The Matthew Effect in Science

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Matthew Effect in Science reers are more productive later on than those who do not. And the Coles have also found that, at least in the case of contemporary American physics, the reward system operates largely in ac­ The Matthew Effect in Science cord with institutional values of the science,inasmuch as quality of research is more often and more substantially The reward and communication systems rewarded than mere quantity. In science 'as in other institutional of science are considered. realms, a special problem in the work­ ings of the reward system turns up when individuals or organizations take Robert K. Merton on the job of gauging and suitably rewarding lofty performance on behalf of a large community. Thus, that ulti­ mate 'accolade in 20th-century science, This paper develops a conception of image and the public image of scien­ the Nobel prize, is often assumed to ways in which certain psychosocial tists are largely shaped by the com­ mark off its recipients from all the processes affect the ,allocation of re­ munally validating testimony of signifi­ other scientists of the time. Yet this wards to scientists for their contribu­ cant others that they have variously assumption is at odds with the well­ tions-an allocation which in turn af­ lived up to the exacting institutional known fact that a good number of fects the flow of ideas and findings requirements of their roles. scientists who have not received the through the communication networks A number of workers, in empirical prize and will not receive it have con­ of science. The conception is based studies, have investigated various as­ tributed as much to the advancement upon an analysis of the composite of pects of the reward system of science of science as some of the recipients, experience reported in Harriet Zucker­ as thus conceived. Glaser (3) has found, or more. This can be described 'as the man's interviews with Nobel laureates for ex'ample, that some degree of rec­ phenomenon of "the 41st chair." The in the United States (1) and upon data ognition is required to stabilize the derivation of this tag is clear enough. drawn from the diaries, letters, note­ careers of scientists. In a case study The French Academy, it will be re­ books, scientific papers, and biographies Crane (4) used the quantity of publica­ membered, decided early that only a of other scientists. tion (apart from quality) as a measure cohort of 40 could qualify as mem­ of scientific productivity and found that bers and so emerge as immortals. This highly productive scientists at a major limitation of numbers made inevitable, The Reward System and "Occupants university gained recognition more of­ of course, the exclusion through the of the Forty-First Chair" ten tban equally productive scientists centuries of many talented individuals at a lesser university. Hagstrom (5) has who have won their own immortality. We might best begin with some gen­ developed and partly tested the hypoth­ The familiar list of occupants of this eral observations on the reward system esis that material rewards in science 41st chair includes Descartes, Pascal, in science, basing these on earlier theo­ function primarily to reinforce the op­ Moliere, Bayle, Rousseau, Saint-Simon, retical formulations and empirical in­ eration of a reward system in which Diderot, Stenda:hl, Flaubert, Zola, and vestigations. Some time ago (2) it was the primary reward of recognition for Proust (9). noted that graded rewards in the realm scientific contributions is exchanged for What holds for the French Academy of science are distributed principally in access to scientific information. Storer holds in varying degree for every other the coin of recognition accorded re­ (6) has analyzed the ambivalence of institution designed to identify and re­ search by fellow-scientists. This recog­ the scientist's response to recognition ward talent. In all of them there are nition is stratified for varying grades "as a case in which the norm of dis­ occupants of the 41st chair, men out­ of scientific accomplishment, as judged interestedness operates to make scien­ side the Academy having at least the by the scientist's peers. Both the self- tists deny the value to them of in­ same order of talent as those inside it. fluence and authority in science." Zuck­ In part, this circumstance results from The author is Giddings Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, New York 10027. This erman (7) and the Coles (8) have found errors of judgment that lead to inclu­ article is based on a paper read before the that scientists who receive recognition sion of the less talented at the expense American SociolOgical Association in San Fran­ cisco, August 1967. for research done early in their ca- of the more talented. History serves 56 scmNCE, VOL. 159 as an appellate court, ready to reverse Jacques Loeb, W. M. Bayliss, E. H. system, based on differential life­ the judgments of the lower courts, Starling, G. N. Lewis, O. T. Avery, chances, which locates scientists in dif­ which 'are limited by the myopia of and Selig Hecht, to say nothing of the . fering positions within the opportunity contemporaneity. But in greater part, long list of still-living uncrowned Nobel structure of science (14). the phenomenon of the 41st chair is laureates (10). an artifact of having a fixed number In the stratification system of honor The Matthew Effectin the of places available at the summit of in science, there may also be a "ratchet recognition. Moreover, when 'a particu­ effect" (11) operating in the careers Reward System lar generation is rich in achievements of scientists such that, once having of a high order, it follows from the achieved a particular degree of emi­ The social structure of science pro­ rule of fixed numbers that some men nence, they do not later fall much be­ vides the context for this inquiry into whose accomplishments rank as high low that level (although they may be a complex psychosocial process that as those actually given the award will outdistanced by newcomers and so suf­ affects both the reward system and be excluded from the honorific ranks. fer a relative decline in prestige). Once the communication system of science. We start by noting a theme that runs Indeed, their accomplishments some­ a Nobel laureate, always a Nobel lau­ times far outrank those which, in a time reate. Yet the reward system based on through the interviews with the Nobel of less creativity, proved enough to recognition for work accomplished tends laureates. They repeatedly observe that qualify men for this high order of to induce continued effort,which serves eminent scientists get disproportionate­ recognition. both to validate the judgment that the ly great credit for their contributions to science while relatively unknown The Nobel prize retains its luster be­ scientist has unusual capacities and to scientists tend to get disproportionately cause errors of the first kind-where testify that these capacities have con­ scientific work of dubious or inferior tinuing potential. What appears from little credit for comparable contribu­ worth has been mistakenly honored below to be the summit becomes, in tions. As one laureate in physics put -are uncommonly few. Yet limitations the experience of those who have it (15): "The world is peculiar in this of the second kind cannot be avoided. reached it, only another way station. matter of how it gives credit. It tends The small number of awards means The scientist's peers and other asso­ to give the credit to [already] famous that, particularly in times of great ciates regard each of his scientific people." scientific advance, there will be many achievements as only the prelude to As we examine the experiences re­ occupants of the 41st chair (and, since new and greater achievements. Such so­ ported by eminent scientists we find the terms governing the award of the cial pressures do not often permit those that this pattern of recognition, skewed prize do not provide for posthumous who have climbed the rugged moun­ in favor of the established scientist, ap­ recognition, permanent occupants of tains of scientific achievement to re­ pears principally (i) in cases of col­ that chair). This gap in the award of main content. It is not necessarily the laboration and (ii) in cases of inde­ the ultimate prize is only partIy filled fact that their own Faustian aspirations pendent multiple discoveries made by by other awards for scientific accom­ are ever escalating that keeps eminent scientists of distinctly different rank plishment since these do not carry the scientists at work. More and more is (16). same prestige either inside the scientific expected of them, and this creates its In papers coauthored by men of de­ community or outside it. Furthermore, own measure of motivation and stress. cidedly unequal reputation, another what has been noted about the artifact Less often than might be imagined is laureate in physics reports, "the man of fixed numbers producing occupants there repose at the top in science who's best known gets more credit, an of the 41st chair in the case of the (see 12). inordinate amount of credit." In the Nobel prize holds in principle for other The recognition accorded scientific words of 'a laureate in chemistry: awards providing less prestige (though achievement by the scientist's peers is "When people see my name on a paper, sometimes, nowadays, more cash). a reward in the strict sense identified they are apt to remember it and not to Scientists reflecting on the stratifica­ by Parsons (13). As we shall see, such remember the other names." And a tion of honor and esteem in the world recognition can be converted into an laureate in physiology 'and medicine of science know all this; the Nobel instrumental asset as enlarged facilities describes his own pattern of response laureates themselves know and empha­ are made ,available to the honored scien­ to jointly authored papers: size it, and the members of the Swed­ tist for further work.
Recommended publications
  • Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
    Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo's Telescopic Sightings? Dean Keith Simonton Online First Publication, January 30, 2012. doi: 10.1037/a0027058 CITATION Simonton, D. K. (2012, January 30). Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo's Telescopic Sightings?. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0027058 Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts © 2012 American Psychological Association 2012, Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000–000 1931-3896/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027058 Foresight, Insight, Oversight, and Hindsight in Scientific Discovery: How Sighted Were Galileo’s Telescopic Sightings? Dean Keith Simonton University of California, Davis Galileo Galilei’s celebrated contributions to astronomy are used as case studies in the psychology of scientific discovery. Particular attention was devoted to the involvement of foresight, insight, oversight, and hindsight. These four mental acts concern, in divergent ways, the relative degree of “sightedness” in Galileo’s discovery process and accordingly have implications for evaluating the blind-variation and selective-retention (BVSR) theory of creativity and discovery. Scrutiny of the biographical and historical details indicates that Galileo’s mental processes were far less sighted than often depicted in retrospective accounts. Hindsight biases clearly tend to underline his insights and foresights while ignoring his very frequent and substantial oversights. Of special importance was how Galileo was able to create a domain-specific expertise where no such expertise previously existed—in part by exploiting his extensive knowledge and skill in the visual arts. Galileo’s success as an astronomer was founded partly and “blindly” on his artistic avocations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of Multiple Simultaneous Discoveries
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Electronic archive of Tomsk Polytechnic University В целом видно, что студенты положительно оценивают наличие дисциплины «Творческий проект» в учебном плане и дают высокую оценку качеству ее проведения. Вывод: Кто такой инженер? И что такое творчество? Инженер от лат. «ingenium» означает способность, изобретательность. Инженер имеет дело с разработкой и внедрением инноваций и для этого ему необходим творческий как подход как основа будущей деятельности. Творчество – создание чего-то нового, которое непременно разрешает определенную проблему. Отсюда видно, что эти два понятия тесно связаны. Поэтому авторы считают, что дисциплина «Творческий про- ект» положительно влияет на процесс обучения студентов младших курсов и дает возможность получения глубоких практических знаний технических основ будущей профессии. ЛИТЕРАТУРА: 1. Всемирная инициатива CDIO. Стандарты: информ.-метод. изд. / пер. с англ. и ред. А. И. Чучалина, Т. С. Петровской, Е. С. Ку- люкиной; Том. политехн. ун-т. – Томск, 2011. 2. Рабочие программы по дисциплине «Творческий проект» [Элек- тронный ресурс] – URL: http://portal.tpu.ru/fond2 (дата обраще- ния: 13.09.15). Научный руководитель: В.С. Иванова, к.т.н., доцент, каф. ТП ИНК. THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS DISCOVERIES D.V. Isaeva National research Tomsk polytechnic university, Institute of non- destructive testing, Precise instrument making department, group 1B3V Since the beginning of time, people have been making different dis- coveries and inventions. They make great discoveries, which are based not only on the experience of previous generations, but on experiments and scientific analysis. However, what is the nature of discoveries? Theories of invention has been an ongoing discussion for more than a century.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics
    Journal of Humanistic Mathematics Volume 7 | Issue 1 January 2017 Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics Robin W. Whitty Queen Mary University of London Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the Other Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Whitty, R. W. "Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics," Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, Volume 7 Issue 1 (January 2017), pages 172-188. DOI: 10.5642/jhummath.201701.14 . Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/vol7/iss1/14 ©2017 by the authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License. JHM is an open access bi-annual journal sponsored by the Claremont Center for the Mathematical Sciences and published by the Claremont Colleges Library | ISSN 2159-8118 | http://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/ The editorial staff of JHM works hard to make sure the scholarship disseminated in JHM is accurate and upholds professional ethical guidelines. However the views and opinions expressed in each published manuscript belong exclusively to the individual contributor(s). The publisher and the editors do not endorse or accept responsibility for them. See https://scholarship.claremont.edu/jhm/policies.html for more information. Some Comments on Multiple Discovery in Mathematics1 Robin M. Whitty Queen Mary University of London [email protected] Synopsis Among perhaps many things common to Kuratowski's Theorem in graph theory, Reidemeister's Theorem in topology, and Cook's Theorem in theoretical com- puter science is this: all belong to the phenomenon of simultaneous discovery in mathematics. We are interested to know whether this phenomenon, and its close cousin repeated discovery, give rise to meaningful questions regarding causes, trends, categories, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • OPEN SCIENCE' an Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution
    This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 06-38 THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF 'OPEN SCIENCE' An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution By Paul A. David Stanford University & the University of Oxford December 2007 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 725-1874 The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues. The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute. Working papers in this series reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford University. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF ‘OPEN SCIENCE’ An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution By Paul A. David Stanford University & the University of Oxford [email protected] or [email protected] First version: March 2000 Second version: August 2004 This version: December 2007 SUMMARY This essay examines the economics of patronage in the production of knowledge and its influence upon the historical formation of key elements in the ethos and organizational structure of publicly funded open science. The emergence during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of “open science" was a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the Scientific Revolution. It represented a break from the previously dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of Nature’s Secrets, to a new set of norms, incentives, and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers' commitments to rapid disclosure of new knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of the Sole Inventor
    Michigan Law Review Volume 110 Issue 5 2012 The Myth of the Sole Inventor Mark A. Lemley Stanford Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol110/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTORt Mark A. Lemley* The theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly incented. But the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a myth. Surveys of hundreds of significant new technologies show that almost all of them are invented simultaneously or nearly simultaneous- ly by two or more teams working independently of each other. Invention appears in significant part to be a social, not an individual, phenomenon. The result is a real problem for classic theories of patent law. Our domi- nant theory of patent law doesn't seem to explain the way we actually implement that law. Maybe the problem is not with our current patent law, but with our current patent theory.
    [Show full text]
  • Scientific Discovery Reloaded
    Topoi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9531-3 1 Scientifc Discovery Reloaded 2 Emiliano Ippoliti1 3 4 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 5 Abstract 6 The way scientifc discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, 7 inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and 8 analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of 9 discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery (like the deductive, cognitive, and evolutionary), but also 10 new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, methods, heuristic procedures and even a 11 logic of discovery have been investigated, extracted, reconstructed and refned. The outcome is a ‘scientifc discovery revo- 12 lution’: not only a new way of looking at discovery, but also a construction of tools that can guide us to discover something 13 new. This is a very important contribution of philosophy of science to science, as it puts the former in a position not only to 14 interpret what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that they can employ in their activity. 15 Keywords Logic · Discovery · Heuristics · Reasoning · Psychology · Algorithm 16 1 Scientifc Discovery: The Matrix 2006, xii), and they are essential for discovery. Genius (see e.g. Murray 1989), illumination, ‘faculties’ such as intui- 17 38 A long-standing and infuential tradition has shaped the way tion, insight, or ‘divergent thinking’, are common notions 18 39 scientifc discovery has been accounted for.
    [Show full text]
  • Multiple Independent Inventions of a Non‐Functional Technology Combinatorial Descriptive Names in Botany, 1640‐1830
    PEER‐REVIEWED Multiple Independent Inventions of a Non‐functional Technology Combinatorial Descriptive Names in Botany, 1640‐1830 Sara Scharf* Abstract Historians and sociologists of science usually discuss multiple independent inventions or discoveries in terms of priority disputes over successful inventions or discoveries. But what should we make of the multiple invention of a technology that not only gave rise to very few priority disputes, but never worked and was rejected by each inventor’s contemporaries as soon as it was made public? This paper examines seven such situations in the history of botany. I devote particular attention to the inventors’ cultural and educational backgrounds, focussing in particular on the scholastic education most of them shared, through which they would have become familiar with Llullian combinatorics and the mnemonic names used to distinguish syllogistic moods. I also examine their conceptions of the roles of nomenclature in botany, their assumptions about how memory works, their awareness of other similar efforts, and their contemporaries’ reactions to their proposals. I suggest that an evolutionary epistemology of invention may be the middle ground between the chaos of multiple paths suggested by many microhistories and the overly deterministic view that macrohistorical studies often present. Finally, I reflect on the impacts that a consideration of multiple independent inventions of failed technologies may have on current approaches to the history and sociology of science. Multiple discoveries of
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of the Sole Inventor]
    Lemley [THE MYTH OF THE SOLE INVENTOR] The Myth of the Sole Inventor1 Mark A. Lemley2 Any elementary-school student can recite a number of canonical American invention stories. Thomas Edison invented the light bulb from his famous home laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone, again from his home invention laboratory, famously using the phone to call his assistant, saying “Come here, Watson, I need you.” Orville and Wilbur Wright invented the airplane from their bicycle shop, taking it to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina to put it in the air. The list of lone genius inventors goes on and on: Samuel Morse and his telegraph, Eli Whitney and his cotton gin, Robert Fulton and his steamboat, Philo Farnsworth and the television, etc., etc. Patent law is built around these canonical tales. First written in 1790, in the first year of Congress, the patent law betrays its individual-inventor bias at various points, from the requirement that patents always issue to individuals rather than companies to the rule that the first to invent, not the first to file, is entitled to the patent.3 More importantly, the very theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly incented by the lure of a patent. We deny patents on inventions that are “obvious” to ordinarily innovative scientists in the field. 1 © 2011 Mark A. Lemley. 2 William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; partner, Durie Tangri LLP, San Francisco, CA.
    [Show full text]
  • Priority and Privilege in Scientific Discovery
    Priority and privilege in scientific discovery Mike D. Schneider and Hannah Rubin Abstract The priority rule in science has been interpreted as a behavior regu- lator for the scientific community, which benefits society by adequately structuring the distribution of intellectual labor across pre-existing re- search programs. Further, it has been lauded as part of society's \grand reward scheme" because it fairly rewards people for the benefits they produce. But considerations about how news of scientific developments spreads throughout a scientific community at large suggest that the pri- ority rule is something else entirely, which can disadvantage historically underrepresented or otherwise marginalized social groups. 1 Introduction In scientific practice, discoveries of sufficient impact appear to generate certain quantities of prestige, which are to be bestowed upon particular scientists by the scientific community at large. The priority rule is a broad descriptive norm concerning the proper allocation of that prestige. The inference toward such a norm comes via an observed phenomenon in the history of science whereby, in situations of multiple discovery, disputes about who deserves the prestige that comes associated with a discovery are often fought by way of assertions about who was first to make it. That the history of science is laden with instances of multiple discovery has been known since at least the early 1900s. Ogburn and Thomas [1922] document 148 such cases in a variety of high-profile domains of scientific inquiry, and mention in a footnote there there are disputes over priority of discovery in many cases. (In one example, the authors report that the discovery of the cellular basis of animal and vegetable tissue was claimed by seven independent researchers in or around the year 1839.) The particular investigation of these so-called \priority disputes" was eventually taken up (famously) by Merton [1957].
    [Show full text]
  • Art and Science Playing on the Margins. on the Discovery of Photography in the 19Th Century Brazil
    Art and science playing on the margins. On the discovery of photography in the 19th century Brazil. Rosana Horio Monteiro Professor, Visual Arts College Federal University of Goiás (UFG), Brazil Email: [email protected] Abstract This paper examines photography as a particular case of a multiple discovery in science and technology. It concerns an original photographic process developed during the 19 th century Brazil simultaneously and independently from other processes developed with the same aim elsewhere. A detailed reconstruction of this process created by the Frenchman Hercule Florence is performed by directly investigating his manuscripts and other original documents of the period. Combining elements from the Mertonian Social Theory of Discovery to the Science and Technology Studies approach my aim is to find out the factors that shaped this process and made it possible inside (and despite) the local peripheral circumstances. I argue that the latter is embodied in the final form of Florence’s process. Keywords: multiple discoveries, photography in Brazil, sociology of science Introduction The investigation reported here examines the relationship between art and science around the discovery of photography in peripheral contexts. It concerns a photographic process developed in Brazil during the 19 th century by the Frenchman Hercule Florence. This process was produced in 1833 independently and simultaneously to other processes developed with the same aim elsewhere such as the daguerreotype in France and the calotype in England. Based on a detailed reconstruction of Florence’s process, performed by directly investigating his manuscripts and other original documents of the period, and combining elements from the Mertonian Theory of Discovery to the Science1 and Technology Studies (STS) approach 2, this paper aims to identify the factors that shaped this process and made it possible inside (and despite) the local peripheral circumstances.
    [Show full text]
  • Review of Brannigan 1982 by Lee Harvey
    THE SOCIAL BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES by AUGUSTINE BRANNIGAN Cambridge University Press 1981 212 pages Brannigan creates interest in his subject from the outset by illustrating how scientific discovery has been associated with the bizarre and irrational. The myths of Daedalus, Midas, the novels of Huxley, Butler and Zamiatin, the Frankenstein, Jekyll and Hyde and Faustus stories as well as the 'mystical' spurs to discovery reported by Einstein, Kekule and Wallace, not to mention Newton and the apple, all serve to generate a view of discovery as irrational. A view firmly confronted by twentieth century positivism. Reichenbach, and later Popper, clearly drew a line of demarcation between the context of discovery and the context of justification. A positivist doctrine has evolved that dumps the context of discovery in the dustbin of empirical psychology and concentrates on the rational reconstructions of the context of justification. For Popper, there is 'no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas', nor a logical reconstruction of this process. A position reflected by Braithwaite (1960) who argued that the psychology and sociology of discovery were no business of the historian or philosopher of science whose concern should be with the objective arguments in the justification of change in science. Popper’s notion of 'conjectures and refutations' became an injunction about how scientific thinking ought to be done. Ironically, Brannigan argues, the positivistic concentration on the justification process reinforced the view that discovery was irrational. This also led to a rift between the normative prescriptions of the logical empiricists and the generalisations of empiricist historians of sciences concerned with how research had actually been conducted.
    [Show full text]
  • 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Credits
    Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses John Bowers 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies: Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses John Bowers A Handbook for John Bowers’ Visual Communication Design Teaching Assistants VCD 1001 / VCD 2900 / VCD 3045 Edited for AIGA Design Teaching Resource 2020 01 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Credits 02 Credits I would like to thank the following people for their assistance with this handbook. Long-time friend and collaborator Karin C. Warren for her help in developing the manuscript and in guiding its completion. My graduate teaching assistants at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago, Visual Communication Design Department, for their input into the book’s content. 02 Visual Communication Design Teaching Strategies Guiding Undergraduate Studio Courses Preface > Background 03 Before Course Preface Background I have taught and served as an This handbook is a blend of practical advice and pedagogical discussion. It is academic consultant at private and public written for you—the teaching assistant (TA)—as we teach together, and when you universities across the United States, in teach alone as a TA-A in these courses: VCD 1001, Introduction to Visual Canada, and in Sweden, for over 30 years. Communication; VCD 2900, Sophomore Seminar: Design Strategies; and VCD 3045, Web Design: Interface and Structure. These schools have different structures, grading formats, enrollments, and When I began teaching with TAs, I created a simple one-page, bulleted list of missions. Yet the one constant throughout things to discuss with them prior to the first day. That list is now expanded into is the students themselves.
    [Show full text]