Topoi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9531-3 1 Scientifc Discovery Reloaded 2 Emiliano Ippoliti1 3 4 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2017 5 Abstract 6 The way scientifc discovery has been conceptualized has changed drastically in the last few decades: its relation to logic, 7 inference, methods, and evolution has been deeply reloaded. The ‘philosophical matrix’ moulded by logical empiricism and 8 analytical tradition has been challenged by the ‘friends of discovery’, who opened up the way to a rational investigation of 9 discovery. This has produced not only new theories of discovery (like the deductive, cognitive, and evolutionary), but also 10 new ways of practicing it in a rational and more systematic way. Ampliative rules, methods, heuristic procedures and even a 11 logic of discovery have been investigated, extracted, reconstructed and refned. The outcome is a ‘scientifc discovery revo- 12 lution’: not only a new way of looking at discovery, but also a construction of tools that can guide us to discover something 13 new. This is a very important contribution of philosophy of science to science, as it puts the former in a position not only to 14 interpret what scientists do, but also to provide and improve tools that they can employ in their activity. 15 Keywords Logic · Discovery · Heuristics · Reasoning · Psychology · Algorithm 16 1 Scientifc Discovery: The Matrix 2006, xii), and they are essential for discovery. Genius (see e.g. Murray 1989), illumination, ‘faculties’ such as intui- 17 38 A long-standing and infuential tradition has shaped the way tion, insight, or ‘divergent thinking’, are common notions 18 39 scientifc discovery has been accounted for. It has been put employed to support this thesis. Even if this line of argu- 19 40 forward in particular by logical empiricism, mathemati- ment ends up with a obscurum per obscurius, in principle 20 41 cal logic and the analytical tradition in philosophy, which that is not a problem: the whole process of discovery does 21 42 moulded the matrix, that is, the origin and the conceptual not matter so much since what philosophy and science can 22 43 framework, of the received theory of scientifc discovery. reasonably do is evaluate a hypothesis only after it has been 23 44 It simply maintains that there is no way of accounting for generated—since generation and justifcation are logically, 24 45 scientifc discovery in logical or even rational terms: “there temporally and in methods separated. This line of argument 25 46 is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or is maintained by famous philosophers like Popper (1961) 26 47 a logical reconstruction of this process. […] every discovery and Laudan (1977, 1981) as well as scientists like Einstein 27 48 contains an ‘irrational element,’ or ‘a creative intuition,’ in (1958) and Frege (1960). 28 49 Bergson’s sense” (Popper 1961, 32). This idea, which opens The second approach argues that even if discovery is a 29 50 up the way to the ‘psychology of discovery’, breaks down matter of psychology, we can understand it and account for 30 51 into two approaches. several properties of it. This view has been popularized by 31 52 The frst argues that scientifc discovery is a black box: Poincaré (1908), and refned and extended by Wallas (1926), 32 53 the fnal hypothesis is the only thing that we can see, and Hadamard (1958) and Simonton (1988). Wallas made 33 54 this is the outcome of a subjective, REVISEDidiosyncratic, completely explicit the PROOF stages of the process of discovery discussed 34 55 personal process and, as such, it cannot be reconstructed by only informally by Poincaré, while “Hadamard marshaled 35 56 rational means: “there are extraordinary aspects of the per- additional evidence for the theory of unconscious processing 36 57 37 son who is able to produce signifcant new works” (Weisberg and tried to demonstrate the wide role of such processing in 58 other areas of cognition” (Weisberg 2006, 398–399). A typi- 59 cal example used to support this idea is Kekulé’s discovery A1 * Emiliano Ippoliti 60 of benzene structure (Kekulé’s dream). While somnolent in A2 [email protected] 61 front of his freplace, August Kekulé had a vision of atoms 62 A3 1 Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 Journal : Large 11245 Article No : 9531 Pages : 10 MS Code : TOPO-D-17-00156 Dispatch : 12-12-2017 E. Ippoliti Table 1 Kinds of mental processes underlying the generation of outcome of parallelism: unconscious thought is much faster. 103 hypotheses Since the links that enable us to connect an idea to another 104 Parallel Serial are the same for conscious and unconscious processes, it fol- 105 106 Conscious Unconscious Conscious Unconscious lows that once the hypothesis has been generated, the person who produced it is in a position, in principle, to understand 107 Same x Parallelism (Poin- Poincaré x how it came out: “the unconscious does not do anything that 108 caré) conscious processing could not do if there were but time 109 Diferent x Associationism x x available” (Weisberg 2006, 395). 110 (Freud) The second branch maintains that the links created by 111 unconscious thought are diferent from those of conscious 112 thought. That is, unconscious processing can generate 113 63 dancing one after the other and then, later, of a snake biting associative links for reasons of which one is not aware and 114 64 its tail (forming a ring). It was this dream that revealed the perhaps could not be. The diference is qualitative. So “a 115 65 real structure of the benzene ring to the German chemist, creative leap can come about because (1) the processing 116 66 according to his own report. has occurred on an unconscious level, which results in the 117 67 To provide more detail, this second viewpoint, in turn, thinker’s being surprised by the sudden leap; and (2) the 118 68 breaks down into two branches. The separation is about the leap is based on connections that the person could never 119 69 nature of mental processes, the conscious and unconscious think of using conscious thought, which is a second source 120 70 ones, which are involved in the generation of hypotheses of surprise” (Ibid., 389).1 121 71 during the search for the solution to a problem. The psychology of scientifc discovery has been refned 122 72 A frst branch maintains that conscious and unconscious several times (see for example Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 123 73 processes are of the same kind: they are ‘homogeneous’ and 1995) and also popularized in movies and novels. An exami- 124 74 they only difer in the way data-processing is performed. The nation of all the diferent versions of it is beyond the goals of 125 75 conscious mind works in a serial way, while the unconscious this paper. Its ‘philosophical matrix’ is clear enough. What 126 76 works in a parallel way. Poincaré supported this idea, which is more interesting to discuss here are the several, critical 127 77 is labeled parallelism. weaknesses that the whole idea of a psychology of discovery 128 78 By contrast, a second viewpoint states that the two men- faces. I will examine in particular two main problems: 129 79 tal processes are heterogeneous, they are diferent in kind 80 and cannot be reduced one to the other. This hypothesis is 1. the sources employed to extract the mental processes; 130 81 labeled associationism and is supported by Freud and his 2. multiple discovery. 131 82 followers. 83 In more detail, unconscious thought and its relation to 84 conscious thought is approached along two dimensions: 1. The source of traditional psychology of discovery and 132 its fndings is introspection, which is a conscious recon- 133 85 (1) the nature of the links that connect one unconscious struction of an unconscious process (the generation of 134 86 thought to the next one. A link can employ the same a hypothesis to solve a problem). More specifcally the 135 87 processes as the conscious one or not. In the former pieces of evidence used in this case are auto-reports and 136 88 case we have a homogeneity between conscious and interviews—such as the ones provided by Poincaré and 137 89 unconscious thoughts, in the latter a heterogeneity. Kekulé. But auto-reports and interviews are sources hard 138 90 (2) whether the stream of thoughts are parallel, in the sense to trust. They are provided by individuals who “have 139 91 that you can process multiple ideas at the same time, or developed their own theories of creative thinking that 140 92 serial. rely on the opportunity for unconscious processing” 141 (Weisberg 2006, 429). Furthermore “the interviews pro- 142 93 Combining these two dimensions, which are not mutu- vide evidence of the role of unconscious processing in 143 94 ally exclusive, we obtain several REVISEDpossible approaches to the producing PROOF illuminations”, but “the empirical support for 144 95 mental processes underlying the generation of hypotheses the idea of unconscious processing in creative thinking 145 96 (see Table 1). consists of a number of anecdotal reports” (Ibid.). 146 97 Two of them, parallelism and associationism, as stated Auto-reports and interviews not only are fragmentary 147 98 above, are particularly interesting for the psychologistic and anecdotal, but they also imply “that this particular 148 99 approach to scientifc discovery. 100 The frst conception states that unconscious processes are 1 This theory, which of course stems from Freud, is a version of the 1FL01 101 parallel and that they involve the same links as the conscious out-of-mind view, as the person has no conscious awareness of, or 1FL02 102 ones.