004) 95-107. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 49 the fertility decline during the demographic transition, then, was not caused by the delay of births but by the renunciation of fertility. Van Bavel’s research gave a bright insight into the social determinants of the fertility decline. The Leuven bourgeoisie, Van Bavel demonstrated, was the first class to be motivated to limit births: during the nineteenth century children be- came relatively more expensive as the struggle for prestige and power demanded for more investment in a smaller number of sons and daughters. In addition, the decline of infant and child mortality made sure more children stayed alive. Renun- ciation of birth hence became the best way to regulate the lineage. Probably, Van Bavel stated, the bourgeoisie and particularly the highly skilled Leuven inhabitants among them were the first to get access to information about birth control. The middle class proved to have an exemplary role for the working population of the Belgian city: during the late nineteenth century, the lower class took to family con- trol as well.133 Van Bavel thus showed that the social costs of regulating fertility were not high in the all-Catholic city of Leuven. As the bourgeoisie, who took the lead in the fertility decline, could practice birth control with a good conscience, the work- ing class that followed suit apparently felt it could do so too. Van Bavel and Kok recently combined forces and published an article on the way religious denominations influenced the timing and pace of the Dutch marital fertility transition.134 For their research, the authors investigated correlations be- tween the timing of the first birth (starting), the length of the intervals between births (spacing) and the timing of the last birth (stopping). Van Bavel and Kok used life course analysis data from married couples in the province of Utrecht, in the center of the Netherlands, whose children were born between 1845 and 1945. Point of departure in Van Bavel and Kok’s research was the notion that charac- teristics of Catholic and orthodox Protestant demography resulted from a ‘tradi- tional’ mentality. Liberal Protestants and people without a denomination suppos- edly had a ‘modern’ mentality. Just like Van Poppel and Schellekens, the authors referred to Goldscheider’s ‘particularized ideology’ approach. In addition, they listed various considered aspects of the denominations that would motivate spac- ing or stopping behavior. In the first place, the emphasis on literacy and education among Protestants, Van Bavel and Kok argued, might have resulted in a “greater susceptibility to scientific insights”. Catholics, after all, renounced breastfeeding on moral grounds whereas Protestants knew that breastfeeding resulted in a lower infant mortality. Protestants, Van Bavel and Kok continued, might have been more open to information from outside their religious group than Catholics. Further- more, “there’s a difference of opinion about who’s in charge of the things in life”,

133 Jan van Bavel, ‘Van uitstel tot afstel: oude en nieuwe vormen van vruchtbaarheids- controle in Leuven, 1846-1910’, Bevolking en Gezin 31 (2002) 95-116, 106-112. 134 Van Bavel and Kok (2003). 50 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the authors stated. Like orthodox Protestants, Catholics were inclined to submit to the supposed will of God. A third aspect of the denominations taken into account by Van Bavel and Kok is the role of marriage. Protestantism favored mutual sup- port between husband and wife, Catholicism on the other hand stressed the matri- monial aim of procreation – which left little room for considering birth control. Fourthly, orthodox Protestants and Catholics tended to conform to their church rules in defense of their identity, Van Bavel and Kok argued. Mechanisms of social control, like punishing pregnant brides, prevented Catholics from experimenting with birth control: in the tightly controlled communities, the risks were too high. Finally, Van Bavel and Kok considered “the creed and pastoral practice” like the Catholic Church’s campaign against breastfeeding.135 With the enumeration of religious aspects that possibly accounted for differ- ences between denominations in stopping and spacing of pregnancies, Van Bavel and Kok rendered an account of Goldscheider’s rejection of the oversimplified split between traditional demography-stimulating Catholicism and progressive demography-motivating Protestantism. Subsequently the authors turned to their quantitative research. Using advanced statistical methods that enabled them to control for socio-economic characteristics, Van Bavel and Kok showed that liberal Protestants tended to show ‘stopping behavior’ more so than orthodox Protestants or Catholics. Their article, then, once again confirmed the prevalent belief that reli- gion determined Dutch demography.

4.2.4 Dutch demographic historiography: a case of absent religion In some respects, the Dutch demographic historiography is reminiscent of the debate in Irish publications on the subject. Like their Irish colleagues, the Dutch scholars all used what Goldscheider and McQuillan called the ‘characteristics approach’ in their attempt to explain demographic differences between religious denominations. The fertility level and patterns of Dutch Catholics, for example, initially were regarded as a product of their social, nuptial, and economic character- istics. Over and over again, Dutch historiography tried to rule out the religious de- terminant by controlling for socio-economic variables. Frans van Poppel, when being confronted with the religious determination of nuptiality patterns, preferred suggesting that data on a different aggregation level could diminish the role of reli- gion – rather than coming to terms with the tricky concept.136 Only in the last resort, Dutch scholars turned to the ‘particularized theology’ approach. Like in Irish his- toriography, religion then suddenly had to account for the noise in the statistics and was assigned a position as the variable that explained for the remainder of the demographic determination.

135 Ibid, 124-126. 136 Van Poppel (1992) 272. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 51

As to what kind of denomination the ‘particularized theology’ approach is mobilized for, Irish historiography was at least clear. The Dutch, however, seemed at a loss in this respect and alternately attribute demographic effects to religion in general and to particular denominations like Catholicism. Having found that Catholicism correlated with certain fertility levels, Boonstra and Ad van der Woude stressed the “role of religion” in the “whole affair” of the late start of the national fertility decline, leaving the reader in doubt whether religion matters, or just the Catholic denomination.137 Boonstra and Van der Woude correctly referred to the fact that the start of the fertility decline at the end of the nineteenth century “is also noteworthy for the first discussions on birth control and the use of contraceptives in the Netherlands, which provoked the founding of the Malthusian League in 1881”138. Unfortunately, they did not discuss whether and how these matters inter- related with the fertility transition. Likewise, Engelen and Hillebrand showed that conservative religions, i.e. Catholicism and orthodox Protestantism, strongly influ- enced the provincial levels of fertility.139 Nevertheless, they referred to a ‘mental fil- ter’ that determined fertility behavior – an elusive term that obscured the discus- sion considerably.140 Engelen in his attempt to explain what the ‘mental filter’ amounted to even utilized (regional) culture, with which he introduced the ulti- mate “bucket without a bottom”-concept.141 Recent developments in demographic historiography have not changed the nature of the debate. In their 2003 study of Jewish versus Protestant and Catholic marital fertility, Van Poppel and Schellekens mentioned approaches like those of Goldscheider and suggested an alternative explanation for deviating demographic characteristics of Catholics: the ‘social milieu hypothesis’.142 Though their attempts to explain the mechanism behind religious determinants of fertility are only to be applauded, their explanation fell short. If the social milieu of a minority group accounted for fertility, how then did that work? And why appeared some Catholics to be sensitive to their social position, resulting in a high fertility rate, whilst others in a similar social position in different countries were not? And why tumbled the fertility rate of Catholics in the Netherlands below the level of their Protestant countrywomen in the 1970s despite their persistent minority position?

137 Boonstra and Van der Woude (1984) 12-13. 138 Ibid 12. 139 Engelen and Hillebrand (1986) 501-502. 140 Engelen and Hillebrand (1990) 364-365. 141 In a lecture on the usefulness of the concept of culture for socio-economic historians, the anthropologist Arthur Wolf stated that the definition of culture is a “bucket without a bottom”. Arthur P. Wolf, ‘Culture is, like law, I say’ (unpublished paper N.W. Posthumus Institute conference, Nijmegen 2000). 142 Van Poppel and Schellekens (2003). 52 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Like Van Poppel and Schellekens’ report, other recent research into the reli- gious characteristics of demography has ventured to put the matter in a different light. Engelen and Kok in their 2003 article showed that Catholic women deliber- ately remained celibate, with which they proved that the renunciation of marriage was really a fertility strategy among Catholics.143 Van Bavel and Kok showed that lib- eral Protestants took to ‘stopping’ behavior before Catholics did. As they drew a conclusion to the findings of their research, however, they ignored taking into account the rather arbitrary number of denominational aspects that, the authors suggested in the start of their article, may have accounted for their demographic characteristics.144 The conclusions of the articles by Engelen, Kok and Van Bavel were important as they substantiate the historiographical ‘rumor’ that religion matters in determining demography. But these scholars did not interpret the rela- tionship between denominations and their deviating demography. Consequently, did not provide an account of the way religion influenced demography, let alone a definition of religion. Regarding the late start of the fertility decline among Dutch Catholics, Van Bavel’s dissertation on the fertility decline in Leuven showed that simply referring to the Catholic country of Belgium as a proof of the absence of religious influence was inadequate: Catholicism was a hard to measure, but con- stant factor behind the social circumstances that determined the fascinating way in which trendsetters of birth control were mimicked by others.145 Without any doubt, the authors discussed belong to the best scholars of their discipline. They have been responsible for mapping the demographic history of the Netherlands, in the course of which they studied the regional levels and devel- opment of an enormous range of aspects like fertility, nuptiality, mortality, migra- tion and life courses. Their methods of research, data collection and analysis have been of the utmost importance for the development of the (historical-) demo- graphic discipline. How could they fall short in their research on the religious determinants of demographic behavior? The Dutch historiography on the subject got bogged down in demographic ‘characteristics’ of denominations and superficial ‘particularized theological’ ex- planations because of the flaw in the onset of the debate. The fact that Hofstee developed a hypothesis like the ‘Western European marriage pattern’ a decade before Hajnal and yet did not succeed in unleashing worldwide scholarly attention is a tragic characteristic of his methods of working. As Hofstee’s scientific atten- tion was focused on the Netherlands, his interest in demography abroad was con- fined to the contrast it offered with the Dutch case. Though he cannot be con- demned for having a particular scholarly interest for the Netherlands, Hofstee

143 Engelen and Kok (2003). 144 Van Bavel and Kok (2003). 145 Van Bavel (2002). denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 53 unjustly did not draw methods and theories from the international debate on deter- minants of demography into the Dutch case. As a result he missed out on many new views from abroad, like those on the role of religion in determining demo- graphic patterns, which could have gained him a considerable insight into the Dutch situation. Besides, Hofstee published only in Dutch, which isolated both the demographic history of the Netherlands and the discussion on the origins of its characteristics.146 The eagerly held debate on determinants of demographic behavior among Dutch scholars that followed, reflected Hofstee’s flaw. He did not develop any defi- nition of the concept of religion; neither did Van Heek and the other researchers that continued the debate. And like Hofstee, they did not inquire into the fertility stimulating effects of Catholicism beyond the obvious Church directives. Despite the efforts of the contributors, the Dutch debate on the determinants of demo- graphic conduct remained as introvert as when Hofstee had started it. With the exception of the work of Van Heek perhaps, scholars hardly drew in fellow Dutch, let alone international historians and sociologists, specialized in religion in gen- eral and Dutch Catholicism in particular. Like Hofstee’s work, many detailed stud- ies on Dutch demography, for example the dissertations of Engelen, Kok and Van Poppel, appeared in Dutch, which made the comparison between determinants of demography difficult.147 The next paragraph analyses theories from the sociology on religion and their possible contribution to an interpretation of demographic characteristics of Dutch Catholics. Some of these theories were developed in the time Hofstee started his research. His hesitance to apply theories and methods from demographers abroad on the Dutch case forced him to find all origins and explanations for fertility and nuptiality characteristics himself. In their efforts to establish the origins of denom- ination specific fertility and nuptiality, scholars following Hofstee’s interest em- ployed little ideas of other disciplines on the way religion possibly operated when affecting fertility rates. As a consequence, they were often caught out re-inventing the wheel.

5 Unraveling the concept of religion: sociological methods

Hofstee could have come to terms with the concept of religion in a demographic context, even without Irish colleagues or Kevin McQuillan showing him the pit-

146 The few publications by Hofstee in English concern articles on the size of the popula- tion, including future expectations of it. See for example Evert Hofstee, ‘Population increase in the Netherlands’, Acta historiae Neerlandicae: studies on the history of the Netherlands 3 (Leiden 1968) 43-125. 147 Engelen (1987), Kok (1991) and Van Poppel (1994). 54 mixing ovaries and rosaries

falls and the benefits of certain methods. Already in 1954 the social scientist Charles Glock from the University of California, Berkeley in the usa developed a model of ‘religion in 5-d’.148 In this model, Glock presented the five dimensions religion in the Western, Christian world supposedly has, being ideological (believ- ing in God and heaven), ritualistic (belonging to a church and attending it), intel- lectual (trying to enlarge the knowledge about religion), experiential (being willing to pray and receive spirituality) and consequential (keeping up with Christian mor- als). Different variations of the ‘religion in 5-d’ have been proposed, but this model still stands as the basic definition of religion.149 Whether Catholics’ deviant demog- raphy has been part of one of the dimensions of religion or whether it was a result, remained obscure even for Glock himself. “Although religions prescribe much of how their adherents ought to think and act in everyday life,” Glock and his collegue Rodney Stark wrote in their book on American piety , “it is not entirely clear the extent to which religious consequences are a part of religious commitment or sim- ply follow from it.”150 Although the bulk of the brainwork on the definition and con- ceptualization of religion had been done by the time Hofstee began his analysis of the late fertility decline in the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands, the sociology of religion by no means was finished. While demographic historians studied fertility behavior and, in that way, stum- bled on the effects of faith, sociologists of religion approached the subject from a dif- ferent angle. Scholars from that discipline investigated the determinants of attach- ment to a religious affiliation or ‘religiosity’ that, on its turn, prescribed to what ex- tent religion influenced individual behavior. In other words: the effect of religion, for example on reproduction, is traced to reasons of religious involvement. Single factors, discussed in paragraph 5.1, have been designated to determine religiosity. In addition, several complex theories have been developed to explain attachment to a church affiliation. Many of these theories, paragraph 5.2 will show, were refuted but at least one proved a valuable contribution to a better understanding of religious involvement. Finally, paragraph 5.3 will reveal what research on religious determin- ants of demography can gain from the theories of the sociology of religion.

5.1 Single factors determining religiosity

While acknowledging the many aspects of religion that offer opportunities to inquire, many sociologists of religion have distinctly marked out their research

148 Charles Glock, Toward a Typology of Religious Orientation (New York 1954), quoted by Felling, Peters and Schreuder (1986) 13. 149 Ibid. See also Thomas Luckmann, The invisible religion: the problem of religion in modern society (New York 1967) and Robert Wuthnow, The consciousness reformation (Berkeley 1976). 150 Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, American piety: the nature of religious commitment (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1968) 14-16. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 55 area. For Dean Hoge, sociologist at the Catholic University of America in Washing- ton and David Roozen from the usa Hartford Institute for Religion Research, the scope of the study of religiosity has been limited in two ways. “First, it is restricted to the study of church membership and participation. We are not concerned with other aspects of religious commitment such as devotionalism, theological beliefs, or religious experience except as they influence church membership and participa- tion. We make no assumption that motivations for church participation are intrin- sically religious in a way that makes them different, for example, from motivations for motor club participation. But we do assume that motivations for church partici- pation are varied and multiple, and that they are partly unconscious.”151 As a conse- quence of this research restriction, many sociological studies on the subject of reli- giosity in general have been based on large quantitative studies in which church membership and participation are selected as quantified variables of religious involvement. To a large extent, the religious involvement of individuals depended on per- sonal features like sex, age, denomination, the size of the religious community, the degree of urbanization of the environment and the level of received education.152 Sociologists found a high religiosity among persons who participated fewest in modern society and who were the furthest removed from it, such as women, elderly people, rural residents and low-educated people.153 Women tended to be more religious than men. “All research on Protestants and Catholics show higher church attendance for women than for men. (…) Females attend church more often, hold more orthodox beliefs, and are more devo- tional – regardless of age, race, education, or subjective social class,” Hoge and Roozen found.154 The uneven participation in the labor force was initially ‘blamed’ for the dissimilarity of religiosity between sexes. But despite the growing number of women involved in work outside the house in the twentieth century, for example in the usa, their religiosity did not equalize to the level of the males.155 Attempts to explain the higher female religiosity by a narrower network of social contacts or the socialization of school-age children failed too. Until now, the correlation between gender and religiosity has not been satisfactorily explained. Another single factor that popped up in research on the determinants of reli- gious involvement was that of denomination. “All research agrees that denomina-

151 Dean Hoge and David Roozen, Understanding church growth and decline: 1950-1978 (New York, 1979) 42. 152 Felling, Peters and Schreuder (1986). 153 Johan Verweij, Secularisering tussen feit en fictie. Een internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek naar de determinanten van religieuze betrokkenheid (Tilburg 1998) 71-75. 154 Hoge and Roozen (1979) 43. 155 See Matthew Sobek, A century of work: gender, labor force participation, and occupational attainment in the United States, 1880-1990 (Minneapolis 1997). 56 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tional differences exist in church participation,” Hoge and Roozen revealed. “In all studies Catholics have the highest level of church attendance, followed by Protes- tants (…).”Explanations for the high religiosity of Catholics could not be maintained for the period after 1965, when church attendance among Catholics declined sharp- ly.156 According to Hoge and Roozen, demographic factors failed to explain denomi- national differences in religiosity. “Rather, they result from group norms main- tained in the denominations and transmitted via socialization and sanctions. Like sex roles, they are social facts not explainable by characteristics of individuals.” The elucidating power of the single factor of denomination resulted in studies on religi- osity of members of interfaith families, which appeared to have a distinctly lower church attendance than that of single faith marriages. “Apparently,” Hoge and Roozen deduced, “a mixed marriage reduces the identity or belonging functions that church-going serves for the family or for its individual members.”157 The third single factor characterizing religious people appeared to be high age: elderly people tended to be more religious than young people. The acknowledged distortion in this factor of religiosity is that is has been primarily investigated in the usa and, according to Hoge and Roozen, explanations for the correlation were to be found in the particular social meaning of religion and its cultural context in America. But even while explaining for religiosity in the usa, circumstances and events in a certain period of time that influenced the religious involvement of all age groups (so-called ‘period effects’) were to be distinguished from historical cir- cumstance affecting the religiosity of a specific age group (‘cohort‘ or ‘generation effects’). “The cohort effect,” Hoge and Roozen explained, “relates to the impact of having been socialized at a certain time in history (…). The period effect refers to the influence of social factors in any particular historical period.” Although period effects apparently influenced religiosity slightly more than cohort effects, the fac- tor of age on the whole does not account for religious affiliation much. “Ageing, in itself, has a small effect on church behavior,” Hoge and Roozen concluded, “although many studies indicate a decline between 18 and 30 that may be well-nigh universal over recent decades. Beyond that no general statement about age differ- ence can be made.”158 Various other single factors that once seemed promising in explaining religios- ity have been refuted. The relation between community size or urbanization and church attendance, for example, proved to be weak. Region as a factor accounting for church attendance has also been controversial. As Hoge and Roozen put it, “these largely negative findings exist alongside some widely believed theories pur-

156 Westhoff and Jones (1979). 157 Hoge and Roozen (1979) 46-47. 158 Ibid, 45-46. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 57 posing to explain rural-urban differences in religion.”159 No empirical support has been found for any of the attempts to explain religiosity with these factors. Besides single factors that (partly) accounted for religiosity, however, several theories have been developed to explain religious commitment.

5.2 Theories on the determinants of religiosity

Of the seven most important theories on the causes of religiosity, the ‘deprivation theory’ offered the most classical and common explanation of religious involve- ment. As Hoge and Roozen explained, this theory argued that “persons suffering deprivation or dispossession look to religion as a means of compensation and thus become committed to the church.”160 Secularization, according to the theory, re- sulted from a decline in the number of deprived people, which in its turn origi- nated from several developments like the expanded availability of education and medical services. The weakness of this theory was its focus on socio-economic sta- tus, which proved not inevitably to determine a high religiosity, nor vice versa. The negative image of religion presented by the ‘deprivation theory’ motivated the development of the ‘status group theory’. Research demonstrated that poverty did not necessarily correlate with church attendance.161 Scholars then wondered whether middle and upper class participation in the church has been motivated differently than that of lower social classes, resulting in the ‘status group theory’. The theory suggested that, for some people, church participation was related to and stimulated by the status, honor, and recognition it offers. Just like the ‘deprivation theory’, the ‘status group theory’ was falsified. Religion appeared to be an expres- sion of social privilege for the upper classes, Hoge and Roozen summarized, while it seemed to be an expression of compensation for social deprivation for underpriv- ileged people.162 The ‘doctrinal belief theory’ is founded on a strong positive connection between orthodox theological opinions and religious involvement. A person with orthodox beliefs attended church to be confirmed in his or her religious opinions, according to this theory, especially when the church was perceived as the defender of the one and only truth or when the church provided ‘salvation’. While rationalization emerged and the empirical sciences developed, faith in the divine or the supernat- ural declined.163 Despite a seemingly strong connection between orthodox religions and church engagement, the correlation proved to be much weaker than factors

159 Ibid, 47. 160 Ibid, 48. See Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and society in tension (Chicago 1965) 246. 161 Hoge and Roozen (1979) 49. 162 Ibid, 51. 163 Verweij (1998) 76-77. 58 mixing ovaries and rosaries

like socio-economic position and familial ties.164 Moreover, it has been unclear which direction the correlation went: did a religious belief lead to religious behav- ior (for confirmation) or were beliefs obtained by religious conduct? The ‘social learning theory’ depicted church attendance as a kind of behavior that is acquired in families and in specific groups, such as religious denomina- tions. According to the theory, the extent to which religion was part of someone’s upbringing accounted for religious involvement later in life. Important factors during childhood were church attendance of parents, their supervision and stimu- lation of Sunday school attendance, their views on the church and the extent to which children were allowed to pass criticism on their upbringing in matters like these. On the point of explaining secularization as a process of declining religious involvement, the ‘social learning theory’ has not been very successful. Explaining diminishing church attendance of children by that of their parents proved to result in a chicken-and-egg discussion.165 Another theory that included children in its explanatory model was the ‘child rearing theory’. Research has convincingly shown that the presence of school-age children stimulated church membership of adults. The ‘child rearing theory’ was developed based on outcomes like these. Parental church participation increased, it was suggested, in case the church offered their children religious programs. The theory, however, has been a limited solution to the question of the determinants of religiosity. Its explanatory power, Hoge and Roozen stated, has been visible only in research that used “appropriate controls”.166 The fifth theory to offer an explanation of religious involvement was the ‘local- ism theory’. According to this theory, every belief system or value system needed to be supported by a community of persons that interacted with each other on a daily level. In the modern, differentiated and pluralistic society, the number of struc- tures for institutionalized religion declined. As many other theories on church par- ticipation, the ‘localism theory’ lacked a clear understanding of the direction of causation between local orientation and church commitment. Besides, “the close- ness of association between social differentiation and local orientation”, Hoge and Roozen argued, remained obscure.167 Theories based on the structure of values held by an individual, according to Hoge and Roozen, have been prominent in the discussions of church participa- tion. The ‘value structure theory’ focused on the supposed mutual correlation of values, attitudes and religious involvement. Adherents of this theory considered

164 Hoge and Roozen (1979) 57. 165 Verweij (1998) 77. See also Ariana Need and Nan Dirk de Graaf, ‘Losing my religion’: a dynamic analysis of leaving the church in the Netherlands’, European Sociological Review 12 (1996) 87-99. 166 Hoge and Roozen (1979) 54. 167 Ibid, 62. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 59 signs of religiosity, such as church attendance, to be symbolic representations of values and meanings that were of a broader kind than religious alone. Scholars of this approach claimed that during the twentieth century, church attendance declined because the values represented by the church had started to differ too much from those of the individualizing and increasingly materialistic popula- tion.168 Traditional and religious people who did not secularize could be easily rec- ognized by their opinions, attitudes and values: they were law-abiding and conser- vative in the fields of politics, economics and morality. In addition, they attached great importance to marriage and the family and repudiated interference with life and death.169 Their churches had a well-defined world-view concentrating on the private life and aiming at the family and the local community. These churches “value conformity and tradition more than individual freedom and tolerance of diversity, social conservatism more than social change, and definite moral codes more than individualized moral orientations.”170 According to the ‘value structure theory’, then, the church guarded a traditional set of values and tried to keep it sup- ported by believers. A change in the general value orientation on the other hand translated itself into lower levels of church participation and affiliation. With the development of the ‘value structure theory’, to which Hoge and Roozen themselves contributed, an important determinant of religiosity appeared to be revealed.171

5.3 Sociology of religion and its gains for historical demography

Sociologists of religion got to the bottom of religious involvement – though many of their explanations were refuted by colleagues. True enough, three single factors that correlated with religiosity kept returning among the features of religious groups. For obscure reasons, women tended to be more religious than men. Sec- ondly, Catholics had a higher church affiliation than Protestants. The relationship between high age and religiosity appeared easier to explain, but only accounted for the usa. Just like the single factors, most theories failed to completely elucidate church affiliation. Both the ‘status group theory’ and the ‘deprivation theory’ unjustly claimed that socio-economic status correlated with religiosity. Furthermore, the dir- ection of the explanatory model of the ‘doctrinal belief theory’ was unclear: does reli- gious belief determine religious behavior or vice versa? The ‘localism theory’ fell

168 Verweij (1998) 77-80. 169 Jos Becker and R. Vink, Secularisatie in Nederland, 1966-1991. De verandering van opvat- tingen en enkele gedragingen (Rijswijk 1994). 170 Ibid, 59. 171 See Dean Hoge, Commitment on Campus: changes in religion and values over five decades (Philadelphia 1974), Robert Wuthnow, ‘Recent pattern of secularization: A problem of gener- ations?’, American Sociological Review 41 (1976) 850-867 and Hoge and Roozen (1979) 60. 60 mixing ovaries and rosaries

short in the same way as it could not decide whether church commitment preceded local orientation or followed it. The ‘social learning theory’, in stressing that religi- osity was formed during one’s youth, was not able to explain secularization. Only the ‘child-rearing theory’ offered some explanation for situations in which parental religiosity was clearly stimulated by their child’s religious activity and vice versa. The ‘value structure theory’ met with greater approval than most other attempts to explain religiosity. This theoretical approach tried to come to terms with the quaint relation between religion and values. Remarkable is that, while using the ‘value structure theory’, Hoge and Roozen advocated an approach to religiosity that reminds of the way McQuillan dealt with the religious determinants in demo- graphic history. Both argued that religion ought to be studied in the context of the values that influenced people’s behavior. Hoge and Roozen as well as McQuillan underlined the central position religious institutions occupied in forcing people to keep these values. McQuillan, however, explicitly advocated the study of pathways used by churches to impose rules on the flock and the mechanisms developed to reward compliance and punish disobedience.172 The approach to religion as developed by McQuillan, himself a sociologist, dif- fered from those of sociologists like Hoge and Roozen because of the context of demographic history. In order to explain the demographic behavior of a denomina- tional group in a certain period of time, McQuillan proposed to study the influence of religion on different social levels. Sociology of religion, on the other hand, se- lected an aspect of religion to study and left others for different disciplines. Charac- teristic is the way three Dutch sociologists of religion Felling, Peters and Schreuder once argued that religion lends itself for research in various scientific domains. In the first place, religion could be the object of a cultural-scientific research on the level of society. This research would focus on the way religious and non-religious ideas are popularized and how they blend in with public opinion, the authors argued. Religion could also be studied from a sociological point of view on the institutional level – a research field to which Felling, Peters and Schreuder them- selves made valuable contributions.173 The third research angle, according to them, would be psychological and concentrated on an individual level. Scholars working in this area are interested in the place religion occupies in the individual system of

172 McQuillan (2004) 32. 173 See Albert Felling, Jan Peters and Osmund Schreuder, Religion im Vergleich: Bundes- republik Deutschland und Niederlande (Frankfurt am Main 1987); Ibid, Dutch religion: the reli- gious consciousness of the Netherlands after the cultural revolution (Nijmegen 1991); Jan Peters, Johan van der Ven and Leo Spruit, Kerk op de helling: veranderingen in katholiek Nederland en gevolgen voor de pastoraal (Kampen 1993); Gerard Dekker, Joep de Hart and Jan Peters, God in Nederland, 1966-1996 (Amsterdam 1997) and Albert Felling, Jan Peters and Peer Scheepers (ed.), Individualisering in Nederland aan het eind van de twintigste eeuw: empirisch onderzoek naar omstreden hypotheses (Assen 2000). denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 61 personalities.174 Where does this reasoning leave the demographic historian who, in trying to explain fertility rates and patterns of religious groups, is confronted with the concept of religion? Kevin McQuillan, while studying religious determinants of fertility behavior in the past, claimed all research areas that were so carefully distinguished by the three Dutch sociologists of religion. After all, as the position of a religion in a society determined the extent to which rules can be enforced, the cultural-historical con- text of religion has to be looked at. In addition, from the point of view of imposing codes of behavior onto population groups, McQuillan is interested in the institu- tional aspect of religion. Moreover, the way in which individuals follow up on the directives of the church and translate them into a particular demographic behavior will also be focused on. Unfortunately, few demographic historians can be ex- pected to possess both the skills of a sociologist and a psychologist in addition to abundant work experience in the field of cultural sciences. While studying the reli- gious influence, though, McQuillan met the requirements of Felling, Peters and Schreuder and appeared to be aware of the dimensions of religion on macro, meso and micro levels of society. In his 2004 article McQuillan recognized the complex functioning of religion on various social levels that completely coincide with those proposed by the Dutch sociologists of religion. Compared to attempts made in Irish and Dutch historiography, McQuillan’s research approach to the influence of religion on demography already seemed to provide for a much better insight in the mechanism behind the correlation. Various aspects of his method resemble the basic principles of sociology of religion. Over the last fifty years, this discipline provided for a definition of religion and studied re- ligiosity in depth as its research area. The result of the efforts not only was a clear picture of the complexity of religion and religiosity, but also a demonstration of the importance of religious values for the determination of attachment to a religious af- filiation. As McQuillan already stressed, while discussing the influence of religion on demographic behavior, attention should be paid to religious values – both those directly affecting reproduction behavior as well as norms that influence fertility be- havior in a more oblique way. In order to sustain its value sets, the church tried to gain or keep control of behavior of the flock on different levels of society. The social organization of religion that was necessary for this purpose can be observed in the larger society like in politics, in the community by the organization of the religious and secular life and in the life of the individual by the personal check on the be- liever’s behavior by church representatives. In the next paragraph, the lessons of both sociology of religion and McQuillan’s evaluation of approaches to the study of religious determinants of demography will be put to practice in the method devel- oped to research the influence of Dutch Catholicism on fertility behavior.

174 Felling, Peters and Schreuder (1986) 8. 62 mixing ovaries and rosaries

6 Mixing methods: the study of Catholic religion and reproduction in the Netherlands, 1870-1970

In pursuit of the proper method for researching the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior in the Netherlands, several approaches have been evaluated in this chapter. While discussing contributions to Irish demographic history, it seemed that the study of the determinants of fertility lacked a clear understanding of the role of Catholic religion. For obvious reasons, then, Kevin McQuillan in his 2004 article proposed to revalue the influence of religion on demography by using different research methods. He advocated the study of religious directives on reproduction that, from various social levels, have been imposed on believers. In addition to international historiography, in this chapter attention has been focused on the way Dutch demographic historians have dealt with the factor of religion in explaining demographic behavior. Time after time, data showed that fertility behavior correlated with Catholic denomination. None of the Dutch scholars, though, explained convincingly how this relationship should be interpreted and how the influence of religion on reproduction came about. A brief look at contribu- tions to the sociology of religion proved that the concept of religion is too complex to leave undefined and inexplicit, as most Irish and Dutch demographic scholars did. Moreover, it proved McQuillan was right in emphasizing the importance of religious values addressing, both directly and indirectly, fertility behavior. Sociol- ogy of religion additionally appeared to offer foundations to McQuillan’s argument to look at the way influence of religion on fertility behavior has been organized on macro, meso and micro level of society. How are the lessons learned from these evaluations applied to the study of reproduction of Dutch Catholics during the period of national fertility decline? Fol- lowing up on McQuillan, the way Catholic religion imposed rules of fertility behav- ior on believers will be studied on a national, regional and individual level of the Dutch society. The following paragraphs will provide for a brief outline of the inter- pretation given to these levels. In addition, they present hypotheses on the way the organization of religion on each of these research levels determined the influence on Catholic reproduction. Paragraph 6.1 discusses the compartmentalization of the Dutch society that decided the social position of religion on a national level. In 6.2, dissident voting in municipalities provides for an illustration of motives for deviant behavior that conflicted with Church directives. In paragraph 6.3 the objec- tions of the Catholic Church against the Neo Malthusian League show how much the Church valued the effect of behavioral directives on fertility behavior for indi- vidual believers. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 63

6.1 Religion on a macro level in the Netherlands: social sectarianism

During the nineteenth century, the Netherlands constituted a homogeneous Prot- estant-Christian nation state, since 1848 solidly based on a modern constitution. Apart from a small aristocratic elite, Catholics were assimilated obliquely only, or perhaps not at all, into the nation.175 The outlook of the ‘Protestant nation’ did not meet with great opposition from Catholics, according to the social scientist Peter van Rooden, as they did not regard themselves as a national movement or popula- tion group. “Their identity consisted of a peculiar mixture of alliance with the pope and of local sentiments,” the author argued.176 This social atmosphere changed considerably during the last quarter of the nineteenth century due to a social compartmentalization along religious and ideo- logical lines. Industrialization and the social diffusion that followed made possible the rise of socialism. Moreover, the tradition of the homogeneous ‘Protestant nation’ was undermined by a schism among Dutch Protestants. After conflicts on the way church councils were to be elected and disagreement on state funding of denominational education, orthodox Protestants seceded from liberal co-religion- ists.177 Directed by the famous theologian Abraham Kuyper, the orthodox Protes- tants were fast in establishing their own Church community and organizing a political party, using modern political means to reach the masses.178 The Dutch Catholics were slower in developing a social and political movement than the orthodox Protestants. Taking advantage of the liberal constitution of 1848 and the declining involvement of the government in church affairs, Rome estab- lished a new Dutch episcopal hierarchy in 1853.179 During the subsequent decades, all kinds of Catholic religious institutions and organizations were founded. But

175 Rooden (1996) 32. See Peter Raedts, ‘Katholieken op zoek naar een Nederlandse identiteit 1814-1898’, BMGN 107 (1992) 713-725. 176 Rooden (1996) 32-33. 177 Marjanne de Kwaadsteniet, Denomination and primary education in the Netherlands, 1870-1984: a spatial diffusion perspective (Amsterdam 1990) 73-95, Andre de Bruin, Het ont- staan van de schoolstrijd: onderzoek naar de wortels van de schoolstrijd in de noordelijke Neder- landen gedurende de eerste helft van de 19e eeuw: een cultuurhistorische studie (Barneveld 1985). 178 W. Bakker (ed.), De Doleantie van 1886 en haar geschiedenis (Kampen 1986). This schism followed one of a different orthodox Protestant group. W. Bakker, De afscheiding van 1834 en haar geschiedenis (Kampen 1984). The majority of the two secession movements joined in 1892. Luitje J. Wolthuis and Jasper Vree (ed.), De Vereniging van 1892 en haar geschiedenis (Kampen 1992). See also Cornelus Augustijn and Jasper Vree, Abraham Kuyper: vast en veranderlijk: de ontwikkeling van zijn denken (Zoetermeer 1998) and Knippenberg (1992). 179 Paul Hamans, Geschiedenis van de katholieke kerk in Nederland deel 1: Van missionering tot herstel van de hiërarchie in 1853 (Brugge 1992), Hans Knippenberg, ‘1853: Rome plant zijn staf in het hart van Nederland’, Geografie 12 (2003) 34-37. 64 mixing ovaries and rosaries

only about 1900, following the example of the orthodox Protestants, Catholics extended their organizations into the fields of culture, economics and politics.180 Via leisure clubs, newspapers, mass meetings and political parties Catholics were encouraged to identify with their denomination. Just as among the Protestants, the 1890s witnessed rebellion among the ranks of the Catholics: liberal Catholics rose up against their more conservative co-religionists. The result of this conflict, though, was not a schism, like in the Protestant case. The Catholic Church pushed forward the conservative politicians who were to secure the shielded position of the Catholic population, its Church leadership and its doctrines. During the first half of the twentieth century, Dutch society increasingly com- partmentalized along religious and ideological lines. A unique aspect of this social bloc formation, Van Rooden argued, was the mobilization of large parts of the pop- ulation against the notion of the Protestant nation as the highest moral commu- nity. The country was considered to consist of different groups that served the com- mon good best by preserving their own characteristics. Religion became the label for social groups.181 The social sectarianism provided the Catholic Church with a powerful social position and a vast network of Catholic organizations, via which behavioral directives were efficiently and self-evidently enforced upon the believ- ers. As will be discussed in chapter 2, on a national level of Dutch society, the influ- ence of religion on Catholic reproduction morals was determined by the social compartmentalization.

6.2 Competitive motives for demography: meso level

The status quo of the social compartmentalization along religious and ideological lines changed during the 1960s. The internal cohesion and unity that had charac- terized the Catholic social bloc for over a century, decreased rapidly. The growing welfare state and the international cultural revolution of the 1960s and 70s, that rejected patriarchal conventions of authority and a strict sexual morality, alienated the churchgoing public from the overbearing church with its rigid values. Between 1960 and 2000, church attendance of Dutch Catholics decreased by 80%; the number of ordinations by 90%.182 The collapse of the religious-based compartmentalization of society and the increasing disregard for Catholic rules of behavior, however, rooted in economic, social and cultural processes of modernization that had started several decades prior to the 1960s. How successful the Church was in imposing its directives on a

180 Van Rooden (1996) 37. See also Raedts (1992). 181 Van Rooden (1996) 38-41. 182 Theo Schepens, Leo Spruit and Joris Kregting, De Rooms-Katholieke Kerk in Nederland, 1960-2000: een statistisch trendrapport (Nijmegen and Tilburg 2002). denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 65 community, depended on the extent to which these processes had developed on a local level. Illustrative was the electoral support for the Roman Catholic National Party (Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij) that differed in Catholic municipalities. Catholics were only allowed to vote for the Catholic National Party – already in 1901 the epis- copate publicly condemned the first Catholic dissident party from the point of view that only with solidarity Catholics could protect their church against the Protestant majority of the population.183 Nevertheless, a ‘dissident’ party sometimes managed to appeal to part of the Catholic electorate. In the city of Tilburg that, in 1920, con- sisted of Catholics for 96%, the publisher of the local newspaper Antoine Arts decided to run in the 1922 general elections. Soon after, Arts was slandered in Catholic newspapers. Worse, the archbishop repeated the negative opinion of the episcopate regarding dissident parties; his statement was read out loud in many churches in the province, even during the church service in celebration of Arts’ golden wedding anniversary. During the 1922 elections, however, nearly 38% of the Tilburg electorate disregarded the directives of the Church and voted for Arts against only 49% for the Catholic National Party.184 In the nearby city of Eindhoven, which consisted for 91% of Catholics, the Catholic National Party re- ceived 76% of the votes.185 In chapter 3, while selecting Catholic municipalities as case studies, voting behavior is used as a predictor for deviant fertility behavior. The example of Arts’ dissident party demonstrated that, in spite of the social compartmentalization that offered the Catholic Church a powerful and influential position, on a local level the Church was not always able to ensure obedience to its values. Certain social, economic and cultural circumstances in municipalities acted as a brake on the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior. A comparison between circum- stances of six municipalities in 1930 will demonstrate what factors on a meso level could motivate a Catholic community to disrespect Church directives.

6.3 Transmuting dogma into demography: micro level

A serious threat to Catholic pronatalism was formed by the Neo Malthusian League. The organization stimulated the practice of birth control, spread informa- tion on methods and, worst of all, offered moral reasons for family planning.186 As part of the Church’s propaganda campaigns against the League, it refuted the

183 Siep Stuurman, Verzuiling, kapitalisme en patriarchaat (Nijmegen 1983) 278. 184 Koen Vossen, Vrij vissen in het Vondelpark: kleine politieke partijen in Nederland 1918- 1940 (Amsterdam 2003) 94-99. 185 HDNG. 186 Geì Nabrink, 100 jaar Neo Malthusiaanse Bond: Nederlandse Vereniging voor Sexuele Hervorming (Den Haag 1981) 66 mixing ovaries and rosaries

organization’s arguments for family planning. The idea that many pregnancies threatened the health of a woman was disposed of by pointing at the improved sup- port during deliveries thanks to modern medical care as well as at the ‘nature’ of women to yearn for children. Economic reasons for a small family, in particular during the economic crisis and problematic unemployment of the 1930s, were dis- missed as nonsense because population growth was supposed to be good for the economy. Practicing birth control for financial reasons showed one had no faith in God, according to the Church. When opposing the League’s claim that a smaller family could provide a better upbringing for children, the Church pointed at suc- cessful men who were the 10th or 15th child in a family.187 The Neo Malthusian League was portrayed as an organization for people who were lazy, self-indulgent and who had no sense of a duty to multiply, as God sup- posedly desired from people. Moreover, the League was accused of disrupting the family, as birth control would eventually result in an increase in divorces, and of stimulating sexual intercourse among unmarried couples. According to the Catho- lic Church, the purpose of sexual intercourse in natural law was procreation. Con- traceptive sex, which deliberately blocked that purpose, was hence condemned as a violation of natural law – in Dutch referred to as onkuisheid tegen de natuur, lewd- ness against nature, which was a serious sin. Most means of practicing birth con- trol fell under the category of mortal sins. According to the Catechism, the survey of the principles of the Church’s doctrines, coitus interruptus even belonged to the revenge-calling sins “because their wickedness called out to heaven for revenge”.188 Denominational organizations had to prevent the negative consequences of family planning for the religious, moral and social life of Catholics. Promoting the moth- erhood ideal among men and women, boys and girls was one of the weapons used against the League.189 For the Catholic population of the Netherlands, the social discussion on birth control started by the Neo Malthusian League seemed to be counterproductive: it only increased the Church’s urge to control the reproduction behavior of believers. It had several pathways to do so. The Catholic Church was the only authority that could provide a believer with the remission of sin to gain access to eternal life in heaven. Though ‘venal sins’ were believed to have less effect on the chances of going to heaven in the hereafter, by committing ‘mortal sins’ (like not attending

187 Mirre Bots and Maria Noordman, Moederschap als balsem: ervaringen van katholieke vrouwen met huwelijk, sexualiteit en moederschap in de eerste helft van deze eeuw (Amsterdam, 1981) 24-26. 188 Marga Kerklaan (ed.),‘Zodoende was de vrouw maar een mens om kinderen te krijgen’: 300 brieven over het roomse huwelijksleven (Baarn 1987) 87. 189 See F. van de Ven, ‘Positieve bestrijding van het Neo-Malthusianisme door de over- heid, pers en individu’ in: Handelingen van het Rooms-Katholieke Diosecaan Congres over het huwelijk (Den Bosch 1928) 50-76. denominations and demography: historiography and methodology 67

Mass, eating meat on Friday and adultery) one could lose one’s salvation entirely.190 To prevent ending up in hell, Catholics had to repent of their sins, confess with a priest and be granted absolution. This way, practicing birth control without the required permission of the Church for many Catholics caused huge moral con- flicts: either one confessed and risked all kinds of punishment or one ventured eternal life. As McQuillan already emphasized, Catholic pronatalism not only stemmed from religious doctrines that directly affected fertility. The doctrines of the Catholic Church on reproduction were tied in its ideas on the family as the smallest social unit; with the division of tasks between men and women and especially with its ideas on the destiny of women on earth. But the religious values with which the Catholic Church created a standard for reproductive behavior were at least as im- portant for its influence on fertility as the various means to impose a moral code of conduct on believers. The micro-level study of the influence of church doctrines on Catholic fertility, discussed in chapter 4, demonstrates that Catholic pronatalism was succesful not merely because of strict moral values but because the Church had various means to impose behavioral rules concerning reproduction and to punish disobedience.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Catholic religion can not be regarded as a univocal concept influencing demographic conduct in one simple way. Catholicism as a de- nomination that, in the past, determined demography like some other religions represents a complex cluster of direct and indirect values affecting sexuality and procreation. Moreover, Catholicism signifies a social organization that ruled a nation from various social macro, meso and micro levels. Dissecting the religious determinant of Catholic fertility is a perilous under- taking: besides developing statistical evidence with regard to the impact of religion on demography, one has to confront the qualitative background of quantitative data. That background implies a cultural historical context, with sociological impli- cations of the use of concepts like religion and with the individual historical subject which translated religious directives into demographic conduct. The message of Kevin McQuillan in this matter is clear: a bona fide demographer attempting to explain the mechanism behind a denomination’s demographic characteristics will

190 “The words “mortal” and “venial” in connection with sin are not found in the Scrip- tures, but the distinction between the two types of sin is clearly affirmed. There are sins that exclude from entry to the Kingdom (Eph 5.5; Gal 5.19-21) and sins that do not exclude from it (Jas 3.2; 1 Jn 1.8; Eccl 7.21).” New Catholic encyclopedia 13 (Detroit 2003) 155. See also Kerklaan (1987) 64. 68 mixing ovaries and rosaries

study it on macro, meso and micro levels, taking into account religious values that directly and indirectly address matters of fertility behavior. While discussing religious determinants of Irish demography, McQuillan wrote: “Political developments in Ireland provided an opening for the Catholic Church to extend its influence in Irish society. Its leaders followed a carefully crafted strategy that allowed the Church a significant role in many of the institu- tions of the country. Moreover, the Church used its position as a de facto leader of the Catholic population in its struggle with English authorities to build a stronger bond of attachment to the institution among its followers. In this setting, the Cath- olic Church was able to promote more effectively its teachings on matters related to family life and childbearing, thereby contributing to the persistence of high fertil- ity among Ireland’s Catholics well after fertility decline had taken root on other parts of western and northern Europe.”191 The Netherlands were spared an English occupation, however, the Roman Catholic Church and its followers struggled with a dissenting population majority. The result of the denominational battle for self-determination on political, social, economic and cultural fields resulted in the compartmentalization of the Dutch society. Together with pathways to control individual behavior and favorable social, economic and cultural circumstances on a local level, the structure of Dutch society became the setting that enabled the demographic success of Catholic pronatalism. The opportunity of the Catholic Church to “promote more effectively its teachings on matters related to family life and childbearing”, as McQuillan wrote, resulted in high fertility rates and a slow fertility decline among Catholic population groups. Half a century before the ship of ‘Women on Waves’ in the harbor of Dublin challenged the legal consequences of the Catholic Church’s values regarding the sanctity of life, Ireland and the Netherlands looked very much alike.

191 McQuillan (2004) 41. Chapter 2 A nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives

— Pillarization and moralization

1 Aims of the chapter

After having studied the relative importance of work in the life course of women working in the textile industry of the Overijssel town of Enschede between 1880 and 1940, Angélique Janssens of Nijmegen University in an article argued that the historiographical triangle of ‘women, work and family’ should be replaced by ‘women, family and religion’. Girls working in a factory in Enschede did not be- have differently from other women regarding their fertility and family size. ”A family’s social status, as measured by male occupation, appeared to be an irrele- vant factor in fertility decisions,” Janssens concluded. “From this analysis En- schede in the first quarter of the twentieth century emerges as a town not horizon- tally divided along socio-economic groups, but rather as a society divided vertically, along religious and cultural lines.”1 The results of Janssens’s research apply to the whole of the Netherlands: from the late nineteenth century until after the Second World War, Dutch society was compartmentalized along religious and ideological lines. This chapter discusses how this so-called pillarization process contributed to the influence of the Catholic Church on the demographic behavior of its flock. First, the historical setting of the start of the process will be shown by briefly discussing the social position of the Catholic population group in the Netherlands prior to the pillarization process. In paragraph 2, the development of the meanings and phases of the concept as well as the vast theoretical framework on the origins of pillarization are discussed in a con- cise form – just enough to enable the explanation of the way this social structure enabled religious institutions like the Roman Catholic Church to enforce a moral standard on the Catholic population. That the preoccupation of the Dutch with moral behavior did not appear out of thin air during the pillarization period is proven in paragraph 3. A nineteenth century Liberal initiative to socialize subver-

1 Angélique Janssens, ‘Class, work and religion in the female life course: the case of a Dutch textile town: Enschede 1880-1940’, Historical Social Research 23 (1998) 254-274, there 273-274. 70 mixing ovaries and rosaries

sive elements of the lower social classes was followed by supporters of the confes- sional parties who used it to interfere with sexuality, family life and the upbringing of children of the whole of the population. The fact that confessional parties man- aged to make the uplifting of moral behavior a state interest during the pillariza- tion period was especially advantageous for conservative Catholics. As paragraph 4 will show, the strict hierarchy in the Catholic social bloc, its politics and vast orga- nizational network were elements of Catholic pillarization that made pronatalist indoctrination successful.

1.1 The emancipation of the Dutch Catholics

The civil equalization and the right to organize religious life from the end of the eighteenth century onwards allowed for the development of Church life and, even- tually, the formation of a social Catholic bloc. Two years after the establishment of the Batavian Republic in 1795, freedom of religion was formally introduced. The developments heralded a new era for the Catholics in the Netherlands. Subse- quently, a school for priests was founded Den Bosch in 1798, followed by seminar- ies elsewhere. Mass no longer had to be celebrated in secrecy on attics and in back- yards. Catholic Churches were allowed to be visible from the street and no longer had to look like an ordinary row of houses.2 The proclamation of the Kingdom in 1813, however, to some extent reversed the equal citizenship of the Catholic popu- lation. William I made sure the Dutch Reformed Church became the established church again. Although freedom of religion and services was maintained in the constitution of 1815, the king supervised the way churches spent their money and observed the regulations.3 Moreover, in order to curb the influence of the Vatican and to supervise education of Catholic clergy, priests were obliged to attend the state-founded ‘Collegium Philosophicum’ in Leuven. William’s policy regarding religion resulted in the Belgian revolution in 1830 in the southern part of the Netherlands. In the north, Catholics hoped to acquire the right of self-determination by entering into a ‘monstrous alliance’ with Lib- erals.4 William’s successor tried to improve the position of Catholics and although he failed to restore the episcopal hierarchy, he allowed monasteries to canvas new members and permitted the establishment of new orders of priesthood – resulting in a quick increase in congregation numbers.5 Due to the revolts elsewhere in

2 Xander van Eck, Kunst, twist en devotie: Goudse katholieke schuilkerken 1572-1795 (Delft 1994). 3 Hans Righart, De katholieke zuil in Europa: een vergelijkend onderzoek naar het ontstaan van verzuiling onder katholieken in Oostenrijk, Zwitserland, België en Nederland (Meppel 1986) 196. 4 To distinghuish between political liberals and religious ones, the former will be written with a capilat letter and the latter not. 5 Righart (1986) 197. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 71

Europe, the King yielded to the fundamental constitutional changes proposed by Liberals in 1848. The new civil code not only abolished the secular government’s rights to check the relationship between the Vatican and the Dutch Catholic Church but also established freedom of education and press, and legalized organi- zation and assembling. The development of a social structure characterized by religious segregation during the second half of the twentieth century, was illustrated well in Zuid-Hol- land town of Naaldwijk. Catholics, liberal and orthodox Protestants constituted equal parts of the population of Naaldwijk and, prior to the political equalization of all denominations, shared the rural town in peaceful coexistence. While the Protes- tants became embroiled in church schisms, though, the Catholic minority started to get organized. Already during the 1840s the first brotherhoods were founded and several decades later more than half of the Catholic inhabitants of Naaldwijk were members of one of the devotional clubs. During the same period the aversion of the clergy to personal contact between Catholics and Protestants grew. In the first years of the twentieth century, a firm line was taken against Catholic member- ship of interconfessional clubs: Catholic boys and girls were only allowed member- ship of all-Catholic musical societies and dance clubs.6 As the example of Naaldwijk proves, the social compartmentalization of the Dutch society occurred as much on the national as on the regional and individual level. As part of a special research project, seven PhD theses have shown that par- ticularly on the local level social sectarianism developed differently throughout the Netherlands.7 The recently published volume ‘Past the pillarization’ once more emphasized the multiplicity of the phenomenon.8 While acknowledging that pillarization was a process developing on all social levels, the favorable conditions for the religious determinants of demographic behavior were established on the

6 Frans Groot, Roomsen, rechtzinnigen en nieuwlichters: verzuiling in een Hollandse platte- landsgemeente, Naaldwijk 1850-1930 (Hilversum 1992) 113-147. 7 See Rob van der Laarse, Bevoogding en bevinding: heren en kerkvolk in een Hollandse provinciestad, Woerden 1780-1930 (Den Haag 1989); Paul Pennings, Verzuiling en ontzuiling: de lokale verschillen. Opbouw, instandhouding en neergang van plaatselijke zuilen in verschillende delen van Nederland na 1880 (Kampen 1991); Jos Leenders, Benauwde verdraagzaamheid, hachelijk fatsoen: families, standen en kerken te Hoorn in het midden van de negentiende eeuw (Den Haag 1992); Groot (1992), Dirk Jan Wolffram, Bezwaarden en verlichten: verzuiling in een Gelderse provinciestad, Harderwijk 1850-1925 (Amsterdam 1993); Johannes van Miert, Wars van clubgeest en partijzucht: liberalen, natie en verzuiling, Tiel en Winschoten 1850-1920 (Amsterdam 1994); Ron de Jong, Van standspolitiek naar partijloyaliteit: verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer 1848-1887 (Hilversum 1999) and Hans Blom and Carly Misset (ed.), Broeders sluit u aan: aspecten van verzuiling in zeven Hollandse gemeenten (Dieren 1985). 8 Hans Blom and Jaap Talsma, De verzuiling voorbij: Godsdienst, stand en natie in de lange negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 2000). 72 mixing ovaries and rosaries

national level and, hence, this chapter will discuss the social compartmentalization of Dutch society from that point of view.

2 Pillarization: the denominational pathway to propagating morality

Pillarization has often been adapted to explain a variety of historical events – the social and political stability in the Netherlands between 1917 and 1965, for exam- ple. Much to the annoyance of Siep Stuurman, a political scientist working at the History Department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. In his dissertation Stuurman raised his finger in warning to this fake elucidation: “Pillarization does- n’t explicate stability, it’s pillarization itself that needs to be explained.”9 In order to explain how the pillarized social structure of the Netherlands enabled the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior, pillarization itself needs to be explained. In paragraph 2.1, the history of the concept and its meaning will be discussed briefly. In addition, the paragraph amplifies in what way the Dutch pillarization differed from social segmentation in other European coun- tries. In the historical process of pillarization, different phases of development have to be distinguished – they will be treated in paragraph 2.2. Subsequently, the most important driving forces behind pillarization are discussed in a way that hopefully does justice to the scrutiny with which the theoretical framework on the origins of the process was developed. Finally, in paragraph 2.4, the way pillariza- tion offered denominational organizations the chance of the propagation of their religious ideology will be dealt with.

2.1 Pigeon-holing on a large scale: history and meaning

The concept of ‘pillarization’ was invented during the 1940s and developed in the following decades. On February 20, 1940 the Dutch national newspaper De Tele- graaf, discussing the organizational discord in unemployment care, mentioned “the four pillars”.10 During and after the Second World War, the notions of ‘pillar’ (zuil) and ‘pillarization’ (verzuiling) came into use to indicate the salient compart- mentalization of the Dutch society along religious and ideological lines. The term pillarization substituted for prewar expressions like ‘pigeon-holing’ and ‘partition- ing’, particularly referring to the situation in politics. Social scientists used the notion of pillarization during the late fifties in their first attempts to analyze the social phenomena that the concept refers to.11 Social and political scientists made

9 Stuurman (1983) 11. 10 Hans Blom, Verzuiling in Nederland in het bijzonder op lokaal niveau, 1850-1925 (Amster- dam 1981) 11. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 73 use of historical data to substantiate their theories and perceptions, but the contri- bution of historians to the discussion on pillars and pillarization was initially rather small.12 The Dutch historian Louis Rogier, for example, has made some striking descriptions of pillarization in his works on Dutch Catholics, without using the concept as such.13 Defining pillarization has proved to be a tricky business. While considering all arguments pro and contra much discussed origins of pillarization, the political sci- entist Paul Pennings of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam offered some well-con- sidered definitions of the concept. Pillars, Pennings stated, were separate institu- tional complexes of religiously or ideologically motivated institutions and mem- bers that were well delineated in different social sectors along the same dividing lines. Pillars had distinct features like a nationally organized framework consisting of local components and aims that had a national scope. Integration into a pillar was achieved by a clear external demarcation, by internal coordination and by per- sonal unions within the pillar. Pillarization, Pennings continued, is the process in which Catholics, orthodox Protestants and social democrats institutionalized their mutual differences after 1880. The result of the process was a compartmentalized structure of Dutch society in which pillars acknowledged one another’s right to exist and communication took place only between their elites.14 The number of pillars in the Netherlands has been a particular source of schol- arly argument. The Catholic as well as the orthodox Protestant pillar have been generally acknowledged. Using election results of 1920, Stuurman estimated that the Catholic pillar covered about 30% of the population. The orthodox Protestant bloc constituted about 20% of the population and also included the orthodox mem- bers of the Dutch Reformed Church and several of the smaller Protestant denomi- nations.15 The recognition of a social democratic pillar, to which Stuurman attrib- uted 25 to 35% of the population, has been a source of debate. Some scholars argued that the very constitution of a pillar conflicts with the social democrat ideol- ogy of uniting all workers and its single class base.16 The ‘red family’ though, in their effort to get some hold on the political, economic and cultural field, estab-

11 Stuurman (1983) 58. 12 Blom (1981) 11-13. 13 See for example Louis J. Rogier, Katholieke herleving: geschiedenis van Katholiek Nederland sinds 1853 (Den Haag 1956). 14 Pennings (1991) 21. Pennings’ definitions are chiefly based on Rudolf Steiniger, Polarisierung un integration: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der strukturellen Versaulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in Oesterreich (Meisenheim am Glan 1977) and Hans Blom, ‘Onderzoek naar verzuiling in Nederland: status quaestionis en wenselijke ontwik- keling’, Blom and Misset (1985). 15 Stuurman (1983) 60. 16 See Ivo Schöffer, ‘Verzuiling, een specifiek Nederlands probleem’, Sociologische Gids 7 (1956) 121-127. 74 mixing ovaries and rosaries

lished their own institutions and acted as one bloc. Apart from the Social Demo- cratic Labor Partij sdap (Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij) founded in 1894, the pillar included a labor union, an organization for the workers’ youth, a radio station and a newspaper.17 With respect to bloc formation, social democrats differed from Liberals who accounted for about 15% of the 1920 Dutch population.18 The political scientist Arend Lijphart from the University of California in San Diego has put some effort into the development of a definition of pillar that would include a fourth liberal or ‘general’ pillar.19 Liberals, Stuurman remonstrated, “were members of all kinds of social organizations: they were receptive to everybody and they were neither ideo- logically nor culturally committed”.20 Liberals were strong in networks of individu- als, not in organizations.21 They did not possess an organ like that of the churches in the Catholic and orthodox Protestant pillars, nor did they have social organiza- tions based on ideological principles on the same scale and of the same well-coor- dinated character as social democrats.22 In general, scholars have thus acknowl- edged three pillars: a Catholic, a Protestant and a social democratic one. The Netherlands were not the only European country where Catholic, Prot- estant and socialist bloc formation took place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Germany, Austria and Belgium shared features with the pillar- ized Dutch society; links between churches or ideologies, political parties and so- cial organization; conflicts between churches and the state about the secular char- acter of the government and the reaction of one denominational group against the other. The development of Catholic pillars in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands has resulted in several comparative studies.23 Though features of Dutch pillarization and those of compartmentalization in other western European countries are similar, the extent to which they mutually took root made the Dutch process singular in an international context. First of all, the scope of the organizational pillarization in the Netherlands was outstanding: in few countries the development of an integrated organizational network, designed to guide a specific part of the population from the cradle to the grave, assumed the same proportions as those in the Netherlands.24 Several studies on pillarization on

17 Pennings (1991) 21. 18 Stuurman (1983) 60. 19 See Arend Lijphart, Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek (Amster- dam 1968), a revision of Ibid, The politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley 1968), and Ibid, ‘Consociational democracy’, World Politics 21 (1969) 207-225. 20 Stuurman (1983) 67-68. 21 Anne Bert Dijkstra, Jaap Dronkers, Roelande Hofman (ed.), Verzuiling in het onderwijs: actuele verklaringen en analyse (Groningen 1997) 39-40, 36. 22 Pennings (1991) 21. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 75 a local level showed how development of segmented organizations resulted in sep- arate social, economic, political, cultural and religious spheres for each denomina- tion within one town or region.25 A second characteristic of the Dutch pillarization process that makes it out- standing in the European context is the measure with which the pillars dominated political decision-making during a long period of time.26 “Nowhere else”, Stuur- man underlined, “during the period 1918-1960 did the confessional parties suc- ceed in obtaining such a high percentage of votes as in the Netherlands.”27 The long period of time during which confessionals succeeded in steering Dutch politics was striking by European standards too. At record speed, large parts of the popula- tion were mobilized to preserve their ideological characteristics and, in particular, their moral standards.

2.2 Periodization: rise, culmination and fall

The period between 1870 and 1920 marked the start of the process of pillarization in the Netherlands. After the introduction of the constitution in 1848, contrasting ideals of conservatives and Liberals stirred up politics. In 1870, this opposition gave way to a new political foil brought about by an alliance of confessional parties against Liberal atheism.28 Motivated by the political fight for legislative equality

23 Righart (1986); Steiniger (1977); Karl-Fritz Daiber, Religion un Konfession: Studien zu politischen, ethischen und religiösen Einstellungen von Katholiken, Protestanten und Konfession- losen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den Niederlanden (Hannover 1989); Harry Post, Pillarization: an analysis of Dutch and Belgian society (Alderschot 1989); Jaak Billiet, Ondanks beperkt zicht: studies over waarden, ontzuiling en politieke veranderingen in Vlaanderen (Brussel 1993); Peter van Aelst and Tom de Vries, Lokale verzuiling in Vlaanderen: Kontich versus Niel (Antwerpen 1999); Jaak Billiet and Magda Pluymers (ed.), Tussen bescherming en verovering: sociologen en historici over zuilvorming (Leuven 1988); Dirk Vermeulen, De maat- schappelijke beheersingsprocessen inzake de sociaal-culturele sector in Vlaanderen: een sociolo- gische studie van de ‘verzuiling‘, de professionalisering en het overheidsbeleid (Leuven 1983) and Staf Hellemans and Magda Pluymers (ed.), Strijd om de moderniteit: sociale bewegingen en verzuiling in Europa sinds 1880 (Leuven 1990). 24 Stuurman (1983) 62. 25 Blom and Misset (1985); Sandor Noordam, De doleantie op Rozenburg: over de rol van buurtschappen in de verzuiling (Rotterdam 1995); Wolffram (1993); Cornelis de Gast, Gods- dienst en samenleving in het Land van Heusden en Altena: confessie, bevinding en verzuiling 1900-1961 (Tilburg 1993); Peter Olsthoorn, Vrijgemaakt Gereformeerden in Berkel en Rodenrijs 1935-1955: een detailstudie naar locale verzuiling (S.l. 1986); Groot (1992); Miert (1994) and C.E. Schabbing, Verzuilingstendenties in de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland, 1970-1940 (Amersfoort 1985). 26 Dijkstra, Dronkers, Hofman (1997) 48. 27 Stuurman (1983) 62. 28 Ibid, 99-100. 76 mixing ovaries and rosaries

between public and denominational education known as the ‘school struggle’, the clergyman Abraham Kuyper in 1879 combined various Protestant electoral associ- ations into the orthodox Protestant Party arp (Anti Revolutionaire Partij). Kuyper took the lead in the debate on all political issues from the extension of suffrage to the ‘social issue’ of the living conditions in the slums of Dutch cities that resulted in public housing. The period between the founding of the Protestant University (Vrije Universiteit) in 1880 and the establishment of the Protestant Labor Union cnv (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond) in 1908, marked the development of a net- work of organizations that embodied the orthodox Protestant pillar. The Catholics were slow in following the example of the Protestant compart- mentalization. Their support for the Liberals had been rewarded by the restoration of the episcopal hierarchy in 1853.29 Although the sense of unity and self-awareness amongst Dutch Catholics increased from then on, their organizational progress in the social and political fields only gathered speed during the first decades of the twentieth century.30 In 1910, two years after the founding of the Protestant labor union cnv, the Catholics responded with the establishment of a Catholic labor union. In 1904, the General League of Roman Catholic Electoral Associa- tions (Algemeene Bond van RK-Kiesverenigingen) was erected in which many, but not all, Catholic electors’ groups were united. The Catholic National Party (rksp) for- mally resulted from this association in 1926.31 Pillarization reached its highest level between 1920 and 1960. The social dem- ocrats did not succeed in bursting through the established dividing lines of the pil- lars during this ‘age of confessionalism’. Protestants and Catholics were in charge of the government. As soon as the Catholic National Party rksp had its rank and file organized, it was able to end the prevalence of the orthodox Protestant arp by asserting its numerical superiority.32 Apart from politics, the influence of the pil- lars on social and cultural life increased rapidly through expansion of organiza- tions and foundation of new ones.33 The Dutch broadcasting system, for example, became completely ‘pillarized’ with an orthodox Protestant, Catholic, social demo- cratic, liberal-Protestant and even Liberal or ‘general’ broadcasting organization.34 Pillarized organizations got tied up with the governmental apparatus: having started as private initiatives, they became part of the public domain when they started to receive considerable government funding. Public life consequently obtained a singular segmented character.35

29 Hamans (1992). 30 Stuurman (1983) 12. 31 Vossen (2003) 94; Dijkstra, Dronkers, Hofman (1997) 36. 32 Jacobus van Doorn, ‘De onvermijdelijke presentie van de confessionelen’, Jozef de Beus and Jacobus van Doorn (ed.), De interventiestaat: tradities, ervaringen, reacties (Meppel 1984). 33 Stuurman (1983) 12. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 77

100% other parties

90% liberals

80%

70% social democrats

60%

50% Protestants 40% Votes (in percentages) 30%

20% Roman Catholics 10%

0% 1918 1922 1925 1929 1933 1937 1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972

Graph 4 Percentage of votes on confessional parties, social democrats and Liberals during elec- tions for the House of Representatives 1918-1972. Source: .36

In the 1960s the segmented social order was slowly demolished in a process referred to as de-pillarization. As is shown in graph 4, the electoral support for the social democratic, Liberal and other parties increased at the expense of the Catholic and, especially, Protestant parties. Confessional concerns had to be redefined and the ranks realigned. This resulted in the foundation of a new confessional party, the cda (Christen Democratisch Appèl), in 1973 in which Catholic as well as Prot- estant parties merged.37 In spite of the efforts, confessional strongholds fell in the socio-economic domain and the segmentation of everyday life, such as the denom- inational organization of leisure activities, diminished.

34 The orthodox Protestant ncrv (Nederlandsche Christelijke Radio Vereeniging) was founded in 1924; the Catholic kro (Katholieke Radio Omroep) in 1925; the social democrat vara (Vereeniging van Arbeiders Radio Amateurs) in 1925; the Liberal or ‘general’ avro (Algemeene Vereeniging Radio Omroep) in 1927 and the liberal Protestant vpro (Vrij- zinnig Protestantsche Radio Omroep) in 1928. See B. Buddingh, Zuilvorming en verzuiling in de ether (Amersfoort 1966) and Jan van Herpen, Hilversum was wel een mis waard: de verzuiling in de prille radio: radio in dienst van de kerk (Hilversum 2001). 35 Dijkstra, Dronkers, Hofman (1997) 36. 78 mixing ovaries and rosaries

As the social geographers Hans Knippenberg from the University of Amster- dam and Ben de Pater from Utrecht University argued, as soon as the social com- pliance with the pillarized system came to a halt, secularization increased.38 De- pillarization, however, was an essentially cultural process and it left many aspects of Dutch society unaffected: the percentage of interdenominational marriages in- creased, but the education system and policymaking remained, to a considerable extent, ‘pillarized’.39

2.3 The origins of pillarization

Since the concept was introduced, diverging interpretations of the origins of the Dutch compartmentalization has caused indistinctness about the meaning of pillarization.40 The theories developed to explain pillarization contain a recurring set of elements and differ chiefly in the combinations and nuances of these elem- ents. Pillarization has been explained as a necessity of underdeveloped or subordi-

36 The Catholic category is represented by the Roman Catholic National Party rksp (1918- 1937) which was succeeded by the Catholic People’s Party kvp (Katholieke Volkspartij, 1937- 1972). Several orthodox Protestant parties have been counted as Protestant parties: the Christian Democratic Union cdu (Christen Democrtische Unie, 1918-1946), the arp (1918- 1972), the Christian Historical Union chu (Christen Historische Unie, 1918-1972), the Reformed Political Union gpv (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond, 1952-1972) and the National Reformed Party sgp (Staatkundig Gereformeede Partij, 1952-1972). The social democratic cat- egory consists of the Communist Party, the sdap (until 1937), the Liberal Democratic Union vdb (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond, until 1937), the Pacifist Socialist Party psp (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, from 1959 onwards), the Democratic Socialists 1970 ds’70 (Demo- cratische Socialisten 1970, 1972) and the Labor Party PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid, from 1946 onwards). cbs, ‘Historische reeksen: Overheid, politiek en bestuur: Historie Tweede Kamerverkiezingen: Geldige stemmen per partij’ 1918-1972. Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://statline.cbs.nl/ 37 Ibid, 38. See also Pieter Kroeger and Jaap Stam, De rogge staat er dun bij: macht en verval van het CDA 1974-1998 (Amsterdam 1998). 38 Hans Knippenberg and Ben de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland: schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800 (Nijmegen 1988) 194. 39 Dijkstra, Dronkers, Hofman (1997) 38. See also Hans Knippenberg and Herman van der Wusten, ‘De zuilen, hun lokale manifestaties en hun restanten in vergelijkend perspec- tief’, Corrie J. van Eijl, Lex F. Heerma van Voss, Piet de Rooy, Sociaal Nederland: contouren van de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 2001); Ruud Koopmans, ‘Zachte heelmeesters… Een ver- gelijking van de resultaten van het Nederlandse en Duitse integratiebeleid en wat de wrr daar niet uit concludeert’, Migrantenstudies 18 (2002) 87-92; Ans Merens, Integratie: ver- zuiling, aanpassing of anders? Een vergelijkende studie naar de integratie van Italianen, Chine- zen, gereformeerden en katholieken in Nederland (Rotterdam 1995) and Frank Demeyere (ed.), Over pluralisme en democratie: verzuiling en integratie in een multiculturele samenleving (Brussel 1993) studies the friction between integration and pillarization in Belgium. 40 Pennings (1991) 20. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 79 nated groups, such as the Catholics.41 Secondly, it was interpreted as a kind of pro- tection for believers against the dangers of the modern secularizing society – a means to fend off socialism, for example, that aimed at emancipating Catholic workmen, eventually leading them to stray from the mother church.42 Further- more, pillarization was regarded as a means of social control used by the church to check believers.43 Other scholars argued that pillarization was a means of social control of the social elite to supervise the lower classes.44 Finally, theories arguing that pillarization offered denominational groups a framework through which one could get in control of modernization and national unification, the integration of isolated groups and regions within a national context, met considerable agree- ment.45 The theories on the origins of pillarization all paint a picture of the Netherlands during the last quarter of the nineteenth and first three quarters of the twentieth century as a country of which the entire culture, including political, economic, so- cial and religious life, was dominated by divisions. These contrasts, Pennings argued, were characterized by continuously alternating alliances and new divi- sions. The most important division that determined political relations from 1850 was principally between conservatives and Liberals. Although the conservatives lost authority in the following decades, the Liberals within their own ranks were divided on matters of social legislation and suffrage. A second division was formed between Catholics and Protestants and started with the restoration of the episcopal hierarchy in 1853. The friction between the two denominations, Pennings empha- sized, formed an important impulse for the pillarization process. Thirdly, Liberals opposed Catholics. Although Catholics first sided with the Liberals against the

41 See Rogier (1956); Van Heek (1954); Ibid (1956) and Walter Goddijn, Katholieke min- derheid en protestantse dominant: sociologische nawerking van de historische relatie tussen katholieken en protestanten in het bijzonder voor de provincie Friesland (Assen 1957). 42 Jos Perry, Roomsche kinine tegen rode koorts: arbeidersbeweging en katholieke kerk in Maas- tricht 1880-1920 (Amsterdam 1983). See also Righart (1986); Steiniger (1975); Jacob Kruyt, Verzuiling (Zaandijk 1959) and Johan Bornewasser, ‘De katholieke zuil in wording als object van “columnologie”’, Archief voor de geschiedenis van de katholieke kerk in Nederland 30 (1988) 168-212. 43 See Lijphart (1968), Hans Daalder, ‘Consociationalism, center and periphery in the Netherlands, Per Torsvik (ed.), Mobilization, center-periphery and nation-building: a volume in commemoration of Stein Rokkan (Bergen 1981) and Steiniger (1997). 44 Jacobus van Doorn, ‘Verzuiling: een eigentijds probleem van sociale controle’, Sociolo- gische Gids 3 (1956) 41-49. 45 See Antonius Wichers, De oude plattelandsbeschaving: een sociologische bewustwording van ‘overherigheid’ (Wageningen 1965); Daalder (1966); Johan Goudsblom, Dutch society (New York 1967); Siep Stuurman, ‘De Nederlandse staat tussen verzuiling en moderniteit’, F. van Besouw (ed.), Balans en perspectief: visies op de geschiedwetenschap in Nederland (Groningen 1987) 263-283; Knippenberg and De Pater (1988) and Erik H. Bax, Modernization and cleav- age in Dutch society: a study of long term economic and social change (Groningen 1988). 80 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Protestants, Church leaders disassociated themselves from the Liberal cause towards the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the ‘school struggle’. Orthodox and liberal Protestants formed the fourth division. The orthodox Kuyper engaged in a battle with the liberal Protestants and seceded from the Dutch Re- formed Church. Finally, social democrats faced off against all religious groups. The result of all these divisions was a “pillarization rage” that, according to Pen- nings, “was of great importance for the origin and consolidation of the pillars between 1880 and 1925.”46 The question on the origins of the pillarization process did not appear to have a single answer. Clearly though, oppositions between certain population groups that were felt on all social levels, between neighbors in streets and politicians in the House of Representatives, consolidated the pillars. “Only where social conflict did- n’t exist”, Pennings commented, “did one hardly feel the need to pillarize”.47 In the struggle between the Christian churches and the modernizing state, Pennings summarized, the opposition stimulated waves of religious revival. In the case of the Catholics, the opposition against Protestants, social democrats and Liberals gave the Roman Catholic Church the position to act authoritatively regarding its members and their conduct. In this way, the Catholic pillar formed a kind of ‘megaphone’ from the top of the bloc via numerous pillarized organizations to the individuals at the very bottom.

2.4 State discipline and the confessional pillars

During the process of pillarization, private affairs like family and morals became matters governmental and religious institutions felt inclined to prescribe a line of conduct for. The activities resulting from the government’s insistence on codes of behavior were not only negative and repressive but also positive and educative. “The ‘civilizing’ activities of the state are primarily directed at morality, sexuality, health care, sanitary facilities, housing, education and philanthropy,” Stuurman argued in his book on pillarization, capitalism and patriarchy.48 The family was regarded as the very center at which the educative activities of the state were to be directed. A subtle combination of repression, legal regulations and the creation of a ‘moral coherence’ within society backed up the state’s attempt to rule the country on these private matters.

46 Pennings (1991) 17-19. 47 Ibid, 19. 48 Stuurman (1983) 24. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 81

Population development became a matter of state: military competition and imperialism needed a healthy and large population and taxation required the regis- tration of the growing population. Public health and morality also were high on the political agenda: healthy laborers were essential for industrialization, urbanization put forward the matter of hygienics, public housing, neonatal care, children’s up- bringing and control of epidemics and venereal diseases. Pauperism was perceived as potentially dangerous to the state. The development of the labor movement that threatened to organize poor classes against the state, made poverty into a more urgent political matter. The promotion of public decency and a ‘sound’ family life were regarded as a means to fight subversive practices.49 State interference with public life did not develop regularly and simultaneously but generated a new and complex state machine. Not surprisingly, policymaking increasingly relied on modern social and life sciences like statistics, demography, economics, medicine, psychology and sociology. “Population policy simultaneous- ly consists of class strategy and family policy, patriarchal planning and labor man- agement,” Stuurman argued. These mechanisms of control become most appar- ent when studied on the levels of the individual and the family, the political scien- tist argued, although “the emphasis on micro politics ought not end in neglect of the broad, long-term operative strategies of factions in the state and church.”50 Pillarization laid solid foundations for the religious influence on Catholic demographic behavior because of the relationship between these ‘micro-politics’ and the organization of power relations on a national level. Confessional organiza- tions occupied the key position between the state policies on the top level on the one hand and the micro level on the other where the individual’s life was actually affected by the new control of morality and family life. “The state branches off as far as the most remote geographic and social corner of the territory of a country. New ways of working, living, spending spare time and experiencing family rela- tions do not develop just like that, they too are ‘produced’. This ‘production’ is due to churches, associations, private organizations and eventually the state. Not according to a schedule drawn up in advance but in the form of an unremitting bat- tle within and between these regulating bodies,” Stuurman explained.51 The first traces of state intervention through population policies date back to the eighteenth century, but the period between 1850 and 1920 saw it grow to full stature.52 Pillarization activated a new role of the state that, in its turn, generated a structure via which religion was able to influence demography. A comprehensive ‘politicization’ of the personal life characterized the pillarization process. Norms of

49 Ibid, 27-28. 50 Ibid, 28-29. Stuurman’s ideas are based on the views of Foucault. See Michel Foucault, ‘Twee typen macht’, Te elfder ure 29 (1981) 573-587. 51 Stuurman (1983) 32. 52 Ibid, 202. 82 mixing ovaries and rosaries

behavior that focused on family, sexuality and ‘public decency’ were no longer regarded as individual matters of free choice but as ‘natural’ certainties that were transformed into clear guidelines for men, women, boys and girls by means of the pillarized institutions. The governmental debate and state policies on these mat- ters formalized the institutional transformation of norms into rules of conduct and provided a legal base for it. The confessional pillars were fit to provide for the trans- lation of government policies into an enforced practical course of behavior. In fact, rooted in an interpretation of Christianity that made socialism, feminism, liberal- ism and Neo Malthusianism into enemies of the family and morality, the organiza- tions of the confessional pillars were the perfect moral ‘crusaders’. Christian ideol- ogy sustained pillarization, but it worked the other way too as pillarization sup- ported the propagation of Christian morality.53 Only after the Second World War, when social and economic emancipation of women caused increased disharmony between ideological anti-feminism and capital concerns, the once uniting patriar- chal practices and ideologies started to have a disintegrating effect – especially in the Catholic pillar.54 Confessional pillarization stimulated state interference with morality that, in its turn, required the pillars to organize political ideals. Pillarization, hence, mobi- lized and deployed religion at the same time. The concept of pillarization ought to be regarded as the connection between organization and ideology – often a reli- gious ideology, organized as a church. Pillarization offered the social structure to organize religious ideology and, legalized by the state’s interest in moral disci- pline, impose it on believers via the pillars’ networks of organizations. How did so- ciety respond to this moral ‘crusade’? As paragraph 3 will show, the pillarization process that enabled the Catholic Church to enforce rules regarding sexuality and procreation on its members was introduced into a society that already considered morality to be of paramount importance.

3 The moral nation

The Catholic sociologist and politician Piet Aalberse defined morality as “the com- plex of problems resulting from the continuous effect of anti-Christian ideas on the state and society since the Renaissance.”55 The meaning of the nineteenth cen- tury concept of morality (zedelijkheid) corresponds most with the current use of social morality. Many ‘experts’ in the field of morality, like churches, charity organ- izations and the new social sciences, shared their views on the matter and influ-

53 Ibid, 332. 54 Ibid, 14, 236. 55 Ibid, 203. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 83 enced politicians and policies. Consequently, as a political topic, ideas on the fam- ily diverged from each other and were often contradicting. Though the concept was extremely heterogeneous, morality clearly focused on the family and particularly the mother, who was expected to bring the proposed changes into operation. This paragraph deals with morality in the Netherlands and the way it related to pillarization and religious determinants of demography. In paragraph 3.1, quanti- tative data on Dutch moral behavior, such as illegitimacy and abortion, are com- pared with those of other countries. In the following paragraphs, attention will be focused on the way confessionals claimed interference with moral behavior and turned matters like sexuality and women’s emancipation into moral issues. Finally, paragraph 3.5 shows the relationship between the pillarized social struc- ture, the Dutch preoccupation with morality and the enforcement of (demo- graphic) codes of behavior and how concerted action between these processes pro- vided for the perfect conditions for the influence on fertility patterns and levels by the Catholic Church.

3.1 Diagrammatized morality

During the seventeenth century, between 10 and 20% of the births in the Dutch province of Noord-Holland resulted from premarital conceptions. During the eighteenth century these rates rose fast to reach 40% around 1800 – after which the percentage of premarital pregnancies slowly declined to levels between 20 and 30%.56 Within the Netherlands, or at least the western and northern part of it, the province of Noord-Holland did not demonstrate exceptional rates and patterns of illegitimacies.57 Placing the results of his research into the illegitimate births of Noord-Holland within the scope of the broader Dutch and European context, Jan Kok confirmed that by 1900 the Netherlands had extremely low rates of illegitimacies (extra- and premarital pregnancies) compared to the rest of Europe. He also demonstrated that the Dutch pattern already deviated from that of surrounding countries before the end of the nineteenth century. Together with the Irish, Flemish and French countryside, the Netherlands had the lowest number of extramarital births in the whole of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Dutch cities that showed the highest rates were lagging behind other European cities like Paris, where between 1810 and 1819 37% of all births were illegitimate, Vienna that reached a percentage of 49% between 1851 and 1855, Stockholm with 46% during

56 Kok (1991) 135. 57 Ibid, 135. Similar rates are offered in Theo Engelen en M. Meyer, ‘Gedwongen huwe- lijken op het Nederlandse platteland, 1812-1862’, AAG Bijdragen 22 (Wageningen 1979) 190-121 and Dirk-Jaap Noordam, Leven in Maasland: een hoogontwikkelde plattelandssamen- leving in de achttiende en het begin van de negentiende eeuw (Hilversum 1986). 84 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the same period and Prague with 46% between 1881 and 1899.58 When after 1880 everywhere in Europe illegitimacy declined, the rates in the Netherlands where the decline had started in 1825 were much lower. If the introduction of family plan- ning at the end of the nineteenth century had any influence on the number of ille- gitimate births in the Netherlands, it resulted in a further decline in Dutch non- marital fertility. Graph 5 shows a comparison between percentages of illegitimate births in Ger- many, France, England and Wales, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands during the first part of the twentieth century.

14

12

10

8

6

4 averages) 2 (five-yearly and yearly averages)

Proportion illegitimacies of all births 0 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1941 1947 1950 1955 1958

Germany France England/Wales Switzerland

Proportion illegitimacies of all births (five-yarly and yearly Spain Italy Netherlands Graph 5 Proportions illegitimacies of all births (five-yearly and yearly averages) in seven European countries, 1910-1958. Source: Gerrit Kooy and M. Keuls, Enforced marriage in the Netherlands: a statistical analysis in order to test some sociological hypotheses (Wageningen 1967) 46.59

The contrast between the low Dutch level of illegitimacy, that remained fairly sta- ble throughout the decades, and the high and irregular levels of the other countries is striking. In 1915 and 1920, the percentage of illegitimacies in the Netherlands was less than a quarter of the levels of Germany and France and still less than half the levels of Switzerland, England and Wales, Spain and Italy. From the 1950s, the

58 Ibid, 15 and 134-136. See also Arno Sprangers and Joop Garssen, Non-marital fertility in the European economic area (Den Haag 2003). 59 The illegitimacy averages until 1930 are based on five-yearly averages, after 1930 on yearly averages.The Swiss 1940 average is from 1941; the Dutch 1935 level is derived from the five-yearly average from the period 1936-40. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 85 rates in most countries including the Netherlands declined. By the 1960s, when the proportions of illegitimate births had fallen and stabilized in all seven coun- tries, the Dutch percentage was still only a sixth of the German and less than half of the Italian average. The 1960s and 1970s provided for an increasing social acceptance of cohabita- tion and of children born outside wedlock. Even after the second feminist move- ment and the sexual revolution, however, data still testify of Dutch morality, David Coleman and Joop Garssen of the Statistics Netherlands showed in a comparative research on demographic patterns in Europe after the Second World War. Teenage childbearing in the Netherlands (about 6 per thousand teenagers per year), the authors demonstrated, between 1950 and 2000 has been half the average for the 18 European countries. “Not surprisingly in the land of perfect family planning, abor- tion levels are low as well (about 110 abortions per thousand live births per year), again half the European average.”60 Another remarkable difference in the Dutch abortion practices since their legitimacy, is the fact that in the Netherlands women had an abortion much earlier during their pregnancy than women abroad.61 Though evidence on abortion rates prior to its legalization is scarce and unreliable, there is no cause to believe that the Dutch numbers were higher than anywhere else in Europe.62 What do the lower illegitimacy and abortion levels of the Netherlands signify? The late political history professor Hans Righart of Utrecht University in his article on morality in the Netherlands regarded these data as quantitative evidence of Dutch chastity – just like the level and patterns of fertility, he argued.63 The ques- tion whether it was religion that caused the reluctance of Catholics to adopt the modern fertility pattern or their socio-economic position, from the perspective of Righart did not have a foregone conclusion. According to Righart, the discussion on the primness of the Dutch drifted too much in the direction of demographic effects. “It’s a bit of a chicken-egg discussion in the sense that it is hard to deter- mine where the influence of religion stops and where social-economic factors

60 The only European country with a similar low rate of teenage childbearing is Switzer- land. Belgium and the Republic of Ireland have slightly lower abortion rates than the Neth- erlands. David Coleman and Joop Garssen, ‘The Netherlands: paradigm or exception in Western Europe’s demography?’, Demographic Research 7 (2002) 433-468, 442. 61 In the Netherlands, 63.4% of the women who had an abortion in 1974 were before the eighth week of their pregnancy; by 1977 this rate had hardly increased (63.8%). Evert Ketting, Van misdrijf tot hulpverlening: een analyse van de maatschappelijke betekenis van abortus provocatus in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn 1978) 179-180. 62 Jan de Bruijn, Geschiedenis van de abortus in Nederland: een analyse van opvattingen en dis- cussies, 1600-1979 (Amsterdam 1979) 57-58. 63 Hans Righart, ‘Moraliseringsoffensief in Nederland in de periode 1850-1880’, Harry Peeters, Lène Dresen-Coenders en Ton Brandenbarg (ed.), Vijf eeuwen gezinsleven. Liefde, huwelijk en opvoeding in Nederland (Nijmegen 1988) 194-208, 195. 86 mixing ovaries and rosaries

start,” Righart commented on the debate between Hofstee and Van Heek. “Both explanations seem to be complementary: in the hardly industrialized and conse- quently strong traditional types of society in the southern provinces the influence of Catholicism was big of course.”64 Particularly regional differences in demo- graphic behavior within denominations, Righart argued, showed how interwoven influences of socio-economic factors and religion were.65 The author, however, was most cautious in attributing data and percentages independent meanings and regarded them as complementary proof of the Dutch chastity. How did the preoc- cupation with morality among the population of the Netherlands came about?

3.2 The ‘moralization offensive’: from Liberal initiative to confessional crusade

In 1784 the Mennonite clergyman and teacher Jan Nieuwenhuyzen established the Society for the Common Good (Maatschappij tot Nut van ’t Algemeen) in the Noord- Holland town of Monnikendam. In its effort to provide society with structure the Society aimed at educating the people by establishing libraries and savings banks and providing for education. The Society attracted many members among the patriotic bourgeoisie who founded branches all over the Netherlands on the prin- ciple that “knowledge is the road to personal and social development”.66 In his article on the ‘virtuous nation’, the University of Amsterdam historian Bernard Kruithof hailed the founding of the Society for the Common Good as the start of the moralization ‘offensive’.67 At the end of the eighteenth century, ideas stemming from the Enlightenment as well as fear for social disintegration inspired the Liberal bourgeoisie to commence this ‘fight’ and to attempt to make personal matters part of politics. The churches and the state adopted the moralization ‘of- fensive’. The foundation of the Society for the Common Good was followed by the establishment of numerous philanthropic organizations, secular as well as ecclesi- astical poor relief, the rise of a medical class, public housing, welfare work and the women’s and labor movements of the early twentieth century.68 So already before the pillarization period, Churches founded organizations in order to succeed in introducing discipline and a standard code of conduct.

64 Ibid, 197. 65 See Ad van der Woude, ‘Bevolking en gezin in Nederland’, Frédéric van Holthoorn (ed.), De Nederlandse samenleving sinds 1815: wording en samenhang (Assen 1985) 19-70, 67-68 and Hofstee (1981) 50-60. 66 Maatschappij tot Nut van ’t Algemeen, ‘Kennis is de weg naar persoonlijke en maat- schappelijke ontwikkeling’ (nd). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www. nutalgemeen. nl 67 Bernard Kruithof, ‘De deugdzame natie: het burgerlijk beschavingsoffensief van de Maatschappij tot Nut van ’t Algemeen tussen 1784 en 1860’, Symposion 2 (1980) 22-38, 25. 68 Stuurman (1983) 208-209. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 87

Several phases can be distinguished in the period during which church and state copied the moralization ‘offensive’ from the Liberals. In the period between 1848 and 1870 a balance between Liberal rationalism and Christian moralization was barely maintained. Johan Thorbecke for example, Liberal statesman and chairman of the constitutional committee of 1848, did not succeed in withdrawing the inter- ference in poor relief by supporters of the confessional parties. The interest in visit- ing the poor raised amongst the urban Protestant bourgeoisie, in particular unmar- ried women, resulted in the development of the ‘home mission’. This initiative to preach the Christian message among apostates and sinners in the Netherlands was itself part of the so-called Réveil-movement, a zealous pursuit of the revival of the spiritual and ecclesiastical life while engaging in combat with alcoholism, slavery, unmarried motherhood and establishing orphanages.69 Among Catholics, women too devoted themselves to the repression of immorality and to education, – but mostly as nuns living in monasteries. After the restoration of the episcopal hierar- chy in 1853 the first aim was to re-establish the church organization, which was soon followed by the founding of new monasteries. Stuurman for example de- scribed the development of the Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of Jesus and Mary that had 296 Dutch members in 1850, 679 in 1860, 981 in 1870 and by 1880 consisted of 1301 members.70 Like many other female congregations, the nuns en- gaged in education and moralization of the population.71 This way, around the mid- dle of the nineteenth century the moral development of the ‘common people’ was slowly annexed by supporters of confessional parties. By the time the ‘school strug- gle’ positioned the Liberals opposite the confessional parties, rational and liberal Christians in the Society for the Common Good had become isolated. Between 1870 and 1900, during the second phase of the moralization ‘offen- sive’, the state gradually interfered with public morals while the churches sustained their efforts in the field. The development of industrialization resulted in a loss of the traditional link between the family structure and productive labor while child and female labor remained widespread.72 The Liberals were still an important driv- ing force behind the state’s intervention with the social consequences of the new capitalism. They provided for a law regulating child labor; the orthodox Protestant Kuyper was among the people voting against its introduction in 1874. According to the concerned Liberal bourgeoisie, in particular the lowest part of the labor class,

69 Ibid, 211-212. See Pieter Koenders, Tussen christelijk réveil en seksuele revolutie : bestrijding van zedeloosheid in Nederland, met nadruk op de repressie van homoseksualiteit (Leiden 1995). 70 Stuurman (1983) 213. 71 See for example F.P.C. de Kock, Opvoeders in toog en kap : een eeuw opvoeding en onderwijs door religieuzen in Nederland (Voorhout 1953). The education by monks has been well docu- mented in the study of Joos van Vugt, Brothers at work: a history of five Dutch congregations of brothers and their activities in Catholic education, 1840-1970 (Nijmegen 1996). 72 Stuurman (1983) 214. 88 mixing ovaries and rosaries

consisting of unskilled factory workers and rural proletariat, lacked an ‘orderly’ family life and was obstructed by alcoholism and low church participation.73 Other movements denounced social issues and gained support: Neo Malthusianism made the regulation of sexuality subject for debate and feminism contributed to the fact that control of prostitution became the main issue in the discussion.74 The last period of the moralization ‘offensive’, that started around 1900 and lasted for two decades, marked a definite change in politics. This change was caused by an economic upturn and the matter of electoral suffrage: the social issue for which strategies were developed by churches and the state. The years between 1900 and 1920 were of utmost importance for the relationships between the state and the family. The compulsory education law that was passed in 1900 in spite of opposition by confessional parties, made parents responsible for the school atten- dance of young children.75 After the regulation of child labor in factories, this law had to prevent the increase in domestic industry. In 1901 legislation for child wel- fare and industrial injuries followed suit, as well as legislation concerning employ- ment contracts in 1907, paternity testing in 1909 and public morals in 1911. That year a new Labor Law was introduced and, in 1913, a Health Law.76 Legislation passed under the flag of the moral ‘crusade’ between 1900 and 1920, however, was not restricted to the family: as the following paragraph will show, these decades had far-reaching consequences for law-making regarding sexuality too.

3.3 From Neo Malthusianism to the Public Decency Act

During the last phase of the moralization ‘offensive’, state and church involvement with matters of family and sexuality was standardized. This process made it pos- sible to discuss sexuality – but only for a short period and within limited parts of so- ciety. The establishment of the Neo Malthusian League in 1881 heralded the start of the debate on family planning and sexuality.77 Before the Second World War 310.000 copies of Means to consciously limit the number of children: intimate advice of a doctor, first published in 1884, were distributed in the Netherlands by the League.

73 Ibid, 215-217. 74 See Petra de Vries, Kuisheid voor mannen, vrijheid voor vrouwen: de reglementering en be- strijding van prostitutie in Nederland, 1850-1911 (Hilversum 1997) and Martin Bossenbroek and Jan Kompagnie, Het mysterie van de verdwenen bordelen: prostitutie in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1998). 75 The compulsory education law was passed with 50 votes for and 49 against its introduc- tion. The story goes that the Protestant Schimmelpenninck fell off his horse and was not able to come to the parliament to dissent – which resulted in the introduction. Landelijke Vereniging Leerplicht Ambtenaren, ‘Een eeuw Leerplichtwet’ (2000). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.leerplichtwet.nl/eeuwleerplicht.html 76 Stuurman (1983) 211. 77 Ibid, 220-222. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 89

In addition, over a million other papers, brochures and leaflets found their way to Dutch households.78 Besides Neo Malthusianists, physicians originating from the expanded medical sciences tried to make knowledge about the human body public. In illustrated books, they explained the functioning of genital organs and the men- strual cycle – though not always correctly – and discussed methods of birth con- trol.79 Sexology as a science was developed.80 If the activities of the Neo Malthusianists represented the tendency to openly discuss sexuality, the 1911 acts on public decency marked the end of it. The 1911 acts indicated the transition of a political moralization based on Liberal ideas to a moralization ‘offensive’ taken by confessional parties only. The Christian reaction against the Neo Malthusian League had been strong from the start: apart from Catholic response, discussed in chapter 1, a Protestant association was established to fight the spread of the Neo Malthusian ideas on birth control. As president of this anti-Malthusian association, Kuyper regularly pressed for state protection of public decency. The orthodox Protestants in 1911 therefore provided the Catholic secretary Robert Regout with a parliamentary majority for his revision and exten- sion of the act on public decency.81 The revised legislation repealed the regulation of prostitution and introduced an official ban on brothels. The Public Decency Act also tightened up the legislation on abortion and facilitated persecution of the prac- tice of abortion, even when performed on medical grounds. Additionally, the law imposed stricter provisions on pornography, introduced stipulations on homosex- uality and prohibited public propaganda for contraceptives, which greatly impeded the activities of the Neo Malthusians.82 The revised law on public decency formed the climax of the developing balance between the state, the nineteenth century concept of morality and the regulation of

78 During the pre-war years the Neo-Malthusian League also distributed some 725.000 propaganda papers and handbills, 4.000 kits, 634.500 brochures and 400.000 leaflets. In 1935 the 1884 publication was replaced by Joh. Tuyt, Middelenboekje voor geboorteregeling (Den Haag 1920). Gé Nabrink, Seksuele hervorming in Nederland: achtergronden en geschie- denis van de Nieuw-Malthusiaanse Bond (NMB) en de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Seksuele Hervorming (NVSH), 1881-1971 (Nijmegen 1978) 106-107. 79 See Aletta Jacobs, De vrouw: haar bouw en haar inwendige organen (Deventer 1899); Jan Rutgers, Een boek voor jonge vrouwen en meisjes, wenken voor het geslachtsleven (Amsterdam 1900) and Anna Fischer-Dückelmann, Het seksueele leven der Vrouw: een physiologisch- maatschappelijke studie met geneeskundige en hygiënische wenken (Almelo 1901). See also Marloes Schoonheim, ‘Een boek dat de leemte vulde. Anna Fischer-Dückelmann over de vrouwelijke seksualiteit’ in: Strijd om seksualiteit. Jaarboek voor de Vrouwengeschiedenis 20 (Amsterdam 2000) 153-166. 80 See Gert Hekma and Hugo Q. Röling, Het oog op de lust: 100 jaar seksuologie in Amster- dam (Amsterdam 1995). 81 Stuurman (1983) 221-223. 82 Ibid, 223-224, Righart (1988) 195-197. 90 mixing ovaries and rosaries

sexuality. Its introduction – against which all Liberals and socialists voted – indi- cated to what extent the supporters of confessional parties appeared to aim for imposing their ideas of a decent and moral life on the entire nation. However, it also denoted the shift in the ideological climate of politics that changed from Liberal and liberal-Protestant to a confessional parties’ “crusade”, Stuurman argued. The act was passed in spite of objections against the drastic intervention of the state with private morals. “In particular Catholic hair-splitters like Regout and mp Van Wijn- bergen did not wish to take heed of the Liberal or scientific objections, even those from a distinguished Christian politician,” Stuurman continued. “They cared more for the symbolic value of criminalizing deviant behavior than for the introduction of an actually effective penal code.”83 Stuurman appeared to be alarmed by the effects of the morality ‘offensive’ on the legislation of sexuality; his conclusions concerning the Dutch attitudes on women’s emancipation were equally explicit.

3.4 The women’s issue: a moral issue

While the Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth century compared to other European countries was a relatively modern country with regard to inter-sexual relations, the Netherlands in 1950 was traditional.84 Although pillarization and the increased religiosity that followed from it sustained the traditional ideas on the social position of the woman, these processes were preceded by an emphasis on the ‘natural’ role of women during the moralization ‘offensive’. The national exhibition on female labor (Nationale Tentoonstelling van Vrouwen- arbeid) in The Hague in 1898 marked the breakthrough of the first feminist move- ment in the Netherlands that would peak during the start of the twentieth century.85 In 1894 the society for female suffrage (Vereniging voor Vrouwenkiesrecht) was estab- lished which by 1907 counted 3.400 members and by 1916 22.000 members – a larger number than, for example, the Socialist Democratic Labor Party sdap, though still only 0.7% of the female population.86 When the Dutch suffragettes succeeded

83 Stuurman (1983) 224. Due to his statement that socialists were scum, Baron Antonius van Wijnbergen (a member of the Roman Catholic National Party) was nick-named Baron Scum (Baron canaille). Parlement en politiek, ‘Mr. A.I.M.J. baron van Wijnbergen’ (nd). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.parlement.com/9291000/biof/01583 84 Stuurman (1983) 333. 85 Maria Grever and Fia Dieteren (ed.), A fatherland for women: the 1898 ‘Nationale Ten- toonstelling van Vrouwenarbeid’ in retrospect (Amsterdam 2000). 86 Maria Grever, Strijd tegen de stilte: Johanna Naber (1859-1941) en de vrouwenstem in de ge- schiedenis (Hiversum 1994) 28. In 1913 the socialist democratic labor party sdap counted 17000 members. The Dutch population consisted of 3.245.000 females in 1916. cbs, ‘Historische reeksen: Mens en maatschappij: Historie bevolking: Bevolking naar geslacht’ (1916). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.statline.nl a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 91 in obtaining female suffrage in 1917, the support for organizations dedicated to women’s rights dwindled.87 Like the rest of society, the Dutch feminist movement was compartmentalized. This might well have weakened the overall impact of the movement, for every denominational women’s organization formulated aims beyond emancipation. The Catholic Association for the Protection of Girls (Rooms-Katholieke Vereniging ter Bescherming van Meisjes), for example, approached young women in railroad sta- tions who moved from the countryside to the cities to find a job. The association, founded in 1902, wanted to protect these girls against poverty, or worse: moral degeneration. By 1927 the society consisted of 29 departments and 32 hostels in various dioceses.88 At the start of the twentieth century, the association might have looked like an organization inspired by the feminist movement; three decades later it was yet another club throwing itself into the breach exclusively for its own denomination as part of the vast network of the Catholic pillar. Confessional parties regarded feminism as a threat to the family because the movement, in its pursuit of women’s emancipation, highlighted the independent, rational individual. From the perspective of the supporters of confessional parties the rights of the individual were far less important than that of the family as the mainstay of society.89 Opposition to feminism in this sense was part of a broader defense of the patriarchal structured family as a source of everlasting love, happi- ness and loyalty against the ‘materialistic individualism’ generated by the Renais- sance.90 “Like the state, the family in the broadest sense of the word is a society too that is governed by the authority of the father,” Stuurman cites Pope Leo xiii.91 Feminism and legislation that motivated the emancipation of women formed a threat to the gender roles that formed the base of the family. The confessional par- ties’ opinion on feminism was confirmed when after the introduction of an act facilitating divorce in 1883, the number of divorces increased.92

87 See Marja Borkus (ed.), Vrouwenstemmen: 100 jaar vrouwenbelangen: 75 jaar vrouwen- kiesrecht (Zutphen 1994) 197. 88 Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, ‘Rooms-Katholieke Vereniging ter Bescher- ming van Meisjes’ (nd). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.inghist.nl/ Onderzoek/Projecten/Socialezekerheid/literatuurlijst/files/Literatuurlijst020_01860; See also Karen den Dekker, ‘"Verdedigt en beschermt uw zwakke zusters": de Rooms-Katholie- ke Vereniging ter Bescherming van Meisjes in internationaal perspectief’, Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum 21 (1991) 41-60. 89 Stuurman (1983) 225. 90 See also John Tosh, A man’s place: masculinity in the middle-class home in Victorian Eng- land (New Haven). 91 Stuurman (1983) 225. 92 In 1900, 2.2% of all marriages were annulled; in 1910 the ten-yearly average was 3.6%. cbs, Volkstelling 31 December 1930 2: leeftijd, burgerlijke staat (Den Haag 1932). See also Van Poppel (1992) 275-285. 92 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Supporters of confessional parties did not solidly pursue female suffrage – nor were they unanimously against it. Though most orthodox Protestants tolerated so- cial activities of women in the public sphere as part of the Réveil-movement, many rejected female suffrage on biblical principles while others supported female suf- frage because it would bring in quantitative political support.93 Catholic opinion was not unanimous on the matter either. The writers of a 1907 report on the issue, published by order of the association of Catholic Electors’ Associations (later the Catholic National Party rksp), were indistinct on the matter. Though neither of the authors of the report objected on the basis of religious principles, none of them favored immediate introduction of female suffrage. A contemporary poll of the Catholic magazine De Tijd showed that 36% of the readers was in favor of female suffrage, 12% was in favor of suffrage for female heads of households, and 35% was against female suffrage in any form.94 Even if they had no feminist aims, appearances were against any Catholic women’s organization. The temperance organizations for women (Mariaverenigin- gen) fitted well into the ‘moralization offensive’ and had nothing to do with femi- nism, still they were led by a priest. The foundation of a Catholic women’s charita- ble institution for years was opposed by ‘imputations’ on feminism, intercon- fessionalism and schismatic tendencies. When finally, in 1912, the Catholic Women’s League (Katholieke Vrouwenbond) was established, the branches formed in all dioceses were chaired by priests. By controlling the Catholic Women’s League, the Church made sure feminist and suffragette tendencies were shut out – during the League’s opening speech female suffrage was even condemned.95 It took much longer for Catholic women to enter politics: in 1924 the first female candidate of the Catholic National Party was chosen as a member of parliament.96 It took until after the Second World War before a Catholic woman took a position in the government.97 As has been mentioned before, in the Netherlands industrialization developed late, decades after most other Western European countries. What caused this delay is, as Hettie Pott-Buter of the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics of Amster- dam University expressed it, “a mystery which has puzzled generations of eco- nomic historians”.98 Like industrialization, female labor force participation devel- oped slow: as Pott-Buter showed for the period between 1850 and 1990, women’s

93 Stuurman (1983) 229-231. 94 Ibid, 226. 95 Ibid, 228. 96 Parlement en politiek, ‘J.M.J.A. Meijer’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from www. parlement.com/9291000/biof/00913 97 Parlement en politiek, ‘Dr. A. de Waal’, (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from www. parlement.com/9291000/biof/01497; see also Mieke Aerts, De politiek van de katholieke vrouwenemancipatie: van Marga Klompé tot Jacqueline Hillen (Amsterdam 1994). a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 93 shares in labor force participation in the Netherlands were always lower than those in surrounding countries like Belgium, France, Germany, and the United King- dom (see graph 6).99 Particularly labor force participation rates of married women remained very low until the 1970s.

42

37

32

27

22

17

12 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1971

Percentage women working of the total female population Belgium France Germany Netherlands UK

Graph 6 Female labor participation rates: female labor force as a percentage of the total female population in five countries, 1870-1970. Source: Pott-Buter (21).100

The increase of female labor force participation at the start of the twentieth cen- tury, though very slow, was a thorn in the flesh of the confessional parties. The unskilled work of young women in factories alongside older women and – even worse – men, threatened the morality. Work that required schooling was consid- ered bad for a girl too as higher education was not supposed to be healthy for women whose natural tasks, supposedly, were motherhood and being a good wife. The wickedness of these issues, however, paled before the labor participation of married women, because, low as it was, it seriously harmed the confessional par- ties’ championing of the balanced family. In 1899 an estimated 9.5% of married women had a profession; ten years later this percentage had increased to 10.6% –

98 Hettie Pott-Buter, Facts and fairy tales about female labor, family and fertility: a seven- country comparison 1850-1990 (Amsterdam 1993) 64. See also Van Holthoorn (1985). 99 Ibid, 282. 100 For several countries, Pott-Buter used rates from different years. The 1950 rates of Bel- gium and the Netherlands for example relate to 1947. Ibid, 21. 94 mixing ovaries and rosaries

though these data exclude hidden employment in home industry, shop keeping and seasonal work in agriculture and industry.101 Though supporters of confessional parties were much opposed against labor participation of married women, a complete injunction on work for married women was not considered a realistic option because of the interests of industry and the employed women’s poor families. Work for married women was regulated though: in 1909 an ordinance was signed by the orthodox Protestant minister of the interior resulting in the honorable discharge of female teachers younger than 45 on the day of their marriage. In 1910 the arp tried to get all married female civil servants in government service fired.102 Between 1917 and 1940 the government tried nine more times to regulate paid labor for women outside the home. The most drastic attempt was by the Catholic Secretary of Labor Carl Romme who in 1937 proposed a bill prohibiting all labor outside the home for married women. The proposal met with considerable opposition – even from orthodox Protestants – hence Romme cancelled the bill.103 An important hindrance to the labor participation of women was formed by the suspicion the Dutch society harbored about child care. Ever since the nineteenth century nursery schools for young children were established, child care was not regarded as an efficient and essential basic facility in the Netherlands – unlike other European countries. As Dutch terminology reveals, day care is not consid- ered to have an educational value – in the nineteenth century it was called bewaarschool, a school to ‘keep’ children off the street, in the twentieth century kinderopvang, a reception or shelter for children, or kinderdagverblijf, a day center for children. The terms lack any reference to ‘care’ or ‘education’. Even after femi- nists’ protests for free child care during the 1970s, no arrangements were made to make day care free or to regulate its quality. “For a very long time attention was focused on motherhood ideals, motherhood ideology and family ideals,” Louis Tavecchio, child care professor of the University of Amsterdam, explained the Dutch dislike for child care. “Women who left their children to be raised by some- one else were not tolerated.” Even long after the pillarization period with its focus on maternity morals, many people regarded child care as a place where children are ‘kept’ during the day instead of a place where children are educated by trained

101 Selma Leydesdorff, Verborgen arbeid – vergeten arbeid: een verkenning in de geschiedenis van de vrouwenarbeid rond negentienhonderd (Assen 1977) 20. 102 H.J. van de Streek, ‘Haar eigenlijke taak is het huis’, Transparant, tijdschrift van de Vere- niging van Christen-Historici 1 (1990). Retrieved January 26, 2004 from http://www. christenhistorici.nl/mgr/mgr_view.php?id=20021263 103 A. Schoot-Uiterkamp, ‘Terug naar het paradijs? Akties tegen de beperking van vrouwen- arbeid in de jaren dertig’, Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland 1978 (Nijmegen 1978) 182-245 and Jacques Bosmans, Romme: biografie 1896- 1946 (Utrecht 1991). a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 95 professionals who are partners in the children’s upbringing. The prevalent moral remained that a good mother raised her children herself – just like the confessional parties preached during the pillarization period. Their moralization ‘offensive’ has been most successful when it came to explaining women what the real ‘women’s issue’ was.104

3.5 Morality, pillarization and demography

Both in the Netherlands and abroad, the intent of the intervention apparatus that aimed at interfering with the private life of the family, upbringing and sexual morality has been an object of study.105 According to Righart, the Dutch moraliza- tion ‘offensive’ ought best be envisaged in the context of a social order that had changed thoroughly since the late eighteenth century. “The huge transformations in the political and socio-economic life modeled by the industrialization,” Righart argued, “affect attitudes towards sexuality and upbringing too.” Apart from the new social order that generated an interest in ethics, the moral ‘crusade’ started by Liberals was motivated by a genuine fear of the ‘brutish’ labor class in its dirty slum ghettoes. The construction of broad streets or cordons sanitairs surrounding pau- pers’ ghettoes and the development of the housing districts with inspection charac- terized that fear.106 The moralization ‘offensive’ was part of a social policy that aimed at a drastic ‘civilization’ of the working class, however, it had no intention of turning workers into members of the bourgeoisie. The social policy aimed at pre- venting the ‘infection’ of decent workers by the antisocial behavior of others.107 The Dutch ‘obsession’ with decency, Righart argued, eventually caused the deviating demography of the Netherlands.108 In the period between 1850 and 1880, prior to the pillarization process, industrialization developed and socialists started to organize. Reacting against Liberal supremacy in politics as well as in social life,

104 Journalist Mathijs Deen in conversation with Louis Tavecchio on the new law on day care. ovt, ‘Geschiedenis van de kinderopvang in Nederland’ (May 23, 2004). Retrieved Jan- uary 26, 2005 from http://www.vpro.nl/geschiedenis/ovt/index.shtml?4158511+3299530+ 15336249+17106161+17702680 105 See Christopher Lasch, Haven in a heartless world: the family besieged (New York 1977) and Jacques Donzelot, The policing of families (New York 1979). 106 Righart (1988) 199. See also Catharina Lis, ‘Proletarisch wonen in Westeuropese steden in de 19de eeuw: van wildgroei naar sociale controle’, Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis 3-4 (1977) 325-363. 107 Righart (1986) 200. See also Ali de Regt, Arbeidersgezinnen en beschavingsarbeid: ontwikkelingen in Nederland 1870-1940; een historisch-sociologische studie (Meppel 1984) and Adrianne M.M. Dercksen and Loes H. Verplanke, Geschiedenis van de onmaatschappelijk- heidsbestrijding in Nederland, 1914-1970 (Meppel 1987). 108 Righart (1988) 201. See also Frédéric van Holthoon, ‘Verzuiling in Nederland’, Van Holthoon (1985) 159-171. 96 mixing ovaries and rosaries

supporters of confessional parties started to organize too, for example via poor relief. They developed an attitude towards charity that linked it systematically with behavioral regulation: visiting the poor was combined with the fight against alco- holism, idleness, promiscuity, prostitution, Neo Malthusianism and other ‘dan- gers’ for the public and individual decency. Christian motives for these initiatives slowly replaced the Liberal one. During the 1860s and 70s the number of Catholic and Protestant organizations for the protection of religious values steadily grew: Catholic fraternities, devotions, Protestant ‘inner missionaries’, evangelization buildings and Sunday schools came into being. “Positively phrased, the intentions concerned the extension of the obedience of the lower classes to the ecclesiastical authority and the reinforcement of the family’s affiliations; in a negative sense it was all about the fight against liberalism, socialism, Freemasonry and Neo Malthu- sianism,” Righart argued.109 The relationship between pillarization, moralization and the enforcement of behavioral codes is perhaps best illustrated by the ‘school struggle’. After the fam- ily, schools were regarded as the next best pathway to socialization. Liberals consid- ered education to be a stepping-stone for social mobility and emancipation, how- ever, confessional parties perceived it to be a means of imparting religiosity and obedience. The conflict about subsidizing denominational education, hence, was partly a fight for social control. Because the supporters of confessional parties attached great importance to social control via education, the ‘school struggle’ managed to become the mobilization theme for religious orthodoxy and social con- servatism. The conflict marked the end of Liberal supremacy – in 1888 the first cabinet based on confessional parties was constituted – as well as the end of more liberal powers within the Catholic and Protestant blocs. The pillarization process affected many more areas of the Dutch society than those of morality only. But pillarization, Righart stipulated, meant the moraliza- tion actions were preserved in a social structure that offered legalization and orga- nization of interference with private affairs like the family and sexuality.110 Pillarization might not have caused the deviating demography, however, it was the perfect social structure to maintain a religious influence on fertility and nuptiality behavior. “Isn’t it possible,” Righart wondered, “that the moralization by the Fra- ternity of the Holy Family in the pre-industrial Noord-Brabant between 1851 and 1880 strongly influenced the continued effect of the traditional fertility pattern in this province?”111 The next paragraph will show how the Catholic pillar in particular profited from the social structure that preserved intervention with moral behavior.

109 Righart (1988) 204. 110 Ibid, 205. 111 Ibid. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 97

4 The Catholic ‘intercom’ for demographic directives

Compared to other countries, the Netherlands might have shown striking low ille- gitimacy rates in the nineteenth and twentieth century, but the Dutch provinces showed large differences in this degree of ‘moral behavior’. A government study of the situation in Dutch agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century praised the morality of farm laborers in the provinces of Limburg and Noord-Brabant as these Catholic regions appeared to have fewer ‘forced marriages’.112 As Graph 7 shows, Limburg and Noord-Brabant remained the most ‘virtuous’ provinces throughout the last half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, when judged by the percentages of illegitimate live births per 1000 unmarried women. By 1860 the level of illegitimate births in Noord-Brabant was almost half of the Dutch average; the province of Noord-Holland, that in the course of the twentieth century had the largest percentage of inhabitants not related to any church, in 1850 showed more than twice the percentage of illegitimate births of Noord-Brabant and still 1.5 times the rate of the Catholic provinces by 1971. With the state’s attention to disci- pline, pillarization provided the Catholic pillar with an opportunity to direct the behavior of its members.

11

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7 live births per 1000 unmarried

5 women (aged 15-49)

3

1 Proportion of illegitimate 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1947 1960 1969 1971

Noord-Holland Drenthe Noord-Brabant Limburg Netherlands

Graph 7 Illegitimate live births (two-yearly averages) per province, per 1000 unmarried women 113 of 15-49 years. Source: CBS.

112 Kok (1991) 136. 113 cbs, Buitenechtelijke geboorte 1840-1973 (Den Haag 1975) 25. 98 mixing ovaries and rosaries

This paragraph shows how certain conservative elements in the Catholic bloc exploited the pillarization process in the Netherlands in order to impose behavioral codes on believers. In 4.1, attention will be focused on the establishment of the Catholic National Party rksp and the way conservative Catholics gained the upper hand in the party, policymaking and the parliament. Subsequently, the develop- ment of the network of Catholic organizations will be treated in paragraph 4.2. Especially organizations for the working class, founded in order to prevent Catho- lics’ membership of socialist organizations, proved to constitute the core of pillarized Catholicism. Finally, the role of the Catholic clergy in the generation and development of the Catholic pillar will be discussed in 4.3.

4.1 The Catholic National Party: setting the tone in the pillar

The civil equalization of the Catholics and Protestants at the end of the eighteenth century and the restoration of the episcopal hierarchy in 1853 did all but initiate the establishment of a Catholic political party. The top of the gradually more organized and unified Catholic part of the population was divided between liberal-minded Catholics and conservative ones. One side was formed by liberal upper-middle class professionals like doctors and notaries from Amsterdam and Leiden who, liv- ing in the western provinces of the Netherlands, were much aware of their minor- ity position. They had little experience with politics and sympathized with Liberal politicians.114 The other Catholic camp was formed by more conservative Catholics from the rural parts of Noord-Brabant and Limburg, many of which were members of the Dutch nobility. They did not feel the need to develop a political and cultural ‘Catholic awareness’ nor did they favor merging with the Protestant nation – this group explained the demand for Catholic organization as a demonstration against the Protestants.115 The social and political ideological gap between the two Catholic factions was too big to make a move together – let alone found a party. Besides, political isola- tion on Catholic principles was still expected to appear as unltramontanism and, hence, a provocation of the Protestants. When in 1848 the first electors’ association for the protection of the Catholic faith, rights and believers was founded in The Hague, it was therefore met with criticism from both factions.116 The group of polit- ically engaged Catholics showed no signs of cohesion and did not always act in the best interests of their fellow believers.

114 Righart (1986) 198-199. 115 See also Johan Bornewasser, ‘De Nederlandse katholieken en hun negentiende-eeuwse vaderland’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 95 (1982) 577-604 and Eric W.G. Lemmens, Aan vorst en vaderland gehecht, doch tevreden zijn zij niet: Limburgse politici in Den Haag 1839-1918 (Amsterdam 2004) 116 Righart (1986) 201. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 99

Stimulated by a Vatican tail wind, the Catholic conservatives succeeded in depriving the liberal Catholics of their political power during the sixties and seven- ties of the nineteenth century. As the conservative Catholics came to represent the political views of the Church, the interests of Liberals and Catholics drifted apart within a short period of time. In July 1868 the Dutch episcopate formulated the principles for a consistent Catholic policy regarding education. In 1872 the last Lib- eral government led by Thorbecke proposed to abolish the Dutch embassy in the Vatican. Between these years, all liberal Catholics vanished from their representa- tive positions.117 After having supported Liberal aims like the abolition of the right of exequatur and the freedom of education, a large part of the politically engaged Catholics seemed to readopt political conservatism – in particular the clergy among them.118 The prelude to the ‘school struggle’ not only induced the take-over of the politi- cal setting by Catholic conservatives; it also appeared to be suitable for the mobili- zation of Catholics to join the denominational ‘cause’ and resulted in the first steps towards political organization. From the late 1860s onwards electors’ associations were founded. Though they were established both in the south and in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, the associations in Limburg and Noord-Brabant were much more powerful because they were incited by the fight against Catholic liberalism.119 In the early 1880s, members of the elector’s association of Noord-Brabant came to replace liberal Catholic members of the Provincial States and the Dutch House of Representatives. The elector’s associations were ‘old-boys networks’. Cohesion between mem- bers was personal rather than formal; most of the members were part of the nobil- ity. Co-religionists of the petty bourgeoisie were excluded from membership, as was the laboring class. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic contri- bution to the state government was confined to individual Members of Parliament. A central organization on a higher level than that of the region was disapproved of: it was feared that it would deprive associations like that of Noord-Brabant of their own political power and responsibilities and would affect the protection of local interests. Only in 1891 the Catholic Parliamentary Club (Katholieke Kamerclub) was founded. The Catholic mp’s were almost unanimously opposed against universal or even extended male suffrage – a hardly surprising consequence of both their so- cial and geographical background. After all, a Limburg esquire argued at the end of the 1890s, changes in the group of voters would not result in a different delegation other than a Catholic one.120

117 Ibid, 203. 118 Louis Rogier and Nicolaas de Rooij, In vrijheid herboren: Katholiek Nederland, 1853-1953 (Den Haag 1953) 164. 119 Righart (1986) 205. 120 The quoted esquire concerned Jonkheer G. Ruys van Beerenbrouck. Ibid, 206. 100 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The 1878 law on primary education seriously harmed the funding of denomi- national schools and gave an impulse to the ‘school struggle’, however, it took another ten years before the members of the club of Catholic mp’s felt inclined to cooperate closely with the orthodox Protestant Party arp. In 1888 the first govern- ment based on confessional parties was installed with two Catholic ministers and only one year later the law on education was changed. State funding of denomina- tional schools was safeguarded. In 1917 public and denominational schools were formally equalized with regard to state financing. In 1888, the entry of Catholics into government marked an important moment in the formation of the Catholic bloc: it symbolized the formal completion of the emancipation of the denomination. At the same time, the organizational pillar- ization only just got started: there were still few associations in the social and cul- tural area that provided for a Catholic network.121 The fact that conservative Catho- lics gained power over politics during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, was of great importance for the consolidation of traditional Catholic morality in the pillar. At least until the 1940s, the conservative Catholic faction would provide a political – and hence legislative – base for Catholic behavioral norms. Bills regulating modes of conduct like the ones on public decency of 1911, on Christian education of 1917 and on female labor participation of 1937 were either proposed or supported by Catholics. Political incentives for liberal Catholi- cism were completely ruled out. As Righart stated, not only the political but also the social and cultural attitude of Dutch Catholics came to be “riddled” with conservatism.122 The conservatism of the political elite had a strong influence on the outlooks of the whole of the Catholic population group. The political attitude of the Catholic press, for example, re- flected the shift. When during the late 1860s the funding of religious primary edu- cation was a political issue, Catholic magazines like De Tijd stood aloof of a clear opinion. As soon as conservatives seized political power, though, the Catholic press that had previously expressed ‘moderate’ political ideas and, occasionally, Liberal views, made a swing to the right. The political top might have set the trend towards Catholic conservatism in politics, press and the population group, how- ever, they did not generate a Catholic pillar single-handedly. As the following para- graph will show, the politicians owed the development of a network of Catholic organizations for producing a ‘proper’ pillar.

121 Bornewasser (1982) 600-601. 122 Righart (1986) 219. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 101

4.2 Catholic organizational pillarization: snaring the flock

The Industrial Revolution, no matter how irresolute in the Dutch case, started off migration. From the Catholic south of the Netherlands, in particular from Noord- Brabant, Catholic population groups moved to cities like Rotterdam and Amster- dam in the west of the country. The risk that urbanizing rural residents became apostates was high. Com- menting on attachment to religious affiliation during the last decades of the nine- teenth and first decades of the twentieth century; the spiritual advisor of the Roman Catholic League of Farmers and Horticulturists (RK Nederlandse Boeren- en Tuindersbond) argued that the secularization of urbanizing workers concerned “Catholics in particular”.123 The late historian Louis Rogier from Nijmegen Univer- sity even referred to this phenomenon as the “leak of the large cities”, caused by the ill-organized spiritual care for migrants.124 The clergy in the cities only witnessed a growth in parish members caused by the population increase: it was hardly aware of the ‘loss of souls’. Only between 1910 and 1920 this gap in the ‘Catholic market’ was discovered – and fought with numerous social and cultural organizations.125 Until the late nineteenth century, the Dutch elite of the Catholic pillar had a profound distrust of organized labor. At the end of the 1880s Catholic initiatives for the establishment of laborer’s organizations were discouraged as they were considered suspicious places where the seeds of revolution could be sown.126 Pope Leo xiii, however, drew the attention of the Dutch clergy from the ‘school strug- gle’ to the ‘social issue’. The Encyclical Letter of May 15, 1891 on the condition of the working classes Rerum Novarum reported that the “eagerness for change” passing “from the political sphere over into the related field of economics”.127 The situation of the laboring class had caught the attention of the pope, as well as its right to organize and its rights to private possession of goods. Catholic workmen were warned against both poverty and socialism as the ‘rivals’ for Catholicism. Apparently, charity and a more intensive perception of faith were no longer regarded as the only solution to social problems. The first type of Catholic organizations that occupied itself with the working population, in particular in larger towns, was the Saint Joseph Association (St.Josephs-

123 Ibid, 217. 124 Rogier and de Rooij (1953) 468. 125 Righart (1986) 218. See also Jacob Kruyt, De onkerkelijkeheid in Nederland: haar ver- breiding en oorzaken: proeve ener sociografische verklaring (Groningen 1933) and Hanneke Westhoff, Geestelijke bevrijders: Nederlandse katholieken en hun beweging voor geestelijke volks- gezondheid in de twintigste eeuw (Nijmegen 1996). 126 Righart (1986) 219. 127 Catholic Social Teaching, ‘Rerum Novarum: on the condition of the working classes: Pope Leo xiii’ (May 15, 1891). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.osjspm.org/cst/rn.htm 102 mixing ovaries and rosaries

gezellenvereniging), founded in 1868 in the Noord-Babant city of Bergen op Zoom. The association aimed at looking after the religious and cultural welfare of young men between 18 and 25 years of age, who were considered to be most at risk of becoming attracted to moral degeneracy and socialism.128 Numerous Catholic recreational clubs originated from the St.Josephsgezellenverenigingen: brass bands, amateur theatre groups, choirs, billiards groups and – not in the least – football clubs. Apart from workmen, Catholics from other social classes were starting to get organized too. Founded in 1851, religious fraternities like the Brotherhood of the Holy Family (Aartsbroederschap van de Heilige Familie) became popular and by 1888 counted about 90.000 members.129 An organization that was even more occupied with moralization was the Saint Vincent Association (St. Vincentiusvereniging), first founded in The Hague in 1846. The society aimed at self-exaltation through char- ity work. Members of the association were to visit poor families in their neighbor- hood, provide some material support like food, household goods or clothes and in the meantime increase their morality. The ‘raised’ families were expected to con- tribute to the work of the St. Vincentiusvereniging.130 Notably, families who were ‘only’ poor, and not ‘indecent’, were not helped by the association and were thrown back to the common charity of the parish. These initiatives to keep the lower classes from poverty and immorality were all in line with the moral ‘offensive’. Only during the late 1880s Catholic labor organizations were formed that had to keep Catholic workmen from the attraction of socialism and promoted the rights of the laboring class in a ‘proper’ Catholic way.131 The Catholic Workers’ League Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieke Volksbond was founded in 1888 in Amster- dam and had ‘mixed’ membership with laborers from both industry and small- scale, scarcely mechanized businesses. The Catholic Labor Association (Katholieke Arbeiders-Vereniging) was erected in the Overijssel town of Enschede, one of the Dutch centers of the textile industry, had more the character of a labor union than the Catholic Workers’ League and, hence, was a more serious rival for the ‘red’ trade unions. The two Catholic labor organizations caused a schism in the Dutch dioceses. Some dioceses chose to form and coordinate the ‘moderate industrial’ league – like

128 Rogier (1956) 323-324. 129 Wil Reijs and Joos van Vugt, ‘Tussen zelfheiliging en belangenbehartiging: de Aarts- broederschap van de Heilige Familie in Nederland, 1850-1969’, Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum 21 (1991) 11-40. 130 Johannes H.S. Evers, Geen liefdewerk is ons vreemd: 150 jaar Vincentiusvereniging in Nederland (Den Haag 1996). 131 Gerardus Wentholt, Een arbeidersbeweging en haar priesters: het einde van een relatie: theologische vooronderstellingen en pastorale bedoelingen met betrekking tot de katholieke ar- beidersbeweging in Nederland (1889-1979) (Nijmegen 1984). See also Perry (1983). a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 103 in the less industrialized dioceses of Haarlem, Breda and Roermond. The example of the Enschede association was followed in the dioceses of Utrecht and Den Bosch.132 The different characters of the two Catholic labor organizations, Righart argued, reflected a more general contrast between Catholic pillarized organiza- tions. The first type of associations concerned those acting in the interests of a cer- tain occupation or trade. The second kind were social pressure groups that, like an extended pastoral council, advocated religious and moral matters. These organiza- tions had broader material aims like laborer’s health improvement, insurance and cooperative societies. The division between the two Catholic organizational bodies was found in other countries too, although, Righart argued, only in the Netherlands did the competi- tion become so fierce that it seriously weakened the power of the Catholic labor organization.133 After the intervention of bishops it was decided that organizations with purely economic aims were in danger of neglecting the religious, Catholic principles and becoming too materialistic. The choice for organizations that had moral-religious purposes in addition to economic aims, Righart concluded, “dem- onstrates the essence of the confessional pillarization in a crystal-clear way”. It was decided that all labor unions were to be coordinated by the social organizations, a “two in one recipe” in which “‘material’ and ‘spirit’ were synthesized in a way that was characteristic of the pillarization”.134 Until the start of the 1970s, the religious and moral aims of the social organizations were upheld within the Catholic labor movement – which, together with the diocesan in stead of national centralization, obstructed its activities considerably. It might have taken some pains to keep religion and Catholic morality the top priority of the organizational network of the Catholic pillar; it took far less effort to keep the bloc ‘purely’ Catholic. At the turn of the century, in the border regions of Overijssel and Limburg and later in Noord-Brabant various interconfessional labor organizations were founded after the German model. The initiatives were immedi- ately suppressed by the bishops.135 In 1912 the episcopacy forbade all Catholics membership of interconfessional organizations under penalty of exclusion from all sacraments. Only the General Union for Christian Miners in Limburg (Alge- mene Bond voor Christelijke Mijnwerkers) was debarred: interconfessionalist organi- zation was rooted in the international migration to and from the south-eastern part of the province. The episcopacy feared that a ban on membership would stimulate socialism among Catholic miners in Limburg – the interconfessional union, hence, was regarded as the lesser of two evils.136 Nevertheless, it worried the then

132 Righart (1986) 221-224. 133 Ibid, 225. 134 Ibid, 227-229. 135 Ibid, 229-236. 104 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Bishop of Roermond: he urged the maintenance of the ‘Catholic spirit’ in the interconfessional Christian miners’ union and warned against intimate contact with Protestants that would lead to the thoroughly detested intermarriage.137 The range in social organizations that focused on Catholic homogeneity in order to maintain religious norms and morals grew from 1900 onwards. Paul Pennings made a study of the various ‘degrees’ in the process of organizational pillarization between 1860 and 1925. He measured institutionalization, increase and decline in membership, the commitment of the local elites and the funding of the organizational network in the Protestant, Catholic and social-democrat pillars of a number of Dutch municipalities.138 Regarding the Catholic organizational pillarization, the author confirmed that in cities the process started already in 1865. In rural areas, on the other hand, 1890 marked the beginning of the development. The relative degree of pillarization after 1900 when the process really got into its stride, however, reached higher levels in the countryside.139 In the cities where the pillars’ organizations had much more competition from ‘general’ associations, the degree of organizational pillarization remained almost stable between 1870 and 1910, thereafter it increased too. Moreover, between 1885 and 1920 in particular, municipalities with a homogeneous Catholic population showed lower degrees of organizational development than those with a denominationally mixed popula- tion. The special attention for religious and moral matters in Catholic associations that had initially secular (economic or cultural) aims resulted in denominational differences in the degree of organizational pillarization in various social sectors. Compared to the orthodox Protestants, Catholics developed many more organiza- tions in the economic field and in social and medical care – often performed by nuns and monks on the principle of caritas, Christian charity. Protestants on the other hand developed more organizations with religious and educational or peda- gogical directives.140 Though orthodox Protestant municipalities showed a much higher degree of organizational pillarization after 1860 than Catholic ones, the lat- ter outstripped the former after 1900 when the vast network of Catholic clubs and associations grew faster than those of any other denomination.141

136 See also Louis Kreukels, Mijnarbeid: volgzaamheid en strijdbaarheid: geschiedenis van de arbeidsverhoudingen in de Nederlandse steenkolenmijnen, 1900-1940 (Assen/Maastricht 1986). 137 Remigius Dieteren, Mens en mijn: een halve eeuw strijd, groei en bloei van de Nederlandse katholieke Mijnwerkersbond (Heerlen 1953). 138 Pennings (1991) 53-78. 139 Ibid, 131-133. 140 Ibid, 94-97. See also Annemieke Klein, Tussen caritas en psychiatrie: lotgevallen van zwakzinnigen in Limburg, 1879-1952 (Hilversum 1995) and Jan Roes en Jos Schreurs, Midden in Limburg: aspecten van een eeuw sociale werken door aalmoezeniers (Roermond 2002). 141 Pennings (1991) 84, 87. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 105

By the 1950s, the conservative political outlook aiming at guarding Catholic val- ues as well as the continuation of organizational bloc formation had resulted in the establishment of a strong Catholic pillar. Confining Catholics to denominational organizations that propagated Catholic values, the pillar partly preserved itself. The clergy contributed greatly to the conservation of Catholic pillarization too, though. Organizations and the views of its members were checked by the clergy that often filled the chairmanship. Membership of interconfessional or, worse, social-demo- crat organizations was prohibited and socialist sympathies were checked for by the Catholic clergy. When after the Second World War the Labor Party PvdA (Partij van den Arbeid) tried to cut across the lines of the pillarized parties, it became clear that only parties promoting the interests of one of the pillars were guaranteed an electorate by the church. The Roman Catholic Church had no need to have its concerns advocated by any other party than an all-Catholic one. In 1953 an episcopal amendment was issued that prohibited membership of socialist organizations by Catholics. The next paragraph focuses attention on the role of the clergy in the Catholic pil- larization process.

4.3 The clergy: one and all supportive of Catholic pillarization

One of Stuurman’s objections against Hofstee was that he refrained from making distinctions between the Catholic and orthodox Protestant pillar while discussing ‘organized confessionalism’ in the Netherlands. “If it’s true that the pillarization is responsible for the deviating demographic pattern,” Stuurman argued, “then the differences between the pillars and other social blocks ought to affect the views and conduct in the fields of marriage and sexuality.”142 Catholicism and Protestantism, though both Christian ideologies, have influ- enced demographic behavior differently. The differences in the way the two denominations pillarized partly explained why their effects on fertility and nup- tiality diverged. In the course of the pillarization period the orthodox Protestant pil- lar fragmented along with the divisions in the pillar’s church leadership – whereas the Catholic clergy formed a unity. As its design could count on the complete sup- port of the clergy, the Catholic code of conduct could be imposed most effectively. Orthodox Protestants did not agree on infant baptism, let alone consensus was reached on moral behavior regarding sexuality, marriage and procreation.143 “It goes without saying that the clergy conducted the process of pillarization among Catholics,” Righart commented on the role and motivation of the clergy in

142 Stuurman (1983) 332. 143 See Pieter Jongeling, Jurjen de Vries en Jochem Douma, Het vuur blijft branden: ge- schiedenis van de Gereformeerde Kerken (vrijgemaakt) in Nederland, 1944-1979 (Kampen 1979). 106 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the Dutch social bloc formation.144 Not only in the case of the labor movement and the political faction but behind every pillarized organization, he underlined, stood a priest. The clergy was inextricably bound up with the organizational network that formed the body of the Catholic pillar: they often took the initiative to organize and lead the development of associations and clubs. In addition, the institutionali- zation of the ‘spiritual counselor’ guaranteed continuous clerical authority in orga- nizations. In 1909 the episcopate formulated the tasks of the priests in the Catholic orga- nizations. They had to prevent associations from taking any steps that clashed with religious and moral norms, guard the religious-moral interests of the organiza- tions and its members and finally maintain a good relationship with other associa- tions.145 Priests checked on all organizations and, additionally, all articles of clubs and associations required the approval of the bishop. This way, not only the pillarization process but also the development of structural changes in the morality was controlled by the Catholic Church. The 1909 episcopal regulation of ecclesias- tic leadership in secular organizations quashed the few demands for more auton- omy by the laity. In 1916 the bishops confirmed the role of the clergy in labor as well as social organizations.146 The active interference of bishops in secular life, and in their retinue the lower clergy, had various reasons. Fear of socialist sympathies was an important reason to control the outlook of organizations – in particular in the diocese of Utrecht where social democrats threatened to win over the Catholic laborers in the textile industry. However, in Noord-Brabant and Limburg the clergy engaged in combat with Liberalism, another ideology that was supposed to turn the faithful into mate- rialists and lead them morally astray. In particular young farmers, encouraged by agricultural developments like seed improvement, cross-fertilization and breed- ing, appeared to be vulnerable to Liberal ideas. By starting organizations like the Catholic Cooperation for the Purchase of Agricultural Seeds (RK Inkoopcoöperatie voor Landbouwzaden), the Catholic Association for Keepers of Bulls (RK Stier- houderij) and – according to Righart the perfect example of pillarization – the Cath- olic Organization for Goat Breeders (RK Geitenfokvereniging), these modern devel- opments could be kept an eye on. In case they mocked the Creation or harmed the public morality, they could even be restrained.147 Conservatism, that from the late nineteenth century onwards marked the at- mosphere in Catholic policymaking, formed another important driving force behind the clerical involvement with the organizational pillarization. The bishops

144 Righart (1986) 237. 145 Wentholt (1984) 30. 146 Righart (1986) 239-240. 147 Ibid, 240-243. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 107 were true social conservatives, and some strongly opposed Catholic labor unions. According to Righart they were “blind to the secularization” among migrants and in particular to the social changes that caused secularization.148 In Utrecht for example, socialism increasingly appealed to the Catholic workmen because of the bad labor conditions in the textile industry. The Utrecht Bishop Petrus Matthias Snickers (1883-1895) nonetheless preferred the Brotherhoods of the Holy Family (Aartsbroederschap van de Heilige Familie) to labor unions. In the same line the Bishop of Den Bosch, Adrianus Godschalk (1878-1892), issued a charge at the end of the nineteenth century in which he recommended the deepening of spirituality as the most important means to relieve the needs of the workmen. Conservatism, expressed in rigid social attitudes and an extreme episcopal and clerical emphasis on religious morality, proved to bind the Catholic bloc during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. The conservative outlook of the Catholic pillar was reflected in politics, in the aims of the Catholic organiza- tions and in the commitment of the clergy to preservation of the Catholic pillar. This conservatism represented the very core of Catholic moral value and enforced complete observance of behavioral rules. That during the 1960s and 70s this moral conservatism would hamper the continuity of the Catholic pillar and caused dis- cord among its members was inconceivable during the heydays of the pillarization process.

5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at explaining how the social structure of Dutch society contrib- uted to a social meaning of religion that, nationwide, resulted in the powerful moral authority of denominations. As was demonstrated, the Catholic pillar used this authority to impose pronatalist behavioral rules on its flock. In this paragraph, the relationship between the pillarization process, the moral ‘offensive’ of the con- fessional parties and the construction of a conservative Catholic bloc will be evalu- ated in the light of fertility determinants. The civil equalization of Catholics after 1848 and the restoration of the episco- pal hierarchy in 1853 changed the balance between denominations in the religious pluralistic Dutch society. Under guidance of the episcopate, the Catholic section of the population emancipated, as was reflected in the increase in the number of Catholic clubs, organizations and societies. The increased cultural and religious visibility and socio-political presence of Catholics in Dutch society, though, in- duced resistance against their empowerment. When Pope Pius ix announced the geographical arrangement of the dioceses in the Netherlands he added an

148 Ibid, 243. 108 mixing ovaries and rosaries

allocution regretting the “weed of Calvinism” that had been sown ages ago in “that beloved part of God’s field”. This resulted in a grand anti-Catholic movement that all but prevented the diocesan restoration.149 In 1921 the aversion against the ‘papists’ even led to the establishment of the Protestant National Party hgp (Hervormd-Gereformeerde Staatspartij), founded by a group of ministers who wanted to maintain the ban on Catholic processions in the northern part of the Netherlands. Until the Second World War, the party had one delegate in the parlia- ment.150 The development of the welfare state not only strengthened the pillarized social structure but also resulted in attention paid by the state to the civilization of its pop- ulation. This interest coincided with social activities of the supporters of confes- sional parties. “There’s a whole complex of problems that were always considered of principal importance by the confessional ideologists and politicians: family life, prostitution, sexuality, contraceptives, abortion, pornography, homosexuality, the pill, common decency, concubinage, marriage and celibacy,” Stuurman argued. Yet, he explained, the ideology of the family formed the very core of the pillarized moralization activities: “If one had to point out one idea as the very heart of the con- fessional social science, it would be the family as the primal cell of the society. Family and social order are linked up together and as the ‘natural institution’ the family forms a link between the natural and the social order in the Christian ideolo- gies.”151 The denominational organizations came to play a vital role in the imple- mentation of the policies that were carefully drafted to increase the moral level of families. The state had the wish to ‘civilize’ the lower classes; the churches had the means to do so. Initially the lower class families, among which debaucheries and socialism were supposed to reign, were target of the policies. In the course of the pillarization period, however, the revaluation of morals became a concern of the broader population. The attitudes towards female suffrage show how all state pol- icy was reasoned from the perspective of the family as the cornerstone of the socie- ty. A woman was allowed to vote, many supporters of confessional parties thought, if she was the head of the household. The family as the basic social unit with a male head, a wife that supported her husband and was a good mother, formed the point of departure for all moral improvement. Prior to the pillarization period, the focus on moral issues had a long tradition in the Netherlands. During the nineteenth century, moralization became inter- twined with politics; it was sustained by the denominational bloc formation during the first half of the twentieth century. Although pillarization peaked between 1920

149 Righart (1986) 197, Knippenberg (2003). 150 Vossen (2003) 69-82. 151 Stuurman (1983) 78. a nationwide ‘intercom’ for demographic directives 109 and 1960, during the decades before and after, the pillars formed a system of power for the denominations.152 The Catholic Church utilized the pillarization of Dutch society to optimally impose moral behavior on its members. The Church acted with what they regarded as honorable motives: observance of religious doctrines and maintenance of the integrity of the Catholic population group in a fast changing society ruled by dissi- dents – Liberals, social democrats and Protestants. The growing government inter- vention in public morality and family matters provided an opportunity for the Church to form a network of religious affiliated organizations. State policies pro- vided a legal foundation for the interference with conduct on the level of the indi- vidual. The system created was almost self-supporting: the traditional Catholic doctrines that formed the base of behavioral codes not only smoothed the onset of the pillarization process but were also sustained by the compartmentalization of the Dutch society. The fact that the funding of denominational schools turned out to become a major political issue during the last decades of the nineteenth and first years of the twentieth century was hardly surprising. After all, supporters of confessional parties regarded education as the pre-eminent institution to improve public moral- ity – second only to family . Catholic schools would provide for the safeguarding of religious and moral values among the youth – something that certainly im- proved the power of the Church. Denominational education, then, was yet another strategy in the moralization ‘offensive’. In 1917, public and denominational schools were equalized on the point of state financing. Like social welfare and health service, denominational education became government-supported and state-financed. The decision to fight for the funding of Catholic education gave the conserva- tive Catholics a leg up and from the 1860s onwards the liberals could whistle for the political power in the Catholic faction. The clergy backed up the conservative politicians and guaranteed political support as long as politicians took Catholic interests into consideration – a system which left no place for political or legal approval of liberal perceptions on deviating behavior. The Catholic pillar more than any other ideological bloc was sustained by a harmony between the political legislation, the Church leadership and the organizational pillarization. “The Holy Father has insisted on the establishment of organizations subservient to the bish- ops. What influence does a priest have on a dissenter?” None, after all, the Roermond episcopate warned. “From the command of the Holy father to be obedi- ent to the bishop then follows that we have to have Catholic organizations.”153

152 Pennings (1991) 131. 153 Dieteren (1953) 35. 110 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Though laymen certainly played an important role in the realization of the Catholic associations, the Church formed the religious and moral umbrella.154 For the fertility behavior of the Catholic part of the population, pillarization meant interference with moral reproductive behavior was institutionalized. In addition, pillarization as a social structure slowed down the destruction of denomi- national involvement with reproductive behavior. The moral message that the Catholic Church had for its members was clear and pillarization functioned as the Church’s ‘intercom’ for these demographic directives.

154 Pennings (1991) 131. Chapter 3 Scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality

— Demographic, socio-economic and cultural situations of three case studies

1 Aims of the chapter

During the 1920s and 30s, the integralist tendencies of the Dutch pillars to some extent had a contrarious effect on their political unity. According to the political his- torian Koen Vossen of Nijmegen University, pillarization stimulated the develop- ment of the large number of denominational ‘splinter parties’ in the Interbellum. “Against the background of this strongly segmented society,” Vossen argued, “it was more likely that dissatisfactions would lead to small groups that branched off while basing themselves on the same ideological principles as the mother party, yet aiming for a different social-economic program.”1 The Catholic Church advocated one moral plan for the whole nation. Local social, economic and cultural circum- stances though sometimes sabotaged the extent to which the behavioral rules imposed via the pillarized network of organizations caught on with the population. In those cases, different ideas on procreation and marriage behavior could also gain the upper hand in Catholic communities. Fertility rates and patterns of develop- ment could differ from those where the population observed the directives of the Catholic Church. This chapter focuses on the demographic, socio-economic and cultural circum- stances under which the influence of religion on the demographic behavior of Catholics in the Netherlands was tempered on a meso level around 1930. The selection of case studies used for this purpose is accounted for in paragraph 2: the method developed for the selection, the stipulations municipalities had to fulfill in order to be selected and the data used to analyze the causes of the contrasting fertil- ity behavior. In paragraph 3, the general circumstances in the municipalities in 1930 will be presented. Features like population size and geographical changes will be compared. Subsequently, in paragraph 4, the 1930 fertility and nuptiality levels of the cases will be analyzed as well as the development during the two decades prior to 1930. In paragraph 5 demographic characteristics like sex ratio and infant mortality will be discussed, in order to find out whether any fertility dif-

1 Vossen (2003) 69. 112 mixing ovaries and rosaries

ferences between the municipalities can be ascribed to distinctions in these kinds of variables. The analyses will continue in paragraph 6 with an account of the municipalities’ socio-economic characteristics. In paragraph 7 cultural circum- stances that made the introduction of a ‘modern’ demographic behavior attractive, will be analyzed. Finally, in paragraph 8, the overall picture resulting from the research into these case studies will be used to render an account of the setting that hampered the impact of religion on demography in the three cases. Deviations from the course of action as prescribed by the Church were con- demned and punished. Knowing what implications aberrant conduct could have, collective refusal of the Church authority by Catholic communities is conspicuous. While discussing contrasting voting behavior in two municipalities, the next para- graph will give an example of the way political dissent in the Catholic pillar was repressed.

1.1 Intentional wrong or farmers’ stubbornness: political dissent in Mheer

Prior to the elections for the House of Representatives in 1933, the newspaper of the Limburg town of Venlo, the Nieuwe Venlosche Courant, published ‘last instruc- tions’ on the way the Catholic inhabitants of Limburg were expected to vote. “One calmly unfolds the ballot paper and looks for List 8. This is not the eighth list on the top row [of party lists, ms] but the seventh because our ballot lacks List 6. [Italic type:] The number 8 is positioned on top of the Catholic list. [In capital letters:] why list 8? Because it is the Catholic list. Is one allowed to vote for any other list? No. Why not? This question is answered by the Episcopal missive of last Sunday.”2

The loyalty to denominational parties was big, Vossen argued. Because of the dif- ferences in faith and morality felt between the pillars, it was impossible to ‘move’ into a different community without losing ones friends, family, leisure organiza- tions and job. “This really meant that orthodox Protestant laborers or Catholic employers could not easily choose for the sdap [social democrats, ms] or the Vrij- heidsbond [Liberals, ms] in order to have their interests promoted best,” Vossen explained. “The choice for an active party membership was after all more than a

2 Sjoerd Y.A. Vellenga, Katholiek Zuid Limburg en het fascisme: een onderzoek naar het kies- gedrag van de Limburger in de jaren dertig (Assen 1975) 30. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 113 political option: usually it meant the end of participation in their own familiar com- munity with its traditions and culture.”3 As the voting instructions in the Nieuwe Venlosche Courant show, the Bishop of Roermond had felt it necessary to urge the Catholics in Limburg to vote for the na- tional Catholic party and to forbid them to give their support to any other party list. He did so because in some of the municipalities in his diocese dissident Catholic parties were successful and were gaining a large margin of votes. Catholic splinter parties, according to the episcopate, spread discord in the pillar. Some of them showed sympathy for social democrat ideology – enough reason for the Dutch bishops to fight their electoral success. During the elections of 1933 the most successful dissident Catholic party was the ‘Limburg Federation’ (Limburgse Federatie). The party was founded by a former member of the Roman Catholic National Party rksp, H.H. Meertens, who thought that the rksp did not pay enough attention to the needs of Catholic farmers. On average Meertens did not manage to earn a large margin of votes – in the whole of the province of Limburg slightly less than 3% of the votes went to his party – but in some of the municipalities in the far south of Limburg, where Meertens himself lived, his Limburg Federation was given a lot of support. In two municipalities he even managed to get over half of the votes, for example in Mheer.4 Meertens dissolved his party after the 1933 elections when he reconciled with his former party under the pressure of the Church. Returning to the Catholic Na- tional Party, he urged his electorate to do the same and vote for the rksp again.5 Not all Catholic municipalities in Limburg complied with Meertens’ return to con- fessionalism though. In spite of the episcopal ban and the voting instructions in the newspaper, during the 1935 House of Representatives elections new dissident parties stole votes in the Catholic electorate of Limburg. In particular the Dutch fascist party nsb (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging) gained a large margin of votes in Limburg – in fact larger than in any other province in 1935. Mheer was, again, among the municipalities where the nsb scored: 30.9% of the votes went to the nsb, almost thrice the provincial average.6 After a political counteroffensive of the Catholic Church, the support in Mheer for the nsb declined considerably in 1937 to 11.8% of the votes. The priest of Mheer though was not satisfied and wrote in his Memorandum: “The result of our parish was much better than last time, but far from splendid. Because there is only one polling place those [inhabitants, ms] of Mheer blame the many wrong votes to [the inhabitants of, ms] Banholt and vise versa. Hence

3 Vossen (2003) 69. 4 Vellenga (1975) 61. 5 Ibid, 74. 6 Ibid, 5. 114 mixing ovaries and rosaries

it’s quite desirable that both towns would get a separate polling station, in order to see where the halfhearted voters [abstentions, ms] are and the wrong (49 nsb) votes. In any case I’ve told the parish off from the pulpit and “congratu- lated” it with, in spite of the prohibition of the Bishop, 56 wrong and 31 absten- tions = 87 wrong votes. Intentional wrong or farmers’ stubbornness? We’ll hope for the latter!”7

Remarkable is that the priest’s colleague in the neighboring municipality of St Geertruid, only 2.5 kilometers away, did not have any such problems with his flock. In 1933, Meertens attracted less than a fifth of the votes; the support for the nsb in 1935 was less than the national average and in 1937 even less than a percent.8 A description of the inhabitants of the town of St Geertruid gives the impression that strongly-worded people like Meertens and nsb supporters did not agree with the character of the place: “The rural community was characterized by a strong sense of homogeneity that only changed during the second half of the 1960s. Spouses were often found within the borders of the village [of St Geertruid, ms]. Ties between families were very strong and highlighted the authority of the older generation. As a consequence, a collective preservation of established norms and values devel- oped, that was additionally intensified by a feeling of a sense of connection caused by the local dialect. The mutual solidarity did not only reveal itself in a strong social control, but also in spontaneous sympathy and mutual assistance, in particular where it concerned a birth, marriage or funeral (…). Strangers though were treated with suspicion and were regarded as a threat to the own community.”9

Where Mheer, according to the local priest, was inhabited by recalcitrant farmers, St Geertruid’s population was much too loyal to what the Catholic Church stood for to vote for any other party than the Catholic one. The next paragraph will show how voting behavior caused Mheer and St Geertruid to be selected for the study of Catholic fertility behavior.

7 Joep Leerssen and Wim Senden, Historische verkenning van Mheer (Maastricht 1995) 122. 8 Vellenga (1975) 5. 9 J.E.M. Custers, Macht en meerderheid, lokale politiek in Sint-Geertruid tussen 1919 en 1982 (Maastricht 1988) 10. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 115

2 Getting round to case studies: selecting Dutch Catholic municipalities

In selecting case studies, priority was given to an analysis that would respect the dynamical character of demographic circumstances in municipalities and that would show the interaction between socio-economic, cultural and demographic variables. The case analyses do not aim at indicating the broader connection between denominations and characteristics. After all, sophisticated statistical studies on the variations in the characteristics of Catholic demographic behavior with the use of data on a lower aggregated level have already been done. The research based on these data is confined to descriptive statistics in order to avoid the risk of running into the ‘ecological error’ that is inherent in working with aggregated data. The selected case studies are not representative of all Catholic municipalities that have showed deviating demographic behavior at any moment in time. This chapter aims at showing the demographic, socio-economic and cultural conditions under which Catholic demographic behavior could differentiate, using categories of variables on a meso level. The gap between ‘ideal’ Catholic conduct in matters of procreation and marriage as enforced by the Church and actual demographic behavior differed in time and place, hence it is the relative size of that gap that deserves attention. The absolute differences between enforced fertility and actual reproductive behavior as shown in the case studies of this chapter are the result of the mode of selection of the cases and do not provide for a standard disparity between fertility and nuptiality of Catholics who observe the Church’s directives and those who were attracted to family planning. This paragraph accounts of the way three pairs of case studies were selected for an analysis of the circumstances under which the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior was hampered. In 2.1 an account will be given for the choice of 1930 as the year in which the influence in the municipalities was gauged. By dis- cussing the conditions municipalities had to fulfil in order to qualify, the selection itself is described in paragraph 2.2. Finally, in 2.3, the data are used to investigate what demographic, social, economic and cultural circumstances thwarted the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior.

2.1 In the midst of all transitions: 1930

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church had a firm grip on the behavior of its believers, thanks to state intervention with morality and a vast network of denominational organizations. So 1930 not only marked the culmination of the pillarization of Dutch society, but also indicated the middle of the last phase of the demographic transition. The cohort 1886-1890 marked the years from which a majority of Dutch provinces showed a decline in marital fertil- ity. Previous cohorts showed a decline of the number of births per 1000 married 116 mixing ovaries and rosaries

women (aged 15-45), however, in eight out of eleven Dutch provinces marital fertil- ity increased again. Regarding nuptiality, 1899 was the year from which the aver- age proportion ever-married in all age categories (20-24, 25-29 and 40-44) increased in the Netherlands. Nearly a century later, in 1970, fertility levels of Lim- burg and Noord-Brabant finally caught up with the rest of the country and were no longer higher than the other provinces.10

350 92

300 90 88 250 86 200 84 150 82 100 80 (aged 15-45) 50 78

0 76 e d d l t s d t en d d e h d n rg g th n an n an js c n an a u n n la ll la ll ri e a l b b i e s o e o e tr rl er ra n r ie e v U e d B im ro D r -H Z -H h l - L O t e Proportion currently married of all women aged 40-44 F id d e rd Five-yearly numbers of births per 1000 married women G r u o G o Z o N o N N Marital fertility 1926-30 Marital fertility 1931-35 Nuptiality 1930

Graph 8 Marital fertility for the cohorts 1926-1930 and 1931-1935 (five-yearly numbers of averages of births per 1000 married women aged 15-45) and nuptiality (percentage currently married women of the aged 40-44) for 1930 per province. Source: Hofstee (1981) 130,132.

Although by 1930 the marital fertility was declining in Noord-Brabant and Lim- burg, graph 8 indicates that the two provinces still had conspicuous fertility levels compared to other provinces – in particular when the nuptiality of the provinces is included in the analysis. Compared to the other provinces by 1930, Drenthe had the highest nuptiality – 90% of the women in the age group between 40 and 44 were married at that time – whereas nuptiality was low in the Catholic provinces of the country. In Noord-Brabant, 81.4% of the women between 40 and 44 years were married in 1930, just like in the provinces of Zuid-Holland (81.0%), Noord-Hol- land (82.0%) and Utrecht (81.2%). The marital fertility of the latter provinces, though, was only two-thirds of the Noord-Brabant level for the period 1926-1930 and half of the level of 1931-1935. The third Catholic province of the Netherlands,

10 Hofstee (1981) 132, Table 6. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 117

Gelderland, in 1930 had the same proportion of Catholics in its population as the whole of the Netherlands (nearly 37%). In the five years before and after the census year, Gelderland had levels in between those of the Catholic south and the Protestant north-west of the country. Nuptiality in Gelderland was equal to that of Limburg (82.9 and 83.1 respectively) but marital fertility was much lower (230.3 and 273.9 respectively). Evidently, when comparing fertility levels in the context of religious determinants, the nuptiality level ought to also be taken into account. In 1930, the Netherlands consisted of 1077 municipalities. How from this large number three pairs of municipalities were selected for an analysis of the religious determinant of demography on a meso level will be shown in the next paragraph.

2.2 The negative case analysis and the selection of municipalities

Individual data on a micro level offer a good research level to study the exact cir- cumstances under which the church’s regulations regarding procreation and mar- riage are most effective. However, at the time this research was performed a data- base with denominational information on an individual level was not yet avail- able.11 As collecting the data would be time consuming to the extent that it would curtail the comparative context of the research, it has been decided to use aggre- gated data on a municipal level provided by the historical database of Dutch muni- cipalities hdng (Historische Databank Nederlandse Gemeenten).12 Graph 8 suggests that the proportion of Catholic inhabitants in a province determines the level of marital fertility. Previous research, however, has shown that on the local level the relationship between Catholic denomination and fertility can vary considerably even within a Catholic province.13 These variations are caused by certain local social, economic, cultural and demographic circumstances that curb the influence of Catholic religion on fertility and nuptiality behavior. To test the hypothesis that the ideological influence of religion on demography in a municipality depends on above mentioned circumstances a method generally re- ferred to as the negative case analysis is used to select and analyze cases.14 Municipal- ities have been selected that showed a ‘negative’ relationship between religion and

11 In 1989 the project ‘Historical Sample Netherlands’ hsn (Historische Steekproef Neder- land) was started and consists of a representative sample of about 80.000 individuals born between 1812 and 1922 in the Netherlands. At the start of this research, though, the database did not yet contain denominational variables though. See also Kees Mandemakers, ‘The Netherlands: Historical Sample of the Netherlands’, Patricia K. Hall, Robert McCaa and Gunnar Thorvaldsen (ed.), Handbook of international historical microdata for population research (Minneapolis 2000) and iisg, ‘The Historical Sample of the Netherlands (hsn)’ (2005). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.iisg.nl/~hsn/index.html 12 HDNG, see Chapter 1, footnote 11. 13 Engelen (1987). 14 Robert Yin, Case study research: design and methods (California 2003). 118 mixing ovaries and rosaries

reproduction, where Catholic fertility appeared to be less determined by religion than in a neighboring municipality. Each was compared with a neighboring municipality that showed a ‘positive’ relationship between Catholicism and fertil- ity and seemed to have a population that was obedient to the Church regulations concerning marriage and procreation. In order to be selected as a ‘negative case’ for the hypothesis test a municipality had to fulfill three conditions. To be sure that the demographic behavior showed was indeed provoked by Catholics, the municipality had to be almost religiously homogeneous: more than 70% of its population had to be Roman Catholic. From the 1077 municipalities the Netherlands counted in 1930, about 78% dropped out of the selection during this step. In the provinces of Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe in the north of the country, none of the municipalities met the require- ment. As expected, Noord-Brabant and Limburg counted most homogeneous Catholic municipalities: in the former 143 out of 162 municipalities counted 70% or more Catholics. Limburg was all-Catholic in 1930 with all 121 municipalities’ Catholics constituting more than 70% of the populations.15 A second condition for a negative case was that the municipality in question had to display a discrepancy between its religious composition and the expected demographic behavior. As there are no ready-made fertility levels and nuptiality rates available for all Dutch municipalities in 1930, voting behavior was used as a predictor for demographic behavior. This approach was derived from a method developed by the social scientist Ron Lesthaeghe from the Vrije Universiteit in Brussels who argued that a Catholic population with a demographic conduct char- acteristic of their denomination would vote Catholic as well. The election results for the Catholic party, Lesthaeghe thus reasoned, could be used as a proxy for secularization that, in its turn, predicted a change in demo- graphic behavior. The author demonstrated that secularization, measured in the amount of non-confessional votes, to a large extent explained the distribution of fertility in different European countries around 1900.16 Though not all authors support Lesthaeghe in his conclusion, his predictor has been used to select cases for the twentieth-century Netherlands where pillarization made sure citizens affili- ated with their own ideological and moral community.17 During this methodical move, the percentage of votes on the Roman Catholic National Party rksp, as indi- cated in the HDNG database, was subtracted from the proportion Catholics in the municipal population. In a municipality with a population that was obedient to the

15 HDNG. 16 Ron Lesthaeghe, The decline of Belgian fertility, 1800-1970 (Princeton 1977) 154-158 and Ron Lesthaeghe and Chris Wilson, ‘Modes of production, secularization and the pace of the fertility decline in Western Europe, 1870-1930’, Coale and Watkins (1986) 261-292. 17 See Ernest Benz, Fertility, wealth, and politics in three southwest German villages 1650-1900 (Boston 1999). scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 119

Catholic Church, the difference between the percentage of Catholics and the per- centage of votes for the Roman Catholic National Party was small. In such a munic- ipality, fertility was expected to be relatively high. Municipalities in which the dif- ference was large were selected as possible negative cases. The last consideration was that an analysis of the special conditions of negative cases versus those of positive cases could be carried out best if the influence of regional circumstances was reduced as much as possible. The third condition hence was that the selected municipalities had to be situated next to a ‘positive case’ and that the population size of the communities was comparable. In this way, three pairs of Catholic cases were selected: Mheer and St Geertruid in the far south of Limburg (number 1 in map 1), Roosteren and Ohe en Laak in the center of the same province (number 2 in map 1) and Grave and Escharen in the east of Noord-Brabant (number 3 in map 1).

Map 1 Position of Catholic case studies: 1 = Mheer and St Geertruid, 2 = Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 3 = Grave and Escharen.

As table 1 shows, Mheer was the municipality that showed the largest gap between the percentage of Roman Catholics (100%) and the percentage of votes for the rksp (only 44%). In this regard, Mheer was very different from the neighboring municipality of St Geertruid where the support of the Catholic population for the denominational party was more than twice as large. In the ‘negative’ cases of Roosteren and Grave, the support for parties other than the Church-mandated rksp was a lot smaller (respectively 22% and 12%), however, compared to neigh- boring municipalities the ‘disobedience’ in voting behavior – and supposedly in fertility behavior too – was large. In Ohe en Laak 11% of the almost homogeneously Catholic population voted for a ‘dissident’ party; in Escharen only 1%. The selec- 120 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tion once more demonstrates that the mutual differences among the sets of municipalities are important; regional variations in religiosity do not provide for a single Catholic standard. Mheer might seem the most ‘daring’ municipality – com- pared to Escharen the municipality of Grave dug its heels in at least as much. The next paragraph discusses which data on these municipalities were collected.

Table 1 Selection ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases Negative case Positive case Province Municipality % Roman % votes on Municipality % Roman % votes on Catholics RCNP* Catholics RCNP Limburg Mheer 100 44 St Geertruid 91 78 Limburg Roosteren 82 60 Ohe en Laak 98 87 N.-Brabant Grave 92 79 Escharen 100 99 * Roman Catholic National Party

2.3 Data and variables

For the three selected Catholic cases, data have been collected to reconstruct demo- graphic, social, economic and cultural circumstances and to test different sub- hypotheses. For 1930 municipal data were collected from the Statistics Nether- lands cbs (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).18 These publications consist of vol- umes of about 9 pages of ready-made forms per municipality that were filled out manually. Data on these forms, that were entered into a database, include various categories like population number and density, age and sex distribution, denomi- nations, in- and out-migration. The various categories of data on each of the six municipalities provide for dif- ferent variables in the analysis. Population numbers (men, women and totals), the number of towns and their sizes, the population density, the average age and the number of inhabitants per house are all regarded as descriptive demographic vari- ables and used to sketch the general situation of the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ case in 1930.19 After the descriptive variables, indicative variables, again of a demographic nature, have to show whether the populations in the ‘negative’ cases have a fertility behavior as deviant as their voting behavior. Fertility rates, hence, were derived

18 cbs, Gegevens per gemeente betreffende de loop der bevolking in het jaar 1930 (Den Haag ca 1954). 19 cbs municipal data 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’ (column 1,2,3,4,5,13,14,15 and 16) and 2. ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’ (column 1,2,3,4 and 5) and 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’ and 5 ‘Aantal wo- ningen en aantal inwoners per woningen’, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 121 from the ten-yearly averages of liveborns and the total number of women from the age groups 15-19 until 45-49. Nuptiality rates were deduced from numbers of mar- ried women as percentage of all women older than 15 years – in both instances for the years 1909, 1920 and 1930.20 Analytical variables are used to find out what caused the differences in fertility behavior in the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases. The first analytical variable is geo- graphic: numbers of transferred inhabitants during border changes before 1965 are checked to see whether a population transfer due to border changes distorted the fertility and nuptiality levels in the municipalities.21 Subsequently, analytical variables are used to investigate possible demographic causes of fertility differences between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases. Population index numbers on the periods 1880-1950 and 1950-1965 and the population growth (natural growth and balance of migration) show to what extent differences in population growth in the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases are caused by contrasting balances of migration.22 Whether the presence of a monastery distorts municipal fertility levels is revealed by data on the housing population in 1930.23 The age dis- tribution (in five-yearly categories) in the years 1909, 1920 and 1930 demonstrates whether the uneven age structure distorts the fertility level – for example by a fast ageing population.24 Like an unbalanced age distribution, infant mortality might well explain differences in fertility rates: where the level of municipal infant mor- tality is high, one might well expect the pressure to increase fertility to be accord- ingly high. Apart from a social relationship between infant mortality and fertility, biology provides another link: after the death of a baby, the cessation of breast-feed- ing re-establishes fertility. Hence, data on the numbers of deaths in the first year per 1000 liveborn infants for the period 1909-1930 are analyzed.25 Finally, the sex ratio (the number of men per woman) in 1909, 1920 and 1930 will prove whether fertility in the ‘negative cases’ was low because of an uneven balance between men and women.

20 cbs municipal data 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’ (column ‘Vrouwen’ and ‘w.o. gehuwd’) and 10A ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’ (column ‘Levend geborenen’), ibid. 21 cbs municipal data 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1950’ and appendix 4. ‘Oppervlakte, annexaties en grenswijzigingen’, ibid. 22 cbs municipal data 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’, 9b ‘Inwonertal (31 dec. 1920 = 100)’, ibid and appendix 1 ‘Bevolking, huwelijken, geboorte en sterfte’, ibid (for the period 1951-1965) and 10b ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’, ibid. 23 cbs municipal data 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, Ibid (column 6 and 7), ibid. 24 cbs municipal data 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’, ibid. 25 cbs municipal data 10a ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’, ibid (col- umn ‘overledenen totaal’ and ‘>1 jaar’), ibid. 122 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Socio-economic variables form the third analytical category and will serve to find out if differences in prosperity caused contrasts in fertility behavior. For this purpose, not only unemployment rates among the male population will be com- pared. The proportion of men and women working in industrial and service sec- tors in 1930 are used to examine the different development of the industrialization in the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases – although the registration of employed women has not always been accurate in the past.26 In addition, the prosperity in the munici- palities will be demonstrated by sketching the situation of the agricultural labor force. The average size of the companies shows whether farms were developing into modern agricultural enterprises producing for a market, or remained tradi- tional and aimed at self-sufficiency.27 Assuming that in a prosperous community women were not working, labor participation of women is another important so- cio-economic variable.28 Finally, the average capital per taxpayer in the municipali- ties is compared to ‘measure’ differences in prosperity between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ cases.29 The last category of analytical variables is of a cultural nature. As the Catholic bishops during the pillarization illustrated with their fear of interconfessionalism, the presence of other denominations in a municipality is presumed to enlarge the chances for deviating fertility. Protestants in a Catholic community might not have shared information on contraceptives directly, but with their smaller families might have set an example for their Catholic neighbors. Religious multiformity, hence, measured by the percentage of Protestant denominations in the population, will be used to investigate whether other denominations with a different reproduc- tive ideology were present to set an example of practicing birth control.30 Like reli- gious multiformity, migration to a municipality increased the chances of distribu- tion of ideas on family planning and the necessary methods – just like the mobility that represented circulation of the population. For that reason, in-migration, out- migration and mobility in each of the municipalities during the years 1909, 1920

26 cbs municipal data 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 1930’, ibid. 27 cbs municipal data 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 December 1930’, ibid; 13 ‘Beroepstelling land- bouwbedrijven op 31 december’, ibid and 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, ibid. 28 cbs municipal data 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 1930’, ibid (column ‘vrou- wen’). See also Bots en Noordman (1981) 77 and José Harris, Private lives, public spirit: Brit- ain 1870-1914 (Londen 1993) 23-32. 29 cbs, Rangschikkingslijst der gemeenten naar den belastingdruk op het inkomen over de belastingjaren 1930/1931 (Den Haag 1931). 30 cbs municipal data 8 ‘Indeeling der bevolking naar de kerkelijke gezindten volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’, cbs (1954). scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 123 and 1930 will be analyzed.31 Before doing so, however, the 1930 outlines of the municipalities will be given first.

3 General characteristics of the case studies: location and size

Before turning to the analysis of differences in fertility behavior between various municipalities, the following paragraph serves as an introduction to the case stud- ies. What was their population size in 1930? What was the age structure? How was the population distributed in the municipalities? And were the ‘positive’ and ‘nega- tive’ cases much similar in these matters? Answers to these questions with regard to, successively, Mheer and St Geertruid, Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, Grave and Escharen will be given in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.

3.1 Mheer and St Geertruid

The municipalities of Mheer and St Geertruid are located in a region called ‘Little Switzerland’ because of the hilly landscape in the most southern part of Limburg. During the first half of the 20th century Mheer and St Geertruid were small and mainly agricultural. The municipalities were obviously Catholic: St Geertruid was named after the saint that was invoked in case of a plague of rats. The average population size of municipalities in Limburg was smaller than that in other prov- inces (4500 and 7400 respectively), but even by Limburg standards the popula- tions of Mheer and St Geertruid were small: in 1930, the former had 954 inhabit- ants and the latter 878 inhabitants.32 The population compositions of both Mheer and St Geertruid were traditional, pyramid-shaped caused by an overrepresentation of younger age groups.33 In Mheer as well as in St Geertruid, the average age was 29 in 1930.34 The population composition of Mheer was slightly more unstable compared to that of St Geer- truid. Both municipalities though showed a gap in age groups between 10 and 24 years, particularly the male ones of St Geertruid. This gap reflected a temporary

31 cbs municipal data 10a ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’ (column ‘Vertrek’), 11b ‘Vestiging en vertrek naar geslacht, in 0/00, 1921-1950’ and Appendix 2. ‘Vestiging en vertrek’ (1951-1965), ibid. 32 HDNG. 33 cbs municipal data Mheer 6 ‘Inwonertal naar leeftij en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930 (Mannen en Vrouwen)’ cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geer- truid category 6, ibid. 34 cbs municipal data Mheer 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 1, ibid. 124 mixing ovaries and rosaries

high infant mortality in 1908 and 1911 in the whole of the Netherlands. Apart from that, the population compositions of neither Mheer nor St Geertruid appeared to be remarkable. The high fertility that is suggested by the pyramid-shape of the pop- ulation composition induced a steady population growth: between 1920 and 1965 the population of both municipalities steadily increased by 50%.35 In Mheer, the population lived in three hamlets of less than 500 inhabitants (Mheer in the southwest, Terhorst in the east and Banholt in the north) divided over the 9 square kilometers of which the municipality consisted in 1930.36 St Geertruid was, as far as the surface area is concerned, of the same size as its neigh- boring municipality. In this municipality, six hamlets were located (St Geertruid in the center, Moerslag in the south, Libeek in the southeast, Herkenvade in the east, Breusterbosch in the northeast and Ekkelrade in the north).37 The small differences between the size and number of inhabitants of Mheer and St Geertruid resulted in a slightly higher population density in the former than in the latter – respectively 107 inhabitants per square kilometer in Mheer and 96 in St Geertruid.38 Until the 1950s the municipal boundaries were left unchanged.39 On a smaller scale, that of the household, the municipalities at first sight look alike as well. The average household size in Mheer was slightly smaller than that of St Geertruid, respectively 4.7 and 5.0 in 1930.40 These numbers are not obscured by the presence of communities of monks and nuns in the municipalities: no mon- asteries or convents were situated in either Mheer or St Geertruid.41

35 cbs municipal data Mheer 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 9, ibid. 36 cbs municipal data Mheer 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’ and 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, ibid. The exact size of Mheer was 8.94 km2. 37 The exact size of St Geertruid was 9.15 km2. cbs municipal data St Geertruid 3 ‘Opper- vlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’, ibid. See also Rob Kuijsten, ‘Kuypers Gemeente Atlas Limburg 1865-1870’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.rat.de/kuijsten/ atlas/li 38 cbs municipal data Mheer 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 3, ibid. 39 cbs municipal data Mheer 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1950’, appendix 4 ‘Oppervlakte, annexaties en grenswijzigingen’ (on the period between 1951 and 1965), cbs municipal data St Geertruid 4 and appendix 4, ibid. 40 cbs municipal data Mheer 5 ‘Aantal woningen en aantal inwoners per woningen’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 5, ibid. 41 cbs municipal data Mheer 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, 5 ‘Aantal woningen en aantal inwoners per woningen’, cbs municipal data St Geertruid 1 and 5, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 125

3.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

Roosteren and its neighboring municipality Ohe en Laak are situated in the center of the province of Limburg, near one of the bends of the river Maas. These munici- palities are located some 30 kilometers north of Mheer and St Geertruid. The story goes that the bridge over the river at Roosteren marks the dividing line between northern and southern Limburg that supposedly differ in culture and customs.42 Like Mheer and St Geertruid, Roosteren and Ohe en Laak have been small agricul- tural Catholic areas throughout the twentieth century. Unlike the southern Lim- burg municipalities, Roosteren and Ohe en Laak showed contrasting population sizes – hence in this case the population composition graphs are added. The popu- lation of Roosteren with its 1012 inhabitants outnumbered Ohe en Laak, where 577 people lived in 1930.43 As graph 9A and B show, the population compositions of the two municipalities were different too.

>80

70 - 74

60 - 64

50 - 54

40 - 44

Age groups 30 - 34

20 - 24

10 - 14

0-4

-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15%

1930 Men 1930 Women

Graph 9A Population composition Roosteren 1930 in percentages.

The 1930 population compositions of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak show many ir- regularities compared to the model of a traditional population pyramid. In Roosteren’s composition certain age groups for both men and women are under- represented which might be the result of cohort effects – for example, the ex-

42 Stefan Brijs, De brug bij Roosteren: literatuur in de twee Limburgen (Echt 1969) 4. 43 cbs municipal data Roosteren 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 1, ibid. 126 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tremely high infant and child mortality in 1911 can perhaps account for the numer- ical gap in the age groups between 15 and 25. The population of Ohe en Laak shows an even more irregular composition than that of its neighboring municipality, in particular among women, and less frequent cohort effects among male age groups than in the neighboring municipality.44

>80

70 - 74

60 - 64

50 - 54

40 - 44

Age groups 30 - 34

20 - 24

10 - 14

0-4

-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15%

Men Women

Graph 9B Population composition Ohe en Laak 1930 in percentages.

In Roosteren in particular, male age groups between 10 and 20 show a gap, those between 20 and 30 are overrepresented whereas those between 30 and 50 show a gap again. Birth cohort effects in 1910-1920, 1900-1910 and 1880-1895 respec- tively might offer an explanation for the irregularities. Unlike Roosteren, the uneven representation of age categories in the population composition of Ohe en Laak affected females in particular. The populations in both municipalities show a tendency to limit population growth: in Roosteren male and female age groups between 10 and 20 are under-represented and in Ohe en Laak those between 0 and 10 years. Both population compositions consequently are urn-shaped. Compared to Mheer and St Geertruid, the populations of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak grew only moderately: in Roosteren, the population only grew by one third between 1920 and 1965; in Ohe en Laak by less than a fifth.45

44 cbs municipal data Roosteren 6 ‘Inwonertal naar leeftij en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930’ (Mannen en Vrouwen) and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 6, ibid. 45 cbs municipal data Roosteren 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 9A, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 127

In 1930, Roosteren measured 7.43 square kilometers over which no less than six hamlets of less than 500 inhabitants were scattered: Roosteren in the center; Kokkelert on the west side; Oud Roosteren on the east side; Maasheuvel in the north; Visserweert in the south and Mikhoven in the far south.46 Ohe en Laak with its 4.68 square kilometers only had two thirds of the surface of Roosteren, and its population lived in the two hamlets the municipality was named after: Ohe and Laak.47 Though in neither of the municipalities the borders changed, there were other differences: both were primarily farming municipalities, but a different per- centage of the land was used as agricultural land: 83.3% of the surface of Roosteren and 78.0% of Ohe en Laak.48 Even the population density varied in 1930 as Roosteren counted 136.2 and Ohe en Laak only 123.3 persons per square kilometer. Their household sizes were different too: Roosteren counted an average number of 4.5 whereas in Ohe en Laak the average household was composed of 5 people in 1930. Only the average age of their populations matched: the average age in Ohe en Laak outnumbered that in Roosteren by only one year (31.4 and 30.4 respectively).49 The populations of these municipalities were Catholic, however, in neither of them were any monasteries or convents situated.50

3.3 Grave and Escharen

From the perspective of the religious composition of the Dutch population, the province of Noord-Brabant represented a stepping stone between the Catholic and the Protestant parts of the Netherlands. The province separated Catholic Limburg from the mainly Protestant provinces of Gelderland in the east, Zuid-Holland in the west and Zeeland in the southwest of the Netherlands. Of the 163 municipal- ities Noord-Brabant counted in 1930, 143 had a population that was more than 70% Catholic. The rest of the municipalities, located in the west of Noord-Brabant, were

46 cbs municipal data Roosteren 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’ (column 1,2,3,4 and 5) and 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, ibid. See also Rob Kuijsten, ‘Kuypers Gemeente Atlas Limburg 1865-1870’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.rat.de/kuijsten/atlas/li 47 Ibid, cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’ (column 1,2,3,4 and 5), 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkings- dichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 2 and 3, ibid. 48 cbs municipal data Roosteren 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1950’, appen- dix 4 ‘Oppervlakte, annexaties en grenswijzigingen’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 4, ibid. cbs municipal data Roosteren 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 3, ibid. 49 cbs municipal data Roosteren 5 ‘Aantal woningen en aantal inwoners per woningen’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 5, ibid. 50 cbs municipal data Roosteren 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, 5 ‘Aantal woningen en aantal inwoners per woningen’, cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 1 and 5, ibid. 128 mixing ovaries and rosaries

mainly populated by Protestants.51 In spite of the presence of Protestants in the province, Noord-Brabant is famous for – sometimes quite recently invented – Catholic traditions.52 Escharen, located on the south bank of the Maas river, had a completely Catho- lic population, just like the municipality of Grave, on its northwestern side in one of the bends of the river. Excluding industrial centers like Eindhoven, Tilburg, Breda and Den Bosch who all had more than 40000 inhabitants in 1930, the aver- age municipal population size in Noord-Brabant was 5500.53 Compared to the aver- age Grave and Escharen were small as they had 2945 and 1450 inhabitants respec- tively in 1930.54 The population compositions of the two municipalities appeared to resemble aspects of the population compositions of both Mheer and St Geertruid and Roosteren and Ohe en Laak. Like in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak the population size in Grave and Escharen differed much in 1930 – the latter was almost half the size of the former.55 Concerning the population compositions, both the irregular representation of particularly male age groups 30 – 45 on the one hand and0–10 years on the other points at changed birth cohort circumstances in 1890 and 1900 in Grave. In Escharen the population composition showed a gap for both men and women in the age groups between 30 and 45 which might indicate a periodic motion. However, neither of the two municipalities showed an irregular population composition like that in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak: the traditional pyramid-shape of the population reminds more of that of Mheer and St Geertruid and requires no lengthy debate. The traditional over-representation of younger age groups resulted in population growth: the cbs data reveal that between 1920 and 1940, the population of Grave increased by almost 9%, that of Escharen by over 13%.56 The population of Grave was divided over the former castle town of Grave on the east side of the municipality in which over half of the population (52.9%) lived and two hamlets of less than 500 inhabitants – Polderhuisje in the center of the munici-

51 HDNG. 52 Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld, ‘Tussen dilettantisme en deskundigheid. Vijftig jaar tijdschrift Brabants Heem en de geschiedbeoefening’, Brabants heem 50 (1998) 41-51. 53 HDNG. The average municipal population size calculated while excluding Eindhoven, Tilburg, Breda and Den Bosch is 4046; with the four large cities the average population size for Noord-Brabant municipalities in 1930 is 5565. 54 HDNG. 55 cbs municipal data Grave 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 December 1930’ and cbs municipal data Escharen 1, cbs (1954). 56 cbs municipal data Grave 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data Escharen 9a, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 129 pality and Den Elft in the south.57 Escharen had three hamlets: Langendaal in the south, Groot Rustendaal in the southeast and Lageheide in the west, but two thirds of the population lived in isolated houses scattered over the municipality.58 The geo- graphical form they had in 1930 did not survive municipal reclassifications. In 1942, half of Escharen and its population – 680 people – was added to Grave and the other half to the municipality of Mill.59 Grave consequently changed in 1942; besides the surface of Escharen it gained part of other municipalities, Reek and Velp.60 In 1930, from the geographical perspective Grave was much smaller than Escharen – the first measured 11.08 square kilometers, the second 20.07.61 As a result of the fact that Grave had a larger population on a smaller surface, the popu- lation density in this municipality, 265.8 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1930, was quite different from that of the bigger and more scarcely populated Escharen (72.3 people per square kilometer). The average household size, however, was quite similar: in Grave 5.9 in 1930, in Escharen 5.8 that same year – so in both municipalities the average household had one more person than in Roosteren, Ohe en Laak, Mheer and St Geertruid.62 While comparing the average age of Grave and Escharen, which was 32.1 in the first, 28.1 in the latter, one has to take into account that a section of their inhabit- ants was not part of the ‘regular’ population. In Escharen, slightly less than 1% of the population was living in an institution in 1930 – unfortunately the cbs data do not offer information on the kind of institution. While the actual number of Escharen people concerned was rather small – the cbs recorded 13 institutional- ized men in that municipality – the number of Grave inhabitants that were not part of the ‘regular’ population was much bigger. Some 1.8% of the population were nuns and monks – 54 in total. More important, however, is a different group of inhabitants of Grave. A total of 775 people, 24.9% of the men and 27.6% of the women in the municipality, lived in an institution.63 Of the men, a large section

57 cbs municipal data Grave 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’, ibid. See also M.M. Bijlsma and J.W.H. Verwers, Kasteel Grave, archeologisch onderzoek naar de resten van het kasteel van Grave (Amersfoort 1998) and Rob Kuijsten, ‘Kuypers Gemeente Atlas Noord-Brabant 1865-1870’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.rat.de/kuijsten/atlas/nb 58 Ibid and and cbs municipal data Escharen 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’, cbs (1954). 59 cbs municipal data Escharen 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1950’, ibid. 60 cbs municipal data Grave 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1942’ and appen- dix 4 ‘Oppervlakte, annexaties en grenswijzigingen ‘, ibid. 61 cbs municipal data Grave 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’ and cbs municipal data Escharen 3, ibid. 62 cbs municipal data Grave 5 ‘Aantal woningen en aantal inwoners per woning’ and cbs municipal data Escharen 3, ibid. 63 cbs municipal data Grave 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, ibid. 130 mixing ovaries and rosaries

probably was imprisoned in the Grave penitentiary. In addition, the 700-year-old hospice Saint Catherine (St. Catharina Gasthuis) in Grave that from the late nine- teenth century was mainly a home for the well-to-do elderly, housed both men and women.64 The patients of a psychiatric hospital (Rijks Krankzinnigen Gesticht), some 180 of which in 1936 lived with families in Grave, were both male and female too.65 Furthermore, since 1859 the municipality had an institution for blind boys, named after Saint Henry (R.K. Blindeninstituut St. Henricus), and a separate one for blind girls.66 The group of institutionalized inhabitants of the municipality of Grave thus probably concerned people who had no access to marriage and repro- duction: children, imprisoned men, mentally disturbed men and women and elderly people. A large portion of this group had no right to vote: by using election results as a predictor for demographic behavior, then, the selection of the munici- pality was correct.67 But the institutionalized inhabitants were still recorded as part of the Grave community by the cbs. With the analysis of aggregated data on the municipal level of Grave on for example the natural growth, migration and labor participation, this group has to be taken into account. At first sight, the rural Catholic municipalities of Mheer and St Geertruid, Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, Grave and Escharen with their steadily growing but still modest populations of Catholics look much alike. Apart from Ohe en Laak that showed a rather modern population composition and Grave that has a quarter of its population living in institutions, none of the selected municipalities give any indication that by 1930 something odd was at hand with the population, something that affected the demographic behavior of their inhabitants. If voting behavior cor- rectly mirrors fertility and nuptiality behavior, the lack of denominational support during the 1933 elections for the House of Representatives indicates that many inhabitants of Grave, Roosteren and Mheer did not live up to the directives of the Catholic Church. The next section will show whether this predictor works for these Dutch Catholic municipalities.

64 See also H.W. Boekwijt and E.J. Nusselder, Gevangenis De Raam St. Elizabethstraat 35 Grave (Den Haag 1986) and Harm Douma and Frans G.M. Wouters (ed.), 700 jaar St. Catharina Gasthuis Grave: zeven eeuwen zorg en liefdewerk (Grave 1990). 65 Theodores Roelofs, Geschiedenis van Grave: met toevoeging van volledige gegevens en aan- wijzingen over de nog bestaande merkwaardigheden in de stad Grave (Grave 1938) 77-78. 66 See also J.C. Klein, 125 Jaar katholieke zorg voor blinden en slechtzienden: 1859-1984 (S.l. 1984). 67 According to the third article of the electoral law of 1896 that was still legitimate in 1933, the mentally disturbed were not allowed to vote in the event that the judiciary decided they lost control over their possessions or guardianship. Prisoners who were sentenced for more than one year were deprived of suffrage for three years and if they were sentenced similarly later on were deprived of suffrage forever. Kieswet: wet van den 7den Sept. 1896 (Staatsblad No. 154), zooals deze laatstelijk is gewijzigd bij de wetten van 24 December 1921 (Alphen aan de Rijn 1922) 1. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 131

4 Deviating demographic behavior? Fertility and nuptiality

In his search for a predictor for deviant demographic behavior, Lesthaeghe argued: “If we mean by secularization the gradual breaking away from organized religion and the decrease of participation and involvement in the religious community, the best available operationalization would lie in statistics concerning such events as Sunday mass attendance or Easter practice (Easter confession and communion). If we mean by secularization the shift away from principles embodied in Catholic ideology, we should do better by looking at another form of operationalization.”68 Indeed, looking at the deviant voting behavior in Mheer, Roosteren and Grave in 1930, one would expect the population to be secularized in other fields than politics too. This paragraph offers a comparison between the supposed ‘modern’ fertility behavior in the ‘negative’ and ‘traditional Catholic’ behavior in the ‘positive’ cases – successively with regard to Mheer and St Geertruid (4.1), Roosteren and Ohe en Laak (4.2) and Grave and Escharen (4.3). As the patterns and levels of fertility are connected with those of nuptiality, the proportion married will be treated too. If Lesthaeghe’s predictor works for the Netherlands as it did for Belgium, the ‘posi- tive’ cases are expected to show a stronger connection between nuptiality and fertil- ity than the ‘negative’ cases. For the analysis, fertility and nuptiality rates were obtained by derivation, using the cbs municipal data.69 Fertility levels were calcu- lated with the ten-yearly averages of liveborns and the total number of women from the age groups 15-19 until 45-49. Nuptiality rates were deduced from numbers of married women as percentage of all women older than 15 years.

4.1 Mheer and St Geertruid

During the House of Representatives election in St Geertruid in 1933, 78.3% of the mainly Catholic population voted for the Roman Catholic national party rksp (see table 2). Even in the completely homogeneous Catholic population of Mheer only 43.9% of the population voted for the rksp. The majority of the votes for the cat- egory ‘other parties’, 51%, went to the Limburg Federation (Limburgse Federatie), a splinter party of the rksp that pressed for more attention for the interests of the farmers. In St Geertruid the Limburg Federation received only 20.2% of the votes – quite understandable as the Church strictly disapproved of voting for dissident par- ties. Is the political disobedience of the Catholics in Mheer a reflection of a ten- dency to neglect the directives of the Catholic Church?

68 Lesthaeghe (1977) 154-158. 69 Due to the derivation, the data used here differ from more original calculations of mari- tal fertility and nuptiality, for example those offered by Engelen (1987) 234-237. 132 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Table 2 1933 Election results of Mheer and St Geertruid

Mheer St Geertruid Roman Catholic National Party RKSP 43.90% 78.30% Roman Catholic People’s Party (RK Volkspartij) 0.50% 0.20% Social Democratic Labor Party SDAP 1.70% 0.50% Other socialist and communist parties 0.40% 0.70% (Communist Party Holland CPH, Farmer’s Party (Boeren Partij), Revolutionary Socialist Party (Revolutionaire Socialisten)) Liberal parties 0.20% - (Federation for Freedom (Vrijheidsbond), Federation for National Restoration (Verbond voor Nationaal Herstel), Liberal Democratic Federation (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond) Protestant parties 0.90% - (Anti Revolutionary Party ARP, Christian Democratic Party CDU, Christian Historical Union CHU, Orthodox Reformed Party (Hervormd Gereformeerde Partij) National Orthodox Party SGP) Other parties 52.00% 20.20% Total 99.60% 99.90%

Admissible votes (in numbers) 410 411 Enfranchised votes (in numbers) 456 432 Invalid/blank votes (in numbers) 17 1

Graph 10 shows that indeed the fertility levels of Mheer and St Geertruid differ in 1930 just like the election results of 1933. In Mheer, 149 children were born per 1000 fecund women whereas in St Geertruid 161 in 1930.70 The lower fertility lev- el of Mheer then seemed in line with the moderate enthusiasm for electoral sup- port for confessionalism. The proportion married of all women however is slightly lower in Mheer (50%) than in its neighboring municipality where the pro- portion married among all women older than 15 years in 1930 had reached a level of 51%.71 Indeed, the more modern demographic behavior of the Mheer popula- tion is not reflected in a higher proportion married than in the neighboring muni- cipality.

70 cbs municipal data Mheer 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930’ (Vrouwen), 10A ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’ (Levend geborenen), cbs (1954), cbs municipal data St Geertruid 6 and 10A, ibid. 71 cbs municipal data Mheer 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 6, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 133

52% 170

51% 160

50% 150 49% 140 48% 130 47% 120 46%

older than 15 years 110 45% 44% 100 Proportion married from all women 43% 90

42% 80 Number of births per 1000 women (aged 15-49) 1909 1920 1930

Nuptiality Mheer Nuptiality St Geertruid Fertility Mheer Fertility St Geertruid

Graph 10 Fertility and nuptiality in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1909-1930.

The fertility levels of 1930 might confirm the denominational support shown in the election results of 1933; the patterns of the fertility development at first sight are even more convincing where it concerns the reflection of ‘modern’ and ‘tradi- tional’ demographic behavior. As graph 10 illustrates, the development of the fer- tility level of St Geertruid, derived from the ten-yearly averages of numbers of births per 1000 fecund women (in the age group between 15 and 49), contrasted sharply with that of Mheer in the period between 1909 and 1920. In St Geertruid, the strong increase of fertility between 1909 and 1930 opposed the development of the reproductive behavior characteristic of the third phase of the demographic transition. The fact that it appeared to have gone hand in hand with an increase of the proportion married, points at traditional demographic be- havior as nuptiality restrains fertility. In Mheer, the period between 1909 and 1920 shows a similar traditional connection between fertility and nuptiality – although in that case it’s a negative one. Although after 1920 both fertility and the propor- tion married increase, the latter does so much faster, pointing at a ‘modern’ demo- graphic behavior. Though two decades of the development of fertility and nup- tiality patterns in a municipality is a rather short period to get reliable information from, the fact that the fertility levels in St Geertruid increased while those in Mheer remained quite low suggests that Mheer at least showed the most non-Catholic demographic behavior of the two. 134 mixing ovaries and rosaries

4.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

The fertility level of Roosteren in 1930 did not reflect the non-Catholic voting behavior during the elections in 1933 as evidently as in Mheer. In Roosteren, 60.6% of the Catholic population voted for the rksp. Compared to the neighbor- ing municipality of Ohe en Laak where 87.3% of the votes went to the national Catholic party, the political rebellion against the directives of the Church was big: 27.4% of the Roosteren population voted for the Limburg Federation and 3.4% for the social democratic sdap (see table 3). Ohe en Laak, where only 9.4% of the population voted for the ‘dissident’ party and 0.4% for the sdap, did not show a much more Catholic fertility behavior three years before the elections.

Table 3 1933 Election results of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Roman Catholic National Party RKSP 60.60% 87.30%

Roman Catholic People’s Party (RK Volkspartij) 0.20% 1.50%

Social Democratic Labor Party SDAP 3.40% 0.40%

Other socialist and communist parties 0.40% - (Communist Party Holland CPH, Farmer’s Party (Boeren Partij), Revolutionary Socialist Party (Revolutionaire Socialisten) Liberal parties 0.20% - (Federation for Freedom (Vrijheidsbond), Federation for National Restoration (Verbond voor Nationaal Herstel), Liberal Democratic Federation (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond) Protestant parties 1.80% 1.40% (Anti Revolutionary Party ARP, Christian Democratic Party CDU, Christian Historical Union CHU, Orthodox Reformed Party (Hervormd Gereformeerde Partij) National Orthodox Party SGP) Other parties 33.30% 9.40%

Total 99.90% 100.00%

Admissible votes (in numbers) 472 267 Enfranchised votes (in numbers) 535 298 Invalid/blank votes (in numbers) 20 6

In 1930 in Ohe en Laak, 104 children were born per 1000 fecund women, whereas Roosteren counted 105 that year. But as graph 11 shows, the Ohe en Laak fertility levels in 1909 and 1920 were much higher than those in Roosteren, which might suggest that the fertility decline that was part of the demographic transition had scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 135 already taken place in Roosteren by 1909.72 This assumption is supported by the different nuptiality levels of the municipalities: in Roosteren, 47% of the women were married in 1930 against 44% in Ohe en Laak in the same year. In 1920 the percentages were 45% and 41% respectively.73

48% 135

47% 130

46% 125

45% 120

44% 115

43% 110 older than 15 years

42% 105 Proportion married from all women

41% 100 Number of births per 1000 women (aged 15-49)

40% 95 1909 1920 1930

Nuptiality Roosteren Nuptiality Ohe en Laak Fertility Roosteren Fertility Ohe en Laak

Graph 11 Fertility and nuptiality in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1909-1930.

The fertility levels of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak in 1909 and 1920 suggest that fertility had already declined in the former before the years covered by the cbs data. The fertility levels of 1930, however, do not reflect the different levels of political support for confessionalism. Neither do the fertility and nuptiality pat- terns of the two Limburg municipalities at first sight. Between 1909 and 1920 the development of fertility and nuptiality in both municipalities showed the tradi- tional connection between the two variables: in Roosteren fertility increased

72 cbs municipal data Roosteren 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’ (Vrouwen), 10A ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’ (Levend geborenen), cbs (1954), cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 6 and 10A, ibid. 73 cbs municipal data Roosteren 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak 6, ibid. 136 mixing ovaries and rosaries

slightly while the proportion married expanded a bit. In Ohe en Laak fertility declined steeply along with nuptiality. After 1920, nuptiality in Roosteren rose much faster than the fertility of its population. Apparently, the latter is no longer determined by the former – a relation between fertility and marriage behavior that is characteristic of ‘modern’ demographic behavior. The neighboring ‘con- ventional’ municipality of Ohe en Laak also shows this pattern, though in a much stronger way: nuptiality increased while fertility declined fast. The development of the fertility and nuptiality patterns in the two Limburg municipalities give the impression that the demographic behavior of Ohe en Laak between 1909 and 1930 became as modern as that of Roosteren after 1920, however, the two de- cades are rather a short period to give profound evidence of the character of demographic developments. Different from the developments in the municipalities, the levels of nuptiality and fertility in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak prior to 1930 give the impression that ‘negative case’ Roosteren indeed had a more ‘modern’ demographic behavior. In 1909 the fertility in this municipality was 97 births among fecund women aged 15 to 49 and in 1920 103.5; the levels of Ohe en Laak in those years were respectively 27% and 10% higher. Regarding nuptiality, the levels in Ohe en Laak remained lower than those in Roosteren over the whole period varying from only less than 1% in 1909 to 3.7% in 1920 and 3.6% in 1930. For the larger part of the period, Ohe en Laak had a high fertility and a low nuptiality; Roosteren however between 1909 and 1930 had a high nuptiality and a low fertility. Concluding, the fertility levels of Roosteren before 1930 and nuptiality levels for the whole period suggest that this municipality showed a more modern demography compared to its neighbor Ohe en Laak.

4.3 Grave and Escharen

The fertility and nuptiality behavior of the municipality of Grave ought to be ana- lyzed carefully as a quarter of the population was institutionalized and probably could not get married and have children. However, as a large part of them was not allowed to vote, the significant differences in the election results of 1933 appear to reflect a contrast in confessionalism in the two Noord-Brabant municipalities. In Grave, only 78.6% of the mostly Catholic population voted for the Catholic National Party. The majority of the other votes went to the Roman Catholic Peo- ple’s Party (RK Volkspartij), a dissident Catholic labor party; the social democrats sdap received 3.8% of the votes and 4.7% of the votes went to other dissident par- ties (see table 4). In the neighboring municipality of Escharen the all-Catholic population voted denominationally for the rksp (99.1%); only 0.6% supported dissident parties. The fertility levels of 1933 indeed reflect this contrasting support for confessiona- lism: Escharen counted 129 births per 1000 married women aged 15-49 in 1930 scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 137 against only 96 in Grave that year (see graph 12).74 The difference in nuptiality in that year showed a complete reverse; in Grave 37.9% of the women older than 15 years were married, in Escharen this percentage was 10% higher – though this dif- ference might be accounted for by the institutionalized part of the Grave popula- tion.75

Table 4 1933 Election results of Grave and Escharen

Grave Escharen Roman Catholic National Party RKSP 78.60% 99.10% Roman Catholic People’s Party (RK Volkspartij) 7.10% - Social Democratic Labor Party SDAP 3.80% - Other socialist and communist parties 1.00% 0.20% (Communist Party Holland CPH, Farmer’s Party (Boeren Partij), Revolutionary Socialist Party (Revolutionaire Socialisten)) Liberal parties 2.40% 0.10% (Federation for Freedom (Vrijheidsbond), Federation for National Restoration (Verbond voor Nationaal Herstel), Liberal Democratic Federation (Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond) Protestant parties 2.40% - (Anti Revolutionary Party ARP, Christian Democratic Party CDU, Christian Historical Union CHU, Orthodox Reformed Party (Hervormd Gereformeerde Partij) National Orthodox Party SGP) Other parties 4.70% 0.60% Total 100.00% 100.00% Admissible votes (in numbers) 859 647 Enfranchised votes (in numbers) 1052 677 Invalid/blank votes (in numbers) 34 8

Between 1909 and 1930, the patterns of the fertility and nuptiality development in Grave and Escharen are reminiscent of those of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak in Limburg. Like that ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ case, Grave and Escharen in between 1909 and 1920 appeared to have a traditional link between nuptiality and fertility: in both municipalities the number of births per 1000 fecund women decreased as

74 cbs municipal data Grave 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930’ (Vrouwen), 10A ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915’ (Levend geborenen), cbs (1954), cbs municipal data Escharen 6 and 10A, ibid. 75 cbs municipal data Grave 6 ‘Inwoneraantal naar leeftijd en geslacht volgens de volks- tellingen 1909-1930’ and cbs municipal data Escharen 6, ibid. 138 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the proportion married fell. The correlation between nuptiality and fertility appeared to have been weaker between 1920 and 1930 than between 1909 and 1920: in Grave nuptiality increased faster than fertility and in Escharen nuptiality increased slightly while fertility continued to fall rapidly. The situation in these Limburg municipalities, however, is altogether different from contemporary mod- ernizing demographic behavior that showed the abandonment of the restrictive functioning of nuptiality as soon as the number of births is under control. Like the case-study from the central part of Limburg, the ‘positive’ case after 1920 appeared to have a more modern demographic behavior than the ‘negative’ one. As the stud- ied period is rather short, deduction of significant developments from the data, that are vulnerable to period effects, requires considerable caution. The 1930 levels of fertility might seem to reflect the non-denominational voting behavior in Grave; nuptiality however was low that year. This also applies for the other years: fertility in Grave in 1909 was only 100 births per 1000 women be- tween 15 and 49, in 1920 88 and in 1930 96, while during the same years the per- centage married of all women older than 15 was low too, varying from 36.1% in 1909 to 34.3% in 1920 and 37.9% in 1930 (see graph 12).

55% 200

180 50%

160 45%

140

40% older than 15 years 120

Proportion married from all women 35% 100 Number of briths per 1000 women (aged 15-49)

30% 80 1909 1920 1930 Nuptiality Grave Nuptiality Escharen Fertility Grave Fertility Escharen

Graph 12 Fertility and nuptiality in Grave and Escharen, 1909-1930.

The fertility levels of Escharen were much higher in the same period than those of Grave; in 1909 and 1920 over 40% and in 1930 26%. The proportion married in Escharen in those years was higher than in Roosteren but differed not quite as scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 139 much as the fertility rates: in 1909 15.8% more women were married in Escharen than in Grave, in 1920 13.7% and in 1930 10.4%. Taking into consideration that in 1930 25% of the inhabitants were institutionalized, the between 10% and 16% higher nuptiality rates in Escharen seem to make sense. Apart from the unmarried children in the institutions for blind and the (probably mostly) married elderly people in the St. Catharina Gasthuis, the mentally ill, the prisoners and the nuns and monks may well have accounted for the proportion unmarried in the institu- tionalized part of the Grave population. The fertility levels in Grave, in particular in 1909 and 1920, are disproportionately lower than those in Escharen though – and might well reflect some of the non-confessionalism of the 1933 voting behavior. How are these differences in Catholic fertility behavior between the municipalities explained?

5 Demographic causes of deviating behavior: sex-ratios, infant mortality

The previous paragraph has shown that, generally, the populations in the ‘nega- tive’ cases showed a more ‘modern’ demographic behavior than those in the ‘posi- tive’ cases. In St Geertruid, Ohe en Laak and Escharen, fertility rates were perhaps not always simply higher than in Mheer, Roosteren and Grave, but fertility was still restrained by nuptiality. In this paragraph, attention will be focused on possible demographic causes for the contrasting fertility levels and patterns. Does the popu- lation development in the municipalities reflect the contrasting fertility behavior in the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ cases? How much did natural population growth con- tribute to the population development, and how much ought to be ascribed to the balance of migration? Was the balance between men and women in the municipal- ities even? Finally, infant mortality, calculated as the ten-yearly averages of deaths in the first year of life per 1000 liveborn infants, is discussed as possible cause of the deviating fertility in the ‘negative’ case studies.

5.1 Mheer and St Geertruid

Between 1909 and 1930, Mheer showed a more ‘modern’ demographic behavior than St Geertruid. In the former, nuptiality seemed to develop more independent of fertility than in the latter municipality. Moreover, while in Mheer fertility levels remained quite stable in the two decades before 1930, those of St Geertruid in- creased rapidly. As has been discussed in 3.1, the population composition of Mheer and St Geertruid did not show any overrepresentation of higher age groups – so the lower fertility rate of Mheer in 1930 can not be explained by a larger proportion of ageing and unfertile inhabitants. Neither one of the municipalities housed a monastery or convent in 1930, so the municipal data are not obscured by over- representation of celibates. Are the differences in fertility behavior between Mheer 140 mixing ovaries and rosaries

and St Geertruid true reflections of a larger or smaller tendency to ‘confessiona- lism’ among the populations of the two municipalities or are they merely the result of other characteristics of the demographic composition of the populations? As has been mentioned in 3.1, both the populations of Mheer and St Geertruid steadily increased during the first seven decades of the twentieth century. While the population of Mheer remained slightly bigger than that of St Geertruid, the character of the populations increasingly diverged.

124

119

114

109

104

99 Population index numbers (1909=100)

94 1911 1915 1925 1921 1912 1913 1917 1918 1922 1923 1927 1928 1910 1914 1916 1919 1924 1926 1929 1930 1920 1909

Mheer St Geertruid

Graph 13 Population development Mheer and St Geertruid 1909-1930 in index numbers (1909=100).

Graph 13, showing the population development in index numbers, indicates that after a short population increase and decline between 1913 and 1920 the popula- tion of St Geertruid increased faster than that of Mheer during the period between 1920 and 1930.76 The municipal data on the period after 1930 reveal that this pattern of a slightly more powerful population rise in St Geertruid than in Mheer continues up to 1965. At first sight, the index numbers might confirm that Mheer had a more moderate growth both before and after 1930 than St Geertruid. However, was this really caused by a lower natural growth or might migration have been the origin?

76 cbs municipal data Mheer 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’, 9b ‘Inwonertal (31 dec. 1920 = 100)’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 141

Table 5 provides an explanation for the short population increase and fall between 1913 and 1920 in both municipalities. The First World War caused many, primarily Belgian, refugees to flee to the area of southern Limburg and leave again after 1918. As a consequence, the ten-yearly average balance of migration of 1920 for both Mheer and St Geertruid is remarkable (-30.5 and -25.6). The table further shows that the population increase to a quite similar level in both municipalities between 1909 and 1930 is caused by an excess of births over deaths on the one hand and by a balance of migration on the other. In 1910, the population increase in Mheer seemed to have been caused by an excess of births over deaths twice as much as in St Geertruid. In 1920 and 1930 on the other hand, the natural popula- tion growth in St Geertruid seemed to have provided for its population increase more than in Mheer. Both municipalities have coped with a negative migration balance in 1920 and 1930. However, the population of Mheer obviously had more appetite for out-migration as the balance of migration is less positive in 1909 and more negative in 1920 and 1930 than that of St Geertruid.

Table 5 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Mheer and St Geertruid in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) Population increase 1910 1920 1930 caused by: Mheer St Mheer St Mheer St Geertruid Geertruid Geertruid Excess of births 12.3 6.1 14.3 15.0 17.9 19.3 Balance of migration 3.4 7.5 -30.5 -25.6 -5.9 -5.4 Totals 15.7 13.6 -16.2 -10.6 12 13.9

The population development of Mheer and St Geertruid as illustrated by the index numbers between 1920 and 1930 in graph 13 showed a marked difference between the two municipalities. St Geertruid’s population increased at a higher pace than that of Mheer. In 1920 the excess of births was lower in Mheer than in St Geer- truid, just like in 1930. In both years, in particular in 1920, Mheer witnessed a more negative balance of migration than St Geertruid.77 The causes of the population growth might indicate that the lower fertility of Mheer in 1930 was the result of a lower excess of birth (as shown in 1920 and 1930). Moreover, the slower population growth in St Geertruid between 1920 and 1930 is possibly caused by both a low number of excess births and a more negative balance of migration. But the sex ratios in the municipalities can also provide for an uneven balance in the marriage market and hence a different level of fertility.

77 cbs municipal data Mheer 10b ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 142 mixing ovaries and rosaries

115%

110%

105%

100%

Percentage of males per females 95%

90% 1909 1920 1930

Mheer St Geertruid

Graph 14 Sex ratios in Mheer and St Geertruid in permillages 1909, 1920, 1930.

Graph 14, showing the development of the sex ratios in Mheer and St Geertruid, indicates that the proportion of males to females in Mheer clearly increased over the period.78 In 1909 the municipality’s male population was only slightly in the majority; in 1920 and 1930 they outnumbered females by 9% and 13%. The devel- opment of the sex ratio of St Geertruid hardly shows a clear pattern. In 1909 males outnumbered females by 8%; in 1920 females formed a majority by 2% and in 1930 the men did so. Overall, the sex ratios as shown in graph 14 indicate that the marriage markets in these municipalities must have been different: as the number of males per female increased between 1909 and 1930, the marriage market in Mheer must have become steadily more tense. Indeed, as graph 10 shows, the pro- portion of married women rapidly increased between 1920 and 1930. Hence, the social pressure for more women to get married at a younger age – a phenomenon that according to Lesthaeghe is linked to the development of the industrialization – must have been higher by 1930 in Mheer than in its neighboring municipality.79 But with the increasing social pressure for Mheer women to marry, one would expect not only the nuptiality level but also the fertility level to be higher in Mheer than in St Geertruid during that period – which was not the case.

78 cbs municipal data Mheer 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 79 Lesthaeghe (1977) 82-83. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 143

Data on infant mortality offer the last possibility to find a demographic cause for the deviating behavior in Mheer. As shown in graph 15, between 1910 and 1930 the ten-yearly averages of deaths per 1000 liveborn infants were higher in Mheer than in St Geertruid.

180

160

140

120

per 1000 lifeborns 100

80 Number of deaths in first year (ten-yearly averages)

60 1911 1915 1912 1913 1917 1918 1921 1925 1910 1914 1916 1919 1922 1923 1927 1928 1920 1924 1926 1929 1930

Mheer St Geertruid

Graph 15 Infant mortality in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1910-1930.

Though by 1930 the difference was not very big, infant mortality in Mheer was still higher than in its neighboring municipality (109.6 against 90.0). In a municipal- ity with a high infant mortality, a high fertility level would be generally expected, as the period of so-called post-partum ammenorrhea (loss of menstruation after hav- ing given birth) must have been shorter. As fertility in Mheer was actually lower than that in St Geertruid, the high infant mortality makes the demographic charac- teristics of this Limburg municipality even more remarkable: of the fewer children born, less reached adulthood. As it seems from the demographic variables in the analysis of the causes of fer- tility and nuptiality differences between the two south Limburg municipalities, the index numbers show a faster population increase in St Geertruid than in Mheer. From 1920 onwards men outnumbered females and nuptiality indeed increased, however, previous evaluation of the 1930 fertility level showed that it did not in- crease accordingly. In St Geertruid though, despite the fact that after 1920 the mar- riage market was far less tense than in Mheer, nuptiality increased fast and so did fertility. Infant mortality was much higher in Mheer than in St Geertruid, which 144 mixing ovaries and rosaries

only makes the demographic behavior of the former municipality more remark- able: despite the higher loss of infants, fertility in 1920 was almost equal to St Geertruid’s and in 1930 even lower than in St Geertruid. Obviously, the loss of chil- dren was not compensated for by reproduction. The deviating fertility and nup- tiality of Mheer, hence, are not explained by demographic factors.

5.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

In 1930, the populations of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak differed on various points: the population of the former municipality was bigger, its composition was more pyramid-shaped and the population increased more than that of the latter. In both 1909 and 1920 fertility was much lower in Roosteren than in its neighboring muni- cipality Ohe en Laak and between 1909 and 1930 nuptiality was much higher. Des- pite the signs of a more ‘modern’ demographic behavior in the Roosteren popula- tion that reflected their non-denominational voting behavior in 1933, Ohe en Laak had a remarkably urn-shaped population composition in 1930. This population composition lacked the traditional over-representation of the younger age groups and indicated that the ‘positive’ case did not have a demography as Catholic as its election results of 1933.

114

112

110

108

106

104

102

100

Population index numbers (1909=100) 98

96 1911 1915 1912 1913 1917 1918 1921 1925 1910 1914 1916 1919 1922 1923 1927 1928 1920 1924 1926 1929 1930 1909

Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Graph 16 Population development Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909-1930 in index numbers (1909=100).

As graph 16 shows, the index numbers of the population development suggest that the population of Roosteren had a less conventional fertility than its neighbors in scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 145

Ohe en Laak. The population growth in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak kept a similar pace between 1909 and 1916. After that year, the increase in Roosteren came to a halt and between 1916 and 1921 the population even declined. After 1922, it slowly expanded again to witness a short boost in 1929. In Ohe en Laak however, the population increased until 1917. After that year the population index number re- mained high, showing considerable variations until 1927 when it gradually in- creased again and became less pronounced. It halted in 1928, after which the popu- lation growth boomed again for a short period.80 Before deciding whether the popu- lation development of Ohe en Laak is more conventionally Catholic than that of Roosteren in spite of their contrasting voting behavior in 1933, the causes of the population increase ought to be deduced.

Table 6 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) Population increase 1910 1920 1930 caused by: Roosteren Ohe en Roosteren Ohe en Roosteren Ohe en Laak Laak Laak Excess of births 5.8 10.8 7.8 14.0 13.1 13.1 Balance of migration -6.4 -9.6 -12.7 -9.8 -4.8 -9.5 Totals 0.6 1.2 -4.9 4.2 8.3 3.6

As table 6 shows, the natural population growth was much higher in Ohe en Laak in 1910 than it was in Roosteren – in the latter it increased with 5.8 births to every thousand of the population, in the former with almost twice as much. As the level of Roosteren increased faster than that of Ohe en Laak during the period, in 1920 the natural increase in Ohe en Laak was still 61% higher than in Roosteren where it had reached a permillage of almost 8.0. Yet in 1930 the natural increase of Roosteren was equal to that of Ohe en Laak: both had reached a level of 13.1 0/00. The balance of migration however was different in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak during the whole of the period. During the period 1910-1930, the out-migration from Roosteren and Ohe en Laak was higher than the in-migration to these munic- ipalities. In Ohe en Laak, the population decrease because of a negative balance of migration was quite stable: from a permillage of -9.6 in 1910 to -9.8 in 1920 and -9.5 in 1930. In Roosteren the balance of migration fluctuated over the years with- out any pattern. In 1910 and 1930, it was less negative than that of Ohe en Laak; in those years the permillages were -6.4 and -4.8 respectively. Only in 1920 was the

80 cbs municipal data Roosteren 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’, cbs munici- pal data Ohe en Laak, ibid and HDNG population data Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909- 1919. 146 mixing ovaries and rosaries

migration balance more negative: that year the population increase was halted by some 12.7 people emigrating of every 1000 of the population.81 The excess of births as a cause of the population growth appears to have been higher in the ‘positive case’ of Ohe en Laak than in Roosteren in the years before 1930. Whether Ohe en Laak indeed showed a more conventional fertility behavior than Roosteren remains to be seen: the sex ratio in the two municipalities might offer a different explanation for the fertility and nuptiality behavior in the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ case.

110%

108%

106%

104%

102%

100% Percentage of males per females

98%

96% 1909 1920 1930

Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Graph 17 Sex-ratios in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909, 1920, 1930.

In Roosteren, males have outnumbered females in 1910, 1920 and 1930, but the proportion gradually evened out (see graph 17). The fact that men were in the majority might well have resulted in an increased social pressure for the women of Roosteren to refrain from postponement or abandonment of marriage. As was shown in graph 11 in 4.2, nuptiality indeed increased between 1909 and 1930. With more women marrying and probably also at a younger age, the fact that the fertility level only gradually increased is remarkable.82 Although men outnum- bered women in Ohe en Laak too, the sex ratios fluctuated over the period 1910-

81 cbs municipal data Roosteren 10B ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 82 cbs municipal data Roosteren 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 147

1930. In 1909 the number of males per 100 females was almost 100; in 1920 it had risen to 105 and by 1930 had fallen back to 102.5. Still, the proportion of males to females was never as uneven as in Roosteren. The difference in infant mortality between Roosteren and Ohe en Laak resem- bles that of Mheer and St Geertruid. Like in the southern Limburg municipalities, the infant mortality in the ‘negative case’ of Roosteren was higher than in the ‘posi- tive case’ Ohe en Laak (see graph 18). Like in Mheer, the higher infant mortality in Roosteren was combined with a lower fertility – at least in the years 1909 and 1920. One would expect fertility in a municipality with a high infant mortality to be high too. The higher infant mortality, after all, must have caused women in Roosteren and Mheer to have a shorter period of post-partum ammenorrhea than those in St Geertruid and Ohe en Laak with a lower infant mortality.

200

180

160

140

120

100

80 per 1000 lifeborns 60

40

Number of deaths in first year (ten-yearly averages) 20 1911 1915 1912 1913 1917 1918 1921 1925 1910 1914 1916 1919 1922 1923 1927 1928 1920 1924 1926 1929 1930

Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Graph 18 Infant Mortality in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1910-1930.

Concluding, the analysis of the demographic aspects of the deviating fertility in Roosteren did not seem to bring forward any factors that might be the cause of the municipality’s deviating fertility. Index numbers of Ohe en Laak show that its pop- ulation increased much more than in the neighboring municipality. Until 1930, the excess of births was higher in the ‘positive case’ of Ohe en Laak than in Roosteren. The uneven sex ratios in Roosteren resulted in an increase in the pro- portion married, but not in a proportional increase in fertility and the level that exceeded the infant mortality rates in the neighboring municipality of Ohe en 148 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Laak is incompatible with the lower fertility. From the perspective of the demo- graphic situation, Roosteren indeed appears to be more unconventional than Ohe en Laak.83

5.3 Grave and Escharen

As mentioned in 3.3, the cbs data reveal that between 1920 and the municipal rear- rangements of 1940 the population of Grave increased by almost 9% and that of Escharen by over 13%. This difference in population growth is clearly demon- strated in graph 19 showing the index numbers of the Grave and Escharen popula- tion in Noord-Brabant.

130

125

120

115

110

105

100

95

Population index numbers (1909=100) 90

85 1 5 9 11 13 15 17 9 2 3 2 7 9 0 9 9 9 9 1 9 2 9 2 2 19 1 1 1 1 19 1 19 1 19 19

Grave Escharen

Graph 19 Population development Grave and Escharen 1909-1930 in index numbers (1909=100).

Graph 19 seems to suggest that the population of Grave increased in 1920. The boost, though, is caused by the fact that the cbs municipal data covering the period 1920-1930 included the population of other municipalities that were added to Grave in 1942.84 Despite the radical change in the level of index numbers, however,

83 cbs municipal data Roosteren 10a ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915 (kolom overledenen totaal en >1 jaar)’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 84 cbs municipal data Grave 4 ‘Annexaties en grenswijzigingen, 1880-1950’ and appen- dix 4 ‘Oppervlakte, annexaties en grenswijzigingen’, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 149 the nature of the population development in Grave as opposed to that in Escharen is clearly demonstrated in graph 19. Between 1909 and 1920 the population declined in Grave while Escharen witnessed a population growth. After 1920 the ‘larger’ Grave population did not increase; its index numbers varied between 115 and 120 whereas the population of Escharen increased steadily until the index number was 120 in 1922 and 125 in 1925. In particular in the decade after 1920 both Noord-Brabant municipalities showed a similar population development though at different levels. The populations of Grave and Escharen, for example, declined in 1927 and again in 1929 and 1930. The similarity in the development of the population index numbers in Grave and Escharen prove that the section of the population that was institutionalized did not affect the features of the Grave popu- lation very much.85 Table 7 shows to what extent the population developments between 1920 and 1930 in Grave and Escharen were caused by natural growth and migration. The dif- ference in the population increases caused by an excess of births over deaths in the two municipalities is striking: the natural growth in Grave was much lower than in Escharen. Despite the fact that the difference between Grave and Escharen less- ened during the period between 1910 and 1930 – in the first year the population increase caused by natural growth in Grave was a ninth of the permillage of Escharen, in 1930 slightly over a third – the difference remained remarkable.

Table 7 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Grave and Escharen in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) Population increase 1910 1920 1930 caused by: Grave Escharen Grave Escharen Grave Escharen Excess of births 2.2 20.2 3.5 19.3 5.3 17.1 Balance of migration -2.3 -0.7 -4.9 -10.9 -0.3 -12.9 Totals -0.1 19.5 -1.4 8.4 5.0 4.2

Whether changes in the institutionalized population caused the main part of the gap is doubtful: table 7 shows that the average permillage of population change caused by a negative balance of migration increased enormously over the years in Escharen and appears to have been a much bigger issue for the population growth than in Grave. Migration remained only a moderate factor in the population in- crease of Grave, in Escharen the permillage fell from -0.7 in 1910 to -12.9 in 1930.86

85 cbs municipal data Grave 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’, 9b ‘Inwonertal (31 dec. 1920 = 100)’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. 86 cbs municipal data Grave 10B ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. 150 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Apparently the arrival of prisoners, mentally ill and blind children from other parts of Noord-Brabant did not have a large impact on the Grave population – in fact without them, the population increase of the Grave population as shown in graph 19 must have been even more modest. As graph 12 showed, nuptiality in both Grave and Escharen declined between 1909 and 1920 and subsequently increased, particularly in Grave. Did the sex ratios in the municipalities cause this difference? Graph 20 indicates that the sex ratios of both Grave and Escharen vary throughout the three decades. While the balance between men and women got more uneven, sex ratios in Escharen fail to form a clear pattern. In Grave the proportion of men to women declined strongly as men outnumbered women in 1909 by 11.4% in 1909 and by 4.6% in 1920; in 1930 though the municipality had 8% more women than men in the population. In Escharen in 1909 and 1920 the proportion of males to females was respectively 102.1 and 99.1 and it suddenly rose to 111.7 in 1930.87

115%

110%

105%

100%

Percentage of males per females 95%

90% 1909 1920 1930 Grave Escharen

Graph 20 Sex ratios in Grave and Escharen 1909, 1920, 1930.

The off balance proportion of males to females in Grave might partly explain the low fertility levels in 1909, 1920 and 1930. As females were in the majority, the social pressure for this part of the population to get married and to do so as soon as possible in order to fill the needs of the men looking for a spouse, might not have

87 cbs municipal data Grave 9a ‘Inwonertal naar geslacht, 1880-1950’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 151 been high. For example, as not all women were able to find a husband in the muni- cipality, it might have been easier for parents to decide to keep one daughter at home to care for them. This would explain the decrease in nuptiality between 1909 and 1920 as the proportion of males to females declined with the social pressure for women to get married. It does not account, however, for the fact that after 1920 the proportion married increased in Grave again although women outnumbered men. Neither does it explain why fertility increased between 1920 and 1930. As the proportion of males to females was quite equal in the institutions – in 1930 17% more women than men were institutionalized in Grave – this population section does not unbalance the general ratio between men and women.88 In Escharen the balance between the sexes manages to explain the development of its nuptiality rates: the decline in the proportion married in the municipality might have been the result of low social pressure to get married because the proportion of men to women was not very uneven in 1909 and 1920. In 1930 however, the situation was changed: men outnumbered women and hence nuptiality slightly increased. How- ever, fertility did not increase along with it.

150

140

130

120

110

100

90 per 1000 lifeborns

80

70

Number of deaths in first year (ten-yearly averages) 60 1911 1915 1912 1913 1917 1918 1921 1925 1910 1914 1916 1919 1922 1923 1927 1928 1920 1924 1926 1929 1930

Grave Escharen

Graph 21 Infant Mortality in Grave and Escharen, 1910-1930.

The sex ratios in Grave and Escharen do not completely account for the variations in fertility and nuptiality in the two municipalities – neither does infant mortality.

88 cbs municipal data Grave 1 ‘ Bevolking op 31 december 1930’, ibid. 152 mixing ovaries and rosaries

As graph 21 shows, the ten-yearly averages of deaths per 1000 liveborn infants decreased strongly over the period between 1909 and 1930 in both Noord-Brabant municipalities. But unlike the previous cases, infant mortality in the ‘negative case’ Grave was much lower than that in the ‘positive case’ Escharen. Apart from 1910, when in Grave five more children died per 1000 liveborn infants, the infant mortality was higher in Escharen varying from 6 in 1911 to 32 in 1920 and 28 in 1930. It is remarkable that, apart from the fact that the pattern in the development of the infant mortality of Escharen is much more irregular, the municipalities share a number of short rises and falls in the development of the infant mortality. Grave witnessed a temporary fall in the deaths per 1000 liveborn infants in 1912, 1919 and 1926 and a short rise in 1914 and 1928; Escharen experienced most rises and falls one year later in respectively 1913, 1921, 1926 and 1915 and 1928.89 Once again, this proves that the presence of institutionalized persons in Grave did not affect municipal data much. Knowing the high fertility level in Escharen, high infant mortality rates are not surprising. As has been mentioned before, mothers who lost a baby in its first year would be fecund much sooner than when they had to breastfeed for a long time. With the decline of infant mortality in Escharen, fertility could lower as well, be- cause fewer children were needed to compensate for the losses. The unsteady decrease in infant mortality in Escharen might indicate that this municipality re- acted much more eagerly to period effects than the people in Grave did. The demo- graphic characteristics of Escharen appear to explain the fertility and nuptiality lev- els as well as their developments: notwithstanding the decreasing pattern, the level of fertility remained quite high resulting in population growth. Furthermore, the uneven sex ratios resulted in a decrease in nuptiality between 1909 and 1920 and a slight increase in the following decade. Demographic variables in Grave do not seem to explain the deviating demo- graphic behavior of its population. Between 1909 and 1930, the population of Escha- ren increased much more than that of Grave. The excess of births over deaths was much bigger in Escharen than in Grave. In other demographic fields, Escharen ap- peared to stand out more than Grave too: in 1920 and 1930, the balance of migration was much more negative. Although the balance between men and women in Grave was uneven, its development showed a clear pattern. Infant mortality declined in both municipalities, but its fall was much more constant in Grave than in Escharen. Compared to its neighboring municipality, the Grave population, on the whole, did not seem very much concerned with marriage and procreation. As demographic variables do not offer an explanation for the differences between fertility behavior in Grave and Escharen, the next paragraph will turn to socio-economic causes.

89 cbs municipal data Grave 10a ‘Geboorte, Sterfte, Vestiging en Vertrek, 1881-1915 (kolom overledenen totaal en >1 jaar)’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 153

6 Socio-economic causes: industrialization and agricultural modernization

Studying the decline of fertility in Belgium between 1800 and 1970, Lesthaeghe made an interesting discovery. In the industrial towns of Wallonia, where heavy industries and economic specialization developed faster than in other Belgian towns, the proportion married surpassed the national and Walloon average. Lest- haeghe suggested that “when a pronounced degree of industrialization was cou- pled with the dominant presence of a wage-earning class, a much more modern nuptiality pattern prevailed, and few women remained single.”90 Socio-economic reasons for marriage or the limitation of the family size in cer- tain situations outbalanced religious motivations to restrain fertility with nup- tiality only. In this paragraph, the socio-economic circumstances in ‘negative’ cases are compared to those in ‘positive’ cases in order to find out which situations motivated Catholic communities to challenge Church directives regarding repro- duction. In 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, data on respectively Mheer and St Geertruid, Roos- teren and Ohe en Laak and Grave and Escharen are analyzed. The extent to which ‘modern’ economic sectors like industries and trade and services were developed will be studied, as well as employment in the more traditional sector of agricul- ture. Subsequently, the prosperity of the municipalities will be analyzed using data on income taxes. In addition, more indicators of the social status of the ‘nega- tive’ and ‘positive’ cases will be presented, such as the size of farms and female employment.

6.1 Mheer and St Geertruid

As discussed in paragraph 3.1, Mheer and St Geertruid not only shared a mainly Catholic population but also the dominance of an economic sector. In Mheer 94% of the municipal area was used as farmland in 1930, in St Geertruid 98%.91 As graph 22A shows, in that same year almost 70% of the labor force of Mheer worked in this sector and in St Geertruid 80%. Comparing the proportion of males work- ing in non-agricultural sectors, by 1930 Mheer seemed to have developed a slightly more modern economy than St Geertruid: the industrial sector is about 6% bigger and the trade and services sector 2%. However, as both populations of the munici- palities in the south of Limburg are small, the actual numbers of people concerned are low and the significance of these data is questionable.

90 Lesthaeghe (1977) 82-83. 91 cbs municipal data Mheer 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 154 mixing ovaries and rosaries

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of male labor force 10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CaualCasual labour labor and fishery mines services education services

Mheer St Geertruid

Graph 22A Male occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930.

Male unemployment seemed to be rare in Mheer and St Geertruid: in both munici- palities all males between 15 and 65 years were employed in 1930.92 The fact that the cbs registered that in Mheer and St Geertruid only respectively 57% and 58% of the entire male population had a job in that year is probably due to the over- representation of age groups below 15 years in both municipalities. Probably, this extended the unemployed part of the total population.93 The actual numbers of men working in industries in Mheer and St Geertruid might be too few to support the assumption that Mheer was slightly more modern- ized than St Geertruid, but data on the female labor participation per sector (shown in graph 22B) point in the same direction. In Mheer, of the few women that were employed in 1930 more than 7% worked in industry and almost 15% in the trade and services sector. The contrast with the ‘positive case’ of St Geertruid is striking: only 0.6% of the women worked in each of the two ‘modern’ economic sectors. In St Geertruid, the majority of the women worked in the agricultural sector: 94.1% against 61.8% in Mheer. However, as in these agricultural municipalities the work in the domestic services would often have concerned assisting on a farm and only rarely serving as a maid in middle-class families, most of the women

92 cbs municipal data Mheer 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 1930’ and cbs munici- pal data St Geertruid, ibid. 93 Ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 155 working in this sector ought to be regarded as agricultural laborers too.94 But even if adding up the 16% of the women that were employed in the domestic services in Mheer to the percentage women working in the first sector, St Geertruid had much more women working in the agricultural sector: 94.1% with only 4% domestic ser- vants among its female working population against 61.8% and 16% in Mheer respectively.95

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of female labor force 10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CaualCasual labour labor and fishery mines services Education services

Mheer St Geertruid

Graph 22B Female occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930.

To put the socio-economic situation of the two south Limburg municipalities in a broader perspective, the prosperity of both municipalities ought to be compared. Studying the tax payment in 1931, Mheer seemed more prosperous than St Geer- truid. In that year, 23.3% of the Mheer population paid income taxes and capital lev- ies (222 in a total population of 954). In St Geertruid 181 inhabitants did so, 20.6% of the population. The average capital per taxpayer was higher in Mheer than in St Geertruid: respectively 29000 and 28000 Dutch guilders. The average income per taxpayer however was higher in St Geertruid (1774) than in Mheer (1509).96 That Mheer was a more prosperous municipality than the ‘positive’ case St Geertruid is confirmed by a less direct indicator for prosperity: the sizes of the

94 Bras (2002) 79-92. 95 cbs municipal data Mheer 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 19303’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 96 cbs (1931). 156 mixing ovaries and rosaries

farms in the municipalities. In 1930 Mheer counted 125 heads of agricultural com- panies on a total population of 954 inhabitants (see table 8) – so the municipality had one agricultural company for every 8 inhabitants. St Geertruid had 201 agri- cultural heads amongst its 878 inhabitants in 1930 and counted one agricultural company for every 4 inhabitants.97 Obviously, the farms in Mheer were able to pro- vide products for more inhabitants of the municipality than in St Geertruid. Knowing that 8.98 square kilometers of St Geertruid in 1930 were used for agricul- tural purposes, the average size of farms in the municipality was 4.5 hectares whereas in Mheer the 8.40 square kilometers provided for an average farm size of 6.7 hectares.98 By 1930, the farms in Mheer, bigger and providing for more people in the municipality, might have started to develop into modern agricultural enter- prises producing for a larger market, whereas those in St Geertruid were probably more traditional and less market-oriented. A third indicator for the prosperity in the municipalities of Mheer and St Geer- truid is female labor participation. Assuming that in a prosperous Catholic commu- nity women were not working, this variable is a particular good indicator to mark a clear distinction between the municipalities in this respect.99 First of all, the per- centage of women working from the whole of the female population in the two mu- nicipalities differed greatly. In Mheer, 21.2% of all women between 15 and 64 years old worked; in St Geertruid 72.6%, more than 3 times as many.100 As table 8 shows, the differences between male labor participation in the agricultural sectors are not very big, but contrasts in the female labor participation in that sector are huge. The proportion of all agricultural work done by women in St Geertruid is 43.8%; in Mheer only 14.6%. In St Geertruid, the percentages of men and women working in agriculture is nearly in balance (56% of all labor is done by males, 44% by females) – whereas in Mheer the men are clearly in the majority (85% and 15% respectively). In the traditional agricultural companies of St Geertruid, women probably needed to work with their husbands. The percentage of female heads in St Geertruid is al- most the septilateral of that in Mheer: 23% against 3% respectively. While in Mheer widows probably remarried or sold the agricultural companies, widows in St Geertruid might have been pressed to continue the mainly self-sufficient farms.101

97 cbs municipal data Mheer 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 December 1930’ and 13 ‘Beroepstelling landbouwbedrijven op 31 december’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 98 cbs municipal data Mheer 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 99 See chapter 4, paragraph 2.2, Bots en Noordman (1981) 77 and Harris (1993) 23-32. 100 cbs municipal data Mheer 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 19303’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid 12, cbs (1954). 101 cbs municipal data Mheer 13 ‘Beroepstelling landbouwbedrijven op 31 december’ and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 157

Table 8 Agricultural labor participation of men and women Mheer and St Geertruid 1930 in absolute numbers

Heads Common employees Total Male Female Male Female Male Female Mheer 117 8 79 26 196 34 St Geertruid 119 82 86 78 205 160

As the distribution of male and female workers over the different labor sectors proved, Mheer by 1930 was certainly industrializing at a higher pace than its neighboring municipality of St Geertruid. Though Mheer like St Geertruid in 1930 was still mainly an agricultural society, the situation in the sector differed: the agricultural companies in Mheer were larger than those in St Geertruid. In that municipality, most of the agricultural companies were traditional and less market-oriented and demanded all efforts of both spouses and their children. Female labor participation in St Geertruid, consequently, was higher than in Mheer, which was prosperous enough to make women’s labor not a necessity. Income taxes and capital levies confirm Mheer’s economy was more prosperous. The steady modernizing economy of Mheer with developing industrial and trade and services sectors must have stimulated investment of education and labor spe- cialization and, consequently, family limitation. In St Geertruid, where agricul- ture remained directed at self-support, many hands make light work. The socio- economic motivation to respect Church behavioral rules and refrain from practic- ing birth control persisted longer in St Geertruid than in Mheer.

6.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

In 1930, the proportion of surface used for agricultural purposes in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak was lower than that in Mheer and St Geertruid. Still, respectively 83.3% and 78.0% of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak was farming land, indicating that these municipalities had a profoundly agricultural character too.102 The cbs muni- cipal data on the proportion of men working in various occupational groups on the 31st of December 1930, as shown in graph 23A, show that in both Roosteren and Ohe en Laak the agricultural sector provided most of the jobs. In Roosteren half of the population worked in the agricultural sector (50.8%), however, in Ohe en Laak almost three quarters of the population (73.2%) did so.

102 cbs municipal data Roosteren 3 ‘Oppervlakte en bevolkingsdichtheid in 1930 en 1939’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 158 mixing ovaries and rosaries

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of male labor force 10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CasualCauallabour labor and fishery mines services Education services

Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Graph 23A Male occupational groups in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1930.

Judging from the percentage of men working in industries, that sector was twice as big in Roosteren (40.7%) than in Ohe en Laak (21.2%). By the middle of the period of national fertility decline, apparently, the industrialization process was develop- ing much faster in Roosteren than in its neighboring municipality. The other sec- tors – trade and services, professionals, religion and education – hardly differed though all these sectors were slightly better represented in Roosteren. It is striking that in Roosteren almost twice as many males were employed as the number of men between 15 and 65 the municipality actually counted. This means that in 1930 80% of the men over 65 years old and under 15 years were working in Roosteren – in Ohe en Laak this percentage in 1930 had reached the level of 12%.103 Like the case of Mheer and St Geertruid, the actual number of women em- ployed in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak was rather small. The division of female em- ployees over the various economic sectors, though, confirms the impression that the economy of Roosteren was slightly more modernized in 1930 than that of Ohe en Laak (see graph 23B). In addition, the proportion of women between 15 and 64 that had to work was lower in Roosteren (22.4%) than in Ohe en Laak (29.5%).

103 cbs municipal data Roosteren 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 1930’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 159

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of female labor force 10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CasualCaual labour labor and fishery mines services Education services Roosteren Ohe en Laak

Graph 23B Female occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930.

Regarding the sectors in which these women were working, in Roosteren the pro- portion working in industry was over twice as high as in Ohe en Laak (10.3% versus 4.3%). The high number of women in Roosteren employed in religious and educa- tional professions is striking too: 8.8% against only 2.2% in Ohe en Laak. The per- centages of women working in trade and services, on the other hand, were almost equal (10.3% in Roosteren and 10.9% in Ohe en Laak). As with Mheer and St Geertruid, the percentage of women working in the agricultural sector in 1930 was much higher in the ‘positive case’ Ohe en Laak than in St Geertruid (76.1% and 58.8% respectively) – even when adding up the women working in domestic ser- vices that were probably occupied with farm work too (6.5% of the working women in Ohe en Laak, 11.8% in Roosteren).104 What information do data on the tax burdens provide concerning the prosperity of these Limburg municipalities? In Roosteren, 25.1% of the population paid income tax; in Ohe en Laak only 16.5%. In Roosteren only slightly more than 2% of the population paid capital levies, however, the actual number of taxpayers in that category was not listed for Ohe en Laak as the number was too small. The differ- ence in prosperity is once more reflected in the average income per taxpayer that was 1392 Dutch guilders in Roosteren and 1335 in Ohe en Laak. The average capital per taxpayer in the latter municipality is unknown, but in Roosteren it was quite

104 Ibid. 160 mixing ovaries and rosaries

high: 40000 Dutch guilders.105 From these tax data, it thus seems the population of Roosteren had a higher social status than that in Ohe en Laak. The situation of the agricultural sector in 1930 givens a slightly different per- spective on the prosperity of the municipalities. As table 9 shows, Roosteren counted 120 heads of agricultural companies in 1930 and Ohe en Laak only 81.106 With population sizes of respectively 1012 and 577, ‘negative case’ Roosteren counted one agricultural farm for every 8 inhabitants of the municipality; Ohe en Laak one for every 7.107 Thus, the agricultural companies in Roosteren apparently did not provide for more inhabitants in the municipality than those in Ohe en Laak. Taking into account that in 1930 6.20 square kilometers of Roosteren were used as farmland, the average size of agricultural companies in that municipality was 5.2 hectares; in Ohe en Laak where the agricultural land in the municipality took up 5.82 square kilometers, farms were on average about 7.2 hectares. Hence, as a variable for the prosperity of the municipality, the situation in the agricultural sector indicates that although the ‘density’ of the number of farms in the popula- tion was larger, agricultural companies in Ohe en Laak were slightly bigger than in Roosteren which might point at a more modernized and less self-sufficient character of the agricultural sector in the ‘positive case’ Ohe en Laak.

Table 9 Agricultural labor participation of men and women Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1930 in absolute numbers Heads Common employees Total Male Female Male Female Male Female Roosteren 101 19 80 21 181 40 Ohe en Laak 63 18 80 17 143 35

That Roosteren was more prosperous, as tax information and the size of the farms suggest, is reflected in the female labor participation. Though relatively more women between 15 and 65 years were employed in Roosteren than in Ohe en Laak (respectively 22.4% and 19.5%), a larger proportion of the total female population in Ohe en Laak was employed compared to Roosteren (respectively 16.1% and 13.8%). Concerning female labor contributions to the agricultural sector, as table 9 shows, the division of positions in Roosteren differed only slightly from Ohe en Laak. In the latter, the percentage of agricultural work done by women was only 2% higher than in Roosteren. The proportions of female heads show similar small

105 cbs (1931). 106 cbs municipal data Roosteren 13 ‘Beroepstelling landbouwbedrijven op 31 december’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 107 cbs municipal data Roosteren 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 December 1930’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 161 contrasts – 10.8% of the agricultural positions in Ohe en Laak concerned female heads of companies against 8.6% in Roosteren.108 Presuming that in a prosperous municipality, where the agricultural sector was modernizing, female labor partici- pation would decline, Roosteren apparently did not differ much from Ohe en Laak. The socio-economic characteristics of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak have made clear that the differences between the two municipalities in this area are consider- able. Judging from the percentage of men working in that sector, Roosteren in 1930 was much more industrialized than Ohe en Laak. Working women in Roosteren are also better represented in sectors other than agriculture compared to those in Ohe en Laak. However, in Roosteren more men of the age categories above 64 and below 15 worked in 1930. The situation in the agricultural sector indicates that the municipalities showed contrast in their prosperity too: the density of farms in the municipality of Ohe en Laak was higher and their size was smaller compared to Roosteren. In neither of the two municipalities was the proportion of farm work done by women as high as in St Geertruid, but in Roosteren as well as Ohe en Laak almost the same number of women were needed to get all the work done. Only the fact that in Roosteren relatively more inhabitants were taxed than in Ohe en Laak, confirms that in this ‘negative’ case the population was motivated to practice family planning. Socio-economic circumstances, particularly industrialization, thus formed a stimulus behind the deviating demography of Roosteren.

6.3 Grave and Escharen

In 1930, of the 11.08 square kilometers the municipality of Grave took up, 7.50 was used as farming land (67.7%) – the neighboring municipality of Escharen counted 20.07 square kilometers of which 15.03 had an agricultural purpose (74.9%). This difference in the primary purpose of the main part of the municipalities of Grave and Escharen is mirrored in graph 24A, that shows the proportion of men working in the various economic sectors. By 1930, the first sector, that of agriculture and fishery, was in Grave no longer the most important sector. Of the male population in this municipality 40.4% worked in the industry (and 0.1% in the mines) which was twice as much as the percentage of men working in agriculture (20.3%). In Escharen, the occupational structure of the male population in 1930 still resembled that of a nineteenth cen- tury community: 83% of the men worked in the agricultural sector and only 10.5% in industry – which made the male labor participation in this sector four times smaller than that in Grave. The sector of trade and services differed even more; in Grave 13.6% of the males worked in this field against only 2.7% in Escharen – mak-

108 cbs municipal data Roosteren 13 ‘Beroepstelling landbouwbedrijven op 31 december’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 162 mixing ovaries and rosaries

ing the sector five times as big in the ‘negative case’ as in the ‘positive case’. The presence of institutions in Grave is proved by the religious and educational sector, in which 19.1% of the men in Grave worked – against 3.3% of the Escharen males. In Escharen a larger proportion of the men older than 64 and younger than 15 were working than in Grave (11% and 2% respectively). These results reflect the urban character of Grave’s economy: the industrial sector was better developed than in Escharen, as was the trade and services sector.109 The difference between the municipalities regarding the working males as a proportion of the total male popu- lation is remarkable small: 65% in Grave and 63% in Escharen.

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of male labor force

10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CasualCasual labourlabor and fishery mines services Education services

Grave Escharen

Graph 24A Male occupational groups in Grave and Escharen, 1930.

Data on the economic activities of the female population in these Noord-Brabant municipalities confirm that ‘modern’ economic sectors were better developed in Grave, which had a stronger industrial and trades-and-services sector than Escharen in 1930. The representation of various sectors among the working women in the two municipalities was radically different. As graph 24B shows, the women who worked in Grave were divided amongst all economic sectors, while in Escharen 92% of the employed women worked in agriculture – without including the 4% of the women working in the domestic services that were probably occu-

109 cbs municipal data Grave 12 ‘Beroepsbevolking op 31 december 1930’ and cbs munic- ipal data Escharen, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 163 pied with farm work too. The proportion women employed in industry and trade and services did not account for more than 2% in Escharen. Only a few women worked in religious professions and education and the municipality did not have any ‘professional’, highly educated women.

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20 Proportion of female labor force

10

0 Agriculture Industry and Trade and Professionals Religion and Domestic CasualCaual labourlabor and fishery mines services Education services

Grave Escharen

Graph 24B Female occupational groups in Grave and Escharen, 1930.

In Grave the female labor participation in ‘modern’ economic sectors was com- pletely different. It was almost equally divided among the different sectors: almost 17% of the employed women worked in industry, 18% were employed in agricul- ture and 16.1% in the domestic services. The presence of the institutions is mir- rored in the large proportion of women working in religious and educational occu- pations: 16.1%. The institutions partly accounted for the high number of female professionals too: 19.1% of all the working women was employed in this sector. Like the representation of male and female employees in modern economic sectors, the tax burden in the municipalities confirms the impression that Grave was a slightly more prosperous municipality than Escharen. In 1931, 12.6% of the Grave population paid income or capital tax against 11.4% of the Escharen inhabit- ants. The average income and the average capital per taxpayer were considerably higher in Grave than in Escharen: respectively 1840 and 37000 Dutch guilders in Grave and 1705 and 23000 in Escharen.110

110 cbs (1931). 164 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The higher social status of the Grave population compared to that of Escharen, as suggested by the taxation, is not completely reflected in the situation of the agri- cultural sector in 1930. Taking into account that in the municipality of Grave 7.5 square kilometers were used for agriculture, the average farm size in 1930 must have been 8.2 hectares; in Escharen where 15.03 square kilometers were used by farms the average size was 8.3 hectares. Although the farms were of equal size in the two Noord-Brabant municipalities, the number of agricultural companies per head of the population was much lower in Grave than in Escharen. In 1930, 91 inhabitants of Grave were the head of an agricultural company – with a population of 2945 the density of farms was one on every 32 inhabitants. In Escharen, 181 heads of farms in a population of 1450 resulted in one agricultural company on every 8 inhabitants.111 Like in the ‘negative case’ of Mheer, fewer of the Grave women had to work. In Escharen, 64% of all women in the ages 15 to 64 were employed against only 38% in Grave. The proportion of the agricultural work done by women in Escharen con- firms the impression that Grave was more prosperous than the neighboring ‘posi- tive case’. In Grave less than 27% of the agricultural labor was performed by women; in Escharen 37%. In Grave less than 5% of the company heads were female (see table 10) whereas Escharen counted three times as many (14.5%). These data suggest that agriculture in Escharen was probably still quite traditional, main- ly self-supportive and required the cooperation of the whole of the family. In Grave, the agricultural sector was modernizing along with the industrialization process: farm areas were able to provide food for more heads of the population than in the neighboring municipality and probably fewer women had to continue the com- pany after their husband’s death.112

Table 10 Agricultural labor participation of men and women Grave and Escharen 1930 in ab- solute numbers

Heads Common employees Total Male Female Male Female Male Female Grave 91 12 91 54 182 66 Escharen 181 91 215 142 396 233

The socio-economic situation in Grave in 1930, apparently, was radically different from that in Escharen. The percentages of men working in other sectors than that of the traditional, agricultural one were much higher, indicating that the industri-

111 cbs municipal data Grave 1 ‘Bevolking op 31 December 1930’, 13 ‘Beroepstelling land- bouwbedrijven op 31 december’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. 112 cbs municipal data Grave 13 ‘Beroepstelling landbouwbedrijven op 31 december’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 165 alization process was developing in Grave and its economy was modernizing. The social status of the population of Grave seemed to be higher: fewer women needed to work but those who did were employed in all sectors and not mainly in farming. The situation of the agricultural sector gives the impression of Grave as a munici- pality with highly market-oriented agricultural companies that probably did not require the labor of women to the same extent as in Escharen. These municipal characteristics strongly reflect the fact that socio-economic circumstances in Grave were determined by the dominance of the town of Grave. Escharen on the other hand was an agricultural municipality with only a few hamlets. This different de- gree of urbanization of course had a great impact on the opportunities the popula- tions of Grave and Escharen had to modernize both the agricultural sector and ‘new’ sectors like industries and trade and services. In its turn, this had conse- quences for the extent to which people in the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ case were stimulated to adopt a more ‘modern’ demographic behavior. But other motivations than socio-economic ones could lead to the introduction of family planning in spite of the Church rules regarding reproduction: the next paragraph will pay attention to cultural drives for family limitation.

7 Cultural causes: mobility and religious multiformity

In 1995, Susan Cotts Watkins of the University of Pennsylvania and Angela Danzi of the State University New York, usa, published the results of interviews with elderly Jewish and Italian women in New York and Philadelphia. The Jewish and Catholic women appeared to differ in their acceptance of birth control. Watkins and Danzi argued that these divergent outlooks were the result of differences between Jewish and Italian social networks. Jewish women, the authors stated, in general had a larger and more varied social circle to exchange ideas with than the Italian Catholic women.113 In Noord-Brabant and Limburg municipalities where the Church had a strong social position, the spread of information about family planning probably de- pended on the size and variety of the social environment – just like among the women in the usa. This paragraph will discuss the cultural stimulus for the intro- duction of family planning. Firstly, the presence of other denominations than the Catholic one in the municipalities will be analyzed. In particular members of the Dutch Reformed Church, among which liberal Protestants who were allowed by their church to practice family planning, might have served as an example to Cath-

113 Susan Cotts Watkins and Angela D. Danzi, ‘Women’s Gossip and Social Change: Childbirth and Fertility Control Among Italian and Jewish Women in the United States, 1920-1940’, Gender & Society 9 (1995) 469-490. 166 mixing ovaries and rosaries

olics. Secondly, the mobility in the municipalities will be studied. A larger ‘circula- tion’ of inhabitants of the municipalities might have increased the chance of infor- mation on methods of birth control to trickle into the Catholic communities. In this context, the ‘negative’ cases Mheer, Roosteren and Grave will be compared with the ‘positive’ cases St Geertruid, Ohe en Laak and Escharen in 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

7.1 Mheer and St Geertruid

In 1930, Mheer and St Geertruid were both homogeneous Catholic municipalities: each of the municipalities counted only one Dutch Reformed inhabitant. As graph 25 shows, the years preceding 1930 did not show any religious heterogeneity either: in 1909 the population of Mheer was for 99.4% Catholic (and counted 3 members of the Dutch Reformed Church and 2 inhabitants that did not have any church affiliation), in 1920 99.8% (with 10 members of the Dutch Reformed Church and 1 orthodox Protestant). St Geertruid shows similar rates: in 1909 the municipality’s population was completely Catholic, in 1920 and 1930 St Geertruid counted one Dutch Reformed inhabitant while the rest of the population was Cath- olic (99.9% in both years). Despite the slightly higher number of members from other denominations in Mheer, the chances that this small group of people func- tioned as a paragon of family planning are rather small.

100,0%

99,8%

99,6%

99,4%

99,2%

99,0%

Percentages of total population 98,8%

98,6% Mheer Sint Mheer Sint Mheer Sint Geertruid Geertruid Geertruid

1909 1920 1930

Roman Catholic Dutch Reformed orthodox Protestant no church affiliation

Graph 25 Religious composition Mheer and St Geertruid, 1909, 1920, 1930.

Mheer and St Geertruid showed more differences in the mobility of their popula- tions than in religious diversity. Graph 26 shows that in 1910, the mobility per- scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 167 millage (as the sum of in-migration and out-migration) of Mheer was 14% higher than that of St Geertruid. In particular the in-migration to Mheer was higher: 77 emigrants per 1000 of the population in Mheer against 64 in St Geertruid. But the out-migration to St Geertruid was considerably lower than that to Mheer: 72 against 80 immigrants per 1000 of the 1910 population. Ten years later, mobility had increased strongly in both municipalities and Mheer showed only a higher permillage of in-migration. By 1930 mobility had declined in both municipalities again and St Geertruid almost caught up with Mheer as the permillages reached the levels of 124 and 127 respectively.114

170

150

130

110

90

Ten-yearly averages in 0/00 70

50 Mheer St Geertruid Mheer St Geertruid Mheer St Geertruid

1909 1920 1930

Immigration Emigration

Graph 26 Out-migration and in-migration in Mheer and St Geertruid 1910, 1920, 1930.

Regarding the circulation of inhabitants arriving and leaving the municipality pri- or to 1930, Mheer gives the impression of being slightly more dynamic than its neighboring municipality. This could imply that new outlooks on fertility regula- tion were introduced in Mheer. St Geertruid, on the other hand, might have been a more isolated community, where the population, as the social scientist Derksen expressed, “only rarely had contact with people with a different life philosophy; as a consequence it never occurred to them that there was an alternative.”115 Data on a later period show that mobility remained higher in Mheer than in St Geertruid.116

114 cbs municipal data Mheer 10B ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 115 Derksen (1994) 124. 116 cbs municipal data Mheer appendix 2 ’Vestiging en vertrek’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data St Geertruid, ibid. 168 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The two south Limburg municipalities showed small differences in their cul- tural characteristics that might have partly accounted for the deviant fertility behav- ior. Mheer had relatively more non-Catholic inhabitants that could have set an ex- ample with a lower fertility and perhaps shared information about effective meth- ods with Catholic inhabitants. The actual numbers concerned, however, were so few that the influence of other denominations can hardly have been significant. The mobility rates of the two municipalities are different too, particularly before 1930. These rates might indicate a slightly more dynamic population in Mheer with a big- ger chance to ‘import’ new ideas on contraceptive methods. However, compared to the socio-economic stimulus behind a lower fertility, the cultural causes do not con- vincingly explain demographic differences between Mheer and St Geertruid.

7.2 Roosteren and Ohe en Laak

While comparing graph 27 on the religious composition of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak with graph 25 on the situation in Mheer and St Geertruid, at first sight the for- mer two municipalities show more variations. Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, never- theless, were both mainly Catholic municipalities like Mheer and St Geertruid. Of the population of Ohe en Laak in 1909, 99.2% was Catholic; the municipality counted one Dutch Reformed and one orthodox Protestant. In Roosteren that year 99.7% of the population was Catholic, three inhabitants were members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In 1920 similar low numbers of ‘dissidents’ were recorded in these municipalities. By 1930 however, the proportion Dutch Re- formed in Roosteren had increased to 2.3%, which meant that among the 1012 inhabitants of the municipality, 29 were Protestant.117 Compared to Ohe en Laak that had only 5 ‘dissident’ inhabitants, this made a large difference: in Roosteren the group of Protestants was large enough to be visible in the Catholic community and might well have shown a different demographic behavior. Roosteren not only had a religiously varied population; its inhabitants were also more mobile. Different from Mheer and St Geertruid, the contrast between the out-migration and in-migration from and to Roosteren and Ohe en Laak only in- creased from 1909 onwards, as graph 28 shows. In 1909, the permillage of people migrating to and from Roosteren was almost twice as high as in Ohe en Laak (101.6 against 51.4) just like in 1920 (135.1 against 74.8), but in 1930 the mobility per- millage in Roosteren contrasted even more. In particular the in-migration to Roos- teren seems to have been higher than in Ohe en Laak.118

117 cbs municipal data Roosteren 8 ‘Indeeling der bevolking naar de kerkelijke gezindten volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. 118 cbs municipal data Roosteren 10B ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’ and cbs municipal data Ohe en Laak, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 169

100,0%

99,5%

99,0%

98,5%

98,0%

Percentages of total population 97,5%

97,0% Roosteren Ohe en Laak Roosteren Ohe en Laak Roosteren Ohe en Laak

1909 1920 1930

Roman Catholic Dutch Reformed orthodox Protestant different church affiliation no church affiliation

Graph 27 Religious composition Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909, 1920, 1930.

180

160

140

120

100

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60

Ten-yearly avergages in 0/00 40

20

0 Roosteren Ohe en Laak Roosteren Ohe en Laak Roosteren Ohe en Laak

1910 1920 1930

Immigration Emigration

Graph 28 Out-migration and in-migration in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1910, 1920, 1930. 170 mixing ovaries and rosaries

While comparing the religious composition and mobility of Roosteren with Ohe en Laak, it is clear that the cultural differences between the two municipalities, both in 1930 and before, were less subtle than the socio-economic ones. Although the populations of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak were both homogeneously Catholic, the former had 5 times as many members of the Dutch Reformed Church than the latter in 1930. At the same time, mobility was a lot higher in Roosteren than in Ohe en Laak. In particular in-migration might have brought inhabitants who were not obedient to the reproduction regulations of the Catholic Church and advocated a different ideal family size.

7.3 Grave and Escharen

The negative cases of Mheer and, in particular, Roosteren might have given an impression of the impact of religious diversity among the population even in mainly Catholic municipalities – but Grave does so much better (see graph 29). In 1930, 94.5% of the Grave population was Catholic. The remaining part of the population represented all other denominational categories: 3.9% of the popula- tion was Dutch Reformed, 0.4% was orthodox Protestant, 0.5% belonged to other Protestant denominations, 0.3% of the population was Jewish and a similar por- tion did not belong to any church. While considering the actual numbers of ‘dissidents’ in Grave, it is much easier to picture the impact of their presence and their different lifestyles. Of the 2945 inhabitants the municipality counted in 1930, 115 were Dutch Reformed, 12 ortho- dox Protestant, 15 were of a different Protestant denomination, 9 were Jewish and a similar number had no religious affiliation. In the neighboring municipality of Escharen, the population that year consisted of Catholics for 99.9%; only one member of the Dutch Reformed Church lived amidst the Catholics. Other years show similar differences between the two Noord-Brabant municipalities. Like in 1930, Grave in 1909 and 1920 counted slightly less than 5% non-Catholic inhabit- ants. The representation of the various ‘dissident’ denominations varied though; in 1909 the ‘negative case’ counted 22 Jewish inhabitants who at that time had their own synagogue in the town.119 The presence of non-Catholics in Grave was even more significant as half of the population of the municipality lived in the town of Grave whereas in Escharen, 72.7% of the population lived in scattered houses and the rest was divided over

119 cbs municipal data Grave 8 ‘Indeeling der bevolking naar de kerkelijke gezindten volgens de volkstellingen 1909-1930’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. See also Jan Bader, “Bekwame & rechtschapen mannen”: de geschiedenis van de joodse gemeenten in het Maasland, Oss (1796-1866), Lith (1809-1909), Grave (1832-1929) (Breda 1996). scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 171 three hamlets.120 With the concentration of most of the non-Catholics in the town of Grave, the number of ‘dissidents’ per head of the population must have been higher there. As to the institutions – the St. Catharina hospice has certainly only accommodated Catholic elderly people; so did the institutions for the blind. The psychiatric hospital took care of non-Catholics too, but the majority of the patients were Catholic.121 The penitentiary in Grave might have imprisoned several Protestant criminals, however, it primarily had a local function. At any rate, the institutionalized part of the population can never have accounted for the major part of the religious variation in the Grave population.

100%

99%

98%

97%

96%

Percentages of total population 95%

94% Grave Escharen Grave Escharen Grave Escharen

1909 1920 1930

Roman Catholic Dutch Reformed orthodox Protestant Jewish different church affiliation no church affiliation

Graph 29 Religious composition Grave and Escharen 1910, 1920, 1930.

Like the religious variation, the mobility in Grave and Escharen contrasted sharply in 1910, 1920 and 1930. Part of the out-migration and in-migration results of Grave as shown by graph 30, must have been caused by the coming and going of people in the institutions. The institutionalized, however, cannot account for all

120 cbs municipal data Grave 2 ‘Inwoneraantal naar bewoonde oorden en verspreide huizen op 31 dec. 1930’, cbs (1954) and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. 121 Roelofs (1938) 76. 172 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the differences with Escharen: the pattern in the development of the mobility is too similar in the two municipalities. Between 1910 and 1920, mobility increased in Grave as well as Escharen, and diminished again between 1920 and 1930. During the whole period, both the out- migration and in-migration were higher in Grave than in Escharen. In 1909, mo- bility in Grave was 191.8 and in Escharen only 60% of that. In 1920 when the mobility permillages had increased to the levels of 227.2 and 140.4 respectively, the population of Escharen still had only 60% of Grave’s mobility. Finally in 1930 Grave’s permillages had diminished to 203 and that of Escharen was slightly more than half of that, 104.122

250

200

150

100

Ten-yearly averages in 0/00 50

0 Grave Escharen Grave Escharen Grave Escharen

1909 1920 1930

Immigration Emigration

Graph 30 Out-migration and in-migration in Grave and Escharen 1910, 1920, 1930.

Like the socio-economic variables, the cultural ones provide a plausible cause for the demographic differences between Grave and Escharen. Though both Noord- Brabant municipalities had a mainly Catholic population, the relative and absolute numbers of members of other denominations in Grave – in particular members from the Dutch Reformed Church – must have resulted in a confrontation be- tween Catholics and non-Catholic lifestyles. The Catholic population in Grave might have had the chance to encounter different ideas regarding procreation and

122 cbs municipal data Grave 10B ‘Bevolkingstoeneming, geboorte, sterfte, mobiliteit in 0/00, 1881-1950’ and cbs municipal data Escharen, ibid. scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 173 marriage than those preached by their Church. The circulation of the population, caused by in-migration to and out-migration from the municipalities, was much bigger in Grave than in Escharen. This increased the chances of examples of devi- ating demographic behavior entering the municipality along with new inhabitants. As the presence of institutions primed the visits of Catholic as well as non-Catholic visitors and professionals from outside Grave, the institutionalized might have even stimulated the introduction of alternatives to the Catholic way of life.

8 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the mechanism behind the influence of religion on fer- tility on a meso level. It did so by bringing out the contrast between Catholic com- munities where certain demographic, socio-economic and cultural circumstances hampered or rather facilitated that influence. From the late nineteenth century onwards, social compartmentalization along religious and ideological lines consoli- dated the Church’s involvement with moral behavior. This pillarization process, however, developed locally in interaction with social, economic and cultural situa- tions. Pillarization as infrastructure for the enforcement of codes of conduct on Catholics worked out differently everywhere. The effectiveness of religious influ- ence on procreation and marriage, as a consequence, differed locally. The choice was made to analyze a selection of Catholic municipalities that is not statistically significant. The purpose of the research on this level was to show what municipal circumstances drove deviant or conventional fertility behavior of Cath- olics. Multivariate analyses already demonstrated significant correlation between the Catholic denomination and fertility behavior. This chapter shows the variation in the ‘confessionalism’ of Catholic reproduction and what differences in socio-eco- nomic and cultural contexts of municipalities might have caused this variation. The ‘negative case analysis’ offered the possibility to gain insight in circum- stances under which a municipal population showed a deviating fertility. In addi- tion, these results were compared with those of a municipality showing a ‘positive’ relation between the Catholic denomination and demographic behavior. So as to limit regional variations as much as possible, only municipalities were selected that were located next to each other. The 1933 House of Representatives election results of all municipalities in which Catholics formed more than 70% of the popu- lation were used to select case studies. The research aimed to reveal the nature of the ratios between the municipalities, indicating the gap between the success of Catholic pronatalism and the behavior of the believers. The selected ‘negative’ cases Mheer, Roosteren and Grave and the ‘positive’ cases St Geertruid, Ohe en Laak and Escharen have successfully illustrated what demographic, socio-eco- nomic and cultural circumstances could motivate obstinance to follow completely the Church’s demographic rules. 174 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Among both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases, Grave occupy an exceptional posi- tion. A quarter of its population was institutionalized and, therefore, blurred the analysis of municipal data. On the other hand, a large part of the institutionalized concerned children and was part of an age group that was excluded from the analy- sis anyway. In addition, the age composition of the population of Grave did not show any conspicuous features and the representation of various age groups was similar to that of Escharen. Moreover, the population development and infant mor- tality appeared to have been affected by the same cohort effects as Escharen. The effect of the presence of the institutionalized population, thus, was not reflected in the erasure of demographic characteristics of the municipality. The institutional- ized Grave population probably kept down fertility rates and the proportion mar- ried in the municipality. With so many Catholic institutions led by members of the clergy around, however, immoral behavior of the ‘regular’ population of Grave must have been keep an eye on more than in any other ‘negative’ case. From that perspective, the deviant character of the fertility behavior was even more striking. While comparing the nuptiality and fertility patterns and levels of the ’negative cases’ with those of the ‘positive cases’, the levels rather than the patterns appear to show the different influence of Catholicism. In 1930 marital fertility in Mheer was lower than in St Geertruid. In Mheer fertility increased moderately compared to St Geertruid, however, both municipalities showed the traditional connection between fertility and nuptiality. In Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, on the other hand, both populations showed ‘modern’ demographic behavior: fertility no longer seemed restrained by nuptiality. Between these two municipalities, the ‘negative’ case of Roosteren appeared to be at the forefront: the proportion married was higher in Roosteren than in Ohe en Laak. In Noord-Brabant, fertility levels in Grave between 1909 and 1930 were much lower than in Escharen – though results on this municipality are blurred by the presence of institutionalized inhabitants who did not have access to marriage and procreation. The analysis of demographic circumstances in the municipalities appeared only to enhance the deviating character of the ‘negative cases’ in comparison with the ‘positive cases’. The index numbers of the population development in Mheer and St Geertruid showed that the latter grew much faster and sharper between 1920 and 1930. In 1920 and even more so in 1930, the natural growth that caused the popula- tion increase was much higher in St Geertruid than in Mheer. With regard to the case of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, the ‘positive’ case showed a more rapid increase too: in 1909 and 1920 the natural growth of Ohe en Laak was twice as big as in Roosteren. Grave and Escharen showed the same pattern as the other cases: the population of Grave increased much less than in Escharen between 1909 and 1930. Though differences diminished over time – in 1909 the ‘positive case’ showed a natural growth 9 times as high as Grave – in 1930 it was still 3 times as high. Remarkable was that the balance between the male and female population in all three ‘negative’ cases showed a clear pattern between 1909 and 1930 whereas in scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 175 the ‘positive’ cases it did not. In Grave as well as in Roosteren, sex ratios became less uneven. With regard to Grave, this seems striking as between 1920 and 1930 nuptiality increased. Judging from the development in the sex ratios, the marriage market in the municipality became less tense during the decade before 1930; nev- ertheless, the proportion married only increased. In Roosteren, the pattern of the numerical balance between the sexes was even more incompatible as nuptiality in this ‘negative case’ increased during the whole of the period while the pressure to marry – as reflected in the declining sex ratios – waned. In the neighboring munici- pality of Mheer the sex ratios in those years became more uneven, causing in- creased social pressure for young and fertile women to marry. This pattern, how- ever, did not match the decline of the proportion married between 1909 and 1920 and is certainly not reflected in the rather stable fertility. In two of the three pairs of municipalities, infant mortality was higher in the ‘negative’ than in the ‘positive’ case. It is striking that in Mheer, infant mortality was much higher than in St Geertruid – of the fewer children that were born in 1930, less stayed alive. Apparently no need was felt to compensate for the extra loss of children with a higher fertility. In the case of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, the exact same pattern became apparent. In Grave and Escharen, on the other hand, infant mortality was lower in the ‘negative case’ than in the positive one – which means the Grave population did not favor an extra high marital fertility to achieve the desired family size. Hence, only in Grave the deviating fertility behavior might be partly explained by demographic circumstances. Socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities seemed to elucidate the fertility differences between the ‘negative’ and the ‘positive’ cases much better than demographic circumstances. In Mheer and Roosteren, relatively more men and women were employed in the industrial and the trade and services sector while in St Geertruid and Ohe en Laak agriculture still was the most important economic sector. In Grave, twice as many men worked in the industrial sector than in agricul- ture – giving evidence of the urbanized economy of the town of Grave rather than a ‘modern’ industrialized economy. Compared to the ‘positive’ cases, the ‘negative’ cases seemed to be more pros- perous and their populations, in general, must have had a higher social position. In Mheer and Grave, a higher proportion of the inhabitants paid income taxes and capital levies than in St Geertruid and Escharen and the average capital per tax- payer was higher as well. In Roosteren, more people were taxed than in Ohe en Laak too. Presuming that a high social standard correlated negatively with the employ- ment of women, the female labor participation reflected the prosperity in the ‘neg- ative’ cases too. In St Geertruid three times as many women between 15 and 64 years old were employed than in Mheer; in Escharen almost twice as many as in Grave. Roosteren and Ohe en Laak showed fewer differences, but still, the lower proportion of women who were employed were represented in all economic sec- 176 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tors and not just in agriculture. In the ‘positive’ cases of St Geertruid and Escharen, women filled more positions in the agricultural sector (in particular as heads of the companies) than in Mheer and Grave. The large amounts of women working on the farms in the ‘positive cases’ fit with the traditional image of the farm as a family enterprise where wives needed to work along with their husbands in order to get all the work done. Only Roosteren and Ohe en Laak did not show this contrast in the agricultural sector. Finally, the situation in the agricultural sector was used as an indicator of the municipalities’ prosperity. Farms in the ‘negative cases’ seemed to be more mod- ern than those in the ‘positive cases’. In Mheer, Grave and, to a lesser extent, Roosteren, the average size of the farmland was bigger than in St Geertruid, Escharen and Ohe en Laak. In addition, the farms in Mheer seemed to provide for more inhabitants than in St Geertruid. In Grave, agricultural companies appeared to provide for four times as many inhabitants in the municipality as in Escharen, however, the urbanized character of the former might blur comparisons in this field perhaps. In Roosteren, the more market-oriented character of the agricultural sector was not reflected in a lower number of farms per head of the population. With regard to socio-economic circumstances of the influence of religion on fertility, the ‘negative cases’ showed a more developed industrialization and a more prosperous population. At the same time the situation in the agricultural sector was much less traditional and more market-oriented – in particular in Mheer and Grave. The socio-economic circumstances in the ‘negative’ cases were much more modern than those in the ‘positive cases’ and favored family planning. The devel- opment of the industries and trade and services stimulated education and pro- fessionalization of future generations. Modernization in the agriculture made chil- dren’s contribution to the farm work less necessary. In Mheer, Roosteren and Grave, a high number of children was less profitable than in St Geertruid, Ohe en Laak and Escharen – socio-economic circumstances thus formed an important motive for the introduction of family planning. Apart from socio-economic drives, cultural factors have played an important role in determining the fertility characteristics of the Limburg and Noord Brabant municipalities. Compared to its neighboring municipality Ohe en Laak the ‘nega- tive’ case Roosteren had a larger community of members of the Dutch Reformed Church – who were the forerunners of the last phase of the demographic transition in the Netherlands. The introduction of family planning by the intake of migrants, that was much higher in Roosteren than in Ohe en Laak, might also have played a large role. Compared to these municipalities, the differences between the cultural circumstances in Mheer and St Geertruid was less obvious – the numbers of ‘dissi- dents’ were low in both municipalities and the mobility was equal too. Grave and Escharen, on the other hand, showed an even larger contrast in cultural character- istics than Roosteren and Ohe en Laak. The town of Grave had attracted a large Dutch Reformed community and even included orthodox Protestants, Jews and scaling down the religious determinant in the municipality 177 inhabitants without a church affiliation. Like in Roosteren, the circulation of the population was much higher in the ‘negative case’ of Grave than in the neighbor- ing ‘positive case’. The introduction of family planning and information about methods of birth control in Roosteren and Grave might well have been the result of the ‘import’ of different attitudes towards fertility, as well as the presence of other denominations who did not respect the reproductive regulations of the Catholic Church. In the mainly Catholic municipalities of Mheer, Roosteren and Grave, the Church exerted itself to enforce the ‘correct Catholic’ moral behavior probably just as much as in St Geertruid, Ohe en Laak and Escharen. The ‘input’ of the religious determinants was the same. In the ‘negative cases’, though, the deviating socio- economic and cultural circumstances scaled down the influence of the religious determinant. The particular characteristics of the ‘negative’ cases, whether socio- economic or cultural or even demographic, made obedience to the church rules concerning procreation and marriage unattractive to the level that most inhabit- ants of Mheer, Roosteren and Grave accommodated their fertility and nuptiality behavior and made them favorable to the circumstances. Research in this chapter thus showed the interplay of demographic, socio-economic and cultural variables that, to a greater or lesser extent, thwarted the religious determinants of fertility behavior – how the assessment of motives for fertility behavior came about on an individual level will be shown in the next chapter. In 1930, many more Catholics must have thwarted Church regulations regard- ing reproductive behavior than the inhabitants of the ‘negative’ cases. In Mheer, Roosteren and Grave, however, the demographic, socio-economic and cultural conditions were compelling to the extent that not only fertility behavior was adjusted but also the political conduct. The desertion of the Catholic party by the enfranchised citizens in Mheer, Roosteren and Grave was of a similar nature as the deviation in fertility behavior for which it served as a predictor. From the perspec- tive of the Roman Catholic Church, with their voting behavior and divergent fertil- ity the populations of the ‘negative cases’ rebelled against religious doctrines. From the point of view of the inhabitants of Mheer, Roosteren and Grave, their communities simply showed reasonable accommodation to the changing social, economic, cultural and, to a lesser extent, demographic circumstances in 1930. Chapter 4 “We put up with what we were told”

— Catholic women on the regulation of fertility

1 Aims of the chapter

When in the 1930s Raymond Pearl prepared a survey for his research on contra- ceptive efforts among the American population, he decided not to send any ques- tionnaires to Catholic hospitals.1 “The nursing staff of most such hospitals are composed of religious sisters. Many of the medical staff are Catholic in their faith. Our advice was that under these conditions a considerable proportion of Catholic women actually making contraceptive efforts would certainly deny the practice.”2 Pearl was not overanxious envisioning that Catholic nurses would use the answers of his respondents to reprimand any fertility behavior that did not match with the moral ethics of the Catholic Church. As representatives of the Church nuns, and priests even more so, in their contact with laymen supervised their moral behavior for their own good – committing a sin after all would affect a believer’s chances of eternal life. However, the ways the Church used to impose its moral doctrines on believers and to manage the regulation of its flock’s behav- ior, extended to direct interference by Church representatives. Patterns of inter- action or manipulation not only run between persons, or between the Church and persons, but also between the Church and the family and from these to social groups.3 This chapter deals with the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior on a micro level. First the doctrines of the Catholic Church that affected reproduc- tion behavior will be discussed. This exposition in paragraph 2 will include the doc- trines on sinning and confession with which Church gained insight into moral dis- obedience; the dogma’s regarding proper behavior of women in their position as mother, wife and sexual being and the value of the procreational aspect of sex. Sub- sequently, paragraph 3 deals with the way the Catholic doctrines affected fertility-

1 Raymond Pearl, The natural history of population (New York 1939). 2 Ibid, 235. 3 Derksen (1994). “we put up with what we were told” 179 related attitudes and practices of Catholics, like those concerning family planning, methods of birth control, sexuality and motherhood, as reflected in surveys pub- lished in the 1940s, 50s and 60s. The correlation found between socio-economic position, education and religiosity on the one hand and fertility-related decisions on the other, will make clear which part of the Catholic community was most likely to show most adherence to Catholic norms and values. In paragraph 4, analysis of letters by Catholic women on the way their faith influenced their fertility will show pathways via which the pronatalist ideology was imposed on believers. Not only the diverse ways the Church used to pressure its flock to obey sexual and marital doc- trines will be treated, but also considerations of fear, guilt and faith, the Catholic social environment and ignorance that motivated Catholic fertility behavior. Finally, in paragraph 5, the micro level study of religious determinants of Catholic fertility will be evaluated. Both in paragraph 3 and 4, the emphasis will lie on the 1940s, 50s and 60s dur- ing the fertility transition. The analysis of surveys in paragraph 3 aims at revealing how religious doctrines altered Catholic sexual and marital behavior rather than variations in this behavior in time and place. Besides, only in those decades schol- ars in Europe and the usa developed an interest in perspectives of Catholics on reproduction. In paragraph 4, Catholic women’s letters are used that mainly con- cern the 1940s, 50s and 60s. Also in this case, sources did not cover an earlier period of the period of national fertility decline. Moreover, in the context of the hierarchic Catholic pillar with its strong organizational network, there is little rea- son to assume big changes in the ways pronatalist ideology was enforced on believers. Before delving deeper into the way the Catholic Church regulated individual reproductive behavior, the following paragraph will illustrate how highly the Church valued respect for morals in that area. The restoration of the Dutch society after 1945 stimulated female labor participation. The consequential change in the social position of women put their duties to reproduce at risk – something that, according to the leadership of the Church, was much more important than the so- cial and economic depression, in spite of its magnitude.

1.1 The Vatican, morality and post-war restoration

After the Second World War the Netherlands was in a poor state. Some 230.000 civilians were killed during the war; many were physically or mentally injured. Par- ticularly in the western part of the country, that had to wait an extra winter for liber- ation, the health of the population was poor. Parts of the country, like Walcheren in the province of Zeeland, were flooded and various city centers, for example that of Middelburg, Nijmegen and Rotterdam, had been bombed into ruins. Hundreds of thousands of houses were destroyed or damaged; at the start of 1946 the housing 180 mixing ovaries and rosaries

stock was 350.000 short – while the birth rate increased that year from 240 in 1945 to 320 children per 1000 inhabitants.4 The economic problems were impressive: based on the price level of 1945 the loss of profits was estimated 25 million Dutch guilders. Trade had closed down; many products like paper and glass were in short supply. Industries were inopera- tive after the theft of complete inventories and material. Agriculture had to contend with a decimated livestock. The production level in the mining industry was only a quarter of what it had been in 1940. The amount of counterfeit money in circula- tion called for a currency reform.5 The infrastructure was heavily damaged: the rail- way system was ruined after the robbery of almost all trains, carriages, wagons and rails; roads were damaged and more than half of all motor vehicles and bicycles were stolen; harbors and locks like those in IJmuiden were destroyed; more than half of the fleet had disappeared. Dozens of telephone exchanges were inoperative. The country was robbed of over 145.000 kilo’s gold and a large section of its art treasures. A month after the Netherlands were liberated from the occupation by Nazi Ger- many, Queen Wilhelmina appointed a temporary cabinet formed by social demo- crats and Catholics that faced the task of restoring the economy, preparing the country for elections, negotiating with the colony of Indonesia that in August 1945 proclaimed independence, organizing the purge and trial of collaborators and restoring the country’s municipal and provincial administration.6 After 1945, education and job opportunities increased fast for both men and women. As families including mothers were called to aid in the economic restora- tion of the country, the social position of women and the mutual relations of the sexes started to change. The Vatican observed these developments in alarm. In 1947, Pope Pius xii argued that women were to contribute to the post-war recon- struction of their country by model behavior, prayer and ‘silent sacrifice’; adminis- trative and political activities had to remain exceptional.7 The pope additionally emphasized that women who participated in politics had to devote themselves to the well-being of other women: the care for the dignity of girls, wives and mothers and the preservation of the care for husband, children and the housekeeping as the most important duties for women. Pius xii was in favor of emancipation of

4 Onno Boonstra, ‘Tussen droom en daad: vrouwen over ideaal en praktijk van geboorte- beperkende maatregelen binnen het huwelijk, een enquête uit het begin van de jaren ’50 van de twintigste eeuw’, Ex Tempore/Verleden Tijdschrift 24 (2005), forthcoming. 5 See Parlement en politiek, ‘Mr.Dr. P. Lieftinck’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.parlement.com/9291000/biof/00816 6 See Parlement en politiek, ‘Kabinet Schermerhorn-Drees (1945-1946)’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g0cgiy3f 7 Pius xii, Akten van Z.H. Pius XII (Antwerpen 1947) 38-49. “we put up with what we were told” 181 women as women: a kind of ‘Christian feminism’, the social scientist Derksen pointed out, that was also reflected in the Catholic women’s movement.8 The European countries that were recovering from the Second Word War were additionally reminded of the traditional Catholic ideas on female sexuality and fer- tility by Pius’ successor. Paul vi in 1966 felt it necessary to amplify the pronounce- ments of the second Vatican council in a speech.9 Women were urged to observe the sacral character of marriage both as wife and mother: in short, they were pressed to take the responsibility to refrain from birth control, to accept their posi- tion in the family and to keep to motherhood instead of paid work. Women were to apply themselves to these tasks, remain chaste and moral and be a model to others in their behavior.10 Although Humanae Vitae, issued in July 1968 by Pope Paul vi, has become famous for its resolute rejection of all ‘modern’ means of birth control, in particu- lar the pill, in essence it was once more a confirmation of the traditional principles that made contraceptives immoral. According to the Vatican, birth control had serious and unwelcome consequences. In particular ‘artificial contraceptives’, often used to refer to all methods forbidden by the Church, would have “negative effects, both on the individual and in society”.11 Hence the encyclical was hardly trail-blazing in its absolute refusal of approval of new methods of birth control: Humanae Vitae reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s condemnation of all these prac- tices with the exception of total or temporary abstinence.12 The fact that the Vatican repeated the Church’s official attitude on procreation and marriage in a time during which social, economic and cultural developments resulted in new behavioral standards, proves how it regarded these dogma’s as the backbone of the community of believers. According to the Church, the directives on fertility and marriage behavior were the only right consequence of its doctrines on ‘the miracle of life’.13 The following paragraph will discuss these doctrines as well as the rules regulating reproduction that followed from them.

8 See Marjet Derks and Marijke Huisman, ‘Edelmoedig, fier en vrij’: katholieke arbeiders- vrouwen en hun beweging in de twintigste eeuw (Hilversum 2002) and Marjet Derks, Catharina Halkes and Annelies van Heyst (ed.), ‘Roomse dochters’: katholieke vrouwen en hun beweging (Baarn 1992). 9 Derksen (1994) 33. 10 See Katholiek archief: studies van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut 21 (1966) 840-847. 11 Gail Shea, Thomas Burch, Gustavo Perez, Miriam Ordonez, Joseph van Kemenade, Jan Hutjes and Andre Hellegers, ‘Catholic parish priests and birth control: a comparative study of opinion in Colombia, the United States and the Netherlands’, Studies in family planning 2 (1971) 121-136, 127-128. 12 Ibid, 128. 13 Katholiek archief 23 (1968) 813-815 182 mixing ovaries and rosaries

2 Affecting fertility: the doctrines of the Catholic Church

As McQuillan has underlined in his 2004 article on religious determinants of fertil- ity behavior, Catholic values directly and indirectly affected fertility behavior. Among regulations directly influencing reproduction were the ban on contracep- tives and the prohibition of abortion; among indirect influences the ban on sex out- side matrimony and refusal of sex within marriage.14 Another important stimulus for fertility were the Church’s eulogies of the large family. “Large families are most blessed by God and specially loved and prized by the Church as its most precious treasures...,” Pius xii said in 1958. “Where you find families of great numbers, they point to: the physical and moral health of a Christian people; a living faith in God and trust in His Providence: the fruitful and joyous holiness of Catholic marriage."15 In this paragraph, the Catholic doctrines from which directives on fertility behavior stemmed, will be discussed. Subsequently, 2.1 will give an account of the religious value of confession and absolution that provided the Church with a per- fect system to track and punish disobedience to reproduction directives. As 2.2 will show, ideas on the separate calling of men and women resulted in detailed task specifications for women as wives and mothers. Finally, 2.3 will demonstrate how, while procreation was stressed as the most important purpose of sexuality, most methods of birth control were prohibited by the Catholic Church.

2.1 Sin, Church and forgiveness

The human being is supposed to be tempted to violate divine commandments and moral rules on a daily basis; the Church is the only authority that can provide a Catholic believer with the remission of these sins. Because a ‘bad record’ during life is supposed to prevent access to eternal life in heaven (temporarily or com- pletely), regular absolution, granted by a priest as a representative of the Church, is very important. For the majority of the Catholics up to the 1970s, this meant they frequently went to confess. In many cases, the same priest would be confided in each time, and in due course he was likely to find a pattern in the wickedness that tempted a believer. A woman who confessed to have practiced birth control with one of the ‘illicit’ methods for example, could easily be checked on this behavior by the father confessor during a later confession or by him paying her a house visit. The system of sinning and the granting of forgiveness by the Church was perfect: either the believer had to confess and risk punishment or not tell and risk eternal damnation.

14 McQuillan (2004) 29. 15 Pius xii, ‘The Large Family Address to the Associations of Large Families of Rome and Italy, Jan. 19, 1958’, The Pope Speaks 4 (1958) 363-364. “we put up with what we were told” 183

The gravity of a sin can vary. The New Catholic encyclopedia explains that although the words ‘mortal’ and ‘venal’ in connection with sin are not found in the Scriptures, “the distinction between the two types of sin is clearly affirmed”.16 Based on various bible passages, the Catholic Church appointed sins that exclude from the ‘divine kingdom’ and sins that do not exclude from it. By committing cer- tain ‘mortal’ sins, like not attending Mass and adultery, one is believed to lose one’s salvation entirely – unless one repents, confesses and is forgiven. Other sins, called ‘venal sins’, are believed to affect to a lesser extent the chances of going to heaven in the hereafter. In the process of determining to what category a sin belongs, a priest would ideally not only judge what was done but also take into account the cir- cumstances under which it was committed and the sinner’s purpose in doing it. Yet a motive does not change the moral character of the sin committed; it might well bring to light that another moral wrongdoing has taken place. For instance, stealing a sacred object from church is both an act of theft and an act of sacrilege. According to the Catholic Church, the purpose of sexual intercourse in natural law is procreation; contraceptive sex, which deliberately blocks that purpose, is hence condemned as a violation of natural law – in Dutch referred to as onkuisheid tegen de natuur, lewdness against nature. The practice of most means of birth con- trol is consequently regarded by the Church as committing a mortal sin. According to the Catechism, the survey of the principles of the Church’s doctrines, coitus interruptus even belongs to the revenge-calling sins for its wickedness is supposed to call out to heaven for revenge.17 The faithful Catholics were not only stimulated to respect Church directives regarding reproduction by the prospect of being punished in the hereafter if they disregarded moral behavior. A positive stimulus to live in accordance with Church discipline was the fact that, the Catholic Church preached, human beings were cre- ated by God to honor and serve him, and to be happy in that way, at first on earth and later on in heaven. Among other aspects of a social position, the female sex was supposed to imply a different calling than male one. Because of her natural gift to bear children, the Church has emphasized that motherhood is the most important goal of a woman’s life. As the following paragraph will show, the Catholic maternal ideology is closely related to matters of sexuality, marriage and procreation and has resulted in a detailed description of the task of women.

16 New Catholic encyclopedia 13 (Detroit 2003) 152-155. For ‘mortal’ sins see Ephesians 5.5 and Galatians 5.19-21; for venal sins see James 3.2; 1 John 1.8 and Ecclesiastes 7.21. 17 Kerklaan (1987) 87. 184 mixing ovaries and rosaries

2.2 Marriage, parenthood and the gendered division of tasks

As marriage was after all supposed to be an establishment of God, the Church had a good reason to deeply involve in future husbands and wives.18 Marriage was the institution that had to preserve and expand God’s realm on earth and, in addition, the Catholic Church.19 As the accomplished task of fertile love, the primary pur- pose of marriage was procreation – and consequently the raising of children.20 The ‘mutual help’ spouses are supposed to give one another formed the second object- ive of marriage.21 Like marriage, the Catholic Church regarded the family as a God-given and ‘natural’ institution. Children were to be raised from the perspec- tive that they were the continuation of their parents’ ideals in life. Unpretentious- ness and austerity had to be pursued; amusement like dancing, sports and the movies were allowed as long as they did not threaten the unity of the family. During engagement, the future spouses prepared for marriage. The ‘spiritual’ love had to be developed and the future bride was to train virtues like piety, the will- ingness to make sacrifices, self-control and patience. Parents, the Church and other qualified people had to make sure that the engaged couple would not yet give in to the temptation to practice ‘physical love’.22 If the couple was qualified to get married, meaning they knew the catechism, they separately received ‘marital infor- mation’ (on sex) after which their union was solemnized during a Church service. According to the Church, a Catholic marriage could not be annulled because of the Biblical text on the inseparability of something God has joined.23 In exceptional cases, a marriage could be pronounced invalid by an ecclesiastical court if it was proven that the marriage was not yet ‘consummated’ – if the spouses had not yet had sex. Remarriage was never possible, though, only a ‘legal separation’ from for- mer spouses.24 In marriage, both spouses had special duties and responsibilities that, together, were supposed to form the structure for a healthy family life. The church pictured the husband as the loving head of the household; regularly drawing the comparison with the way Jesus was supposed to love the Church, expecting him to

18 See Westhoff (1986) 34-42 and Jan M. Hutjes, Katholieken over geboortenregeling en sexu- aliteit (Nijmegen 1974). 19 Bots and Noordman (1981) 20. See also Papal Encyclicals Online, ‘Casti Connubii: Encyclical of Pope Pius xi on Christian marriage’ (December 31, 1930). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius11/P11CASTI.HTM 20 Angelo Somers and Frans van Poppel, ‘Het vergaan der huwelijkskuisheid: de invloed van priesters op de geboorteregeling onder katholieken in Nederland in de periode 1935- 1970’, Mens en Maatschappij 4 (2003) 300-330, 301; Hutjes (1974) 14. 21 Shea et al. (1971) 126. 22 Bots and Noordman (1981) 19-20. 23 See Mark 10:9. 24 Kerklaan (1987) 171-172. “we put up with what we were told” 185 be a natural leader and (source of) inspiration. In her position as a wife, a woman was subservient to her husband and ought to pay him natural respect. She was to take care of her husband, share his tensions and serve him both mentally and physically.25 As a mother she had to look after the household and had to pass on the religious and moral values of the Catholic Church to her children.26 The God- given talents of the female – a spirit of sacrifice, serving love, charm and affluent emotions – were supposed to serve to make the best of her motherhood. Bearing children was supposed to be the first and natural function of the female. Even if a woman was not able to have children, she could fulfill her duty as a mother by being a ‘spiritual mother’ and keep people on the straight, religious (Catholic) path.27 Preparing for Catholic motherhood started with the proper upbringing of girls. Religious education, strong authority and a healthy family life were the mainstay of the Catholic upbringing.28 A mother was primarily responsible for teaching her daughters the practical side of motherhood and marriage by involving them in housekeeping. In the same way, girls’ education was directed towards the perfec- tion of a girls’ nature and developing her at her own speed. As both the nature and the development of boys and girls was different both sexes required a different pace of didactics and a different emphasis on certain subjects – after all a girl was expected to become a mother and housewife which required different skills. For that reason, the Catholic Church was pre-eminently an advocate of gender-sepa- rated education.29 The Church approved of the Middelbare Meisjes School (mms), a girls’ high school with a curriculum that was adapted to the woman’s psyche and aptitude, rather than the schools with gender-equal education programs. Practical courses in pedagogy, hygiene and simple bookkeeping were offered instead of nat- ural sciences and mathematics.30 The mms was a school for middle- and upper class Catholic girls. Lower-class girls went to schools for advanced elementary edu- cation (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs or mulo) or to domestic science schools (Huishoudschool) of which Catholics girls constituted 93% of the pupils in 1930.31 The intellectualism of universities was not supposed to be proper for any class of

25 Ibid. Papal Encyclicals Online, ‘Casti Connubii: Encyclical of Pope Pius xi on Christian marriage’ (December 31, 1930). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.papalencyclicals. net/Pius11/P11CASTI.HTM 26 Bots and Noordman (1981) 27-28. 27 Ibid, 16. 28 See Michel van der Plas, Uit het rijke roomsche leven: een documentaire over de jaren 1925- 1935 (Utrecht 1966). 29 Bots and Noordman (1981) 32 and cbs, De ontwikkeling van het onderwijs in Nederland (Den Haag 1966) 69. 30 Bots and Noordman (1981) 32-33. 31 Ibid, 34-35. 186 mixing ovaries and rosaries

girl – hence for decades the proportion of female students remained much lower than that of other religious denominations.32 Like too much education, work was regarded as an unsuitable activity for women, as it meant that a woman had less energy for motherhood and the proper raising of her children.33 When after the legal emancipation of the Dutch woman in the 1920s even the Catholic women’s organizations approved of labor participa- tion of Catholic girls, it was still underlined that women were not qualified for all labor.34 Suitable female labor participation consisted of jobs in which a woman could express her female talents, for example in the field of childcare, hospital nursing and education – occupations in which women who were not (yet) mothers could express their talents. The female abilities were supposed to make a woman especially qualified for activities that required dedication, human emotion, sensi- tivity to sorrow and similar requirements, but at the same time they set her bound- aries. Women were supposed to be more dependent on their inner (emotional) life than men, which made her less capable of commanding others and of holding positions on boards. The psyche of the woman was regarded as ‘geared’ to do something else than working – and not just by the (male) Church leadership.35 Indeed, the Dutch Catholic Women’s League demanded more appreciation of the labor participation of women, but only for the unmarried ones. When in 1935 the Catholic secretary of state Romme introduced a bill in the parliament that prohib- ited labor for married women, he was given the full support of the Dutch Catholic Women’s League.36 In the course of the twentieth century and particularly after the Second World War women were increasingly attracted by the expanding labor market. As a result, a growing number of Dutch Catholic organizations turned to employed Catholic girls to check on their morality and the extent to which their working activities remained in the field of their feminine talents.37 At the same time an expanding amount of advisory literature had to ensure the quality of Catholic motherhood and not only set forth the characteristics of a successful mother but also emphasized the Church’s valuation of maternity.38 After all, if women were changing their life goals the consequences reached far beyond their own lives: their fixed position in the

32 Ibid, 37. In the year 1929-1930, only 13.1% of the female students were Roman Catholic. 33 Ibid, 134. 34 See Derks and Huisman (2002) and Derks (1992). 35 Johannes Sassen, De Katholieke encyclopaedie 23 (Amsterdam 1936) 702. 36 Schoot-Uiterkamp (1978). 37 See Annemieke van Drenth, ‘‘Twee rozenhoedjes in de fabriek’: katholieke zorg om een betwiste vrouwelijke identiteit’, Annelies van Heijst and Marjet Derks (ed.), Terra incognita: historisch onderzoek naar katholicisme en vrouwelijkheid (Kampen 1994) and Westhoff (1996) 203-279. 38 See Dymphna van Berkel, Moederschap tussen zielzorg en psychohygiëne: katholieke des- kundigen over voortplanting en opvoeding 1945-1970 (Assen 1990). “we put up with what we were told” 187 family was linked with the preservation of that mainstay of society. Small wonder, then, that the Catholic Church developed a specified set of aims regarding marriage as the one and only legal setting for procreation and family life. As the following paragraph will show, though, the emphasis on motherhood, the family and the reproductive aspect of marriage did all but lead to a positive approach to sexuality.

2.3 Sexuality versus procreation

Catholic theology promoted high fertility through the fact that both spouses were entitled to demand sex.39 In reality, particularly women were taught that they were not allowed to refuse their husband sexual intercourse.40 Together with the pro- creational purpose of marriage, the prohibition of contraceptives and the submis- sion of the woman to the man these values for marital life formed the driving force behind the Catholic pronatalist pressure on couples, and women in particular.41 In December 1930 Pope Pius xi issued the encyclical Casti Connubii (‘On Christian Marriage’) in which both doctrines on the procreative goal of marriage and the prohibition of contraceptives were expressed.42 Like marriage, the aim of sex was to procreate. Both sexuality and procreation were institutionalized in mar- riage: without it they could not be performed. Discussing sexuality either in education or during upbringing was directed towards the acquirement of chastity. Immorality was a mortal sin and covered sex- ual desires as well as the stimulation and practicing of sexual activities outside wedlock. In this way, not only adultery, rape and incest were mortal sins but also all other sexual activities that were not regarded as ‘true-to-nature’, like masturbation, artificial fertilization and homosexuality. Desiring let alone practicing these sexual activities showed that a Catholic was not able to control him- or herself and that the sin was committed consciously.43 In addition, devout Catholics were to watch more ‘subtle’ ways of sinning: a chaste woman was not only expected to remain a virgin until her marriage but neither to have aroused sexual feelings in a man by touching or kissing him, looking at him in a certain way or by discussing certain matters. Women were not expected to experience sexual feelings like sexual gratification or eroticism. In the light of her function as a mother, the woman had to take care that sex was only practiced for procreation.44 She was expected to be better at that than her ‘lustful’ husband. Hence, the message of the Catholic Church for women

39 Bots and Noordman (1981) 20, McQuillan (2004) 29. 40 Kerklaan (1987) 71-72. 41 Bots and Noordman (1981) 21, Sassen 23 (1936) 740. 42 See also July 15 2004, ‘On Christian Marriage’, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/ Pius11/P11CASTI.HTM 43 Bots and Noordman (1981) 22. 44 Ibid, 23. 188 mixing ovaries and rosaries

was quite paradoxical: on the one hand women did not count in matters of sexual- ity whereas on the other they had to watch the morality of themselves, their hus- band and their children. Mary, the mother of the messiah who even in a 1981 publi- cation of the Roermond bishop was held exemplary for women, in this regard was also a rather difficult role model.45 After all, Mary supposedly managed to conceive without the ‘stain’ of original sin and is believed to still have been a virgin before, during, and after the conception and birth of her divine son.46 The eulogium of the large family by the Catholic Church was a logical extension of the aversion to contraception.47 As the institute of marriage was divine and its purpose was to reproduce, family planning violated the holy matrimony – and did not contribute to the sensus catholicus, a Catholic majority in population.48 The Church drew distinctions though between the various means and methods of birth control. Abstinence from sex (general or periodical) was not forbidden because it involved a ‘natural’ way to limit the number of children instead of a human obstruction of fertilization – but still conflicted with the purpose of marriage as well as with the task of motherhood for women and threatened to stimulate an indifferent attitude towards procreation on the side of the parents.49 Periodical ab- stention was officially permitted by Pius xii in 1952 – but only under certain condi- tions that had to be checked with a priest.50 Poverty was not necessarily an accept- able motivation to get permission to practice family planning, but when for exam- ple another pregnancy would endanger the health of the mother and thus the upbringing of the children, a couple – if both agreed – could get permission to prac- tice periodical abstention.51 Withdrawal during sex or coitus interruptus was never allowed because of the Biblical condemnation of the spilling of semen.52 Absolutely forbidden were ‘appliance’ methods like abortion, the condom, the intra-uterine

45 Derksen (1994) 32. See also Joannes M. Gijsen, In het spoor van Maria: vrouwen in Lim- burg in de 19e en 20ste eeuw en hun betekenis voor Kerk en maatschappij: moeder Clara Fey, moeder Maria Stollenwerk en moeder Josefa Stenmanns, moeder Maria Teresa van de heilige Jozef, dr. Edith Stein/zuster Teresia Benedicta van het Kruis (Roermond 1991). 46 Catholic Encyclopedia, ‘The Blessed Virgin Mary’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15464b.htm; see also ‘Virgin Birth of Chirst’ (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15448a.htm 47 Judith Blake, ‘Catholicism and fertility: on attitudes of young Americans’, Population and Development Review 10 (1984) 329-340, 329; see also Judith Blake, ‘The Americanization of Catholic reproductive ideals’, Population Studies 20 (1966) 27-45. 48 Bots and Noordman (1981) 24. 49 Ibid, 23, Kerklaan (1987) 84-85, 89 and 107-108. 50 Somers and Van Poppel (2003), Noonan (1965) 444-445. 51 Sassen 23 (1936) 431 and Bots and Noordman (1981) 24. 52 See Genesis 38:8-10 and Deuteronomy 23:1. See also Gigi Santow, ‘Coitus interruptus and the control of natural fertility’, Population Studies 49 (1995) 19-43 and ‘Catholic Ans- wers’, ‘Contraception and Sterilization’ (August 10, 2004). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.catholic.com/library/Contraception_and_Sterilization.asp “we put up with what we were told” 189 device, sterilization, the diaphragm and the pill, methods that were successively developed during the twentieth century.53 The allowed methods of birth control, periodical and general abstinence, were not efficient means to practice family planning. Complete abstention required full cooperation and endorsement from both partners. The success of the practice of periodical abstention depended on the calculation of a woman’s ovulation (which in many cases required a doctor) and the strictly keeping to abstention in fertile periods – and even then the method could fail. As a result, a considerable propor- tion of the Catholics practiced coitus interruptus that was often referred to in popu- lar speech as ‘leaving the Church before the gospel’ (voor het zingen de kerk uit)–so before the sermon and the blessing. Others, in fear of committing this mortal sin, claimed that ‘God’s water has to run over God’s field’ (Gods water moet over Gods akker lopen) and did not practice any birth control. During pillarization, the regulation of reproductive behavior by the Catholic Church was successful. Most Catholics adopted moral directives and accepted Church interference with their private affairs, like sexuality and family life, without question. Catholic women’s organizations, for example, not only advocated that giving birth and raising children was a duty for women, but also a ‘right’– after all, without that a woman did not admit to her nature and could not reach happiness. The Dutch Catholic Women’s League, consequently, called on their members to take a firm line against the Neo Malthusian league by boycotting shops selling con- doms or attempting to change the mind of people who were in favor of family plan- ning.54 How successful Catholic pronatalist indoctrination was, is demonstrated by the deviating opinions on fertility-related matters as recorded by numerous sur- veys during the transition period, as will be shown in the next paragraph.

3 Internalizing doctrines: Catholic attitudes to family planning, contraceptives, sexuality and motherhood

During the 1950s and 60s, Beatrijs, a magazine for Catholic women published between 1939 and 1967, still regarded the topic of family planning too awkward to discuss.55 Although during the 1950s ‘personal matters’ increasingly came to the notice of the magazine, for example in articles by psychologists with special atten-

53 Bisschoppelijk schrijven over de abortus provocatus (Heemstede 1971) and Wilhelm van der Marck, Liefde en vruchtbaarheid: aktuele vragen over geboorteregeling (Roermond 1964) 23-25. 54 Kerklaan (1987) 26. 55 Marloes Hülsken, ‘Vrouwenbladen als zedenhervormers? Beatrijs, weekblad voor de katholieke vrouwen 1939-1967’, Margreet Hagdorn and Angelie Sens (ed.), Van zeep tot soap: continuïteit en verandering in geïllustreerde vrouwentijdschriften (Amsterdam 2004) 54-67. 190 mixing ovaries and rosaries

tion to the problems of young women, Beatrijs remained pervaded by the tradition- al Catholic ideology on sexuality and motherhood. Large families, though never considered self-evident, were frequently a subject of report and treated with respect and awe; migration instead of birth control was suggested as the solution for the overpopulation; problems concerning pregnancies in general and unwanted ones in particular were not discussed. And although motherhood was depicted as hard work, it was clearly regarded as the most beautiful task in a woman’s life. During the late 1960s the magazine promoted the contribution of men to the household and child care without affecting their position as the authoritarian head of the household.56 While Beatrijs stiffly ignored the introduction of the ‘lynesterol’ birth control pill by Organon in 1963, the interest of researchers in fertility increased as the birth rates in most industrialized (i.e. more developed) countries declined.57 Studies indicated that even though actual differences in family size between denomina- tions disappeared during the 1960s and 70s, Catholic couples still deviated in their ideas on what a ‘proper’ family ought to look like. The influence of religion on ideas about fertility appeared to be stubborn; surveys and interviews on different scales were used to unravel the way Catholic norms regarding fertility and mar- riage had become intertwined with broader social values. Aim of this paragraph is to show the way Church reproductive rules altered fer- tility-related attitudes of Catholics, which in their turn resulted in certain demo- graphic behavior. Research results in the area mainly concern the 1940s, 50s and 60s during the fertility transition and originate from the Netherlands as well as from other European countries and the usa. In 3.1 will be shown how, even during the 1950s and 60s when Catholic fertility rates declined, Catholics in Europe and the usa were still found to desire more children than other denominations and to hesitate using borth control. Furthermore, Catholics differed in the methods of birth control used and in the pace with which they adopted contraceptives that were prohibited by the Church, as will be demonstrated in 3.2. The effects of the indoctrination are also shown by the sexual experiences of Catholics, discussed in 3.3, that deviated from other denominations. Subsequently, 3.4 will treat the analy- sis of in-depth interviews with Catholic women that has revealed the most impor- tant elements of the motherhood ideology. Finally, in 3.5, variation in obedience to Church reproductive rules among Catholics will be discussed as well as the factors (socio-economic position, education and religiosity) that caused the diversion.

56 Ibid, 61-62. 57 See Simon Szreter, Robert Nye and Frans van Poppel, ‘Fertility and contraception dur- ing the demographic transition: qualitative and quantitative approaches’, Journal of interdis- ciplinary history 34 (2003) 1141-154. “we put up with what we were told” 191

3.1 Persisting in deviance: desired family size and family planning

Shortly after the Second World War, research both in Europe and the usa indi- cated that fertility behavior of Catholics was changing. In 1950 and 1951, a commis- sion established to study the circumstances under which the birth rate changed sent nearly a thousand questionnaires to women from eleven municipalities sur- rounding large Dutch cities who, for public inspection, had indicated at the Coun- try Clerk’s Office that they intended to get married.58 In the mainly Catholic south of the Netherlands, women indicated to desire just three children or less because of financial problems, the wish to give children a good education, the housing short- age, overpopulation and lessons learned from being raised in a big family.59 In Great Britain, a 1949 report on family limitation by the Royal Commission on Population showed an increase in the use of birth control amongst Catholics – though it never reached the Protestant level.60 In the usa, the 1970 national Fertil- ity Study revealed a considerable increase in the use of contraception before the first pregnancy among Catholic women married during the 1960s.61 In spite of the spotted transformation in Catholic fertility, however, due to the moral restrictions of their faith Catholics in Europe and the usa still wished more children than members of other denominations. Dutch Women in the Catholic towns of Tilburg, Eindhoven and Nijmegen desired more children and on average wanted them sooner after their marriage than female inhabitants of Utrecht, Haar- lem, Groningen, Arnhem and Enschede where liberal Protestants constituted the largest denomination.62 A 1958 national probability sample among adults in West- ern Germany showed that Catholics expected, desired and idealized more children than Protestants: the mean expected family size was about 15% higher for Catholics (2.4) than for Protestants (2.1) while those with no religion wished fewer children than either of the denominational groups.63 A decade later, a survey among 1000

58 About a quarter of the questionnaires returned, although from the cities in Noord- Brabant a lower percentage was sent back. A.E. Diels, Opvattingen van ondertrouwde vrouwen omtrent de grootte van haar toekomstig gezin part 1 Amsterdam, Rotterdam, ’s Gravenhage (Am- sterdam 1951) and A.E. Diels, Opvattingen van ondertrouwde vrouwen omtrent de grootte van haar toekomstig gezin part 2 Arnhem, Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Haarlem, Nijmegen, Til- burg, Utrecht (Amsterdam 1953). 59 Diels (1953) 97-101. 60 The survey was performed among 11.000 women. E. Lewis-Faning (ed.), Papers of the Royal commission on population volume 1: Report on an enquiry into family limitation and its influence on human fertility during the past fifty years (London 1949). 61 Ronald Rindfuss and Charles Westoff, ‘The initiation of contraception’, Demography 11 (1974) 75-87. 62 Diels (1953) 52-53. 63 Ronald Freedman, Gerhard Baumert and Martin Bolte, ‘Expected family size and fam- ily size values in West Germany’, Population Studies 13 (1959) 136-150, there 144. 192 mixing ovaries and rosaries

southern usa high school students indicated that, despite being born during the pe- riod when Catholic fertility was declining, Catholics students still wanted more chil- dren than members of other denominations.64 Even as late as 1980, a survey of 58.000 students of high schools in the whole of the usa showed Catholic youths even then still “expect larger families, rate having children as more important, are more traditional in defining the maternal role, and know less about birth control”.65 In addition to a different ideal family size, family planning still was not as com- mon among Catholics as among other denominations. In 1949 and 1950, inter- views with 700 Dutch married women about their attitudes towards the practice of birth control showed that Catholics were less likely to intend to practice family planning.66 Of the respondents who had never planned to practice birth control before their marriage and never started to use it during their marriage, 20% were Catholic and 7% devout Catholic (measured by whether or not the respondent con- fessed with Easter). Of the respondents who never intended to practice birth con- trol but started family planning after they got married, 16% was Catholic and 4% devoutly so. Only 7% of the women who had planned to use birth control already before their marriage and indicated to have done so were Catholic but none were devout.67 Remarkable was that respondents of all categories intended to have fewer children than their mothers.68 A birth control survey among over 6000 married and unmarried women in England in the 1950s, part of a research project led by Eustace Chesser of the Eng- lish Research Council into Marriage and Human Relationships, had outcomes similar to the Dutch research.69 Apart from a rather Freudian interest in the way in which the respondents had experienced their youth – among Catholics a much higher percentage of ‘unhappy youths’ was counted than among any other denom- ination – the research mainly focused on sexual and marital accounts.70 More than half of the Catholic respondents declared not to practice any birth control; a much higher portion than among Church of England members (31%), non-conformists (21%) and those without religious affiliation (25%). Less than a decade later, a sur-

64 Susan Gustaves and Charles Nam, ‘The formation and stability of ideal family size among young people’, Demography 7 (1970) 43-51. 65 Blake (1984) 338. 66 Of the 2300 forms sent to doctors, 766 were returned. A.E. Diels and Sjoerd Groen- man, ‘Gesprekken met getrouwde vrouwen omtrent geboorteregeling’, Sociaal-weten- schappelijke verkenningen: uitgave bij gelegenheid van het 15-jarig bestaan van het Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek van het Nederlandse Volk (Assen 1957) 98-109. See also Boonstra (2004). 67 Diels and Groenman (1957) 99-100. 68 Ibid, 101. 69 18.000 Forms were sent to general medical practitioners all over England, 6251 com- plete questionnaires returned. Eustace Chesser, The sexual, marital and family relationships of the English woman (London 1956) 12-13. 70 Ibid, 265-268. “we put up with what we were told” 193 vey among 3000 single and ever-married men and women in Great Britain con- firmed that Catholics and Protestants from the same marriage cohort showed dif- ferences in the practice of birth control.71 Among the birth control using respon- dents married prior to 1929, only 20% were Catholic and 55% Protestant. For the marriage cohort 1940-1949 the difference was still considerable: 74% of the Protestant marriages from that decade had practiced birth control against 61% of the Catholic and 73% of the marriages by those without a denomination. In the usa, studies showed relationships between Catholicism and hesitation to practice family planning like those found in Europe. Of all the Catholic respon- dents in a 1955 sample of over 2700 married American women, 67% indicated to have used contraceptive methods or to intend doing so in the future; among Prot- estants, the percentage was 83%.72 The renouncement of birth control by Catholics was verified with data on the planning circumstances of the interval preceding each pregnancy collected from a sample of nearly 5000 married American women during the early 1960s. The data were used to establish the fertility planning status of the respondents, like failure of the number of children desired, the timing of children and whether there was any pregnancy at all. The probabilities of failure show a clear pattern by race and education as well as religion: Catholics were more likely to indicate number and timing failure than non-Catholics.73 As recently as the 1970s, Catholic population groups in the Netherlands, Ger- many, Great Britain and the usa had a higher fertility, desired more children and refrained from family planning more resolutely than Protestants and those with- out a religion. As the next paragraph will show, Catholics also differed in the me- thod of birth control practiced.

3.2 Only if Church-approved: the use of methods of birth control

During the decades after the Second World War, the variety in birth control meth- ods expanded. Several studies, though, indicated that Catholics respected their Church’s ban on most of these methods in the 1960s as they had done in the 1930s. In the usa as well as in England and the Netherlands, Catholics mainly

71 Griselda Rowntree and Rachel Pierce, ‘Birth control in Britain’, Population Studies 15 (1961) 3-31. 72 The sample concerned 2713 women between 18 and 39 years. Ronald Freedman, Pascal Whelpton and Arthur Campbell, Family planning, sterility and population growth (New York 1959). See also Ronald Freedman and Pascal Whelpton, ‘Social and psychological factors affecting fertility: the relationship of general planning to fertility planning and fertility rates’, The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly 29 (1951) 218-243; ibid, ‘Social and psychologi- cal factors affecting fertility: fertility planning and fertility rates by adherence to traditions’, The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly 30 (1952) 61-90. 73 Norman Ryder and Charles Westoff, ‘Fertility planning status: United States 1965’, Demography 6 (1969) 435-444. 194 mixing ovaries and rosaries

used non-appliance types of birth control (abstinence and coitus interruptus)as opposed to appliance methods (like condoms and diaphragms). In 1955, the rhythm method was still most commonly used amongst Catholics in the usa, as was shown by a survey among 2700 married women. Of the Catholic couples, 50% used periodical abstention for family limitation against only 7% of the Protestant respondents. Coitus interruptus was not commonly used among both Protestants and Catholics – 3% of the couples of each denomination used only this method. Of the Catholics, 13% used appliance methods solely – against 15% of the Protestants.74 Ten years later, a survey amongst housewives on Rhode Island in 1968 and 1969 showed that the different use of contraceptive methods among Catholics and other denominations had persisted. While of non-Catholics the majority used oral contraceptives, only young Catholics appeared to do so – most Catholic women still used the rhythm method.75 Research in England on the use of methods of birth control among denomina- tions showed the same results as in the usa. In 1946 and 1947, questionnaires spread among 11000 hospitalized women in England.76 Results indicated that among Catholic women married between 1930 and 1934, the proportion using non-appliance methods was twice as high as those using appliance methods (31% versus 15%). The proportion of Catholic women using appliance methods increased rapidly in later marriage cohorts. Finally, among Catholic women mar- ried after 1940, the percentage using appliance methods was at level with the pro- portion using the ‘traditional’ methods (20% and 19% respectively).77 Dutch research not only showed that, like in the usa and England, periodical abstention and coitus interruptus were the most common methods of birth control practiced by Catholics in the Netherlands, but also that spouses sometimes had a different notion of the method and frequency of birth control used. In an attempt to get to know his patients, a doctor organized a survey amongst nearly 500 newly- wed Catholic couples in the western mining district of southern Limburg in 1960 and 1961.78 Half of the female respondents indicated to have practiced periodical abstention – usually during a pregnancy. Of the men, though, 60% said so. More- over, more female respondents indicated to practice periodical abstention than males did, whereas the latter said to use coitus interruptus more often than their wives.

74 Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell (1959) 185. 75 Leon Bouvier, ’Catholics and contraception’, Journal of marriage and family 34 (1972) 514-522. 76 E. Lewis-Faning (1949) 1 and 23. 77 Ibid, 81-82. 78 489 Men filled out questionnaires and 766 women. Lambert Timmermans, Huwelijks- beleving van katholieke jonggehuwden: een onderzoek middels een enquête in de westelijke mijn- streek van Limburg (Utrecht 1964) 82-83. “we put up with what we were told” 195

In 1965, a different social class of Dutch Catholics was polled on love and mar- riage by the magazine Margriet.79 Among the primarily middle class readers, though, considerable differences were found in the kind of birth control methods used by the various denominations as well. The fact that the magazine had pub- lished an article on the pill probably caused the appreciation for that contraceptive – the majority of the Catholic readers (65%) considered the pill acceptable whereas only 52% thought so about the condom. All the same, a much higher proportion of liberal Protestants approved of the pill.80 Catholic readers of the magazine mostly used periodical abstention (44%) and coitus interruptus (41%); among liberal Prot- estants these percentages were 37% and 69%. Two years later, interviews with 400 women married in 1961 confirmed the results of the Margriet survey.81 The respondents were all living in Utrecht – a prov- ince that mirrored the Netherlands where it concerned the religious composition of the population, the age composition and the representation of various economic sectors. In Utrecht, periodical abstention appeared the most widely used form of birth control among Catholics (51%) compared to orthodox Protestants (44%) and liberal Protestants (24%). Coitus interruptus however was more common among orthodox Protestants (41%) than among Catholics and liberal Protestants (21% and 27% respectively). Condoms were used by almost half of the liberal Protestants (48%) and less by orthodox Protestants and Catholics (35% each). The pill was used by slightly over a third of the Catholics and orthodox Protestants and by 42% of the liberal Protestants. Respondents without a religious denomination mostly used the condom and the pill (44% and 43% respectively).82 The role doctors played in the spread of information on ‘new’ methods of con- traception among Catholics, is unclear. Obviously, some physicians were deeply concerned with their patients’ unsuccessful attempts to limit their family size. Aletta Jacobs, the first female doctor in the Netherlands, in her memoirs recounted how during her studies she was faced with “the many and heavy grievances of women who time and time again got pregnant”.83 In 1930, Joannes Smulders, a Catholic doctor in rural Brabant who on a daily basis witnessed the poor circumstances in which big families had to live, published a book on periodical abstention.84 It was a huge success: probably over 30.000 cop- ies were brought into circulation and by 1939 Periodieke onthouding in het huwelijk:

79 Pierre Dupuis, Sex in Nederland (Utrecht 1969). 80 Ibid, 224-225. 81 Hendrik Heeren and Hein Moors, Gezinnen in groei: een onderzoek naar de gezins- planning van vrouwen van het huwelijkskohort – 1961 te Utrecht (Utrecht 1968). 82 Ibid, 82. 83 Aletta Jacobs, Herinneringen (Nijmegen 1985) 79. 84 Joannes Smulders, Periodieke onthouding in het huwelijk: methode: Ogino-Knaus (Nij- megen 1930) 196 mixing ovaries and rosaries

methode: Ogino-Knaus had reached its seventh reprint. The fact that the book was written in ‘easy’ Dutch so as to provide information for people without higher edu- cation was one of the aspects of the publication that infuriated the board of the 85 Catholic doctor’s magazine (RK Artsenblad). Smulders was not the only physician who was much involved with his patients’ struggle with Church rules. The efforts of Lambert Timmermans to retrieve his Limburg newlywed patients’ attitudes to topics of family limitation and marriage suggest similar sentiments.86 Research into family limitation among doctors in the Netherlands indicated physicians started practicing birth control rather early in the nineteenth century compared to other social groups.87 However, before the Second World War, many Catholic women were aided in delivery by a midwife as she was less expensive than a doctor. A physician became involved only when complica- tions arose. From the 1950s onwards, consultation of a doctor became less exceptional and it is very likely that physicians witnessed a changing need for help in family limita- tion among their patients. A 1960 survey among Dutch physicians indicated that the majority of the Dutch doctors were willing to give information on family plan- ning – though Catholic doctors indicated to limit the methods they advised about.88 From the 1950s onwards the doctor formed the most important access to birth con- trol – not only for the calculation of ‘fertile’ days but also for information on ‘new’ methods, the application of a diaphragm and, later on, the prescription of the pill.89 As the following paragraph will show, moral directives regarding reproduction behavior affected not merely Catholic opinion about types of methods but the whole area of sexuality. As a result, even among the minority of Catholics who were informed by a physician about family planning or had access to books like that of Joannes Smulders, many were not convinced about the morality of birth control.

3.3 Practicing what is preached: sexual experience

The extent to which Catholics were indoctrinated with their Church’s pronatalist ideology is clearly demonstrated by the differences in sexual experiences between Catholics and non-Catholics up to the 1970s. One of the most famous studies on

85 Kerklaan (1987) 91-93. 86 Timmermans (1964). 87 Frans van Poppel and Hugo Röling, ‘Physicians and fertility control in the Nether- lands’, Journal of interdisciplinary history 34 (2003) 155-185. 88 1550 Questionnaires were sent to doctors; 780 forms were received back. See Stichting Welzijn en Bevolkingsgroei, Tal en last: contactorgaan van de Stichting Welzijn en Bevolkings- groei 1 (1962) 23 and G.J. de Bruyn, Rapport over het bevolkingsvraagstuk, uitgebracht door de Commissie Bevolkingsbeleid van de Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (Amsterdam 1966) 48. 89 Kerklaan (1987) 90. “we put up with what we were told” 197 the sexual and reproductive experiences of men and women was undertaken by Alfred Kinsey in the usa during the late 1930s. In two decades, his research devel- oped into a huge project organized by the Institute for Sex Research of Indiana University.90 In 1953 the results were published of an analysis of case histories pro- vided by 5940 white women who were contacted via various ‘social units’ (groups and clubs) and interviewed before 1950.91 Measured by the frequency with which they confessed, of the women interviewed by Kinsey cum suis 19% were ‘nomi- nally’ Catholic, 3% ‘moderately’ and 7% devoutly Catholic.92 Some types of sexual activity of women appeared not to correlate with attach- ment to the Catholic religious affiliation in any other way than with Protestant or Jewish religiosity. Incidents of masturbation were similar among Catholics and women of other denominations. Likewise, Catholicism did not seem to have a dif- ferent effect on nocturnal sex dreams or extra-marital coitus compared to Protes- tantism or Judaism. Among all denominations, fewer of the active or devout believ- ers had had the experiences in question.93 Three types of sexual activity showed a particular effect of Catholic religious background. Catholicism, more than any other variable like age, rural-urban back- ground or parental occupation class, restricted the numbers of women with experi- ences of pre-marital ‘petting’ (i.e. physical contacts between females and males without copulation) but also the frequency of experiences, times, places and tech- niques involved.94 In a similar way, religiosity correlated negatively with accumula- tive incidences and frequency of pre-marital coitus among all denominational groups but it did so particularly where it concerned active incidences of orgasms among Catholic women. “This may mean,” the authors speculated, “that feelings of guilt which were experienced by the more devout females had reduced the satis- faction of the pre-marital coitus.”95 The third type of sexual activity that was most affected by religious background was homosexuality: the more devout religious women, in particular the Catholic ones, were less likely to have had experiences in that area. Of the nominal Catholics, a remarkably high proportion (25%) had had homo- sexual experiences, compared to the inactive Protestant females (17%). While

90 Alfred Kinsey, Wardell Pomeroy and Clyde Martin (ed.), Sexual behavior in the human male (Philadelphia 1949) (based on over 5300 interviews with white males) and Alfred Kinsey, Jerome Cornfield and Jean Brown (ed.), Sexual behavior in the human female (Phila- delphia 1953). 91 Ibid, 22. 92 Ibid, 32, 34 and 56. 93 Ibid, 203-205, 424. 94 In the late teens, the devout Catholic incidence was 15% against 31% for the inactive Catholics; for Protestant groups it was 19% and 22% respectively and for Jewish groups 23 against 33%. Ibid, 247-248. 95 Ibid, 306. 198 mixing ovaries and rosaries

moral restraints kept many women from making homosexual contacts, the authors also noted that “some of the females had become involved in homosexual activities because they were restrained by the religious codes from making pre-marital het- erosexual contacts”. Homosexual experiences, in some cases, stimulated women to leave the church, “thereby increasing the incidences of homosexual activity among the religiously inactive groups”.96 Among Protestants and Jews, religious background and the level of religiosity hardly affected experiences of female respondents with marital coitus where it con- cerned frequency or response to orgasm. Among Catholics, however, devout women showed a lower response to orgasms (i.e. the percentage of copulations that had led to orgasm) than inactive co-religionists.97 In this respect, the authors underlined that religious background played a bigger role amongst men. “Actually, since it is the male who has most to do with determining the rate of coitus in marriage, and since our data have shown that the more devout males do carry over their moral attitudes and keep the coital rate low in marriage, it is not surprising to find that the level of the male’s devotion affects the rates of the marital coitus while the female’s level of devotion does not.”98 When, more than a decade after the Kinsey report appeared, Eustace Chesser questioned British women on their sexual experiences, the outcomes were different where it concerned the contrasts between Catholics and non-Catholics.99 The pro- portion of single Catholic women who had had sex was low compared to Church of England members (19% and 26% respectively), but not as low as among non-con- formist respondents (17%). Married Catholic women, though, had the highest per- centage of pre-marital intercourse (47%) compared to married non-conformists (24%) and even Church of England members (40%). The portions of women who had ‘petted’ before their marriage showed the highest scores for single Catholic women; Catholic married women did not differ on this point from other denomina- tions.100 Compared to Catholics in the usa, religious doctrines appeared not to put a curb on sexual behavior of British co-religionists – on the contrary. Results of inquiries on the influence of the religious background on sexual atti- tudes in Germany resembled those of the Kinsey report rather than those of Chesser. In 1953, Ludwig von Friedeburg found that church attendance accounted for the more traditional outlook of German Catholics – at least with regard to the use of contraceptives and divorce.101 A decade later, over 6000 Western German male

96 Ibid, 465. 97 Ibid, 360. 98 Ibid. See Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin (1949) 482 for an account of the correlation between religion, religiosity and marital coitus among men. 99 Chesser (1956). 100 Ibid, 266. 101 Ludwig von Friedeburg, Die Umfrage in der Intimsphäre (Stuttgart 1953) 51. “we put up with what we were told” 199 and female students, of which 24% were Catholic and 70% Protestant (evangelisch), were interviewed on their sexual experiences by Hans Giese and Gunter Schmidt.102 The survey indicated that attachment to religious affiliation, measured by church attendance, correlated negatively with some of the sexual experiences like masturba- tion and pre-marital sexual intercourse, in particular among Catholics.103 Of the Catholic male students, for example, 60% had had pre-marital sex against 66% of the Protestant students. Catholic female students showed an even larger difference with their fellow students of Protestant denomination: 46% and 59% respectively. Dutch historiography lacked a study on sexual experiences like that by Kinsey in the usa, Chesser in Great Britain and Giese and Schmidt in Germany. The Margriet survey of 1965 did not investigate the matter as exhaustively as the studies abroad and mainly discussed it in the context of the marital union. Like co-religion- ists abroad, however, Dutch Catholics appeared to cherish more traditional confes- sional values than members of other denominations: a higher proportion consid- ered children to be the primary aim of marriage, did not believe in the equal value of childless marriages and considered initiatives in the field of sexuality to be unvirtuous.104 Even as late as the 1960s, among Catholics reproduction was consid- ered to be as intrinsic to sexuality as motherhood was to the woman.

3.4 Compliance and a sense of duty: the motherhood ideology

Rather than providing a match for Kinsey’s sexologist study, Dutch research focused on the experience of motherhood.105 In 1981 a study appeared that focused on the Catholic motherhood ideology and the motivations of Catholic women to comply with it.106 Using the method of the ‘focused interview’, Mirre Bots and Maria Noordman questioned twenty Catholic women who were married between 1925 and 1940, had children and were living in the mainly Catholic city of Nijmegen.107 In spite of their different social backgrounds, the experiences of the respon- dents were much alike. For a start, they shared a conventional Catholic upbringing that included daily prayers, attending services at least every Sunday and often dur- ing the week too, making first and solemn Communion (respectively at the age of seven and twelve), attending Catholic schools and classes on catechism and con- fessing regularly. Inherent in the upbringing and religious education were strong

102 The sample concerned 6128 male and female students of 12 universities. Hans Giese and Gunter Schmidt, Studenten-Sexualität: Verhalten und Einstellung: eine Umfrage an 12 westdeutschen Universitäten (Reinbek bei Hamburg 1968). 103 Ibid, 282-283, 314-315. 104 Dupuis (1969) 214-219. 105 See also Van Berkel (1990). 106 Bots and Noordman (1981). 107 Ibid, 44. 200 mixing ovaries and rosaries

feelings of fear (for hell) and guilt (after having sinned) and a strong awareness of morality and decency without actually having been informed about sex. A critical attitude was all but stimulated: Church representatives for instance were to be respected and Protestants were not to be associated with.108 The respondents denied to have had any positive or negative expectations con- cerning marriage – the fact that they would get married was simply too self-evi- dent. Only a few of the interviewed women indicated to have looked forward to their marriage, as it put a stop to their responsibilities to their parents or their employer. Most of the respondents knew nothing about sex and the ‘marriage con- fession’, a private conversation with the priest prior to the marriage during which the future spouses’ knowledge of the catechism was tested and the reproductive implications of the Catholic marriage explained. Women were often told that they were to obey their husbands, that the only function of sex was to procreate and that they were not allowed to refuse intercourse or to practice birth control. Although the Church rejected women working, 9 out of the 20 interviewed women had to work for financial reasons after their marriage: they helped out in a shop or sewed.109 The labor force participation of some of the women and their con- sequent limited independence appeared to have been a source of concern for priests: several interviewed women indicated to have been called to account during house visits by the clergymen regarding the ‘proper’ role of the woman. Both work- ing and non-working women considered their subordinance to the ‘heads of the household’ as natural, like it had been between their parents, and perceived any uneasiness with the superiority of their husbands as something that had to be sup- pressed and controlled.110 Although three of the interviewed women were pregnant before they got mar- ried and hence were ‘forced’ to marry, most women were true virgins when they married. They indicated to have lacked even basic knowledge about sex and procre- ation until after their marriage – one of them was informed about delivery only after the breaking of her waters. The ban on contraceptives made the threat of preg- nancy decrease many of the women’s sexual appetites, which created tensions among some of the couples. Though being pregnant and raising children were regarded as proper aspects of their tasks as mother and wife by all Nijmegen women, eleven out of twenty practiced periodical abstention, two prolonged the period during which they breastfed their children in order not to get pregnant, one woman observed complete abstention and one used condoms. The respondents who had practiced periodical abstention had all suffered moral dilemmas. These women also indicated to have been primarily responsible

108 Ibid, 50-64. 109 Ibid, 61-80. 110 Ibid, 80-92. “we put up with what we were told” 201 for the practice of birth control in their marriage, partly because they had to count their cycle. Most women felt more troubled about their ‘sinning’ than their hus- bands, but those with liberal husbands had been able to share the responsibility for the family size and had experienced less troubles. A regular cycle prevented feel- ings of guilt too: they practiced periodical abstention without feeling they ‘re- nounced’ their marital obligations. Only three of the women, Bots and Noordman reported, referred to the deliber- ate promotion of a high fertility by the Catholic Church – for most of the respon- dents a large family was part of their ‘natural’ task as Catholic women, the expecta- tions of the environment they lived in and the period in time that made it ‘com- mon’.111 All of the interviewed women, however, indicated that their motherhood had been the central point in their life – which made it hard for them to admit their uneasiness with a high fertility or with any pressure exerted on the field. That fact that they regarded their primary task of motherhood as proper and natural and that they loved their children (including the ones born despite having practiced birth control) made them feel guilty when complaining about initially unwanted preg- nancies. The best proof perhaps of their compliance with the moral norms and val- ues of the Church was that the respondents, even those mildly criticizing them, indicated to have brought up their children in the same confessional way.112 The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the interviews by Bots and Noordman are confirmed by similar studies on the subject of sexuality, marriage and birth control. Recurrent elements in the observations of the Catholic mother- hood ideology were a Catholic upbringing and education (often with nuns) that lacked any information on sexuality and the social assumption that a girl would marry. Other important factors appeared to be the obviousness with which repro- duction started right after marriage and the model of the mother as a self-effacing “broody hen”. The only allowed contraceptive, periodical abstention, failed regu- larly. Moreover, the position and power of the male head of the household seemed rarely to have been questioned. In general, Catholic women in the pillarized Dutch society complied with the Catholic moral standards.113 During their interviews, Bots and Noordman as well as other researchers recorded statements of Catholic women that characterized their outlook on vari- ous aspects of motherhood. In 1986, interviews held with 65 Catholic women

111 Ibid, 92-117. 112 Ibid, 117-128. 113 See Marjo Eitjes, ‘Huwelijk en gezinsleven, een interview’, Bert van Dijk, Liesbeth Huijs en Trees Versteegen (ed.), Katholieke vrouwen en het feminisme: een onderzoek door de Acht Mei Beweging (Amersfoort/Leuven 1990) 90-99; Aafke Elisabeth Komter, De macht van de vanzelfsprekendheid: relaties tussen vrouwen en mannen (Den Haag 1985) and Cornelis Straver, Veranderend gezinsontwerp: een bijdrage tot het gesprek over geboorteregeling (Hilver- sum and Antwerpen 1964). 202 mixing ovaries and rosaries

from around the Limburg town of Roermond provided for apt descriptions of work, sexuality and family planning in the period between the Second World War and 1965.114 Like in other parts of the Netherlands, the respondents were withheld information on sex education and had been brought up under the taboo of the subject: “When I had my first period my mother preached: “you are liable (sic) to boys now, if one boy touches you with only one finger you have to beat him…”115

A research among newlyweds, commissioned by the ministry, showed that by the late 1960s a tenth of the Dutch marriages concerned so-called ‘forced marriages’.116 The punishment of one of the Roermond respondents after having become preg- nant before her marriage indicated how the Catholic milieu still regarded it as thor- oughly shameful in the 1950s: “I was married in a different village, because of the disgrace. The pastor wanted to marry me in his own parish [but only at] 6 o’clock in the morning, but my father did not want that. That’s how it went those days. The girl was blamed and the boy was innocent… If I had killed somebody, it would not have been worse… You thought you were the worst person in the world… It was as if our family fell back a step on the social ladder. A nun told my mother: “throw her out on the streets with nothing, as you make your bed, so must you lie on it” and the pastor called me a street girl.”117

Women who were pregnant before their marriage were heavily punished not only to frighten other women but also to prevent the ‘fallen’ women from committing more sins. People engaging in ‘forced marriages’ after all were among the group of those running the risk of falling from grace further: Belgian research showed that in the nineteenth century forced marriages, as well as marriages between divorced spouses, were most likely to occur during Lent and Advent, the periods during which Catholics were not allowed to marry.118 The overall majority of Catholic women, however, never found themselves in this situation – as interviews with Catholic women like those living in Nijmegen and Roermond showed, the prede-

114 Brigitte Lentz, Vrouwen uit Roermond en omgeving over werk, seksualiteit en geboorten- beperking na 1945 (S.l. 1986) 55. 115 Ibid, 46. 116 Instituut voor Psychologisch Marktonderzoek and Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk, Problemen onder jonggehuwden: onderzoek, uitgevoerd in 1968 en 1969 door het Instituut voor Psychologisch Marktonderzoek in opdracht van het Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk (Den Haag 1970) 46-49. 117 Ibid, 47. 118 Koen Matthijs and Bart van de Putte, ‘Huwen tijdens de advent en de vasten in de 19e eeuw in Vlaanderen’, Belgische Tijdschrift voor Nieuwe Geschiedenis 31 (2001) 75-112. “we put up with what we were told” 203 termination for women was a chaste marriage. The daughter of a Roermond farmer for instance stayed at home to help at the farm while her brothers went away for continuing education: “They never asked me what I wanted… I stayed home from my 12th until my 26th. Until I got married. My mother had 11 children. On Saturdays I worked in a shop as an assistant saleswoman to collect money for the trousseau.”119

A large part of the Roermond respondents, who all had worked during the 1950s, gave up their job as soon as they were married; others did so when they had their first child.120 Though most practiced periodical abstention or coitus interruptus, chil- dren “just came, that was common”.121 A comparison between interviews with Catholics and those with non-Catholic women show that not all experiences of sexuality and marriage were ‘typically’ Catholic but rather seem to have been characteristic for the period of time to which respondents refer. Prior to the 1950s, birth control seemed to have been regarded as a very private matter among all social classes and denominations. Interviews with Italian and Jewish women in the usa during the first half of the twentieth cen- tury proved that the topic indeed was highly embarrassing: the women, in particu- lar the Italian ones, appeared to have gossiped practically about everything except for matters of birth control.122 Interviews with over a hundred working class men and women in England and Wales indicated that these women, raised between 1920 and 1950, lacked knowledge of family planning and even of basic biological matters too – as one respondent expressed herself, “You never get told anything like that”.123 Like among Catholic couples, the relationship between spouses was not equal: “It always was a man’s world, a woman always had to do what she was told or be used when he wanted”.124 While discussing denomination-specific attitudes towards reproductive behav- ior, not only the differences between opinions typical for Catholics and for mem- bers of other denominations require nuances. The pronatalist Church doctrines were not successfully imposed on all believers: variety in opinions was also to be found among Catholics. As the next paragraph will show, religiosity determined

119 Ibid, 32. 120 Ibid, 36. 121 Ibid, 51. 122 Watkins and Danzi (1995) 469-490. 123 Fisher interviewed 107 men and women born between 1899 and 1925. Kate Fisher, ‘ ‘She was quite satisfied with the arrangements I made’: gender and birth control in Britain 1920-1950’, Past and present 169 (2000) 161-193, 168. 124 Ibid, 192. See also J. Mayone Stycos, Kurt Back and Reuben Hill, ‘Problems of commu- nication between husband and wife on matters relating to family limitation’, Human rela- tions 9 (1956) 213. 204 mixing ovaries and rosaries

the extent to which Catholic outlooks on fertility-related matters corresponded with those of their Church.

3.5 Effectiveness of indoctrination: variation among Catholics

For the greater part of the twentieth century, Catholics in the usa, Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands showed similarities where it concerned reduced enthusiasm for family planning and a preference for ‘non-appliance’ methods of contraception. Judging by the fewer and less varied sexual experiences of Catholics in other countries and their compliance with the motherhood ideology found in the Netherlands, they also shared a respect for the moral authority of their Church. But to what extent was this worldwide deviating behavior by Catholics caused by adherence to the norms of the Roman Catholic Church? In 1971, interviews with over a 1000 ‘Chicanas’, Mexican American women, indicated that religiosity only determined the demography of those brought up in the usa but not Mexican Americans raised in Mexico.125 The following sub-paragraphs will subsequently discuss the extent to which socio-economic position and educational level deter- mined the attitudes and behavior of the Catholic population groups in Europe as well as the usa, and the circumstances under which religiosity affected Catholic fertility and nuptiality-related decisions.

3.5.1 Socio-economic position and education: the Catholic exception Few of the studies discussed credit socio-economic position and religiosity with a similar strong effect on ideas and practices of family planning. The 1958 survey on the expected family size and family size values in Western Germany showed that for all respondents in general their religion, income, occupation and whether or not the female spouse worked, affected the expected, desired and ideal family size.126 Studies that explored the specific correlation between socio-economic pos- ition and Catholic denomination, however, drew different conclusions. An English survey on the practice of family planning, held a year after the German one, found that like religion, social class correlated positively with the use of birth control – except among Catholics.127 “Adherence to the Roman Catholic faith was not only associated with a relatively low practice in all classes”, the authors concluded, ”it also tended to eliminate class differences, at least among the 266 Catholic inform- ants in the survey”.128

125 Georges Sabagh and David Lopez, ‘Religiosity and fertility: the case of the Chicanas’, Social forces 59 (1980) 431-439. 126 Freedman, Baumert and Bolte (1959). 127 Rowntree and Pierce (1961) 3-31. 128 Ibid, 24. “we put up with what we were told” 205

In the Netherlands, relationships were found between socio-economic position and the practice of family planning, but among Catholics the correlation appeared to be much weaker. The survey among Dutch married women in the early 1950s showed that from the respondents who had planned to use birth control already before they got married, relatively many women had worked in ‘white-collar’ pro- fessions before they married. Fewer of this class were found among respondents who had planned to limit their family size before their marriage but had not done so during their marriage and among those who never intended to practice family planning.129 The survey among Dutch ‘betrothed’ women offered the chance to study the effect of socio-economic position on enthusiasm for family planning while distinguishing between mainly Catholic cities as opposed to towns with high proportions of Protestants or inhabitants with no religious affiliation. Among the ‘betrothed’ women correlation was found between labor participation of women and the wish to postpone the first pregnancy, but much more so among respon- dents in the mainly Protestant cities than in the Catholic ones. In Haarlem, Groningen, Arnhem and Enschede 59% of the female respondents with an occu- pation hoped not to get children right after marriage; in Utrecht 50% and in Tilburg, Nijmegen and Eindhoven only 34%.130 In particular usa research has shown that, education, like socio-economic position, correlated with the practice of birth control to a smaller degree among Catholics than among other denominations. In the 1955 American survey among 2700 married women, the degree of approval of contraception correlated posi- tively with education. Of the Catholic women who were college-educated, 85% approved of family limitation and only 2% absolutely disapproved. Of the Catholic women who had only attended grade school, 50% approved and 22% of them completely disapproved.131 The Kinsey report, on the other hand, had shown few differences in sexual behavior between high school, college and graduate school samples of women – with the exception of homosexual experience that correlated positively with education.132 Likewise, a research on fertility planning status in the usa in the 1960s showed that in most religious groups failure of the planning of pregnancies inversely related to education – the more education, the higher the chance of succeeding in correct timing and number of children – except among white Catholics.133

129 Ibid, 101. 130 Diels (1953) 71. 131 Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell (1959), 166. 132 Kinsey, Cornfield and Brown (1953) 463. 133 18.000 questionnaires were sent to 45 Catholic and non-sectarian educational institu- tions for first- and fourth-year female students of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Mormon denominations to fill out; over 14.000 returned. Ryder and Westoff (1969) 435-444. 206 mixing ovaries and rosaries

To unravel the exact relation between education and family planning, a survey was held among 14000 female students in the country. It showed that, in the cases of Catholics and Mormons, the correlation between education and religion was determined by the extent to which that education was church-operated.134 For these denominations, images of large families, intentions to plan fertility, number of siblings, career plans and religiousness retained “a significant amount of inde- pendent predictability”.135 The data suggested that “both family-size preference and beliefs are a function of the overall religious and social system in which women find and orient themselves.” Hence religious preference, when simplified into Catholics and non-Catholics, remained “an important predictor of the number of children desired” in this research too.136 In Europe, the correlation between educa- tion and the introduction of family planning received fewer attention among schol- ars. The survey in Western Germany in 1958 indicated that the educational level did not have a huge influence on the expected, desired and ideal family size of the respondents in general, Catholic and Protestant alike.137

3.5.2 Religiosity and the obedience to Church doctrines Adherence to religious directives regarding reproduction among Catholics appeared not to be highly affected by social-economic position and educational level, yet the degree of attachment to these directives was different among believ- ers both in Europe and in the usa. Quantifying religiosity with church atten- dance, the 1955 American survey amongst 2700 married women in general indi- cated that it did not influence the use of contraceptive methods.138 Among Cath- olics, however, church attendance appeared to correlate negatively with qualified approval of birth control.139 Of the Catholic women who attended Church regu- larly, 25% approved of family limitation and 42% completely disapproved; of those who seldom went to Church, 56% approved and 17% completely disap- proved. Additionally, Catholics deviated from other denominations where it con- cerned the degree of approval. “While both Catholic and Protestant wives over- whelmingly approved of some control methods under some conditions, many more Catholics than Protestants disapproved either completely or with qualifica- tions”, the authors stated.140

134 Charles Westoff and Raymond Potvin, College women and fertility values (Princeton 1967). 135 Ibid, 218. 136 Ibid, 219. 137 Freedman, Baumert and Bolte (1959). 138 Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell (1959) 108. 139 Ibid, 161. 140 Ibid, 155. “we put up with what we were told” 207

The English Chesser-report of the 1950s provided more information on varia- tion in religiosity among Catholics and other denominations. Catholics appeared to be more loyal churchgoers than Protestants. Of the female Catholic respon- dents, 30% frequently went to Church with their husband against 23% among non-conformists and only 7% among Church of England members. Church atten- dance of married Catholic women was outstripped by that of single women. Of this group, 66% went to Church frequently – the highest score of all denominations.141 When, during the 1959 English survey, respondents were asked to assess the importance he or she attached to religion, Catholics valued faith more than other denominations.142 This research also showed that religiosity, defined as impor- tance attached to religion, correlated negatively with the practice of family plan- ning.143 Dutch survey outcomes gained additional insight in the correlation between the degree of religiosity and the respect for religious reproductive directives, espe- cially those regarding family limitation. The survey amongst married Dutch women in the early 1950s investigated what motivations women had to renounce family limitation. Of the women who never wanted to practice family planning and did not start practicing birth control during their marriage, 27% had religious motives (mainly Catholic and orthodox Protestant); 64% indicated they also wished their fertility to take its natural course; 18% additionally wanted a big family and 22% were not familiar with contraceptive methods either.144 The 1960 poll amongst Limburg newlyweds revealed how Catholics valued cer- tain methods of birth control and how the use of the methods correlated with religi- osity, defined as the frequency of confession. The majority of the men and women rejected coitus interruptus: 75% of the women and 85% of the men considered it wrong.145 Nevertheless, 21% of the men who regarded the method morally wrong practiced it. Other contraceptives (like the condom and diaphragm) were consid- ered wrong by the overall majority of the respondents.146 Apparently, the frequency of the confession correlated with the birth control method used: men who con- fessed less practiced coitus interruptus; the second category used periodical absten- tion and coitus interruptus; the third group only practiced periodical abstention and those who confessed most did not practice family planning at all.147 Among women

141 Chesser (1956) 274. 54% of the single non-conformist women went to Church fre- quently; 24% of the single female members of the Church of England. 142 Rowntree and Pierce (1961) 3-31. 143 Ibid, 22. 144 Diels and Groenman (1957) 103. 145 Ibid, 94. 146 Ibid, 97. 147 Ibid, 109. 208 mixing ovaries and rosaries

who confessed most, periodical abstention was indicated as the method most prac- ticed, which suggests they asked the priest for permission. Concluding, surveys in the usa as well as various European countries have shown that the Catholic fertility rates and patters, as mapped by demographic his- torians, were the result of certain attitudes on family planning, methods of birth control, sexuality and motherhood. The attitudes all bore the mark of the influence of the Church’s moral standards regarding reproduction – in spite of the interna- tional differences in outlooks of Catholics on reproductive matters. The fact that religiosity, when measured by the frequency of Church attendance or confession, more than socio-economic position or educational level affected the introduction of family planning, showed the power of pronatalist indoctrination. Until the 1970s, the fertility rates of Catholics were not higher than those of other denomi- nations simply because the Church stimulated pregnancies, but because many believers, on religious grounds, objected against the practice of birth control, par- ticular methods, certain sexual activities, the ‘renunciation’ of the task of mother- hood for women and a different family hierarchy. Catholic fertility behavior devi- ated from that of other denominations because of loyalty to the Church’s moral authority. The next paragraph is focused on the ways in which moral values, that affected fertility, were conveyed to believers.

4 Pathways of pronatalism: women’s accounts of indoctrination

After having dealt with the Catholic doctrines that directly or indirectly influ- enced fertility behavior as well as with the way doctrines shaped outlooks on reproduction related matters, this paragraph discusses how the pronatalist ideol- ogy was imposed on believers. Sources for the study of pronatalist indoctrination are a collection of letters by Catholic women on the subject of Catholic fertility, written in the 1980s, which will be introduced in 4.1. How the Church enforced a reproductive code of behavior on individual Catholics will be discussed in 4.2: the priest’s exclusive rights to provide information about reproductive doctrines; punishments of disobedience to Church rules; the obligation to ask permission to practice family planning; confession and house visits paid by priests. Apart from Church officials, believers themselves pursued pronatalist ideals: their faith, but even more so feelings of fear and guilt, treated in 4.3, formed an impor- tant motive to hold on to reproductive values. Finally, in 4.4, the pronatalist pres- sure of the Catholic milieu, including parents, partner and the broader commu- nity, will be discussed. While translating the letters, considerable effort has been put into leaving their style intact. For that reason, different titles for priests are all translated differently. A pater is translated as Father; Biechtvader is translated as Father confessor; priester as priest; pastoor and pastor (a Catholic parish priest) as pastor; missiepaters as mis- “we put up with what we were told” 209 sionary Fathers and Kapelaan as curate. Regarding Church services, a distinction is made between Heilige Mis, Mass, which took place every day of the week; Hoogmis, High Mass (also called Solemn Mass or Sung Mass) which took place on Sundays only and Het lof, Benediction, a sung service taking place in the evenings.

4.1 The sources: letters of mothers of large families

In 1985, the journalist Marga Kerklaan advertised in the radio and tv guide of the Catholic television broadcast company Katholieke Radio Omroep (KRO) that she was looking for women’s accounts of Catholic life for a television documentary.148 Kerklaan directed her appeal, additionally expressed during one of the KRO radio programs, to mothers of large families. Kerklaan had formulated four straightfor- ward questions to which women could respond: did you have a large family because you wanted that yourself, did the strict sexual moral code chase you out of the church, how do you feel towards your children’s changing attitudes to life and do you accept homosexual children?149 “Do sit down and write me”, she closed her appeal. Kerklaan hoped for at least thirty letters with more or less complete life stories to base her documentary on. In the months of January and February 1985, she received over 300 letters. Stimulated by the response to her advertisement, Kerklaan published a collection of the letters in 1987. The composition of group of Catholic women who wrote Kerklaan, was diverse. The letter writers were born between 1894 and 1934 and married between the early 1920s and the late 1960s. Most of them lived in Catholic regions in the northern part of the Netherlands – some municipalities in the part of the province of North Holland generally called West-Friesland, agricultural parts north of Rotterdam in the region referred to as the Westland where horticulture is practiced extensively and parts of the bollenstreek, the bulb-growing area between The Hague and Leiden). A second category of letters was from women living in large cities in the west of the Netherlands (Den Haag, Utrecht and Rotterdam). Apparently, for women who had had the opportunity to contrast their reproductive values and behavior with those of other denominations, the advertisement of Kerklaan had much appeal. According to Kerklaan, women living in the two Catholic provinces of Brabant and Limburg in the south of the Netherlands were underrepresented. The majority of the women had only attended elementary school and came from devout, “consciously Catholic families”.150

148 Kerklaan’s documentary ‘Mother of a large family’ (Moeder van een groot gezin) was part of a tv series in honor of the anniversary of the Catholic Radio Broadcasting organization kro. 149 Kerklaan (1987) 7. 150 Ibid, 8. 210 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The sample of Catholic women these life stories represent was determined in the first place by the way Kerklaan formulated her questions. She was looking for sources for her documentary and did not set out to do a scientific study using inter- view questions formulated carefully according to psycho-sociological rules. Kerk- laan meant to formulate the questions in a way that would trigger women to write to her, and many women explicitly mentioned their relief to write down their accounts. In order to leave the life stories intact as much as possible, Kerklaan’s publication of the letters is quite sober. In general, she simply transcribed the let- ters, in only a few places extending them with some lines from interviews. She added some structure: selecting parts of letters that addressed a certain, usually very broad, theme and largely kept a chronological classification. Kerklaan used complete letters, parts of letters and quotes but always took care that the authentic context was clear. The accounts of Catholic pronatalism sent to Kerklaan are probably not repre- sentative of the experiences of all Dutch Catholic women during the whole of the pillarization period. As the letters will not be used to establish the frequency of, for example, house visits by priests as a means of checking on reproductive behavior, they are suitable sources for the study of the influence of religion on fertility behav- ior on a micro level. The letters, after all, are analyzed for the ways via which Catho- lics were confronted with pronatalist ideology of their Church. Although the letters vary as much in style as well as in their accounts of Catholic pronatalism, many shared points of particular interest and a certain businesslike tone. Most of Kerklaan’s respondents appeared to be very conscious of the pronatalist ideology their Church propagated. Recounting the pressure to repro- duce felt in different moments in life, many also tried to explain what brought them to comply with the directives of the Church. In doing so, many letter writers describe the doctrines that concerned their fulfillment of the motherhood ideal, their social position as women and their female sexuality and recall in what ways these doctrines reached them: “Born in 1921, raised with the strict life rules of the Roman Catholic Church, so boys and girls strictly separated in school and church and youth association. I was from a family of seven girls myself. Eighteen years old when the [Second World] war began and married in 1949. Hardly any marital information [i.e. on sex, ms] because one did not talk about such a topic. After elementary school no education anymore, the nuns at our place [i.e. town, ms], even until in 1957 when I had two of my own sons on the elementary school, said: girls do not have to learn, they will marry anyway. So I married as a virgin, literally and figu- ratively. The only thing we remembered of the 45-minutes talk with the pastor [prior to the marriage] was: no semen was to be wasted, that was a deadly sin. The act of marriage was primarily meant to procreate and practice was three to four times a week. Love was not discussed and I was very much in love. The well known or notorious bridal blessing in the church, and also back then the com- “we put up with what we were told” 211

plete obedience to the husband, that was what you still promised as a bride then. (...) After my marriage I was pregnant straight away, which was common too. (…) Needless to say: I then was married for five years and two months exactly and had had four children and two miscarriages [i.e. 6 pregnancies in five years, ms]. And after ample twelve years of marriage I had had eight chil- dren, and certainly not because I wanted them so badly.151

The majority of Kerklaan’s respondents might have been aware of the Catholic pronatalism, however, very few considered eluding the Church directives let alone opposing them. As the following paragraph will show, the means of the Catholic Church to indoctrinate believers with dogma’s on reproductive behavior were diverse and very effective.

4.2 Imposing the rules: the Church’s means of indoctrination

“Qualitative data obtained from interviews with women who bore their children in the 1920’s and 1930s suggest that they were keenly aware of the Catholic view of contraception and reluctant to disobey those teachings,”152 Kevin McQuillan argued with respect to Catholic women from Quebec. “You did your duty and that was all”, he quoted one of the respondents.153 Like most of the Quebec women, Dutch women complied with the moral standards of the Catholic Church and obe- diently performed their task as women and mothers. How did the Church indoctrinate its flock with the pronatalist ideology? As 4.2.1 will show, boys and girls were kept in the dark about sex and were informed about the reproductive values of the Catholic Church by the priest. In 4.2.2, various means to punish believers who did not uphold these values will be discussed. The obligation to confess sins, including those regarding sex and marital life, gave the Church an important hold over believers, as did the obligation to ask permission to practice family planning, which will be dealt with in 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 respectively. In the last part of the paragraph, a notorious Church method to inspect reproductive behavior will be treated: house visits by priests.

4.2.1 The priest’s marital message In his book on fertility, class and gender in Britain, Simon Szreter of the University of Cambridge in Great Britain refers to “the profound ignorance of reproductive biology at marriage, absence of the most rudimentary instruction from their own

151 Ibid, 172-173. 152 McQuillan (2004) 37. 153 Danielle Gauvreau and Peter Gossage, ‘Empêcher la famille: fécondité et contraception au Québec, 1920-1960’, Canadian historical review 78 (1997) 478-510, 507. 212 mixing ovaries and rosaries

mothers, and often innocence of, fear and distaste at their own bodies’ sexual functionings” as one of the “most consistent themes emanating from the sources of direct testimony from women of all classes”.154 Something similar was remarked in a study of Dutch Catholic women: “Fact is that those who are most affected by the consequences of a pregnancy know least about birth control.”155 Obedience to Catholic morals by parents, teachers and the broader community ensured no knowledge of basic facts on sexual and procreation matters among young people: “At that time [at the time of the issue of the intended marriage, ms] I was 26 years but for a month, and during all those years I had never been intimate with him [her fiancée, ms]. During our wedding night [the first night of the mar- riage, ms] I had sex for the first time, really. We also had to pledge on the bible together to get as many children as God wanted to give us. And despite the fact that we loved each other and still love each other, back then we were more wet behind our ears than a child of 12 or 13 years old.”156

Various respondents indicated that they could not practice birth control simply because they did not know how to: “We were married in 1948 and had eight children. There was no pressure from outside in our case. The simple reason was that you did not know anything. When my husband leaned against me during our engagement I was already scared I would get a baby. In addition, I was very scared to commit any sins.”157

The Kerklaan letters show that many Catholic women lacked even the basic facts about reproductive biology. Few respondents indicate to have exchanged sexual experiences with mothers, sisters or daughters, for example after the first marital night. Matters like cycle and menstruation, let alone fertilization remained highly embarrassing subjects that were not addressed straightforwardly. Ignorance about procreation and the taboos surrounding sexuality stood in the way of successfully practicing family limitation: “We loved each other, but what did you know about sex? We had never heard of foreplay and after play, you were not allowed to think about that according to the ninth commandment [saying that you are not allowed to desire immorali- ties, ms]. So the act of marriage started with my husband climbing on top of me and ended if he, satisfied, rolled off me. He then immediately fell asleep. And I remained awake, hoping and praying that I would not be pregnant again.”158

154 Simon Szreter, Fertility, class and gender in Britain, 1860-1940 (Cambridge 1996) 425. 155 Hutjes (1974) 123. 156 Kerklaan (1987) 68. 157 Ibid, 111-112. 158 Ibid, 77. “we put up with what we were told” 213

For many respondents, the Church provided the only education on sex they had had. During the engagement period, a couple ideally remained ‘chaste’, in their contact as well as in their knowledge. Only prior to their marriage they were sum- moned to visit the priest and were told what requirements their sex life had to meet. In separate conversations, men and women were informed about the con- summation of marriage and their duties: “Shortly before our marriage we received ‘marital education’ [on sex] from the pastor of our parish, both of us separately. The pastor read something, very fast, from a small book. After doing so he handed me a small blue book that I had to read and had to observe (...). The most important points were: a. No male semen was allowed to be wasted; b. During ejaculation the woman had to lie on her back; c. For women only three K’s existed, being: Kids, Kitchen and Cellar [Kelder in Dutch, ms] (probably food provision, primarily preservation).159

As most of the women had not received any information on sex before the conver- sation, the priest’s advice was not always of use: “Sins existed in various kinds: daily sins, mortal sins, sins against the Holy Spirit, strange sins and sins calling for revenge [of God, ms]. Impurity against nature [i.e. homosexuality, ms] among other things belonged to that last cate- gory. (...) Only years later, to be precisely a week before my marriage when we were educated [on sex, ms] by the pastor, I was told that ‘spilling semen’ [i.e. co- itus interruptus, ms] was a sin against nature and something extremely bad. But because I was completely innocent – I had never seen a man naked and knew nothing about the act of marriage – I could not comprehend anything he said.”160

Having been informed about sex by a priest, the proper reproductive behavior remained obscure for other respondents too: “Prior to the marriage the pastor told you what was forbidden and what your duties were. The act of marriage had to proceed correctly; you were not allowed to waste the semen of your husband. You were not allowed to do anything before the marriage and you knew nothing either. Sometimes you hear some- thing. But then it came! Within a month [after the marriage] I was pregnant, did not get my period, we were both happy. But then my conscience troubled me [as she was already pregnant, sex could not be for procreational purposes and con- sequently only for – forbidden – purposes of lust, ms]. My husband still wanted the act of marriage and I withdrew a bit, having nothing bad in mind. But I well remembered the words of the pastor [that no semen was allowed to be wasted,

159 Ibid, 66. 160 Ibid, 62. 214 mixing ovaries and rosaries

ms] and I felt unworthy to go to church or Communion. I told my husband: “You go ahead to bed”. Only if he slept, I crawled into the bed. That could not continue for a long time. I went to the confessional completely upset and told that pastor I was pregnant. “Can I refuse my husband?” [I asked.] “No,” he answered. Then I asked him: “But where then does the semen go now?” Answer: “Get out of here and do not come back”. Such a time back then!”161

As from their girlhood, women were prepared for marriage and motherhood, but only in an ideological way. For some, the physical responsibility that was part of that task and the pressure to procreate came as a shock. A woman born in 1905 wrote Kerklaan: “Your advertisement unsettled me (this summer 80 years old, God willing). What did it mean to have sex for man and woman in the past? It meant fear, remorse, feelings of failure, etcetera. Confess and confess again. I don’t like the way it is now either, mail-order babies [i.e. being able to time a pregnancy exactly, ms]. But back then, twelve children in fifteen years, I couldn’t endure that. How innocent I was when I married. When we visited the presbytery to give notice of the intended marriage and the pastor elaborated on the marital life, I was completely stressed out: such a task.”162

As the authority on moral and ethical issues and provider of absolution, a priest played a central role in the Catholic’s reproductive life. The priest’s power, how- ever, extended beyond reproductive information: as the next paragraph will show, he had various ways to penalize believers who acted against his moral advice.

4.2.2 Deterrence: Church punishment Church representatives had various ways to inflict disciplinary punishment on members of the congregation who had not obeyed the reproductive rules. “For French Canadians prior to 1960,” McQuillan argued, ”to be barred from active involvement in the Church had both practical and emotional consequences. Per- sonal honor and the reputation of one’s family would be called into question. Par- ticipation in the many organizations the Church operated or controlled would be affected. Indeed, especially in smaller communities, to be publicly identified as a “bad Catholic” might entail economic disadvantage and social exclusion, as well as the emotional costs associated with the marginal status in a society in which reli- gion played such a vital role.”163

161 Ibid, 110. 162 Ibid, 70. 163 Ibid, 36. “we put up with what we were told” 215

In particular where it concerned ‘sinful’ sexual and marital behavior, many Church officials, Canadian and Dutch alike, regarded it as their duty to publicly penalize deviant behavior: not only to save the souls of those who had committed the sin but also to prevent others from making the same mistake. Believers depended on the Catholic Church for all major life occasions – birth, marriage and death – as well as for many frequently returning events – like the forgiveness of sins. This relationship of subordinateness offered the Church the power to com- mand obedience to its moral rules. The Church could withhold important rituals from congregation members that, apart from their religious symbolism, had important social functions. Children born to couples who were cohabitating were only baptized after permission of the bishop and becoming a godfather or god- mother required fulfillment of duties of confession and communion at Easter. A respondent remembered how the priest refused to marry her future husband and her if they fell short of certain conditions: “We married in 1941, we had little money and so we had both kept our own [sin- gle, ms] beds. But the pastor was only willing to solemnize us if we promised to exchange our two separate beds for one.”164

Among respondents, the fear that the Church would withhold their sacrament, which would not only have spiritual but also social consequences, was genuine: “I’m not a mother of a big family, but I am born and raised a Catholic woman, born in 1924 and married in 1952, complete with a sung Holy Mass and the pre- ceding ‘information’ [on sex, ms] from the pastor of our parish church. Both of us had to fill out a questionnaire at the end of the ‘information’ session, and answer several questions. Among other things you had to answer the question whether or not you wanted an infinite number of children. We didn’t want that, but we answered the question with a ‘yes’ because we didn’t dare risking a refusal [of the solemnization of their marriage, ms]!. So we started our marriage with a lie, that we were forced to tell.”165

The deterring effect of Church punishments was especially large if sinners were disciplined in public. Not being allowed to leave the pew to go forward and receive the Eucharist with the rest of the community, for example, attracted the attention of everyone and lead to public judgment and condemnation. One respondent even recounted how she was banned from mass altogether for practicing birth control.166 A respondent wrote how ‘proper’ marriages were announced in Church as opposed to those of a couples that married ‘in sin’ when the woman was already pregnant:

164 Ibid, 68. 165 Ibid, 68-69. 166 Ibid, 66-68. 216 mixing ovaries and rosaries

“I got married in 1936, we knew each other for three years. (...) Three weeks before the marriage, it was announced in church from the pulpit. In such cases it rang: “Entering into a Christian [underlining by respondent, ms] marriage are announced... (and then the name of the man and woman). That happened for three Sundays, and on the fourth the marriage was performed. But woe betide you if you were pregnant before you got married. Than you were pro- claimed softly, [you were announced] to enter into a marriage instead of a Christian one. And not in front of the big altar, oh no, in front of the small altar. Nor [did you get, ms] a Mass with songs or organ music, no, everyone had to see and hear how inferior the bridal couple was.”167

Referring to a ‘sinner’ during the sermon warned the whole of the congregation that disobedience to Church regulations would be punished by such an embarrass- ment: “By coincidence my neighbor – she had two children and I had four – and I were simultaneously hospitalized. The neighbor for her heart and I for the thy- roid gland. When we were home and went to church again, the chaplain preached: “And then they are often in the hospital nowadays. They ought to do their duties properly, then they won’t get nervous”. That’s the way it went.”168

Publicly being told off for disobedience to reproductive directives was a humilia- tion few Catholics wanted to risk. Most chose to practice family planning with the consent of the Church that, as the next paragraph will show, was not easy to obtain.

4.2.3 By courtesy of the Church: permission to practice birth control Catholics were obligated to ask a priest for permission to practice the only permit- ted means of birth control – periodical or complete abstention. The letters showed that priests not always sympathized with reasons for family limitation, like bad financial and socio-economic circumstances, and that it was not easy to get permis- sion. One of the respondents recounted the housing shortage after the Second World War and the resulting need to practice family planning: “We had four children, the last one twins, the eldest one was just turning three and we lived in the front room of my parents in law. We were allowed to use the kitchen but only if I cooked for them too. (...) When we went to sleep at night we first put the chairs on the table. The playpen went, folded in, in the hall, the beds were folded out and a mattress was laid on the ground where my husband and I slept. During the day it stood in the hall, behind a curtain, where the bikes were parked too. We lay with our heads under the table and with our feet

167 Ibid, 65. 168 Ibid, 118-119 “we put up with what we were told” 217

against the buffet, with our children at our left and right side. It was a horrible time and we did not get permission for periodical abstention. “You are young,” the pastor said, “and your husband has a good job, you can afford to live on your own”. Yes, what did he know. He lived with two chaplains and a housekeeper in a presbytery with no less then seven rooms and a big garden. I would have loved to park the baby carriage there during the summer, but in those years you did not dare asking such a favor.”169

Like poverty, health reasons did not warrant a permit from the Church to practice family planning either. Some respondents call suspicion of immorality and frivol- ity on themselves by asking the priest to assent to family limitation: “I am 87 years old. (...) In my time, you could only experience your marriage in a common way. But in my case it happened that my husband was warned [that his wife might not survive the delivery, ms] when I had my first child and I had three more children with great difficulty and three miscarriages. When my third child was born and I was churched [purging of a mother after she had a delivery, ms] indeed I told a pastor that we were thinking about becoming care- ful [i.e. trying not to get pregnant again, ms]. I was answered: “I guess you also lived randomly prior to your marriage” [i.e. that she had sex prior to her mar- riage, ms]. I came home crying, you can understand that when you always regard yourself as being married in honesty and purity [i.e. as a virgin, ms].”170

Though family planning was rejected and motherhood and large families eulo- gized, after a delivery women were considered to be ‘tainted’. Before attending Church service again, women had to visit a priest for ‘churching’ (kerkgang doen)in order to be ‘purged’: “I am a mother of eight daughters and four sons. You can call that a big family. We got married in 1940 and both came from a large family, my husband from a family of nine and I from a family of seven children. When we got married, we thought those were big families, not imagining we would have twelve children ourselves. It was war and already on the first birthday of our first baby we had a twin, with which we were happy nonetheless. In that way continually one [child] was added, with intervals of fourteen, sixteen, eighteen months. We had a nice pastor, but when I asked him for periodical abstention we did not get permis- sion. He told us: “God puts so much trust in you, that you can bear it!” (Maybe he was right.) Just prior to every delivery our pastor usually came to give me the ‘blessing of motherhood’ for a good outcome [of the delivery]. After the delivery as a mother you were not allowed to get out before you did your ‘churching’.

169 Ibid, 103-104. 170 Ibid, 120. 218 mixing ovaries and rosaries

You had to confess and then were allowed to go to Communion again, because then you were clean again! For me that was something of a contradiction. If you had delivered a baby, you certainly were not sinful?”171

Apart from the priest, a physician could play an important role in the introduction of family planning. As several letters show, however, like priests, Catholic doctors regularly objected against their responsibility in family planning: “You wanted to know what the experiences and ideas are of a mother (62 years old) of a big family. In current times you could call this a big family. You see, we had seven children and two miscarriages took place. We are Catholic and raised quite strictly. We married at the start of 1947. Right after nine months the first child arrived, which we liked very much. You knew nothing about contracep- tives, we were not told anything, by nobody. When the fifth child arrived, the eldest was exactly seven years. Of course I was busy, but you are still young and they were all healthy. The sixth one came, a nice and healthy baby too. I was 38 years old and I thought: this is enough. Already years before we heard about periodical abstention. Oh well, with all of that you became anxious [i.e. the me- thod resulted in fear for pregnancy, ms]. Miscarriages came too. But I did give away all baby stuff. When I was 42 years old, I thought I could talk with the doc- tor because only then I heard about the pill. But he was a dear, Catholic, elderly man just like my husband and said: “You are healthy and if God wants it, you have to approve, things work out well this way”. I did not get the pill. In those years you were too modest to go to a different doctor. I also went to the Father of the parish. (Why I went to a member of the clergy I still do not understand myself now, what did he know about marital life?) He repeated and emphasized a couple of times: “Your husband is the head of the family and you have to obey him otherwise he will go to different women.” It was 1965 then. My husband and I had a hard time. I more than he had because I did not care for ‘it’ [i.e. sex, ms] that much anymore: not in that way, planning sex [i.e. periodical abstention from sex, ms] and always hoping it would turn out well. By the way, that Father also talked with my husband and I bet he told him the same because my hus- band said too: “Now I know why some men turn to other women”. But he would never have done that or do that, he is too faithful and good for that. 45 Years I was when I got pregnant again.”172

If a priest refused to permit the practice of birth control, the authority of the doctor could sometimes overrule the opinion of the priest:

171 Ibid, 114. 172 Ibid, 102-103. “we put up with what we were told” 219

“During my marriage we lived with the parents of my husband. With two un- married sisters. (...) We were fighting huge financial problems. I helped in our shop for the whole day. In the meantime a servant girl (when available) raised the children. When there were three children, I asked the doctor for advice. He referred me to the pastor. “You are such a brave woman, I hear that from all sides, you can easily have a few more”. After the fifth child (we then had a very young doctor), he gave me one of the first ‘pills’. He understood our situation, also because I visited him with the others [other family members, ms] with symptoms that resulted from the stress of the cohabitation of two generations and the business.”173

In some occasions, a priest allowed family planning to be practiced for a certain period of time. One of the two letters sent to Kerklaan by a man, accounts of such a permit during an economic crisis: “In the meantime [of the economic crisis, ms] your family got bigger and you went to the Father confessor to ask permission for periodical abstention! In the case of my wife it involved a very young chaplain who pondered on it so long after she asked him the question that she thought he had fallen asleep behind the screen. The answer: “I give you permission for two months”.

A mother of five children who was not allowed to have any more for health reasons, was only permitted general abstention by her priest: “In the confessional I first told that I already had five children and that I was not very strong. The pastor then said: “Tell your husband Gijs to spare you and leave you alone” [i.e. practice general abstention, ms]. And all those nights you sleep in the same bed and you love each other. Isn’t that inhuman. I still dream about that.”174

A respondent, who had had four children in four years, was sterilized because she was not allowed the pill: “My husband refused periodical abstention. I secretly bought condoms (abroad). But he could not handle them. Still because of that [method] I achieved that it took a little longer before my other children came: number five in 1961 and number 6 in 1962. The pill was introduced. My Roman-Catholic doctor refused to give it to me, because we were both Catholics. The gynecologist at the Roman-Catholic Radboud University [the hospital of Nijmegen University, ms]

173 Ibid, 104. 174 Ibid, 118. 220 mixing ovaries and rosaries

was not allowed to prescribe the pill either. But he did offer to let me sterilize because that was allowed.”175

Because it was so hard to get permission for family planning, many Catholics lim- ited their family’s size without their Church’s consent. This meant committing a sin, which had to be confessed.

4.2.4 “Father, I abused matrimony”: confession Until the 1960s and 70s, it was common for Catholics to regularly make confession at their local Church or a monastery. To help the faithful in confessing all commit- ted sins and in that way keeping them away from Purgatory, the Catholic Church provided them with a ‘confession order’ one could keep to. Prior to the confession itself, one prayed thrice to Mother Mary to be helped in confessing correctly, fol- lowed by an equal number of Hail Mary’s. Secondly, one prayed to the Holy Spirit to help find sins committed, express them correctly and truly regret them. Further- more, one was expected to contemplate one’s life and truly look for any sins com- mitted. Usually, a written confession order would suggest various areas in life where one could have committed sins. Even for children examples were given of places they could have sinned: in Church (not always or not timely attending mass), at home (not having been obedient to parents, lying, stealing), at school (not having been obedient) and in the streets (behaving bad while playing). In the time that remained until the confession, one was expected to feel remorseful. After having entered the confessional box and closed the curtain or door, one asked the priest, seated in the box behind a partition with a screen, for a blessing, after which the sins were recounted. Depending on the gravity of the sins commit- ted, the priest gave punishments – usually in the form of a number of prayers one had to recite. Subsequently, one showed remorse of having sinned, left the confes- sional box and literally ‘prayed the punishments’ in Church. Before leaving the Church with a clean slate, one thanked God, the Holy Spirit and Mother Mary.176 Because they had to tell all their sins, confessors shared the most intimate details of their life with a priest, even with regard to matters of sexuality and procre- ation. A woman married in 1943 wrote: “When you went to confession, now I still don’t understand that we put up with what we were told, you often had to tell that pastor exactly how you did it in bed.”177

175 Ibid, 175-177. 176 Ibid, 117. 177 Ibid, 66. “we put up with what we were told” 221

Partly because it was difficult to receive permission for and information about peri- odical abstention, many Catholics practiced coitus interruptus – ‘leaving the Church before singing’ (voor het zingen de kerk uit). According to the Catholic Church, prac- ticing this ‘immoral’ method put one’s access to paradise at stake: “When you ran to your father confessor again after the coitus interruptus,he said: “Be glad you were not ran over while crossing the street, otherwise a cess- pool of fire would have opened for you”.178

Confession was not only an effective way to check people’s obedience to the repro- ductive rules of the Church but also coach them in ‘proper’ moral behavior: “Because the menstruation was very irregular [so periodical abstention was im- possible, ms], we had to manage with leaving the Church with the sign of the Cross [met het kruisje de kerk uit, i.e. coitus interruptus, ms], but during confession (that was after all the way you were raised) the chaplain told you off: all sexual in- tercourse ought to be intended to procreate and all old life [of the mother, ms] had to yield for new life [of the child, ms]...!. He did not even understand the ar- gument that the children were much better off if they were raised by their own mother; I had to trust Our Good Lord with these matters...! That was 1956!”179

The risk of not asking for permission for family planning was not being forgiven for the sins committed. In Brabant, not getting absolution was called ‘getting the screen’ (het schuifje krijgen), referring to the kind of screen in a confessional box that was opened when you started your confession and was closed suddenly with a bang if your sins were not forgiven:180 “After looking for a place to live we could finally marry in 1950. That place was an attic with a living room, bedroom and kitchen. Within ten months the first baby came and when we were married for four years, we had three children. The situation was really abominable. We tried periodical abstention over and over again and my husband in particular disliked the fact that he was in the con- fessional every week with the same story. And I tried to do it as little as I could (confessing I mean!). Luckily a chaplain arrived who said: “I am not married and it is easy enough for me to say anything about it: listen to your conscience”. That was very daring in those years! But it helped us enormously. Then we moved to Brabant and there we got ‘the screen’, meaning no absolution. “We do not commit those sinful practices here” the chaplain said, “if you do not prom- ise to do better and will not get pregnant, I will not give you absolution”.181

178 Ibid, 106-107. 179 Ibid, 94-95. 180 Ibid, 105. 181 Ibid, 105. 222 mixing ovaries and rosaries

Not receiving a priest’s permission to practice family planning, not receiving abso- lution for having practiced coitus interruptus or not being informed by a doctor about methods of birth control simulated many of Kerklaan’s respondents to find a pragmatic solution: “Taking a different doctor back then was not very easy, but you could always choose a different father confessor. That was a blessing in disguise: you were not obliged to confess at your own parish and you could look for someone who shared your ideas for as long as you wanted. But you had to be somewhat adven- turous and in a village it was a little bit harder than in a city, where more par- ishes were situated.”182

The extent to which priests enforced the Catholic morals differed a lot, so many believers tried to confess with priests who had a more liberal attitude towards fam- ily planning and certain (banned) methods of birth control. Some large parishes had more than one priest who could be consulted, another possibility was to go to a priest of a neighboring parish. Especially clergy in monasteries had the reputation of being liberal:183 “The doctor advised my mother not to have children anymore because of her health. When my father went to confess at Easter, he came from the confes- sional looking dismayed. My mother, who was still waiting for her turn, asked him what was wrong. Father [i.e. her husband] whispered he had been ‘given the screen’ [i.e. not having received absolution, ms]. My mother got extremely angry and said: “Come, let’s go to Rotterdam”. They took the bus and went to confess with the Fathers on the Goudse Rijweg. My father honestly told that he had not been given absolution. “I bet it’s a secular priest [i.e. a clergyman not living in a monastery, ms],” the Father said, “that kind has always been so childish”.”184

The geographical distribution of liberal and conservative priests appeared to have been at random both in the southern Catholic regions of the country and in the western, predominantly Protestant regions. The discrepancy in the enforcement of reproductive rules offered believers the chance to get permission and absolution, but also created inequality among believers: “When my friend from Nijmegen [in the southeast of the Netherlands, ms] had five children, she told me that a Father had said that that was enough. That story gave me the possibility to ask whether five children was enough [for her, ms]

182 Ibid, 103. 183 Ibid, 124. 184 Ibid, 125. The letter writer refers to the Church of the Redeemer of the Holy of Holiest (Kerk van de Allerheiligste Verlosser) from the redemptorists order in Rotterdam. Alex den Ouden, ‘De kerk aan de Goudse Rijweg’, (n.d.). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http:// www.rotterdammers.nl/kleingrut/vragen.htm#15a “we put up with what we were told” 223

too. I arranged this myself without discussing it with my husband. This clergy- man [she consulted, ms] himself came from a family in West-Friesland [the north of Noord-Holland, ms], where the sexual morality was very strict in those days. You will guess his answer. So more children came.”185

In 2003, Angelo Somers and Frans van Poppel published their analysis of inter- views with 22 priests active in the diocese of Breda in the 1940s up to 1970. The interviews affirmed that many of the clergy members felt pastoral responsibility for their flock, also where it concerned matters of reproduction and marriage, but did not confirm repression of moral disobedience by punishment.186 All clergymen indicated to have regarded the use of condoms and other modern appliances as a serious sin, but only the older priests admitted to have occasionally refused absolu- tion.187 The Breda priests also denied having paid house visits to check on a family size.188 As the next paragraph will show, however, the Kerklaan letters indicated that pronatalist indoctrination by priests extended beyond the confessional box and even reached the living room.

4.2.5 Crossing the threshold: house visits Confession was an effective way to check the reproductive behavior of Catholics; however, there were more ways for the Church to exercise its authority. Several of the letters written to Kerklaan indicated that priests paid house visits to his parish- ioners – not often perhaps but yet on a more or less regular basis. These visits pro- vided a priest with the opportunity to size up the religious and moral situation of a family, including the number of children. In addition, a priest showed how long the arm of the Church really was: “I married in 1949. (…) We were scared to death to get children. It had become impossible in the new age that had started [post-war economic crisis, ms]. (…) Because of certain circumstances we were very poor, but if you were in trouble do not expect to be allowed to knock on the door of the church [for support, ms]: they were not home. After all, poverty was an election of God. We moved to [the province of, ms] Holland. There we finally got more freedom, became more free to love each other and God and our Mother Mary, but the church was exactly the same here. When we had our daughter about six months, she was the fifth child, the pastor came for a short visit and asked: “How do you live, there is not yet another one coming?”189

185 Kerklaan (1987) 132. 186 Somers and Van Poppel (2003) 300-330. Somers interviewed priests who dealt with believers on a daily basis (secular and regular) as well as those involved with priests’ education. 187 Ibid, 321. 188 Ibid, 317-318. 189 Kerklaan (1987) 109. 224 mixing ovaries and rosaries

House visits by priests had the reputation of being used for the stimulation of fer- tility. Consequently, not getting house visits for some women was a proof of their success as a wife and mother and would be something to be proud of. A mother of 12 children wrote: “The pastor never had to visit us, to confirm whether or not all was well.”190

Recounting the frustrations of providing for a large family during economic hard- ships, a respondent born in 1921 considered the praises of the priest for fulfilling her reproductive task as rather uncomplimentary: “We knew about periodical abstention but the Pope was against it so no doctor wanted to cooperate. (…) So I had [a child, ms] in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, in 1949 a miscarriage, 1950, in 1951 twins (of which one died at the age of three): children in a flow production. I thought that would do and asked my doctor for contraceptives. The pill was not yet introduced. There was no Catholic doctor in the town where we lived back then. That man sent me to the pastor for permis- sion. As if the pastor created my children and took care of their life and well-being. No, my husband worked for that day and night (in the literal and fig- urative sense). (…) In the end, the doctor realized that my request was reason- able and gave me a diaphragm and a recipe for sperm killing ointment. (…) In the village where we lived back then, the chaplain once came to see how we were doing. He entered [the house] and said: “I can see everything is fine here.””191

The Kerklaan letters do not indicate that house visits were only used to propagate Catholic pronatalism, but they certainly seemed to be a common means to remind congregation members of their religious and moral duties. One of the letter writers recalled the way she was addressed by the priest for the ‘sinful’ behavior of her son during his puberty: “The chaplet was neglected when it was possible, or skipped completely. My eldest son had discussed that with his father confessor and he came to threaten me one evening with: “If you continue like that, it’s your own fault if his soul will get lost”.”192

In the light of the efforts believers made to meet the reproductive requirements of the Church, the examination of the moral situation and of the correctness of repro- ductive behavior during house visits by priests has been considered humiliating by many Catholic respondents. Many Catholics, however, did not need this type of vis-

190 Ibid, 78. 191 Ibid, 99-100. 192 Ibid, 158-160. “we put up with what we were told” 225 its by priests to be reminded of their moral duties: they applied themselves dili- gently to observing the doctrines of their Church. As the Catholic dogma’s were internalized, believers put themselves under pronatalist obligations.

4.3 A matter of the conscience: faith, fear and guilt

“If I think about the old days I do that with respect for the huge confidence [in the Church, ms] my parents had summoned. I can get annoyed when some- times one acts as if everything was so naive.”193

Obedience to Catholic doctrines was not solely driven by the Church. As a religion, Catholicism motivated people to act as their God wanted them to. As 4.3.1 will show, for many Catholics, this meant the size of their family was a matter to be only decided by God. Many more respondents though appeared to follow the repro- ductive directives of the Church because practicing family planning without con- sent of the Church or using illicit methods generated feelings of guilt and fear for punishment by the Church or by God, as will be demonstrated in 4.3.2. After all, every sin brought its punishment with it, as the saying was.

4.3.1 ‘God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb’: faith and family size The infallibility of God ensured devout Catholics that they would never be tested more than they were capable of bearing. Where was fertility concerned, having faith ideally meant Catholics trusted God not to give them more children than they could handle financially, physically or emotionally. A respondent, married in 1945, recalled her parents’ marriage: “I was born in 1922 in a family of ten children, of which I was the fourth one. My mother was not strong and unable to cope with a big family. My father was more Catholic than the Pope and lived according to the [Catholic, ms] laws, resulting in the fact that my mother died at the birth of her tenth child. When the ninth was born with great difficulty and the doctor told my father not to have more children, my father said: “The Good Lord will provide for that.” And so it happened.”194

The Church fed the belief that God decided the size of the family: “I already felt anxious imagining I would just have to await what would happen to me as a woman and mother. Because, as the Church told, that lay in the hands of God.”195

193 Ibid, 161. 194 Ibid, 88-89. 195 Ibid, 167. 226 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The majority of the respondents indicated to have experienced the influence of their faith on their reproductive behavior as negative; only one or two felt that the religious doctrines made a positive contribution to their fertility behavior: “I’m the youngest in a family of ten children and was born in 1916. My parents were devout Catholics and gave us much love and a strong sense of safety. “Love your neighbor as you do yourself and God above all”, my mother used to say. And also: “Watch and pray that you will not be doomed and pray often to Mary, immaculately conceived, to purify my body and bless my soul.” I did that very often too. And it really works, because everyone has sinful thoughts and acts sinfully while young, and praying hampers those things. I got married in 1940, after three years dating. Never had sex before [the marriage, ms]. Took us both lots of effort and harmed both of us. But we prayed for a chaste engage- ment. And we were supported by the father confessor, who listened and advised. Every Sunday we most eagerly went to Mass and to Benediction [het lof, the evening service, ms] always too. When we got married, my husband said: “I’m so proud of you, and happy to marry such a pure girl”. Nine months later a son was born. Everyone happy, and we just did our duty. Nature cannot be tampered with, the priests said. And that is the solid truth. We got eight chil- dren.”196

Though many of the respondents at some point in their letter expressed their faith, those indicating to have experienced their fertility as a commandment of God appeared to be exceptions: “I am a mother of eleven children, four boys and seven girls, have been through many things. When my youngest child was 2 years, my husband died and as a widow I was on my own. (...) Never a pastor or chaplain came to my house to tell me or my husband something about this [i.e. the catholic obligation to have a large family]. To be honest, I think those are all fairytales. (...) We just did our duty of the ten commandments that Moses received on the mountain Tabor, and those were the commandments of God. Nowadays they explain the com- mandments of God in a way that suits them best.”197

Some respondents showed huge faith in their Church’s moral right. Their per- sonal task was to meet the requirements as best as they could while performing their duty as wife and mother: “(...) we were Roman-Catholic and consequently knew exactly what was allowed and what not. And we had much confidence in God. All our wrongdoings and

196 Ibid, 62-64. 197 Ibid, 130. “we put up with what we were told” 227

all the troubles we went through, were incorporated in the chaplet at night, and that’s how we toiled through our whole marital life.”198

Desperation, caused by the ban on effective ways of family limitation, could severely damage faith in the involvement of God with fertility issues: “Properly married as a virgin on April 13, 1950. First child(ren) (a twin) January 14 1951 [exactly nine months and a day after the marriage took place, ms]. Third child (three weeks premature) on December 25, 1951 [11 months after the mother’s first delivery, ms]. Then I asked my father confessor permission to practice periodical abstention – even only for half a year. ‘No’, was the answer, ‘because if God doesn’t want you to have more children, you won’t get any’. So just abstention then. We managed that until May 30, 1952. God liked us to have one more, because on February 21, 1953 number four came. The oldest only two years and already four children. (…) With five children in a house that was too small, with little money and a diminishing health, my conscience said: it can- not be God’s will to have more. So I thought that it could never be sinful to start using contraceptives. I was starting to lose faith too. Something you once took so serious and then does not seem to work, makes you doubt more.”199

Failing to completely meet the reproductive requirements of their faith, many of the respondents sincerely believed to risk eternal life when practicing family planning. Moreover, they imagined practicing birth control would disappoint their God: “My first marital night was such a disillusion. And I assure you that our chil- dren are only conceived because you were not allowed to sin. Because the act of marriage had to be completed. For me, sinning meant upsetting Our Lord. And I never wanted to upset anyone by purpose, so Him neither. (...) My husband was in favor of a small family. But we didn’t know how to combine that with the Catholic doctrines. I assumed only a large family was blessed.”200

Compliance with Church rules was no sign of naïveté. Having been directed to become a mother and consider children as a blessing from God, many of the respondents admitted to have followed reproductive directives because they desired to live in accordance with the laws of God. Moreover, the psychological price of not doing so was often high, as the following paragraph will demonstrate.

198 Ibid, 68. 199 Ibid, 89. 200 Ibid, 76. 228 mixing ovaries and rosaries

4.3.2 The price of sinning: guilt and fear Many of Kerklaan’s respondents did not succeed in complete obedience to Church regulations regarding sexuality and procreation. Because of financial problems as well as housing shortage, many believers felt compelled to limit their family size. Health problems forced women to prevent further pregnancies. A growing num- ber of people wanted to offer a smaller number of children better socio-economic opportunities, which required investments in education. In the decades after the war, overpopulation and fear of another war stimulated smaller families too. Thwarting religious doctrines, however, entailed moral conflicts that sometimes did not make up for the advantages of the small family: “When I met women who only had one or two children, I wondered at that time how they managed to do that. Did they use contraceptives? How did they com- bine that with their being Catholic? I then felt a better Catholic woman. Later on I met women who, as they said, became neurotic because of agony of con- science, as they did not experience their marriage according to the Catholic morality and consequently lived in a state of sinning.”201

The strict enforcement of Catholic morals, already during youth and education, was often successful. The conscientious complications of ‘immorality’ formed a strong deterrent: “I was born in 1913, brought up strictly Catholic. My parents were God fearing Christians. In those times there was but one sin in the Catholic Church and that was immorality. (…) My parents feared the worst with six daughters. Before we were twenty, we were not even allowed to look at a boy: that was just a dan- gerous possibility to sin. I married when I was 37. The engagements that I have had are too many to count. Every time one [boyfriend, ms] tried to approach me, I broke it off completely. It gave me a long time of sorrow, but everything was better than to burn in hell for eternity.”202

Not being able to meet the reproductive requirements the Church, God and the Catholic community, many respondents indicated to have felt ‘trapped’ between the expectations of their religion and the economic reality of the day: “I had twelve children. I experienced that as follows. Born on August 3 1920, I was 21 years old when I married (1942). Already within a year I had my first child, one-and-a-half years later number two. That way it went on and on, of course there was not yet a pill. We have tried to live periodically [i.e. to practice periodical abstention, ms] but it couldn’t go wrong. When I was pregnant of the twelfth [child], it was no fun anymore. In the meantime one of my children got

201 Ibid, 91. 202 Ibid, 139-140. “we put up with what we were told” 229

ill, eight years, and died within two weeks. We are Roman Catholics and feared that that was our punishment for thinking the twelfth [child] was too much.”203

Once having started ‘sinful’ reproductive behavior like family planning, some respondents felt to have arrived in a downward spiral of sins. A respondent born in 1922 and mother of nine children, whose doctor postponed information on family planning, wrote: “As soon as I understood that I had to manage it myself, the way I lived and thought did change. But feelings of guilt over and over again and your marriage would almost end because of it. The result is that I did estrange from church and faith: a feeling of guilt once again.”204

The ‘moral’ responsibility for family planning was not always shouldered by both partners. Women appeared to have been emotionally and spiritually weighed down by it more often than man: “[I] Am almost eighteen years a widow and a mother of seven children. The eldest will be fifty this year, the youngest 37 [i.e. she had 7 children in 13 years, ms]. Married in 1934. Came from a strict Catholic family, my parents had 10 children. When I got married (the crisis was well under way so poverty every- where) I was really determined not to have ten children like my parents, but I still had seven. Absolutely not deliberately. I just had them and always with pain and effort, literally and figuratively, but in particular because of the Catho- lic faith my whole marriage has been a nightmare. I always thought: if some- thing happens to me, I will die like this then I will go straight to hell. Because I thought I did not live according to the rules of the religion. [i.e. she practiced family planning, ms] Of course, I did want the first two [children, ms]. (...) My husband always went to Sunday mass with the children. I did during the first years, but [later on, ms] I did not dare to. Because I always thought: I commit more and more deadly sins. I dared not confess. I dared not tell that I did not live the way I was supposed to and so could not go to Communion. But if once again one of the children had to make his first Holy Communion, I dared not go to church and take Communion without confessing. Then I first wanted to confess and then I used to circle the church ten times [not daring to go in and confess, ms]. I used to go [confessing, ms] in the beginning [of her marriage, ms], but I dared not talk about that [practicing birth control, ms] and so I thought: another deadly sin. After the seventh child, I was 34 then ([so] I was able to get another seven children) I just started to avoid my husband. Maybe after that it [i.e. sexual intercourse, ms] happened six or seven times but not in a

203 Ibid, 119. 204 Ibid, 98. 230 mixing ovaries and rosaries

correct way [i.e. not without practicing birth control, ms] and after my fortieth year never anymore. (…) Back then, I could be so jealous at people with only two or three children, who happily went to church and to Communion every day with their children, I could not do that because of my conscience.”205

Many respondents indicated to have had a higher standard of morality than their husbands – hence they fell victim for sentiments of guilt and fear much easier than their husbands. The fact that the Church kept urging women to fulfill their sole duty as mother and wife as best as they could in order to save their soul, did not contribute to a light-hearted experience of the Catholic reproductive morality: “Mother came to Amsterdam from a small village as a servant girl. She married when she was 25 years old and had five children with intervals of two or three years. (…) Once she [mother] told me: “Yes, back then during a mission week [a week during which religious zest and knowledge was boosted by special priests, ms] a Father said: Mothers, take care that if you lie on your death bed and your children are gathered around you, you won’t have to think: there could have been more children of mine here”.206

A mother of five children who was advised by her doctor not to have more, indicated to have suffered moral conflicts particularly on important Christian holy days: “Despite of our paying attention and counting after three years a daughter came and then six years later another daughter, I was 38 then. But there are no words to express the twitches of conscience it cost me during all those years. (...) For years during that period I had a frantic fear to confess. Christmas, Easter, Pen- tecost, those were miserable days for me. A chaplain once told me after my con- fession, during which I told that we practiced periodical abstention: “So you too. I still regarded your family as one of the good ones.”207

A respondent indicated to have started using the pill on her own responsibility – but also declared to still expect punishment: “Together we had eight children, but my husband decided that would do after the fourth one and went to talk with the Father of our parish who was a good friend of us. He [the Father, ms] considered no sex and separate bedrooms a good solution. We didn’t think much of that, so we got permission for periodi- cal abstention. A worthless method: I still had three children and we still lived sinful because we didn’t think much making love if the calendar allows it. So we decided that if we were to have many children, we would just welcome them.

205 Ibid, 115-118. 206 Ibid, 137. 207 Ibid, 118. “we put up with what we were told” 231

I was 42 when my youngest was born and I started taking the pill intentionally then, setting aside all conscience problems and scruples. But I’m absolutely sure that, would we have lived as good Catholics [meaning using no contracep- tives, ms], I would have had eighteen instead of eight children. If there’s a pur- gatory, I will have to spend considerable time there.”208

The interviews with the clergymen from Breda showed that priests did not under- estimate the emotional and psychological burden that the Catholic conjugal ethics formed for many Catholics. They suggested that these rules formed an important motivation for people to leave the Church. Giving up one’s faith, however, entailed serious social consequences. The Catholic milieu, which is the central focus of the next paragraph, formed an important motivation to toe the doctrinal line.

4.4 The Catholic social standard of fertility

By the start of the twentieth century, Catholic principles regarding sex and mar- riage no longer were the domain of the Church only but had become fused with norms and values of the Catholic community.209 This paragraph will discuss how the Catholic milieu contributed to the propagation of pronatalism: during the upbringing of children (4.4.1), in the relationship between husband and wife (4.4.2) and in contact with the broader Catholic community (4.4.3).

4.4.1 Youth: the mother-to-be Judging from the Kerklaan letters, many aspects of Catholic girlhood seemed to be imbued with preparations for the female duties: “Being raised strictly Catholic it was most common to have a big family. You did choose for a marital life according to the rules of the Roman Catholic Church. Large families used to be as common as small families are now. They were intertwined with the culture of those years, one might say. Right now the tendency is to stand up for yourself, that you are important, that you have to feel comfortable with yourself (or as one now usually says: feeling content), in the past to serve was essential. To live for other people, to make them happy and feel happiness yourself by that. I remember the oath at the KJM [Katholieke Jeugdbond voor Meisjes, Catholic youth group for girls, ms] that I swore (approxi- mately 13 years old): “I pledge loyalty to the church and worldly authorities. I pledge moral decency, sincerity and promise to be good to everyone. May God help me to remain faithful to these promises.” These were no empty words, it

208 Ibid, 80-81. 209 See Van der Plas (1966). 232 mixing ovaries and rosaries

was an ideal, for me anyway. My marriage was based upon them. I loved chil- dren and a big family appealed to me.”210

Devout Catholic parents did not hesitate to give their children a strict upbringing in order to prevent them from committing any sins in the field of sexuality and relationships: “I’m from a devout Catholic descent, a family of eight children with a good upbringing, very conscious. Two sisters in a strict Carmelite convent and six others married. My parents were very pious and we got married in that atmos- phere. Often in our family it sounded: “If any of my children had to get mar- ried... [i.e. was pregnant before marriage, ms] Rather see you dead.” It never happened. Fear controlled our family.”211

The authority of parents in matters of life, and particularly morals, was not ques- tioned. A respondent recalled a relationship with a non-Catholic boy: “We did not have to try that. Even if the boyfriends I had who were ‘nothing’ were nice. The end of the story? “Break off” dad said.”212

Catholic education is supposed to have paid an important contribution to the prop- agation of pronatalism.213 Many respondents, though, indicated that a Catholic upbringing by parents, and particularly the mother, was at least as important as education. Because parents did not share private matters with their children, the relationship between parents seemed smooth and morally pure, which often made a profound impression: “Our parents lived completely properly, cheerfully self-effacing for a large num- ber of children that they made into virtuous, fine people.”214

For girls, the way their mothers had shown an irrefutable trust in the spiritual approval of maternity set an example: “I’m born in 1924. Married in 1950. My very religious mother was utterly con- vinced that only a big family sanctified.”215

210 Kerklaan (1987) 71. 211 Ibid, 151. 212 Ibid, 165. 213 See John Sullivan, Catholic education: distinctive and inclusive (Dordrecht 2001); Philip Gleason, Contending with modernity: Catholic higher education in the twentieth century (New York 1995); Annette Mevis, ‘Een boek lezen was tijd verknoeien: meisjesonderwijs en vrouwenarbeid in Helmond en de Peel, 1918-1940’, Maria Grever and A. van der Veen, Bij ons moeder en ons Jet: Brabantse vrouwen in de 19e en 20ste eeuw (Zutphen 1989) 51-78; Hans de Frankrijker, De katholieke onderwijzersopleiding: organisatie en ideologie 1889-1984 (Nijkerk 1988). 214 Kerklaan (1987) 167. 215 Ibid, 76. “we put up with what we were told” 233

The example of a faithful mother and wife, set by the mothers of the respondents, did not always result in the innocent copying of that behavior. Respondents brought up during the 1950s and 1960s appeared to have been very conscious of the difficult life their mothers had as a result of the compliance with the Church directives regarding reproduction: “To marrying in white [dress, so as a virgin, ms] and become a mother, yes, back then those were the ideals little girls looked forward to realize. But if you were born in a big family, this future image could frighten you as well. Being the eldest, it was common to help raising the younger ones, but sometimes you heard you mother sighing that this was really too much for one mother!216

For many respondents, the mother had been a role model that stimulated them to try and meet the behavioral requirements of the Church too, while for others it stimulated to introduction of family planning in their own marriage. As the next paragraph will show though, the relationship between husband and wife some- times lacked consent about the moral appropriateness of family planning.

4.4.2 A matter of mutual agreement: pronatalism in marriage A necessary condition for the practice of family planning in a marriage was the co- operation of both spouses.217 Most respondents indicated to have started family planning with cooperation of their husband and by mutual agreement. A few letter writers, however, indicated that their husbands had a different opinion on the mat- ter of family planning than they had: “I was twenty-five years old when I married (1934); my husband was 35. Ten months after the date of our marriage my eldest son was born. When he was twelve, I had ten children, one of which was a twin, and I had three more after [10 children in 12 years, 13 in total, ms]. I was 44 when my youngest daughter was born. When I was pregnant of Mary, I really cried. My husband (raised strictly Catholic) said: ‘Oh baby, every child is a gift of Our Good Lord.’ You know what my answer was? ‘Well, I would like Him to give His gifts to the neighbors’ (who had only three children).”218

As the man was the head of the household, his opinion on the practice of family planning often was decisive: “My husband and I had seven children. After the birth of number five our strict Catholic doctor thought it was enough, in particular because I could have been in better health. So periodical abstention. My husband could not

216 Ibid, 94-95. 217 See also Szreter (1996). 218 Kerklaan (1987) 89. 234 mixing ovaries and rosaries

cope with that: he was mortally afraid of ‘deadly sinning’ – for him that was more important than our family which was living in a cramped house and me. My attitude was more liberal – we had performed our duty [to multiply] didn’t we? In those years it has spoiled my life, ‘sex’ was not enjoyable any- more for the fear of a new pregnancy. Which meant my husband and me drifted apart (…)”219

Though women were instructed to respect the superiority of their husband as the male head of the household, some respondents appeared to have been well aware of the double social standard for men and women: “I have never felt like being a drudge you know, but it was true that the man had so many more liberties in so many areas. Okay, if you had a big family then you had enough to do, as we did not have a servant and you did everything yourself as much you could. But to give a small example: my husband was [a member, ms] of several youth associations and was praised for his versatility. In spite of his big family he made use of himself for others. But image it would have been me who had done that instead of him. Then probably I would have been a gad- about woman that had left her poor husband at home.”220

A woman married in 1935 gave birth to six children, among which a child with a spinal problem, and had a miscarriage during the pre-war years, the mobilization, the occupation and the after-war economic crisis: “Eventually, a neighbor who had only one child pointed out to me that it was irresponsible to put children in the world during war time. I did tell my hus- band this, but he then said: “It’s better to have children than to have a disease”. And I was also told that it was a blessing.”221

For Catholic women, to reach mutual agreement about family planning with their husband was crucial – because in most relationships, the man eventually laid down the law. A much broader part of the social environment, though, than par- ents and husband exerted influence on the decision to limit family size – which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

4.4.3 Just like everyone else: fertility and the Catholic community Apart from the information on Catholic reproductive values and the way pronatalist ideology was imposed on people, the Kerklaan letters clearly reflect the pillarized state of Dutch society. Contact with members of other Christian denomi-

219 Ibid, 155. 220 Ibid, 156. 221 Ibid, 172. “we put up with what we were told” 235 nations, let alone interchange of reproductive ideals, appeared to be rare. The rare occasions that Catholics had the opportunity to view their reproductive life from a different perspective did not lead to a change in behavior: “We have thirteen children because we were not allowed periodical abstention by the pastor. And so you did not practice that. That was that! (...) We had a gro- cery store and all children helped (...). In between [jobs] they had to do their homework or attend evening classes. My husband had humanistic customers, noble people they were. They were worried when the fifth child was born, for the upbringing but also for the work later. My husband said: “We love children and that’s what we work for. They can become whatever they want to be”. When my husband had been walking with the milkman’s cart for fifty years, he was congratulated by that family. He went to thank them and the first thing the lady asked, was: “How many children do you have now?” because they had moved out of the neighborhood. My husband said it had become thirteen; incompre- hensible it was for that lady, but it just happened.”222

The pronatalist pressure exerted by the Catholic Church did not take place in a social vacuum. A respondent recounted how the pressure for a large family, exerted by priests but also by other Church representatives and members of the family and the broader community, resulted in a pronatalist social ambience: “I was born in 1918. When I was twelve years old I was already prepared for motherhood (...). Something that I always remembered and what was empha- sized over and over again, is that you never were allowed to refuse your hus- band [in having sex, ms]. (...) My mother had six children, absolutely not because she wanted to but because she was supposed to. I have five children and that was an absolute obligation too. Having a baby in every two years. (...) No, these strict morals did not chase me out of the church, but still I found it very difficult. This was emphasized once again by the district nurse (a nun) who visited me after the births of my children and urged me over and over again to always be available for my husband. One now wonders: what caused her to emphasize that so much?”223

The expectations of the community regarding fertility behavior formed an impor- tant motivation for Catholics to observe reproductive rules. Many influential social positions were occupied by orthodox Catholic laymen or by Church representatives. Nurses and midwifes for example were often nuns and could ‘refresh’ a woman’s knowledge of reproductive rules during the intimate moments of a delivery:

222 Ibid, 133. 223 Ibid, 71. 236 mixing ovaries and rosaries

“I was born in 1931. My mother was almost 30 years old then. One-and-a-half year later, my brother was born with a spinal. He lived for only six weeks. My mother was still in childbed when the district nurse, a nun would you believe, advised her to get another child as soon as possible. After this five more chil- dren were born.”224

Church punishment of neglected moral duties had consequences for the position of the ‘sinner’ in the Catholic community. On the other hand, behavior that was approved of by the Church could compel admiration in the congregation. Respon- dents gave various examples of rather explicit pronatalism by ‘laymen’: “We had three little ones [children, ms] already and lived house resembling a slum dwelling. Next to ours [their house] new public housing units were built after the war. Secretly, without my husband knowing it, I competed for such a house too. Then one of the ‘dignitaries’ of the village came to check whether it was really necessary. But that man was 50 years and unmarried. “Well,” he said, “but three children is not much”. Looking at my belly he said: “Or is another one being made?” That was the way it went (...).”225

Deviation from the standard for fertility behavior was not only disapproved of by the Church but was also met with aversion in the Catholic social milieu: “My husband as well as I came from a very traditional Roman-Catholic family. (…) Yet this from my perspective rather cramped attitude to life did not appeal to me. (…) Luckily I could discuss that with my husband, then my fiancée. He had a more liberal attitude than his parents. Very pious though, but thinking that his brains were given him to use them (...) Prior to our marriage we agreed how to arrange it when we would get married. We did not want to deliberately wait for a long time with having children, then we wanted no more than two or three children and then get on with our studies together (…). This mode of thinking was not always appreciated because for many members of the family as well as for many friends and acquaintances we were interfering with the established ideologies and ideas.“226

The social support for the pronatalist ideology of the Catholic Church culminated in the foundation of the Association for Large Families (Bond Voor Grote Gezinnen), where advocates of the large family could confer about housing and could share their horror of Neo Malthusianism:

224 Ibid, 69. 225 Ibid, 118. 226 Ibid 167. “we put up with what we were told” 237

“[I am, ms] Born February 1915 in ‘s Hertogenbosch [Noord Brabant, ms], the middle one of that kind of a big family of fifteen children, married in 1942 with an Amsterdam doctor. (…) During the twenties I witnessed the foundation of the bvgg [Bond Voor Grote Gezinnen, Association For Large Families, ms]: my father had a seat on the (regional?) board. He was also treasurer of the building society ‘Saint Joseph’, founded on behalf of large families who needed spacious housing. (...) I think that association attracted so many members especially because of those practical building and living activities for the large families. The church (the hierarchy) most certainly and primarily meant to provide the big families with ‘accommodation’ in such an association. (…) They were to experience a safe ‘among us’ there, but in fact it was more of a ghetto against “the onrushing and abhorrent violence of the Neo Malthusianism”, as you were told in the fire-and-brimstone sermons during the mission week in the [nine- teen]twenties. The Neo Malthusian League (…) was a ‘threat’ to the Catholic conjugal ethics and I think that the ‘we-sentiment’ of the BVGG also increased the people’s idea that having many children was a good and God-agreeable, so religious business.”227

At least until the 1970s, religious pronatalism determined the prevailing standards for fertility behavior in Catholic communities. Observance of moral codes with regard to sexuality and procreation required constant prompting by the Church. As a means of spreading the pronatalist ideology, the social milieu functioned rather like the Association for Large Families and formed a ghetto where high fertility was an expression of decent Catholicism. As the Kerklaan letters show, obedience to the reproductive directives as propagated by Church representatives and motivated by faith, fear and guilt, was thus preserved by the Catholic environment.

5 Conclusion

In the 4th century, procreation became the central focus of the Catholic conjugal ethics; since then Church fathers, moralists and canonists have kept themselves busy with the extent to which not adhering to these behavioral rules, for example by obstructing pregnancy, was to be regarded as moral disobedience.228 This chap- ter focused attention on the mechanism behind the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior on a micro level. It discussed the doctrines that affected fertil- ity behavior and the way they altered individual perceptions on fertility-related mat- ters like family planning, sexuality and motherhood. Analyzing letters from Cath-

227 Ibid, 85-85. 228 Westhoff (1986) 34-42. 238 mixing ovaries and rosaries

olic women on their sexual and marital life, this chapter also dealt with the various ways via which fertility of believers was stimulated. The pronatalist ideology of the Catholic Church ensued from a number of doc- trines that, both directly and indirectly, affected reproductive behavior. The ‘sacra- ment of penance’ obligated believers to report their own moral disobedience to the Church – under penalty of eternal damnation. This way, the Church could inquire into the sexual and marital life of individual believers and was able to only punish illicit reproductive behavior. ‘Holy matrimony’ was another sacrament that constituted the pronatalist ideol- ogy. In Catholicism, procreation was reserved for man and woman who formed a ‘natural’ union that could not be annulled. Within marriage, husband and wife had different tasks, which were primarily determined by their gender. Once married, it was a woman’s duty to have children and take care for them, a role that was suppos- edly natural to the female. Alleged talents of the female, like a self-effacement, sup- ported her in accomplishing her task. Employment was supposed to be ‘unnatural’ for women and stimulated her to renounce her task of reproducing and caring for children. As a result of the Church’s emphasis on the gendered division of tasks between men and women, Dutch Catholic girls received less education than Protestant girls. According to the Catholic Church, however, in her position as wife and mother, the dedication of the woman to the family was much more important than economic or educational achievements: after all she was responsible for the moral development of future generations. Doctrines directly affecting fertility made an important contribution to the pronatalist ideology. A woman was not allowed to refuse her husband sexual inter- course, something women were regularly reminded of by priests. Sex was only allowed within marriage and it’s only aim, according to the Catholic Church, was to procreate. It was the woman’s responsibility to observe this rule, for she was not supposed to experience much lust anyway. The ‘act of marriage’ had to be practiced in a ‘natural’ way, meaning fertilization was not to be obstructed. General or period- ical abstinence from sex, hence, were the only methods of birth control allowed, but only with consent of a priest. Other methods like coitus interruptus, abortion, the condom, the intra-uterine device and the pill were forbidden. Like sexual desires and sexual activities outside wedlock, they were considered to be mortal sins. The overall majority of the women contributing to the Shere Hite study of female sexuality, Catholic, Protestant and Jewish alike, indicated to have been raised with the idea that sex was ‘bad’.229 Indoctrination with the Catholic reproduc-

229 Shere Hite, The Hite report: a nationwide study of female sexuality (New York and Lon- don 1976). 95% Of Hite’s sample indicated to have been brought up with the idea that sex was bad or at least a subject never mentioned; Catholic women in her sample only made up 25%. “we put up with what we were told” 239 tive rules, however, appeared to have affected attitudes of Catholics towards fertil- ity-related issues more thoroughly. In this respect, numerous surveys in the usa as well as in Europe not only demonstrated the extent to which Catholics deviated from all other denominations, but also proved the consistent reproductive behav- ior among Catholics. Even after the Catholic and non-Catholic fertility behavior converged, Catholics desired larger families and were less inclined to practice fam- ily planning than members of Protestant denominations. When practicing family planning, Catholics preferred periodical abstention and coitus interruptus rather than ‘appliance methods’. Among Catholics more than among other denomina- tions, attachment to religious affiliation correlated negatively with experiences with pre-marital ‘petting’, pre-marital coitus, homosexuality and response to orgasms during marital coitus. Rather typically, Dutch research has focused on Catholic experiences with motherhood rather than sexuality and showed a general tendency among women to comply with the reproductive doctrines of the Catholic Church. Marriage and motherhood as the destiny of a woman’s life was regarded as self- evident as was subordinance to the husband, even if a woman worked too. Notably, religiosity rather than socio-economic position and level of education determined dedication to these doctrines. Though the selection of the respondents requires cautious analysis, the Kerklaan letters provide for an excellent insight in the various ways Catholics were indoctrinated with the pronatalist ideology. Within Catholicism, moral innocence was synonymous with sexual and reproductive ignorance: often, the priest’s mari- tal information was the first and only sex education a couple received. In this way, the Church could guide believers in ‘moral’ reproduction. Evasion of the pronatalist rules could be punished by withholding ‘sinners’ from sacraments and publicly disgracing them. The obligation to ask permission for family planning gave the Church an excellent insight in the moral status of believers. Confession, in addition, provided priests with the possibility to remind the faithful of the ‘proper’ reproductive behavior and to punish them by withholding absolution of sins. Finally, house visits were paid to supervise the moral state of a family and, when necessary, question believers within privacy of their own home. Many respondents were kept on the virtuous path not only by priests but also by their faith. Believers were told to trust God to take care of their family limitation. Some actually did, though many more appeared to be motivated to uphold repro- ductive values by a negative effect of their religion: sentiments of guilt about illicit moral behavior and fear for punishment by the Church or, worse, their God. Fam- ily limitation was bound to cause scruples, especially among women whose virtu- ousness, as Catholicism had taught them, was all about having and caring for chil- dren.230 Finally, the Catholic milieu played an important role in propagating the pronatalist ideology. Mothers provided girls with role models of supposedly proper ‘moral’ and ‘feminine’ behavior. The practice of family planning depended on the 240 mixing ovaries and rosaries

cooperation of a husband who may be inclined to cherish a large family and obedi- ence to the Church reproductive doctrines. As the Kerklaan letters indicated, how- ever, members the broader, often all-Catholic environment had at least as much influence on fertility decisions as parents and partners. In a milieu where respect for the moral authority was common, not coming up to the standard of the ‘proper’ Catholic family could have serious social implications. The foremost strength of the ‘infrastructure’ for the enforcement of Catholic pronatalism, as revealed by the Kerklaan letters, was that immoral behavior was blamed on people and not on their circumstances, like poverty.231 The Church, faith and the social environment called for unconditional respect for the Catholic moral values: the reward being eternal life, the hardships these behavioral rules caused were to be considered trivialities. This chapter has demonstrated what the Catholic pronatalist ideology implied and how it effectively influenced individual fertility behavior. Within the confinement of the Catholic pillar, the authority of the Church, desire for divine approval and the social behavioral standard ensured that Catholic municipalities where alternatives to the Catholic fertility behavior sur- faced, remained rare cases. The Kerklaan letters represent a period of time during which the influence of Catholic religion was not only evident, but was also taken for granted. As one of the respondents phrased it: “Because the chaplain said you were allowed periodical abstention while the pastor was opposed to it, you did not practice it. That was that!”. From the 1940s onwards, however, this atmosphere started to change, the respondent recalled. “We got married in 1943 and have thirteen children (...). Every child that was born was received with gratitude, but in spite of that we had many worries. (…) Already then there was a changing perception of big families.”232 Between 1960 and 1970, Catholic fertility rates tumbled and converged with those of the other denominations. In the final chapter, attention will be turned to the last phase of the influence of religion on Catholic reproduction.

231 Derksen (1994) 31. 232 Kerklaan (1987) 93. Chapter 5 That rag freedom!

— Catholic faith and fertility in the Netherlands, 1870-1970

1 Aims of the chapter

This chapter recapitulates the results of this study and embroiders on its theme. The religious determinants of Catholic reproductive behavior in the Netherlands between the start of the fertility decline in the late 1870s until the end of it in the early 1970s were found on three social levels. Firstly, on the macro level Church interference with morality was institutionalized through pillarization. Secondly, on a meso level, differences in social-economic circumstances and the degree of cultural multiformity could cause adoption of family planning or maintenance of conventional fertility behavior. Thirdly, on a micro level, Catholic pronatalist doc- trines were most effectively enforced on believers. Paragraph 2 summarizes the conclusions of the previous chapters. The third paragraph takes a closer look at the period between 1960 and 1970, when fertility declined in the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands to reach a level below that of the Protestant regions. This inversion of Dutch Catholic fertility exposes once more the mechanism behind the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. Finally, paragraph 4 concludes with some personal observa- tions on the subject.

2 Catholic religion and reproduction in the Netherlands, 1870-1970: conclusions

The demographic transition in the Netherlands distinguished itself from that in other western European countries by a late onset and slow development of the fer- tility decline. Not the entire Dutch population, however, was hesitant to take up modern demographic behavior that included family planning, a lower age at first marriage and a higher proportion of ever-married. The Catholic provinces of Lim- burg and Noord-Brabant appeared to have been responsible for keeping the natio- nal average birth rate high from 1870 until 1960. Dutch demographic history has rendered an account of religion as a variable that, after having controlled for socio-economic determinants, could explain regional differences in fertility and nuptiality levels and patterns during the demographic transition. Ever since the 242 mixing ovaries and rosaries

debate on this topic between Hofstee and Van Heek though, research has lacked a clear recognition of the social position and meaning of religion and therefore a workable approach to the religious determinant of demographic behavior. The ten- dency was to just measure the proportion of traditional denominations in the Netherlands, and of Catholics in particular, without figuring out the mechanism behind the influence of religion on demographic behavior. Most Dutch demo- graphic historians, like their Irish colleague Compton, still treated religion as a “demographic irritant” that hampered clear socio-economic explanations for varia- tions in fertility and nuptiality behavior.1 This study, however, showed the mechan- isms behind the influence of religion on fertility on a macro, meso and micro level of Dutch society by unraveling the involvement of Catholicism with each of the levels separately. On a macro level, religion was institutionalized in the Netherlands when, dur- ing the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it became the basic principle behind social divisions. From 1870 onwards, the political scene diversified and simulta- neously consolidated: a division between Liberals and conservatives gave way to clear-cut delimited blocs of Protestants, Catholics, social democrats and Liberals. The decades following 1920 were the heydays of pillarization and witnessed a so- cial confessionalism that was no longer the business of Christian population groups only but characterized the whole of society including, as Hofstee under- lined, the part of the society that did not belong to any denomination.2 Pillarization preserved the preoccupation with moral welfare in the private sphere that had been the focus of the nineteenth century moralization ‘offensive’. As the state provided laws that made intervention with private matters legal and relished it as a matter of national interest, the Catholic as well as the Protestant churches provided a network of organizations to regulate morality. Public life, including labor organizations, social services, health care, culture, sports and edu- cation, became segmented along ideological lines. In Dutch society, there was little chance of escaping from pillars; within the Catholic pillar, Church-controlled orga- nizations were unavoidable. “People don’t have an ideology, they live (in) the ideology,” Siep Stuurman argued.3 The actual circumstances in which people live, he expounded, will deter- mine how an ideology, which simultaneously is part of the circumstances, func- tions. For the meso level study of the influence of religion on fertility, ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ case studies of municipalities were selected. The case studies showed how, in spite of similar religious compositions, demographic and in particular

1 Compton (1976) 451. 2 Hofstee (1981) 58-64. 3 Stuurman (1983) 37. that rag freedom! 243 socio-economic and cultural circumstances could change the extent to which reli- gion managed to determine fertility and nuptiality levels and patterns. Data analyses on a meso level revealed the profundity with which religion was intertwined with socio-economic and cultural community structures. A higher degree of industrialization and consequently better developed trade and services sector, a more modern agrarian sector, a higher degree of mobility or the presence of other (Protestant) denominations could stimulate a lower fertility rate and, hence, the introduction of family planning among Catholics. The sometimes deli- cate differences in these socio-economic and cultural circumstances affected the populations of the municipalities of Mheer, Roosteren and Grave up to a point where the stimulus to limit the family size tipped the balance of the ideological objections. With regard to the religious determinants of fertility behavior on the level of the individual, Catholic pronatalism in the Netherlands entailed more than the prohi- bition of contraception and abortion. Important doctrines that affected fertility concerned the gendered division of tasks and the ‘natural fate’ of women to become strong mothers and loyal wives. The doctrines altered views of Catholics on family size, family planning, methods of birth control, sexuality and mother- hood. The Roman Catholic Church had several ways to enforce obedience of its flock to the moral reproductive code. The system of confessing sins and requiring an absolving blessing allowed priests to look after the reproductive virtues of believers. The permission required to practice family planning offered another possibility to check the extent to which the faithful kept to directives on sexuality and procreation. Fear of punishment in the afterlife and on earth, and faith in the truth claimed by the Catholic Church motivated people to obey moral rules. More- over, within the confinement of the Catholic milieu in which people grew up, were educated, worked, married and raised their children, they were hardly exposed to alternatives to the Catholic reproductive life style. The self-evident acceptance of the Church authority in moral affairs, the unfa- vorable sphere surrounding matters of sexuality and contraception and the fallibil- ity of the most common methods of birth control were factors that made family limitation for Catholics difficult up to the 1960s. For most Catholic women, the complexities surrounding fertility added to the day-to-day reality with financial hardships, the care for the children’s physical, moral and spiritual well-being and the household. The spiritual backing of the Church in all big and small life events and the social community that came with a religious denomination made the financial and physical price of ‘natural’ fertility modest or at least tolerable. From the late nineteenth century onwards, socio-economic developments stimulated the fertility decline in the Netherlands and set about to dissolve the influence of religion on fertility. After 1900, Catholic fertility rates and patterns started to change, however, Catholic religion still correlated with a particular fertil- ity and nuptiality behavior. This correlation ought to be regarded as an indication 244 mixing ovaries and rosaries

of the mechanism of the influence of Catholic pronatalist ideology on fertility at work in the Dutch society at large, on meso levels and on the micro level both sepa- rately and in a triple relationship.

3 The final blow for Catholic fertility: 1960-1970

According to Kevin McQuillan, three conditions need to be met for the effect of religion on demography to occur. A religious institution must have formulated directives for behavior that “have linkages to fertility outcomes”; “means to com- municate its teachings to its members and enforce compliance” must be in place as well as “a sense of attachment to the religious community” on the side of the believers.4 From the 1910s until the 1960s the gradual changing socio-economic and cultural circumstances affected the adherence of Catholics to moral doctrines. Both in Europe and the usa, however, the developments only very slowly lead to demographic shifts in Catholics’ actual and ideal family size. Catholics’ enthusi- asm for family planning and ‘appliance’ methods did not significantly alter either. Up to the 1960s, the Catholics’ motivation to practice birth control remained lower than that of any other denomination and appeared to be affected mostly by religios- ity. Particularly in the Netherlands this appeared to be the case: only after 1960 the gradual changes in norms regarding sexuality, procreation and marriage acceler- ated and could no longer be curbed.5 The ironic fate of the Catholic Church’s influence on fertility behavior was that when the necessary conditions for that kind of effect on morality changed, its mechanism not only started to falter but became clearly exposed too. “Institutional power may produce signs of conformity in situations where deviance brings severe punishment to offenders,” McQuillan argued, “but it may also encourage cynicism that leads to covert forms of resistance and outright rejection once the institution’s power begins to weaken.”6 In Europe and the usa, the 1960s brought an end to the gradual character of social, economic and cultural changes and brought a sudden convergence of fertility and nuptiality levels of Catholics and Protestants. On a large scale, nominal as well as devoted Catholics started to practice family planning and used other methods than the Church-allowed periodical abstention.7 During the baby boom, Charles Westoff and Elise Jones alleged, the fertility of American Catholics still showed an increase that was disproportional compared to that of other denominations. During the 1960s, though, the convergence that had devel-

4 McQuillan (2004) 49-50. 5 Paul Luykx, De actie “voor God” 1936-1941: een katholieke elite in het offensief (Nijmegen 1978) 260-306. 6 McQuillan (2004) 47. 7 Ibidem, 209-210. that rag freedom! 245 oped only gradually prior to the Second World War suddenly advanced. By the mid-1970s, the fertility rates of Catholics, regardless of the degree of their religios- ity, virtually matched those of other denominations.8 At the end of the 1960s, Westoff and Jones argued, the Church’s rigorous affir- mation of its traditional attitude towards the practice of contraception brought about deterioration of the Church’s moral authority. In particular Humanae Vitae, the authors alleged, derided the authority of the Church in ethical matters. The encyclical letter rigorously and unconditionally prohibited contraceptives after years of moral ambiguity by Church representatives and after the Church had knowingly refrained from interference with the increasingly widespread use of the pill among its members.9 The Church was late, its flock had moved on. The bad timing of Humanae Vitae also concerned the moment of publication. In the usa, with its protests against the Vietnam War and student’s fight for democratization 1968 was a rather unfortunate year to claim any absolute respect for authority.10 In Europe, 1968 saw a strike of 9 million workers in France and ‘Prague Spring’. In the Netherlands, ‘happenings’ mocking the establishment’s power alternated with more vicious attacks on authority.11 In the years following the publication of Humanae vitae, the fertility rates in the Catholic regions of the Neth- erlands fell to below the level of the predominantly Protestant and non-denomina- tional parts of the country.12 Like in the usa, the use of contraceptives among Cath- olics increased considerably.13 In the Netherlands, the loyalty to the Church and the obedience to its teachings not only declined as a result of the counterproductive effects of Humanae vitae and an anti-authoritarian atmosphere. These developments coincided with a serious crisis in the Church that harmed the respect for the Dutch clergy among the most faithful part of the Church’s rank and file, especially in the southern hotbed of Catholicism. “The strong decrease in the fertility of the Dutch Catholics in the period 1935-1970,” Somers and Van Poppel argued, “is closely connected with the huge changes that took place in the Catholic Church and in the Dutch Catholic Church provinces in particular from the 1950s onwards, both with regard to the doctrines concerning marriage and procreation and the organization of the Church.”14 The preparations for Vatican ii, the Second general council of the uni-

8 Westoff and Jones (1979) 213. 9 Ibid, 216. 10 Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its afterlives (Chicago 2004) and Mark Kurlansky, 1968: The Year That Rocked the World (New York 2003). 11 Hans Righart, De eindeloze jaren zestig: geschiedenis van een generatieconflict (Amsterdam 1995). 12 Somers and Van Poppel (2003) 301. 13 Hutjes (1974). 14 Somers and Van Poppel (2003) 201. 246 mixing ovaries and rosaries

versal Church that was announced by Pope John xxiii early in 1959, stimulated a new ecclesiology that focused on the manifestation of the Church on a local level. An increased autonomy for local churches in theology, liturgy, canon law and orga- nization was the result.15 The Dutch ecclesiastic changes joined in with (international) theological modernizations that, since the 1940s, gradually put the strict divisions between bishops, priests and the flock into perspective and urged for a development of “a creed of the laymen” beside the teachings of the hierarchy.16 The increased atten- tion for psychology at several seminaries in order to prepare future priests for the spiritual care they were expected to provide for believers, as well as the develop- ment of parochial discussion groups to spread the idea of believers contributing to the Church, were both illustrations of these developments.17 Stimulated by the technical developments concerning birth control, the character of the relationships between the Church, its flock and the moral doctrines increasingly became a topic of discussion rather than an incontestable fact: “The structure of hierarchy devel- oped into one based on collegiality and dialogue,” Somers and Van Poppel argued. “The strict external control and sanctioning through confession, the threat of excommunication and censure were replaced by codes of conduct and personal moral control.”18 The developments were met with enthusiasm among liberal Catholics who desired a Catholicism that was “receptive for the consequences of economic, tech- nological and social modernization”.19 At a high speed, the Church transformed: liturgics increasingly emphasized the bible and the proclamation of faith, rituals became more sober, private confession was neglected, theology stressed the reli- gious experience, involvement of laymen in Church affairs increased, political engagement – including concern about global overpopulation – became regarded as a Christian virtue, interests in congregations and pilgrimages decreased, ecu- menism stimulated contact with Protestants and attitudes towards morality diver- sified and liberalized.20 Drums entered the Church service while Latin left and in bible groups for youths discussions about the moral limits for sexuality and mar- riage increasingly replaced rehearses of the catechism.21 The believers’ respect for

15 Jan Jacobs, ‘Jaren van groei en bewustwording: de clerus van het bisdom Roermond in de periode 1954-1965’, Antonius Duffhues (ed.), Van katholiek Limburg naar katholieken in Limburg (Heerlen 1988) 85. 16 Walter Goddijn, Jan Jacobs, Gérard van Tillo (ed.), Tot vrijheid geroepen: katholieken in Nederland: 1946-2000 (Baarn 1999) 40. 17 Somers and Van Poppel (2003) 313-316; Goddijn, Jacobs and Van Tillo (1999) 41. 18 Somers and Van Poppel (2003) 302. 19 Goddijn, Jacobs and Van Tillo (1999) 40. 20 Derksen (1994) 30 21 Kerklaan (1987) 170. that rag freedom! 247 the authority of a priest and their expectations of his function changed. “The group that in former days played the most important role in the spread and explanation of the Catholic conjugal ethics, the supervision of observance of that morality and the organization of the Catholic community life,” Somers and Van Poppel empha- sized, “in the 50s and 60s to a large extent lost its task and position.”22 Like the laymen, the Dutch clergy liberalized. A 1971 survey on the attitudes regarding birth control among priests in the Netherlands, the usa and Colombia showed how much the Dutch clergy compared to colleagues in the other countries had drifted off the official course of the Church with regard to family planning.23 Information about birth control had to be easily accessible for both married and single people, over 90% of the priests indicated. The same proportion thought the expression of love was the primary purpose of marital intercourse – not procre- ation.24 Almost half of the Dutch priests regarded coitus interruptus as a morally per- mitted method and more than half considered the condom or diaphragm to be per- mitted; three quarters thought the pill was morally allowed as a contraceptive (instead of only as a means of cycle regulation).25 The majority of the interviewed priests in the usa and Columbia still held the belief that the use of contraceptives would have negative effects on both the individual and society, an assumption repeated in Humanae Vitae. Less than a third of the Dutch priests thought contra- ceptives would lead to a lowering of moral standards. Compared to American and Columbian colleagues, Dutch priests had the most liberal and the most realistic opinion on birth control practices of the flock. Half of them estimated that the majority of the Dutch Catholics (60 to 80%) used contra- ception and nearly a third thought that almost all Dutch Catholics limited their family; over half reckoned that the majority of the Dutch Catholics used methods of birth control that were not allowed. In comparison: the majority of the Colom- bian and American priests still harbored illusions about the proportion of Catho- lics limiting their family or claimed not to know.26 The 1971 priest survey was all too clear: the overall picture of the universal Church was one of “division, confusion, inconsistency, and strain, a situation that portends change rather than stability.”27 The Dutch priests apparently were at the forefront of this development: they held the most liberal views on sexuality and marital life and the moral cost of several ‘forbidden’ birth control methods. Dutch

22 Somers and van Poppel (2003) 303. 23 Shea, Burch, Perez, Ordonez, Van Kemenade, Hutjes and Hellegers (1971) 122-123. In total 1500 Dutch priests were sent a questionnaire, 500 Colombian priests and 1711 Ameri- can priests. 24 Ibid, 125-126. 25 Ibid, 127. 26 Ibid, 132. 27 Ibid, 136. 248 mixing ovaries and rosaries

priests seemed also very much aware of the differences between the views of the high and low clergy in the Netherlands and those of the Vatican. By the early 1970s, in matters of birth control Dutch Catholics were most likely to receive consistent permissive advice, if they took the trouble of consulting a priest in the first place. Additionally, the risk of punishment decreased as their priests tended to reject tra- ditional notions of sin and both parties generally abandoned private confession as a religious practice.28 The climax of the liberalization of the Dutch clergy and the relaxation of its urge to impose a particular code of fertility behavior on believers was the appearance on tv of Bishop Bekkers of the diocese of Den Bosch in March 1963. Asked to reflect on the introduction of the pill in the Netherlands, he stated that its use was a matter of the personal conscience of people.29 Of course, there was still a considerable conservative section of the Church that was horrified by the destruction of traditional religion, morality and power rela- tionships within the Church and between the Church and Rome.30 The change of the Dutch Church province from the model of traditional ‘pre Vatican ii Catholi- cism’ to ‘the avant-garde of the international church’ met with disfavor in the Vati- can too. When in June 1970 the Dutch bishops raised the matter of the clergy’s celi- bacy with the Vatican and asked for a mitigation of obligations in that field, Rome decided to intervene by appointing the conservative bishops Simonis in the diocese of Rotterdam in 1970 and, two years later, Gijsen in Roermond. By increasing their influence on Catholic organizations and institutes and assigning Church-law-abid- ing Catholics in the most important Church organs, the Vatican hoped to reverse the modernizations.31 It proved to be counterproductive; a long-lasting and serious episcopal discord followed and diocesan particularism became rampant. In Lim- burg, the province in the Netherlands that had always formed the loyal mainstay of the Church, the strict and inconsiderate policies of Gijsen resulted in an increasing alienation between the Church and the believers.32 These matters undermined the trust of the flock in their Church – they induced many believers to leave altogether – and fostered criticism from the most involved Church members. The opportu- nity to comment arose when in 1985, shortly after having appointed the conserva- tive Ter Schure as bishop of Den Bosch in Brabant, Pope John Paul ii visited the Netherlands and went to Den Bosch where he was all but given a hearty welcome: the streets remained empty in revenge.33

28 Ibid, 133. 29 Goddijn, Jacobs and Van Tillo (1999) 260. 30 Derksen (1994) 31. 31 Walter Goddijn, Democratie en Christendom: Veertig jaar sociologie van kerk en godsdienst (Kampen 1991) 131-156. 32 Goddijn, Jacobs and Van Tillo (1999) 272-277. 33 Ibid, 383-392; Ton van Schaik, Katholieken in de Twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 1999) 47-51. that rag freedom! 249

4 Mixing ovaries and rosaries: observations

In 1954 Van Heek predicted a clash between Catholic Church representatives and believers, based on the growing gap between the official Church morals, the in- crease of socio-economic and cultural motives to practice family planning, the pressure exerted on the clergy and the means they had to enforce fertility and nup- tiality behavior.34 Surely he did not expect the huge changes that took place in the Dutch Church, including the clergy’s advocacy of moral reforms in the 1960s. As a continuation of the pattern that started during the previous decades, the tumble in the Catholic fertility rate between 1960 and 1970 could not have been predicted. The social scientist Derksen recapitulated the social change that, first gradually and then drastically, transformed the social norms and values regarding morality in the Netherlands and stimulated the Church’s different moral practice. “Con- cepts like ‘autonomy’, ‘openness’, ‘freedom’ and ‘loyalty to yourself’ for a long time formed no part of the religious consideration: matters were dealt with in moral terms,’ Derksen explained. “In that society guilt and remission slowly gave way to a more psychological and sociological view, in which the moral judgment is not the first matter of importance but where phenomena are placed within their social context.”35 The increased sensitivity to context intensely affected the position of reli- gion on all levels: in the fast de-pillarizing society, confessionalism no longer formed the fundament for the social structure of the Netherlands. In post-war poli- tics, parties striving for socio-economic principles rather than scriptural ones in- creasingly managed to attract Catholics for a longer period than farmer Meertens in Limburg had back in 1933, causing integralism of the Catholic party to be re- placed by ecumenism.36 Socio-economic and cultural diversification demanded a multifaceted Church that in the complex context of an urbanized, mobile, com- pletely industrialized and market-oriented society recognized that sexual and pro- creational morality had become contextual and, hence, a matter of personal choice. Now that faith implied a general spirituality rather than a moral lifestyle, and the Catholic milieu was replaced by a milieu with Catholics, the remaining means of the Church to impose codes of behavior on believers had become useless. In an increasingly secular world in which family limitation became the norm, private confessions during which believers were reminded of objections against birth con- trol were disproportional to the Church’s general social position. While Protestant churches reinterpreted doctrines like those on the use of con- traceptives and abortion so as to level out religious and secular norms and values, the fertility-related teachings of the Roman Catholic Church remained the same.

34 Van Heek (1954). 35 Derksen (1994) 22. 36 Vellenga (1975) 61. 250 mixing ovaries and rosaries

The Vatican could not reject its moral principles, the intrinsic holiness of life and matrimony, that resulted from its claim to possess the truth about life – principles that might be up for discussion in some industrialized countries but were still respected in many others. Even during the 1960s and 70s, the Vatican still believed in the, as Westoff and Jones quoted, “high fertility potential” of the Catho- lics last proven during the baby boom.37 By doing so, the gap between religious doc- trine and the actual fertility and nuptiality standard in the Netherlands, like in many other countries, grew considerably. How big the gap between the moral norms of the Catholic Church and those of Dutch society had become was brightly illustrated when in April 2001 the Nether- lands was the first country in the world to introduce same-sex marriage.38 Though marriage was once defined by “religious doctrine, moral tradition, and home-cen- tered commitments to child rearing and gender complementarity in productive labor,” a contributor to The family in America expounded, it has become an institu- tion deracinated of its Christian roots, a highly individualistic and egalitarian insti- tution, no longer implying commitment to home, to Church, to childbearing, to traditional gender duties, or even (permanently) to spouse. Marriage as a civil insti- tution, the author continued, has nothing more to do with Christian norms and values: it certifies a certain legitimacy in the cultural mainstream and delivers tax, insurance, life-style, and governmental benefits — without most of the obligations of marriage as defined by the Catholic Church. Same sex marriages do not reflect unprecedented new attitudes among homosexuals, The family in America argued, but constitute the predictable culmination of the changed institution of marriage.39 What holds true for the definition of marriage, applies to reproduction as well. A ‘Catholic fertility potential’ was out of the question when the Catholic commu- nity lacked religious affiliation and lay obedience to the Church’s teachings. Char- acteristic Catholic fertility was finished with when a personal and context-bound sexual and procreational morality was introduced during the 1960s. Moral free- dom was claimed, which was not something that could be combined with strict observance of behavioral directives. “The free society? That rag freedom!” a character in Iris Murdoch’s novel The Unicorn states. “Freedom may be a value in politics, but it’s not a value in morals.

37 Westoff and Jones (1979) 216-217. 38 See The Advocate, ‘Dutch treats: The Netherlands becomes the first country to allow gay marriage, and the men in charge talk to The Advocate’ (May 8, 2001). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.advocate.com/html/stories/837/837_dutch_marriage.asp; in Feb- ruary 2003, Belgium became the second country to introduce same-sex marriage. 39 Bryce Christensen, ‘Why homosexuals want what marriage has now become’, The fam- ily in America 18 (2004). Retrieved January 26, 2005 from http://www.profam.org/pub/ fia/fia_1804.htm that rag freedom! 251

Truth, yes. But not freedom.”40 From the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, in the light of moral truth and everlasting life, reproductive freedom for its flock was of marginal importance.

40 Iris Murdoch, The Unicorn (London 1963) 114. List of graphs

Graph 1 Average proportion Catholics, members of the Dutch Reformed Church, citizens without religious denomination and other denominations among provincial populations, 1930 18 Graph 2 Dutch marital fertility rates 1876-1975: births per 1000 married women (aged 15-45) 19 Graph 3 Marital fertility 1870-1970: births per 1000 married women aged (15-45) in the Republic of Ireland, England and Wales, the Netherlands, Limburg and Noord-Brabant 36 Graph 4 Percentage of votes on confessional parties, social democrats and Liberals during elections for the House of Representatives 1918-1972 77 Graph 5 Proportions illegitimacies of all births (five-yearly and yearly averages) in seven European countries, 1910-1958 84 Graph 6 Female labor participation rates: female labor force as a percentage of the total female population, 1870-1970 93 Graph 7 Illegitimate live births (two-yearly averages) per province, per 1000 unmarried women of 15-49 years 97 Graph 8 Marital fertility for the cohorts 1926-1930 and 1931-1935 (five-yearly numbers of averages of births per 1000 married women aged 15-45) and nuptiality (percentage currently married women of the aged 40-44) for 1930 per province 116 Graph 9A Population composition Roosteren 1930 in percentages 125 Graph 9B Population composition Ohe en Laak 1930 in percentages 126 Graph 10 Fertility and nuptiality in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1909-1930 133 Graph 11 Fertility and nuptiality in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1909-1930 135 Graph 12 Fertility and nuptiality in Grave and Escharen, 1909-1930 138 Graph 13 Population development Mheer and St Geertruid 1909-1930 in index numbers (1909=100) 140 Graph 14 Sex ratios in Mheer and St Geertruid in permillages 1909, 1920, 1930 142 Graph 15 Infant mortality in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1910-1930 143 list of graphs 253

Graph 16 Population development Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909-1930 in index numbers (1909=100) 144 Graph 17 Sex-ratios in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909, 1920, 1930 146 Graph 18 Infant Mortality in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1910-1930 147 Graph 19 Population development Grave and Escharen 1909-1930 in index numbers (1920=100) 148 Graph 20 Sex ratios in Grave and Escharen 1909, 1920, 1930 150 Graph 21 Infant Mortality in Grave and Escharen, 1910-1930 151 Graph 22A Male occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930 154 Graph 22B Female occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930 155 Graph 23A Male occupational groups in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak, 1930 158 Graph 23B Female occupational groups in Mheer and St Geertruid, 1930 159 Graph 24A Male occupational groups in Grave and Escharen, 1930 158 Graph 24B Female occupational groups in Grave and Escharen, 1930 163 Graph 25 Religious composition Mheer and St Geertruid, 1909, 1920, 1930 166 Graph 26 Out-migration and in-migration in Mheer and St Geertruid 1910, 1920, 1930 169 Graph 27 Religious composition Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1909, 1920, 1930 169 Graph 28 Out-migration and in-migration in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1910, 1920, 1930 171 Graph 29 Religious composition Grave and Escharen 1910, 1920, 1930 Graph 30 Out-migration and in-migration in Grave and Escharen 1910, 1920, 1930 172 List of tables and maps

Table 1 Selection ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ cases 120 Table 2 1933 Election results of Mheer and St Geertruid 132 Table 3 1933 Election results of Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 134 Table 4 1933 Election results of Grave and Escharen 137 Table 5 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Mheer and St Geertruid in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) 141 Table 6 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Roosteren and Ohe en Laak in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) 145 Table 7 Population increase caused by excess of births and migration in Grave and Escharen in permillages in 1910, 1920, 1930 (ten-yearly averages) 149 Table 8 Agricultural labor participation men and women Mheer and St Geertruid 1930 in absolute numbers 157 Table 9 Agricultural labor participation men and women Roosteren and Ohe en Laak 1930 in absolute numbers 160 Table 10 Agricultural labor participation men and women Grave and Escharen 1930 in absolute numbers 164

Map 1 Position of Catholic case studies 119 Bibliography

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“keep your rosary out of my ovary”, read a bumper sticker on a Californian highway in early 2004. Something good has come of the American pro-life move- ment: it inspired the eloquence of pro-choicers. The Dutch lack the necessity to defend the right to use contraceptives and abort unwanted pregnancies. Catholics in the Netherlands appear to have little difficulty in separating religious rules from moral practice nowadays. Thanks to them, my research on religion and reproduc- tion was historical rather than political. Numerous people contributed to my research in various ways. Paul Klep, for one, offered me the chance to begin my Ph D research in January 2000 and contin- uously encouraged me in my work. Amiability characterized not only the contact with my supervisor but also with other colleagues of the Nijmegen University His- tory Department – I have cherished memories of the coffee-and-cake meetings with my fellow Ph D’s in particular. In 2003, Nijmegen University provided me with a Frye stipend to study in the United States; the Fulbright Center offered me extra funding for this undertaking and the Department of Anthropology of Stan- ford University welcomed me as a visiting scholar. Hill Gates and Arthur Wolf made my four months in California unforgettable. I owe much gratitude to them, as well as to the members of the research project ‘Population and Society in Taiwan and The Netherlands’ from the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Stanford University and Nijmegen University, who offered me the chance to extend my broadened research horizon to include Taiwan. After having been scrutinized by Peter Raedts from Nijmegen University, Koen Matthijs from the Catholic University Leuven and Jan Kok from the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, this manuscript improved considerably. Ralf Futselaar from the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation added flow- ery slander to the margin, resulting in the elimination of numerous explicative foot- notes. Having finished my dissertation, I foisted off my work on my Glasgow friend Richard Mosses who corrected my, as he called it, “quirky” English. Marion Elen- baas from the English Language Department of Nijmegen University found Eng- lish equivalents for untranslatable Dutch concepts. I owe Frans van Poppel from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute in The Hague for the con- tinuous infection with his zeal for historical demography ever since I was a student, when I had the privilege to work with him for the first time. Word of thanks 279

It was the devil’s own luck that my Ph D research came to be co-supervised by Theo Engelen. Being not only an inspiring scholar but also a valued author of chil- dren’s novels, his books reflect the patience, empathy and humor that characterize him. Always cheerfully emphasizing that, to quote our mutual guru Carry Bradshaw, “without mistakes we’d have nothing to shape our lives”, Theo not once imposed his views on my work, no matter how often I consulted him and how wrong my methods were. I am in his debt. There is a group of people whose contribution to my research came in the form of distraction. Some teased me relentlessly and made me bad coffee, like my Social- and Economic History Department colleagues Onno Boonstra, Lout Bots, Jan Brabers, Bart van Elderen, Marloes Hülsken, Angélique Janssens, Loes Lemmens and Margriet de Rooij. My father Pieter Schoonheim kept sending me his transla- tions of the classical physician Galen’s views on nosebleeds, his idea of ‘light read- ing’. My mother Inge Schoonheim shared her intense experience with Catholi- cism, explained rituals and elucidated customs, showing how an instructive his- tory for one can be a nightmare for another. Heleen van Leerzem warned me not to lose track of ambitions and proved how good it is to know a professional pianist who eases your mind with Bach. My other paranimf, Mirjam Hemker, proved how having a chum around, preferably one that doesn’t shrink from constructive criti- cism, should be in the list of human rights. I used to be puzzled when, during Ph D ceremonies, the partner of the fresh doctor was congratulated. What the heck did the beloved contribute to all the work done, I wondered? After having reached startling heights of hysteria during the last months before I handed in my manuscript, I had a sound grasp. Hardened in Sili- con Valley during the booming years of information technology and wizened up on her motorbike in the deserts of Australia, my wife Marjan Onrust dauntlessly confronted a historical research she was not concerned with, larded with twisted reasoning and linguistic blunders and written by someone as sensitive and hot- tempered as the Queen of Hearts. She nevertheless encouraged and admired, read and corrected, abducted me to San Francisco and Spain and gave me beers and first editions of favorite novels. My gratitude for my beloved’s support in my research made me understand the Holy aspect of our matrimony. I dedicate my book to two ‘hands-on’ experts whom I did not have the opportu- nity to present my research results to. My liberal Protestant grandmother, Rie Schoonheim-van der Linde, who had seven children “because that is the proper thing to do”, died when her youngest could barely walk. My Catholic grandmother, Corrie Janson-Laken, had seven children and an estimated number of three mis- carriages before she died of breast cancer at an early age. I wonder what motto they would have provided my research with. Without their advice I held on to a self- chosen one, written by the poet Lucebert: 280 mixing ovaries and rosaries

kinderen der roomse schoot kromgefluisterd door gereformeerde dood neem af het kruis sta op kneed aardse duiven uit het dagelijks brood Summary

This book aims at disclosing the mechanism behind the influence of Catholic reli- gion on fertility behavior in the Netherlands between 1870 and 1970. During this period fertility declined as a part of a broader demographic transition. The fact that the Catholic regions in the Netherlands adopted ‘modern’ reproductive behavior slowly and only after 1900, when mainly Protestant provinces had already wit- nessed a rapid fall of birth rates for three decades, has attracted considerable atten- tion among Dutch demographic historians. They have uncovered important knowledge about the quantitative correlation between the Catholic denomination and fertility, however insufficient light has been shed on how Catholic reproduc- tive behavior that underlied the deviating rates came about. Looking at the historiography of the subject as well as its methodological con- text, the first chapter contains a quest for a research approach. The qualities and shortcomings of Dutch studies on the relationship between Catholicism and fertil- ity are discussed and compared to research on Irish fertility behavior, revealing a lack of understanding of what causes attachment to religious affiliation altogether. The Canadian sociologist Kevin McQuillan in his 2004 evaluation of decades of international research on religious determinants of demography offered a solution for this historiographical hiatus and propagated the study of religious values that intend to regulate reproductive behavior both directly and indirectly. He also emphasized that religious determinants of demography need to be regarded at var- ious social levels – a notion that meets with response in the sociology of religion. The outcome of the theoretical exploration in chapter 1 is a proposal for a method including quantitative and qualitative research of Dutch Catholic fertility behavior on the macro, meso and micro levels of the Dutch society. The second chapter discusses the peculiar position of religion in the Dutch so- ciety during the period of fertility decline. It was the result of what came to be known as ‘pillarization’, a social-organizational compartmentalization along reli- gious and ideological lines. What started as a mainly political schism resulted in a top-to-bottom social bloc formation when various denominations sided with politi- cal parties. From the start of the twentieth century until the 1970s, a religious de- nomination like Catholicism came to represent not merely a faith but a lifestyle. The organizational network that developed was of overriding importance for the standardization of Catholic values. When the government became increasingly 282 mixing ovaries and rosaries

concerned with the ‘morality’ of the population, Church interference with individ- ual reproductive behavior became sanctified by law. Most justifiably, the Nether- lands in this period has been nicknamed ‘the moral nation’ by historians. The na- tional climate during the research period was not only favorable for the imposition of directives concerning reproduction; it made obedience to them a matter of course. Chapter 3 deals with social, economic and cultural factors stimulating or curb- ing the influence of Catholic religion on fertility on the meso level in Dutch society. Non-confessional versus confessional voting behavior during the elections for the House of Representatives in 1933 is used as a predictor for deviant or rather ‘char- acteristic Catholic’ fertility behavior respectively. Three pairs of Catholic munici- palities, situated in the southern part of the Netherlands, are selected. Fertility and nuptiality behavior in these municipalities is derived from municipal data of 1930. Descriptive statistics show in what socio-economic and cultural circumstances the population appeared to be willing to neglect pronatalist pressure and practice fam- ily planning. In the municipalities with a lower fertility than its pair, industrializa- tion developed slightly faster; the agricultural sector was more modern; there was a larger presence of Protestants and members of other denominations with a differ- ent lifestyle and a larger turnover of inhabitants resulting in the in-migration of dif- ferent ideas. These factors could stimulate the adoption of family planning. How individual fertility behavior was influenced by Catholicism is witnessed in chapter 4. Doctrines of the Catholic Church that directly or indirectly affected reproductive behavior are discussed, showing that not only rules concerning the use of contraceptives but also less obvious directions on the gendered task division were part of the Church’s pronatalism. Various surveys, in the Netherlands as well as abroad, have revealed how the behavioral directives were internalized by Catho- lic believers and resulted in ideals regarding family size, the practice of family plan- ning, methods of birth control used and education and labor participation of women. Extensive attention is paid to letters on Catholic pronatalism collected by the Dutch journalist Marga Kerklaan in 1987. The women’s accounts of their expe- riences with Catholic reproductive directives show the various means the Church deployed to enforce doctrines and also reveal the part the individual’s conscience and the social environment played in accepting the Church’s moral rules as only ‘natural’. Ironically, the mechanism that underlied the influence of the Catholic denomi- nation on fertility behavior, from the 1960s onwards was self-destructive. When ‘de-pillarization’ started, prosperity increased and affinity with the Catholic denomination declined, and the coercing functioning of Catholic pronatalism be- came counterproductive. Between 1960 and 1970, fertility declined in the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands to reach a level below that of the Protestant regions. What is at the bottom of the quantitative characteristics of Catholic fertility between 1870 and 1970 was the social institutionalization of church interference Summary 283 with morality, the sometimes small differences in local social-economic circum- stances and cultural multiformity that determined ‘moral’ reproductive behavior and the inevitability of indoctrination by Catholic pronatalism for individual believers. Chapter 5 recapitulates the uncovered religious determinants of Catholic repro- ductive behavior in the Netherlands between the start of the fertility decline in the late 1870s until the end of it in the early 1970s. It also takes a closer look at the period between 1960 and 1970, when fertility declined in the Catholic provinces of the Netherlands to reach a level below that of the Protestant regions. This inversion of Dutch Catholic fertility exposes once more the mechanism behind the influence of Catholic religion on fertility behavior. Samenvatting

Dit boek stelt zich ten doel het mechanisme achter de invloed van katholicisme op vruchtbaarheid bloot te leggen door een studie van de Nederlandse situatie tussen 1870 en 1970, de periode waarin, als deel van de demografische transitie, vrucht- baarheid daalde. De katholieke regio’s in Nederland die traag en pas na 1900 het moderne vruchtbaarheidsgedrag aannamen, toen de voornamelijk Protestantse provincies al enkele decennia getuigen waren van een snelle afname van het geboortecijfer, hebben de aandacht van Nederlandse demografisch historici ge- trokken. Zij toonden de kwantitatieve correlatie aan tussen de katholieke gezindte en vruchtbaarheid. Hoe de deze correlatie tot stand kwam, is echter onduidelijk gebleven. Het eerste hoofdstuk, waarin de historiografie van het thema en de methodolo- gische context worden behandeld, betreft een afweging van de onderzoeksopzet. De kwaliteiten en tekortkomingen van Nederlandse studies op het gebied van de relatie tussen geloof en vruchtbaarheid worden behandeld en vergeleken met on- derzoek naar Ierse fertiliteit. Hieruit blijkt een gebrek aan inzicht in wat religiosi- teit bepaalt. De Canadese socioloog Kevin McQuillan heeft een oplossing geboden voor dit vacuüm in de historische demografie. Hij stelde onderzoek naar religieuze waarden voor die, zowel op directe als indirecte wijze, de reproductie reguleerden. Ook benadrukte hij dat religieuze determinanten van demografisch gedrag op ver- schillende maatschappelijke niveaus moeten worden onderzocht. Zowel het be- lang van de door de kerk gepropageerde waarden, die een groter terrein dan het re- ligieuze betreffen, als het feit dat religie niet alleen een zaak van het geweten maar van de hele maatschappelijke orde is, vindt weerklank in de godsdienstsociologie. De uitkomst van de theoretische verkenning in het eerste hoofdstuk is een ont- werp voor een kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek naar katholiek vruchtbaar- heidsgedrag in Nederland op drie niveau’s van de Nederlandse samenleving. Het tweede hoofdstuk richt zich op het macro niveau en bespreekt de bijzon- dere positie van religie in de Nederlandse samenleving in de periode van de fertili- teitsdaling als gevolg van de verzuiling. Van het begin van de twintigste eeuw tot de jaren zeventig stond katholicisme niet alleen voor een geloofsovertuiging maar voor een maatschappelijk compartiment waarbinnen het volledige sociale en cul- turele leven zich afspeelde. Het netwerk van verzuilde organisaties werd van groot belang voor het tot een gedragsstandaard verheffen van katholieke waarden die Samenvatting 285 de voortplanting betroffen. Toen de overheid zich in toenemende mate geroepen voelde in te grijpen in de ‘zedelijkheid’ van de bevolking, werd bemoeienis van de kerk met individueel reproductief gedrag gelegitimeerd. Het maatschappelijke kli- maat dat in Nederland ontstond tijdens de onderzoeksperiode was niet alleen gun- stig voor het opleggen van regels betreffende reproductief gedrag maar maakte ge- hoorzaamheid daaraan ook vanzelfsprekend. Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeert sociale, economische en culturele factoren die de in- vloed van katholicisme op vruchtbaarheid op een meso-niveau van de Nederlandse samenleving stimuleerden of juist afremden. Confessioneel en ‘afwijkend’ stem- gedrag tijdens de Tweede Kamer verkiezingen van 1933 wordt gebruikt als een pre- dictor voor vruchtbaarheidsgedrag dat respectievelijk karakteristiek katholiek is of tekenen vertoont van ‘modern’ demografisch gedrag. Drie paren van gemeenten, gesitueerd in Limburg en Noord-Brabant, zijn geselecteerd. Uit gemeentegege- vens zijn vruchtbaarheid en huwelijksgedrag rond 1930 afgeleid. Met behulp van beschrijvende statistiek wordt inzicht verkregen in de sociaal-economische en cul- turele omstandigheden die van invloed waren op de bereidheid van lokale bevol- king de katholieke pronatalistische druk te negeren en geboortebeperking toe te passen. Een grotere mate van industrialisatie, een modernere landbouw, de aan- wezigheid van inwoners van andere gezindten en een grotere mobiliteit zijn facto- ren die in de case studies ervoor lijken te hebben gezorgd dat het moderne vrucht- baarheidsgedrag werd aangenomen. Hoe individueel vruchtbaarheidsgedrag werd beïnvloed door katholicisme wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 4. Ten eerste worden de doctrines van de Katholieke kerk behandeld die direct of indirect reproductief gedrag beïnvloedden. Niet alleen voor de hand liggende regels, zoals het verbod op het gebruik van anticonceptie- middelen, maar ook doctrines die bijvoorbeeld de gescheiden taken voor man en vrouw betreffen, maakten onderdeel uit van het pronatalisme van de kerk. Ver- schillende onderzoeken, zowel uit Nederland als daarbuiten, hebben aangetoond hoe de gedragsregels werden geïnternaliseerd door gelovigen en resulteerden in ideeën over de ideale gezinsgrootte, geboorteplanning, anticonceptiemiddelen en gepast onderwijs voor en arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen. Bijzondere aandacht wordt besteed aan brieven over katholiek pronatalisme, in 1987 verzameld door de journaliste Marga Kerklaan. Op basis van meer dan 300 verslagen van vrouwen wordt getoond op welke manieren de kerk doctrines oplegde, maar ook wat het aandeel was van bijvoorbeeld de katholieke sociale omgeving in het aanvaarden van gedragsregels ten aanzien van de voortplanting. Pronatalistische indoctrinatie en de sancties die op veronachtzaming van doctrines stonden, brachten respect voor gedragsregels die ingrepen in het intieme reproductiegedrag op individueel niveau tot stand. Hoofdstuk 5, tenslotte, recapituleert de gevonden determinanten van katholiek reproductiegedrag in Nederland vanaf het begin van de vruchtbaarheidsdaling in 1870 tot het einde ervan in de vroege jaren zeventig van de twintigste eeuw. Ook 286 mixing ovaries and rosaries

wordt aandacht besteed aan de periode tussen 1960 en 1970 toen de vruchtbaar- heid in de katholieke provincies van Nederland tot onder het niveau van de Protes- tantse regio’s daalde. Deze inversie toont des te meer aan welk mechanisme schuilgaat achter de invloed van de katholieke religie op vruchtbaarheidsgedrag in Nederland tussen 1870 en 1970. Ten eerste de maatschappelijke intitutionalise- ring van kerkelijke bemoeienis met zedelijkheid. Ten tweede lokale verschillen in sociaal-economische en culturele omstandigheden die acceptatie van gedragsre- gels ten aanzien van reproductie bepaalden. En tenslotte het feit dat voor gelovigen aan de katholieke pronatalistische indoctrinatie niet viel te ontkomen. Curriculum vitae

Marloes Schoonheim (1976) studied history at Leiden University. She specialized in the History of Culture and Mentality and in Socio-economic History. During an apprenticeship at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (nidi) in The Hague in 1995 she made a study of infant mortality among Jews in The Hague in the nineteenth century. In 1999 she graduated cum laude with a thesis on the English literary ‘Bloomsbury group’. From 2000 until mid-2004 she worked as a PhD at the History Department of the Radboud University Nijmegen. In 2003 she won a Frye stipend and a Fulbright scholarship, enabling her to study at the Department of Anthropology of Stanford University in the usa where she contributed to a comparative research on the ethnography of fertility in the Nether- lands and Taiwan. Currently she works as a teacher and post-doc researcher at the Radboud University.