DOCSLIB.ORG

Scientific Discovery Reloaded

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Scientific Discovery Reloaded Topoi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9531-3 1 Scientifc Discovery Reloaded 2 Emiliano Ippoliti1 3 4 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 5 Abstract 6 The way scientifc discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, 7 inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and 8 analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of 9 discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery (like the deductive, cognitive, and evolutionary), but also 10 new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, methods, heuristic procedures and even a 11 logic of discovery have been investigated, extracted, reconstructed and refned. The outcome is a ‘scientifc discovery revo- 12 lution’: not only a new way of looking at discovery, but also a construction of tools that can guide us to discover something 13 new. This is a very important contribution of philosophy of science to science, as it puts the former in a position not only to 14 interpret what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that they can employ in their activity. 15 Keywords Logic · Discovery · Heuristics · Reasoning · Psychology · Algorithm 16 1 Scientifc Discovery: The Matrix 2006, xii), and they are essential for discovery. Genius (see e.g. Murray 1989), illumination, ‘faculties’ such as intui- 17 38 A long-standing and infuential tradition has shaped the way tion, insight, or ‘divergent thinking’, are common notions 18 39 scientifc discovery has been accounted for. It has been put employed to support this thesis. Even if this line of argu- 19 40 forward in particular by logical empiricism, mathemati- ment ends up with a obscurum per obscurius, in principle 20 41 cal logic and the analytical tradition in philosophy, which that is not a problem: the whole process of discovery does 21 42 moulded the matrix, that is, the origin and the conceptual not matter so much since what philosophy and science can 22 43 framework, of the received theory of scientifc discovery. reasonably do is evaluate a hypothesis only after it has been 23 44 It simply maintains that there is no way of accounting for generated—since generation and justifcation are logically, 24 45 scientifc discovery in logical or even rational terms: “there temporally and in methods separated. This line of argument 25 46 is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or is maintained by famous philosophers like Popper (1961) 26 47 a logical reconstruction of this process. […] every discovery and Laudan (1977, 1981) as well as scientists like Einstein 27 48 contains an ‘irrational element,’ or ‘a creative intuition,’ in (1958) and Frege (1960). 28 49 Bergson’s sense” (Popper 1961, 32). This idea, which opens The second approach argues that even if discovery is a 29 50 up the way to the ‘psychology of discovery’, breaks down matter of psychology, we can understand it and account for 30 51 into two approaches. several properties of it. This view has been popularized by 31 52 The frst argues that scientifc discovery is a black box: Poincaré (1908), and refned and extended by Wallas (1926), 32 53 the fnal hypothesis is the only thing that we can see, and Hadamard (1958) and Simonton (1988). Wallas made 33 54 this is the outcome of a subjective, REVISEDidiosyncratic, completely explicit the PROOF stages of the process of discovery discussed 34 55 personal process and, as such, it cannot be reconstructed by only informally by Poincaré, while “Hadamard marshaled 35 56 rational means: “there are extraordinary aspects of the per- additional evidence for the theory of unconscious processing 36 57 37 son who is able to produce signifcant new works” (Weisberg and tried to demonstrate the wide role of such processing in 58 other areas of cognition” (Weisberg 2006, 398–399). A typi- 59 cal example used to support this idea is Kekulé’s discovery A1 * Emiliano Ippoliti 60 of benzene structure (Kekulé’s dream). While somnolent in A2 [email protected] 61 front of his freplace, August Kekulé had a vision of atoms 62 A3 1 Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9531 Pages : 10 MS Code : TOPO-D-17-00156 Dispatch : 12-12-2017 E. Ippoliti Table 1 Kinds of mental processes underlying the generation of outcome of parallelism: unconscious thought is much faster. 103 hypotheses Since the links that enable us to connect an idea to another 104 Parallel Serial are the same for conscious and unconscious processes, it fol- 105 106 Conscious Unconscious Conscious Unconscious lows that once the hypothesis has been generated, the person who produced it is in a position, in principle, to understand 107 Same x Parallelism (Poin- Poincaré x how it came out: “the unconscious does not do anything that 108 caré) conscious processing could not do if there were but time 109 Diferent x Associationism x x available” (Weisberg 2006, 395). 110 (Freud) The second branch maintains that the links created by 111 unconscious thought are diferent from those of conscious 112 thought. That is, unconscious processing can generate 113 63 dancing one after the other and then, later, of a snake biting associative links for reasons of which one is not aware and 114 64 its tail (forming a ring). It was this dream that revealed the perhaps could not be. The diference is qualitative. So “a 115 65 real structure of the benzene ring to the German chemist, creative leap can come about because (1) the processing 116 66 according to his own report. has occurred on an unconscious level, which results in the 117 67 To provide more detail, this second viewpoint, in turn, thinker’s being surprised by the sudden leap; and (2) the 118 68 breaks down into two branches. The separation is about the leap is based on connections that the person could never 119 69 nature of mental processes, the conscious and unconscious think of using conscious thought, which is a second source 120 70 ones, which are involved in the generation of hypotheses of surprise” (Ibid., 389).1 121 71 during the search for the solution to a problem. The psychology of scientifc discovery has been refned 122 72 A frst branch maintains that conscious and unconscious several times (see for example Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 123 73 processes are of the same kind: they are ‘homogeneous’ and 1995) and also popularized in movies and novels. An exami- 124 74 they only difer in the way data-processing is performed. The nation of all the diferent versions of it is beyond the goals of 125 75 conscious mind works in a serial way, while the unconscious this paper. Its ‘philosophical matrix’ is clear enough. What 126 76 works in a parallel way. Poincaré supported this idea, which is more interesting to discuss here are the several, critical 127 77 is labeled parallelism. weaknesses that the whole idea of a psychology of discovery 128 78 By contrast, a second viewpoint states that the two men- faces. I will examine in particular two main problems: 129 79 tal processes are heterogeneous, they are diferent in kind 80 and cannot be reduced one to the other. This hypothesis is 1. the sources employed to extract the mental processes; 130 81 labeled associationism and is supported by Freud and his 2. multiple discovery. 131 82 followers. 83 In more detail, unconscious thought and its relation to 84 conscious thought is approached along two dimensions: 1. The source of traditional psychology of discovery and 132 its fndings is introspection, which is a conscious recon- 133 85 (1) the nature of the links that connect one unconscious struction of an unconscious process (the generation of 134 86 thought to the next one. A link can employ the same a hypothesis to solve a problem). More specifcally the 135 87 processes as the conscious one or not. In the former pieces of evidence used in this case are auto-reports and 136 88 case we have a homogeneity between conscious and interviews—such as the ones provided by Poincaré and 137 89 unconscious thoughts, in the latter a heterogeneity. Kekulé. But auto-reports and interviews are sources hard 138 90 (2) whether the stream of thoughts are parallel, in the sense to trust. They are provided by individuals who “have 139 91 that you can process multiple ideas at the same time, or developed their own theories of creative thinking that 140 92 serial. rely on the opportunity for unconscious processing” 141 (Weisberg 2006, 429). Furthermore “the interviews pro- 142 93 Combining these two dimensions, which are not mutu- vide evidence of the role of unconscious processing in 143 94 ally exclusive, we obtain several REVISEDpossible approaches to the producing PROOF illuminations”, but “the empirical support for 144 95 mental processes underlying the generation of hypotheses the idea of unconscious processing in creative thinking 145 96 (see Table 1). consists of a number of anecdotal reports” (Ibid.). 146 97 Two of them, parallelism and associationism, as stated Auto-reports and interviews not only are fragmentary 147 98 above, are particularly interesting for the psychologistic and anecdotal, but they also imply “that this particular 148 99 approach to scientifc discovery. 100 The frst conception states that unconscious processes are 1 This theory, which of course stems from Freud, is a version of the 1FL01 101 parallel and that they involve the same links as the conscious out-of-mind view, as the person has no conscious awareness of, or 1FL02 102 ones.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
    Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo's Telescopic Sightings? Dean Keith Simonton Online First Publication, January 30, 2012. doi: 10.1037/a0027058 CITATION Simonton, D. K. (2012, January 30). Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo's Telescopic Sightings?. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0027058 Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts © 2012 American Psychological Association 2012, Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000–000 1931-3896/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027058 Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo’s Telescopic Sightings? Dean Keith Simonton University of California, Davis Galileo Galilei’s celebrated contributions to astronomy are used as case studies in the psychology of scientific discovery. Particular attention was devoted to the involvement of foresight, insight, oversight, and hindsight. These four mental acts concern, in divergent ways, the relative degree of “sightedness” in Galileo’s discovery process and accordingly have implications for evaluating the blind-variation and selective-retention (BVSR) theory of creativity and discovery. Scrutiny of the biographical and historical details indicates that Galileo’s mental processes were far less sighted than often depicted in retrospective accounts. Hindsight biases clearly tend to underline his insights and foresights while ignoring his very frequent and substantial oversights. Of special importance was how Galileo was able to create a domain-specific expertise where no such expertise previously existed—in part by exploiting his extensive knowledge and skill in the visual arts. Galileo’s success as an astronomer was founded partly and “blindly” on his artistic avocations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of Multiple Simultaneous Discoveries
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Electronic archive of Tomsk Polytechnic University В целом видно, что студенты положительно оценивают наличие дисциплины «Творческий проект» в учебном плане и дают высокую оценку качеству ее проведения. Вывод: Кто такой инженер? И что такое творчество? Инженер от лат. «ingenium» означает способность, изобретательность. Инженер имеет дело с разработкой и внедрением инноваций и для этого ему необходим творческий как подход как основа будущей деятельности. Творчество – создание чего-то нового, которое непременно разрешает определенную проблему. Отсюда видно, что эти два понятия тесно связаны. Поэтому авторы считают, что дисциплина «Творческий про- ект» положительно влияет на процесс обучения студентов младших курсов и дает возможность получения глубоких практических знаний технических основ будущей профессии. ЛИТЕРАТУРА: 1. Всемирная инициатива CDIO. Стандарты: информ.-метод. изд. / пер. с англ. и ред. А. И. Чучалина, Т. С. Петровской, Е. С. Ку- люкиной; Том. политехн. ун-т. – Томск, 2011. 2. Рабочие программы по дисциплине «Творческий проект» [Элек- тронный ресурс] – URL: http://portal.tpu.ru/fond2 (дата обраще- ния: 13.09.15). Научный руководитель: В.С. Иванова, к.т.н., доцент, каф. ТП ИНК. THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS DISCOVERIES D.V. Isaeva National research Tomsk polytechnic university, Institute of non- destructive testing, Precise instrument making department, group 1B3V Since the beginning of time, people have been making different dis- coveries and inventions. They make great discoveries, which are based not only on the experience of previous generations, but on experiments and scientific analysis. However, what is the nature of discoveries? Theories of invention has been an ongoing discussion for more than a century.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics
    Journal of Humanistic Mathematics Volume 7 | Issue 1 January 2017 Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics Robin W. Whitty Queen Mary University of London Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the Other Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Whitty, R. W. "Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics," Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, Volume 7 Issue 1 (January 2017), pages 172-188. DOI: 10.5642/jhummath.201701.14 . Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/vol7/iss1/14 ©2017 by the authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. JHM is an open access bi-annual journal sponsored by the Claremont Center for the Mathematical Sciences and published by the Claremont Colleges Library | ISSN 2159-8118 | http://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/ The editorial staff of JHM works hard to make sure the scholarship disseminated in JHM is accurate and upholds professional ethical guidelines. However the views and opinions expressed in each published manuscript belong exclusively to the individual contributor(s). The publisher and the editors do not endorse or accept responsibility for them. See https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/policies.html for more information. Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics1 Robin M. Whitty Queen Mary University of London [email protected] Synopsis Among perhaps many things common to Kuratowski's Theorem in graph theory, Reidemeister's Theorem in topology, and Cook's Theorem in theoretical com- puter science is this: all belong to the phenomenon of simultaneous discovery in mathematics. We are interested to know whether this phenomenon, and its close cousin repeated discovery, give rise to meaningful questions regarding causes, trends, categories, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • OPEN SCIENCE' an Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution
    This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 06-38 THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF 'OPEN SCIENCE' An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution By Paul A. David Stanford University & the University of Oxford December 2007 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 725-1874 The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues. The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute. Working papers in this series reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford University. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF ‘OPEN SCIENCE’ An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution By Paul A. David Stanford University & the University of Oxford [email protected] or [email protected] First version: March 2000 Second version: August 2004 This version: December 2007 SUMMARY This essay examines the economics of patronage in the production of knowledge and its influence upon the historical formation of key elements in the ethos and organizational structure of publicly funded open science. The emergence during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of “open science" was a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the Scientific Revolution. It represented a break from the previously dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of Nature’s Secrets, to a new set of norms, incentives, and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers' commitments to rapid disclosure of new knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of the Sole Inventor
    Michigan Law Review Volume 110 Issue 5 2012 The Myth of the Sole Inventor Mark A. Lemley Stanford Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol110/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTORt Mark A. Lemley* The theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly incented. But the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a myth. Surveys of hundreds of significant new technologies show that almost all of them are invented simultaneously or nearly simultaneous- ly by two or more teams working independently of each other. Invention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, phenomenon. The result is a real problem for classic theories of patent law. Our domi- nant theory of patent law doesn't seem to explain the way we actually implement that law. Maybe the problem is not with our current patent law, but with our current patent theory.
    [Show full text]
  • Multiple Independent Inventions of a Non‐Functional Technology Combinatorial Descriptive Names in Botany, 1640‐1830
    PEER‐REVIEWED Multiple Independent Inventions of a Non‐functional Technology Combinatorial Descriptive Names in Botany, 1640‐1830 Sara Scharf* Abstract Historians and sociologists of science usually discuss multiple independent inventions or discoveries in terms of priority disputes over successful inventions or discoveries. But what should we make of the multiple invention of a technology that not only gave rise to very few priority disputes, but never worked and was rejected by each inventor’s contemporaries as soon as it was made public? This paper examines seven such situations in the history of botany. I devote particular attention to the inventors’ cultural and educational backgrounds, focussing in particular on the scholastic education most of them shared, through which they would have become familiar with Llullian combinatorics and the mnemonic names used to distinguish syllogistic moods. I also examine their conceptions of the roles of nomenclature in botany, their assumptions about how memory works, their awareness of other similar efforts, and their contemporaries’ reactions to their proposals. I suggest that an evolutionary epistemology of invention may be the middle ground between the chaos of multiple paths suggested by many microhistories and the overly deterministic view that macrohistorical studies often present. Finally, I reflect on the impacts that a consideration of multiple independent inventions of failed technologies may have on current approaches to the history and sociology of science. Multiple discoveries of
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of the Sole Inventor]
    Lemley [THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTOR] The Myth of the Sole Inventor1 Mark A. Lemley2 Any elementary-school student can recite a number of canonical American invention stories. Thomas Edison invented the light bulb from his famous home laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone, again from his home invention laboratory, famously using the phone to call his assistant, saying “Come here, Watson, I need you.” Orville and Wilbur Wright invented the airplane from their bicycle shop, taking it to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina to put it in the air. The list of lone genius inventors goes on and on: Samuel Morse and his telegraph, Eli Whitney and his cotton gin, Robert Fulton and his steamboat, Philo Farnsworth and the television, etc., etc. Patent law is built around these canonical tales. First written in 1790, in the first year of Congress, the patent law betrays its individual-inventor bias at various points, from the requirement that patents always issue to individuals rather than companies to the rule that the first to invent, not the first to file, is entitled to the patent.3 More importantly, the very theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly incented by the lure of a patent. We deny patents on inventions that are “obvious” to ordinarily innovative scientists in the field. 1 © 2011 Mark A. Lemley. 2 William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri LLP, San Francisco, CA.
    [Show full text]
  • Priority and Privilege in Scientific Discovery
    Priority and privilege in scientific discovery Mike D. Schneider and Hannah Rubin Abstract The priority rule in science has been interpreted as a behavior regu- lator for the scientific community, which benefits society by adequately structuring the distribution of intellectual labor across pre-existing re- search programs. Further, it has been lauded as part of society's \grand reward scheme" because it fairly rewards people for the benefits they produce. But considerations about how news of scientific developments spreads throughout a scientific community at large suggest that the pri- ority rule is something else entirely, which can disadvantage historically underrepresented or otherwise marginalized social groups. 1 Introduction In scientific practice, discoveries of sufficient impact appear to generate certain quantities of prestige, which are to be bestowed upon particular scientists by the scientific community at large. The priority rule is a broad descriptive norm concerning the proper allocation of that prestige. The inference toward such a norm comes via an observed phenomenon in the history of science whereby, in situations of multiple discovery, disputes about who deserves the prestige that comes associated with a discovery are often fought by way of assertions about who was first to make it. That the history of science is laden with instances of multiple discovery has been known since at least the early 1900s. Ogburn and Thomas [1922] document 148 such cases in a variety of high-profile domains of scientific inquiry, and mention in a footnote there there are disputes over priority of discovery in many cases. (In one example, the authors report that the discovery of the cellular basis of animal and vegetable tissue was claimed by seven independent researchers in or around the year 1839.) The particular investigation of these so-called \priority disputes" was eventually taken up (famously) by Merton [1957].
    [Show full text]
  • Art and Science Playing on the Margins. on the Discovery of Photography in the 19Th Century Brazil
    Art and science playing on the margins. On the discovery of photography in the 19th century Brazil. Rosana Horio Monteiro Professor, Visual Arts College Federal University of Goiás (UFG), Brazil Email: [email protected] Abstract This paper examines photography as a particular case of a multiple discovery in science and technology. It concerns an original photographic process developed during the 19 th century Brazil simultaneously and independently from other processes developed with the same aim elsewhere. A detailed reconstruction of this process created by the Frenchman Hercule Florence is performed by directly investigating his manuscripts and other original documents of the period. Combining elements from the Mertonian Social Theory of Discovery to the Science and Technology Studies approach my aim is to find out the factors that shaped this process and made it possible inside (and despite) the local peripheral circumstances. I argue that the latter is embodied in the final form of Florence’s process. Keywords: multiple discoveries, photography in Brazil, sociology of science Introduction The investigation reported here examines the relationship between art and science around the discovery of photography in peripheral contexts. It concerns a photographic process developed in Brazil during the 19 th century by the Frenchman Hercule Florence. This process was produced in 1833 independently and simultaneously to other processes developed with the same aim elsewhere such as the daguerreotype in France and the calotype in England. Based on a detailed reconstruction of Florence’s process, performed by directly investigating his manuscripts and other original documents of the period, and combining elements from the Mertonian Theory of Discovery to the Science1 and Technology Studies (STS) approach 2, this paper aims to identify the factors that shaped this process and made it possible inside (and despite) the local peripheral circumstances.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Brannigan 1982 by Lee Harvey
    THE SOCIAL BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES by AUGUSTINE BRANNIGAN Cambridge University Press 1981 212 pages Brannigan creates interest in his subject from the outset by illustrating how scientific discovery has been associated with the bizarre and irrational. The myths of Daedalus, Midas, the novels of Huxley, Butler and Zamiatin, the Frankenstein, Jekyll and Hyde and Faustus stories as well as the 'mystical' spurs to discovery reported by Einstein, Kekule and Wallace, not to mention Newton and the apple, all serve to generate a view of discovery as irrational. A view firmly confronted by twentieth century positivism. Reichenbach, and later Popper, clearly drew a line of demarcation between the context of discovery and the context of justification. A positivist doctrine has evolved that dumps the context of discovery in the dustbin of empirical psychology and concentrates on the rational reconstructions of the context of justification. For Popper, there is 'no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas', nor a logical reconstruction of this process. A position reflected by Braithwaite (1960) who argued that the psychology and sociology of discovery were no business of the historian or philosopher of science whose concern should be with the objective arguments in the justification of change in science. Popper’s notion of 'conjectures and refutations' became an injunction about how scientific thinking ought to be done. Ironically, Brannigan argues, the positivistic concentration on the justification process reinforced the view that discovery was irrational. This also led to a rift between the normative prescriptions of the logical empiricists and the generalisations of empiricist historians of sciences concerned with how research had actually been conducted.
    [Show full text]
  • 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Credits
    Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses John Bowers 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies: Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses John Bowers A Handbook for John Bowers’ Visual Communication Design Teaching Assistants VCD 1001 / VCD 2900 / VCD 3045 Edited for AIGA Design Teaching Resource 2020 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Credits 02 Credits I would like to thank the following people for their assistance with this handbook. Long-time friend and collaborator Karin C. Warren for her help in developing the manuscript and in guiding its completion. My graduate teaching assistants at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago, Visual Communication Design Department, for their input into the book’s content. 02 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Preface > Background 03 Before Course Preface Background I have taught and served as an This handbook is a blend of practical advice and pedagogical discussion. It is academic consultant at private and public written for you—the teaching assistant (TA)—as we teach together, and when you universities across the United States, in teach alone as a TA-A in these courses: VCD 1001, Introduction to Visual Canada, and in Sweden, for over 30 years. Communication; VCD 2900, Sophomore Seminar: Design Strategies; and VCD 3045, Web Design: Interface and Structure. These schools have different structures, grading formats, enrollments, and When I began teaching with TAs, I created a simple one-page, bulleted list of missions. Yet the one constant throughout things to discuss with them prior to the first day. That list is now expanded into is the students themselves.
    [Show full text]
  • Richter, Adam, MA, HIST, August 2011
    Priority and Nationalism: The Royal Societyʼs International Priority Disputes, 1660-1700 by Adam Richter Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2011 © Copyright by Adam Richter, 2011 DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance a thesis entitled “Priority and Nationalism: The Royal Societyʼs International Priority Disputes, 1660-1700” by Adam Richter in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Dated: August 24, 2011 Supervisor: _________________________________ Readers: _________________________________ _________________________________ ii DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY DATE: 24/08/11 AUTHOR: Adam Richter TITLE: Priority and Nationalism: The Royal Societyʼs International Priority Disputes, 1660-1700 DEPARTMENT OR SCHOOL: Department of History DEGREE: MA CONVOCATION: October YEAR: 2011 Permission is herewith granted to Dalhousie University to circulate and to have copied for non-commercial purposes, at its discretion, the above title upon the request of individuals or institutions. I understand that my thesis will be electronically available to the public. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s written permission. The author attests that permission has been obtained for the use of any copyrighted
    [Show full text]