Multiple Independent Discovery & Creativity in Science

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Multiple Independent Discovery & Creativity in Science Multiple Independent Discovery & Creativity in Science . ..--- Number44 NOVt?MWr 5, ‘IYMI Many scientists have told me how dis- “Sometimes the discoveries are simul- appointing it is to have their research taneous or almost so; sometimes a anticipated by other independent in- scientist will make a new discovery vestigators. To have your ideas pre- which, unknown to him, somebody else empted in print just as you are about to has made years before. ”d One of the publish is especially frustrating. A few most commonly cited examples is the in- studies suggest [hat anticipated research dependent formulation of the calculus is an occupational hazard for the nraj”or- by Newton and Leibniz, which has been i[rv of active researchers. Indeed, some definitively described by A. Rupert investigators report being anticipated Halls Another is the theory of the several times in their careers. evolution of the species, independently Building on general trends of an- advanced by Charles Darwin and Alfred ticipation within various fields he first Russel Wallace. observed in 1965,1 University of But multiple independent discovery is Wisconsin sociologist Warren Hagstrom not limited to only a few historical in- surveyed 1,718 US academic research stances involving [he giants of scientific scientists in 1974.2 Of these, 46.2qo research. On the contrary, Merton be- believed they were anticipated once or lieves that multiple discoveries, rather twice, and 16.4V0 more thought they than unique ones, represent the common were anticipated three or more times. In pattern in science.~ 1971, Jerry Gaston, Southern Illinois Interest in the widespread phenome- University sociologist, surveyed 203 non of multiples in science has rekindled British high energy physicists. J He found a philosophical debate on the process of that 38V0 believed their results had been discovery and creativity in science. One anticipated once, and another 26%’omore side of the debate has its roots in the than once. These figures agree rather “great man” or “genius” theory of well with the simple theoretical models history, proposed in the l%h century.7 of multiple discovery that will be dis- Traditionally opposed to this theory is cussed in this essay. the “social determinist” or ‘‘zeitgeis[” Anticipation or preemption of re- argument. ~ More recently, a “chance” search results is a subset of a wider phe- theory based on probabilistic models has nomenon referred to by historians and tried to account for the occurrence of sociologists as “multiple independent multiples.g discovery. ” Robert K. Merton, Colum- Jacob Schmookler, University of bia University sociologist of science, Minnesota economist, says the great defines what he calls “multiples” as in- man theory explained discovery and in- stances in which similar discoveries are vention primarily in terms of the in- made by scientists working indepen- dividuals who made them.T (p.189) dently of each other.d Merton says, Dean Simonton, social psychologist at 660 the University of California at Davis, Ogburn and Thomas believed “that the adds that the individual scientists and innovations became virtually inevitable inventors were believed to possess ex- as certain kinds of knowledge accumu- traordinary abilities, backgrounds, and lated in the cultural heritage and as personalities which allowed them, rather social developments directed the atten- than their “ordinary” colleagues, to tion of investigators to particular prob- make important discoveries. s Simonton Iems. ”b points out that thegenius or great man Simonton has labeled the social deter- theory ofcreativitycan’t adequately ex- minist argument the zeitgeist theory of plain the simultaneous appearance of creativity. 8 He says the social determin- independent discoveries. However, he ists claim that “the sociocultural system says it does explain one special case of as a whole, embodied as the spirit of the multiples—’’premature” discoveries times [zeitgeist], is ultimately respon- that were “rediscovered” by indepen- sible for any given technoscientific ad- dent investigators after a period of vance.”s While it is a plausible explana- years. I recently discussed the delayed tion of simultaneous independent dis- recognition of premature scientific dis- coveries, Simonton says that premature coveries ina separate essay.lo discoveries “must prove an embarrass- The social determinists acknowledge ment to zeitgeist theory.”s that mental ability plays an obvious role When Merton redirected the attention in discovery and invention, but they be- of sociologists and scientists to the im- Iieve that cultural factors are far more portance of multiple discoveries in important than individual personalities. 1952, J3 he recommended a moderate The distinguished anthropologist A. L. position between the opposing theories Kroeber was an early proponent of the of scientific creativity. Instead of per- social determinist argument. In a 1917 petuating “the false disjunction between article,ll he reasoned that there are the heroic theory centered on men of many people with high intelligence in a genius and the sociological theory large population at any given time. centered on the social determination of Thus, if a particular inventor had died as scientific discovery,”6 Merton proposed an infant, there is a good chance that the an alternative theory that combined invention would stiIl have been con- elements of both. He acknowledges the ceived by someone else. The fact that central position of the accumulated certain ideas or inventions occur at the knowledge base in culture, but denies same time to different people proved, to that discovery and invention are in- Kroeber at least, that they’ ‘seem to have evitable as a resuk. b Merton points out been destined to come about precisely that the main ingredients of some dis- when they did” 1I because of cultural coveries were present in culture for factors. many years before they were finally A few years later in 1922, the sociolo- made. gists William Ogburn and Dorothy Also, he attributes a distinctive roIe to Thomas, Columbia University, com- genius but denies that the’ ‘great man’s” piled a list of 148 independent discoveries mentality gives him insights impercepti- and inventions made between 1420 and ble to the ordinary man.b Merton rede- 1WI. 12 They observed that the rate of fined genius in sociological rather than such repeated innovations increased psychological terms. The genius doesn’t with time. They concluded that cultural see something to which the ordinary evolution must account for the increased man is blind—rather, he sees more, and frequency of multiple independent in- more quickly. As a result, “The genius vention because inherited mental ability will have made many scientific discov- could not have significantly increased in eries altogether. This means that 500 years. In fact, Merton observes, each scientist of genius will have con- 661 tributed the functional equivalent to the Table 1: Poisson distribution and simulta- advancement of science of what a con- neous discovery (see Price D J D. Z.i/de siderable number of other scientists will science, big science. New York: Columbia have contributed in the aggregate.’ ‘G University Press, 1963. p. 67). The great man theory predicts that the 1000 apples genius conceives of things far in advance Number of Merton-Barber simultaneous data cases and men of “the crowd” by virtue of his unique discoveries cases capability, and his ideas therefore stand o . [368]* alone. Merton’s expanded sociological 1 — 368 theory of genius predicts that the genius 2 179 184 will be involved in more multiple dis- 3 51 61 coveries than the ordinary scientist 4 17 15 because of a great number of discoveries 5 6 3 altogether. Merton cites many cases of 6 or more tl 1 the “multiplicity of multiples” among the great scientific thinkers. G interest- * i.e., there are 368 cases in which an apple is rrof picked. The remaining 632 apples are ingly, Simonton showed that more emi- picked, singly or multiply, by the thousand nent scientists are “still more likely to pickers for an akerage of 1,6—[hat is, 1.6 participate in multiples even after con- discoverers/discovery. trolling for individual differences in the number of notable contributions.”8 Several authors point out that Mer- are near the truth. For example, he says, ton’s modified social determinist posi- “One can calculate from Table 1 that tion, which denies both the inevitability about 37V0 of the apple pickers will of scientific discovery and a unique role make uncontested discoveries but the re- for individual genius, is actually com- maining 63V0 will be engaged in multip[e patible with a “chance” model of multi- discovery. It is worth noting that the ple discovery .7,~.ld Derek Price, Yale distribution of the discoveries is dif- University historian of science, sug- ferent from that of the discoverer. Some gested a “ripe apple” model using a 58V0 of the discoveries are unique and Poisson statistical distribution. He asks, the remaining 42V0 are shared in the “If there are 1000 apples in a tree, and multiple process. ” I5 1000 blindfolded men reach up at ran- Simonton also subjected the Merton- dom to pick an apple, what is the chance Barber list of 264 multiples to a of a man’s getting one to himself, or statistical analysis using a Poisson distri- finding himself grasping as well the hand bution.q Instead of arbitrarily defining of another picker, or even more than the number of “apples and pickers, ” one7~~14 The statistically expected Simonton set mean values ranging from distribution of multiples was then com- 0.8 to 1.6 to see which would most pared with an actual distribution among closely agree with the Merton-Barber 264 multiples compiled by Merton and distribution. He found that a mean Elinor Barber in 1961.6 As can be seen in value of 1.4 agreed most closely with the Table 1, the distributions agree to some Merton-Barber figures.
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